Larry Catá Backer's comments on current issues in transnational law and policy. These essays focus on the constitution of regulatory communities (political, economic, and religious) as they manage their constituencies and the conflicts between them. The context is globalization. This is an academic field-free zone: expect to travel "without documents" through the sometimes strongly guarded boundaries of international relations, constitutional, international, comparative, and corporate law.
Once upon a time in many parts of the world, Jews were permitted residence on the sufferance of the suzerain. As easily as they were invited into a place, they could be forced to leave. This applied in all contexts, even when they might have resided in the place long before the suzerain and their ethno-demos. Usually they could stay as long as they were useful; and they were useful as long as they produced wealth or service of value to the rulers. For a long time Jews tended to bounce back and forth between the parts of the Roman Empire that had morphed into Christian and Muslim camps--expulsions from one region moved them to another; in Muslim states the vagaries in the condition of the Jewish dhimmi ( ذمي residence in return for tax) was the order of the day until modernity.
Recent analyzed data sets have been used to try to find patterns for expulsions--for example in weather patterns (see "From the Persecuting to the Protective State? Jewish Expulsions and Weather Shocks from 1100 to 1800" or moneylending (see , No Return: Jews, Christian Usurers, and the Spread of Mass Expulsion in Medieval Europe(Princeton University Press, 2023). The constant, though, was the notion of residence at sufferance--at least until France after the Revolution, and the start of the process of formal emancipation--and periodic eruptions and extortion against resident Jews by the princes whose protection was also a necessary condition of residence. It lingers, from time to time erupting with horrendous consequences, radiating out from its Mediterranean heartland everywhere else.
And yet. . . . the discursive tropes of the position of the Jew in a social collective do not merely suggest whatever negative judgment or belief encased in the trope itself. They sometimes provide a shorthand signification, a semiotic bridge, into a wider set of meanings, expectations and conditions. The reassurance that It also appears to carry, inherently, the associated and consequential notions--of a tentative emancipation; and of the apparently undiminished subtext that the Jewish condition in any place, space, or time, is continued on good behavior (however that is defined), utility, and ultimately sufferance.
That, perhaps unintentionally, appears to come out quite distinctly in words that President Biden meant as solace and comfort for the citizens and residents of the United States who also happen to be, believe themselves to be, or are believed by others to be Jews. And perhaps that is a reminder--not so much for its intended audience--but for the rest of the nation, who tend to approach the discourse about and around Jews in a perpetually out of context (space, place, or time) way. That resonates with the parallel unintentionally uttered but inherent in the parallelism of the legitimacy of the Jewish presence in Israel (the context for which was the student eruptions on university campuses) and the more general (and more traditional) contingent legitimacy of Jewish residence anywhere where they o longer serve a purpose. One does not deal here with antisemitism, as such; one encounters here the much older and quite potent impulse about belonging in a political society with respect to which the object of that impulse (the Jew) appears to have little to contribute but utility. That then conflates the idea of settler colonialist in a much more comprehensive way. If the Jew lives on sufferance everywhere, then the idea of a Jewish homeland becomes incomprehensible, as does permanent Jewish presence anywhere. The power of this signification, of course, is that it need not be uttered to be effective, it need only be triggered. And, inadvertently, that may well have been where a President, in an act of generosity and kindness, revealed what might lie behind the rhetorical curtains of precisely antiseptic speech around which his intervention was made necessary.
President Biden, inadvertently, reminded the nation of space, place and time by resort to an ancient reality and premise in an effort to assure Jews in the U.S. that there is nothing to worry about. For many of them it would not be unexpected for them to think that indeed there had been nothing to worry about until the President suggested that it well might be. If the President must reassure the nation that he will protect the nation's Jews then the question of protection, and the old premise of residence on sufferance, appears to be very much on the table.
The text of the remarks along with earlier remarks delivered as the Gaza related student protests began in 2 May follow below.
I pass along the contents of the Spring 2024 issue of Academe, in which the journal reconsiders the role of race in its history. This from the announcement:
Our spring issue takes an overdue step toward reconsidering the role of race in the AAUP’s history. Articles look to the past and draw lessons for the present, examining such topics as W. E. B. Du Bois’s membership in and resignation from the AAUP; the Association's discriminatory membership practices during the segregation era; academic freedom investigations and the Black freedom struggle; the AAUP’s work with HBCUs; the Angela Davis case at the University of California, Los Angeles; and the AAUP’s role in fights over affirmative action.
This does appear more and more to be an age in which people and institutions are not only exposed but in which people and institutions are more eager to make choices and take sides in ways that will irrevocably change the dynamics of those social relations carefully constructed after 1945.
Officials at the International Criminal Court warned on Friday against efforts to try and sway the court after reports that Israel and its allies are attempting to dissuade the UN court from issuing arrest warrants against senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, over the war in Gaza.
While the ICC “welcomes open communication” with government officials and non-governmental bodies alike, it will only engage in such dialogue so long as it is “consistent with its mandate under the Rome Statute to act independently and impartially,” ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan said in a statement.
