Very recently, Professor Xu Zhangrun (许章润)
Professor of Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law at Tsinghua
University, posted an essay, "Our current fears and expectations" (我们当下的恐惧与期待). The essay appeared on the website of the Unirule Institute of Economics (天则经济研究所), an independent think tank in Beijing;(and below). It was then translated into English by Geremie R. Barmé, Editor, China Heritage on 1 August 2018 and posted to its website with an elegant and thoughtful introduction by the translator (Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes — A Beijing Jeremiad). The essay is important and worthy of reflection, even for those inclined to reject its claims, in whole or part.
Flora
Sapio and I have each written reflections on the many important ideas,
and provocations, in Professor Xu's essay. Flora Sapio's reflection, 孙晓义评 许章润:我们当下的恐惧与期待/ Flora Sapio, Thoughts on Xu Zhangrun: Our current fears and expectations, appears here (and may also be accessed HERE).
My reflection, 白轲评 许章润:我们当下的恐惧与期待/ Larry Catá Backer, Thoughts on Xu Zhangrun: Our current fears and expectations appears below. Professor Xu's essay may be accessed at the end of each of our reflections.
The essay may be downloaded HERE.
白轲评 许章润:我们当下的恐惧与期待/
Larry Catá Backer, Thoughts on Xu Zhangrun: "Our Current Fears and Expectations"
Very recently, Professor Xu Zhangrun (许章润) Professor of Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law at Tsinghua University, posted an essay, "Our current fears and expectations" (我们当下的恐惧与期待). The essay appeared on the website of the Unirule Institute of Economics (天则经济研究所), an independent think tank in Beijing (and below). It was thereafter translated into English by Geremie R. Barmé, Editor, China Heritage on 1 August 2018 and posted to its website with an elegant and thoughtful introduction by the translator (Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes — A Beijing Jeremiad).
What has made that somewhat remarkable, for Western observers at least, was the tone and objectives of the essay. One outlet noted "Xu spoke specifically of three problems afflicting the regime in China: Party nobility, special needs provisioning, and a new personality cult" (Chinese professor publishes scathing critique of Xi Jinping's administration, calls out president's personality cult). John Pomfret, a former Washington Post bureau chief in Beijing, is the
author of The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and
China, 1776 to the Present,” who on August 3, 2018, published a short essay in the Washington Post worth reading. Entitled "Unease rattles China’s invincible facade,"
the essay sympathetically laid out the arguments made by Professor Xu,
suggesting that it "captured the feelings of many Chinese people
when he questioned whether
China’s reforms and opening up policies “are being terminated and
whether totalitarian rule will return.”(Ibid). That trajectory follows, it argued, from the systematic unraveling of the four basic
parts of an implied social contract. "Xu’s essay has resonated deeply
among China’s intellectual elite and has been widely shared on Chinese
social media, despite attempts by China’s censors and Chinese largest
search engine, Baidu, to erase mentions of his name." (Ibid). And that unraveling has been revealed, we are meant to understand, in the context of the intense trade negotiations in which Chin and the United States are now embroiled.
And, indeed, it appears that Professor Xu's essay might be understood as important only in the shadow of trade. More interesting, perhaps, is that it might derive its internal power from what appears to be China's never ending reflection in the mirror held up to (or for) it reflecting the United States. Not Europe or Latin America, or even other Asian state (objects and subordinate places it might be understood). . . but the United States itself (the equal, the competitor, the rival, the objective). This is an irony that runs from this essay to the triumphalism in Chinese policy that it was in part meant to attack.
To that end, both Chinese and Westerners might seize this essay (and what might usefully be extracted from it) for their own ends, of course. In this case those ends include trade and U.S. relations, with respect to which criticisms could be blown up to take on the character of an assault on the core political system of the state itself, rather than on the unfortunate and erroneous choices made by current leaders in the application of that system toward policy ends. To the extent, then, that Professor Xu's essay proves useful (and utility is built into the fabric of Western academic and political ideology) then it may be referenced for that purpose; but not necessarily read. Perversely, certain elements of home state authorities also have acquired this habitat if the West; sometimes condemning an essay (and its author) for its purported optics, rather than engaging in its content. That is a pity as well.
It is useful to style the essay a "Jeremiad," a prolonged lamentation or complaint. Perhaps it is also usefully characterized as a
cri de coeur. Yet perhaps, reading the essay more carefully might reveal something other than its optics, than a performance piece meant mostly for its emotive and dramatic value. That something might not focus on complaints or laments, but rather engage precisely in those actions demanded by the Chinese Communist Party itself in the exercise of leadership and in the fulfillment of its own obligations--regardless of the individuals who for short periods of time are vested with the grave responsibility of seeing this duty undertaken wisely. Taken as a whole, the essay evidences the evolving characteristics of a Chinese Constitutional Leninism with Marxist democratic characteristics.
The thoughts that follow, then, consider Professor Xu's reflections from the perspective of theory--of the core obligations of the Communist Party itself and the expression of that obligation in the actions of the state organs. These are based on the Barmé translation. The resulting insights, in turn, may prove useful not merely for Chinese constitutional theory, but for the operation of Western constitutional systems as well. It is to reflections along those lines that this essay is devoted.
__________
Xu starts the essay with three fundamental points that then inform the essay as a whole and serve as its structural bones.
First, Xu starts with a curious invocation of the overtones of the mass line (群众路线). He does not put his own concerns at the center of the essay, but rather those of the people, and the people of all classes.
First, Xu starts with a curious invocation of the overtones of the mass line (群众路线). He does not put his own concerns at the center of the essay, but rather those of the people, and the people of all classes.
"Yet again people throughout China — including the entire bureaucratic class — are feeling a sense of uncertainty, a mounting anxiety in relation both to the direction the country is taking as well as in regard to their personal security." 包括整個官僚集團在內，當下全體國民對於國家發展方向和個人身家性命安危，再度深感迷惘，擔憂日甚，已然引發全民範圍一定程度的恐慌。(Xu, supra.).
The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party makes this clear: "The biggest political advantage the Party has is its close ties with the people while the biggest potential danger it faces as a governing party is becoming distanced from them. Party conduct and the Party’s ties with the people are of paramount importance to the Party." The masses wish to speak, yet they are afraid to make their voices heard. They feel; they do not speak. They are worried, they are confused. The implication, of course, is that they lack leadership, or that the leadership is failing in its fundamental obligation under the Basic Party Line. The initial and important implication is of a failure of the mass line, and by that failure, a failure of the leadership obligation at the core of vanguard legitimacy.
Second, Xu suggests a cause of the failure of leadership, and of the mass line. That cause is rooted in misdirection, or the loss of direction. More fundamentally, it is caused by deviation from the principles on which a state (and specifically the Chinese state) is organized (立國之道).
This is primarily due to the fact that in recent years our National Orientation [立國之道], has betrayed the Basic Principles that I outline below. 蓋因近年來的立國之道，突破了下列底線原則，倒行逆施，(Xu, supra).
Note here the nature of the structuring proposition. It is one grounded in the failure of leadership; it is not grounded in a failure of principle. In a sense that brings what follows firmly within the Leninist tradition of leadership within the vanguard, rather than positioning the writer as outside the system itself. If the first point invokes the mass line, this second point firmly invokes democratic centralism and intra-Party democracy ("The Party must fully encourage intraparty democracy, respect the principal position of its members, safeguard their democratic rights, and give play to the initiative and creativity of Party organizations at every level and all Party members" (Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party)). The invocation democratic centralism in the 2nd point also suggests its corollary--the positive obligation of criticism-self criticism at the heart of the CPC working style to ensure that the collective remains at the center, even when guided by its "core."
Third, Xu points to those basic principles, those core principles that form the foundations of Chinese Marxist Leninist normative organization which have been breached. In this way he draws a distinction between the principles, to which Xu declares firm allegiance, and the individuals whose actions, he will now argue, who have failed in their duty to those principles.
Third, Xu points to those basic principles, those core principles that form the foundations of Chinese Marxist Leninist normative organization which have been breached. In this way he draws a distinction between the principles, to which Xu declares firm allegiance, and the individuals whose actions, he will now argue, who have failed in their duty to those principles.
In my opinion, these Basic Principles should not be compromised, and under no circumstances should they be undermined. They are the principles central to the policies formulated by the Communist Party following the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and during the years that it slowly and painstakingly managed to regain a measure of political legitimacy. Throughout the three decades of the Open Door and Reform era, these Principles proved to be the most appropriate political approach; they reflected a minimum consensus arrived at by the entire populace on the basis of which the country could enjoy a form of peaceful co-existence. (Xu, supra).
In his gloss on the translation, Barmé suggests that the invocation of 立國之道 points to fundamental
principles of something like natural law that might be more fundamental
than the CPC Basic Line itself. I agree that the invocation is deliberate, and meant to suggest the fundamental principles that serve as the core of his argument. I am less sure that the invocation was meant disturb the identity between that concept and its expression in the core principles for state construction at the heart of the CPC Basic Line. My sense, then, is that the invocation
is to the core of the CPC Basic Line itself--the grounding of the
political principles of the state in the theory proceeding from Marxism
Leninism. But not just any Marxist Leninist principles, instead the invocation is quite specific--those Chinese Marxist Leninist principles produced in the forge of the Cultural Revolution.
These are not merely theoretical principles. Xu does something more than that. He suggests that these principles are fundamental to the nation and to the CPC itself. That is, that Chinese Marxist Leninism is the natural law of China to which the CPC itself is bound. Personal deviation is not permitted within a system in which the collective stands at the center.
These are not merely theoretical principles. Xu does something more than that. He suggests that these principles are fundamental to the nation and to the CPC itself. That is, that Chinese Marxist Leninism is the natural law of China to which the CPC itself is bound. Personal deviation is not permitted within a system in which the collective stands at the center.
The form of the essay, and its object, is now clear. With three concise points Xu declares his allegiance to the current political and ideological system; he expresses his allegiance to and invokes its core relationship between the vanguard and the masses; and he adds substance to that core Leninist dynamic through a defense of the normative principles of Chinese Marxist Leninism that emerged as the fundamental political constitution of China after the Cultural Revolution. These are the basic political notions that shape the ideological base of the people of China (and not just its state apparatus or the political vanguard). It follows that these must then be reflected in the whole of the CPC and its work. This, then, frames both the declaration of allegiance and the j'accuse that follows. And even that j'accuse might be deemed to have deep roots in Chinese Marxism-Leninism. It is hard, then, to see in this essay, an attack from the outside. It is rather, at its core, a most Leninist exercise in the protection of Chinese Marxism.
If "Leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the greatest strength of this system" (Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party), then each of its members "must wholeheartedly serve the people, be ready to make any personal sacrifice, and dedicate their lives to realizing communism." (Const. CPC, Art. 2). That, more than anything else, makes what follows both important and sensitive. The bulk of the essay then turns to four basic principles on which the failures of leadership rest. "So, then, what are the Four Basic Principles? 那麼，是哪四項底線原則呢？(Xu, supra). These include (1) security and stability; (2) respect for property rights ; (3) a measure of tolerance for personal freedoms ; and (4) term limits for individuals.
