(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Westlake, Hangzhou, China [西湖 杭州])
It was my great delight to be able to participate in this year's 10th
Annual Conference on "Politics, Law and Public Policy"
(第十届“政治、法律与公共政策”年会) (more on that event HERE). For that event, I was invited to speak to emerging theoretical approaches to socialist democracy. To that end I will present brief remarks (to follow shortly) derived from a conference draft that my co-author, Miaoqiang Dai (戴苗强) and I (白轲) prepared, entitled 问责时代的社会主义宪制民主 (白轲 戴苗强 翻译：戴苗强)--Socialist Constitutional Democracy in the Age of Accountability.
English and 中国语文 versions of the Conference Draft follow below and may be downloaded HERE. Comment and engagement always welcomed.
Socialist Constitutional Democracy in the Age of Accountability (责)[1]
Larry Catá Backer[2], Miaoqiang Dai[3]
Larry Catá Backer[2], Miaoqiang Dai[3]
Abstract
This paper examines the development of democratic theory, in general, and the emergence of deep structures of Socialist Democracy in China in the New Era. To that end, we will briefly touch on the conjoining of two theoretical trajectories that, in the West, are rarely conjoined. More the pity for our understanding of the world as it is. But is an oversight that merits correction. What are these theoretical trajectories? The first is the development of a theory of democratic behavior that extends beyond the conventional orthodoxies we sometimes mistakenly come to believe are both complete and impregnable. We will suggest that, indeed, conventional exogenous democratic theory is not just pregnable but has in fact given birth to something quite remarkable. That is, it has opened the possibilities to theories of endogenous democracy. The second is the trajectory of the development of a robust Leninism that we have sometimes assumed is capable only of governance models in which power holders are essentially unaccountable. We will suggest that in seeking to more deeply embed the core postulate of collectivity within its own theoretical structures, emerging notions of Chinese Leninism has given us a glimpse at the possibilities of an accountability-based structure of governance that is in its essence robustly democratic.
.
Keywords: Socialist Consultative Democracy, Accountability, Democratic Centralism, Leninism,
I. Introduction
This paper presents an initial examination of the development of democracy theory in the global “new era.” That examination, in turn, will point to the development of a theory of democratic behavior that extends beyond the conventional orthodoxies we sometimes mistakenly come to believe are both complete and impregnable. Current historical conditions requires the reconsideration of theories of democracy (as concept and as institutionalized) that better reflects both the conceptual foundations both Western liberal and Marxist Leninist theories, and the national context in which each are applied. To that end, it is necessary to conjoin of two theoretical trajectories that have been treated as theoretical “strangers.” Yet contemporary historical conditions demands that theory keep pace with facts. Globalization, technological advances, the advanced state of the development of productive forces, and the progression of all around administration, for example, now point to a need to advance democratic theory to suit the times. What are these theoretical trajectories? We start with conventional exogenous democratic theory, no longer the sole or apex objective of political organization, and no longer solely satisfied by the mechanics of popular elections in representative democracies. The gaps left open by traditional exogenous democratic theory has in fact given birth to something quite remarkable. That is, it has opened the possibilities to theories of endogenous democracy. The second is the trajectory of the development of a robust Leninism that we have sometimes assumed is capable only of governance models in which power holders are essentially unaccountable. We will suggest that in seeking to more deeply embed the core postulate of collectivity within its own theoretical structures, emerging notions of Chinese Leninism has given us a glimpse at the possibilities of an accountability-based structure of governance that is in its essence robustly democratic. As such, while the initial focus of our study is on endogenous democracy generally, the central focus of our examination is on the emergence of Chinese Socialist Democracy as an important expression of endogenous democratic theory that may provide valuable insights to political societies beyond China.
What has become clear after the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is that the "New Era" addition to the CPC ideological line is having some very important and very quickly moving changes on the organization of the state apparatus and on the way on which the CPC asserts its leadership role. We will suggest that “New Era” socialist consultative democracy is not built around popular elections and the rise of political parties, but around engagement in governance exercised through the organs that bring together the CPC and the United Front parties within the Chinese People’s Political and Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
It is in those institutions that socialist democracy are being developed—an exercise in endogenous democracy in contradistinction to the West’s emphasis on exogenous democratic exercise. The nexus between state, CPC and United Front through the CPPCC, then, serves as the connective tissue between CPC and State constitutions, and between the political authority of the CPC and its exercise through the rule system, it itself has mandated as its own political line. It expresses in contemporary form the ideals of the New Democracy thinking embraced by the CPC before the founding of the PRC.
In this paper, we examine the emergence of the CPPCC more closely in this context. Part 1 lays the groundwork, considering the development of notions of endogenous democracy within Chinese constitutional thought. Part II then ties this development to the emergence of New Era constitutionalism from out of the 19th CPC Congress and expressed in the transformations of CPC and State Constitutions in late 2017 and early 2018. Part III then considers this emerging framework within a larger shift—implied by the move to endogenous democracy—from regulatory to consultative mechanisms built around the centrality of accountability (and the rich vocabulary around 责). This endogenous consultative Socialist Democracy theory is to be understood as both a method of engagement and as a fundamental normative expression of socialist constitutionalism in the “New Era.”
II. Endogenous versus exogenous democracy—An Emerging Divide in Democratic Constitutional Theory
It makes sense to start with a consideration of the analytical framework. That requires a light engagement with some of the most intractable concepts in political theory and philosophy, one that have been violently contentious over the last 300 years. These touch on the character of democracy as exogenous or endogenous, and the relationship of that principle to legitimate government.
In earlier work we considered the question: Where does democracy happen?[4] Consideration of that fundamental question produced an elaboration of an argument that what appeared to be the universal orthodox position of the West—that it occurs principally exogenously, and is manifested in the rituals of voting—may not be the only possible orthodoxy for democratic theory. It was suggested that democratic institutions might be centered on endogenous rituals, manifested through the formalities of inter-institutional consultation undertaken through systems of collective and representational decision making. Moreover, it was suggested, that the rituals of democracy would then decisively affect the construction and operation of a constitutional order.
The reasons for such constructions could be understood in relation to context and historical circumstance in the states and political cultures from which these core theoretical premises emerged. Central to the construction of democracy is the premise that democracy requires an ordering principle for binding a political core, that is the individuals and institutions charged with the exercise of political power, with the political collective, that is the mass of individuals who together constitute a self-contained unit or organization. That fundamental ordering relation—between the core and the collective, tends to have been overlooked, as theory focused more on the expression of that construction within national cultural preferences. It is worth re-centering that fundamental premise, though, to reclaim for democratic theory, a flexibility necessary to order society as historical circumstances change.
For Western states, the response to the need to order the relationship between the core and collective was to focus on the external elements of that relationship. To that end, the starting point was the individual and her relationship to the societal and political mass. That required, in turn, a means of expressing that relationship. The answer was found in the concept of representation, but in a very specific and material sense. For Western theory, the individual ceded authority to her representative, and in the process also removed herself from the direct process and exercise of authority. The representative in turn, served as the core through which power could be manifested. The power to vote for a representative represented the apex of individual political action and involvement. That pattern then infused not just politics but also economic organization. The corporation, like the state, operates on the basis of personal representation. The relationship, is both personal and exogenous to the institutions of power created for the exercise of power.
This system exists in pure form only in theory. For several centuries, at least, those clean lines of interaction between the core and the collective on the basis of exogenous and representational principles, have been challenged by the realities of the administrative state and the actual workings of public authority. Increasingly, theorists began to note that democratic theory could not focus entirely on its exogenous practice. For some the rise of the administrative state also suggested an endogenous space for ordering the legitimate relationship between core and collective. That space was built on notions of accountability rather than on notions of representation. Accountability is built on a more intimate and less arm’s length relationship between core and collective. It acquires an endogenous character in the sense that it is built on the exercise of the core-collective relationship in the context of core decision-making. It is built on consultation, on assessment, on measurability, and on the fulfillment of objectives. The core exercises authority, and is vested with leadership. The legitimacy of the exercise of its power, however, rests on its fidelity to the core democratic principle of accountability, and accountability is grounded in the responsibility of the core to the collective through the mechanics of consultation.
Let us take a moment to consider the character of exogenous and endogenous democracy, and then consider their effect on the construction of constitutional orders. Within the conventional master narrative of constitutional democracy, democracy is practiced exogenously. That is its practices are centered on actions that all occur beyond the institutions of government. Elections are the manifestation of the most basic foundation for the operation of democratic principles in a constitutional state grounded in popular sovereignty. Beyond the formal connection between election and democratic accountability (assuming a privity between voters, their representatives, and the actions of the state), elections, serve important legitimating functions in Western constitutional orders. Elections, function as a social act and an act of social discipline. Elections serve as a means of managing popular violence. Elections serve as a measure of governmental legitimacy. Elections function as a ritual of affirmation of the mass democracy grundnorm as the basis of political organization, as a method of popular organization to support or undermine the state apparatus, and as an affirmation of belonging.
Each of these functions evidences an exogenous relationship to the state. The democratic act is fulfilled with the election of the representative. And formally, accounts are rendered by representatives to the people via elections. But functionally, elections may have lost their function of direct accountability for representative government. The modern administrative state makes it virtually impossible for the electorate to hold a small group of individuals accountable for the actions of the state and its administrators. There is no way to connect the dots. As a result, representatives in democratic states find themselves with substantial autonomy from the people to whom they are responsible. Yet none of them are the representative owes little by way of direct responsibility to the electorate to its desires. He represents the electorate by he is effectively not accountable to them for his everyday work, nor is he accountable for the many decisions that then devolve effective governance from the representative to the administrative officials to whom fall the great tasks of government.
For the modern state, the resulting democratic detachment distances the electorate not just form their representatives but also form the organs of state. For the West, this is an acceptable state precisely because of the other and important functions of elections I have just described. But for Leninist states, elections serve no such legitimating functions. Formal political authority is vested in the vanguard party and exercised administratively through the state apparatus toward specific ends—Marxist ends, rather than the satisfaction of electoral desires from time to time expressed through the persons of their representatives.
The core responsibility of a Leninist Party, to exercise principled leadership, poses a double legitimacy challenge: first the legitimacy of vanguard mass leadership within the vanguard, and then the legitimacy of leadership of the masses. Both require democratic responses, but not in the Western sense of election. Rather they suggest legitimacy through the operation of collective organizations in the service of the principles of governance and the objectives of government for which the vanguard leadership was constituted. The identity in Leninism is between the ideal of collectivity and democratic action. Fidelity and accountability—a metrics of representational fidelity—rather than elections, mark the effectiveness of collective government. And, indeed, where Leninist states seek to mimic the forms of the West—especially its elections—the emptiness becomes apparent. It is not surprising then, that especially European Leninism with its false mimicry has been subject to ridicule and its pretensions to democratic functionality rejected.