The response, perhaps was to a letter, dated 24 April 2024, to which twelve members of the U.S. Senate appended their names, addressed to Prosecutor Khan. It was blunt, but oddly so around its edges. And the signatories did not appear to spend much time on it on their social media platforms. One has to wonder. One wonders if the sudden appearance of this text is not an element in the cognitive warfare enveloping development in this conflict. But constructs also take on a life of their own. And none of its signatories has yet disavowed its contents. Either way it may be worth reading as a provocation and an indication of the trajectories of sentiment. With these caveats, and assuming, then, that it is not a construct, the text of the letter provides:
Mr. Karim A. A. Khan KC Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal Court Oude Waalsdorperweg 10 The Hague, The Netherlands Dear Mr. Khan, We write regarding the reports that the International Criminal Court (ICC) may be considering issuing international arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials. Such actions are illegitimate and lack legal basis, and if carried out will result in severe sanctions against you and your institution. The ICC is attempting to punish Israel for taking legitimate actions of self-defense against their Iranian-backed aggressors. In fact, in your own words, you witnessed "scenes of calculated cruelty'' conducted by Hamas in Israel following the October 7 attacks. These arrest warrants would align the ICC with the largest state sponsor of terrorism and its proxy. To be clear, there is no moral equivalence between Hamas's terrorism and Israel's justified response. The ICC is also prohibited by its charter from proceeding in any case unless the relevant government is unwilling or unable to police themselves. You yourself have said that "Israel has trained lawyers who advise commanders and a robust system intended to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law." By issuing warrants, you would be calling into question the legitimacy of Israel's laws, legal system, and democratic form of government. Issuing arrest warrants for the leaders of Israel would not only be unjustified, it would expose your organization's hypocrisy and double standards. Your office has not issued arrest warrants for Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or any other Iranian official, Syrian President Bashar al Assad or any other Syrian official, or Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh or any other Hamas official. Nor have you issued an arrest warrant for the genocidal General Secretary of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, or any other Chinese official. Finally, neither Israel nor the United States are members of the ICC and are therefore outside of your organization's supposed jurisdiction. If you issue a warrant for the arrest of the Israeli leadership, we will interpret this not only as a threat to Israel's sovereignty but to the sovereignty of the United States. Our country demonstrated in the American Service-Members' Protection Act the lengths to which we will go to protect that sovereignty. The United States will not tolerate politicized attacks by the ICC on our allies. Target Israel and we will target you. If you move forward with the measures indicated in the report, we will move to end all American support for the ICC, sanction your employees and associates, and bar you and your families from the United States. You have been warned.
The letter, a facsimile of which appears above, appears to take the position that courts, at least in this context, are actors confined to the four corners of their jurisdictional mandates within the larger structures of the state system and international law. Somewhat interesting is that the letter did not appear to be generally circulated until 6 May 2024, well after the better reported news that "Three House Republicans from New York wrote a letter Tuesday imploring
the Biden administration to prevent the "sham prosecution" of Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli government officials by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes." (Here). More interesting is the implication that both the prosecutor, and the ICC apparatus as a whole, are in some sense political actors operating within the sensibilities and conduct expectations of a dispute resolution body (perhaps like a national Constitutional Court, e.g. here and here), and to that extent (as well as with respect to its decisions and judgments) responsible for their decisions, will have to bear the political consequences of the choices they make. But that, largely, appears to be the case for a long time within liberal democratic systems (see, e.g., here, and here).
The circulation of that letter, however, does underscore a larger and more important issue. Indeed, as Prosecutor Khan has made clear, the Kompetenz-kompetenz issue is wrapped around what might be in the end a fundamental shift in jurisdictional narratives fueling interpretive exercises: from one in which the ICC and its apparatus understand themselves as "a detached apex of the international criminal justice system" to one in which the ICC and its apparatus are embedded as "a hub of global accountability efforts." Two very different narratives fueling two very different interpretive and operational projects. Two very different structures for the development of an internationalized criminal law. And the intense scrutiny of the Jews in a context in which they are hardly the only players will produce additional lessons, especially respecting the value (now substantial) of building a human wall as a a critical structure for tactical military operations, may well become an important template in other military actions where the level of global scrutiny is less intense. Which prevails remains to be seen. But either one will exact a price.
And again, the consequences of the Hamas actions on 7 October and its
aftermath continue to produce some significant effects.
Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War.” China has continued to expand its nuclear capabilities while the United States feels under pressure to enhance its own capabilities. While some experts describe the bilateral relationship currently as being in a moment of “fragile stability,” this remains precarious. Bilateral military-to-military talks have resumed after Presidents Biden and Xi met in San Francisco last November; and the two sides held a consultation on arms control and nonproliferation last November, but the meeting produced no specific results. During this period of fragile stability, to what extent has risk in the nuclear domain decreased, and what risks remain? What actions do experts recommend both sides take to reduce nuclear risk? What should we expect for the future of U.S.-China nuclear relations?