If "Leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the greatest strength of this system" (Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party), then each of its members "must wholeheartedly serve the people, be ready to make any personal sacrifice, and dedicate their lives to realizing communism." (Const. CPC, Art. 2). That, more than anything else, makes what follows both important and sensitive. The bulk of the essay then turns to four basic principles on which the failures of leadership rest. "So, then, what are the Four Basic Principles? 那麼，是哪四項底線原則呢？(Xu, supra). These include (1) security and stability; (2) respect for property rights ; (3) a measure of tolerance for personal freedoms ; and (4) term limits for individuals.
Let us consider these four basic principles together. First, they do not exactly parallel the fundamental principles that together comprise the CPC Basic Line or the core principles from which they derive. And yet they are derived from both Basic Line and core principles. Xu's four principles, then, might be considered the pragmatic expression of the elements of the Basic Line, or they might be understood as the summary expression of the core principles of the meaning of vanguard responsibility, then elaborated in the Basic Line. Second, the four principles seek to the core manifestation of theory, rather than to its elaboration. They manifest truth from facts, or rather theory from expression in governance. Third, they imply the continued importance of a hierarchically arranged political system at the center of which is a vanguard party whose legitimacy is based (as the CPC Constitution itself underlines) on fidelity to its ideological principles translated into political action. Fourth, they touch on the core structures through which the Basic Line itself can be advanced, or impeded. Each of the principles looks toward the attainment of normative goals, but none of them are of themselves a goal. Fifth, all of Xu's principles are subjective and contextual. They require interpretation, but in light off the history and conditions of China (that, of course is the main point--one forgets the Cultural Revolution in China at one's own risk, or in this case at the risk to the integrity of the CPC and the march toward a communist society). Sixth, they suggest the necessity of aligning political ideology with the construction and operation of the state apparatus--without exception for individuals, and without deference for the status of the position. This last remains radical and elusive in a society (like all societies) that tend toward rank.
These, then, might be the way to understand the National Orientation [立國之道] at the heart of Xu's elaboration. Let us consider briefly each in turn.
These, then, might be the way to understand the National Orientation [立國之道] at the heart of Xu's elaboration. Let us consider briefly each in turn.
(1) security and stability. Xu notes the importance of both security and stability to the basic "bargain" on which the legitimacy of the vanguard rests. These are nearly universal notions, though, as important in the management of Western democratic social orders, as it is for theocratic states. China, in this sense is no different. What is different is the theoretical basis for that security and stability. Here Xu draws on the lessons of the Cultural Revolution (as he sees them) He also suggests the way that the system that emerged after the Cultural Revolution has been subject to increasingly frequent shocks brought about by personality based distortions.
There must be an end of the tendency to pursue new and repeated ‘Political Movements’ [that is, mass moblisation and voluntarist campaigns with short-lived political aims] as well as ‘Lawlessness’ aimed at crushing criminals and underworld gangs. (Xu, supra).)
These constant personality enhancing campaigns detract form stability of an ideological order already well established, Xu asserts. To some extent, Xu's argument may be overbroad. The problem, of course, is that his core tendency opens the door to ossification. That is, stability in which the ideology, its principles and application become fixed, tend to produce systems that eventually atrophy as popular understanding increasingly departs from unchanging principles. The same applies to security issues. Social order is a critical element of a progressive society. But at the same time, a security apparatus can be a vanguard element in the suffocation of social progress. The difference between the two must be mediated by principle--and principle must be grounded in a coherent theory of the social order. And here, again, Xu and the current leadership can quibble. But there is little here on which one can see how that quibble must inevitably point in one direction rather than another.
Yet here, Xu moves decisively from abstraction to something quite concrete. The criticism blends the un-Leninist propensity toward personality in government, with the need to protect the socialist modernization project:
Despite a few clashes, the average Chinese has been of the opinion that no matter who was in power, or who fell from grace, given the orderly succession of bureaucrats, a general feeling grew up over time that national policy priorities would continue to focus on substantive nation building. Thus, when it came down to it, most people were willing to put up with the existing political arrangements, in other words: ‘You hold onto the reins of power; I’ll enjoy my personal life’. This official-popular consensus and collaboration produced the social stability and security that I have been discussing here. (Xu, supra)
Here, Xu takes the opportunity to mock the China Dream (中国梦); "That’s to say, it’s not so much about ‘This Dream’ or ‘That Dream’, rather it’s been about growing the economy and developing the society with an emphasis on nation building" (Ibid.). And not just 中国梦, but also the personal ambition, Xu implies, that drives individuals to produce (invent) these campaigns that do not contribute to the core objective of the vanguard.
This presents a curious mix of criticism from the right and the left. From the right, Xu embraces the centrality and permanence of the socialist modernization project. In that sense, Xu embraces Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Up as the basic principle against which everything must be judged. He judges much of what comes after more optics than substance. Here he makes a point that merits serious consideration by the CPC itself--even if undertaken internally. From the left, Xu embraces security and social reconciliation as the price to be paid for economic advancement under the leadership of a vanguard. So where is the center of the criticism? It is quite narrow in this respect:it is on unnecessary political movements, and the increasing tendency to use these political movements to mask cults of personality. Yet, in the end, there is little to help either cadre or citizen figure out what is necessary and what is unnecessary. Clearly, political movement, including that described in the 19th CPC Congress is central to the obligation of the CPC to lead the Chinese people forward toward the attainment of its goals. At the same time, the ritual of political movements has not clearly produced much by way of advancement of goals.
This presents a curious mix of criticism from the right and the left. From the right, Xu embraces the centrality and permanence of the socialist modernization project. In that sense, Xu embraces Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Up as the basic principle against which everything must be judged. He judges much of what comes after more optics than substance. Here he makes a point that merits serious consideration by the CPC itself--even if undertaken internally. From the left, Xu embraces security and social reconciliation as the price to be paid for economic advancement under the leadership of a vanguard. So where is the center of the criticism? It is quite narrow in this respect:it is on unnecessary political movements, and the increasing tendency to use these political movements to mask cults of personality. Yet, in the end, there is little to help either cadre or citizen figure out what is necessary and what is unnecessary. Clearly, political movement, including that described in the 19th CPC Congress is central to the obligation of the CPC to lead the Chinese people forward toward the attainment of its goals. At the same time, the ritual of political movements has not clearly produced much by way of advancement of goals.
(2) respect for property rights. Xu here touches on the slow by steady development of principles that protect wealth creation and the exclusive use of property. He devotes much space to praising the development of what I have called Markets Marxism (e.g., here).
We went from a time when private property and ownership were regarded as the source of all social evils [during the era of ‘High Maoism’, from 1956 to 1976] and entered a period that tolerated hundreds of millions of Chinese legitimately pursuing greater personal wealth, and then on to a time when there was the prospect that property rights would even be recognised constitutionally — or as the short-hand puts it, ‘private property would be allowed into [recognised by] the Constitution’ (Xu, supra)
A quick reading might suggest a criticism of the 19th CPC Congress Report's reference to the rise of a new basic contradiction in this very phenomenon of wealth disparities and income distribution. Yet Xu appears to have a different target, not the new contradiction but the restriction of the private sector in ways that might imperil socialist modernization.
(3) a measure of tolerance for personal freedoms. There is a stark contrast between the realized attainment of expectations of property and wealth creation, on the one hand, and the discussion of civil society and mass action in the context of Xu's third principle. Indeed, from some perspectives, this principle appears to be aspirational rather than one that, having been attained, is now challenged by change.
(3) a measure of tolerance for personal freedoms. There is a stark contrast between the realized attainment of expectations of property and wealth creation, on the one hand, and the discussion of civil society and mass action in the context of Xu's third principle. Indeed, from some perspectives, this principle appears to be aspirational rather than one that, having been attained, is now challenged by change.
Over the past decades, civil society has not evolved in China. Whenever there’s been an outbreak of anything approaching normalcy, it has been crushed. This has had a profoundly negative impact on the individual growth and political maturation of our citizenry. (Xu, supra).
Xu regrets the focus on individual rather than on civil freedoms.
Today, people enjoy their liberties of social actors but not as citizens; this is particularly so in the case of the more economically advanced provinces where this has been the case for some time. What I mean by ‘the liberties of social actors’ is that in the private sphere people can enjoy limited personal freedoms, in particular in regard to normal pleasures such as eating, going about one’s daily business and personal intimacy behind closed doors. " (Ibid),
For Xu, the trade off is unacceptable. Here is an argument from the left rather than the right. Xu is unimpressed with a society that expands personal freedoms that permit what he might consider personal self indulgence, especially those that have no public social significance. He regrets that in return for this broader permissiveness in personal choices, individual political expression is curtailed. Here, of course, Xu runs into the grave difficulty of basic Leninism, which posits that all politics must be exercised (and enjoyed) within rather than beyond the vanguard Party. To that extent Xu's criticism turns to the right int he sens of seeking to broaden the political sphere beyond the Party. Yet this is an area worthy of some discussion. Even if one believes that Xu is wrong, that the CPC must retain a monopoly of political action, that does not imply no political role for non-CPC members. Xu's own invocation of the mass line provides a hint. And, indeed, there is much room for improvement int he ways that the CPC undertakes its mass line responsibilities without encouraging popular watchfulness and discussion. In this sense, there is nothing in Leninism that suggests that even if the CPC retains all political power, that it must pretend that the masses themselves are without expression. And more importantly, it does not suggest that CPC social policy--or the way such policy is implemented--does not constitute political error. Yet that is not the argument that Xu makes. He notes, as he should, recent actions of lower level officials that substantially interfere with popular habits or practices, but which are suppressed without the benefit of coherent political decisions. Yet it is not clear that the answer to these administrative abuses is a larger civil society rather than a greater and stricter political supervision of officials. Here is an area in which a transparent social credit might prove useful in disciplining the state and ensuring political correct decisions.
(4) term limits for individuals. Here, Xu offers his view of the construction of Chinese political constitutionalism.
In essence, the Party-State is founded on dictatorial political principles which at their rotting core are maintained by a philosophy of pitiless struggle and factional infighting. On the surface, this is a political modality with an ugly maw that can only be sated by ruling over and consuming the wealth of the nation. However, due to a Constitutional Provision that limited the highest power-holders to two five-year terms in office — and that includes both the state president and the premier — since 2003 , and with the peaceful transition of leadership the country finally experienced ten years [2003 to 2012] after which the leadership showed that it was satisfied with two five-year terms in power. (Xu, supra).
This, Xu suggested, implied a constitutional settlement that aligned law and reality, bolstering certainty and international confidence in institutional stability.
Despite all the vacuous hoopla about other kinds of political reform initiatives, the Party-State system had otherwise remained immobile. So, everyone came to believe that now, no matter who you are or what you do, at most you’ll only be in power for ten years. (Xu, supra)
Here Xu implies the overtones of class struggle. The notion that such a settlement reduced the differences between political and laboring classes. It offered a solution to the great contradiction of the 19th CPC Congress--not with respect to wealth but rather with respect to political differences. There could be tolerance for Party rule, especially when individuals came and went. Again, posing this in Leninist terms might have been useful. That is, that the constitutional settlement advanced Leninist notions of collectivity, in politics as well as economics by de-centering the individual in favor of the collective (I had suggested something along those lines here).