To that end, Leninist approaches to democracy might be better expressed endogenously—within the operations of the political vanguard and the administrative organs of state. An endogenous element responds to the problem of democratic detachment within exogenous democracy and the irrelevance of the mechanics of election to the problem of representation in a Leninist state. It creates an identity between democracy and accountability which inevitably follows the construction of a political society grounded in the belief in the inexorable progress toward a very specific set of societal goals. But its center is not focused on the performance of elections but on the practice of collectivity, one that is disciplined through deep webs of fidelity and accountability by reference to objectives. Leninism’s core embraces principles of accountability.[5] At its core is the principle that both Party and cadres (whatever their rank) requires mutual and simultaneous accounting to bring (1) each other to account, (2) oneself to account, and (3) to be brought to account. It is contains in its core substantial focus on the application of core principles in the implementation of a principled Marxist-Leninist state. That accountability merges with its democratic expression as (a) the act of answering to, explaining of in relation to an expectation, (b) to a specific and functionally segmented objective, (c) manifested as conduct, norms, methods, consequences, (d) directed to oneself to others, and (e) to the specific ends of making right, disciplining behavior to ensuring order.
Endogenous democracy presents its own challenges. And just as the danger for exogenous democracy through elections is populism and the rise of charismatic leadership whose object is to satisfy themselves, so the danger for endogenous democracy through accountability is the cult of personality producing a leadership core without a collective. The issue of the fiduciary character of the role of the representative within the state forms the fundamental problem of endogenous democracy. The individual ought to disappear within the web of fiduciary obligation that her actions represent. While it may not be clear what the collective might want, what is clear is that the collective would not want decision making grounded in personal agendas. To move beyond theory to practice--to develop rule and accountability systems to implement this approach presents the greatest problem to the operationalization of endogenous democracy. Thus, endogenous democracy worries about how representatives practice democratic action within government and how to avoid actions that serve individual rather than collective objectives.
III. Endogenous Democracy and New Era Principles
Theory is one thing, and reality quite another. Is it possible to see glimmerings of this movement toward both a theory and the practice of endogenous democracy within Chinese Leninism? The answer is not clear but let me make some suggestions that point to the glimmer of possibility.
First, the CPC itself exercises leadership legitimately through a constant reaffirmation of fidelity to its Basic Line. The CPC must lead itself in ways that are consistent with its leadership of the collective. Top that extent the notions of core-collective democracy extends from the most general level of political organization to its apex within the organization of the CPC itself. Western society does not have an objective other than to please itself (though that itself is a powerful enough goal). To that end, an exogenous democratic structure better reflects the organization of the core-collective relationship. Leninist societies, on the other hand, are bound by a fidelity to key objectives. The core objective is the establishment of a communist society in China. The principles through which that objective is to be realized include fidelity to core values—the CPC Basic Line, pursuit of socialist modernization, and operation consistent with the four Cardinal Principles. The principal means by which this is accomplished is through what the Chinese are developing as a people’s democratic dictatorship. That concept, completely incompatible with Western liberal traditions, has within it the possibilities of accountability based democratic structures.
Second, the CPC itself has developed key patterns of interactive relationships that both reinforce its leadership role but also provide a basis for internal and external accountability and discipline in its operationalization of its core objectives.
This paper presents an initial examination of the development of democracy theory in the global “new era.” That examination, in turn, will point to the development of a theory of democratic behavior that extends beyond the conventional orthodoxies we sometimes mistakenly come to believe are both complete and impregnable. Current historical conditions requires the reconsideration of theories of democracy (as concept and as institutionalized) that better reflects both the conceptual foundations both Western liberal and Marxist Leninist theories, and the national context in which each are applied. To that end, it is necessary to conjoin of two theoretical trajectories that have been treated as theoretical “strangers.” Yet contemporary historical conditions demands that theory keep pace with facts. Globalization, technological advances, the advanced state of the development of productive forces, and the progression of all around administration, for example, now point to a need to advance democratic theory to suit the times. What are these theoretical trajectories? We start with conventional exogenous democratic theory, no longer the sole or apex objective of political organization, and no longer solely satisfied by the mechanics of popular elections in representative democracies. The gaps left open by traditional exogenous democratic theory has in fact given birth to something quite remarkable. That is, it has opened the possibilities to theories of endogenous democracy. The second is the trajectory of the development of a robust Leninism that we have sometimes assumed is capable only of governance models in which power holders are essentially unaccountable. We will suggest that in seeking to more deeply embed the core postulate of collectivity within its own theoretical structures, emerging notions of Chinese Leninism has given us a glimpse at the possibilities of an accountability-based structure of governance that is in its essence robustly democratic. As such, while the initial focus of our study is on endogenous democracy generally, the central focus of our examination is on the emergence of Chinese Socialist Democracy as an important expression of endogenous democratic theory that may provide valuable insights to political societies beyond China.
What has become clear after the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is that the "New Era" addition to the CPC ideological line is having some very important and very quickly moving changes on the organization of the state apparatus and on the way on which the CPC asserts its leadership role. We will suggest that “New Era” socialist consultative democracy is not built around popular elections and the rise of political parties, but around engagement in governance exercised through the organs that bring together the CPC and the United Front parties within the Chinese People’s Political and Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
It is in those institutions that socialist democracy are being developed—an exercise in endogenous democracy in contradistinction to the West’s emphasis on exogenous democratic exercise. The nexus between state, CPC and United Front through the CPPCC, then, serves as the connective tissue between CPC and State constitutions, and between the political authority of the CPC and its exercise through the rule system, it itself has mandated as its own political line. It expresses in contemporary form the ideals of the New Democracy thinking embraced by the CPC before the founding of the PRC.
In this paper, we examine the emergence of the CPPCC more closely in this context. Part 1 lays the groundwork, considering the development of notions of endogenous democracy within Chinese constitutional thought. Part II then ties this development to the emergence of New Era constitutionalism from out of the 19th CPC Congress and expressed in the transformations of CPC and State Constitutions in late 2017 and early 2018. Part III then considers this emerging framework within a larger shift—implied by the move to endogenous democracy—from regulatory to consultative mechanisms built around the centrality of accountability (and the rich vocabulary around 责). This endogenous consultative Socialist Democracy theory is to be understood as both a method of engagement and as a fundamental normative expression of socialist constitutionalism in the “New Era.”
II. Endogenous versus exogenous democracy—An Emerging Divide in Democratic Constitutional Theory
It makes sense to start with a consideration of the analytical framework. That requires a light engagement with some of the most intractable concepts in political theory and philosophy, one that have been violently contentious over the last 300 years. These touch on the character of democracy as exogenous or endogenous, and the relationship of that principle to legitimate government.
In earlier work we considered the question: Where does democracy happen?[4] Consideration of that fundamental question produced an elaboration of an argument that what appeared to be the universal orthodox position of the West—that it occurs principally exogenously, and is manifested in the rituals of voting—may not be the only possible orthodoxy for democratic theory. It was suggested that democratic institutions might be centered on endogenous rituals, manifested through the formalities of inter-institutional consultation undertaken through systems of collective and representational decision making. Moreover, it was suggested, that the rituals of democracy would then decisively affect the construction and operation of a constitutional order.
The reasons for such constructions could be understood in relation to context and historical circumstance in the states and political cultures from which these core theoretical premises emerged. Central to the construction of democracy is the premise that democracy requires an ordering principle for binding a political core, that is the individuals and institutions charged with the exercise of political power, with the political collective, that is the mass of individuals who together constitute a self-contained unit or organization. That fundamental ordering relation—between the core and the collective, tends to have been overlooked, as theory focused more on the expression of that construction within national cultural preferences. It is worth re-centering that fundamental premise, though, to reclaim for democratic theory, a flexibility necessary to order society as historical circumstances change.
For Western states, the response to the need to order the relationship between the core and collective was to focus on the external elements of that relationship. To that end, the starting point was the individual and her relationship to the societal and political mass. That required, in turn, a means of expressing that relationship. The answer was found in the concept of representation, but in a very specific and material sense. For Western theory, the individual ceded authority to her representative, and in the process also removed herself from the direct process and exercise of authority. The representative in turn, served as the core through which power could be manifested. The power to vote for a representative represented the apex of individual political action and involvement. That pattern then infused not just politics but also economic organization. The corporation, like the state, operates on the basis of personal representation. The relationship, is both personal and exogenous to the institutions of power created for the exercise of power.
This system exists in pure form only in theory. For several centuries, at least, those clean lines of interaction between the core and the collective on the basis of exogenous and representational principles, have been challenged by the realities of the administrative state and the actual workings of public authority. Increasingly, theorists began to note that democratic theory could not focus entirely on its exogenous practice. For some the rise of the administrative state also suggested an endogenous space for ordering the legitimate relationship between core and collective. That space was built on notions of accountability rather than on notions of representation. Accountability is built on a more intimate and less arm’s length relationship between core and collective. It acquires an endogenous character in the sense that it is built on the exercise of the core-collective relationship in the context of core decision-making. It is built on consultation, on assessment, on measurability, and on the fulfillment of objectives. The core exercises authority, and is vested with leadership. The legitimacy of the exercise of its power, however, rests on its fidelity to the core democratic principle of accountability, and accountability is grounded in the responsibility of the core to the collective through the mechanics of consultation.
Let us take a moment to consider the character of exogenous and endogenous democracy, and then consider their effect on the construction of constitutional orders. Within the conventional master narrative of constitutional democracy, democracy is practiced exogenously. That is its practices are centered on actions that all occur beyond the institutions of government. Elections are the manifestation of the most basic foundation for the operation of democratic principles in a constitutional state grounded in popular sovereignty. Beyond the formal connection between election and democratic accountability (assuming a privity between voters, their representatives, and the actions of the state), elections, serve important legitimating functions in Western constitutional orders. Elections, function as a social act and an act of social discipline. Elections serve as a means of managing popular violence. Elections serve as a measure of governmental legitimacy. Elections function as a ritual of affirmation of the mass democracy grundnorm as the basis of political organization, as a method of popular organization to support or undermine the state apparatus, and as an affirmation of belonging.
Each of these functions evidences an exogenous relationship to the state. The democratic act is fulfilled with the election of the representative. And formally, accounts are rendered by representatives to the people via elections. But functionally, elections may have lost their function of direct accountability for representative government. The modern administrative state makes it virtually impossible for the electorate to hold a small group of individuals accountable for the actions of the state and its administrators. There is no way to connect the dots. As a result, representatives in democratic states find themselves with substantial autonomy from the people to whom they are responsible. Yet none of them are the representative owes little by way of direct responsibility to the electorate to its desires. He represents the electorate by he is effectively not accountable to them for his everyday work, nor is he accountable for the many decisions that then devolve effective governance from the representative to the administrative officials to whom fall the great tasks of government.