Tong suggests greater clarity on Chinese perspectives as a point of departure for engagement:
A close assessment of the evolving thinking within China’s political leadership and security policy circles reveals that Chinese officials are not simply expanding their nuclear arsenal for military-technical purposes. Rather, Chinese leaders seem to have embraced the untested belief that nuclear weaponry grants them greater geopolitical leverage to counter perceived threats. Beijing’s objections to what it sees as an unfair U.S. nuclear strategy and illegitimate U.S. security interests further solidify its willingness to use unilateral measures to address its security concerns. Washington must understand how these underlying perceptions shape Beijing’s nuclear policy if it wants to steer the U.S.-Chinese relationship in a more prudent direction—or risk responding on the basis of flawed assumptions, with potentially counterproductive or even catastrophic results. [仔细评估中国高层和安全政策圈内的思想演变显示，中国并非是完全出于军事和技术层面的目的而扩大其核武库。相反，中国领导人似乎接受了一种未经验证的理念，即认为核武器可以赋予中国更大的地缘政治影响力，以对抗其所认为的战略威胁。同时，北京认为美国的核战略不公平、美国追求的安全利益也不合理，这进一步巩固了中方使用自主措施解决战略关切的意愿。华盛顿必须了解这些潜在观念如何塑造了中国的核政策，以推动中美关系朝着更稳定的方向发展，并降低由于错误假设而造成适得其反甚至灾难性后果的风险。] ( "The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion)
Witherspoon, Wichterman, and Shankar suggest the utility lessons from the last nuclear crisis updated in time, space, and place:
Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. * * * The authors draw on these Cold War case studies and as well as Chinese perspectives on CBMs to inform policy recommendations for the modern Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship. The United States and China should institute measures to enhance mutual understanding and foster epistemic communities to generate mutually acceptable shared principles and ideas about nuclear crisis prevention and management, personnel, and mechanisms. These ideas should be discussed among government officials in Track 1 dialogues prior to implementation. Furthermore, the U.S. and China should prioritize reducing risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding by revitalizing direct communications links (DCLs) and strengthening institutions that mimic the functions of the National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. (Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives, p. 7).
The authors all share a fundamental view about the importance of confidence building measures to stabilize and perhaps diffuse the threat. A lively discussion is anticipated. Chinese language announcement and translation of the Tong essay follows (赵通：中国扩大核力量的真实关切).
The Hong Kong National Security law has attracted a substantial amount of attention outside of HR-SAR (eg here, here), and generated the start of what is likely to be a lively judicial debate (eg here). That attention continues to be divided on ideological lines. Those lines have a significant effect on the way in which the issue of HK_SAR position is understood as an actor in international law. The position of China is the most traditional--the HR-SAK is and remains a part of the sovereign territory of China, and that consequently its governance structure is ultimately a matter of China's own constitutional system. China has chosen to develop a One Country Two Systems structure which, after 2020 was built on political solidarity and economic variability. In contrast traditional internationalists, including the UK and elements in the US, reject the Chinese position and instead continue to advance the position that under international law China acknowledged limits in operational sovereignty (in its most narrow version) through 2047 under the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration (and here). A broader view takes the position that Hong Kong's regional political development is protected under international norms. Lastly, a more radical version, held by some, took the last position and argued that Hong Kong was entitled to at least limited self determination because its people and norms had developed autonomously of that on the Mainland and were entitled to international recognition and protection (discussed in my book, Hong Kong Between “One Country” and “Two Systems”).
The ramifications of these divergences continue to be felt. It is much in evidence in the Report of the Asian Lawyers Network (ALN), A Legal Analysis of Hong Kong’s New Safeguarding National Security Ordinance and What it Means for Lawyers. In its announcement of the circulation of that Report ALN explained:
The Asian Lawyers Network (ALN) has written a report on the threats and negative impacts that Hong Kong’s new Safeguarding National Security Ordinance poses for lawyers, which has been cosigned by two other organizations, The 29 Principles and Lawyers for Lawyers. The report lists 11 categories of threats against lawyers under the law, and it recommends that Hong Kong authorities repeal the law, as well as relevant authorities repealing other laws restricting civil and political rights in Hong Kong.
Asian Lawyers Network (ALN) was founded in 2021 as a network of lawyers and activists around the world that advocates for the rights of lawyers and legal activists throughout the Asia region that are subject to arbitrary detention, sanction, and harassment for their legal advocacy, as well as for strengthening standards of protection for lawyers and for civil and political rights generally. (here).
Fortune Teller, Summer Palace Long Corridor, Beijing; Pix credit here
Early in the leadership period of Xi Jinping, the vanguard party offered guidance and leadership on the meaning and practice of atheism for Communist Party cadres. The object of that guidance was 信鬼神 [Belief in Ghosts and Gods]. The object was to distinguish spiritualism, belief in ghosts and gods (信鬼神) from believe in science (相信科学). It builds on a long process of re-imagining Chinese civilization now through the lens of Marxist-Leninist rationality (for a quite interesting readings, see, Xiaofei Kang, Enchanted Revolution: Ghosts, Shamans, and Gender Politics in Chinese Communist Propaganda, 1942-1953 (OUP, 2023). But the move was bound up in the ancient conneciton between the spirit, morality, and the administration of the State that can be traced back in one form or another to earliest times.One gets a sense of this from Remarks delivered by Xi Jinping early in the time of his leadership:
Strengthening ideals and beliefs and adhering to the spiritual pursuit of Communists have always been the foundation for Communists to settle down and live their lives. Belief in Marxism, socialism and communism is the political soul of Communists and the spiritual pillar for Communists to withstand any test. To put it figuratively, ideals and beliefs are the spiritual "calcium" of Communists. Without ideals and beliefs, and if ideals and beliefs are not firm, there will be a spiritual "calcium deficiency" and "rickets." In real life, some party members and cadres have problems of this kind. In the final analysis, they are confused in their beliefs and spiritually lost. (Speech delivered at the first collective study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee on November 17, 2012). 坚定理想信念，坚守共产党人精神追求，始终是共产党人安身立命的根本。对马克思主义的信仰，对社会主义和共产主义的信念，是共产党人的政治灵魂，是共产党人经受住任何考验的精神支柱。形象地说，理想信念就是共产党人精神上的“钙”，没有理想信念，理想信念不坚定，精神上就会“缺钙”，就会得“软骨病”。现实生活中，一些党员、干部出这样那样的问题，说到底是信仰迷茫、精神迷失。（2012年11月17日在十八届中央政治局第一次集体学习时的讲话）(习近平：坚定理想信念 补足精神之钙, 二 [Xi Jinping: Strengthen ideals and beliefs to replenish spiritual calcium, at ¶ 2 ]).
