(Pix from Reflection of Cuba’s Castro on Deng Xiaoping, Free More News, June 25, 2012)
The last several months has witnessed a substantial movement in the the development of Chinese Leninism, and consequentially, to some extent, its Marxism as well. Much has already been written about the substantial and honest new direction offered in the Report of the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress (discussed here, here, here, here, here, here, and here). Its effects on the development of Chinese constitutionalism have already emerged (see here).
That movement has been reflected in amendments to the CPC Constitution (e.g., here, and here), and now to the State Constitution (e.g., here, and here). These changes reflect profound advances in the understanding of the collectivist element in Leninism, especially in the Chinese context, and the tight inter-connection between collective leadership where the Party rules and not a person, and the mass line that reflects the fundamental obligation of the CPC to remain true to its Basic Line and to serve the people in the way in which that basic line can be made relevant and legitimate, as well as serve as a tool for the forward progress of socialist society, socialist rule of law, and socialist culture. These represent strong pillars for the expansion of notions of socialist modernization. But these changes require some substantial study, both for what they suggest is the movement forward of Leninism within a Marxist context and the obligations of the CPC to realize in its actions the promise of its ideals. My own quite contrary views are set out here (PPT here).
It is in that context that a number of reports that have been recently circulated might provide some food for thought for those who place some value in connecting dots. The first include reports that the Chinese Constitution will be amended further to lift the term limits of the of the President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China (e.g., here; for comment see here and here). The second are recently circulating suggestions that China has much to learn from Cuban (and thus 1980s European) Marxism-Leninism. That is a curious development indeed in light of the antipathy that the Cuban Communism views the ideological heresies of Chinese Marxism Leninism. Indeed, one still recalls that near the end of his public Life Fidel Castro publicly dismissed Deng Xiaoping and extolled the virtues of the East German model of Leninism under Eric Honeker. Now, for those up to it, connect the dots.
The primary sources from which these dots emerge follow.
What and why is China learning from Cuban Socialism?
Written by Ricardo Barrios.
The survival of the Cuban party-state has been a subject of interest to many Chinese observers. For decades, Chinese leaders and scholars alike have marveled at how the island—with its limited size and stunted economy—has managed to subsist at the doorstep of a hostile superpower, and even weather the collapse of its economic patron, the Soviet Union.
Motivated by the belief that there is wisdom to be gleaned from their Caribbean comrades, some Chinese observers have taken this fascination beyond casual interest and turned it into a pragmatic pursuit. Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Zhu Jiamu’s 2007 article, aptly titled “Why Has Cuba’s Socialist Regime Been Able to Endure?,” is illustrative of Chinese observers’ search for the reasons behind Cuban socialism’s continued survival, and its purported “lessons” for China.
China’s curiosity is present throughout its intellectual ecosystem, where it is visible in the work of academic institutions, establishment think tanks, and even some media outlets. The analysis produced by Chinese observers in these institutions consistently highlights the work of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) and the Cuban social welfare system as some key factors explaining the continued existence of the Cuban socialist system, and as possible learning opportunities for Chinese socialism. While causal links between Chinese observers’ analysis of Cuba and Chinese policy outcomes remain hard to establish, this analysis may still have an ideological function, as it allows China to measure itself according to a socialist standard that does not directly challenge the state’s socialist ideology.
Lessons from My Brother
Given its centrality in Chinese narratives regarding the resilience of Cuban socialism, the PCC is a natural subject of interest to Chinese observers, who have shown a keen interest in the Party’s ideological work. Within the context of a socialist party-state, a party’s ideological work is a joint effort comprised of both theory building and mass propagation. Both of these aspects are present in Chinese observers’ examinations of Cuban ideological work, which range from the theoretical (e.g., the national adaptation of Marxism) to the practical (e.g., applied theoretical pedagogy).
On the theoretical end, Chinese observers have noticeably been drawn to the PCC’s work on the adaptation of Marxist theory to the Cuban context. For example, in their state-funded analysis of Cuban theory work, Xia Xiaohua and Zhou Jianhua remark that this process of adaptation—the so-called “localization of Marxism”—is visible in Cuban socialism’s emphasis on elements such as anti-imperialism and national independence, as well as the formal addition of José Martí and Fidel Castro to Cuba’s socialist ideological pantheon. Xia and Zhou conclude that Cuba’s development of Marxist theory serves as a reminder that Marxism alone is insufficiently “lively” and must be adapted to the national and historical context.