For the modern state, the resulting democratic detachment distances the electorate not just form their representatives but also form the organs of state. For the West, this is an acceptable state precisely because of the other and important functions of elections I have just described. But for Leninist states, elections serve no such legitimating functions. Formal political authority is vested in the vanguard party and exercised administratively through the state apparatus toward specific ends—Marxist ends, rather than the satisfaction of electoral desires from time to time expressed through the persons of their representatives.
The core responsibility of a Leninist Party, to exercise principled leadership, poses a double legitimacy challenge: first the legitimacy of vanguard mass leadership within the vanguard, and then the legitimacy of leadership of the masses. Both require democratic responses, but not in the Western sense of election. Rather they suggest legitimacy through the operation of collective organizations in the service of the principles of governance and the objectives of government for which the vanguard leadership was constituted. The identity in Leninism is between the ideal of collectivity and democratic action. Fidelity and accountability—a metrics of representational fidelity—rather than elections, mark the effectiveness of collective government. And, indeed, where Leninist states seek to mimic the forms of the West—especially its elections—the emptiness becomes apparent. It is not surprising then, that especially European Leninism with its false mimicry has been subject to ridicule and its pretensions to democratic functionality rejected.
To that end, Leninist approaches to democracy might be better expressed endogenously—within the operations of the political vanguard and the administrative organs of state. An endogenous element responds to the problem of democratic detachment within exogenous democracy and the irrelevance of the mechanics of election to the problem of representation in a Leninist state. It creates an identity between democracy and accountability which inevitably follows the construction of a political society grounded in the belief in the inexorable progress toward a very specific set of societal goals. But its center is not focused on the performance of elections but on the practice of collectivity, one that is disciplined through deep webs of fidelity and accountability by reference to objectives. Leninism’s core embraces principles of accountability.[5] At its core is the principle that both Party and cadres (whatever their rank) requires mutual and simultaneous accounting to bring (1) each other to account, (2) oneself to account, and (3) to be brought to account. It is contains in its core substantial focus on the application of core principles in the implementation of a principled Marxist-Leninist state. That accountability merges with its democratic expression as (a) the act of answering to, explaining of in relation to an expectation, (b) to a specific and functionally segmented objective, (c) manifested as conduct, norms, methods, consequences, (d) directed to oneself to others, and (e) to the specific ends of making right, disciplining behavior to ensuring order.
Endogenous democracy presents its own challenges. And just as the danger for exogenous democracy through elections is populism and the rise of charismatic leadership whose object is to satisfy themselves, so the danger for endogenous democracy through accountability is the cult of personality producing a leadership core without a collective. The issue of the fiduciary character of the role of the representative within the state forms the fundamental problem of endogenous democracy. The individual ought to disappear within the web of fiduciary obligation that her actions represent. While it may not be clear what the collective might want, what is clear is that the collective would not want decision making grounded in personal agendas. To move beyond theory to practice--to develop rule and accountability systems to implement this approach presents the greatest problem to the operationalization of endogenous democracy. Thus, endogenous democracy worries about how representatives practice democratic action within government and how to avoid actions that serve individual rather than collective objectives.
III. Endogenous Democracy and New Era Principles
Theory is one thing, and reality quite another. Is it possible to see glimmerings of this movement toward both a theory and the practice of endogenous democracy within Chinese Leninism? The answer is not clear but let me make some suggestions that point to the glimmer of possibility.
First, the CPC itself exercises leadership legitimately through a constant reaffirmation of fidelity to its Basic Line. The CPC must lead itself in ways that are consistent with its leadership of the collective. Top that extent the notions of core-collective democracy extends from the most general level of political organization to its apex within the organization of the CPC itself. Western society does not have an objective other than to please itself (though that itself is a powerful enough goal). To that end, an exogenous democratic structure better reflects the organization of the core-collective relationship. Leninist societies, on the other hand, are bound by a fidelity to key objectives. The core objective is the establishment of a communist society in China. The principles through which that objective is to be realized include fidelity to core values—the CPC Basic Line, pursuit of socialist modernization, and operation consistent with the four Cardinal Principles. The principal means by which this is accomplished is through what the Chinese are developing as a people’s democratic dictatorship. That concept, completely incompatible with Western liberal traditions, has within it the possibilities of accountability based democratic structures.
Second, the CPC itself has developed key patterns of interactive relationships that both reinforce its leadership role but also provide a basis for internal and external accountability and discipline in its operationalization of its core objectives.
Figure 1 Endogenous Accountability Mechanisms
i. Internal Accountability StructuresInternal accountability structures include the principles of democratic centralism, of the core and collective, and of consultation within the CPC itself. It also includes disciplinary measures that have become quite potent in the apparatus of disciplinary inspection. Of these, the core and collective tends to reflect the basic division within society between vanguard leaders, the forces burdened with responsibility and accountability for it to themselves and to the people they serve, and the collective. From core and collective develops the axis of accountability. From the collective itself emerges the notions of consensus and consultation.
From its proclamation at the 6th Plenary of 18th Central Committee of CPC in 2016[6], the Guiding Principles for Intra-party Political Life under New Situation (hereinafter The Guiding Principles under New Situation) inherited core principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership and intra-party democracy from its predecessor[7] which was drafted in 1980 as a condensation of lessons learnt from the Cultural Revolution. The Guiding Principles issued in 1980 provided a set of norms to not only bring order back to the party after a decade of chaos but also facilitate the shift of the party’s work from class struggle to the project of socialist modernization. The proclamation of the new guiding principles in 2016 marked a significant step forward and updated the norms and principles that “must be abide by in a period in the future for intra-party political life” as Xi Jinping pointed out[8]. To incarnate core principles and norms, the Guiding Principles under New Situation built up a portfolio of intra-party consultation and accountability spanning from the party’s congress system to intra-party supervision system and consultation mechanisms.
a. Fundamental Binary Structure of the Party’s Internal Accountability
National Congress of the Party is the overarching venue where the leadership as the core was beholden to the party as the collective through the work report given by the Secretary General of the CPC for every five years. A chain of 6 sets of collective-core relationships incarnates the accountability of the Secretary-General as the core to the Party: the 19th National Congress of the Party with 2280 members as the core of the whole Party with 90 million members as the collective[9], the 204-member central committee[10] as the core of the National Congress as the collective, the 25-member politburo as the core of the central committee as the collective, the 7-member politburo standing committee as the core of the politburo and at last, the Secretary-General as the core of the politburo standing committee. Democratic centralism applies to decision-making process of major issues across those binary relationships, requiring the decision to be made by the majority rule after discussion of the collective. Also, standing committee as the core is also required to be subjected to supervision of the collective as the Guiding Principles calls for a regular reporting system to be completely built.
Figure 2 Sets of Collective-Core Relations
Such a model of accountability is replicated and installed to each levels of the party apparatus including province, city, county and party branches in non-governmental entities such as schools and businesses. Core of leadership at each level of the organizational structure of the party is beholden to the collective at that level and the accountability mechanism also centers at those cores while having its roots deeply and widely in the collectives. But unlike the core of the National Congress of the CPC which is only beholden to the collective at the highest level, leadership of party apparatus at provincial level and below are subjected not only to its collectives but also to the of corresponding leadership of party apparatus at the upper level in the hierarchy. Hence intra-party accountability appears to be unfolded into dimensions: horizontally towards the collective at the same level, vertically towards corresponding leadership at the level(s) above.
The same pattern of the intra-party accountability structure could also be found in the division of work by specialized fields of work at each levels but democratic centralism become more salient as a decision-making principle. The Guiding Principle clarified that both collective leadership and individual work division are critical parts of democratic centralism, the rule of sticking to collective leadership and combine it with individual work division (“坚持集体领导，实行集体领导和个人分工相结合”, The Guiding Principle under New Situation) shall not be violated by “any organization and any individual under any circumstance with any excuse” (“任何组织和个人在任何情况下都不允许以任何理由违反这项制度”, ibid.). Division of work brought only functionality but also specifically defined accountability to cadres at each level of apparatus ranging from the politburo to grass-root level. Being embedded into the collective-core system, division of work hold party cadres firmly accountable by subjecting them to double leadership of a collective at the same level and the corresponding leadership at the upper level.
This replicability is an essential element of the structures of a Leninist approach to Socialist Democracy. It is premised on the fundamental principle of core and collective as an infinitely flexible relationship through which the core normative principles of Marxism may be realized. It creates incentives toward achievability through its simplicity—the operating model is direct and capable of understanding and operation without tremendous effort. At the same time it is capable of substantial complexity. But that complexity is structured within blocks and processes each of which is infused with the same operational characteristics. That replicability makes it possible for the system o build while preserving its ability to communicate clearly and coherently among its parts. And it embeds within each element of the system, and its subparts, and the system as a whole, the structures of accountability that are both internal and external.
b. Intra-party Consultation as Operational Accountability Mechanism
Consultation as a process of building up consensus and the foundation of the collective leadership and democratic centralism. Decision-making by discussion of the collective requires opinions of members in the leadership team get fully voiced (“领导班子成员……在研究工作时充分发表意见”, ibid.), the core member should “listen to different opinions and respect the minorities opinions” (“党委主要负责同志……注意听取不同意见，正确对待少数人意见”, ibid.). Bi-dimensional structure of the collective-core relationship also requires the upper organization as the core consult its subject organizations as the collective for major decisions relevant to the latter (“建立上级组织在作出同下级组织有关的重要决策前征求下级组织意见的制度”, ibid.).
In practice, consultation mechanisms at the operational level are becoming increasingly established as common forms of combination of intra-party consultation as the input of democratic centralism from the collective to the core and supervision as the accountability mechanism toward the core. The Guiding Principle under New Situation urged sticking to democratic salon and organization salon systems (“民主生活会和组织生活会制度”), heartful talk systems (TanXinTanHua “谈心谈话制度”) and democratic assessment of party members (”对党员的民主评议”). Those mechanisms are built as not only channels of consultation between the core and the collection, among members of leadership and between upper apparatus and subject apparatus, but also a operational system of “criticism and self-criticism” (“批评与自我批评”) that serves as self-diagnosis and correction mechanism. The effectiveness of consultation and criticism & self-criticism is even set as an important criteria for evaluating the performance in The Guiding Principles under New Situation.
c. Intra-party Supervision System as the Implementation and Enforcement
The Regulation of Accountability of CPC[11] implemented since 2016 clearly framed the collective-core relationship in a laconic but powerful way: “the accountability work of the party……. should match accountability with any power endowed, hold those with responsibilities accountable, investigate any misconduct of accountability, and make clear the political responsibilities of the party organization in the governance of the party” (“党的问责工作……做到有权必有责，有责要担当，失责必追究，落实党组织管党治党政治责任”). Responsibilities are differentiated and identified among the leadership team, the individual leader of the leadership team, the member of the leadership team who is in charge of the issue and other members of the team. Resonating with the collective-core theory, the overall responsibility (全面责任) goes to the collective as decisions must be made through collective discussion under democratic centralism. However, the core leader of the collective still bears major leadership responsibility (主要领导责任) which matches strictly with leadership allocated to the core.
