(Zhiwei Tong, PIX (c) Larry Catá Backer)
For 2012, this site introduces the thought of Zhiwei Tong (童之伟), one of the most innovative scholars of constitutional law in China. Professor Tong has been developing his thought in part in a essay site that was started in 2010. See, Larry Catá Backer, Introducing a New Essay Site on Chinese Law by Zhiwei Tong, Law at the End of the Day, Oct. 16, 2010. Professor Tong is on the faculty of law at East China University of Political Science and Law. He is the Chairman of the Constitution Branch of the Shanghai Law Society and the Vice Chairman of the Constitution Branch of the China Law Society.
The Zhiwei Tong (童之伟) Series focuses on translating some of Professor Tong's work on issues of criminal law and justice in China, matters that touch on core constitutional issues. Each of the posting will include an English translation from the original Chinese, the Chinese original and a link to the original essay site. Many of the essays will include annotations that may also be of interest. I hope those of you who are interested in Chinese legal issues will find these materials, hard to get in English, of use. I am grateful to my research assistants, YiYang Cao and Zhichao Yi for their able work in translating these essays.
(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2012)
Part XXV—Zhiwei Tong (童之伟) Series: Petitioning System and the Constitution of China (Part III)
First Published March 19, 2011
Part I of this essay was published at Part XV—Zhiwei Tong (童之伟) Series: The Petitioning System and the Constitution of China):
Part II of this essay was published at Part XXIV—Zhiwei Tong (童之伟) Series: Petitioning System and the Constitution of China (Part II).
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5)
Strategies to solve problems created by petitioning
What are the petitioning problems? The term “petitioning
problems” mainly refers to the set of pressure and stress brought about by
petitioning visits conducted by citizens, legal persons or other organization
without following statutory dispute-resolution procedure and by receptions and
processing of petitioning visits by relevant public institutions that would
create damages to the status and authority of the core political system.
Petitioning problems have two major forms:
one form consists of the pressure and stress brought about by visits
conducted by citizens, legal persons and other organization going around or
disordering statutory dispute-resolution procedures; the other form consists of
the pressure and stress caused by the inefficiency of the core political system
which forces problems, that should be solved by the main channels of the core
system, to rush into the petitioning channel and seek remedies through the
petitioning system. The cause for this type of pressure and stress can be
described by “overload for auxiliary system as the core system lacks relevant
functions.” Therefore, the expression “solve petitioning problems” in this
article refers to the elimination and resolution of the two above mentioned
negative forms of petitioning, it does not mean to eliminate petitioning or
reception of petitions. In reality, it is possible to find to some extent
phenomena regarding petitioning similar to those mentioned in this article in
any countries under the rule of law nowadays, the difference is that people use
different language or terms to conceptualize these phenomena. Therefore,
petitioning is normal, the auxiliary function of the petitioning system and processing
of petitions without harm to the core political system can strengthen the
constitutional framework.
Radically speaking, the only way to solve petitioning
problems is to build and improve the functional capabilities of the core system;
there are no better ways beside this.
In order to enhance the functional capabilities of our
country’s justice-promotion system as a whole, it is necessary to form specific
consensus on its reform and construction, based on the clear understanding of
the relationship between the core system and the petitioning system.
Admittedly, in past decades, different mechanisms were applied and coordinated
inappropriately during the justice-promotion process guided by the core and
auxiliary systems, causing conflicts and competition between the core and
auxiliary systems. Opinion holders with different views on the petitioning system
have all noticed the above point, and have all tried to provide a prescription
of their own to solve petitioning problems.
Some researchers of the petitioning system have provided
many prescriptions, but generally these prescriptions do not look very
symptomatic. As stated, expansionists hope to elevate the legal status of and
add functional power to petitioning organs in order to solve disputes brought
through petitioning. If this method of strengthening the petitioning system is
imposed, then perhaps it will relatively speaking solve accumulated disputes in
the short run with efficiency, but measures of this type will certainly induce
more dispute-resolution seekers to present their problems to the petitioning
system instead of statutory dispute-resolution systems, causing even more
petitions. Moreover, adding more functional power to petitioning organs which
has a zero-sum relationship with the core system will reduce unavoidably the
power and justice-promotion function of state organs and their working bodies
established in accordance with the Constitution and laws. As regarding
abolitionists, despite their clear and courageous solution proposed in regard
to petitioning problems, their proposals are unattached to the reality of
contemporary China, or might not even be pertinent to the need of future China.
