The New Order for the Ages? "Trump's Tariffs," Fractured Territories and the Discursive (Re)Ordering of the Global

 

Pix credit here (Great Seal of the United States)

 One tends to ignore seals of powerful (and less powerful) places. And yet the way a state names itself can have powerful reverberations on its self constitution.  

Cultures tied to the tradition of Abrahamic religions encounter this semiotic reality of signifying the world around the central figure of humanity under the leadership of God (Gen 2:118-19 (Adam naming all of the creatures brought before him by God), and lists. Lists are found throughout the Bible and provide a detailed description of historical connection, of pedigree, of the passage of time, and of the thing that is listed by reference to the quality the lists chronicle in common (eg, Gen 5:1-32 (the generations separating Adam from Noah and the first destruction of humanity). Guiguzi speaks of Ming (名)--of naming, of defining accurately, and of drawing distinctions, a concept that itself was closely though controversially tied to that of shi (实) of actuality, truth, or essence of the thing names (Guiguzi, Guiguzi: China’s First Treatise on Rhetoric: A Critical Translation and Commentary (Hui Wu (trans) (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2016), p. 156; 60 n. 26. (Xi Jinping's Semiotics of Marxism (名实) and the Coding Languages of Knowledge Platform).

Pix credit Wall Street Journal

And so it is with the "naming" of the United States--a novus ordem seclorum (something like a new order for the ages), but, in the style of Genesis, one in which annuit cœptis, a higher power favors the undertaking. But there is an ironic semiosis to all of this that is worth recalling before one indulges in the sort of hysterics that has becomes the set pattern of engagement with the Trump Administration (that, of course, and the courts--yet that is a story for a different sort of essay, see, e.g., here). The novus ordem seclorum suggests both time and framing. Yet it ought to be remembered that both time and order is measured by reference to humans, and that humans tend to measure things in relation to themselves, and that humanity as a measure  tends to view time and space as a function of stages of human development which arcs both within the lifespan of a generation and within that of the social collective that time frames for humanity. The short version of all of that might be vulgarized in expressions like "nothing lasts forever," or an human epoch may be measures by the pace in which society moves from one stage of historical development to another."  The annuit cœptis is also a semiotic joke on humanity--a higher power does indeed look favorably on an endeavor. . . . until that higher power does not. Human have no control over the choices the higher power makes, though they do work relentlessly to try to manage, interpret, and fulfill in human terms (perhaps hijack as well) whatever it is may be discerned from the intents, wants, desires etc. of that higher power. And ideology incarnates that higher power in a variety of context suitable ways that also change over time.  

Pix credit here

All of this provides a necessary framing for consideration of the recent events that, like a slow motion train wreck, or the sinking of an unsinkable ship, incorporates the arrogance of an age, its conceits, and its utter failure to understand the character of belief that both gives form to and that undermines the inevitability or eternity of unchanging perfected rules or pathways in, as and on human collectives. And so it is with globalization. What had appeared to be inevitable--in either its Marxist-Leninist or liberal democratic variation--and which for a moment in time seemed somewhat attainable (though as passions fade and memories are (re)constructed that may be subject to some discussion)--now to no one's surprise lies in shatters in a way that even the most creative propaganda department will find hard to contort back to another and more pleasant reality. 

Why no surprise? Because both the discourse and the actions of states and other actors have pointed in this direction (while appearing to speak in the direction of globalization) for the greater part of this century; because while all collectives loved the ideal of unity, no one was yet willing to abide the vision of the collectivity except that held by themselves; because, in the end, those who had the power to impose their vision had neither the ruthlessness, nor consistency, nor will to see it through; perhaps because, as the 20th century ought to have taught one, in this time in the historical development of human collectives, the power of collective suicide appears to be directly proportional to the power of collective hegemony; and perhaps meta-systems have the sort of sense of humor that inevitably produces the poorest judgment among  who play a role in decisive moments of history.  Who is to say?  Semiotics suggests (like the cyclical theories of history from the medieval Arab world and antiquity, and others in virtually all centers of collective civilization (self understood as such) that indeed that dialectic between the individual human, the human collective, and between the natural and virtual human person and collective, now enhanced by technology, produces  patterns and trajectories of action/understanding that that is inevitably managed by death and regeneration.  Or as certain strains of Marxist-Leninist theory would put it  (colloquially) contradiction always messes up everything. Eternity is always in motion and never entirely in one place or time. And it is certainly never embedded in any human, though a human may be invested with such a supposition by the management and articulation of a belief in that embedding.

This, then, may be as useful a starting point as any (unless one's taste runs to the conventional and shepherd managed discourses quite popular at levels of social relations in this era) for thinking about the "end" or "transformation" or "abandonment" etc. of globalization. And perhaps, that puts intp a more useful frame the reporting and reaction in the wake of the Trump Administration's extravagant performance of the funeral rituals of a thing everyone loved to hate, and hated to love (especially from the comforts of their globalization fueled daily lives--but privation is a virtue we are now told by those without the ability to preserve the structures of plenty and expand it as promises). 