Intra-party discipline and inspection system also roots deep in the fundamental structure of CPC’s National Congress from which the 133 members of 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was elected as the core of the party’s disciplinary inspection system[12]. The same pattern collective-core structure among the commission, the standing committee and the secretary of the commission also applies in this sub-system of intra-party accountability. Parallel to each levels of the party apparatus, intra-party discipline, and inspection system also have a two-dimensional accountability structure. Commission for Discipline and Inspection both report to the Congress of the Party at its level and subject to leadership of the Commission for Discipline and Inspection at the upper level.
Western observers usually experience difficulty in understanding the material significance of this system because the manifestation of accountability and democracy cannot fit into their orthodox approach. The difficulty is compounded because the mechanics of exogenous democracy—elections of representatives into an apparatus within which all political power is allocated—is de-centered within endogenous democratic systems. However, once the holistic picture of the chain of collective-core binaries is seen, it will be evident that the fundamental structure of intra-party accountability is firmly constructed to connect the core of the leadership and the vanguard party. It is in those structures of intra-party accountability that the structures of endogenous democracy becomes visible.
ii. External AccountabilityExternal accountability mechanisms include the mandatory axis between CPC and people—the mass line. The mass line takes the logic of the collective-core principle of governance and exports it to the relationship between party and people. The implicit collectivity of leadership decisions through the power of the ministries and the need for consultation. The apparatus for consultation with academic and other expert stakeholders through back channels well-funded and established but out of sight of the masses (and outsiders). And lastly, it includes cultures of collectivity on decision making and policy implementation through consensus-based action (even if the consensus is to some extent strategic).
CPC as the vanguard of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation, is defined in its party constitution as the leadership core of the socialist undertaking of Chinese Characteristics, its representative of and accountability to the people form the ubiquitous mega-binary relationship between the mass as the collective and the party as the core in Chinese socio-political system at the highest level. What connects the party to the mass is deeply imbedded in the mandate of leadership toward a communist society and the obligation of fidelity which the party owes to the mass. The party itself is consisted of 90 million of members who are not only the vanguards, but also ordinary members of the mass (“中国共产党党员永远是劳动人民的普通一员。”, The Constitution of the Party). The mass line is also firmly set by denying any special interests of the party that is not part of the interests of the mass (“党除了工人阶级和广大人民群众的利益，没有自己的特殊利益。” ibid.). The fundamental principle of the mass line applies thoroughly to every level of the party’s leadership in every sector ranging from the party apparatus itself to the state apparatus and other entities such as businesses and civil organizations.
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is one of the most important places where the axis of mass line functions as the external accountability mechanism for the party’s leadership. CPPCC has been playing the role since 1949 when the first conference laid the foundation of the People’s Republic. Soon National People’s Congress was founded to serve as the supreme authority of the people’s democratic dictatorship and the CPPCC was relegated to political consultation, democratic supervision, political participation, and advisory.
Unlike other national political apparatus, CPC does not take significant portion of seats (only 99 seats) in CPPCC. In the 13th National Committee of CPPCC, more than 90 percent of seats is taken by non-CPC members ranging from members democratic parties (“民主党派“, taking 360 seats), civil organizations (taking 315 seats), academia (taking 180 seats, including science & technology and social science), ethnic minorities (taking 103 seats), overseas Chinese and representative individuals from each field (including arts, education, press, healthcare, religion, etc.)[13]. Through the theoretical lens of collective-core relationship, the composition of CPPCC effectively brings voices from all major parts of Chinese socio-political community and concentrates them in the 2100-member national committee. By building such an external collective-core binary structure, CPC subjected its leadership of the state apparatus to accountability mechanisms responsive toward the mass.
Not surprisingly, the bi-dimensional collective-core relationship applies to CPPCC as well. A set of binary relations among national committee, standing committee of the national committee, and the group of vice presidents and the president build up the structure of CPPCC at the national level while division of sub-committees carries out specified functionality in each field[14]. Meetings, inspections, and making suggestions are major forms of consultation and supervision from CPPCC to the state apparatus while accountability comes from the mandatory response from the state apparatus back to CPPCC. One the one hand, the mechanism that CPPCC members as representatives of the larger collective of the mass hold adequate discussions before decisions being made by leadership of the state apparatus made demonstrated how consultation is carried out and the state apparatus under the leadership of the party is connected to the collective, which at its level of greatest generality oncludes all of the masess. On the other hand, CPPCC’s supervision toward the state apparatus after decision-making process and throughout execution process filled the last part of the external accountability mechanism of the state apparatus and the party’s leadership.
Among the most important consultation mechanism in CPPCC is the current bi-weekly consultative symposiums (双周协商座谈会) system. In its current form this mechanism dates back to 2013, though the idea could be traced back to the founding years of the nation. The first bi-weekly symposium was held by CPC Hong Kong branch at the beginning of Chinese Liberation War as democratic parties could not operate publicly in mainland China because of KMT’s suppression. Those symposiums invited middle-level leaders of democratic parties and non-party patriots to discuss major issues of the nation. [15] After 1949, the tradition of holding bi-weekly symposium was inherited by CPPCC and symposiums were frequently held (more than 110 times according to Li and Qi’s research in 2016) from 1950 to 1966. Symposiums were suspended during the Cultural Revolution and the mechanism were not formally re-installed until 2013.
According to records of National Committee of CPPCC, the bi-weekly consultative symposiums were held 76 times during the term of 12th national committee and 10 times since the 13th national committee took office in March 2018.[16] A typical list of participants of each symposium includes 15 members of National Committee of CPPCC, 3 non-CPPCC experts or scholar and 4 incumbent government officials at ministry level (Vice Minister or Minister)[17]. Topics of symposiums covers a wide range of eminent issues including air pollution (the 5th symposium of 12th National Committee of CPPCC held on December 25, 2013), the application of big data technology in improving the state’s governance capability (the 13th symposium of 12th National Committee of CPPCC held on June 12, 2014), legal problems of rights related to land in rural areas (the 34th symposium of 12th National Committee of CPPCC held on July 2, 2015) and healthcare (the 10th symposium of the 13th National Committee of CPPCC held on September 14th, 2018).
The significance of those symposiums in terms of serving as part of external accountability mechanism between the party (as core) and the masses (as collective) is shown by the fact that there is a two-way interaction between CPPCC and the state apparatus, what’s more important is that they are all hosted by the President of CPPCC who also sits in the Standing Committee of CPC Politburo. Before each symposium, research teams lead by senior members of the National Committee of CPPCC will be dispatched to the forefront spot relevant to the issue of the symposium and then during the symposium, reports with advises will be presented by CPPCC members and non-affiliation experts to incumbent senior officials who have to give response. Transparency also adds to the effectiveness of this accountability mechanism as interactions between participants and government officials are all recorded and publicized.
Bi-weekly symposiums system in CPPCC is a good example but still a small portion of channels that links the party to the mass as an external accountability mechanism. The mass line is applied into almost every collective-core relationship throughout not only political institutions such as CPPCC, the party apparatus and the government, but also civil organizations and businesses (both state-owned and private).
Taken together, these suggest the building blocks for democratic engagement, but one internally driven. That is, it suggests the mechanisms through which an endogenous democratic structure can be built. And by that one can understand those structures as protective against cults of personality and the distortions of temporary popular infatuations. It points to structures developed to ensure fidelity to the core long-term objectives. It provides the cage of principle and regulation necessary to produce baselines against which the performance of the individual—as representative of the people, the state, and the CPC, can be assessed, and disciplined. And it provides mechanisms for substantial engagement among the operative elements of the political and administrative institutions to ensure a vigorous connection between overarching objective, leaders and the masses to which both are responsible. For the West, that the actual record has not lived up to this potential suggests that such endogenous democratic structures cannot be fully attained; for Chinese Leninism, that failure suggests the extent that the road to a fully functional system of Socialist Democracy has not yet been implemented rather than of a failure of theory.
IV. Socialist Democracy and Inter-Institutional Accountability in the New Era
It was perhaps the need for context-based development of core concepts, tied to the notions of the need for relevance in each historical era, that might have driven the further development of these principles of Leninist collectivity applied to emerging practices of consultative endogenous democracy. Xi Jinping, in his Report to the 19th CPC Congress, was quite specific in seeking to bring theory forward to the “New Era.”
The 19th CPC Report groups the evolution and consolidation of consultative socialist democracy within six broad categories. The first centers on “Upholding the unity of Party leadership, the running of the country by the people, and law-based governance.” These touch not just on the role of the CPC, but of the embedding of that role within a complex of supporting institutions. The idea resonates with the fundamental principles of core-collective but now directed in a different way. That is, it characterizes the core-collective as a unified pair consisting of the CPC on one axis (the core) and other institutions (people's congresses, governments, committees of the CPPCC, courts, and procuratorates on the other (the collectives).
The second follows from the first. It focuses on “strengthening institutional guarantees” with the end of ensuring accountability to the people. Here the notion of representation, in the shadow of the overall objectives of the political project, and fidelity to both acquires an accountability element.
The fourth speaks to “advancing law-based governance.” This provides a grounding for the construction of the mechanisms of accountability, that is, of the rules against which performance and fidelity to the CPC and national project can be measured. It is also a means of memorializing the constant negotiations of the manner in which such objectives can be realized with the cooperation of the masses. It touches on the projects of integrity, and with it of social credit based disciplinary mechanisms. These helps legitimate the CPC project by ensuring not just the fidelity of the representatives of the people to policy and practice, but also that such conform to the consensus objectives of the nation.
And the Fifth concentrates on “deepening reform of Party and government institutions and the system of government administration.” This engages the project of broadening leadership down from the unified central government to the local level. It brings accountability down to the masses by shifting responsibility downward.
But it is the third, which speaks to “giving play to the important role of socialist consultative democracy” and the sixth, which focuses on “consolidating and developing the patriotic united front” that serve as the core of endogenous socialist democracy around which the other four categories serve collectively. These are worth closer examination.