In the long run, the presence of auxiliary system is necessary and beneficial
to the stability of the core political system and its full exercise of
functions. The fact that many countries under advanced rule of law have
parliamentary supervision organs or official reception organs for appeals by
citizens, explain to a certain degree my argument.
Seeing from
the result of researches so far, part of the suggestions by holders of
reformist view on the petitioning system has better reference value than other
schools of thoughts. Reformist scholars proposed that in order to solve
petitioning problems, it is not only necessary to reconstruct and renew the
petitioning system, but also necessary to reconstruct and renew the entire
dispute-resolution and remedy-seeking mechanism. Their reforms include: unify
current petitioning organs that are too scattered by establishing a nationwide
computer network system; establish parliamentary supervision or executive
supervision system similar to foreign countries in order to coordinate the
petitioning works in various departments of various regions; amending the law
to expand the scope of administrative reconsideration and administrative
litigation; establish a number of specialized administrative tribunals,
specialized in disputes such as land expropriation, housing demolition, give
full play to the role of NPC representatives in connecting with their voters.[i] Other reformist scholars propose to consider
the reforms of the petitioning system in association with the construction of
national constitutional politics and political modernization by setting the
medium-term policy for the temporary solution of petitioning problems as
“strengthen the responsibility and ability of judicial organs at various levels
to receive complaints and appeals by citizens as well as to process such
cases,” and by setting the long term policy for the fundamental solution of
petitioning system as “abolish petitioning organs in all departments of
governments at all levels, concentrate petitioning to the NPC of various
levels, supervise the work of the
government, court and the procuratorate through the NPC and establish
systematic organizations that express interests of the people.”[ii] These understandings show
the comprehensiveness of reformists’ observation and awareness. Their proposal
for reform is better targeted and has stronger feasibility, it also include
thoughts to enhance the construction of the legal system in order to reduce the
reliance on the petitioning system in the process of promoting justice.
However, it is probably due to the difference in academic emphasis that they
have not conducted a division of the Chinese constitutional framework into the
core political system and auxiliary system, nor have they discussed the
relationship of the petitioning system to the core system as part of the
auxiliary system. Due to this reason, they have never well explained the
internal connections between the construction and reforms of the core system
and the development of the petitioning system, thus no systematic and
constructive opinions were proposed regarding the management of the
relationship between these two systems belonging to two different legal
statuses.
From the
point of view of the constitution and core-system auxiliary theory, regarding
the reforms of the petitioning system, whether at present time or long term, we
can only develop them towards the direction of the enhancement of the core
political system. Perhaps, comparatively speaking this is the most suitable way
to solve petitioning problems and enhance fundamentally the constitutional
framework of our country.
But what concrete steps must be
followed to advance the construction or reform of the core system in order to
radically solve petitioning problems and enhance the function of the
constitutional framework? Evidently, there is nothing easier than providing an
oversimplified prescription, and there is nothing more meaningless than doing
so as well. I think, speaking for jurisprudential researchers, knowing what to
do concretely is not important, it is essentially important to make a proper estimation
on the direction of development of the interactive relationship between the
petitioning system and the core system in association with the specificity and
long term necessity of the conditional framework of China. In this regard,
since I have already made similar discourses, in this article I would only like
to express the following few points as reference for relevant organizations and
people who concern about the issue:
1) The application and reform of the
petitioning system has to be considered under the framework of the
constitution. Under this framework, the petitioning system is a part of the
auxiliary system; it is subordinate to the core system; its construction or
reform has to obey and serve to the construction and reform of the core system,
its relationship to the core system should be arranged in accordance with this
understanding. If this logic is correct, then we cannot stay out of suspicion
regarding the appropriateness of some expressions that are still currently
quite popular. For example, the reasonability of the expression “legalization
of the petitioning system” that appears often on media is very much
doubtful, because this expression is no
different than elevating the petitioning system , a component of the auxiliary
system, to the same level as the core political system. But the question is
that why can we not enhance the functions of the constitutional framework
through the construction and improvement of the core system rather than
elevating the status of the auxiliary system? Moreover, proposing the “legalization
of the petitioning system” is in reality to change the power distribution among
state organs at various levels provided by the current constitution, therefore,
the implementation process of such proposal would also be the process in which
the core system is weakened or harmed. Other examples are the expression “Magna
Reception” and the method of establishing joint petition-processing organs
unifying power of two or more regional state organs in order to solve disputes.[iii] These actions are
against the spirits of independence of the court and procuratorate, and will
result in the strengthening of the auxiliary system while weakening the core
system.
