(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2015)
We have been considering the regulatory universe for civil society in China in light of recent efforts to modify regulation of foreign NGOs operating in Mainland China /(see,
here,
here, here, and here).
But much of this analysis, as is customary in the West, sometimes stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the importance of the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within this architecture. That stubbornness, and the analytical blindness that follows, is deeply rooted in the conceptual framework of western analysts, who may transpose their own ideological framework when considering Chinese approaches to law and governance. That transposition makes assigning a role for the Chinese Communist Party in the structure of the administrative apparatus difficult conceptually. That difficulty, in turn, flows both from an inability to understand an apply Chinese Leninist notions and to reject the legitimacy of those notions (and thus the value of considering them in analysis). What ever one thinks of Party-State systems, and whatever one thinks of Leninist organizational principles, the construction and operation of constitutional states, that is the reality of China, one one that requires acknowledgement even by those whose personal or national political preferences run in other directions.
This is especially the case, when considering the organization and operation of Chinese civil society. Conceptually, civil society necessarily must flow from, and be legitimated only in connection with, the leadership of the vanguard Party (the CCP). Since collectivity is central to Leninist notions of democracy (see
here, discussed
here), and since the collective is represented by the CCP, no civil society organization, under this theory, may exist autonomously of the CCP, at least to the extent of the power of the CCP to assert its leadership role in their activities. These principles apply as well to the organization of other autonomous collectives--for example corporations, which can exist apart from, but still connected with, the CCP (see
here and
here). The principle is political--grounded on the core ideal of the CCP as representative of the state, people and society (e.g.,
Sange Daibiao 三个代表 (the CCP as the representative for the development of productive forces, advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the
broadest masses of the people) discussed
here).
These ideological foundations have also found their way into the management of Chinese civil society. This post considers some of the ways in which the CCP asserts its leadership authority within Chinese civil society organs. Prepared by my graduate student Shaoming Zhu (Penn State SJD expected), in a
Coalition for Peace and Ethics Working Paper (No. 8/3 (August 2015), entitled,
The Chinese Communist Party in Chinese NGOs. Considered are (1) the Regulation of Leading Party Members' Groups of CCP (Trial Implementation)
中国共产党党组工作条例(试行 ); (2)
Opinion on strengthening
negotiation in urban and rural communities 关于加强城乡社区协商的意见; (3)
Overall Programme of the Separation
of Administrative Organs and Industry and Business Association 行业协会商会与行政机关脱钩总体方案; (4)
nterim Provisions on the
Management of Leading Personnel in Public Institutions 事业单位领导人员管理暂行规定; and (5)
Guidance to the Pilot Work
of Further Promoting the Construction of Rural Community 关于深入推进农村社区建设试点工作的指导意见; 安定.
Portions of the Working Paper and some comments follow. The full Working Paper may be accessed
here.