The rise of these four basic clusters of constitutional principles, for Xu, contributed to the operation of the CPC led Party-State. It's de-stabilization produced distortions that might imperil the operation of the system as a whole. And what Xu sees are distortions--not just at the edges of these constitutional settlements but at their core.
However, in expanding to become a system of ‘Stability Maintenance’ the methods of employed to achieve social control have in effect put entire areas under quasi-martial law . . . The recent Sino-US Trade War has, in particular, revealed underlying weaknesses and the soft underbelly of the system. All of this has only served to exacerbate a widespread sense of insecurity in the society at large. (Ibid).
Worse, for Xu, is the contraction fo the private sector in favor of the public sector., And, indeed, that is a concern that has driven American policy in the current quite contentious battles over trade frameworks. Xu fears the return of economic policies that center the political objectives of economic activity over its role in creating wealth. But most important, Xu fears that in departing from the spirit of the four constitutional settlement principles he outlined that a new form of Cultural Revolution will return to China, and with it, disaster for both state AND Party.
It is feared that in one fell swoop China will be cast back to the terrifying days of [one-man rule under] Mao. Along with this Constitutional revision there is also a clamour surrounding the creation of new personality cult, something that in particular has provoked the Imminent Fears that I outline below. (Ibid).
And that transition brings Xu from the description of abstract principle and a generalized sense of distortion in implementation to the eight quite specific manifestations of damage to the Chinese dream from a continued investment in trajectories of present policies. Here one has the operation of mass line and criticism (though not self criticism) operating at its most elevated level.
The eight causes of insecurity provide a glimpse at the weaknesses of current policy--at least from the perspective of Xu. But it also suggests, or should suggest to CPC leaders with a heightened sense of duty to the Basic Line, the context in which the party's political work, as well as its operationalization in the economic, societal and cultural sectors, might require adjustment--and explanation to the masses. That would be the appropriate approach of a Leninist vanguard fully confident in its legitimacy and in its confidence in meeting popular appeals, incorporating them into its programs, and then reshaping them in ways consistent with CPC objectives.
With respect to the assault on property, Xu is worried both about immigration, but also about the corruption that served to distort the process of moving to a Markets Marxist System. Worse, for Xu, is that wealth disparities are not the consequence of private accumulations, but of the ability of Party padres to accumulate wealth.
The eight causes of insecurity provide a glimpse at the weaknesses of current policy--at least from the perspective of Xu. But it also suggests, or should suggest to CPC leaders with a heightened sense of duty to the Basic Line, the context in which the party's political work, as well as its operationalization in the economic, societal and cultural sectors, might require adjustment--and explanation to the masses. That would be the appropriate approach of a Leninist vanguard fully confident in its legitimacy and in its confidence in meeting popular appeals, incorporating them into its programs, and then reshaping them in ways consistent with CPC objectives.
With respect to the assault on property, Xu is worried both about immigration, but also about the corruption that served to distort the process of moving to a Markets Marxist System. Worse, for Xu, is that wealth disparities are not the consequence of private accumulations, but of the ability of Party padres to accumulate wealth.
The biggest winners during the decades of the Reform policies and the Open Door has been that particular stratum of Party bureaucrat-cum business tycoon. They have milked the system with consummate skill and they make up the lion’s share of the migrating uber-rich. The official media carefully limits information , but popular grumbling is rife and, added to that, the propagandists still time and again strum the old tune about ‘the ultimate goal of communism being the abolition of private property’ to which hysterical populists add ‘Overthrow the Wealthy, Divide the Spoils’. (Xu, sipra)
Here Xu is right--hypocrisy is the worst corrosive element to the legitimacy of a political order. Here there is an alignment with some of Xi's anti-corruption initiatives. Yet it comes from a very different place. Xu appears to suggest that the current policy of killing property and wealth creation to reduce corruption would do neither.
With respect to the second fear, Xu suggests that the reversion to Mao era political initiatives can be dangerous. He notes, and not without some reason, that it may be impossible to detach old political initiatives from their effects. There is a sense here that Xu is skeptical that one can revert to Maoist ideological initiatives without suffering the consequences that are well known. One cannot detach an initiative from its context, even if the context in which it is to be applied has changed. The foundations of the Great Leap Forward might not have miraculously different results when applied a half a century later to a nation in very different financial conditions. But underlying the unease is a legitimate question: if the Leninist project demands moving forward to confront new conditions in their context, an idea firmly reaffirmed in the 19th CPC Congress Report, then how is it possible to revert of old approaches whose disastrous results are historically documented? There is no answer here; and none seems to be forthcoming. But a vanguard party must resolutely face this question and provide leadership if it is to overcome insecurity and lead willing masses. And, indeed, Xu raises the equally important question about CPC working style--self-criticism explicitly and democratic centralism implicitly.
With respect to the second fear, Xu suggests that the reversion to Mao era political initiatives can be dangerous. He notes, and not without some reason, that it may be impossible to detach old political initiatives from their effects. There is a sense here that Xu is skeptical that one can revert to Maoist ideological initiatives without suffering the consequences that are well known. One cannot detach an initiative from its context, even if the context in which it is to be applied has changed. The foundations of the Great Leap Forward might not have miraculously different results when applied a half a century later to a nation in very different financial conditions. But underlying the unease is a legitimate question: if the Leninist project demands moving forward to confront new conditions in their context, an idea firmly reaffirmed in the 19th CPC Congress Report, then how is it possible to revert of old approaches whose disastrous results are historically documented? There is no answer here; and none seems to be forthcoming. But a vanguard party must resolutely face this question and provide leadership if it is to overcome insecurity and lead willing masses. And, indeed, Xu raises the equally important question about CPC working style--self-criticism explicitly and democratic centralism implicitly.
The third fear follows the pattern of the second. But here the object is class struggle. Again, Xu wonders whether movement toward the revival of class struggle in modern China also is a species of looking backwards to move forward. He raises the question that should be at the core of study among Party faithful: how can historical materialism be reconciled with policies that appear to look backwards? Indeed, such a policy can be criticized within Chinese Leninism both for its left error and its right error. It is left error because it opens the door to cronyism and cults of personality. It is right error to the extent it promotes false conflict among people whose unity is a prerequisite toward the objectives of achieving a communist society. A return to class struggle, indeed, would suggest that the CPC's political work was a failure. It would suggest that little has changed since 1949 in terms of the class constitution of Chinese society, and that all Chinese leaders to date have failed in their obligation., But that cannot be true. If that is the case then the return to class struggle itself is grave error.
That brings Xu to his fourth, and perhaps greatest fear--trade and prosperity. Having built China to serve as the factory to the world, politics, it seems will close those factory doors in ways that can only reverse the progress of socialist modernization. This ia a fear with societal and cultural implications. His fear, and not without some justification, is that China may make political choices that will preserve a sort of backwards looking politics that will produce, in turn, a backwards nation. The result is that all efforts to assume a leading role in the world will come to nothing. Terrifying, to be sure, but justified? Xu argues that "Now, for China to buddy up to failed states and totalitarian regimes like North Korea and Venezuela not only goes against the popular will, it flies in the face of the tide of history. Indeed, it lacks wisdom" (Xu, supra). More pointedly, he notes the hypocrisy--that officials now pushing an aggressive policy against the West had already transferred substantial wealth to those very places. The result is that the Chinese people will bear the price of policies which may not affect officials. This produces the critical charge--that officials have put their own interests, and the institutional interests of the CPC , ahead of that of the nation. This is a serious charge. But its implications are more powerful--it suggests that the basis of the core obligation of the CPC--to align its interest to those of the nation--have been breached, and with it fidelity to the CPC Basic Line and its legitimating ideology.
Fifth, Xu worries that moving from economics to politics internally will have significant spillover effects in terms of foreign policy. Here Xu makes an oblique criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative. He effectively suggests that Belt and Road is effectively more successful as a political rather than as an economic project. But that such political adventurism itself breaches the CPC's core duty to the nation.
It is said that China is now the world’s largest source of international aid; its cash-splashes are counted in billions or tens of billions of dollars. For a developing country with a large population many of whom still live in a pre-modern economy, such behaviour is outrageously disproportionate. Such policies are born of a ‘Vanity Politics’; they reflect the flashy showmanship of the boastful and they are odious. (Ibid).He references as well the ramifications in the face of the current U.S.-China trade dispute.
Following the recent outbreak of the Sino-US Trade War, the official state media has called on the nation to ‘Overcome the Present Difficulties in a Spirit of Unity’ [共克時艱], a slogan that has been widely mocked.. . . The Masses have responded by deriding such nonsense mercilessly: ‘Fuck you’, you hear people say. ‘What the hell does that have to do with anything?’ Such sentiments reflect popular sentiment; people can’t be duped like the hapless and uncomplaining subjects of yesteryear.
But, Xu warns, and a warning that should be taken seriously, that such efforts erode confidence precisely because of the falsity of the challenge they represent. Here agains, Xu'0s concern is actually Party positive. The concern is missteps by officials, borm of a fear that the accumulation of error by officials who may have lost a sense of fidelity to the party and its objectives, might destroy the system itself. This is hardly the cry of an individual who fulminates against the state. The reverse is true; here is a cadre who takes steps to protect the collective for the benefit of the people. The only response that is legitimate is to meet the criticisms . . . or change.
The sixth concern focuses on the repression of the intelligentsia. This is well known and understood. Xu, however, does not raise the arguments that might have been rightly criticized for its rightist error. Rather he raises concerns that focus on the ability of the state to continue to develop the productive forces of the intelligentsia where it seeks to suppress their contribution. There are other ways to manage intellectuals. And China has already experimented, unsuccessfully with the methodologies much used between 1957 and 1976. Again this is a variant of the principal argument that Xu develops--is the CPC failing in its leadership obligations by seeking to look backwards to move forward. More importantly, however, Xu suggests that the current policy effectively eliminates democratic centralism. Yet, the elimination of democratic centralism is itself a core breach of the fundamentals of Leninist organization. If the CPC cannot encourage robust intra-party democracy, it will never be able to meet its obligation to successfully extend its political work to all the masses. It is difficult to see how the CPC can maintain fidelity to its own core values in this context.
The seventh concern turns to the cost of great power status. Xu worries that the cost of a Chinese arms race would be borne on the backs of those least able to afford it. Worse, it would constrain the primary objective of socialist development."The main issue for China is that we cannot afford to interrupt our developmental trajectory or further frustrate the Great Modern Transformation just as it is within sight of being realised" (Xu, supra). Xu had written about this in the past. He "did so in an effort to point out the inherent dangers in this development and to forewarn of its negative consequences" (Ibid.). For Xu this is icing in the cake of a series of bad policy choices. In particular, Xu worried, and quite correctly, that China had no business worrying about whether its system was better or worse than that of other powers, especially the United States (a thinly veiled critique of some writing from other departments at Tsinhua University hat had become influential in some circles). The accumulation of these factors would not produce positive effects for Chinese objectives.