That fundamental position was elaborated a little in 2013 in 官员信鬼神患的是“精神缺钙”病 [Officials who believe in ghosts and gods are suffering from "mental calcium deficiency" disease], the text of which follows below.
But these sorts of pronouncements require constant examples--stories that can be used to illustrate and train. Here is one from the Mudanjiang Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision related by Liao Yongsong and Huang Shi (廖永松 黄师) in in 2023 on cadre "mental "calcium deficiency" and loss of direction" (精神“缺钙” 迷失方向). It is entitled: "Take the case as a lesson | He ended up in jail for lack of ideals and beliefs" [以案为鉴｜理想信念缺失 他终陷囹圄].
Tan Shengxian claimed to be loyal to the party, firmly believed in Marxism-Leninism, and science, but secretly he engaged in feudal superstitious activities. After serving as the main leader of Jinchengjiang District, he did not appreciate the organization's training and trust, but became more superstitious about Feng Shui, and even pinned all his hopes for fame and fortune on gods and Buddhas. In order to "seek luck", Tan Shengxian has been friends with so-called "Feng Shui masters" for a long time. Whenever he encounters difficulties or setbacks in work or life, he invites so-called "Feng Shui masters" to his home or even the office to see Feng Shui, measure good and bad luck, and perform "faithful rituals" with the intention of changing his "fate" and achieving "smooth sailing." In August 2019, after learning that the organization was investigating his violations of discipline and law, Tan Shengxian used his public holidays to visit the statues in the scenic spot, pray for "peace charms" and "amulets", and purchased Five Emperors ancient coins to carry with him, with the intention of protecting his career. In May 2020, after learning that the relevant personnel with whom he had jointly obtained financial funds were subject to organizational review and investigation, Tan Shengxian hired a "Feng Shui master" to perform "legal services" for him at a high price in an attempt to defuse and evade the organizational review and investigation. On the day he was detained by the organization, Tan Shengxian carried an amulet of Five Emperors ancient coins with him. Even the screen saver on his mobile phone was a peace amulet. When the investigators were confiscating his mobile phone, he also asked the investigators to leave him the safety charm on the back of the phone case.
Mentally "calcium deficient" and with incorrect outlook on life, especially a severely distorted outlook on power, Tan Shengxian completely lost his direction in life. During his tenure as the main leader of Jinchengjiang District, he would not refuse red envelopes from his subordinates during holidays, weddings, and weddings. Not only that, he also used his power to intervene and intervene in many engineering projects in the fields of development and reform, finance, transportation, education, water conservancy, urban investment and other fields, greeting and providing help to project bosses in project contracting. 精神上“缺钙”，三观不正，特别是权力观严重扭曲，让覃生贤彻底迷失了人生方向。在担任金城江区主要领导期间，逢年过节、红白喜事，面对下属的红包，他来者不拒。不仅如此，他更是利用手中的权力干预和插手发改、财政、交通、教育、水利、城投等领域多个工程项目，为工程老板在项目承揽方面打招呼、提供帮助。(Ibid.)
And the penalty: expulsion from the Party, a large fine and a long prison sentence. "In February 2022, Tan Shengxian was expelled from the party and public office for serious violations of discipline and law; in August 2022, he was sentenced to 12 years and six months in prison for bribery and corruption, and was fined 1 million yuan." 2022年2月，覃生贤因严重违纪违法被开除党籍和公职；2022年8月，因犯受贿罪、贪污罪被判处有期徒刑十二年六个月，并处罚金100万元。(Ibid.).
The problem is not necessarily belief in ghosts and gods, but rather such a belief is symptomatic of ideological deterioration. That deterioration, in turn, is understood, as the pathway to corruption of all sorts. This line was made clearer in 今日锐评 | 迷信背后是信仰迷失 [Today's critical commentary | Behind superstition is the loss of faith (8 August 2022)]. "If
a person has no faith, his spirit will easily collapse and collapse; if
a party member and cadre does not have strong communist ideals and
Marxist-Leninist beliefs, his soul will become empty, and decadent
things will take advantage of it." (一个人没有信仰，精神就容易坍塌、崩溃；一个党员干部，共产主义理想、马列主义信念不强，心灵就会变得空虚，腐朽没落的东西就会乘虚而入。) (Ibid.).