Turning towards the applied component of Cuban thought work, observers have also paid attention to the PCC’s use of ideology to incorporate and mobilize broad swathes of Cuban society. In their analysis of Cuba’s “Battle of Ideas,” Dong Weihua and Ceng Changqiu comment favorably on the PCC’s application of political ideology in areas including social management and mass mobilization. Like Zhou and Xia, Dong and Ceng conclude that the experiences of Cuba (along with North Korea) illustrate the importance of politico-ideological work to socialist countries, as well as the need to localize ideology and diversify political thought work.
Besides the work of the Party, Chinese scholars have also spent significant time examining Cuba’s social welfare system in the hopes of learning from the island’s remarkable accomplishments in healthcare and education. In the area of healthcare, scholars often highlight the universal nature of Cuban healthcare, as well as the system’s ability to thrive under the U.S. embargo. Beijing Normal University’s Wang Nuo, for example, commends the “efficiency, effectiveness, and equity” of the Cuban healthcare model, which he contrasts to China’s own “difficult” and “expensive” system. Striking a similar tone on education, Le Xianlian and Wu Hangping praise Cuba’s “great, internationally recognized success” in the equitable development of schooling and suggest China follow Cuba’s socialist example in its pursuit of educational equity.In each case, the authors arrive at the same conclusion: China, for all its growing wealth and power, would do well to learn from its socialist brother.
Learning, Theoretically
For several reasons, it is hard to determine the extent to which Chinese observers’ analysis of Cuban socialism has affected Chinese state and party policy-making. On the one hand, there is no evidence that unequivocally demonstrates that China is applying these purported lessons from Cuba. On the other hand, there are many parallels to be drawn between the two countries’ (and two parties’) efforts in areas ranging from economic reform to ideology promotion. Looking at recent events, one cannot discard the possibility that China’s recent breakthrough with the Vatican was inspired at least partially by Cuba’s own experience in handling organized religion.
Even so, a lack of visible policy change need not necessarily diminish the exercise’s value to the Chinese state. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics may have proven a formula for economic success, but it has also resulted in gross inequalities that continuously call into question the country’s commitment to socialism. Indeed, this continual defiance of socialist orthodoxy and its redefinition of what it means to be a socialist state (by advocating for globalization, for instance) presents a recurring challenge to China’s ideological foundation.
Regardless of whether this analysis has led to concrete policy outcomes, some scholars have begun theorize that China’s use of Cuba as a socialist mirror is a way of coping with the tensions created by China’s changing economic and political circumstances. Utilizing the Chinese observers’ perspective, Yinghong Cheng has suggested that Chinese observers’ use of Cuba as a “socialist other” should be regarded as a means to discuss ideological issues (e.g., social equity) that are otherwise difficult to debate within a Chinese context. Meanwhile, adopting a more statist perspective, Nele Noesselt has argued that China’s close study of Cuba should be interpreted as the former’s search for “add-ons to increase the efficiency and legitimacy of its own ‘socialist’ system.”
Cheng and Noesselt both seem to agree that the juxtaposition of Cuba and China serves a distinct function within the Chinese state, because this sort of comparison permits observers to measure China’s performance according to a classical (state-friendly) Marxist standard. This not only creates opportunities for the improvement of state performance (in accordance to Marxist criteria), but also does it in a way that does not call into question, and may even reinforce, the dominant socialist ideology espoused by the state.
Ricardo Barrios is the program associate in the Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin America and the World Program, where he focuses on China-Latin America affairs. He writes regularly for the Dialogue’s China and Latin America Blog. He tweets @elbarrioschino. Image credit: CC by jim/Wikimedia Commons
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Under the Chinese political system, true power lies with the general secretary, but Xi Jinping could be aiming to shift the dynamicPUBLISHED : Monday, 26 February, 2018, 6:02amUPDATED : Monday, 26 February, 2018, 8:31pm
The decision to remove the constitutional restriction on China’s presidential term limits suggests Chinese President Xi Jinping may want to turn what is essentially a ceremonial position into a role carrying much greater political heft, an observer familiar with party ideology says.