At the moment, as the political atmosphere of China is becoming increasingly repressive and the country is entangled in a foreign trade dispute, there is an increased possibility of an economic downturn, something that could led to things that are beyond control and that may have various unintended consequences. In such a situation it is not unreasonable to be afraid that matters could result in some form of military conflict, be it either a hot or a cold war. One should mindful of the need to prevent such an outcome. Popular wisdom argues that a trade conflict between China and the United States should not be used as a pretext [by the propagandists and policy advisers] for heightened ideological contestation, nor should there be a competition over which side has a superior political system.
For Xu, war and military emphasis, is bad for the business of socialist development. more importantly, it would interfere with what he suggests is the trajectory of Chinese restoration to its former glory and place among states.
The eighth and capstone worry brings Xu back to the opening of the essay. Xu worries that when current government and Party policy is amalgamated, what emerges is not just a progress of CPC policy to meet the challenges of the time, but instead, the end of reform and a return to the working style of the Cultural Revolution period. An opening up to war would, in Xu's view also open China up to a return to totalitarianism. That, he argues, is the firm lesson of recent Chinese history.
The eighth and capstone worry brings Xu back to the opening of the essay. Xu worries that when current government and Party policy is amalgamated, what emerges is not just a progress of CPC policy to meet the challenges of the time, but instead, the end of reform and a return to the working style of the Cultural Revolution period. An opening up to war would, in Xu's view also open China up to a return to totalitarianism. That, he argues, is the firm lesson of recent Chinese history.
But all is not lost. To counter the eight worries that Xu extracts from leadership failures to remain loyal to core principles, Xu also offers what he calls "eight immediate hopes (八項期待). These are the concrete policy suggestions that Xu suggests would correct the errors he has outlined. They mirror, of course, the eight fears.
The first two touch on Chinese foreign policy and economic largesse ("Put a stop to grand gestures and Wasteful International Largess," and "Put an End to Diplomatic Extravagance"). Probably reflecting some public sentiment, Xu expressed chagrin at the cost of building the Belt and Road Initiative.
The first two touch on Chinese foreign policy and economic largesse ("Put a stop to grand gestures and Wasteful International Largess," and "Put an End to Diplomatic Extravagance"). Probably reflecting some public sentiment, Xu expressed chagrin at the cost of building the Belt and Road Initiative.
At the recent China-Arab States Cooperation Forum [on 10 July 2018] the Chinese Leadership [that is, Xi Jinping] announced that twenty billion US dollars would be made available for ‘Dedicated Reconstruction Projects’ in the Arab world. On top of that, [Xi Jinping declared that] ‘a further one billion yuan will be offered to support social stability efforts in the region’. Everyone knows full well that the Gulf States are literally oozing with wealth. Why is China, a country with over one hundred million people who are still living below the poverty line, playing at being the flashy big-spender? How can the Chinese not comment in astonishment: just what is the Supreme Bureaucratic Authority thinking? Don’t They care about our own people? (Xu, supra).
What is worse, is the charge that these initiatives end run the National People's Congress and might, on that score, be extra legal. This is a delicate matter. The Belt and Road Initiative is a crown jewel of the Chinese Going Out and economic initiative, the heart of the great challenge to the Post WWII global system and the dominance of the United States. To challenge its implementation surely hits the current leadership near the center of where it might hurt most. And yet, from a theoretical perspective, this is not the strongest point of the argument. Whatever one thinks of the Belt and Road Initiative, it is hard to argue that it shows a lack of fidelity to the core principles of State or Party. Indeed, the reverse is more likely true. Whether the policy will actually succeed remains in doubt. But no state can survive long if its leadership cannot take good faith risks in furtherance of legitimate objectives. And that is the case here. The same is true of diplomatic extravagance. And in any case this is an old old complaint; one recalls even Deng Xiaoping complaining about the value of banquets.
The third, fourth, and fifth hopes, "End the privileges of the Party Nobility," "End the System of Luxury Provisioning," and "Require Officials to Divulge their personal assets," are both necessary and quite stinging public rebukes. It is hard to maintain legitimacy in a Leninist organization grounded in class struggle (especially where the Party is itself seeking to revive this device) where cadres acquire special privileges that from the outside resemble those reserved for high capitalists.
This is not merely a betrayal of the self-advertised ‘Revolutionary Spirit’ [of the Communist Party], it is also in breach of modern standards of civic life. What’s all that talk of ‘the remnants of feudalism’ for? This is a perfect example of it! People are outraged but powerless to do anything about it and it’s one of the main reasons why people regard the system itself with utter contempt. On one side of the hospital Commoners face the challenge of gaining admission for treatment, while everyone knows that grand suites are reserved on the other side for the care of high-level cadres. The people observe this with mute and heartfelt bitterness. Every iota of this bottled up anger may, at some unexpected moment, explode with thunderous fury. (Xu, supra).
Anyone with even the smallest connection to history recalls the devastating effects of these sorts fo systems of privilege on the Communist nobility in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. People are also well aware of the whispering of the masses in places like Cuba where, though the privileges are relatively smaller, they are still quite noticeable. The privileging stings more where the masses are asked to sacrifice int he name of equality of state policy. Leaders who lead most authoritatively lead from the front. Those who enjoy comforts int he rear eventually may find that the armies they deploy may turn around. That is a lesson that early Chinese Communist theorists were as sensitive to as others.
To be sure, there has been some reform. And that is to be lauded. But as Xu suggests, one wonders whether it is enough. More importantly, one wonders whether the Party has made sufficient effort to fix its optics to satisfy mass expectations. Failure here can have substantial effect. Xu suggests a connection between luxury provisioning, with respect to which much care is lavished, and the lack of care for safety standards relating to goods made available to the masses. These double standards are bad theory, and worse governance--at least for the long run. Individuals who care about strengthening the system ought to care deeply about these sort of charges. But the solution for discipline leaves something to be desired. Especially from experience in the West, disclosure if a good first step, but hardly a basis for the disciplining of officials. This is especially the case where the difficulty is systemic. Xu puts his faith in "the national Internet, and with the oversight of 1.4 billion pairs of eyes, everything would immediately become clear" (Xu, supra). He might have done better to put his faith in social credit systems (see, e.g., Next Generation Law: Data Driven Governance and Accountability Based Regulatory Systems in the West, and Social Credit Regimes in China).
The sixth and seventh hopes present timely and key challenges to current policy--"Put a Stop to New Personality Cult Immediately," and Restore Term Limits for the National Presidency." The issue of cults of personality should not be underestimated in China. Even if none are actually being engineered, the optics of personality cults can make large segments of the population, segments that have fresh memories of the Cultural Revolution, nervous. To some extent, Xu openly states what some segments of Chinese society had been whispering for some time. Perhaps that declaration was necessary. It is a pity that such an argument might be exploited by Westerners. Xu clearly has it in mind to bring the Chinese state closer to a state where theory and practice converge. He has no interest in attacking the legitimacy of the current political system or of the leadership of the CPC. But he does insist the CPC practices what it preaches better. That is fair enough. Even if one disagrees. Westerners, however, are unlikely to resist the urge to see in these charges all the evidence they need to conclude that the system is itself illegitimate. That is hardly the take-away Xu suggests, nor is it warranted by the essay. In any case, an official response is equally necessary. And it is possible to make such an answer--it is already an essential feature of Chinese political principle (see Constitutional Reform Comes to the Chinese State Constitution and Changes to China's Global Trade Relationships).
The eighth hope is perhaps the most impossible, to "Overturn the Verdict of 4 June." His reasoning is not absurd. It is indeed quite pragmatic. If one diffuses the political potency of the 4th of June, then it no longer serves as a focus of dissent. Xu notes correctly precedent for this rehabilitation in the recent history of the CPC. And to soem extent, he taunts the current leadership. If Deng Xiaoping could rehabilitate a very sensitive anniversary (5th April 1976), then why is it not possible for the current core leadership to do the same with the 4th of June? That, of course, is a question that only the core can answer. But certainly there is substantial inertia on that score.
To be sure, there has been some reform. And that is to be lauded. But as Xu suggests, one wonders whether it is enough. More importantly, one wonders whether the Party has made sufficient effort to fix its optics to satisfy mass expectations. Failure here can have substantial effect. Xu suggests a connection between luxury provisioning, with respect to which much care is lavished, and the lack of care for safety standards relating to goods made available to the masses. These double standards are bad theory, and worse governance--at least for the long run. Individuals who care about strengthening the system ought to care deeply about these sort of charges. But the solution for discipline leaves something to be desired. Especially from experience in the West, disclosure if a good first step, but hardly a basis for the disciplining of officials. This is especially the case where the difficulty is systemic. Xu puts his faith in "the national Internet, and with the oversight of 1.4 billion pairs of eyes, everything would immediately become clear" (Xu, supra). He might have done better to put his faith in social credit systems (see, e.g., Next Generation Law: Data Driven Governance and Accountability Based Regulatory Systems in the West, and Social Credit Regimes in China).
The sixth and seventh hopes present timely and key challenges to current policy--"Put a Stop to New Personality Cult Immediately," and Restore Term Limits for the National Presidency." The issue of cults of personality should not be underestimated in China. Even if none are actually being engineered, the optics of personality cults can make large segments of the population, segments that have fresh memories of the Cultural Revolution, nervous. To some extent, Xu openly states what some segments of Chinese society had been whispering for some time. Perhaps that declaration was necessary. It is a pity that such an argument might be exploited by Westerners. Xu clearly has it in mind to bring the Chinese state closer to a state where theory and practice converge. He has no interest in attacking the legitimacy of the current political system or of the leadership of the CPC. But he does insist the CPC practices what it preaches better. That is fair enough. Even if one disagrees. Westerners, however, are unlikely to resist the urge to see in these charges all the evidence they need to conclude that the system is itself illegitimate. That is hardly the take-away Xu suggests, nor is it warranted by the essay. In any case, an official response is equally necessary. And it is possible to make such an answer--it is already an essential feature of Chinese political principle (see Constitutional Reform Comes to the Chinese State Constitution and Changes to China's Global Trade Relationships).
The eighth hope is perhaps the most impossible, to "Overturn the Verdict of 4 June." His reasoning is not absurd. It is indeed quite pragmatic. If one diffuses the political potency of the 4th of June, then it no longer serves as a focus of dissent. Xu notes correctly precedent for this rehabilitation in the recent history of the CPC. And to soem extent, he taunts the current leadership. If Deng Xiaoping could rehabilitate a very sensitive anniversary (5th April 1976), then why is it not possible for the current core leadership to do the same with the 4th of June? That, of course, is a question that only the core can answer. But certainly there is substantial inertia on that score.
Xu has now moved his reader from the basis of the argument, in the form of betrayals of fundamental principles, to the exposition of the four core principles, to the eight worries and eight hopes that provide a framework for understanding what is error and how to overcome them in the current environment. But Xu is not done. In Section 4, Xu seeks to answer the fundamental Leninist question: What is to be done? His answer, in times of transition, dislocations are likely but those who manage to avoid conflict will win in the end--at least for their people.
