I have been suggesting that it might be possible to construct a legitimately constitutionalist state grounded in single party governance. Backer, Larry Catá, The Party as Polity, the Communist Party, and the Chinese Constitutional State: A Theory of State-Party Constitutionalism (January 10, 2009), Journal of Chinese and Comparative Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009. But that construction requires something that most party-state systems find difficult to achieve during their revolutoionary phase--the institutionalization of power and its bureaucratization through a the institution of rule of law systems administered by a community of people sharing political power under the substantive principles underlying state organization. The adoption of a constitution does not necessarily produce a constitutionalist state. "These include the reflection of the party-state construct (1) in a division of the character of citizenship between economic and social citizenship, claimed by all persons, and political citizenship, which can be exercised through the Party, (2) in an understanding of political organization in which the state power and its institutions are subordinate to political authority, (3) in an institutionalization of political authority within a collective that serves as the source and conduit of constitutional values to be applied by the holders of state authority, and (4) in a system in which Party elaboration of rule of law values is contingent on state and party self discipline." Id. I have suggested the way that the Chinese have been moving toward the realization of such a legitimately constitutionalist state, though one whose values and distribution of power are significantly different (in values andimplementation) form Western democratic systems. See Backer, Larry Catá, A Constitutional Court for China within the Chinese Communist Party: Scientific Development and the Institutional Role of the CCP (November 28, 2008); Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2006.
But while China has been moving forward in the constriuction of a constitutionlaist state grounded in Marxist Leninist principles, Cuba has lagged. It remains, to a great extent, struck at the moment of its founding--its revolutionary experience. The Americans have contributed greaty to this stagnation--its opposition to the government has permitted its leaders to adopt a permanent state of revilutionary struggle. The Cuban state apparatus, and the Cuban Communist Party under whose guidance it is supposed to be operated, can continue to adaopt the pose of outsider, rather than of a state apparatus now half a century in power. In Havana, as in Miami, the clock stopped on January 1, 1959. And that is a shame.
Yet things are slowly changing, vene within the apparatus of the Cuban Communist Party. One gets a very small sense of the possibilities of this change, and its reflection of the Chinese approach, in recent remarks of Raul Castro to a Plenum of the Cuban Communits Party. Raul Castro Ruz, Intervención del Segundo Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, compañero Raúl Castro Ruz, en las conclusiones del VI Pleno del Comité Central del PCC, efectuado en el Palacio de la Revolución, La Habana, el 28 de abril de 2008, "Año 50 de la Revolución" reprinted in Granma Internacional, January 18, 2009. The language is still laced with the aesthetics of 1959--the Party continues to exist in revolutionary times:
Yet Raul Castro also suggests the need for movement. "En ese empeño tendremos, como meta principal, seguir mejorando nuestro aún imperfecto pero justo sistema social, en medio de la realidad actual, que sabemos en extremo compleja y cambiante, y todo indica seguirá siéndolo en el futuro." Id. And it is in this context that one encounters something new--a suggesiton for institutonalization of Party power and state organization along new lines.
Rule of law based institutionalization, even one based on a rule fo law based Party structure, ought to be encouraged if the state is to survive in it present form. The real quesiton is whether the very limited reference to institutionalization and rule fo law governance portends significant changes in the form of the organization of Party-State power in Cuba, or whether it is meant to serve as a power for the continuaiton of the sort of siege rule that hasd characterizede the organization of the Cuban state since 1959. If the revolution is to survive its principal progentors it will have to move beyond January 1, 1959 and beyond the limits of its organization along Soviet lines. Raul Castro suggests that this may be possible in Cuba. The quesiton will be whether the Party-state apparatus can be reformed in time.
But while China has been moving forward in the constriuction of a constitutionlaist state grounded in Marxist Leninist principles, Cuba has lagged. It remains, to a great extent, struck at the moment of its founding--its revolutionary experience. The Americans have contributed greaty to this stagnation--its opposition to the government has permitted its leaders to adopt a permanent state of revilutionary struggle. The Cuban state apparatus, and the Cuban Communist Party under whose guidance it is supposed to be operated, can continue to adaopt the pose of outsider, rather than of a state apparatus now half a century in power. In Havana, as in Miami, the clock stopped on January 1, 1959. And that is a shame.
