The Chinese Communist Party in Chinese NGOs

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2015)

We have been considering the regulatory universe for civil society in China in light of recent efforts to modify regulation of foreign NGOs operating  in Mainland China /(see, here, here, here, and here). 

But much of this analysis, as is customary in the West, sometimes stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the importance of the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within this architecture.  That stubbornness, and the analytical blindness that follows, is deeply rooted in the conceptual framework of western analysts, who may transpose their own ideological framework when considering Chinese approaches to law and governance.  That transposition makes assigning a role for the Chinese Communist Party in the structure of the administrative apparatus difficult conceptually.  That difficulty, in turn, flows both from an inability to understand an apply Chinese Leninist notions and to reject the legitimacy of those notions (and thus the value of considering them in analysis). What ever one thinks of Party-State systems, and whatever one thinks of Leninist organizational principles, the construction and operation of constitutional states, that is the reality of China, one one that requires acknowledgement even by those whose personal or national political preferences run in other directions. 

This is especially the case, when considering the organization and operation of Chinese civil society.  Conceptually, civil society necessarily must flow from, and be legitimated only in connection with, the leadership of the vanguard Party (the CCP). Since collectivity is central to Leninist notions of democracy (see here, discussed here), and since the collective is represented by  the CCP, no civil society organization, under this theory, may exist autonomously of the CCP, at least to the extent of the power of the CCP to assert its leadership role in their activities.  These principles apply as well to the organization of other autonomous collectives--for example corporations, which can exist apart from, but still connected with, the CCP (see here and here). The principle is political--grounded on the core ideal of the CCP as representative of the state, people and society (e.g., Sange Daibiao 三个代表 (the CCP as the representative  for the development of productive forces, advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people) discussed here).

These ideological foundations have also found their way into the management of Chinese civil society.  This post considers some of the ways in which the CCP asserts its leadership authority within Chinese civil society organs.  Prepared by my graduate student Shaoming Zhu (Penn State SJD expected), in a Coalition for Peace and Ethics Working Paper (No. 8/3 (August 2015), entitled, The Chinese Communist Party in Chinese NGOs. Considered are (1) the Regulation of Leading Party Members' Groups of CCP (Trial Implementation) 中国共产党党组工作条例（试行 ); (2) Opinion on strengthening negotiation in urban and rural communities 关于加强城乡社区协商的意见; (3)   Overall Programme of the Separation of Administrative Organs and Industry and Business Association  行业协会商会与行政机关脱钩总体方案; (4)  nterim Provisions on the Management of Leading Personnel in Public Institutions 事业单位领导人员管理暂行规定； and (5） Guidance to the Pilot Work of Further Promoting the Construction of Rural Community 关于深入推进农村社区建设试点工作的指导意见； 安定.

Portions of the Working Paper and some comments follow. The full Working Paper may be accessed here.

It is always tempting to import the sensibilities of one's own system when evaluating the systems of others.  One of the great foundations of Western ideology is the separation, at least as a formal matter, between the state and civil society.  Though there exist complex mechanisms for disciplining civil society in the West, these tend to avoid direct intervention by the state.  At their limits, of course, the state can be used as an instrument to keep civil society elements well contained within the parameters acceptable to Western society.  Thus, for example, in the United States, tax law is used as a disciplinary technique, limiting tax exempt status to a broad category of organizations that fall within the broad limits of acceptable activity.  Institutions that advocate policy deemed sufficiently threatening to the social order--supporting ISIS, or slavery, for example, are likely to have no tax exempt status, and in some cases may become the object of police surveillance.    In China, the CCP sits at the center of organized life--according to its own core ideology.  The reason for that is simple and often forgotten--the social, political and economic order in Marxist Leninist states is bent to one overall objective, that is to socialist modernization and the attainment, sometime down the road, of a communist society.  If the CCP is bound to work toward the attainment of socialist modernization as the leading element of society, government ,economic and political order, then its leadership, it political work, must be centered in all societally significant activity.  Because the West does not share this basic objective--it establishes government to protect public welfare and sometimes the enjoyment of the people in their customs and traditions, but without a specific direction, the structures of government will be framed quite differently. That, at any rate, is the theory.  

There are two consequences for the structuring of civil society, both of which permit some variation in implementation.  The first is that  civil society organs must either conform to or not serve as an obstacle to the great societal project of socialist modernization,.  And the second is that to that end, all organizations must accept some level of supervision, or leadership, from the CCP. For Western civil society elements, these consequences are inimical to their own foundational ethos, grounded in Western notions of the relationship between civil society and the state.  And, indeed, to some large extent, Leninist organizational parameters are at some level incomparable with the operational structures of Western liberal civil society.  There is a space, though, within which encounters between the two may be harmonized, but that does not  erase the effects of this difference in foundational ideology. Both systems discipline civil society--but each does this in ways that are hard to harmonize with those of the other. The leadership role of the CCP in the civil society sector, is thus central to the ideology of Chinese Marxist Leninism and a core element of the ideological objective of socialist modernization.