Human beings are, above all, political animals, and politics is the ultimate expression of human ingenuity. What is necessary in the here and now is that, no matter what the present situation happens to be, we cannot allow ourselves to deviate from the grand course of Peaceful Development. We have a period of historic opportunity that can only be seized on by the wise. We don’t need heedless antagonism; at all costs we must not cast aside the good hand that we have been dealt. (Xu, supra).
Xu suggests that China and the United States find themselves with quite similar leaders at the same time, and both perhaps suited for the transitional time sin which they find themselves. "This is and can only something that happens in a transitional moment; it’s the typical kind of unruly coincidence that occurs during periods of heightened historical drama" (Ibid). He has little positive to say about either leader--though he paints both with a similar brush. In both cases, the leader is not aligned with the needs of the people or the direction in which duty requires.
Be it in China or abroad, in the present or in the past: we’ve seen their kind before. One is reminded of those [recent] jokes about how ‘Bad People Have Gotten Older’ [a reference to a popular comic observation that: ‘It’s not that old people have suddenly turned bad, it’s just that bad people have gotten older’ 不是老人變壞了，而是壞人變老了]. (Ibid).
And who might come to the rescue? The intellectual class, of course. Here Xu ties back the implications of one of the eight worries, with strands of soem fot he hopes, to produce a suggestion that, ironically, centers his own class at the heart of the political discourse of a re-invigorated China.
In China it is necessary to call for an end to the ever-increasing censorship and to give freedom of expression back to the intelligentsia [讀書人, literally, ‘those who read books’]. For only then, and only with the painstaking work of generations, can the motherlode of Chinese Civilisation be regenerated and nurtured, its role protected and its relevance strengthened. Only then will it be possible to face unfolding possibilities with clear-sightedness, or to be able to respond calmly to immediate challenges so that we can apply ourselves to practical service in the world. "
Like Xu, I am a great fan of the intellectual class within which I function. And like Xu I believe that the ability of this class, in the aggregate, to fully develop knowledge (and to some controlled extent to disseminate it appropriately), can serve society well. . .quite well. At the same time, a class is a class is a class. Those of us who have been enmeshed within its institutions, especially its disciplinary societal institutions, understand well that the intelligentsia is a subjective to the excesses of orthodoxy and of simony as any other. The charges Xu makes against an ossified and detached ruling elite can as easily be made against a detached and self reflective intelligentsia bloated on its own image of itself and worried more about protecting its view of itself than of serving knowledge or society. It is difficult, then to convincing argue for intellectual leadership, where, instead, the cultivation of the individual in the exercise of knowledge production, might serve society better. But that is an argument for another day, but one that is contextually contingent (Democratizing the Global Business and Human Rights Project by Catalyzing Strategic Litigation from the Bottom Up). Yet for Xu, this is important. It ties the legitimacy of the proffered eight hopes, to the authority of the intelligentsia to proffer them to state authority.
And so Xu ends his argument, but not before insulting the venality of the people who curry favor with the current leadership through complicity in augmenting tendencies toward cults of personality; "one imagines that the whole performance is being stage-managed by a duet of bureaucrats and businessmen, each in hot pursuit of their own ends."(Ibid). That, perhaps, more than anything else, suggests the enormity of the task that Xu confronts. This, perhaps, he realizes as he ends his essay: "That’s all I’ve got to say now. We’ll see what Fate has in store; only Heaven can judge the nation’s fortunes. 話說完了，生死由命，而興亡在天矣." (Ibid.).
One can see why the essay might have been viewed as sensitive within China. And one can see as well the value of the essay for outsiders eager to continue the by now tiresome game of proving the illegitimacy of the Chinese constitutional system in a quest for regime change of some kind. Both urges are not merely tiresome but they impede the self interested advancement of the interests of all sides. Xu had made a strong Leninist case for change--some parts of it stronger than others. But the argument itself is quite conservative, in the sense of starting from the assumption that the system itself is not in question, just the choices made by those in positions of authority at the moment. That is fair. A more Leninist argument might have resonated more; but it would have been lost entirely on much of the audience Xu tries to reach. And that, ironically ought to be understood as the greatest criticism that ought to be made of the current situation. The CPC has failed to do its work when it has, after so many years, continued to fail to normalize the discourse of its system within the operative vocabulary of its people. In the end, it doesn't matter much if in the rarefied halls of the Party schools it is possible to have deep and elegant conversations about the operation of the state and the role of its vanguard. That is intellectual elitism that is every bit as corrosive in the intellectual arena as Marxist notions of advanced capitalism is in the economic arena. Until Xu's arguments can be normalized within the ideological view of the vanguard, the vanguard has much work to do to make itself understood.
One can extract several larger insights from Xu's essay.
The first is that the intellectual class is now nervous enough to seek ways to gain the attention of the highest level officials of the political and the administrative state. That should serve as a warning to officials. That warning has internal dimensions. If the collective governance system excludes its intellectuals to the point where such performances are deemed necessary, as sensitive as they might be, it suggests that some one is not listening, someone who ought to be listening. And of course, to listen does not mean to agree, or to act on what is said. But it is to hear and consider. Here, perhaps the greatest insight--the current system continues to require further work on the embedding of the mass line into its working style.
Second, the causes of that nervousness is not tied to an erosion of faith in the fundamental operational principles of the state or even of the Leninist organization of political power. The reverse appears to be true. It is a failure to adhere to founding principles that have made the intellectuals nervous. In this context it is important to note how, despite misgivings, Chinese constitutional ordering has developed a firm foundation. To see in Xu's essay an opportunity to advance arguments about the legitimacy of the current political order or its norms is error.
Third, it follows that Xu's essay does not in the slightest evidence any sort of constitutional crisis. Rather, it evidences a crisis of confidence in the fidelity of leadership to remain faithful to core Leninist principles of governance that have developed in China since the 1970s. It evidences the rise of constitutional Leninism that is both remarkable and highly understudied. Yet this emerging constitutional Leninism it is potent for ensuring the sort of collective governance at the heart of the evolving Leninist collective project, both for preserving the normative objectives of the Marxist political order, and for ensuring that the drive toward governance systems in which the collective remains at the center, and through which individual discretion is constrained by rules faithful to the normative project.
Fourth, the essay suggests the difficulty, even for people of clear vision like Xu, to move from the identification of the problem to its solution. To some extent, that is the great strength but also the great weakness of the essay. It clearly sees the problem but can do little more than what the adversary offers--looking backward to move forward. This has been the great problem of other Marxist Leninist States (see, e.g., The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform: Current Status and Future Reform). But as Xu suggests as well, also a growing problem among Western democracies. As such it is a bit ironic to both criticize the looking backwards strategy in adversaries while offering a variant of that same strategy as an alternative. The answer cannot be to preserve the past (Xu's position) or to return to a different past (the solution of factions currently influential in state and party).
Fifth, the essay lamentably may fall into its own trap; and in doing so reflects a global problem for intellectuals and their role in contributing to the integrity of the governance of states in accordance with their contextually relevant political norms. Like his Western counterparts in the United States, concerned intellectuals of all political allegiances appear increasingly unable to separate arguments about policy and rules--and a fidelity to both, from the all-to-easy temptation to personal mockery of individuals. Yet succumbing to that temptation substantially weakens the power of the criticism, and its helpfulness. If, indeed, the object (or an object) is to ensure avoidance of cults of personality, then focusing on personality in critique might well appear to have the opposite of intended effect (see, The NATO Meeting's Agit-Prop Moment--Is this Any Way to Run an Alliance in the Age of Media Spectacle? On Reshaping Discourse in NATO). As a consequence, the authority of intellectual intervention is also weakened; it becomes politics by another means. That is as true in the United States as it might be in China.
Sixth, Xu reminds us that in a system founded on the union of politics and economics, one in which socialist modernization remains at the center, one cannot discount trade when speaking to politics, and one cannot value political theory that diminishes the reality of its economic effects. For Xu, this cuts in two contrary ways. For one, it puts a political spotlight on the Belt and Road Initiative. But this is bad business from the perspective of long term economic planning and the advancement of Chinese economic objectives. But that is precisely the problem that Xu describes but fails to analyze completely--the measure of political and economic risk differ; and a society's tolerance for economic risk will likely be quite different form its tolerance of political risk. And yet the Belt and Road Initiative requires a balancing of both in its construction and implementation. In that respect Xu focuses necessarily on the political risk (with respect to alternative expenditures of public money), but fails to consider the importance of the economic risk analysis. This is lamentable especially in the shadow of the overall imperative of socialist modernization. For the other, it centers the relations between China and the United States in ways that may distort China constitutionalism, Chinese politics, and Chinese economics. That is certainly a pity, but it is a problem of long standing. And, indeed, it behooves the Chinese intellectual class to determine a mechanics for finding escape velocity form the shadow of the United States. Normal relations between the two most powerful systems in the globe might never attain a level of value to both until each ceases to operate in the shadow of the other.
And so Xu ends his argument, but not before insulting the venality of the people who curry favor with the current leadership through complicity in augmenting tendencies toward cults of personality; "one imagines that the whole performance is being stage-managed by a duet of bureaucrats and businessmen, each in hot pursuit of their own ends."(Ibid). That, perhaps, more than anything else, suggests the enormity of the task that Xu confronts. This, perhaps, he realizes as he ends his essay: "That’s all I’ve got to say now. We’ll see what Fate has in store; only Heaven can judge the nation’s fortunes. 話說完了，生死由命，而興亡在天矣." (Ibid.).
One can see why the essay might have been viewed as sensitive within China. And one can see as well the value of the essay for outsiders eager to continue the by now tiresome game of proving the illegitimacy of the Chinese constitutional system in a quest for regime change of some kind. Both urges are not merely tiresome but they impede the self interested advancement of the interests of all sides. Xu had made a strong Leninist case for change--some parts of it stronger than others. But the argument itself is quite conservative, in the sense of starting from the assumption that the system itself is not in question, just the choices made by those in positions of authority at the moment. That is fair. A more Leninist argument might have resonated more; but it would have been lost entirely on much of the audience Xu tries to reach. And that, ironically ought to be understood as the greatest criticism that ought to be made of the current situation. The CPC has failed to do its work when it has, after so many years, continued to fail to normalize the discourse of its system within the operative vocabulary of its people. In the end, it doesn't matter much if in the rarefied halls of the Party schools it is possible to have deep and elegant conversations about the operation of the state and the role of its vanguard. That is intellectual elitism that is every bit as corrosive in the intellectual arena as Marxist notions of advanced capitalism is in the economic arena. Until Xu's arguments can be normalized within the ideological view of the vanguard, the vanguard has much work to do to make itself understood.
__________
One can extract several larger insights from Xu's essay.
The first is that the intellectual class is now nervous enough to seek ways to gain the attention of the highest level officials of the political and the administrative state. That should serve as a warning to officials. That warning has internal dimensions. If the collective governance system excludes its intellectuals to the point where such performances are deemed necessary, as sensitive as they might be, it suggests that some one is not listening, someone who ought to be listening. And of course, to listen does not mean to agree, or to act on what is said. But it is to hear and consider. Here, perhaps the greatest insight--the current system continues to require further work on the embedding of the mass line into its working style.