2) The fundamental way to solve petitioning
problems is to construct, reform and improve the core system as well as to
elevate its justice-promotion functions. The construction, reform and
improvement of the core system involve many issues regarding specific
institutional construction. Amongst, the most important topic is to elevate the
level of civil rights protection, especially the protection of private property,
free speech and publication. Regarding the freedom of speech and publication,
for example, Premier Wen Jiabao demanded in the “Government Work Report”
delivered on the Third Meeting of the Eleventh Session of the NPC : “to create
conditions for the people to criticize and supervise the government , at the
same time give full play to the supervisory role of the news media, let the
power run under sunshine.”[iv] This is a remarkable
expression, but these are only words spoken by him on behalf of the highest
executive organ of the state, in reality, all public organs should be under the
supervision of citizens and news media. It should be created a condition in
which media can, on legal basis, publish reports criticizing or even revealing
the dark side of local public organs and their leaders, related disputes should
be resolved through judicial ways when they arise.
The solution to petitioning problems has to rely on the construction of
the structure of the form of democracy and distribution of legal powers
suitable to the characteristics of the market economy. Market economy is a
system in which the market plays the basic role in the distribution of economic
resources in a society, in correlation, the principles of political and legal
life should be consistent with the principles of economic life, that is to say
the distribution of political and legal resources is done through the competition
as that of the market. This task contains the following contents:
1) Construction
of democratic institutions within the ruling party. Democratization of political
parties is the prerequisite and basis for the democratization of the state, it
is also the political basis on which state organs at various level can
effectively reflect popular opinion. According to the principle that the
distribution of political and legal resources is consistent with the
distribution of social economic resources, members of the committee leadership
at various levels of the ruling party and candidates nominated for leadership
positions of state organs by the ruling party should all go through competition
before becoming elected , every ordinary party member should have rights to
directly elect members of the party leadership and participate in the election
to determine party’s nomination of candidates for leadership positions of state
organs.
2) Legalization,
standardization and procedure establishment of the relationship between Party’s
organizations at various levels and corresponding state organs. The report of
CCP’s Seventeenth Assembly emphasizes that the Party should maintain the basic
policy of running the country in accordance with law, elevate the ability to
rule in accordance with law, “promote institutionalization, standardization and
procedure establishment of socialist democratic politics in order to provide
political and legal protection for the continued stability of the Party and
State.”[v] In this regard, the main problem we face now
is that there is no constitutional or specific
legal provision that govern the relationship between the organs of the
ruling party and state organs, this is an important problem that should be
solved immediately.
3) Direct
and orderly competitive elections of NPC representatives at all levels, the
standing committee, and main leaders of the Government, Court and Procuratorate
at all levels. The reason to form this competitive electoral system is to impel
those who hold and apply public authority to be responsible to their voters and
protect these voters with law. The first action to be taken is to hold
concretely competitive elections of leaders of local state organs, by
implementing the current “Local People's Congress and People's Government
Organization Law”, making single-candidate election rare exception or isolate
case.
4) Although
the power distribution model between the central government and local
government as well as between superior levels and inferior levels of state
organs belong to the scope of national organization, it is determined by the
level of democratization of its society. In this regard, conducting a reform
characterized by the transfer of power towards lower level of the government is
an important condition to the solution of petitioning problems.
What has the most direct
meaning to the solution of petitioning problem is to elevate the authority and
the public trust of judicial organs, the court especially. Authority and public
trust of judicial organs are the soft resources accumulated through years of
independent exercise of functional power. In the past 30 years after the
“Opening Up and Reform ,” the judicial authority and public trust in our
country has both gained and weakened, as a whole it is still in serious
shortage. This situation of the judicial system is not only a huge potential
threat to the stability of the nation, but also a fundamental cause of the
formation and development of petitioning problems. Justice in our country needs
mostly an image of independent exercise of functional power and neutrality.
Therefore, the leadership of the ruling party should be able to notice the
difference of the judiciary branch compared to the Legislature and the
Executive, and change the myopic utilitarian attitude.