Of course, there are several paths to CCP leadership of civil society.  China appears to have chosen a more direct approach, one grounded, in part, on now ancient "soviet" notions of direct participation, as an organizational element of each civil society organ.  The objective is both to provide a formal presence in each and to exert surveillance power and influence in civil society activity. That is what Shaoming Zhu's excellent Working Paper describes. But, of course, the soviet working style of CCP leadership is not the only avenue open to the assertion of such leadership in the service of socialist modernization. It is possible to construct another path.  For example, CCP leadership can be as forcefully asserted through the implementation of parameters within which civil society may operate--organized along functional lines and disciplined through transparent reporting mechanisms.  That would permit the CCP ro deploy civil society an an important productive element of socialist modernization without the need to waste resources on the elaboration of additional bureaucracies. And indeed, cultivating stronger cadre allegiance to the CCP line in their everyday work, including when they serve within civil society, would more effectively extend the CCP's leadership as a functional matter than might the erection of  formal bureaucratic or organizational structures within civil society.  It will be interesting to see how the CCP approaches the operationalization of its political work as it approaches issues of utilizing productive civil society forces to advance socialist modernization.

The Chinese Communist Party in Chinese NGOs, Shaoming Zhu
Coalition for Peace & Ethics Working Paper No. 8/2
(August 2015)

1. Regulation of Leading Party Members' Groups of CCP (Trial Implementation)

中国共产党党组工作条例（试行）

Regulation of Leading Party Members' Groups of CCP (Provisional) is passed on May 29th at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee. Leading Party Members’ Group is the representative organ dispatched by Party Organizations.[1] According to this Regulation, a leading Party members' group will be formed in the leading body of a central or local state organ, people's organization, economic or cultural institution or other non-Party unit. The group plays the role of the core of leadership. Its main tasks are: to see to it that the Party's line, principles and policies are implemented, to discuss and decide on matters of major importance in its unit, to do well in cadre management, to rally the non-Party cadres and the masses in fulfilling the tasks assigned by the Party and the state and to guide the work of the Party organization of the unit and those directly under it.

A meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee on May 29th passed a regulation—“Regulation of Leading Party Members' Groups of CCP (Trial Implementation)” (hereinafter referred to as the “Regulation”).

The meeting was presided over by Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee.

According to Xinhuanet, the meeting states that it requires a strong and powerful organizational guarantee system for the Party to play the central leadership role to command the overall situation and coordinate the efforts of all quarters. To form leading Party members’ groups in state organs, people's organizations, economic institutions, cultural institutions, social organizations or other organizational leading units, is important channels to guarantee the implementation of the line and policies of the Party. It reflects the political advantages, organizational advantages, and institutional advantages. During the different periods of revolution, construction and reform, the system of leading Party members' groups played significant roles. The Regulation governs the establishment, responsibilities, organizational principles, procedures of decision-making, supervision and inspection, as well as accountability system. The meeting says that the Regulation is a basic and main inner party regulation in terms of the work of leading Party members’ groups, and it is the fundamental rule of the setup and operation of leading Party members' groups. The development and implementation of the Regulation will further standardize the work of leading Party members' groups, strengthen and improve the Party's leadership, consolidate the Party’s ruling status, improve the Party’s capability of governance. The meeting agrees to public the full text of the Regulation. The meeting stresses that Party committees at all levels need to fully understand the extreme importance of strengthening and improving the work of leading Party members' groups and strengthen the organizational leadership of the implementation of the Regulation. Party committees at all levels need to grasp the interpretation and study training of the Regulation, in order to help all levels of Party organizations and Party members to understand the spirit of the Regulation, accurately grasp the main contents of the Regulation, and enhance the ability of working well in the leading Party members' groups. Party committees at all levels need to strengthen supervision to ensure the implementation of the Regulation. [2]

What is Leading Party Members' Group?

Leading Party Members’ Group is the representative organ dispatched by Party Organizations.[3]

Where to set up Leading Party Members’ Groups?

A leading Party members' group may be formed in the leading body of a central or local state organ, people's organization, economic or cultural institution or other non-Party unit.[4]

What are the role and tasks of Leading Party Members’ Group?

The group plays the role of the core of leadership. Its main tasks are: to see to it that the Party's line, principles and policies are implemented, to discuss and decide on matters of major importance in its unit, to do well in cadre management, to rally the non-Party cadres and the masses in fulfilling the tasks assigned by the Party and the state and to guide the work of the Party organization of the unit and those directly under it. [5]

What are the members of Leading Party Members’ Group?

The composition of a leading Party members' group is decided by the Party organization that approves its establishment. The group shall have a secretary and, if necessary, deputy secretaries.[6]

What are the differences between Party Organizations and Leading Party Members’ Group?

1. Party Organizations include central organizations of the Party, local organizations of the Party, and primary organizations of the Party.[7]

2. Party Organizations at all levels are elected. Leading Party Members’ Groups are not elected[8], but decided by the Party Organizations.

3. A leading Party members' group must accept the leadership of the Party organization that approves its establishment. [9]

What is new and different in the Regulation than it is in the Constitution?

The Chinese press call this Regulation “a big change”.[10] Since the full text has not been published yet, the main change that we can tell according to the release press from Xinhuanet is that the social organizations are required to set up leading Party members' group. In another word, social organizations will be under the direct leadership of the Party.

* * * 

NOTES:

[1] See http://renshi.people.com.cn/n/2015/0603/c139617-27099733.html

[2] http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-05/29/c_1115455011.htm

[3] See http://renshi.people.com.cn/n/2015/0603/c139617-27099733.html

[4] Article 46 of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

[5] Article 46 of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

[6] Article 47 of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

[7] Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

[8] Article 10 of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

[9] Article 47 of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

[10]http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA5NTY5MzUxMQ==&mid=208031234&idx=1&sn=00c36cf00ddabbc4804318596b3339bd&scene=5#rd