Second, the causes of that nervousness is not tied to an erosion of faith in the fundamental operational principles of the state or even of the Leninist organization of political power. The reverse appears to be true. It is a failure to adhere to founding principles that have made the intellectuals nervous. In this context it is important to note how, despite misgivings, Chinese constitutional ordering has developed a firm foundation. To see in Xu's essay an opportunity to advance arguments about the legitimacy of the current political order or its norms is error.
Third, it follows that Xu's essay does not in the slightest evidence any sort of constitutional crisis. Rather, it evidences a crisis of confidence in the fidelity of leadership to remain faithful to core Leninist principles of governance that have developed in China since the 1970s. It evidences the rise of constitutional Leninism that is both remarkable and highly understudied. Yet this emerging constitutional Leninism it is potent for ensuring the sort of collective governance at the heart of the evolving Leninist collective project, both for preserving the normative objectives of the Marxist political order, and for ensuring that the drive toward governance systems in which the collective remains at the center, and through which individual discretion is constrained by rules faithful to the normative project.
Fourth, the essay suggests the difficulty, even for people of clear vision like Xu, to move from the identification of the problem to its solution. To some extent, that is the great strength but also the great weakness of the essay. It clearly sees the problem but can do little more than what the adversary offers--looking backward to move forward. This has been the great problem of other Marxist Leninist States (see, e.g., The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform: Current Status and Future Reform). But as Xu suggests as well, also a growing problem among Western democracies. As such it is a bit ironic to both criticize the looking backwards strategy in adversaries while offering a variant of that same strategy as an alternative. The answer cannot be to preserve the past (Xu's position) or to return to a different past (the solution of factions currently influential in state and party).
Fifth, the essay lamentably may fall into its own trap; and in doing so reflects a global problem for intellectuals and their role in contributing to the integrity of the governance of states in accordance with their contextually relevant political norms. Like his Western counterparts in the United States, concerned intellectuals of all political allegiances appear increasingly unable to separate arguments about policy and rules--and a fidelity to both, from the all-to-easy temptation to personal mockery of individuals. Yet succumbing to that temptation substantially weakens the power of the criticism, and its helpfulness. If, indeed, the object (or an object) is to ensure avoidance of cults of personality, then focusing on personality in critique might well appear to have the opposite of intended effect (see, The NATO Meeting's Agit-Prop Moment--Is this Any Way to Run an Alliance in the Age of Media Spectacle? On Reshaping Discourse in NATO). As a consequence, the authority of intellectual intervention is also weakened; it becomes politics by another means. That is as true in the United States as it might be in China.
Sixth, Xu reminds us that in a system founded on the union of politics and economics, one in which socialist modernization remains at the center, one cannot discount trade when speaking to politics, and one cannot value political theory that diminishes the reality of its economic effects. For Xu, this cuts in two contrary ways. For one, it puts a political spotlight on the Belt and Road Initiative. But this is bad business from the perspective of long term economic planning and the advancement of Chinese economic objectives. But that is precisely the problem that Xu describes but fails to analyze completely--the measure of political and economic risk differ; and a society's tolerance for economic risk will likely be quite different form its tolerance of political risk. And yet the Belt and Road Initiative requires a balancing of both in its construction and implementation. In that respect Xu focuses necessarily on the political risk (with respect to alternative expenditures of public money), but fails to consider the importance of the economic risk analysis. This is lamentable especially in the shadow of the overall imperative of socialist modernization. For the other, it centers the relations between China and the United States in ways that may distort China constitutionalism, Chinese politics, and Chinese economics. That is certainly a pity, but it is a problem of long standing. And, indeed, it behooves the Chinese intellectual class to determine a mechanics for finding escape velocity form the shadow of the United States. Normal relations between the two most powerful systems in the globe might never attain a level of value to both until each ceases to operate in the shadow of the other.
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2018-07-24
累计浏览：31266