The party’s Central Committee on Sunday announced a plan to remove language from the charter saying the president and vice-president “shall serve no more than two consecutive terms”. The move is the strongest indication yet Xi plans to stay in power beyond the end of his second term as general secretary in 2022.While most China experts have long expected he would find a way to remain in power, it is surprising the amendments have come so early in the second term.Theoretically, Xi does not need to rely on the title. In Chinese politics, the role of president is largely ceremonial, with real power resting in the hands of the general secretary and the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi holds all three positions.Deng Yuwen, former editor of the Study Times newspaper affiliated with the Central Party School, said the timing of the amendment suggested Xi planned to make the office more significant.“In the next five years, the president may be given more substantial power, and we are likely to see that in future constitutional amendments,” Deng said. “The president is still largely a nominal title now, so raising the term limit is not too significant unless new power is attached to the title.”The announcement came just as the South China Morning Post reported that Wang Qishan – Xi’s trusted ally and the party’s former anti-corruption chief – will be appointed as vice-president at the annual congress next month.
Experts said the amendment could also make the vice-presidency more powerful.The announcement could pave the way for the party to redefine both of those roles, giving Xi and Wang a more solid base to exercise power, although the released draft did not touch on that area.Deng said the move sent an obvious message about Xi’s intention.“This is a very clear sign that the president will remain in office beyond the existing term limit,” Deng said. “We don’t know if it could be life tenure at this stage, but two extra terms will be of no question.”The role of president carries only nominal power, such as signing laws and suggesting a premier to the National People Congress. The president has no say over the appointment of other members of the State Council or the party’s all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Nor does he have legal power to command the army, which answers to the chairman of the Central Military Commission.The country only reinstated the position of president in the early 1980s, and it was sometimes occupied by party elders who were not the paramount leader.But the title has grown in significance in the decades since, with the seat being held by the general secretary, the most powerful position in the party.In the past two decades, the supreme Politburo Standing Committee has seated a successor no later than the end of the incumbent president’s first term.But the question of Xi’s successor was left open at the 19th party congress in October – the first time the political elite failed to anoint an heir apparent during a leader’s second term.An editorial in the Global Times, affiliated with the state-run People’s Daily, said the constitutional amendment did not mean life tenure.“A broad consensus has formed in the party, and China has successfully solved the problem of orderly power transition of state and party leaders,” said the article, published soon after Xinhua’s announcement.Yet veteran China watchers were less certain about when Xi might step down.“He will stay at his pleasure, for as long as he wants to and feels that he needs to do so,” said Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute at the University of London.There will be no limit to how long he can stay on, once this proposed change is incorporated into the constitution.”
Beijing-based political commentator Zhang Lifan agreed.“Now there’s no limit to his terms,” he said, adding Xi could remain in a decisive role even until the 100th anniversary of the founding of the nation in 2049. He would be 96 by then.
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Sunday, August 19, 2012
Fidel Castro on Deng Xiaoping and Erich Honecker--Understanding the Foundations of Cuban Political and Economic Policy
Larry Catá Backer
Law at the End of the Day
Two recent reflections are particularly relevant:
(Pix from Mann des Apparats, der den Staat mit sich riss, Frankfurter Rundschau, 30. Mai 1994)
CONDUCTS HARD TO FORGET
THE most revolutionary German I have known is Erich Honecker. Every human being lives in his or her era. The current one is of infinite change, in comparison with any other. I had the privilege of observing his conduct when he was paying bitterly for the debt contracted by the man who sold his soul to the devil for a few shots of vodka.
I retain for Honecker the most profound sentiment of solidarity.
Fidel Castro Ruz
June 11, 2012
3:17 p.m.
(Original Spanish Version): El alemán más revolucionario que he conocido fue Erich Honecker.
Cada hombre vive su época. La actual es infinitamente cambiante, si se compara con cualquier otra anterior. Me correspondió el privilegio de observar su conducta cuando este pagaba amargamente la deuda contraída por aquel que vendió su alma al diablo por unas pocas líneas de Vodka.
Guardo hacia Honecker el sentimiento más profundo de solidaridad.
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(Pix from http://english.people.com.cn/zhuanti/Zhuanti_410.html)
DENG XIAOPING
HE thought of himself as a wise man and, doubtless, he was. But he made a small mistake.
"Cuba has to be punished," he said one day. Our country never even pronounced his name.
It was a totally unwarranted offense. Fidel Castro Ruz
June 14, 2012
1:40 p.m.
(Original Spanish Version): Presumía de hombre sabio y, sin duda, lo era. Pero incurrió en un pequeño error.
"Hay que castigar a Cuba", dijo un día. Nuestro país nunca pronunció siquiera su nombre.
Fue una ofensa absolutamente gratuita.