There are limits, though these come with some ambiguity. In 党纪学习教育·每日一课丨关于党员信仰宗教、搞迷信活动的处分规定 (30 April 2024) (“Party
Discipline Study and Education: Daily Lesson丨Regulations on Penalties
for Party Members to Believe in Religion and Engage in Superstitious
Activities”) the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the State Supervision Commission explained:
In the process of practice, there are two points that need to be grasped: First, the identification of party members’ religious beliefs does not require party members to participate in religious initiation ceremonies or obtain religious certificates such as lay certificates and conversion certificates for lay followers of Buddhism and Taoism. The premise is that the party member has participated in religious activities in a legal religious venue, but the criterion should be that the party member abandons his communist beliefs and believes in a certain religion. The second is to distinguish organizing or participating in superstitious activities from organizing and participating in general folk customs and customary activities, as well as normal participation in tourist activities. Some folk customs and customary activities with historical, cultural traditions and national and regional characteristics cannot be regarded as superstitious activities. Party members and cadres occasionally visit some temples, Taoist temples, churches and other legal religious venues to visit or participate in activities and ceremonies. The purpose is only for sightseeing or work, and should not be regarded as participating in superstitious activities. 实践过程中，有两点需要把握：一是认定党员信仰宗教问题的，既不以党员参加入教仪式或取得佛道教在家信徒的居士证、皈依证等宗教类证件为前提，也不以在合法宗教活动场所参加过宗教活动为前提，而是应当以该党员背弃共产主义信仰，信仰某一宗教为判定标准。二是把组织或参加迷信活动与组织、参加一般的民俗、习俗活动，以及正常参加游览活动区分开来。不能把一些有着历史文化传统和民族、区域特色的民俗、习俗活动当成迷信活动。党员干部偶尔到一些寺庙、道观、教堂等合法宗教活动场所参观游览或参加活动仪式等，其目的仅仅是为了游览或工作，也不应认定为参加迷信活动。
Context matters, as does place, space and time. And the ideal against which much is measured is corruption. Corruption, interestingly enough, is now measured, at least conceptually, against the expectations of decisions undertaken n the spirit of the Mass Line. "To further inquire, for a leading cadre who "does not ask the people but ghosts and gods", how much can he listen to the demands and sufferings of the people? How scientifically can the various principles and policies of the party and the country be implemented?" (进一步追问，对于一个“不问苍生问鬼神”的领导干部，百姓的诉求、群众的疾苦能听多少？党和国家的各项方针政策能科学地落实多少？) (今日锐评 | 迷信背后是信仰迷失).
The Russian Revolution might be understood as a series of eruptions between 1905. Each built on the others (and not necessarily in a linear way) and each contributed to the construction of critical narratives cobbled together by a large group of groups united only in their ambition to topple the IMperial government--one way or another. Each of these events, then, semiotically at least, might be understood as knots in a very special kind of garrote which, when strung together on the narratives being woven, could be used to strangle the apparatus of a Russian Imperial government who collectively were unable to grasp the meaning of and serving as moments in and
through which a quite anarchist environment of opposition groups could
be both sustained and solidified. All that was needed for the necessary context in which that garrote could be used, and that context could be constructed by inflamed passions and a successful effort to de-legitimate the apparatus selected for extinction. Once done, the anarchist space could do its own work, leaving it only for the groups united in opposition, to cull their ranks until only one remained.
That, of course, has absolutely nothing to so with events since Seattle in 1999; Genoa G8 in 2011; or the 2011 Occupy movement (for an interesting take here). They could not be understood as knots on a revolutionary garrote. Nor does the methodologies of 19th century anarcho-revolutionary movements and the well ordered disciplinary cells built around it have anything to tell us about the semiotics of engineering social disintegration--especially with respect to the value and understanding (much less the application) of its core norms and fundamental mission. Nor does it offer any insight into the ossification, dissipation, and decay of contemporary boyars who through a combination of arrogance, laziness, and a sense that neither time nor context change as generations are born and die, add their contribution to the decay of political solidarity, a core solidarity which at the fundamental level is necessary element of the cohesion required to preserve a mass political collective.
Still, it may be instructive to understand the impulse toward revolutionary action. In this case not so much as a morality story about the preservation of a society unwilling or unable to defend itself and protect its values, instill loyalty and commitment to its values, enhance the solidarity of its mass organs in principle and action. Rather, it is useful for understanding key insights about successful revolutionary movements, and, of course, the successful utilization of decay and corruption as a sort of compost in which revolutionary mass organizations can cultivate what might emerge--out of violence necessary for the destruction of one, and the constitution of another, binding collective orthodoxy.
To those ends it may be useful to consider how contemporary revolutionary movements operate and what that might tell us about the enduring principles from out of which any society can be de-stabilized, its strengths used against it, and the ruthless exploitation of the laziness, decay and self-absorption of that society's leadership caste, as well as its mindless self indulgence of exaggerated tendencies toward its edges, can be turned into knots in contemporary garrotes to be vigorously tightened by the leadership castes of revolutionary movements. One useful venue for acquiring a glimpse of this are the folks at CrimethInc.
