The Trump-Biden Era continues to develop the America First project, though under President Biden in a less provocative and more inclusive way. The Biden portion of the Trump-Biden Era has taken the original insight, similar to that of the core of leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, that the era of global convergence is over, that it is nece4ssary to define and protect the imperial core and develop its peripheries, and that such development-protection strategies must be built around a rationalized markets driven, civil and political liberties model with the United States at its core. That effort is aided by the actions of other centers of imperial core-periphery frameworks built around China (more successfully) and in a more antique and 19th century way around Russia.
To that end, the United States has just released a quite interesting document, the "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States" (February 2022). It serves as a consolidation of policies that have been in development since the time that the Trans-Pacific Partnership global convergence model was abandoned, and that the certainty of economic (and political) detachment and competition became solidified at the core of US policy (see, e.g.,Ruminations 76: From Global to Fortress America; Thoughts on "National Security Strategy of the United States" (4 Dec 2017)). While it aligns with the trajectories of post-global empire represented by China's Belt & Road Initiative, it also offers a structure built around principles that more closely align with the US economic-political model. presents The Indo-Pacfic nicely frames the
For centuries, the United States and much of the world have viewed Asia too narrowly—as an arena of geopolitical competition. Today, Indo-Pacific nations are helping to define the very nature of the international order, and U.S. allies and partners around the world have a stake in its outcomes. Our approach, therefore, draws from and aligns with those of our closest friends. Like Japan, we believe that a successful Indo-Pacific vision must advance freedom and openness and offer “autonomy and options.” We support a strong India as a partner in this positive regional vision. Like Australia, we seek to maintain stability and reject coercive exercises of power. Like the ROK, we aim to promote regional security through capacity-building. Like ASEAN, we see Southeast Asia as central to the regional architecture. Like New Zealand and the United Kingdom, we seek to build resilience in the regional rules-based order. Like France, we recognize the strategic value of an increasing regional role for the European Union (EU). Much like the approach the EU has announced in its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, American strategy will be principled, long-term, and anchored in democratic resilience.
The United States will pursue five objectives in the Indo-Pacific—each in concert with our allies and partners, as well as with regional institutions. We will: (1) ADVANCE A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC; (2) BUILD CONNECTIONS WITHIN AND BEYOND THE REGION ; (3) DRIVE REGIONAL PROSPERITY; (4) BOLSTER INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY ; and (5) BUILD REGIONAL RESILIENCE TO TRANSNATIONAL THREATS. ("Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States"; p7).
Most Important, the "Indo-Pacific Action Plan" ("Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States" pp. 15-17) suggests the contours of an evolution of what started as the America First project. It is now acquiring a former structure for post-global empire built around the core principles of the old global convergence model that served, in turn, as the normative foundation of the networked global system between 1945 and 2015.
"We are deepening our five regional treaty alliances—with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand—and strengthening relationships with leading regional partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands. We will also encourage our allies and partners to strengthen their ties with one another, particularly Japan and the ROK." ("Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States"; p9)
Pix Credit HERE
The Action Plan is built around ten objectives that together present a comprehensive approach to regional integration, and as well a template for similar frameworks in other regions: (1) resource targeting; (2) increased integrity and efficiency of leading force markets systems; (3) military protection of integrated markets; (4) enhanced cooperation in core societal policies (health, connectivity, and deeper people to people exchanges); (5) develop regional powers out from the core along spokes of authority (e.g., India, Japan, Korea, Australia, etc.); (6) develop an America First ramped up variation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (e.g., the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue"); (7) Continue to develop the US-Japan-Korea hub and spoke alignment; (8) develop national resilience against environmental, climate change, and sustainability challenges; (9) focus on convergence of the political economic model through capacity building based on "good governance" and "accountability" principles already well developed in OECD and IFI sectors; and (10) drive technological innovation, infrastructure networks, and tech driven markets and administrative managerialism. Nonetheless, this may be an uphill battle as the Chinese have had a number of years head start. Still, the promise of the project is built around its project of flexible alliance: "Modernized alliances; flexible partnerships, including an empowered ASEAN, a leading India, a strong and reliable Quad, and an engaged Europe; economic partnership; new U.S. defense, diplomatic, development, and foreign-assistance resources; sustained focus on and commitment to the region at all
levels of the U.S. government." (Ibid., p. 10).
The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States" can be accessed (and downloaded) HERE. The full exposition of the ten Indo-Pacific America First program follows below. At some point, of course, those who manage the discourse of empire will have to come up with a better name than America First. My suggestion: Partnerships for Democratic Shared Prosperity (cf. here).