These reflections are remarkable both as a window into the perspective
and context within which Fidel Castro formed long held opinions, but
also the way the personal and the political were
merged in particularly intimate ways in forging very durable policy
within the Cuban Party and State apparatus. It appears that for Fidel
Castro, Erich Honecker's East Germany still represents in Castro's mind
the ideal Marxist Leninist state, one in which a certain level of
prosperity is bought at the price of strict control of population, a
vestigial non-state sector and a tightly vertically ordered system of
state planning. In Castro's mind this form of state organization was
working until the East German regime was betrayed and paid the price for
the betrayal of others. In other words: "He found it impossible to
change, and as Soviet leader Gorbackev instituted reform he remained
hard-line Communist. During mass protest demonstrations in Leipzig and
other cities he proved unable to provide a way forward and resigned on
18 October 1989." (Biography of Erich Honecker, National Cold War Exhibition).
Honecker, like Fidel Castro, perhaps, was a victim of historical circumstances, the upright leader of a state dependent on larger ones and subject to the vicissitudes of that relationship. Both would have to pay the debts incurred by others and live to see their life's work undone. "
Honecker, like Fidel Castro, perhaps, was a victim of historical circumstances, the upright leader of a state dependent on larger ones and subject to the vicissitudes of that relationship. Both would have to pay the debts incurred by others and live to see their life's work undone. "
"The man" selling his soul for vodka was not identified, sparking a debate among Cubans, some thinking Castro meant former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, a reputed lover of the beverage.
Others argued he meant former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, whose reforms helped lead to the end of the Soviet empire and to vital economic aid from the USSR to Cuba." (Patrick Oppmann, Fidel Castro stretches for a commentary topic -- yoga, CNN, June 19, 2012)
Is this a reference to the Raúlistas in the Cuban Communist Party and a
call to arms to resist the sort of opening up that has been central to
the Chinese Communist Party Line since the 1980s? Only time will tell.
In stark contrast is Deng Xiaping. Dripping with dismissive contempt,
Fidel Castro's criticism of Deng Xiaoping is both personal and
professional. "Cuba must be punished" might well refer to the sense that
Deng had both Cuba and Fidel himself in mind when he made the
statement. Castro appears never to have forgiven or forgotten. Part of
the causes of the estranged relationship might go back to the Cuban
support of Vietnam in the wake of the 1979 Chinese invasion, for which
Deng Xiaoping is blamed by name in particularly disparaging terms, terms
that suggest that his loyalty as a communist might be suspect (and thus
providing a foundation for later casting suspicion on his economic
reforms).
De más está decir que no se sabe ni siquiera lo que está pasando dentro de China, no se sabe: los problemas, las divisiones que tienen, cuál de las facciones es la que está trazando la pauta en este momento, y quiénes son los responsables, cuál de las facciones es responsable de esta guerra y de esta increíble aventura, aunque a todas luces, a todas luces, el que está allí al frente de esta canallada, de este crimen, el responsable número uno parece ser este mentecato (RISAS), este títere, este desvergonzado de Deng Xiaoping, que lo purgan una vez, vuelve otra vez, lo vuelven a purgar, vuelve, y cualquier día lo purgan otra vez de nuevo. Eso puede pasar. Aquí no se sabe. Las facciones hace muchos años que se vienen purgando unas a otras. Se purgan, se rehabilitan, se vuelven a purgar y se vuelven a rehabilitar hasta el día en que el pueblo chino los purgue a todos de una sola vez (APLAUSOS). ¡Ah!, pero son peligrosos, peligrosísimos. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE EN JEFE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER SECRETARIO DEL COMITE CENTRAL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA Y PRESIDENTE DE LOS CONSEJOS DE ESTADO Y DE MINISTROS, EN EL ACTO NACIONAL DE SOLIDARIDAD CON VIET NAM Y DE CONDENA A LA AGRESION CHINA, EFECTUADO EL 21 DE FEBRERO DE 1979, "AÑO 20 DE LA VICTORIA"; My thanks to Marce Cameron for first pointing out this connection; at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CubaNews/message/133692 )
But business is business and Cuban Chinese relations took a turn for the
better after the collapse fo the Soviet Union and the aftermath of the
diplomatic isolation of China in 1989.