3) Before the construction and reform of
the core political system has reached effective results, the constitutional
framework of our country has no other choice but to rely somewhat on the
petitioning system. It is impossible to solve petitioning problems without the
elevation of the level of civil rights protection, democratization within the
ruling party, competitive election of NPC representatives and leaders of state
organs at various levels, as well as effective protection of judicial
independence. It is thus also meaningless to discuss the weakening of the
petitioning system in such circumstances. In this situation, relying on the
petitioning system and allowing it to interfere with the tasks or sometimes
substitute the function of the core political system are objective necessities
independent of human will.
Of course, when forced to rely somewhat on petitioning system, the
principle is that harms to the authority and the status of the core system
should be maintained at a minimum level. In our country, there is an unbalanced
development of the core political system geographically and also in terms of
time, therefore , in some regions, at a certain time, it is not absolutely
impossible for individuals in charge to reduce the harm of petitioning
reception and process to the core system close to zero while managing to obtain
social justice.
4) Undoubtedly, based on the development
trend of the constitutional framework in our country, the petitioning system
should soon dilute or demise. Most of its powers, or even all of its powers
should be gradually overtaken by the core political system. The Chinese
Constitution has not only created the core political system, it has also
conferred all powers entrusted by the people to various bodies included within
the scope of the core system, these bodies are the National People’s Congress
and local People’s Congress.[vi] Therefore, according to
the Constitution of our country and principles it provided, the core political
system bears the entire constitutional responsibility in promoting justice
since the very beginning; therefore it should assume the entire function of the
national constitutional framework. Turning our sight to the auxiliary system,
although the preamble of the Consecution has confirmed that “the Political Consultative
will exists and develop for a long period of time”, the Constitution has never
granted the Political Consultative Committee any state power; as regarding the
petitioning system, the Constitution has not even mentioned the word “Xinfang”
(petitioning), nor any law has had a provision mentioning the word. Therefore,
seeing form the view of the Constitution and laws, it is improper to attribute
too much justice-promotion functions to the petitioning system.
The dilution of the petitioning
system should be conducted gradually. The first step is to abolish the reception of petitions
regarding cases ruled by the second instance or retrial of the court.
Petitioning regarding legislative bodies should be done through voter reception
path by NPC representatives. Petitions regarding executive organs generally
have greater reasonability, they may exist for a much longer time, therefore
this part of discussion is postponed till later.
5) In order to obtain the best efficacy of the
current constitutional framework, a clear placement of the relationship between the
arrangement of the petitioning system and the reform and construction of the
core system must be made at a comprehensive scale. For more than a decade, what
has been missing in the research of the petitioning system and management of
petitions is the clear placement of the petitioning system as part of the
auxiliary system, based on the division of the core and auxiliary system within
the framework of our Constitution. Unclear placement of petitioning system has
caused uncoordinated or even conflicting situation between the development of
the petitioning system and the reform and construction of the core system;[vii] it has also left to the
public impressions an image of unpreparedness, partiality and confusion of
relevant parties. In order to avoid
repeated occurrences of this type and change the passive environment regarding
petitioning problems, it is extremely necessary to place the petitioning system
in the auxiliary system and limit its function within the auxiliary system.
This is a question of understanding or question of theory.
On the
one hand, whether in our country or any other country, the core system alone
should be capable enough to solve the majority of social disputes and realize
the level of social justice that matches the stage of its social development; on
the other hand, it is very difficult for the core system of any country to
carry the entire load of responsibility of promoting social justice without the
support of the auxiliary system. Conjecturing with common sense, if a country
over-relied on the auxiliary system, then it means that this country’s core
system is not strong and efficient enough; it has to be further strengthened
and reformed systematically. Associating this with the reality in our country,
if there is need to strengthen the constitutional framework in China, the first
concern should be on the strength of the core system, only after considering
the core system that it would secondly come to consider whether to seek
assistance form the petitioning system or evaluate whether it should be
enhanced or not. Same reason, if the constitutional framework of our nation
demonstrated great demand for petitioning system, then that demonstration is
only the superficial appearance; it is covering the reality that the core
system necessitates urgent enhancement and reforms.