Crimethink is everything that evades control: the daydream in the classroom, the renegade breaking ranks, the spray-painted walls that continue to speak even under martial law. It is the persistent sense that things could be otherwise, that there is nothing natural or inevitable about the prevailing social order. In a world optimized for administration, everything that cannot be classified or displayed on a screen is crimethink. It is the spirit of rebellion without which freedom is literally unthinkable. (About CrimethInk)
In the context of the anarchist movements which, like their predecessors that became so potent after the constitution of Empire in Europe from 1848 but took on a more permanent institutional form the 1860s, contemporary anarchist movements became so potent in the wake of the constitution of global empire after the collapse of the Soviet imperial systems (the last--to that point of territoriality based ethno-nationalist Empire fueled by some sort of religious solidarity structures, in that case their version of Marxist-Leninism). There are enormous differences of course. Each is activated by the "flavor of the month" triggers that ignites passions: in the 19th century those included issues of class, hierarchy, and the positive values of ethno-xenophilia. In this century the triggers are identitarian, self-actualizing, and "anti" (anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-(hetero)nomrative and like their predecessors committed to a "re-set" or "re-boot" of societies as a function of some sort of ideal state). Until then, secrecy, anonymous collective action, and interlinking of disparate revolutionary groups connected principally by their opposition to whatever orthodoxy they seek in their own contextual circumstances to overthrow (the CrimethInk version here) . Each are parts of the weave through which the collection of eruptive knots can again be strung together in a revolutionary garrote.
While it remains for the future decades to fully understand the "1905"repercussions of 1999 and the events of Seattle and thereafter Genoa, the Occupy Movement and Ferguson (2014) and George Floyd (2020) protests etc. (contemporary elites in power are caught between fear and infatuation as they have been since the start of the post-colonial era; TIME named “The Protester” the person of the year in 2011), there is little doubt that those lessons and those connections were not lost on contemporary revolutionary movement. While the global empire (in all of its ideological forms) continued to naval gaze after 1999, revolutionary movements reinvested anarchism with its old semiotic potentiality, as a conceptual space within which the bubbling brew of revolutionary multiplicity might find a common space to work on the larger project--the undermining the entire apparatus of global empire, one variation of which at a time. For the moment, the American elite apparatus appears to be an excellent target; others will follow, or will better prepare for what global revolutionary anarchism believes is coming.
Understand that there is a difference between anarchism and chaos. Anarchism speaks to order without a center. Whether it is a stable state remains to be seen. It has certainly sometimes been a violent system in that sense that while order is sublime, its lack of a center provides substantial spaces for contestants within its ordering principles. But not always. Chaos speaks to disorder--a system in which systemicity is itself the enemy; it is the ultimate paradox of solidarity, and thus while extraordinarily potent, has a very short half-life. (Human) Nature tends to find its way back to order--and often to a compulsory orthodoxy of some or other.
"Do not let “centering Palestine” serve as a rationale to become less disruptive. The war machine killing Palestinians is an essential part of the war-making institutions of the US empire, which includes not only universities and weapons contractors, but the economy itself. All of these are interconnected with other governments and colonial projects around the world. Stopping the genocide of the Palestinians means challenging every aspect of the prevailing world order. . . As the struggle against Cop City in Atlanta has made clear, the oppression of the Palestinian people represents a blueprint for a possible future for all of us. . . . In the long run, the only way to end the genocide in Gaza will be to the dismantle the American war machine and the corporate board rooms that drive it." (Why the State Can’t Compromise with the Gaza Solidarity Movement:And What That Means for Us )
"Why are the police being so heavy-handed? Why are the media contorting themselves into increasingly bizarre contradictions to condemn the protests? Why are the Democrats and the Republicans united in opposing these protests? And how is it that, in their haste to crack down, university administrations, politicians, and police appear to have forgotten the basic principles of protest management?" (Ibid.).
The answers start from the re-imagination of the actions in Gaza as a semiotic signification of something far greater than that microcosm. If Gaza is a semiotic firstness (object), its signification (how to constitute its meaning, secondness) is critical for the elaboration of a powerful interpretation aligned with the imaginaries or lebenswelt (Lifeworld) of the collective, that is, its thirdness. Fundamental to that answer is the notion of contradiction: (1) the contradiction of liberal democratic principles of universal human rights and the support for what the narrative must characterize as white settler-colonialism (which, in another project, must be distinguished from mass migrations that are part of a positive migratory discourse); the inevitable connection between this contradiction and genocide; (2) much more easily exploitable, the contradiction between the idea of the university and its dependence on funding by the forces of genocide, global empire, and conservatism, and (3) the contradiction between the ideal of free speech and the suppression of speech performance by students and their allies (ibid.). The old recourse of class struggle in this context, just a whiff, is quite interesting.
The essay notes that pattern, and indirectly, the power of constituting knots strung together within a coherent narrative structure.