The main incident that endeared Castro to many in China’s current leadership was his coming through when they desperately needed allies during post-Mao China’s most severe crisis: . . . The critical period, as chronicled by Cheng in a forthcoming issue of China Quarterly, began on June 4, 1989, when the government cracked down on demonstrations around China. In his memoirs, then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen tells how he was touring Latin America when the repression began and how he suddenly found himself persona-non-grata in the region. He “retreated” to Cuba. Castro treated him royally for four days and gave Cuba’s unconditional support for whatever actions Chinese leaders considered necessary to preserve socialism, as he had for the Soviets in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Not coincidentally, within days Fidel launched his own repression, namely the execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa and others on charges of corruption and drug dealing but really for seeming to challenge his power. Then China returned the support. (William Ratliff, Mirroring Taiwan: China and Cuba, The Jamestown Foundation vol. 6 issue 10)
Since then, the Chinese Cuban relationship has remained pragmatic and far warmer on the military than on the Party side. Chinese nationalism is still highlighted as worth imitating--its version of Marxist Leninist organization is not. Whatever the state of relationship with China now, Fidel Castro has consistently viewed Deng's opening up with substantial suspicion (e.g., The UnRepentant: Fidel Castro Confronts Cuban Globalization, Law at the End of the Day, Sept. 15, 2007), a suspicion not shared to the same degree by his brother (e.g., On the Anniversary of the Attack on the Moncada Barracks: Cuba Moves Forward towards its Chinese Future, Law at the End of the Day, July 27, 2007).
(Pix FIDEL CASTRO, MÁS ESCUETO Y CON UN SORPRENDE CAMBIO DE ESTILO, El
Lagarto Verde "ca. 1980, Havana, Cuba — The General Secretary of the
German Socialist Party and President of the Council of State of the
German Democratic Republic, Eric Honecker is greeted by Fidel Castro at
Havana airport. — Image by © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS") )
These short reflections, then, encapsulate a lifetime of judgement, political and ideological alignment that is profound. Honecker is the revolutionary; Deng thinks himself wise. The first is an opinion shared by peers, the second is a conceit, which is "doubtless" so. But it is clear that while Fidel Castro embraces the view of Honecker as a real revolutionary, he might not embrace the judgement of Deng as wise. Honecker was the honest revolutionary betrayed by the circumstances in which he was given a leadership role in East Germany. He was betrayed by others. He and Fidel Castro are more brothers than strangers. Deng, though perhaps wise, was not wise enough to avoid mistakes. And the most important mistake Deng made was with respect to Cuba--"Cuba must be punished." For Fidel this was profoundly offensive; it speaks to the arrogance of a great power mistreating smaller states, the lessons of 1979 are never far from Fidel Castro's mind. The offense was completely gratuitous, and it hurt all the more for its character. The effect was profound, considering that the sting is still felt decades later. And so he turns the tables on Deng; it was not merely China that could play the role of --China was so remote from Cuban consciousness, so exotic and foreign, they would not even have spoken Deng's name (a subtle link to Western notions of the unpronounceable character of Chinese language and the unreadability of Chinese writing). But this remoteness runs deeper--it suggests a remoteness from the ideological foundations of Chinese Marxist Leninism as well, something the name of which Cubans would not pronounce. For Honecker there is solidarity; for Deng there is a profound separation. Much in the way of Cuban state, Party and economic policy was built on these premises, now undone to the extent that Raúl Castrio and his followers do not share them.
More than anything else, these short reflections are likely to be as close as we will come to understanding the reasons that Cuba finds itself in its particular current predicament. It is one based perhaps on a nostalgia for what could have been, East Germany, and a fear and loathing for what may be: Chinese style decentralization.
(Pix from Deng Xiaoping's Economic Reforms, Facts and Details).