Figure 3 The Essence of Endogenous Democracy
What is the essence of consultative democracy? The 19th CPC Congress Report explains that “The essence of the people's democracy is that the people get to discuss their own affairs.” But that process of consultation must be managed. And that management of popular expression is built around the mass organizations which serve to mediate between the raw and undiluted expression of popular opinion and the effective representation of that opinion for consumption by the political vanguard. In essence, the process is one that gives fuller expression to the first part of the mass line — “from the people”, in a way that response is possible. That response completes the circularity of the mass line — “to the people.” The 19th CPC Congress Report emphasizes “institutionalized development of consultative democracy.” It then notes its proper venues — “consultations carried out by political parties, people's congresses, government departments, CPPCC committees, people's organizations, communities, and social organizations.”
And among these organs, the CPPCC is to play a key role: “The CPPCC, as a distinctively Chinese political institution, is a major channel for socialist consultative democracy, and its committees are specialist consultative bodies.” Theirs is the task of consultation to the ends of strengthening unity and democracy. Here is the operational heart of the endogenous democratic process. The CPPCC, the Congress of all of the political bodies that together with the vanguard represents all China, is tasked with the objective of mediating between state political and administrative organs, and vigorous consulting on the other. Consulting is meant to be a two-way street: it the object of consultation is both to deliver consultation up but also to produce consensus downward. In these crosscutting obligations lies accountability as well.
The CPPCC role is extended through the role of the patriotic united front in social consultative democracy. Here the object is unity, nationalism and the construction of a political demos out of a patchwork of ethnic and religious communities. Bound up in these relationships in CPC oversight guided by “the principles of long-term coexistence, mutual oversight, sincerity, and sharing the rough times and the smooth.” But the efforts are not limited to ethnic groups. Reflecting a trajectory starting with Sange Daibiao—it includes incorporating intellectuals and business leaders as well. More interestingly, it also includes embedding overseas Chinese and returned Chinese and their relatives into the national political framework. Cuba has attempted something similar allowing diaspora Cubans to participate in the consultations over the 12018 draft Constitution. This last point is quite sensitive—it can easily be viewed as an interference with the internal affairs of other countries in which such overseas Chinese have become citizens.
What is then centered is socialist consultative democracy built around the CPPCC? The nexus between state, CPC and United Front through the CPPCC, serves as the connective tissue between CPC and State constitutions, and between the political authority of the CPC and its exercise through the rule system, it itself has mandated as its own political line. It expresses in contemporary form the ideals of the New Democracy thinking embraced by the CPC before the founding of the PRC.
Does the 19th CPC Congress Report suggest an evolution of the notion of the utility of the construction of a Republic under the dictatorship of several revolutionary classes? Clearly, that is not possible under the CPC Basic Line, but its insight can be applied to the internal governance of the state even as the leadership authority is maintained by the vanguard. That itself required the development of democratic structures that were endogenous and that focused consultation on the administration of the state rather than on the exercise of political authority. The operation of the state, the place where norms are operationalized through the state apparatus, is a broader consultative space now emphasized by the 19th CPC Congress focus on consultative democracy under the leadership of the CPC as the basis of the project of developing socialist democracy. Developed for a new era, the insights of the New Democracy can be applied to move China closer to an endogenous and accountable democratic structure within the constraints of its ideology.
The theoretical castle in the sky I have just described remains a glimmering. It is far from reality. But its bits and pieces are now clearly identified and may eventually produce a coherent operational transformation more clearly visible in the operation of the state. And thus, I end by forcing reality to intrude on this theoretical reverie: First, there is a wide chasm between theoretical possibilities and the realities of governance. Second, there is no consensus on the character of application of endogenous democratic principles. Third, the connection between consultation and accountability remains tenuous, though theoretically possible. Fourth, consultation and accountability remain opaque. Lastly, the role of the disciplinary inspection apparatus remains unclear.
V. Conclusion
All societies believe themselves democratic. The concept of democracy, however, has proven to be both elusive and malleable. Recent centuries have sought to discipline that connection between the construction of political institutions and the principles of democratic organization. Contemporary life has brought to the center a challenge that had long existed on the periphery of democracy and its organizing principles—the problem of the way that democracy can be expressed. Over the course of these remarks, we have endeavored to sketch out a theoretical possibility that democracy, long expressed principally exogenously to the political institutions that administer government, might also be expressed endogenously within the institutions of political and administrative authority. We suggested that the organizing principles of Leninism provide a very useful framework within which this possibility could be studied and understood.
We suggested further that Chinese Leninism has, in fact, already made substantial efforts to theorize, and to a lesser extent to implement, principles of endogenous democracy within its organizational structures and in its working style. We explored the inherent compatibility of endogenous democracy to the construction of Chinese socialist democracy. We noted the strong connection between accountability, systemic fidelity, and the principles of an endogenously based political organization. Lastly, we described the developed of a theoretical foundation for such structures with Chinese characteristics and noted the long road from theoretical possibility to well implemented operational structures. What Chinese efforts demonstrate, at least preliminarily and in theoretical form, is that endogenous democracy is substantially compatible with Leninist state organization. But it may be worth considering whether the accountability principles at the base of endogenous democratic theory might also find expression in Western systems as well.
NOTES:
[1] This is a discussion draft prepared for presentation. It is lightly referenced for ease of reading and commentary. We will distribute a draft fully referenced for publication shortly.
[2] W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law & International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University; 239 Lewis Katz Building; University Park, PA 16802. This research was first presented for the Panel: The Emerging Structures of Chinese Constitutionalism in the New Era of the 13th Annual Conference of the European China Law Studies Association in Turin, Italy 13 – 14 September 2018.
[3] Master of International Affairs at School of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University (expected 2019).
[4] See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Essays on Democracy, Law at the End of the Day (2018). Available https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/search/label/Democracy.
[5] See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, “Unpacking Accountability in Business and Human Rights: The Multinational Enterprise, the State, and the International Community,” in Accountability And International Business Organizations: Providing Justice For Corporate Violations Of Human Rights, Labor, And Environmental Standards (Liesbeth Enneking, et al., eds. Routledge, forthcoming 2019).
[6] Guiding Principles for Intra-party Political Life under New Situation, approved by the 18th Central Committee of CPC in its 6th Plenary on October 27, 2016. http://news.12371.cn/2016/11/02/ARTI1478091665764299.shtml (accessed October 9, 2018)
[7] Guiding Principles for Intra-party Political Life, approved by the 11th Central Committee of CPC in its 5th Plenary on February 29, 1980. http://news.12371.cn/2015/03/11/ARTI1426059362559711.shtml (accessed October 9, 2018)
[8] Xi Jinping: Illustrations on Guiding Principles of Intra-party Political Life under New Situation and Regulations of Intra-party Supervision of CPC, People’s Daily November 3, 2016 http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1103/c64094-28830231.html (accessed October 10, 2018)
[9] According to statistics from the Organizational Department of the CPC Central Committee quoted by CanKaoXiaoXi (参考消息) http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/china/20180701/2286621.shtml (accessed October 2018)
[10] According to the Structural Layout of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/414940/index.html (accessed October 10, 2018)
[11] Regulations of Accountability of the CPC http://news.12371.cn/2016/07/18/ARTI1468818648595687.shtml (accessed October 10, 2018)
[12] According to the Structural Layout of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/414940/index.html (accessed October 10, 2018)
[13] Data source: CCTV, the Composition of the Membership of the 13th National Committee of CPPCC, March 2, 2018 http://news.cctv.com/2018/03/02/ARTIuhbRCztGp02s2WE2MZe9180302.shtml (accessed October 11, 2018)
[14] Composition of the National Committee of CPPCC, http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/newcppcc/jgzc/index.shtml (accessed October 11, 2018)
[15] Li Guihua, Qi Pengfei. The History of Bi-weekly Symposium System of National Committee of CPPCC, Qianxian 2016:3. Available at http://www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n241795c894.aspx (accessed October 11, 2018).
[16] Bi-weekly Consultative Symposium page of the official website of the National Committee of CPPCC, http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/newcppcc/szxszth/index.shtml (accessed October 11, 2018).
[17] Based in analysis of 86 symposiums held from October 22, 2013 to September 14, 2018. Data available at http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/newcppcc/szxszth/index.shtml (accessed October 11, 2018).