“The U.S. has been at the center of globalization,” said Andre Sapir, a former EU official who is now economics professor at the Free University of Brussels. “Now the U.S., the center, wants to pull away.” (Trump Tariffs Aim to Bring Down Curtain on Era of Globalization)

And that is so.  The U.S., certainly, was at the center of a form of globalization, but it was a form of globalization that produced a broad challenge, from its characterization as an induced global fugue state (especially for post-colonial and developing states), to a fight for narrative hegemony to match the structural hemegomies built into the system. Thus, this might be argued: Critical actors liked the idea of convergence--as long as they could have it their way. It thus took a bit of ruthlessness--and sacrifice--to build and maintain whatever it was one could build and maintain. That appeared to be impossible to maintain in the long run (measured in human terms). The hegemon lost its taste for ruthlessness; becane out of touch; its elites certainly became increasingly aristocratic (and not in a good way) enclosed within virtual, ideological, and bureaucratic spaces (Forbidden Cities).  And events overwhelmed a system running on inertia, conceits, and an arrogant presumption that its processes were "automatic." 

And so the collective, abstracted, and incarnated children played, and in play tended to be hard on their toys and sometimes harder on their playmates (but that has always been a problem for the poor with rich friends).

Pix credit here (Kali c. 1910)

And they still play.  With a sort of manic and unrealistic hope that what is happening is merely a blip in the system that will carry on despite us, the managed reaction has been semiotically interesting.  First there is the throw back narratives well played in the media by opponents of Mr. Trump's bad manners in accelerating the pace of events in ways that offer no expiation for whatever sins and wrongs ought to be expiated. These are built around the narratives of "trade war" (recalling the 1920s-30s and inevitably the 1940s), the dress rehearsals for which were undertaken during the first Trump Administration.  They are effective as far as it goes, especially by those who believe that they can still retain the system but find in these actions an opportunity (in narrative certainly) to substitute themselves for the old hegemon.  One can hardly blame them--especially the Chinese and the EU--who have been rolling out their own narrative variations for years. And it is more discursively delightful when one can personalize events--Trump's Tariffs both rolls off the tongue (in English anyway) and suggests that it is a personal aberration (like 2016-2020) which can be as easily excised as it would be to remove the person whose name graces the events. 

And yet, from at least one perspective, what Mr. Trump managed, in the usual ham handed way that appears to be the operating style (and the theatrics) of this administration, was merely to make unavoidable, and to accelerate the pace of, the disintegration of that great vision which for a moment dominated collective life on the planet (however passionately contested it was). And Mr. Trump has had a lot of help along the way. Convergence was fractured discursively decades ago. And it was being dismantled in the ast decade through projects everywhere, from the dual circulation strategies of Marxist-Leninism, to the Brussels Effects ideologies of Europe, to the systemic approaches of the post-colonial Global South. That is not to say that convergence has disappeared--quite the reversed, it has become more important than ever, but t is fractured now. It is being reconstructed within hub and spoke state to state constructs being attempted to be built on the foundations of globalization through Belt & Road and America First Initiatives. It s attempted to be reconstructed in more modest ways by South.South  integration efforts.  But is all marked by what the South-South community pioneered in ALBA and the Chinese refined as win-win relations--transactional, and uneven in the sense that the value of transactional relations is not measured by a single standard but is a function of the value that each participant apples to the transaction (and their aggregation) as a function of their national needs and national circumstances. Indeed, if there is a globalization to be extracted from its transformation or dismantling (it doesn't matter to the realities of the ground though the naming will have powerful directional and rationalizing effects on whatever it is that emerges) it is one built around B&R, ALBA, America First and (among the most reactionary of the lot) Brussels Effects cores, grounded in unequal transactions, and bundled together by aggregations of transactions, control of supply chains and trade roots at the core, with a large and "unofficial" range of territories beyond civilized space which will be used, cordoned off, and effectively left to its own devices (except to the extent that some parts of it come under the umbrella of trade or supply territorialization. That is a nice bleak vision of our novus ordem seclorum which if successful in one certainly that can attest to annuit cœptis, and certainly for those for whom the old vision remains vital and important. In a sense in order to reach Mr. Trump's Golden Age for America it may be necessary to travel on the bronze age pathways of global convergence based globalization as conceived at the end of the 20th century.  That would likely be viewed as positive by those who adhere to that vision, and as quite disastrous for its opponents.