Yet things are slowly changing, vene within the apparatus of the Cuban Communist Party. One gets a very small sense of the possibilities of this change, and its reflection of the Chinese approach, in recent remarks of Raul Castro to a Plenum of the Cuban Communits Party. Raul Castro Ruz, Intervención del Segundo Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, compañero Raúl Castro Ruz, en las conclusiones del VI Pleno del Comité Central del PCC, efectuado en el Palacio de la Revolución, La Habana, el 28 de abril de 2008, "Año 50 de la Revolución" reprinted in Granma Internacional, January 18, 2009. The language is still laced with the aesthetics of 1959--the Party continues to exist in revolutionary times:
Lo examinado hoy en el Pleno y los acuerdos adoptados constituyen un paso importante en esa dirección, y también en la de afianzar el papel del Partido como vanguardia organizada de la nación cubana, que lo situará en mejores condiciones para enfrentar los retos del futuro y, como ha expresado el compañero Fidel, para asegurar la continuidad de la Revolución cuando ya no estén sus dirigentes históricos. Id.The Revolution of 1959 remains fresh--the touchstone of of the work of the Party, in its search for perfection as the vaguard organization of the Cuban people. As such "no hay otra alternativa que la de trabajar unidos por seguir adelante, avanzando con el mismo espíritu de lucha y firmeza de estos casi 50 años de Revolución, transcurridos en medio de constantes agresiones, amenazas, guerras y hostilidades de todo tipo a que nos ha sometido el imperio." Id.
Yet Raul Castro also suggests the need for movement. "En ese empeño tendremos, como meta principal, seguir mejorando nuestro aún imperfecto pero justo sistema social, en medio de la realidad actual, que sabemos en extremo compleja y cambiante, y todo indica seguirá siéndolo en el futuro." Id. And it is in this context that one encounters something new--a suggesiton for institutonalization of Party power and state organization along new lines.
Raul Castro here raises the spectre of rule of law governance--not just for the state, but for the Party. He also references the delegation of state power through a bureaucracy. It is possible ot see very hazy parallels between this line of development and the recent suggestions crystalized in the more sophistacted form of scientific development described by Hu Jintao. Hu Jinato, Report at 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 15, 2007) Section VI.
REFORZAR LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD
En estos tiempos, y los que están por venir, resulta necesario y decisivo contar con instituciones políticas, estatales, de masas, sociales y juveniles fuertes. Reafirmo lo que expresé el pasado 24 de febrero: mientras mayores sean las dificultades, más orden y disciplina se requieren, y para ello es vital reforzar la institucionalidad, el respeto a la ley y las normas establecidas por nosotros mismos.
Los acuerdos que hemos aprobado dan fin a la etapa de provisionalidad iniciada el 31 de julio del 2006 con la Proclama del Comandante en Jefe, hasta el mensaje en que nos expresó su propósito de ser sólo un soldado de las ideas, vísperas del 24 de febrero del 2008. Durante esos 19 meses, trabajamos colegiadamente, junto a otros compañeros, sobre la base de la delegación de funciones que él realizó. A esto me referí con más amplitud en el punto de la agenda sobre la Comisión del Buró Político. Id.
And maybe that institutionalization is necessary to continue to develop both CCP and State: from a system in which the CCP represents a collection of individuals who together comprise a revolutionary vanguard (to which political power over the state and its organs might be appropriate) to a system in which the CCP becomes the source and protector of the core values of Chinese society to which an ever broadening base subscribes. That is, the CCP moves from a revolutionary vanguard party outside the system, to become the system itself—the values and principles that ground the construction and operation of all organs of political power in the nation. Backer, Larry Catá, A Constitutional Court for China within the Chinese Communist Party: Scientific Development and the Institutional Role of the CCP (November 28, 2008);
Rule of law based institutionalization, even one based on a rule fo law based Party structure, ought to be encouraged if the state is to survive in it present form. The real quesiton is whether the very limited reference to institutionalization and rule fo law governance portends significant changes in the form of the organization of Party-State power in Cuba, or whether it is meant to serve as a power for the continuaiton of the sort of siege rule that hasd characterizede the organization of the Cuban state since 1959. If the revolution is to survive its principal progentors it will have to move beyond January 1, 1959 and beyond the limits of its organization along Soviet lines. Raul Castro suggests that this may be possible in Cuba. The quesiton will be whether the Party-state apparatus can be reformed in time.
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