"There is no way for Democrats to give the Israeli government carte blanche to carry out genocide while buying the votes of those who believe that the lives of Palestinians have inherent value. This makes for a situation that may be unique among all the mass struggles in recent history. Centrist media outlets and Democratic politicians were prepared to countenance the George Floyd Uprising of 2020 in hopes of drawing activists back into the fold of policy negotiations. They thought that they could exploit those protests to build an electoral base against Trump during an election year. This moment is different. It is impossible for the Democrats to budge at all now because both parties have hinged their political platforms on unequivocal support of the Israeli government, condemning any opposition as anti-Semitic. Democratic politicians have continued doubling down on that position even as it has become more and more preposterous. The fact that the Democrats now control the federal government prevents them from benefiting from outrage against what is effectively a bipartisan policy. In that sense, there is a sort of symmetry here. While the (first?) Trump era ended with the George Floyd Uprising, cementing the ascendancy of direct action tactics at the culmination of four years of resistance to Trump, the Biden era appears to be ending with a conflagration of its own, signifying an irreparable break between the centrists and the autonomous movements they have long sought to co-opt." (Ibid., emphasis supplied)
In the larger context then, important insights might be gleaned. The first: "Every occupation that disbands after winning minor concessions will only pave the way for genocide." The second "Do not let “centering Palestine” serve as a rationale to become less disruptive." The third: "This is about you, too." The fourth: "Those concerned with their personal safety should not deny others the freedom to take risks that they are willing to accept." (bid.).
Of course, the tools of revolutionary anarchism do not, in themselves, have an ideology. Any group can utilize its methods, outlooks, premises as and to the extent they like, infusing it with their own ideological flavors. What joins them all, of course, from Antifa to radical libertariansm is the outward commitment to autonomy, but an inward commitment to the ordering principles and expectations, the guardrails, within which that autonomy may be exercised. That, ultimate, contradiction, inevitably ties even the most radical anarchism to global empire in its liberal democratic, Marxist-Leninist, theocratic, or post-colonial variation. No matter how far "out" one is always "in" something. Or, in the language of a more radical anarchism--order requires no center--it is, however, a system of order, and ecologies of order--however they present themselves from era to era. It is this formative insight, of course, that one finds the counter to anarchism--its strength can be used against it as its cadres use the strengths of oppositional systems to the same effect. And back one goes to power relationships and the management and control of collective meaning making, the collective semiotics of control--and the need for power to attach to itself an ordering principle around which a compelling narrative may be spun consisting of the thing itself (object), the attachment of a strategic meaning to that object (signification), and the deployment of that signification in the construction of a shared narrative reality (operationalization of aggregated signified objects that can be applied for problem solving and social control) within which everything can be understood (interpretation).
Links to the essay as well a to reports from the field (universities in which students have been active) follow below. Together, they provide a much better picture from the inside of the larger issues for which Gaza serves as the latest useful eruption.
I post the Statement without comment. I do note the reporting that:"A spokesperson for Columbia Law School told Fox News Digital that the exam schedule would proceed forward."Law School exams resumed on Thursday, May 2, after a one-day suspension, and will be administered through the conclusion of the exam period," the statement reads." (here).
It was in Kant, to call to mind only what is generally known, that modern speculative thought, feeling itself mature and come of age, became tired of the guardianship in which it had lived hereto under dogmatism and, like the prodigal son, went to its father and demanded that he divide and share the inheritance with it. The outcome of this division of the inheritance is well known, and also that speculation did not have to go abroad in order to squander its resources, because there was no wealth to be found. The more the I in criticism became absorbed in contemplation of the I, the leaner and leaner the I became, until it ended with becoming a ghost, immortal like Aurora's husband. . . . Because reflection was continually reflecting about reflection, thinking went astray, and every step it advanced led further and further, of course, from any content. (Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (Howard Hong and Edna Hong, trans; Princeton University Press, 1989 (1841)), p. 272.
While students and others sharing their views and methods have been gathering on university campuses to perform their viewpoints and advocate for an embrace of their way of seeing things, doing things, and resolving things relating to the situation (broadly understood) in the MENA but focused, for the moment on the Israeli response in Gaza to the Hamas attacks of 7 October, it appears that other students and those sharing their views have taken to the courts to seek the prevention, mitigation, and remediation of adverse impact on their own rights against representatives of those performing what they view as the full extent of the rights under the 1st Amendment to the US constitution on shared space.
On 1 May 2024, a lawsuit in the federal courts of Virginia: Maya
Parizer et al. v. AJP Educational Foundation, Inc. a/k/a American
Muslims for Palestine and National Students for Justice in PalestineCase 1:24-cv-00724 US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Filed 05/01/24) (access here also). The case represents the first, though no doubt not the last, effort to transpose the action on the grounds of the university into the courts. It does so not by seeking remedy for the speech acts of the students and their allies, but rather by linking the organizations connected with those efforts to the multinational operational chains that support or act for or are complicit with the rights impacting actions of Hamas.
It parallels an investigation, launched in October 2023 by the Virginia Attorney General. "Attorney General Jason Miyares today announced that the Office of the
Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Section has opened an
investigation into AJP Educational Foundation, Inc., also known as
American Muslims for Palestine, for potential violations of Virginia’s
charitable solicitation laws" (here), an action condemned by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee in a Statement as well as by the defendant American Muslims for Palestine.