Pix Credit Poster Marat/Sade Movie 1967

All of this analysis is wrong, of course. And necessarily so, certainly from a discursive perspective. From a semiotic perspective none of this was, is or will happen. In other words, the power of the discourse orients vision, understanding, and conception. The power of the collective signification of the discursive tropes of globalization are vitally necessary to mask and permit the effective transition from one set of interpretive systems to another with minimal disruption to the cognitive cages within which societal collectives remain stable.  Mr. Trump's worst sin, then, is to unmask that semiotics, but with a semiotic interpretive landscape of his own. And that discursive semiotics with its transformation of the signification of objects (Tariffs)  and its re-rationalization of collective interpretive spaces, poses a problem for those committed to the stability enhancing value of the prior discourse and its idealized signification. The problem, though, is that this semiotic stabilization invites challenge precisely because of its increasing distance from its own phenomenology (the actions taken by states and others with the power to do so).

Either way, events appear to continue to proceed along its current pathways; and in that, the contradictions, desires, and actions of the key actors will have been fulfilled in the most ironic of ways. And so what will likely happen is that there will be e renewal of the narratives of a way of organizing the world that will be increasingly from the realities on the ground. That this discourse will be used strategically and instrumentally as a facade--a facade to make more palatable the transformation of the system into forms the structures of which are already quite visible. And those who would see in this transformation  now led by the United States (in its usual way of doing things) will find in it an opportunity to challenge its hegemony (first discursively, a process begun really in the 1970s and now well structured and nimble), and then in reality. That may or may not be successful. Great states tend to destroy themselves before creating the space in and through which others may finish the job. It is not clear that  this is what is happening here.  Certainly the Trump Administration thinks it is building by destroying, and the Trump Administration's opponents will also likely rebuild on what is destroyed (some of which they contributed to given the fierce fighting in the last several decades for the "soul" of globalization). Either way, Mr. Trump's Liberation Day rhetorical tropes will likely come in handy. Time will tell, and periods of transitions tend to be bad moments for robust prediction other than that things are indeed changing as the U.S. moves from one stage of its historical development to another. And yet one cannot help thinking that one is here well in the semiotics of Marat/Sade (Peter Weiss, The Persecution and Assassination of Jean-Paul Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton Under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade (Play 1963, Movie 1967). Certainly the political semiotics resonate in ways that ought to trouble those who will remain blissfully untroubled; cognitive cages keep things out as well as ensure that things stay in.

And yet, ironically, for the rest there is little to do but push back (Von der Leyen vows to use all cards to 'push back' against Trump's reciprocal tariffs). China has taken the same position publicly at least (China urges US to immediately lift tariffs, vows retaliation; Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun’s Regular Press Conference on April 3, 2025). 

China’s Finance Ministry said it will match Mr. Trump’s plan for 34 percent tariffs on goods from China with its own 34 percent tariff on imports from the United States. Separately, China’s Ministry of Commerce said it was adding 11 American companies to its list of “unreliable entities,” essentially barring them from doing business in China or with Chinese companies. (Trump’s Trade War Escalates as China Retaliates With 34% Tariffs)

Perhaps in doing so they will push forward. And indeed, at least discursively, the appearance is one of pushing back both against the U.S. but also back in time. But to where; to what? It is unlikely that there is a "sweet spot" in time and conceptual space to which the community of States can return. More importantly, pushing back in kind merely underscores the point that the Trump Administration was making--it plays into their strategy, which would not appear to be the wisest course  for those seeking to break that initiative and the use of its methods. Indeed,  any push back strategy necessarily puts its users in a reactive rather than an active position. Increasingly it appears that this is no longer "Trump's" Tariffs.  

Alternatives are not likely precisely because these would have to defend precisely the core of the old convergence globalization that the U.S.'s opponents have also effectively rejected (except, of course for its discursive power, and infused with new signification, and as propaganda or cover). Many key states, and certainly the intellectuals, officials, and academics driving discourse were all over themselves in their zeal to expose, condemn and seek the reconstitution of the old unitary consensus model Any alternatives, for example a tariff free united front excluding the U.S., would require resolution of the differences that had been tearing the old consensus apart for decades. That is unlikely.  And no one right now is willing to give up on the unstated premises behind the fracture--the return of sovereignty, national interest and state security, all, of course, with national characteristics. "Trumpism" it seems may be the name that might be given to the new era if only because it appears to be the only conceptual framework around which there is global consensus (with national characteristics and for national ends).

In the meantime and while all of this is going on it may be worth remembering that transitions like this one can be harsh, brutal, and violent.  More importantly, perhaps, it might well be kept in mind that those who control the risks, strategies, and power over all of these actions etc. are not the ones who will have to bear the risks of bad decisions, or the costs of transitions. Those will be borne by the masses for whom all of this is said to undertaken. And the masses have been known to upend dynasties, systems, and ways of doing things from time to time. And thus back to the politics of Marat/Sade.

Pix credit The Golden Age by Joachim Wtewael, 1605