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翻译：戴苗强
摘要
本文考察了广义上的民主理论发展和新时代中国社会主义民主的深层结构。我们所处的时代正经历着两大理论发展轨迹的交汇，西方常常忽视了这一点。从正确理解世界的角度来说，这着实令人惋惜，我们试图指出这一问题并加以纠正。交汇理论之一是民主理论的发展已经超出了我们误以为已经发展完备并坚不可摧的传统范畴。我们认为正统的外生式民主理论并非坚不可摧，相反，这一模式的缺陷恰恰为另一条道路上的内生式民主带来了生机。交汇中的另一个理论轨迹是列宁主义的发展完善，该理论经常被视作一种无法在根本上问责执政者的治理模式。我们认为在将集体概念贯彻在其理论结构的过程中，发展中的中国特色列宁主义已经证明了一种基于问责制的治理结构的可行性，而且这一结构在根本上也是完全民主的。
关键词：社会主义协商民主，内生式民主，问责，民主集中制
一、 导论
本文是对全球新时代民主理论发展的初步思考，指向的是民主理论的发展已经超越了我们误认为发展完备并坚不可摧的传统理论定势。当下的历史条件要求我们对民主理论（既包括理念也包括理论机制）进行重新思考，我们需要一套不仅能够同时反映西方自由主义和马克思列宁主义两大理论基础，还能够适应不同国家语境的民主理论。此外，当代历史条件也呼唤理论跟上实践发展的步伐。全球化，技术进步，生产力的高度发展，以及全面管理的进步已经对民主理论提出了与时俱进的要求。要实现民主理论的历史性跨越，我们必须看到长期以来被视作相互绝缘的两大理论路径已经在交汇处相遇。这两大理论路径分别是什么呢？ 首先是传统的外生式民主理论，这一理论已经不再是政治组织的唯一或者至高目标，代议制民主中的大众选举机制也不再是民主的唯一实现形式。传统民主理论与实践的鸿沟催生了另一种不可忽视的民主路径，也就是内生式民主。其次是列宁主义的健全发展，该治理模式执政者难以得到问责的情况有了制度化改进。我们认为在将集体概念贯彻在其理论结构的过程中，发展中的中国特色列宁主义已经证明了一种基于问责制的治理结构的可行性，而且这一结构在根本上也是完全民主的。尽管我们的研究始于对广义内生式民主理论的探索，但社会主义民主在中国的兴起作为一种内生式民主的重要表现形式成为了我们研究的重点，这一理论发展毫无疑问将为超乎中国以外的广泛政治社会研究提供宝贵素材。
十九大之后，中国共产党基本意识形态路线在新时代的发展已经对党领导下国家组织机构产生了迅速而又重大的影响。我们认为新时代的社会主义协商民主并不是基于政党兴起和大众选举，而是通过人民政协体系中中国共产党和统一战线各方共同参与的治理实现的。
正是在这些机制中，社会主义民主才能够得以发展，这与西方强调外生式民主实践是十分不同的，这是内生的。国家机器、党和统一战线通过政协的联系不仅构成了党和国家在宪制层面上的有机连结，也是中国共产党政治权威和其通过治理体系行使权威的连接机制，这也是明确在中国共产党本身的政治路线中的。实际上，这种新型民主思想早在新中国成立之前就已经由中国共产党在革命中实践了，当下的协商民主可以看作是其延续至今的当代版本。
在本文中，我们细致考察了政协在上述语境中的角色。本文第一部分是理论导论，思考了在中国宪制思想中的内生式民主理念发展。第二部分将该理论发展与十九大之后的新时代宪制发展和2017年底以及2018年初的党章、宪法修改联系起来。第三部分考察了作为内生式民主变化表现的宏观框架变化，即以监管机制转变为问责为中心的协商机制。这一内生的社会主义协商民主理论可以被理解为是新时代对社会主义宪制的实践路径和基本规范表述。
二、
内生与外生式民主——民主宪制理论的分歧
本文的讨论从分析框架开始，这需要我们将目光放在从300年前起就已经得到广泛讨论的政治哲学理论上。这些理论讨论了内生和外生式民主的特性，并辩论了民主原则与一个合法政府组织的关系。
我们在之前的文章中讨论了这样一个问题：民主产生于何处？[4]对这一根本问题的思考引出了当下在西方被奉为普世、正统的民主叙事：民主通常是通过投票这一程序所代表的外生性方式产生的， 不过这一叙事可能并不是唯一的民主价值来源。民主机制可以基于内生的程序，通过正式的机制间的协商来达成集体和具有代表性的决策。此外民主的程序可以对宪制秩序的构建和运作产生决定性的影响。
产生这种结构的原因可以被理解为是与国家的特定历史时期语境有关的，或者是与这些核心理论前提产生其中的政治文化有关。对民主的构建起到核心作用的是这样一种前提：即民主需要在政治核心和政治集体间建立秩序的原则，其中的政治核心指的就是负责行使权力的个人或机制，而政治集体就是由广大个人组成的自治共同体或组织。由于理论常常更关注民族文化偏好中的结构表现，这一核心与集体之间的基本秩序经常被忽视。在当下变化中的历史条件中，我们需要重新思考这一理论前提以调整民主理论，让其适应新的相对秩序。
在西方国家，对于上述秩序的调整是置于核心与集体关系的外生因素之中的。让我们先看看个人与社会、政治大众之间的关系，即代议制。这一制度有着十分具体和重大的意义。在西方理论的代表制运作中，个人让渡了其部分权力给其代表并由此放弃了自己直接参与权力运足与行使的机会。行使为代表投票的权力是个人政治活动与政治参与的顶峰时刻。与之相对，代表们则担当起了手握权力的核心角色。这一模式不仅在政治中广为应用，还被引入了一些经济组织。企业，正如国家一样，也是在个人代表的基础之上运转的。这一关系是个人为基础的的，对于运作权力的机构来说，是外生的。
完美的机制只存在于理论之中。数世纪以来，国家行政机器与公共权威无数次挑战了上述核心与集体间基于外生代表原则的互动。理论家们开始注意到民主理论不能仅仅局限于外生原则。对于很多人来说，行政国家机器的权力上升表明核心与集体的合法秩序间的内生性理论空间正在不断膨胀。这一空间由问责这一概念支撑，而非西方传统的代表理念。问责的基础在于更为亲近的核心与集体间关系，与代表制的至少一臂之距（arm’s length）不同，问责制中核心与集体之间距离比一臂更近（less than arm’s length）。这也要求了内生式民主将核心决策置于核心-集体的关系互动之中。协商、评估、度量以及目标的实现都是这一理论运作的基本概念。政治核心形式权威进行领导，其权威的合法性来自于其对问责这一核心民主原则的忠诚承诺，而问责则通过政治核心对集体协商的责任履行得以实现。
在思考内生和外生式民主理论对宪制秩序建构的影响之前，我们先来看看二者分别有何特质。在传统的宪制民主叙事中，民主是通过外生的方式进行实践的，也就是说是在公权力机构之外活动的。选举是在人民主权的宪制国家中民主原则运作最为根本的表现。除了选举与民主问责（可以认为是选民、代表和国家机构行为之间的互动）的正式联系之外，选举还在西方宪制秩序中担当着合法性来源的角色。选举，作为一种社会行为和社会纪律，有着管理大众暴力的作用。选举结果也是一种对政府合法性的测度。选举是将大众民主基本规范确认为政治组织之根基的程序，是大众组织用以支持或反对国家机器的方式，也是一种自我归属感的确认。
上述功能与角色都证明了西方代表制民主体系呈现出相对于国家机构来说的外生性特征。在这一体系中，民主是通过对代表的选举得以实现的，代表对人民的“权力负债账户”也是通过选举而正式建立起来的。不过反过来讲，选举机制中代表的存在也可能使得人民失去了对政府直接问责的途径。现代行政国家的发展让选民们无法使一小部分人对整个国家和其行政官员的行为负责。在他们之间建立起有力的联系几乎是一项不可能完成的任务。尽管负有对选民负责的义务，民主国家中由选举产生的代表们越发感到自己相对于选民的自主权越发膨胀了。代表们对选民们的需求并没有直接的责任，他们既不用在日常工作任务中有效地代表选民，也不用在有关治理的决策中对选民负责，因为治国理政的责任已被移交到行政官员手中，实现良治的重大任务实际上落在了政府的肩上。
对于现代国家来说，上述代表制的缺陷导致的民主分离（democratic detachment）不仅疏远了选民和他们的代表之间的距离，更是使得国家机构与选民之间的距离愈发遥远。对于西方来说，这是可以接受的，因为选举还有其他重要的角色和功能。不过对列宁主义的国家来说，选举并没有产生合法性的功能。先锋政党被赋予了正式的政治权威，这种权威通过国家机构的行政行使以带领整个社会达到一个特定目标——马克思主义的目标。与此对比，西方代表制的目标可能仅仅只是满足选民的要求，而这些要求又是时不时通过代表制体系内的代表们表达出来的。
列宁主义政党行使原则性领导的核心责任引出了两个对其合法性的挑战：其一是在先锋政党内部的领导的合法性，其二是党作为整体对于群众的领导的合法性。这二者都需要有民主的方式来做出回应，但解决方案显然不是西方的选举制度。相反，这两大挑战表明了合法性不仅可以在集体为治理原则服务的运作中得到实现，也可以通过作为先锋领导力得以形成的治理目标得以实现。列宁主义是在集体理念与民主行为之间得以确立的，忠诚与问责（问责本身也是对代表性忠诚的衡量）而非选举体现了政府有效的合法性。此外，当列宁主义国家寻求在形式上模仿西方选举体系时，选举程序的苍白无力也就变得显而易见了。在这个意义上讲，欧洲列宁主义在选举的民主功能上的东施效颦广遭诟病并且收效甚微也就不足为奇了。
因此，列宁主义对民主的实践路径应当被称作内生的民主，即在政治先锋集体和国家行政机关运作过程之中实现的民主。其内生的特质有效回应了外生式民主中的民主分离问题，也回应了选举程序的形式化为列宁主义国家带来的代表性问题。这一路径使得问责和民主有了相同的地位，前者不可避免地将一个政治社会构建在了朝一套具体社会目标前进的历史进程之中。不过问责的重点并不在于选举，而是在于集体的实践，这种实践受到坚持追求特定目标的忠诚义务与问责责任的约束。列宁主义的核心是与问责原则紧密结合的。[5]其根本原则是党和其干部都需要相互而且同时地（1）对对方问责，（2）对自己问责，（3）保证受到群众的问责。这些原则的执行在马列主义国家的运作之中始终处于中心地位。问责与民主的表达通过以下几种方式达成了统一：（1）对于特定期待的回应和解释，（2）对于特定，功能化目标的确定，（3）通过执行、规范、方式和结果得以表现，（4）对于自我和他者的相互关系，以及（5）为了实现正确、有纪律的行为以保证秩序。
内生式民主也面临着一些挑战。正如外生式民主可能遭遇的民粹主义和克里斯玛型领导者一样，内生式民主的危险也来自于个人崇拜导致的只有核心而无集体的空洞领导和问责困境。国家内代表角色的受托（fiduciary）特质也对内生式民主提出了挑战，个人常常被淹没于其行为所代表的受托责任之中。集体的诉求可能并不清晰，但集体一定不希望某个个人的利益诉求左右决策。从理论走向实际，即发展一套规则和问责体系来进行实际的执行是内生式民主在运作层面的最大挑战。因此，内生式民主中令人担忧的是代表们如何在政府内实践民主以及如何避免公权力的滥用。
三、
内生式民主和新时代的民主原则
理论是一回事，实践却往往是另一回事。我们有可能看到中国列宁主义内生式民主的理论与实践共同发展吗？答案尚不明确，不过我们仍然可以看到一些可能性。
首先，中国共产党本身就不断通过对坚持其基本路线的不断确认来维持其领导的合法性。党对自身的组织领导必须与其对群众集体的领导一脉相承。在这意义上讲，核心与集体的民主概念已经从最宽泛的政治组织层面延伸到了中国共产党本身。西方社会除了自娱自乐以外没有其他的目标（尽管自娱自乐有时已经是一个强大的目标了）。因此，外生的民主理论需要以最直接的方式反映出核心与集体关系的组织结构。与之形成对比的是，列宁主义社会有着对一个重大目标持之以恒的坚守，在中国，这一核心目标就是建立共产主义社会。为了实现这一目标，整个社会需要始终坚持其核心价值——即中国共产党的基本路线，社会主义现代化，以及四项基本原则。这些原则正是中国作为一个人民民主专政国家得以发展的原因。这样的理念是与西方自由主义传统完全冲突的，不过其本身也有着打造出基于问责的民主结构的可能。
第二，中国共产党已经发展出了一套互动关系的模式，这既加强了其领导角色，又为其对内和对外的问责以及运行纪律打下了基础。
图表 1
内生问责机制
1.