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社评：支持中央修宪建议，这是理性也是信仰
Original 2018-02-25 社评 环球时报中共领导国家早已是中国的现实。准确说，宪法的这个条文不是写出来的，是历史选择出来的，是中国人民走出来的。宪法序言中一直有相关表述，但是当依然不断有少数力量在境外势力支持、鼓动之下试图挑战这一原则时，将它写入宪法总纲就成为十分必要的修宪行动。
国家主席的设立和职权范围自中华人民共和国建国以来几经变化，最近二十几年形成了中共中央总书记、国家主席、军委主席“三位一体”的领导体制，它被实践证明健全、有效。这次修宪取消对国家主席连续两届任期的限制，有助于保持上述“三位一体”，进一步完善党和国家领导体制。
根据权威解读，这一修改不意味着恢复国家主席职务终身制。应当看到，在党内外有一个广泛的共识，那就是改革开放以来，在党的领导下，中国已经成功解决并将继续有效解决党和国家领导层依法有序更替的问题。
确立监察委员会作为国家机构的法律地位，将极大促进对所有公职人员的监察全覆盖，实现全面深化改革、全面依法治国、全面从严治党的有机统一。
上述修宪建议是中央二中全会做出的决定，这是党领导立法原则的又一重要体现。自1982年宪法颁布以来，加上这一次，中央一共领导进行了5次修宪，总体上使宪法始终适应不同历史阶段和历史任务的需要，充分发挥出根本大法的作用。
坚决跟党走，在重大事项上坚决与党中央保持高度一致，这是实践反复证明了的中国社会根本利益之所在。我们生活在世事多变迁的年代，国家不断穿越复杂的事态和信息前行，我们每个人的视野和甄别力都是有限的。党中央无疑最有能力把握全局，在立足现实的基础上展望未来，带领我们建设强大国家和美好的个人生活。因此对包括修宪在内的重大决定，我们坚定的选择就是相信党中央的智慧，坚决支持、维护党中央的决定。
每临中国作重要改革，酝酿关键决定时，舆论场涟漪的形态往往耐人寻味。主波纹就是主旋律的呈现，同时也会有因为正面信息做不到迅速深入全社会每一个层面和角落而引起的次波纹。另外永远都会有刻意搅浑水的，特别是当西方舆论场强烈希望影响我们这边的时候。
正因为这样，加强党中央的权威，与党中央保持一致的政治主张自改革开放以来不断被强调，它逐渐成为中国社会团结一致完成各项使命、冲破一切艰难险阻的法宝。支持党中央所支持的，践行党中央所要求的，改革开放以来中国社会就这样一次又一次成为这个世界上的大赢家，中国人在西方人面前建立起了自己的尊严。
十八大以后，在波澜壮阔的全面深化改革进程中，习近平同志成为党中央新的领导核心，党因此而变得更加坚强，更敢啃硬骨头。从反腐败到全面依法治国再到深刻的经济转型，以习近平同志为核心的党中央稳健地开创了中国新时代，这个国家充满希望。
本次修宪是对新时代中国特色社会主义立法性总结的点睛之笔，也是为实现中国继续前进做出的关键性宪法保障。无论是出于理性还是信仰，我们都支持这些修宪建议，期待它们为整个中华民族带来福祉。
本文为环球时报社评，原标题：支持中央修宪建议，这是理性也是信仰
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全国人民代表大会常务委员会：
根据新时代坚持和发展中国特色社会主义的新形势新实践，中国共产党中央委员会提出关于修改《中华人民共和国宪法》部分内容的建议如下：
一、宪法序言第七自然段中“在马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和‘三个代表’重要思想指引下”修改为“在马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论、‘三个代表’重要思想、科学发展观、习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想指引下”；“健全社会主义法制”修改为“健全社会主义法治”；在“自力更生，艰苦奋斗”前增写“贯彻新发展理念”；“推动物质文明、政治文明和精神文明协调发展，把我国建设成为富强、民主、文明的社会主义国家”修改为“推动物质文明、政治文明、精神文明、社会文明、生态文明协调发展，把我国建设成为富强民主文明和谐美丽的社会主义现代化强国，实现中华民族伟大复兴”。这一自然段相应修改为：“中国新民主主义革命的胜利和社会主义事业的成就，是中国共产党领导中国各族人民，在马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想的指引下，坚持真理，修正错误，战胜许多艰难险阻而取得的。我国将长期处于社会主义初级阶段。国家的根本任务是，沿着中国特色社会主义道路，集中力量进行社会主义现代化建设。中国各族人民将继续在中国共产党领导下，在马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论、‘三个代表’重要思想、科学发展观、习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想指引下，坚持人民民主专政，坚持社会主义道路，坚持改革开放，不断完善社会主义的各项制度，发展社会主义市场经济，发展社会主义民主，健全社会主义法治，贯彻新发展理念，自力更生，艰苦奋斗，逐步实现工业、农业、国防和科学技术的现代化，推动物质文明、政治文明、精神文明、社会文明、生态文明协调发展，把我国建设成为富强民主文明和谐美丽的社会主义现代化强国，实现中华民族伟大复兴。”