INDO-PACIFIC ACTION PLAN To implement this strategy, we will pursue ten core lines of effort in the next 12 to 24 months:
DRIVE NEW RESOURCES TO THE INDO-PACIFIC
Building shared capacity requires the United States to make new regional investments. We will open new embassies and consulates, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and increase our strength in existing ones, intensifying our climate, health, security, and development work. We will expand U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation in Southeast and South Asia and the Pacific Islands, with a focus on advising, training, deployment, and capacity-building. We will refocus security assistance on the Indo- Pacific, including to build maritime capacity and maritime-domain awareness. We will also expand the role of people-to-people exchange, including the Peace Corps. Within the U.S. government, we will ensure we have the necessary capacity and expertise to meet the region’s challenges. Throughout, we will work with Congress to ensure that our policy and resourcing have the bipartisan backing necessary to support our strong and steady regional role.
LEAD AN INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
We will launch, in early 2022, a new partnership that will promote and facilitate high-standards trade, govern the digital economy, improve supply-chain resiliency and security, catalyze investment in transparent, high-standards infrastructure, and build digital connectivity—doubling down on our economic ties to the region while contributing to broadly shared Indo-Pacific opportunity.
REINFORCE DETERRENCE
The United States will defend our interests, deter military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners—including across the Taiwan Strait—and promote regional security by developing new capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives, and a more resilient force posture. We will work with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative. Through the AUKUS partnership, we will identify the optimal pathway to deliver nuclear- powered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy at the earliest achievable date; in addition, we will deepen cooperation and enhance interoperability through a concrete program of work on advanced capabilities, including cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea capabilities.
INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
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STRENGTHEN AN EMPOWERED AND UNIFIED ASEAN
The United States is making new investments in U.S.-ASEAN ties, including by hosting ASEAN leaders for a historic U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit—the first-ever to be held in Washington, D.C. We are committed to the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, and will also seek new ministerial-level engagements with ASEAN. We will implement more than $100 million in new U.S.-ASEAN initiatives. We will also expand bilateral cooperation across Southeast Asia, prioritizing efforts to strengthen health security, address maritime challenges, increase connectivity, and deepen people-to-people ties.
SUPPORT INDIA’S CONTINUED RISE AND REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
We will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia; collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific. We recognize that India is a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development.
DELIVER ON THE QUAD
We will strengthen the Quad as a premier regional grouping and ensure it delivers on issues that matter to the Indo-Pacific. The Quad will play a leading regional role on COVID-19 response and global health security, delivering on its investment to provide an additional one billion vaccines to the region and to the world. It will advance work on critical and emerging technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and advancing common technology principles. The Quad will build a green shipping network, and will coordinate the sharing of satellite data to improve maritime domain awareness and climate responses. Its members will cooperate to provide high-standards infrastructure in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands and will work to improve their cyber capacity. The Quad Fellowship will formally launch in 2022, recruiting its first class of 100 students from all four countries to pursue graduate degrees in STEM fields in the United States beginning in 2023. The Quad will continue to meet regularly at the leader and ministerial levels.
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INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
EXPAND U.S.-JAPAN-ROK COOPERATION
Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and partners, particularly Japan and the ROK. We will continue to cooperate closely through trilateral channels on the DPRK. Beyond security, we will also work together on regional development and infrastructure, critical technology and supply-chain issues, and women’s leadership and empowerment. Increasingly, we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a trilateral context.
PARTNER TO BUILD RESILIENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
The United States will work with partners to establish a multilateral strategic grouping that supports Pacific Island countries as they build their capacity and resilience as secure, independent actors. Together, we will build climate resilience through the Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility; coordinate to meet the Pacific’s infrastructure gaps, especially on information and communications technology; facilitate transportation; and cooperate to improve maritime security to safeguard fisheries, build maritime-domain awareness, and improve training and advising. We will also prioritize finalization of the Compact of Free Association agreements with the Freely Associated States.
SUPPORT GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
We will support Indo-Pacific governments’ capacity to make independent political choices by helping partners root out corruption, including through foreign-assistance and development policies, leadership at the G7 and G20, and a renewed role in the Open Government Partnership. We are also partnering with governments, civil society, and journalists to ensure they have the capability to expose and mitigate the risks from foreign interference and information manipulation. The United States will continue to stand up for democracy in Burma, working closely with allies and partners to press the Burmese military to provide for a return to democracy, including through credible implementation of the Five Point Consensus.
SUPPORT OPEN, RESILIENT, SECURE, AND TRUSTWORTHY TECHNOLOGIES
We will promote secure and trustworthy digital infrastructure, particularly cloud and telecommunications vendor diversity, including through innovative network architectures such as Open RAN by encouraging at- scale commercial deployments and cooperation on testing, such as through shared access to test beds to enable common standards development. We will also deepen shared resilience in critical government and infrastructure networks, while building new regional initiatives to improve collective cybersecurity and rapidly respond to cyber incidents.
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