The gravamen of the suit is quite interesting. It argues a form of complicity on the part of the named defendant organizations. That this that they are complicit in the continuing gross human rights violations of those whose interests they serve under cover of the protection of the constitutional orders of host states. "There is a legal chasm between independent advocacy and knowingly serving as the propaganda and recruiting wing of a Foreign Terrorist Organization in the United States. AMP and NSJP are the latter. They are not innocent advocacy groups, but rather the propaganda arm of a terrorist organization operating in plain sight." (Complainant, p. 3). The Complaint, and the claims it advances, are ones with potential substantial ramifications for
the development of the law of complicity, facilitation, and aiding and
abetting--concepts already being broadened in the context of business
and human rights in Europe (on facilitation and complicity here and here; and at its edges here)--as well as for the interpretation and
application of the US Anti-Terrorism Act and more generally sanctions based regimes (eg here, here, and here). And at the fringes and in the
shadows, a potentially necessary discussion of the borderlands between
speech acts and acts of complicity and facilitation. There is no reason to think that like any other object, speech itself can also serve as an instrument of terror under the Act, or as the means of producing substantial adverse human rights impacts in specific contexts. Likewise complicity based relationships may be generated around speech acts that either facilitate the work of Terrorist organizations (as officially listed by a State) and within its domestic legal order or adverse human rights impacts. This becomes more important as the idea of narrative as a tool for destabilizing a society or corrupting a discourse becomes a common theme of war (see, e.g. here, here, and here). It is against these changing conditions that traditional principles about the US 1st Amendment may have to be dynamically interpreted to be suitable to the historical era in which it must be applied. That, certainly, will likely be the thrust of some arguments that may be put forward in this case. These are all important subjects that require some discussion
in these rapidly changing times in which many of the old assumptions
about the way things worked and their inter-relationships may be subject
to some stress.
The plaintiffs are those who suffered injury, or whose close relatives were murdered, on or about 7 October 2023 at the Nova Music Festival and in places near there (Complaint ¶¶ 1-9). The defendants are described this way:
10. Defendant AJP Educational Foundation, Inc. a/k/a American Muslims for Palestine (“AMP”) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation incorporated in California with its principal place of business in Falls Church, Virginia. In a separate action, AMP is accused of being the successor entity to two organizations currently dodging a judgment exceeding $150 million under the Antiterrorism Act for providing material support to Hamas.1 11. Defendant National Students for Justice in Palestine (“NSJP”) is an unincorporated association without a formal principal place of business or publicly identified leadership structure. NSJP was founded by AMP to provide it on-campus management and control of hundreds of university chapters of Students for Justice in Palestine (“SJP”). AMP controls NSJP and uses it to operate a propaganda machine for Hamas and its affiliates across American college campuses.
1. See First Amended Complaint, Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine, No. 1:17-CV-3591 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2019), ECF 179 [henceforth, “Boim FAC”]. That matter is ongoing. See also Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine, 9 F.4th 545 (7th Cir. 2021). (Complaint ¶¶ 10-11).
The factual allegations provide a chronology of the genesis of the defendants from and connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestine Committee alleged to serve as a funding source for Hamas and to advance their joint political religious and ethnic objectives in the regions (Complaint ¶¶ 19-41). The contours of that strategy was then described as a terror by propaganda strategy (Complaint ¶¶ 47-73) along with a description of what was alleged to be material aid to Hamas beyond mere strong sympathy for the views and aims of Hamas (Complaint ¶¶ 74-108).
All of this was proffered in aid of the Complaint's principal objective--
116. This case is not about independent political advocacy. It is about organizations whose very creation was intended to provide continuous, systematic, and substantial assistance to a Foreign Terrorist Organization and its allies. 117. The law distinguishes between those who engage in independent advocacy and those who are providing a service to FTOs. Defendants do not just assist Hamas but see themselves as part of the movement Hamas controls—the same movement that attacked Plaintiffs and continues to attack them to this day. There is no doubt that Defendants fall into the latter category. 118. The assistance Defendants provide to Hamas through their propaganda is material, critical, systematic, and of significant monetary value. In fact, Defendants’ substantial assistance is invaluable. Hamas is unable by law to retain public relations services in the United States, but if it could, these services would be prohibitively expensive. For comparison, the state of Qatar spent $200 million on one lobbying campaign alone in 2017,122 including millions to various public relations firms.123 119. It is not just Defendants’ propaganda that provides substantial assistance to Hamas; they are similarly responsible for providing Hamas with substantial assistance through their control, management, and instigation of various acts of domestic terrorism, including violent acts for the express benefit of Hamas and its allies. (Complaint, ¶¶ 116-119).
The complaint is grounded on the Anti Terrorism Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 2331 et seq. Section 2333(a) provides that
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees. (8 USC §2333(a)).
Section 2333(d)(2) provides that liability may be asserted against any person (as defined in the Statute) that aids and abets ("liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism." Relying in its reading of Twitter v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471 (2023), the Complaint asserts that "defendant may be liable under the Antiterrorism Act even without a “strict nexus” between the substantial assistance and the act of international terrorism so long as there is “a foreseeable risk” of such act. Indeed, in some cases, “defendant’s role in an illicit enterprise can be so systemic that the secondary defendant is aiding and abetting every wrongful act committed by that enterprise.” (Complaint ¶ 123, quoting in part Twitter v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471, 495-9). From there, the Plaintiffs summarize their complaint:
By aiding and abetting Hamas in committing, planning, or authorizing acts of international terrorism, including the acts that caused each of the U.S. Plaintiffs to be injured in his or her person and property, Defendants are liable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d) for, threefold any and all, damages that U.S. Plaintiffs have sustained as a result of such injuries, and the costs of this suit, including attorney's fees. (Complaint, ¶ 134).