二、宪法序言第十自然段中“在长期的革命和建设过程中”修改为“在长期的革命、建设、改革过程中”；“包括全体社会主义劳动者、社会主义事业的建设者、拥护社会主义的爱国者和拥护祖国统一的爱国者的广泛的爱国统一战线”修改为“包括全体社会主义劳动者、社会主义事业的建设者、拥护社会主义的爱国者、拥护祖国统一和致力于中华民族伟大复兴的爱国者的广泛的爱国统一战线”。这一自然段相应修改为：“社会主义的建设事业必须依靠工人、农民和知识分子，团结一切可以团结的力量。在长期的革命、建设、改革过程中，已经结成由中国共产党领导的，有各民主党派和各人民团体参加的，包括全体社会主义劳动者、社会主义事业的建设者、拥护社会主义的爱国者、拥护祖国统一和致力于中华民族伟大复兴的爱国者的广泛的爱国统一战线，这个统一战线将继续巩固和发展。中国人民政治协商会议是有广泛代表性的统一战线组织，过去发挥了重要的历史作用，今后在国家政治生活、社会生活和对外友好活动中，在进行社会主义现代化建设、维护国家的统一和团结的斗争中，将进一步发挥它的重要作用。中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度将长期存在和发展。”
三、宪法序言第十一自然段中“平等、团结、互助的社会主义民族关系已经确立，并将继续加强。”修改为：“平等团结互助和谐的社会主义民族关系已经确立，并将继续加强。”
四、宪法序言第十二自然段中“中国革命和建设的成就是同世界人民的支持分不开的”修改为“中国革命、建设、改革的成就是同世界人民的支持分不开的”；“中国坚持独立自主的对外政策，坚持互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处的五项原则”后增加“坚持和平发展道路，坚持互利共赢开放战略”；“发展同各国的外交关系和经济、文化的交流”修改为“发展同各国的外交关系和经济、文化交流，推动构建人类命运共同体”。这一自然段相应修改为：“中国革命、建设、改革的成就是同世界人民的支持分不开的。中国的前途是同世界的前途紧密地联系在一起的。中国坚持独立自主的对外政策，坚持互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处的五项原则，坚持和平发展道路，坚持互利共赢开放战略，发展同各国的外交关系和经济、文化交流，推动构建人类命运共同体；坚持反对帝国主义、霸权主义、殖民主义，加强同世界各国人民的团结，支持被压迫民族和发展中国家争取和维护民族独立、发展民族经济的正义斗争，为维护世界和平和促进人类进步事业而努力。”
五、宪法第一条第二款“社会主义制度是中华人民共和国的根本制度。”后增写一句，内容为：“中国共产党领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的特征。”
六、宪法第三条第三款“国家行政机关、审判机关、检察机关都由人民代表大会产生，对它负责，受它监督。”修改为：“国家行政机关、监察机关、审判机关、检察机关都由人民代表大会产生，对它负责，受它监督。”
七、宪法第四条第一款中“国家保障各少数民族的合法的权利和利益，维护和发展各民族的平等、团结、互助关系。”修改为：“国家保障各少数民族的合法的权利和利益，维护和发展各民族的平等团结互助和谐关系。”
八、宪法第二十四条第二款中“国家提倡爱祖国、爱人民、爱劳动、爱科学、爱社会主义的公德”修改为“国家倡导社会主义核心价值观，提倡爱祖国、爱人民、爱劳动、爱科学、爱社会主义的公德”。这一款相应修改为：“国家倡导社会主义核心价值观，提倡爱祖国、爱人民、爱劳动、爱科学、爱社会主义的公德，在人民中进行爱国主义、集体主义和国际主义、共产主义的教育，进行辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义的教育，反对资本主义的、封建主义的和其他的腐朽思想。”
九、宪法第二十七条增加一款，作为第三款：“国家工作人员就职时应当依照法律规定公开进行宪法宣誓。”
十、宪法第六十二条“全国人民代表大会行使下列职权”中增加一项，作为第七项“（七）选举国家监察委员会主任”，第七项至第十五项相应改为第八项至第十六项。
十一、宪法第六十三条“全国人民代表大会有权罢免下列人员”中增加一项，作为第四项“（四）国家监察委员会主任”，第四项、第五项相应改为第五项、第六项。
