Friday, August 09, 2019

Albert Chen Hung-yee 陳弘毅 (Hong Kong U.) on the Situation in Hong Kong Part 2: 一國兩制的博弈 ["The Game of One Country Two Systems"]


Last week Albert Chen Hung-yee 陳弘毅 posted the first of a two part essay, 理性溝通的困境 ["The Dilemma of Rational Communication"] first appeared on 2 August in the Ming Newspaper supplements [發表於《明報》副刊] which I posted here

Today, Professor Chen posted the second part of the essay, 一國兩制的博弈 ["The Game of One Country Two Systems"]. It also originally appeared in the Ming Newspaper on 9 August 2019. 

In the first essay Professor Chen assumed the voice of the classical Greek chorus delivering the parados or entry song, in this case an an elegy to discourse, and to the tragedy that is working its way to climax in Hong Kong.

In the Second essay, 一國兩制的博弈 ["The Game of One Country Two Systems"], the tone shifts. It retains its distance from the central characters in the drama, but now uses the mechanics of the modern oracle--game theory, and classical economic theory of behavior--to both make a prediction and to urge at least one side in the current situation in Hong Kong to reconsider the path some of its members have chosen to attain goals which only partly overlap with that of the government camp. Here one enters the realm of the role of the chorus in Sophocles's Antigone. Here Professor Chen introduces key thematic or emotional elements essential to the unfolding of the inevitable course of the tragedy. Here, as well, Professor Chen lays out the elements of the tragedy that principle begot in a context whose course was set in motion years ago and by others.
Thou hast rushed forward to the utmost verge of daring; and against that throne where justice sits on high thou hast fallen, my daughter, with a grievous fall. But in this ordeal thou art paying, haply, for thy father's sin. . . Reverent action claims a certain praise for reverence; but an offense against power cannot be brooked by him who hath power in his keeping. Thy self-willed temper hath wrought thy ruin. (Sophocles, Antigone, Chorus).
For these and other reasons, apparent to those who study it, Professor Chen's essay, 一國兩制的博弈 ["The Game of One Country Two Systems"], is worth reading.  The essay follows below in English  以及原始的中文版本

Cross posted (in Italian also) in Albert Chen: Il Gioco di Un Paese, Due Sistemi | 一國兩制的博弈 | The Game of One Country Two Systems, with thanks to Flora Sapio.





一國兩制的博弈
Albert Chen Hung-yee 陳弘毅

(發表於《明報》,2019年8月9日)

經濟學假定個人在選擇如何行動時是理性的,就是說他知道什麼結果對他有利或其目標是什麼,他會在不同選項中選擇一項,務求最大程度上實現其目標或取得最佳回報。


理性假設的一個應用便是成本效益的計算: 如果不同選項,我會考慮每選項的成本和效益, 務求以最低成本獲取最大效益。

理性假設的另一個應用便是博弈論,其處理的是兩方或多方互動的情況,每方的行為都可能影響對方的行為,每方選擇如何行動時,必須運用其掌握的資訊(例如關於對方會怎樣行動的資訊),務求在互動過程中實現己方利益的最大化或最大程度上實現自己的目標。“零和遊戲”、“雙贏”、“雙輸”等概念都來自博弈論。

博弈論或可用來分析一國兩制下各方的行為及可能結果。我們可考慮各方的利益或其所希望達到的目標,以及其行動的選項。例如,中央和特區政府的目標是在於在保障“一國”利益的前提下,維護香港的繁榮安定。建制派人士基本上認同此目標,而非建制派人士則希望香港能實現真普選,以保障港人的人權和自由和促使政府通過民主選舉向港人問責。

但是,非建制派人士也希望香港能維持繁榮安定,所以他們如果是理性的話,應該不會贊成以暴力抗爭為手段來實現其目標,因為這種抗爭可能會危害香港的繁榮安定,而且成功達到其目標的機會相當渺茫。因此,在香港的情況選擇暴力抗爭,可說是非理性的。

(二之二)


The game of one country, two systems
Albert Chen Hung-yee 陳弘毅 


(published in Ming Pao, August 9, 2019)

Economics assumes that an individual is rational in choosing how to act, that is, that he understands what results are good for him or what his goals are. He will choose one among the different options in order to maximize his or her goals or achieve the best return.

One application of the rational actor hypothesis is the cost-effective calculation: In the face of different options, I will consider the cost and benefit of each option, in order to get the maximum benefit at the lowest cost. Another application of rational hypothesis is game theory, which deals with the interaction of two or more parties. Each party's behavior may affect the behavior of the other party. When each party chooses how to act, that party must use the information it has (for example, about Information on how the other party will act), in order to maximize the interests of the parties in the process of interaction or to achieve their goals to the greatest extent possible. The concepts of “zero-sum game”, “win-win” and “double lose” come from game theory.

Game theory can be used to analyze the behavior and possible outcomes of all parties under one country and two systems. We can consider the interests of all parties or the goals they wish to achieve, as well as the options for their actions. For example, the central government and the SAR government's goal is to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity and stability while safeguarding the interests of "one country." Those in the pro-government camp all basically agree with this goal. The non-government camp hope that Hong Kong can achieve universal suffrage to protect the human rights and freedoms of Hong Kong people and encourage the government to hold Hong Kong people accountable through democratic elections.

However, the non-government camp members also hope that Hong Kong can maintain prosperity and stability. Therefore, if they are rational, they should not agree to use violent resistance as a means to achieve their goals, because such resistance may endanger Hong Kong's ability to successfully achieve prosperity and stability. The chances of attaining its other goal are quite slim. Therefore, it is irrational to choose violent protests in Hong Kong.

(two of two)

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