包括整个官僚集团在内，当下全体国民对于国家发展方向和个人身家性命安危，再度深感迷惘，担忧日甚，已然引发全民范围一定程度的恐慌。盖因近年来的立国之道，突破了下列底线原则，倒行逆施，而这曾是“文革”后执政党收拾合法性，并为三十多年的“改革开放”证明为最具正当性的政治路线，也是全体公民和平共处最低限度的社会政治共识，本不该动摇，千万不能摇撼。
一、四条底线
那么，是哪四项底线原则呢？
第一，维持基本治安，明确国家愿景。结束连年“运动”，中止“和尚打伞无法无天”，以包括连番“严打”在内的强力整肃，阻止社会失范，维护社会治安，同时尽力实现社会和解，大致提供了一般民众生聚作息的基本秩序条件，是四十年里现有政体的底线合法性，也是历经劫难后的亿万国民拥护“改革开放”的原因所在。虽说从治安到公正，自就业而尊严，公共产品的内涵缺一不可，而且时移世易，诉求必然逐次提升，但在高端产品阙如之际好歹有底线保障，对于历经动乱和苦难的百姓而言，总是好事。毕竟，升斗小民，日常起居的美好愿景不过是安宁生活，期期于温饱小康，而以世道安靖为前提。虽说此种治安格局及其后来发展出来的“维稳”路径，反过来滋生出新的问题，暴露出政治统治正当性不足这一致命病灶，但就其提供基本治安而言，却是成功的，也是合意的。
不宁唯是，三十多年里，尤其是1992年春夏之后，执政党以经济建设为中心，所谓“专心致志谋发展，聚精会神搞建设”，坚持二十年不变，则官民互动之下，几个回合下来，一般国民认为不管谁上谁下，他唱罢你登场，反正发展经济、专心国家建设这一条蔚为基本国策不会改变。有此预期兜底，遂仿佛多所安心，接受既有政体安排，你当你的官，我过我的小日子，而合作共谋出此刻这一社会治安格局。换言之，不是这个梦那个梦，而是发展经济社会，专注于国家建设，别搞运动，安宁生计，凡此底线原则，筑就了展示并通达国家道义愿景的起点，也是百姓接受统治的前提。
第二，有限尊重私有产权，容忍国民财富追求。从废除私有制，声言私产为万恶之源，到有限保护私有产权，容忍亿万人民对于财富增长的追求，并且诉诸立宪，所谓“私产入宪”，释放了发家致富的普遍人欲，给予追求美好生活的人性志向以正面政治迎应。在此情形下，不仅国家经济实力空前增长，并以此支撑了科教文卫与国防武备，特别是庞大的党政费用，而且，一般国民亦多获益，生活水准多所提升。此为中国经济快速成长的法制缘由，同时说明了既有政制合法性之获得全民容忍的经济原因。毕竟，动什么，别动大家的钱袋子，是硬道理。其实，此为一切正常人类社会的通则，近世产权理念与人性观念为此特加张本，“改革开放”以“拨乱反正”皈依普世大道，实为知错能改善莫大焉。
第三，有限容忍市民生活自由。几十年里，公民社会不见成长，稍有冒头即遭整治，严重阻滞了国民政治心智发育与公民人格养成。政治社会更是不见踪影，导致中华国族的政治成熟捉襟见肘。但是，伦理社会基本恢复，经济社会与市民社会确乎多所发育。市民自由而非公民自由，尤在市场经济较为发达省份，早成生活事实。所谓市民生活及其市民自由，指的是私性领域的有限生活权利，着重于吃喝拉撒卿卿我我，特别是对于自家生活方式无涉政治的自我支配，至少是发型服饰无需看官家脸色行事。大家搓澡搓脚，旅游宴飨婚外恋，小资麻麻，这世道才有烟火气。较诸毛氏极权政治下千篇一律的铁桶生活，连裤裆都管得死死的，此刻国民暂弃公民身份追求，而满足于市民幸福，回归普通人的日常本色，既无可厚非，更是大家之能容忍刻下政体的原因所在。就此而言，警力以抓嫖为柄，实施定向人身控制，造成普遍不安全感，虽于一案一事得计，可丧失的却是普遍的市民预期，反而得不偿失。至于北京市以整治市容为据，而将好端端便民商铺酒肆一律封拆，彰显的是“光荣政治”对于市民社会的为所欲为，一种权力的美学恶趣。——就是香港、伦敦与巴黎，超大规模国际大都会，不还都容忍并规划街市交易嘛。至于市场经济之下，笑贫不笑娼与娱/愚乐至死，忸怩作态、无德无识无耻却大富大贵，亦为普通众生的市民生存，遵循的是商品逻辑，讲述了一个不得不为了市民常态生聚而付出文明腐朽代价的现代喜剧与后现代闹剧。
第四，实行政治任期制。三十多年里，究其实质，虽说社会多元与政治容忍度明显增长，但整个政治体制未见任何具有实质进步意义的变革，骨子里依旧是那一套陈腐而残忍的敌我斗争与专政理念，外加上“吃江山”的贪婪丑态。但因立宪规定了包括国家主席和国务总理在内的政治任期制，以及“人权入宪”，并经2003年以还的十年任期后实现党内和平禅让，终于兑现了最多连任两届、最长十年这一宪法规定，纸上的宪法规定至此似乎积习而为“宪法惯例”，好像立法与实践均双双尘埃落地，这便总算给予国民以一定政治安全感，也令国际社会觉得中国正在步入现代政治。不妨说，三十多年里嚷嚷政体改革而政体岿然不动，这是唯一看得见摸得着也拿得出手的政治改革成果。在大家看来，不管你如何，不过就是十年的事。诸位，百姓无辜，小民蝼蚁，平时面朝黄土背朝天，分散如沙，为养家糊口而劳生息死，根本无力抵抗任何组织化强权。此刻终于好歹有此“十年任期”，似乎感觉也还算是对于随时可能爆发的政治任性的一招制约，这便随遇而安地打理自家油米柴盐也。
综上所述，总体来看，以治安为导向的社会控制，在提供治安这一基本公共产品层面，依然有效，但发展至“维稳”体制，局部地区甚至是一种准戒严状态，则尾大不掉，靡费非常，说明体制潜力已然用尽，有待升级换代。特别是此次中美贸易战争，将国力的虚弱与制度软肋暴露无遗，更加强化了不安全感。此前高峰申言，“执政合法性不是一劳永逸的”，对此危机似乎还有所警醒，而近年来对此严重缺乏敏感，却自信膨胀，类如“扶贫运动”这种准运动式政经操作方式再度登场，令国家愿景的确定性再度打折。另一方面，对于私有产权的有限保护与一般国民发家致富欲望的有限满足，不仅促进了经济增长，而且提升了亿万国民的生活水准，但却终于遭遇所谓“国进民退”与实际生活中屡屡发生的公权力肆意剥夺私有产权恶性案件的证伪，倒逼出“私权神圣”这一国民诉求，而背后的逻辑不过是“权力不能私有，财产不能公有”这一公民认知。本来，“分清公私”方能“提供和平”，二者均为古今政治的基本内涵，今日于此必得过关而后安。而最为世诟病并令人胆战心惊的，便是修宪取消政治任期制，等于一笔勾销了三十多年的改革开放，一巴掌直要把中国打回那个令人恐惧的毛时代，伴随着甚嚣尘上而又可笑之至的领袖个人崇拜，这才引发出下列全面恐慌。
二、八种担忧
在此，总括而言，大家的担忧与恐慌，主要集中在下列八个方面。
第一，产权恐惧。几十年里积攒的财富，不管多少，能否保有？既有的生活方式能否持续？法定的产权关系还能获得立法所宣谕的保障吗？会不会因为得罪了哪位实权人物（包括村委会主任）就企业破产、家破人亡？凡此种种，最近几年间，反倒随着时间推移，而愈发缺乏确定性，遂至上上下下恐慌不已。它首先冲击的是在改革开放大潮中已然掘金成功人士，而以大规模富人移民现象作为应对之道。一般中产阶级中下层，温饱有余，但却同样为生老病死进程中随时可能降临的任何意外而担惊受怕，尤其害怕通胀通缩钱不值钱。当然，富人移民的原因复杂，既有追求更高生活品质的，也不乏洗钱赶紧溜的，更有权贵携款逍遥法外的，但普遍缺乏产权安全感则为通例。官商一体权贵的巧取豪夺是“改革开放”的最大赢家，也是富人移民的主体。官方信息披露有限，民间传说嘈嘈切切，加上官媒时不时演奏个“共产党的终极理想就是消灭私有制”之过门，伴随着“打土豪分田地”式民粹叫嚣，更且加剧了此种不安全感。恐慌之际，高峰居然集体学习《共产党宣言》，一份曾令世界不得安生的两位年轻天才的轻狂之作，其予全体国民的负面心理震撼，也只有在此语境下，才能获得真切解释。
第二，再次凸显政治挂帅，抛弃以经济建设为中心这一基本国策。几年来，意识形态火药味愈来愈浓，以争夺话语权为标识，而实则依仗公权力施行意识形态迫害的阵势，已然导致知识界的普遍恐慌。置此情形下，自我审查，层层加码，导致出版业遭受重挫，舆论界钳口日甚，中国与外部世界勾连之阻力加剧。甚至出现了鼓励小朋友举报告发父母这类官方宣传品，违忤基本伦理，既反传统又违现代，活脱脱一副极权政治嘴脸，令人不得不想起曾经的野蛮“文革”岁月，实在匪夷所思。影响所及，大学教师连连因言获罪，因为担忧党政宣传口子找麻烦与课堂上学生特务告密，而战战兢兢。更为严重的是，地方官僚基于政治担忧普遍不作为，而中国经济的成长实在有赖于地方官员基于政绩观而认真干活的发展观。那边厢，“重庆模式”那帮余孽与高校中曾经的“三种人”联袂一体，今日摇身一变，滚雪球，构成“新极左”，喊打喊杀。
本来，一般国民对于“政治运动”之苦记忆犹新，新生代汲汲于市民生活，已然习惯于常态经济社会与市民生活，对于人为的“政治挂帅”与毫无逻辑的极权泛政治化倾向，了无兴趣，也不关心，硬逼他们，只能徒增反感。实际上，几十年来，上下一心，这个政治体制还能获得国民容忍，就在于国家以经济建设为中心，全心全意谋发展，不再天天运动式“讲政治”，停止或者减少干涉私人生活，更不会上演什么“宁要社会主义草，不要资本主义苗”这类荒唐闹剧。终究而言，“以经济建设为中心”发展到一定阶段，必需转向以宪政建设为中心，而于政经两面次第推进建设现代国族，为现代中国接生。但就目下而言，最低限度却依然应该是固守前者，再谋他图，岂能背道而驰。
第三，又搞阶级斗争。前几年官媒与官方意识形态主管官员屡提阶级斗争，早已让大家一阵恐慌。这几年的施政方向，令人再度怀疑会否重搞斯大林—毛韶山氏阶级斗争那一套。犹有甚者，随着反腐之第次展开，特别是新建国家监察委及其权力之无限扩大，将全体公教人员悉数划入，不仅未能提升大家基于法制的安全感，相反，却不禁令人联想到克格勃式辖制以及残酷的党内斗争的可能性，而再度引发重回过往阶级斗争岁月的阵阵恐慌。因而，对于“斗，斗，斗”这一恐怖政治模式的国民记忆，及其是否重回华夏大地的普遍担忧，使得政治疏离感日增，和合与祥和气氛日减。本来，“私产入宪”与“人权入宪”，伴随着两任到顶这一党内禅让制的施行，有望朝向一个常态国家渐行渐近，意味着不再需要动用“斗”字诀，可这几年的做法却仿佛与此背道而驰，大家自然心惊胆战。
第四，再度关门锁国，与以美国为代表的西方世界闹僵，却与朝鲜这类恶政打得火热。中国的经济成长与社会进步，是中国文明的自我进步，循沿的是超逾一个半世纪的文明大转型固有逻辑，也是现代世界体系在中国落地后之发育成长，并非外力所能主导。但在具体操作层面，却是在重启“改革开放”而与西方世界关系改善之后，以进步主义为导向，以“与世界接轨”为目标，而搭乘上全球化市场经济快车实现的。没有“开放倒逼改革”，就没有今天的中国经济、社会和文化。而与朝鲜、委内瑞拉这类失败国家、极权国家打得火热，违背民意，忤逆历史潮流，实在不智。虽说民间调侃，鉴于中国大量官商的子女玉帛均寄存于彼方山水，故而不用担心两国交恶，但明暗之间一闪失，倒霉的是这个据说全民所有的国族，而必然落在每个具体的百姓人头，摇撼的是他们的口粮与衣衫。在此，究其缘由，就在于以政党理性代替国家理性，而以扭曲的国家理性压制公民理性，不思进取，一意孤行，早已落后于时代思潮，所以然哉，有以然哉。
第五，对外援助过量，导致国民勒紧裤腰带。据说中国已成世界最大外援国，动不动“大手笔”划拉几十亿几百亿。此就一个发展中人口大国而言，不少地方还处在前现代，实在是不自量力。究其根源，扩张性“光荣政治”逻辑作祟，蔚为主因，而公子哥心态与做派亦且难辞其咎。现有的国家财富，包括那三万亿外储在内，是四十年里几代人血汗累积的，更是远自洋务运动以还数代中国人奋斗的善果，怎能随便乱花。长期高速的经济增长终有结束之时，则如此慷慨，类如当年无原则“支援亚非拉”，导致亿万国民勒紧裤腰带过日子，甚至于饿殍遍野，在在不能重演。此次中美贸易战爆发后官媒以“共克时艰”号令，傥论什么“先天下之忧而忧，后天下之乐而乐”，立刻遭遇百姓无情嘲讽，“去你妈的，都哪儿对哪儿呀”，正说明人心所向，早已非当年那般忽悠得了的了。
第六，知识分子政策左转与施行思想改造。虽然早就说知识分子是劳动人民的一部分，但一有风吹草动就拿他们当外人，甚至当敌人，已成国朝政治的最佳晴雨表，也是政制底色的政治表达。教育部一再声言要加强对教师的思想教育，网传必须重点防范海归教师，以及高校中的极少数文革遗左纷纷如打鸡血般跳将出来喊打喊杀等等，都令人担忧所谓的知识分子改造政策再度降临，特别是伴随着政策左转而再次施行思想改造运动，乃至于不排除更为严重的态势。“妄议”大棒挥舞，人人噤若寒蝉，还有什么言论自由可言。而无自由思想与独立精神，则探索未知、学术精进与思想创发云乎哉。本来，历经这四十年的积累奋斗，再好好干一、两代人，中华文明有望迎来一个思想学术的全盛高峰。但是，假若此种钳口政策再延续下去，甚至日益趋紧，则此种可能性无望变成现实性，中华国族终究只是精神侏儒与文明小国。