十二、宪法第六十五条第四款“全国人民代表大会常务委员会的组成人员不得担任国家行政机关、审判机关和检察机关的职务。”修改为：“全国人民代表大会常务委员会的组成人员不得担任国家行政机关、监察机关、审判机关和检察机关的职务。”
十三、宪法第六十七条“全国人民代表大会常务委员会行使下列职权”中第六项“（六）监督国务院、中央军事委员会、最高人民法院和最高人民检察院的工作”修改为“（六）监督国务院、中央军事委员会、国家监察委员会、最高人民法院和最高人民检察院的工作”；增加一项，作为第十一项“（十一）根据国家监察委员会主任的提请，任免国家监察委员会副主任、委员”，第十一项至第二十一项相应改为第十二项至第二十二项。
十四、宪法第七十九条第三款“中华人民共和国主席、副主席每届任期同全国人民代表大会每届任期相同，连续任职不得超过两届。”修改为：“中华人民共和国主席、副主席每届任期同全国人民代表大会每届任期相同。”
十五、宪法第八十九条“国务院行使下列职权”中第六项“（六）领导和管理经济工作和城乡建设”修改为“（六）领导和管理经济工作和城乡建设、生态文明建设”；第八项“（八）领导和管理民政、公安、司法行政和监察等工作”修改为“（八）领导和管理民政、公安、司法行政等工作”。
十六、宪法第一百条增加一款，作为第二款：“设区的市的人民代表大会和它们的常务委员会，在不同宪法、法律、行政法规和本省、自治区的地方性法规相抵触的前提下，可以依照法律规定制定地方性法规，报本省、自治区人民代表大会常务委员会批准后施行。”
十七、宪法第一百零一条第二款中“县级以上的地方各级人民代表大会选举并且有权罢免本级人民法院院长和本级人民检察院检察长。”修改为：“县级以上的地方各级人民代表大会选举并且有权罢免本级监察委员会主任、本级人民法院院长和本级人民检察院检察长。”
十八、宪法第一百零三条第三款“县级以上的地方各级人民代表大会常务委员会的组成人员不得担任国家行政机关、审判机关和检察机关的职务。”修改为：“县级以上的地方各级人民代表大会常务委员会的组成人员不得担任国家行政机关、监察机关、审判机关和检察机关的职务。”
十九、宪法第一百零四条中“监督本级人民政府、人民法院和人民检察院的工作”修改为“监督本级人民政府、监察委员会、人民法院和人民检察院的工作”。这一条相应修改为：“县级以上的地方各级人民代表大会常务委员会讨论、决定本行政区域内各方面工作的重大事项；监督本级人民政府、监察委员会、人民法院和人民检察院的工作；撤销本级人民政府的不适当的决定和命令；撤销下一级人民代表大会的不适当的决议；依照法律规定的权限决定国家机关工作人员的任免；在本级人民代表大会闭会期间，罢免和补选上一级人民代表大会的个别代表。”
二十、宪法第一百零七条第一款“县级以上地方各级人民政府依照法律规定的权限，管理本行政区域内的经济、教育、科学、文化、卫生、体育事业、城乡建设事业和财政、民政、公安、民族事务、司法行政、监察、计划生育等行政工作，发布决定和命令，任免、培训、考核和奖惩行政工作人员。”修改为：“县级以上地方各级人民政府依照法律规定的权限，管理本行政区域内的经济、教育、科学、文化、卫生、体育事业、城乡建设事业和财政、民政、公安、民族事务、司法行政、计划生育等行政工作，发布决定和命令，任免、培训、考核和奖惩行政工作人员。”
二十一、宪法第三章“国家机构”中增加一节，作为第七节“监察委员会”；增加五条，分别作为第一百二十三条至第一百二十七条。内容如下：
第七节 监察委员会
第一百二十三条 中华人民共和国各级监察委员会是国家的监察机关。
第一百二十四条 中华人民共和国设立国家监察委员会和地方各级监察委员会。
监察委员会由下列人员组成：
主任，
副主任若干人，
委员若干人。
监察委员会主任每届任期同本级人民代表大会每届任期相同。国家监察委员会主任连续任职不得超过两届。
监察委员会的组织和职权由法律规定。
第一百二十五条 中华人民共和国国家监察委员会是最高监察机关。
国家监察委员会领导地方各级监察委员会的工作，上级监察委员会领导下级监察委员会的工作。
第一百二十六条 国家监察委员会对全国人民代表大会和全国人民代表大会常务委员会负责。地方各级监察委员会对产生它的国家权力机关和上一级监察委员会负责。
第一百二十七条 监察委员会依照法律规定独立行使监察权，不受行政机关、社会团体和个人的干涉。
监察机关办理职务违法和职务犯罪案件，应当与审判机关、检察机关、执法部门互相配合，互相制约。
第七节相应改为第八节，第一百二十三条至第一百三十八条相应改为第一百二十八条至第一百四十三条。
以上建议，请全国人民代表大会常务委员会依照法定程序提出宪法修正案议案，提请第十三届全国人民代表大会第一次会议审议。
中国共产党中央委员会
2018年1月26日
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