内生的问责机制
内生的问责结构包括民主集中制的原则，核心与集体的关系以及中国共产党党内的协商。强大的纪律检查机构负责的纪检措施也包含其中。在这些当中，核心与集体的关系反映了在社会中作为问责的对象并有着领导权力与义务的先锋与被服务的人民的基本区分。从核心与集体的关系中发展出了问责这一概念，而从集体本身中则衍生出了协商与共识的理念。
在2016年第十八届六中全会通过的《关于新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则》（下称《新形势下的准则》）[6]从1980年为总结文革经验通过的《关于党内政治生活的若干准则》（下称《准则》）中继承了作为中国共产党理论核心的民主集中制原则，集体领导原则和党内民主原则[7]。《准则》不仅在文革结束后为拨乱反正提供了政治生活规范，还为党的工作从阶级斗争转移到社会主义现代化的重大历史转折中提供了思想指导。正如习近平指出的，2016年通过的《新形势下的准则》也标志着党内政治生活规范和原则的重大更新与发展，这些准则也是“在当前和今后一个时期党内政治生活必须遵循的”。 [8]
1) 党内问责的基本二元结构
每五年召开一次的党的全国代表大会是党的领导集体对党进行问责汇报的最高场所。在大会上，作为领导核心的总书记将代表党的领导集体向全党做工作报告。由六组核心-集体关系组成的结构链条搭建起了总书记到全党的问责逻辑：十九大的2280名全国代表是全国九千万党员这个集体的核心[9]；大会产生的204名中央委员是2280名全国代表这个集体的核心[10]；25名政治局委员有是204名中央委员的核心；7名政治局常委则是25名政治局委员的核心；最后，总书记则是7名政治局常委的领导核心，也是整个中国共产党的领导核心。民主集中制的原则适用于上述二元关系中任何一个环节的重大事项决策，要求集体充分讨论并且少数服从多数。此外，正如《新形势下的准则》呼唤建立例行报告制度，核心也被要求接受集体的监督。
图表 2
党的核心-集体二元关系结构
这种问责模式的逻辑也被复制应用到了省、市、县以及学校、企业等非政府主体等各级党组织中。在各级党组织中的领导核心都对其所属集体负有责任，问责机制也以这些核心为中心并广泛扎根于各级集体之中。不过于全国代表大会级的领导核心不同，地方层级的领导核心同时也受上级组织领导。因此党内问责机制实际上呈现出一种双轨结构：作为各级核心的党组织及其领导班子一方面水平地接受本级的集体问责，另一方面也垂直地接受上级组织问责。
同样的结构也适用于各级党组织的不同领域分工之中，不过民主集中制作为决策原则显得更加引人注目。《新形势下的准则》明确指出要“坚持集体领导，实行集体领导和个人分工相结合”，并且“任何组织和个人在任何情况下都不允许以任何理由违反这项制度”。分工不仅在实现了党在功能上的有效运转，也明确了从政治局到基层各级机关干部的特定职责。同时，嵌入于核心-集体体系中的分工机制通过同级集体和上级组织的双重领导使得党的干部能够受到有效的问责。
这种可复制性对于社会主义民主的列宁主义路线结构来说是十分重要的。它基于十分灵活的核心-集体关系实现了马克思主义的规范性原则。该模式创造了一套简单有效的激励机制，这种运转模式对于应对高度的复杂性来说是直接，清楚易懂而又便捷有效的。不过复杂性也是在融入于运转过程中的模块与程序中产生的，可以复制的管理模式使得整个系统可以在保持浩大规模和复杂结构的同时仍能够在不同部分之间保持有效的沟通。这一逻辑是内嵌于整个系统的每一个角落中的，由此也组织起来了不仅对内的，同时也对外的问责结构。
2) 作为运作层面问责机制的党内协商
协商作为一种寻找共识的过程夯实了集体领导和民主集中制的基础。核心与集体的依存关系在决策过程中也体现得淋漓尽致，作为集体的“领导班子成员”要“在研究工作时充分发表意见”，而作为核心的“党委主要负责同志”则要“注意听取不同意见，正确对待少数人意见”[11]。此外，核心-集体的双重领导结构也要求上级组织在重要决策前充分与下级组织进行协商（“建立上级组织在作出同下级组织有关的重要决策前征求下级组织意见的制度”，《新形势下的准则》）。
在实践中，执行层面的协商机制也逐渐成熟并推广开来，既以党内协商的角色担当起了民主集中制中集体对核心的“数据输入口”，也成为了集体对核心的监督和问责机制。《新形势下的准则》要求坚持“民主生活会和组织生活会制度”， “谈心谈话制度”和“对党员的民主评议”。这些机制不仅仅被打造成为了核心与集体之间，上级组织领导与下级组织之间协商的通道，更是成为了自我诊断，自我纠正的“批评与自我批评“哲学的执行机制。《新形势下的准则》甚至还将民主协商和批评与自我批评的开展效果列为了干部和机关绩效考核的一项重要标准。
3) 作为执行与强制手段的党内监督体系。
2016年开始执行的《中国共产党问责条例》[12]对于核心-集体关系有一段简要而有力的表述：“党的问责工作……做到有权必有责，有责要担当，失责必追究，落实党组织管党治党政治责任”。领导班子，主要负责人，分管负责人以及班子其他成员都有着不同但都明确的责任。与核心-集体关系相呼应，必须通过民主集中制做决策的整个集体对决策负有“全面责任”，在集体中拥有相对领导地位的核心领导个人则对决策负有“主要领导责任”。
党内纪检体系也同样扎根于上述根本的二元结构。例如，第十九届党的全国代表大会所有代表作为集体产生中央纪委，由此产生的133名中央纪委委员则成为了作为集体的全国纪检系统的核心。同样的结构也适用于中纪委、中纪委常委，作为纪检系统最终核心的中共中央纪委书记以及中央以下的所有党内问责与纪检的子系统。同样的，与党的行政机构一样，党内纪检系统也呈现出一种双轨结构。各级纪委既向同级的党的代表大会汇报，也接受上级纪委领导。
西方观察者们常常发现他们很难理解这一体系的重大意义，其原因在于这种问责和民主的表现形式完全无法与他们的“正统理论”相适应。这一问题之所以难解是因为外生式民主模式，即选举代表并让这些代表在国家机器中行使政治权力的模式，在内生的民主体系中是完全边缘化的。不过一旦看到了由一个个集体-核心二元结构串联起来的链条全貌，用以构建先锋政党的领导核心与集体之间紧密联系的根本结构也便跃然眼前，然后，党内问责和内生式民主结构也就清晰可见了。
2.
党与党外的问责
对外问责机制包括党和人民之间的强制性联系，即群众路线。群众路线与治理的核心-集体原则逻辑一脉相承，并且将这一逻辑外化到了党与人民的关系上。领导集体通过行政权力的需要和协商结果做出决定。对学者专家和其他利益相关方的协商渠道也是相对健全的，尽管许多机制并不为大众（以及外人）所知。这也包括了决策中的集体文化和基于共识的政策执行机制（共识有时会是战略性的）。
中国共产党作为中国人民和中华民族的先锋队，在其党章中的定义上就被明确为了中国特色社会主义事业的领导核心。从无所不在的以群众为集体和以党为核心的超级二元关系中衍生出了党对人民的代表性和面向人民的问责，这一关系在中国社会政治体系中是处于最高层级的。将党与群众联系在一起的正是领导人民迈向共产主义社会的使命以及党对群众的忠诚义务。中国共产党本身就有着多达九千万之众的党员，不过正如党章所述，这些党员不仅是先锋政党的一部分，也是广大人民群众的一员。群众路线也在利益的统一上排除了党与人民群众利益的潜在冲突（“党除了工人阶级和广大人民群众的利益，没有自己的特殊利益。”，党章）。群众路线的根本原则被全面地应用到了党在各级、各领域（包括国家、党本身以及企业甚至公民组织）的领导。
中国人民政治协商会议是群众路线作为党的领导接受党外问责的最重要机制。自从1949年拉开新中国时代序幕的第一次会议以来，政协就始终扮演着这样的角色。在人民代表大会建立并成为了人民民主专政的最高权力机构之后，人民政协正式开始完全地履行其政治协商、民主监督和参政议政的职能。
与在其他的国家政治机构中的情况不同，中国共产党并没有在全国政协中占据大量（当前仅99席）席位。在第十三届全国政协中，90%以上的席位都由来自各界的非共产党员委员担任，包括民主党派（360席），民间组织（315席），学术界（共180席，包括自然科学与社会科学），少数民族界（103席），华人华侨界以及各其他领域的代表（包括艺术、教育、新闻、医疗、宗教等）。[13]从核心-集体的关系角度看，政协的组成有效地将中国社会政治共同体各主要方面的声音都囊括进了这个由2100名委员组成的全国委员会。通过构建起这样一个党外的核心-集体架构，中国共产党把其在国家机构中的领导置于了对群众的反馈与问责机制之中。
丝毫不令人意外的是，双轨的核心-集体关系也同样适用于政协系统。从全国委员会到常委，再到政协副主席与主席的一连串二元关系在国家层面搭建起了政协的基本结构，各个专业化的分委员会也同样把各个领域的职能分工有效组织了起来。[14]会议、调研和建议是政协参与国家机构协商和监督国家机构的主要方式，问责则来自国家机构对政协诉求的强制性回应。在另一方面，政协委员们作为群众这一集体的代表在党领导下的国家机构对重大问题做决策之前需要进行充分的讨论，这一机制也体现了协商是如何得以实现以及党领导下的国家机构是如何与作为最广泛的集体的群众保持联系的。政协在决策制定后及决策执行中对国家机构的监督也补足了党领导下的国家机构对外问责机制的最后一个环节。
现行的双周协商座谈会机制是政协最重要的，最具代表性的协商机制之一。尽管当前的座谈形式始于2013年第十二届全国政协，但作为协商民主形式的座谈会可以追溯到建国之前。为了避开国民党的压迫，第一个双周座谈会机制由中国共产党香港分部举办于解放战争期间的香港。这一系列座谈会邀请了民主党派和无党派爱国人士的中层领导人共同讨论国家要事。[15]1949年以后，这一传统由人民政协继承并且座谈会在1950年到1966年间仍然经常举办（根据李桂华和齐鹏飞在2016年的研究，该期间举办了多达110次座谈会）。十年文化大革命期间，座谈会被暂停。虽然拨乱反正之后有断断续续的举办，但协商座谈会机制直到2013年才实现正式的制度化。
根据全国政协网站记录，双周协商座谈会在十二届全国政协任期期间举办了76次，自2018年3月第十三届全国政协开始履职至今也已经召开了11次。[16]通常来讲，一次典型的座谈会成员包括15位在任全国政协委员，3位非政协的专家学者以及4位副部级及以上的在任政府官员。[17]座谈会的协商讨论涵盖了十分广泛的议题，比如：污染（2013年12月25日举办的第十二届全国政协第5次双周协商座谈会），大数据科技在提高政府执政能力中的应用（2014年6月12日举办的第十二届全国政协第13次双周协商座谈会），农村土地权利有关的法律问题（2015年7月2日举办的第十二届全国政协第34次双周协商座谈会），以及医疗（2018年9月14日举办的第十三届全国政协第10次双周协商座谈会）。
这些座谈在作为党和群众之间问责机制的重要性通过政协和国家机构之间双向的互动体现了出来，更重要的是，政协主席实际上是由党的最高领导集体成员，政治局常委担任的。在每次协商座谈会之前，全国政协的高级官员将会带领一支调研小组前往该座谈会议题有关的最前线了解情况，在座谈会期间，调研报告和建议将由政协委员和专家学者直接向有关部门的在任高级官员提出，这些官员也必须在会上做出回应。
政协中的双周协商座谈会体系是一个很好的案例，但也仅仅只是在党外问责机制中将党和群众联系起来的渠道中很小的一个部分。群众路线也正是通过这些渠道应用到了不仅是政协、党和政府等政治机构，还有民间机构和企业（包括国有和私有）等各场景中的核心-集体二元关系中。