第七，陷入重度军备竞赛与爆发战争，包括新冷战。短短十年间，整个东亚其实已然陷入军备竞赛，但所幸爆发战争的概率依旧尚处可控层面。问题是，不能由此打断中国的常规发展，就此摧折了尚未最后水落石出的伟大现代转型。两年来，在“阻止中国陷入全面内战”与“保卫改革开放”两文中，笔者都曾指认中国逐渐于“维稳体制”之上又叠加了“战备体制”，就在于提示其危险性，防范其负面影响。此刻随着内政紧绷与外贸纠纷日甚，经济下滑可能性加剧，则其进程不可控因素增多，防范其不至被迫走向战争状态，不管是热战还是冷战，绝非杞人忧天。坊间舆议提醒中美贸易争端不应再引向意识形态之争，更不要进行政治模式之争，亦为同此忧虑而发，还算靠谱。
第八，改革开放终止与极权政治全面回归。虽说“改革”一词已然多少污名化，毕竟，恶政亦且假尔之名而行之，但在当下中国语境下，置身大转型尚未完成、有待临门一脚的现状，较诸爆炸性革命与极左式的倒退，改革依旧是最为稳妥的路径。改革空转，抑或不进则退，早已非只近几年的事了，实已延绵一届任期。照此趋势以往，“改革开放”会否就此终止，极权回归，亦未可知。此时此刻，全体国民之最大担忧，莫此为甚。说是极权回归，就在于胡温任期，仿佛出现极权向威权过渡趋势，故而称为“后极权时代全能型威权政制”。但这两年反其道而行之，这才引发“极权政治全面回归”的恐慌。中国近代史上，1894年的甲午战争与1937年抗战爆发，两度打断中国的现代进程，致使追求日常政治的努力付诸东流，中国的现代事业因而被迫延宕。今日这一波延绵将近两个世纪的大转型已到收尾时段，有待临门一脚，切切不能再因战祸而中断。倘若中断，下次历史机遇何时再来，恐伊于胡底矣。
三、八项期待
当此之际，针对上述担忧与恐慌，从内政着眼，无涉经贸（包括大幅度减税），也不上纲上线到民主法治层面，仅就下列八项而言，具体而有形，允为时务。
第一，杜绝援外撒钱“大手笔”。非必要的无谓援外大撒把，砸钱，最令一般民众反感寒心。中国尚处发展爬坡时段，无论基础设施还是民生福利，均难题如山，任重道远。且不说养老、就业与教育，但就乡村凋敝而言，就压力山大，而需公权力多所措意。否则，半个中国仍处前现代，等于现代中国只是个半拉子工程，谈何文明复兴。近日中阿论坛期间宣布拨银两百亿美金，设立所谓阿拉伯国家“重建专项计划”，并且“探讨实施总额为10亿元人民币的项目，支持有关国家维稳能力建设”。可我们知道，海湾国家个个富得流油，何需尚有上亿未曾脱贫国民的中国在此充当冤大头，让人不禁感慨有司心肠何在，还把自家国民当人待吗？而且，凡此支出，完全无视既有预决算体制，将最高国家权力机关的国库司库宪法职权撇在一旁，在实质性瘫痪既有官僚科层建制化之际，等于向宪制与法制开战。
第二，杜绝主场外交中的铺张浪费。开个平常的会，就使劲折腾，不计成本，劳民伤财，其实既无里子也无面子。此为“光荣政治”，而非“实利政治”，更非“实力政治”，亦非什么“中国人民自古以来具有热情好客的优良传统”，非徒谋虚荣者不为。照此思路，联合国所在地的纽约峨冠博带，岂非天天戒严不可；全球性组织最多的日内瓦和巴黎，衣香鬓影，还不夜夜都要放烟火。就国家自助体而言，概需以实力立世，而旨在谋取实利，同时不废道义心肠。两项既存，三者并立，沾溉国民，荣光不求自来。无此维度，汲汲于光荣政治那一套，当事者出头露面好像挺风光，而不恤民力，做冤大头，实则招人鄙夷，也会激发民愤。连举世嫌弃的隔壁独夫胖墩来，居然大阵仗迎送，那文图俱在、传闻中酒席宴上128万元一瓶的矮嘴茅台，说实在的，一下子令亿万国民离心离德。——还中国梦呢，做梦吧！
第三，取消退休高干的权贵特权。国朝体制，高干生养病死全赖国库，而享受超国民待遇。原有生活待遇、医疗标准与度假休养诸项，耗费巨量民脂民膏，大家耳闻目睹，而至今不敢公布，正说明见不得人。此种体制，承继的是朱姓子民、八旗子弟的奉养传统，既违忤曾经自诩之革命精神，更不符现代公民立国原则。若说什么“封建残余”，此为典型。国民痛恨不已，可毫无办法，遂成制度招恨之一大毒瘤。这边厢普通人民住院难，那边厢高干病房巍哉峨兮，隔离于一般病区，让多少百姓看在眼里恨在心里，而每一丝仇恨都可能在某个时刻于心田中成长为惊天雷暴。
第四，取消特供制度。七十多年里，其实早从延安时期就已开始，无论是在国民饥寒交迫的年代里，还是此刻亿万百姓为婴儿奶品、日常食品安全而提心吊胆之际，特供制度供养着这个号称人民政权的高层权贵，提供着一般人做梦都不敢想象的诸种特权，除开几个极权政体之外，举世找不出第二家，可谓豪奢之至，而无耻之尤。社会恒有差等，贤愚贫富实为自然，但那是结果，而非抹煞起点平等的公民理想，更非公然利用国库供养少数权贵。此制一日不除，“第34号”依旧，中国食品安全就一日没有保障，两方同样无任何真正的安全可言。
第五，实施官员财产阳光法案。有关于此，民间早已呼吁多年，居然毫无动静，说明其间猫腻最大，最见不得人。现有官员升迁程序中对于子女玉帛的说明，只限内部掌握，存见于干部档案，而一般国民无从知晓，遂使一切迷雾重重。而无论人力物力，还是技术手段，早已成熟，正为施行此制，并经由全国联网，用十四亿双眼睛施行有效监督，铺垫好一切基础。反腐而腐败不止，就在于搞成了内部的事，而非基于政治公开原则的法制作业，缺的就是阳光法案这一环。你们若非心虚，那就施行此制，让一切大白于天下吧！你们要是正心诚意，那就加入大多数国家均在其中的《艾格蒙国际反洗钱组织》吧！何必云山雾罩，将亿万国民当二百五。
第六，“个人崇拜”亟需赶紧刹车。改革开放四十年，没想到神州大地再度兴起领袖个人崇拜。党媒造神无以复加，俨然一副前现代极权国家的景象。而领袖像重现神州，高高挂起，仿佛神灵，平添诡异。再者，官员讲话，本为秘书手笔，不过等因奉此，居然汇编刊行，精装亮相，全球免费赠送，徒耗纸张，令人喷饭。此间不仅需要反思为何当事人如此弱智而好名，更需要检讨为何曾经遭遇此种戕害的偌大国家，包括她的芸芸“理论家”“研究者”，居然对此毫无抵抗力，却不乏舔痈吸疽之徒。而亿万人犹如虚无，竟然容忍其大行其道，奈何不了那几个马屁精大员，正说明所谓启蒙是一个未竟事业，需要每一代人在公共事务上公开运用自己的理性，方能如履如临而砥砺前行。而且，它更加说明中国尚未完全进入现代世俗理性的常态国家境界，而有待接续奋斗矣。
第七，恢复国家主席任期制。年初修宪，取消政治任期，令世界舆论哗然，让国人胆战心惊，顿生“改革四十年，一觉回从前”的忧虑。此间作业，等于凭空制造一个“超级元首”，无所制衡，令人不禁浮想联翩而顿生恐惧。因此，今明两年的适当时机，如秋季召开人大特别会议或者明年三月全国人大例会，通过再度修宪，恢复国家主席任期制，以保卫改革开放、防范重回文革极权政治。《宪法》既立，无论是何种质量的宪法，本不宜改来改去，无奈这是大转型时段过渡政体下的一部临时宪法，只好频繁修订。但愿转型落地之前，这是最后一次修宪。
第八，平反“六四”。今明两年，适值“改开”四十周年、“五四”百年与“六四”三十周年，一连串所谓敏感节点纷沓。而中美贸易战的后果，亦将延时第次显现，增加了所谓的不确定性。在此，既有的“维稳”思路是“以治安对付政治”，叠加上“用政制钳制政治”，而非“以政治迎应政治”这一常态政治之道。当年给“四五”平反，从此每年四月五号不再成为敏感节点，就在于“以政治迎应政治”，兵来将挡水来土掩，结果各得其所，皆大欢喜。因此，值此迎来“六四”爆发三十周年之际，当局于今明两年适当时刻公开为其平反，不仅表明“以政治迎应政治”的诚意与智慧，而且，从此每年六月四号无需再如临大敌，为全体公民政治上的和平共处扫清障碍，既裨益于民心舒畅，更有助于收拾政治合法性。
以上诸项，均为现代政治的一般常识，也是刻下国人的普遍诉求。此番“冒着杀头的危险说出人所共知的道理”，就在于举世滔滔，若无此说法，就无此立法，从而吾侪百姓没个活法，其奈也何，呜呼哀哉！
四、过渡时段
两年多来的世界进入政治调整小周期，无需惊恐，远未到分晓时分，更须也唯有稳健推行内政改革，健全国族身心，方能应对过关，维持包括中国在内的这艘世界大船持续扬帆于和平与发展的常态政治航道。冲突与战争是人类这个残忍物种的常态，但是身处历史机遇关头而推延或者避免其发生，则为政治的天命所在，更是对于肉食者政治智慧与德性的大考，而人类恰恰就是政治的动物，政治为世间最高智慧。就刻下情形而言，纵便事态已如今日，也还未能根本偏转“和平与发展”这一大势。而这就是历史机遇，就是所谓的“机遇期”，唯智者方能攫获，而不至于东怼西怼，将一手好牌打成烂牌也。
至于太平洋沿岸东西两大国均不期然间先后步入“老红卫兵执政”状态，是而且不过是一种短暂的过渡现象，实为每临历史危机关头就会出现的那种一再上演的乱象之再现而已。就此岸言，其毫无历史感与现代政治意识，更无基于普世文明自觉的道义担当，昧于时势大道，却又深濡文革政治烙印，虚骄之下，允为干才而用力过猛却用错了方向，致使弄权有术，当官有方，而治国无道，岂止折腾，直是倒行逆施。就彼岸看，实为一群依旧生活在列强时代与冷战政治中的老不死幽灵登台，虽不乏对于当今世界政治图景与文明变局的现实判断，却同样缺乏历史感，短视而贪婪，根本开出了误诊处方，反将早年裙带资本权贵的重商主义国策与基于唯我独尊、掠夺成性的帝国主义式傲慢偏见与粗鄙蛮横，赤裸裸的讹诈，尽兴抖露无遗，展示了一个文明衰败的疲惫帝国狗急跳墙式的晚期症状。而自大爱国狂适成祸国害人精，所谓爱国贼，中外古今，史不鲜见。同时，它还说明，如同“坏人变老了”一般，人人都是自己早年教育体系的产物，此后无所用心，了无自省，便难以挣脱羁绊。以旧知识应对新事物，却又自信爆棚，遂刚愎自用。其理念，其政策，如托克维尔所言，不过是“发霉的旧货”。
此时此刻，就中文世界的一般舆议心态与脉络来看，基于公民理性的政治自觉已然充沛发育，更不缺昂扬正大的道义立场，但少见基于国家理性意识的文明自觉，特别是未能梳理清楚适用于“国家间政治”的国家理性与适用于“国家政治”的公民理性之二元分际，而混战一团，指东打西，甚至崇拜起彼岸老红卫兵来，将自己降格到铁锈州红脖子们的水准，套用一句名人名言，可谓“土样土尿泡”。同时，也是政体感召不足，导致认同缺失或者疲弱，而使国民身份与公民认同两相悖逆之怪象。毕竟，“大清”与“中华”，虽纠结缠绕，还就真的不是一回事。你们“坐江山”“吃江山”，江山有事了，就让大家“共克时艰”来“保江山”，这不扯淡吗！有舆议感慨，一些人说话办事，仿佛自己不是中国人，而处处倒为对方设计着想，实在是怪而不怪，正为向心力凝聚力这一软实力不足国族常见的景象矣。再者，撇开究竟何为“中国人”等等认知争议，置此情形下，可得申言者，两边各说各话，越是昂扬正大，越可能将话谈死，而无转圜余地。凡此再度说明，国族的政治成熟必以其知识精英的心智作育为先导，而心智作育要在精神自由，众口喧哗却又紧扣人生与人心的普世心思，摒拒任何定于一尊的愚妄与傲慢，要求当局不要再钳口日甚，而把言论自由还给读书人，从而，在几代人的接续用功磨砺中，涵养保育中华文明思想母机，护卫其功用，强化其势能，这才有望清醒观势，冷静应事，而清明用世矣。
目前来看，当局一再重申绝不会因为贸易战而改变“改革开放”的基本国策，也不会动摇在开放交往中发展经济的既有路线，并决心协力捍卫多边体制。与此表态相呼应，并有相应开放措施出台，仿佛尚有定力。其于证明“开放倒逼改革”这一中国式发展路径依赖的同时，却又似乎未见任何实质性内政改革，雷声大雨点小，则不免令人失望，而对其诚意和实效，采取游移观望态度。故而，上述八项，允为时务，先做起来再说。
都说你能干肯干，这八项你只要干一件，我们就欢喜。你要是干三、四件，我们就心服口服。你要是全干了，则普天同庆。
年初高官曾经宣示今年还要陆续放大招，以回应“改革开放”四十周年，此刻时间过半，宁信其有，且翘首以待矣。
最后，顺说一句，陕西省梁家河村四五十户人家，常驻百十来口，居然在上海设立联络处和农副产品展示馆，一望可知非淳朴乡民所能为，毋宁，官商勾结的媚上双簧，于各怀襟抱中各逞其图。还有，最高检开设“12309检察服务中心”，层峰邀约与此八竿子打不到一块儿的梁家河村支书共同揭牌，同属太监姿态，希图借此创造勾兑机会，拍马屁不要脸。至于陕西省社科联的招标项目“梁家河大学问”，以及近年来各类所谓社科项目之造神运动与领袖崇拜，反现代，逆潮流，匪夷所思，恬不知耻，丢人现眼，更不论矣！凡此种种，太作了，太过分了，而过犹不及，只会把我们带回那个人人觳觫苟存的酷烈人世也！
话说完了，生死由命，而兴亡在天矣。
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