The
author thinks, the justice-promotion model based on the proper placement for
both the core system and petitioning system should guide the future of reform
of the petitioning system. The characteristic of this model is to determine
with clarity that the core system is the main body in terms of structure and
function in the constitutional framework; the petitioning system and other
component of the auxiliary system are only at a position of assistance. The
former is an institution provided by the Constitution and laws, the latter is
not provided by the legal system thus extrajudicial and subordinate to the
former. Under this model, the connection between the core system and
petitioning system should be linked by normative documents lower than statutory
laws, for example administrative regulations, regional regulations and judicial
explanations. It can be said that this is the most suitable model to the
current constitution and relevant laws of our country, and the only model that
the author can agree with as a supporter of the core-system auxiliary
theory.
6) It is necessary to reform petition management
mechanism. The direction of the reform should be pointed at the elimination of
the harms the petitioning system creates to the authority and efficacy of the core
system. According to the provisions and spirits of the Constitutions and laws,
the role of the core system and petitioning system is very clear, that is: the
former is the main body of the constitutional framework, the latter is
subordinate to the former; the former is recognized by the Constitution and
laws, the latter is subordinate to the auxiliary system established by
normative documents inferior to laws and the Constitution. However in practice,
the difference of status and legal boundary between the core system and
petitioning system are often neglected in our country, causing the formation of
a confusing mixture of the two systems, and in the process of justice promotion
the two systems sometimes benefit mutually and sometimes result in zero-sum game.
The consequence is: on one side the lack of efficacy of the core system causes
the birth of a large quantity of petitions, resulting in the over-reliance on
the petitioning system when seeking justice; on the other side the petitioning
system complements the functions and efficacy of the core system, however it
harms and weakens the core system when providing complementary assistance in
implementing social justice.
Under the current petition management
mechanism, institutional elements of the petitioning system that have actually
made their way to the scope of the functions of the core system generally have
a zero-sum relationship with the core system. During the procedure of justice promotion,
the competition between the two systems is also of zero-sum nature.
Following the thinking path
described earlier, it is possible to divide logically the interactional
relationship of the core system and petitioning system into two models: one is
the “contained and bounded” model, in this model, although the establishment of
petitioning organs does not have legal basis, there are however administrative
regulation, regional regulation and other normative documents that serve as
normative basis, activities of the petitioning organs in this model fully
respect the status and power of statutory organs; the other one is the “wild
and confusion” model, its main
characteristics are the establishment and use of extrajudicial organs which go around
statutory organs and procedure in order to solve petitioning disputes. The
typical behavior of the “wild and confusion” model is the establishment of
petitioning organs that possess powers even beyond state organs without any
normative basis. This behavior generally harms the functions and powers of
statutory state organs.[viii] In the “contained and
bounded” model the petitioning system provides complementary and auxiliary
functions to the core system. In the “wild and confusion” model, however the
effect of the petitioning system has two sides: it does promote justice, but at
the same time it has the side effect of harming the status and authority of the
core system. We can see this kind of two-sidedness during certain joint
reception of petitions by state organs. For example, as reported, in July 13
2008, the party secretary and major of a certain city, along with other eight
members of the city leadership “hold a joint conference to study fourteen group
petitions. They listened to individual report of each petition, analyzed them
individually and provided solution specific to each petition. At the end all
fourteen petitions received clear solution methods and assignment of officials
in charge of the solution.” [ix] In the context of the
report, it looks like they have not only processed one litigation, the eight
members of the city leadership might include also the head of the city court
and procuratorate. This is to say that this type of joint conference is not
only a joint operation between the Party and the local administration, it also
has the nature of joint operation that includes the Party, local administration
and judicial organs, it is a super-joint operation. However, a temporary joint
organ like this, is not consistent with at least the following principle and
spirits of the Constitution: rule of low, constitutional and statutory
assignment of powers, independence of the court, independence of the
procuratorate. Therefore it is not an exaggeration to conclude that this type
of extrajudicial organization has harmed the authority and status of the core
system when processing and receiving petitions.
Hence, at least from what is
seen in the reality of the current stage, what first faces the reform of the
petitioning system is to eliminate organs whose powers and functions are
without legal basis and whose processing of petitions harms the core system. In
this regard, what is often seen are instances when higher level officials issue
orders beyond their statutory power and when organs without statutory basis provide
final judgment to disputes ignoring the function and procedure of state organs.
These actions are against the principle of the rule of law.
If politicians and legalists in our country can have a more
profound understanding on the zero-sum relationship between the petitioning
system and core system, and reform it appropriately considering the overall
environment, perhaps it will not be particularly difficult to radically
eliminate or ease petitioning problems in the society.