总的来看，这些都是搭建民主参与大厦的砖瓦，内在的大梁还是在于对于核心长期目标的忠诚坚持，这也是内生式民主结构得以实现的重要保证。此外，这些结构也可以看作是针对个人崇拜和暂时民众情绪波动与扭曲的保护机制。原则与规章的笼子由此成型并可以用来评估、限制作为人民、政府和党的代表的个人的表现。这也为政治和行政机构的运作提供了得以参与内生式民主的机制，并且保证了首要目标、领导者和上述二者都应当对之负责的群众之间的紧密联系。对于西方来说，当前内生式民主尚未完全发挥其潜能的境况表明了内生式民主本身就是无法完全实现的，但是对于中国列宁主义发展来说，这一阶段意味着完全成熟并运转起来的社会主义民主尚需时日而非这一理论本身的失败。
四、
新时代的社会主义民主和跨机构的问责
可能正是核心概念在不同历史时期语境下的演进驱动了前述列宁主义集体原则的发展与协商式内生式民主的应用。习近平在十九大报告中表达了中国共产党在“新时代”推动完善这一特定理论的雄心。
十九大报告将社会主义协商民主的演进和强化归入了六点来阐述。[18]第一点以“坚持党的领导，人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一”为中心。这不仅有关中国共产党的角色，更是关系到党在一整套国家建制机构复合体中的相对位置。这一理念与核心-集体的原则相呼应，不过也指向了另一套相对架构。在这套结构里，党仍旧处在核心，而其他的所有机构（包括人大，政府，政协，法院以及检察院等等）则构成了集体。
第二点与第一点一脉相承，把目光放在了“制度保障”上，其根本目的还是要增强面向人民的问责机制。此处表明的是，政治生活中集体的代表性以及对集体的忠诚都需要有问责来加以保障。
第四点强调了“深化依法治国”。这也为问责机制的构建打下了基础，法律法规正是足以用来衡量中国共产党的执政表现以及在领导全国人民前进过程中对人民忠诚尽责的标尺。“依法治国”也是一种对于为了实现上述目标而与人民合作过程中不断探索的概念化途径。品行正直、社会信用有关的纪律机制由此成为了“依法治国”实践重要的组成部分。这些也帮助了中国共产党的合法性从在政策和实践层面对人民的忠诚尽责与代表延伸到了对全国层面的法治共识的遵循。
第五点着眼于“深化机构和行政体制改革”。这将我们观察的视野从集中的中央政府扩展到了地方层面。问责的机制也由此向下沉淀，直至基层群众。
不过正是强调“发挥社会主义协商民主重要作用”的第三点和聚焦“巩固和发展爱国统一战线”的第六点才是内生式社会主义民主的核心，其他四点都是相对这两点的“集体”。此处需要进一步的分析。
图表 3
内生式民主的要素
什么是协商民主的精髓？十九大报告解释道“有事好商量，众人的事情由众人商量，是人民民主的真谛”。不过商量的过程是一定要有所管理的。这种对于大众意见表达的管理通过在来自群众的组织中把离散的、未经加工的大众意见“原材料”凝练成为了有效的民意，并且反馈给政治先锋以供考量。在本质上来说，这一过程通过打造便捷的民意输入和反馈通道，给群众路线中来自人民（from
the people）的意见表达提供了更大的空间。与此同时，执政者的反馈则从回到人民（to the people）这一角度完成了群众路线的闭环。十九大报告强调了“协商民主制度建设”，并且勾勒了一幅恰当机制的蓝图，即“统筹推进政党协商、人大协商、政府协商、政协协商、人民团体协商、基层协商以及社会组织协商”。
在这些机构中，政协扮演着关键的角色：“人民政协是具有中国特色的制度安排，是社会主义协商民主的重要渠道和专门协商机构。”政协的职责就在于通过协商增强团结和实践民主，是内生式民主程序的运作核心。人民政协也就是所有政治主题的“代表大会”，把代表中国各个方面的先锋人士都集中起来，共同肩负起协调国家政治机构和行政机构之间的关系并积极参与协商的责任。这里的协商是双向的：其目的既是表达协商的意见，也是为了达成一致的共识，且在这过程中还带着问责的意义。
人民政协的角色也通过社会主义协商民主中的爱国统一战线得到了延伸。其目的在于实现团结和爱国者的民族主义以及从少数民族和宗教界构建立起政治的统一认同。中国共产党与上述主体的关系由 “长期共存，互相监督，肝胆相照，荣辱与共”原则指导，不过其背后的理论轨迹在“三个代表”中就已经勾勒清楚，即囊括了少数民族、工商界人士、知识分子等在内的“最广大人民群众”。更有意思的是，海外华人华侨及他们的亲属也作为一个单独界别被包含进了统一战线的政治框架之中。古巴在2018宪法草案协商过程中也尝试了类似的机制。这也就引出了一个十分敏感的问题，即政协与已成为他国公民的海外侨胞的这种联系很容易被视作是对他国内政的干涉。
在政协的社会主义协商民主体系中，什么是处于中心地位的呢？政协作为国家、党和统一战线的连结点也将党章和宪法有机联系在了一起，还将党的政治权威与其通过统治系统的权力行使联系在了一起。这正是新中国成立以前党所倡导的新民主主义的当代版本。
十九大报告有指出革命阶级专政之下的共和国构建理念的演进吗？显然这已与中国共产党基本路线不相符合，不过其想法可以应用到先锋政党领导下的国家的内部治理之中。这本身就要求了内生式民主结构的发展，并且把协商的重点放在了国家行政而非政治权威的行使之上。十九大强调了国家通过行政机构和规章制度的运作过程是在党的领导下进行协商的广泛场所。新民主主义在新时代的发展与应用将带领中国走向一个尽管有着意识形态的限制，但本质上依旧具有内生式民主性质和问责性质的民主结构。
上述理论架构已如薄雾中的远山若隐若现，不过从理论到现实的道路仍旧漫漫。理论的主要枝节已经清晰可见并且可能从中生长出一套与国家运转相适应的实践机制。因此，我们在本文最后将现实与实践引入讨论：首先，理论的可能性与治理的现实之间有着巨大的差异。其次，目前学界并没有对内生式民主原则在应用中的特征达成共识。第三，尽管理论上可行，协商与问责之间的联系仍旧很不稳固。第四，协商和问责本身在很大程度上仍是隐晦、不透明的。最后，纪检机构的角色仍然不够清晰。
五、 结论
每个社会戴着民主的帽子，然而民主的概念却变得越发难以捉摸并高度可塑。数百年来，人类历史一直在探索政治机构的构建与民主组织原则之间的关系。当代生活也把长期存在于民主和其组织原则边缘的一大问题推到了聚光灯下：民主到底是如何实现的？在本文的讨论中，我们尝试勾勒出与传统不同的理论轮廓，即与长期被认为是政治机构和政府治理不二法则的外生式民主模式不同，民主也可能通过政治与行政机构的内生机制得以实现。我们认为列宁主义的组织原则为我们提供了理解这一全新模式的理论框架。实际上中国列宁主义的发展已经在理论上和较有限的实践层面上对内生式民主原则做出了具有中国特色的显著贡献，这一发展与中国的国家组织结构和运作机理有着密不可分的联系。我们探究了内生式民主在中国社会主义民主构建中的适应性，发现了问责、体系化的忠诚尽责（systematic fidelity）以及政治组织的内生原则之间的显著联系。最后，我们描述了上述中国特色结构的理论基础，还讨论了从理论走向实践操作的漫漫长路。在中国的这一发展至少从理论层面初步证明了内生式民主是与列宁主义国家组织高度兼容的，不过我们可能也需要思考下作为内生式民主理论基础的问责原则是否也能够融入西方体系中。
[2] 宾夕法尼亚州立大学理查德和玛丽·埃舍尔曼教席学者，法学教授，国际事务教授。地址：239 Lewis Katz Building; University Park,
PA 16802，电子邮箱：
lcb11@psu.edu。本研究初稿最初展示在2018年9月举办于意大利图灵的第十三届欧洲中国法学会年会上。
[4]
参见, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Essays
on Democracy, Law at the End of the Day (2018). Available https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/search/label/Democracy.
[5]
参见, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, “Unpacking
Accountability in Business and Human Rights: The Multinational Enterprise, the
State, and the International Community,” in Accountability
And International Business Organizations: Providing Justice For Corporate
Violations Of Human Rights, Labor, And Environmental Standards (Liesbeth
Enneking, et al., eds. Routledge, forthcoming 2019).
[6]
关于 新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则，2016年十月27日十八届六中全会通过http://news.12371.cn/2016/11/02/ARTI1478091665764299.shtml (访问于2018年10月9日)
[7]
关于 新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则，2016年十月27日十八届六中全会通过http://news.12371.cn/2016/11/02/ARTI1478091665764299.shtml (访问于2018年10月9日)
[8]
习近平：关于《关于新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则》和《中国共产党党内监督条例》的说明，人民网-人民日报， 2016年11月3日 http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1103/c64094-28830231.html
(访问于2018年10月10日)
[11]
关于 新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则，2016年十月27日十八届六中全会通过http://news.12371.cn/2016/11/02/ARTI1478091665764299.shtml (访问于2018年10月9日)
[13]数据来自中央电视台，第13届全国政协委员的组成，2018年3月2日http://news.cctv.com/2018/03/02/ARTIuhbRCztGp02s2WE2MZe9180302.shtml
(访问于2018年10月11日)
[15]
李桂华，齐鹏飞. 全国政协双周协商座谈会制度的历史沿革,《前线》2016:3. http://www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n241795c894.aspx
(访问于2018年10月11日).
[17]
基于October 22, 2013 至2018年10月21日的87次座谈会数据分析，数据来自http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/newcppcc/szxszth/index.shtml
(访问于2018年10月21日).
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