(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2012)
Endnotes
[i] Jiang Mingan, “Reforming the Petitioning System to
Refresh Dispute-Resolution and Remedy-Seeking Mechanism in our Country, ”
Public Law Website of Peking University, May 19 2005. 姜明安:《改革信访制度，创新我国解纷和救济机制》，北大公法网，2005年5月19日， http://www.publiclaw.cn/article/Details.asp?NewsId=471&Classid=&ClassName=
[iii] In recent years, beside the Committee of Political
and Legal Affairs of local Party Committee, there are also petitioning organs
that jointly represent local administration, court and procuratorate with
different names such as “Office of Stability Maintenance,” “Office of
Pracuratorial Supervision” or “Office of Coordination.” These offices often
process petitions of extensive importance with substantial decision and then
enforce the decision in name of the court. This is evidently against provisions
of Article 126 of the Constitution regarding the independence of the court.
Between May and April of 2010 the author conducted research in this aspect in
Foshan, Guangdong province, and Qiming, Shanghai Municipality, and found out
that such joint operations are rather common methods to process petitions.
[iv] “Government Work Report” presented to the Third
Meeting of the Eleventh Session of the NPC by Premier Wen Jiabao. Xinhua News
Agency, 15 March. 温家宝总理在第十一届全国人大三次会议上所作的《政府工作报告》，新华社北京3月15日电。
[v] “Collection of Documents of CCP’s Seventeenth
National Representative Assembly,” People’s Press 2007, p.28.《中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会文件汇编》，人民出版社2007年版，第28页。
[vi] The Second Article of the Constitution provides: “All
power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs
through which the people exercise state power are the National People's
Congress and the local people's congresses at different levels.”《宪法》第2条规定，国家的“一切权力属于人民。人民行使国家权力的机关是全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会。”
[vii] In this aspect, one of the most common situations is the
willingness to solve disputes through petitioning path rather than
institutional channels provided by the Constitution and laws. For example in
regard of communications between the government and the public, there is a
large number of People’s Congress representatives, they can do much in terms of
connecting with voters and representing their wishes, however the current core
system has not formed an efficient mechanism that impels the representatives to
undertake the responsibilities for their voters in their corresponding
constituency. Facing this situation of lack
of “hardware,” relevant parties instead of improving and forming
efficient mechanism through reforms, they choose to spend more time and energy
in launching activities such as “Magna Reception” and promote temporary
non-institutional initiatives. Other frequent situations include: establishment
of temporary joint petitioning organs that exercise state powers beyond the
Constitution and laws; and special
orders regarding certain petitions made by leaders of local party
organizations, People’s Congress, government and Political Consultative
Assembly to the court of the same or lower levels.
[viii] Many offices established by municipal, district and
country level party committee with different title but similar joint powers all
possess this nature. A real example revealed recently is the “Office of
Leadership Team on the Disposal of Popular Illegal Financial Activities” in
Leqing city, Zhejiang Province. Not long ago this so called “office,” ordered
an arrest by the Public Security Bureau and then asked the family of the
individual arrested a sum of 500 000 Yuan (about 85 000 USA), the individual
was released after the sum of money was paid as promised. As some legal workers
pointed out, this office has not only conducted a “transaction” with the power
of the Public Security Bureau, it has also done it with the power of the
Procuratorate and the Court , even the rights of the individual arrested were
transactional. Under the name of “maintaining stability” and “harmonious
justice,” problem was solved only with 500 000 Yuan, they have completely
overridden on the Law and powers of the Public Security Bureau, the Court and
Procuraotrate. This office is not namely a petitioning organ, but it holds
petitioning functions, and currently there are many multi-functional
petitioning organs that have similar powers to this office. Regarding this
Office in Leqing, please see Chen Youxin : “A Living Sample of the Harmonious
Justice Theory,” Shanghai Channel Renmin Daily website March 22 2010. 请参加见陈有西：《和谐司法理论的一个活标本》，人民网上海频道2010年03月22日，http://sh.people.com.cn/GB/134780/139978/11195926.html。
[ix] Correspondents Wang Lin, Reporter Tang Runqing:
“Magna Reception of Petitions by the Entire Party and Administrative Leadership
of Tangshan, Hubei Province ” 通讯员王琳、记者汤润清：《河北省唐山市级党政领导全员大接访》，2008年07月29日，新华网，http://news.qq.com/a/20080729/001565.htm。
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