As the protest in Hong Kong entered its
13th week, a public dialogue that runs parallel to the protest has been
unfolding between and among state actors. The dialogue has been taking
place on different occasions, the most notable one being the 2019 Summit of the Group of Seven (G7) As
it has become customary, at the end of the Summit, the countries of the
Group of Seven (Italy, France, the United States, Germany, Canada,
Japan and the United Kingdom), released a Leaders' Declaration. The
Declaration is a “one-page document summarizing the main decisions made
on global crises;” its 259 words document can be consulted at this URL. The relevant portion of the Statement read in full as follows:
The Chinese response was equally short.
The interest and relevance of the document and the response does not lie as much on the effects it can directly produce on the situation Hong Kong, but on what it may tell us abut the way in which China and the G7 are coming to reconceive the institutionalization of Empire along two quite distinct lines. For the G7 the language is grounded in the principles of the collective imperium built around the United Nations system and its community of states lead by a vanguard group of powerful states. For the G7, the imperium is built on the control of the violence of states within and outside of the sphere's of control. For China, the responsive language is built on the principle of an imperium built along the lines of productive power--it speaks the language of the imperium of the production chain centered in the leadership of a national collective. For China, the imperium produces aligned system of control and dependency that is interior to the national leadership core; it is built on the control of violence within its dependencies projected inward from abroad.
The G7 reaffirms the existence and importance of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 on Hong Kong and calls for violence to be avoided.
The Chinese response was equally short.
"We express our strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition to the statement made by the leaders of the G7 Summit on Hong Kong affairs,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said at a press briefing in Beijing on Tuesday. “We have repeatedly stressed that Hong Kong’s affairs are purely China’s internal affairs and that no foreign government, organization, or individual has the right to intervene,” he added. (Press TV; China ‘resolutely opposes’ G7 statement on Hong Kong).
The interest and relevance of the document and the response does not lie as much on the effects it can directly produce on the situation Hong Kong, but on what it may tell us abut the way in which China and the G7 are coming to reconceive the institutionalization of Empire along two quite distinct lines. For the G7 the language is grounded in the principles of the collective imperium built around the United Nations system and its community of states lead by a vanguard group of powerful states. For the G7, the imperium is built on the control of the violence of states within and outside of the sphere's of control. For China, the responsive language is built on the principle of an imperium built along the lines of productive power--it speaks the language of the imperium of the production chain centered in the leadership of a national collective. For China, the imperium produces aligned system of control and dependency that is interior to the national leadership core; it is built on the control of violence within its dependencies projected inward from abroad. 
The G7 Leaders' Declaration on Hong Kong
can be considered a political and rhetorical - and yet legitimate -
move. The Declaration is worth discussing, because it can reveal several
of the global dynamics that surround the Hong Kong protests. Members of
the Coalition for Peace and Ethics have focused on two distinct
aspects the Joint Declaration evoke. The two essays appear in full below (reposted from Flora Sapio's excellent blog). 
Flora Sapio notices how the Leaders'
Declaration, and China's response to it, have catalyzed public attention
around the principle of 'One Country, Two Systems'. The words 'One
Country, Two Systems' used to be the preserve of PRC domestic
discourse, Western politicians and academics versed in the art of
interpreting esoteric political formulas. Today, these words are known
by the public of Western countries. In a sense, the principle of 'One
Country, Two Systems' has been globalized. This principle exists not
only in the Statute of the Chinese Communist Party and in the
Sino-British Joint Declaration. It has been acknowledged by the Group of
Seven, and by the European Union as well. The global diffusion of this
principle in turn invites a reflection on the power of regimes of soft
regulation.
Larry Catà Backer considers the meaning
of the Joint Declaration within the context of forms and modes of
sovereignty that are rapidly changing, and that exist in the absence of
an adequate theorization. Dense with references to the work of Hardt and
Negri, his post shows how, beyond popular theorizations about "Empire",
the new sovereignty regimes we are witnessing are composite regimes. Each
regime of sovereignty is composed by internal (endogenous) and external
(exogenous) parts. The relationship between these parts, and other
regimes of sovereignty, is determined by the network of relations that
occur between any one of the endogenous and exogenous components, summed
to the relations between all of the existing regimes of sovereignty.The CPE welcomes additional readings and opinions informed by academic impartiality and independence. Both essays follow. The essays and this introduction are reposted from Flora Sapio's excellent blog,
The G7 Declaration on Hong Kong, and the Globalization of One Country Two Systems
Flora Sapio
Coalition for Peace & Ethics Working Group on Empire
30 Aug. 2019
From August 24 to 26, the leaders of Italy, France, the United States, Germany, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom held the 2019 Summit of the Group of Seven (G7).
On August 26, a Leaders’ Declaration was made public. The declaration
is a “one-page document summarizing the main decisions made on global
crises”. The document can be consulted at this URL.
The Leaders’ Declaration is not a
legally binding document. But, its political and rhetorical value cannot
be denied. The document had a broad impact, outside of the narrower
circles of national and global governing elites. If anything, the
Declarations' mention of the situation in Hong Kong provoked an
immediate response from China.
 |
| G8 Summit 2001 - Genoa - Italy. Credit: Wikimedia Commons |
The Leaders’ Declaration and China’s
response captured global attention, for a sustained period of time.
Public awareness about the situation in Hong Kong, and about Great
Britain's role in the Opium Wars,
and how the UK acquired and then returned sovereignty on the Island are
contributing to shaping different opinions. The opinions that are
taking shape about each one of the issues raised by press commentaries
may be marginal to the formation of new modes of governance. At
different times, different countries or cities may be the forge of those
new modes of governance. Yet, popular opinion has to somehow be taken
into account by the respective leadership of "pilot territories". Beyond
political forms, and beyond divergences in ideology as well, popular
consensus might be of some importance.
 |
| LegCo Conference Room, 2019. Source: Wikimedia Commons |
The weight of the G7 Declaration and
China's response however goes beyond considerations about new modes or
governance. Or, at least, the G7 Declaration and China's response a
little-observed dimension of the emerging mode of governance. Everyone,
inside and outside of the academia, is talking about the Leaders’ Declaration and China’s response.
Who is instead aware of the latest legally binding documents enacted by
the governments of China, Hong Kong, or any of the G7 countries? Who is aware of the full content of the Sino-British Joint Declaration?
Those are legally binding documents, "hard law". The G7 Declaration on Hong Kong instead is not a legal document per se.
It doesn't have the same legal authority as an international treaty.
And yet discussion about the G7 Declaration and the China's response
overshadowed an official treaty deposited with the UN, in compliance
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
The G7 Leaders’ Statement provided a
summary of the consensus reached by the heads of state and government
about the situation in Hong Kong:
The G7 reaffirms the existence and
importance of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 on Hong Kong
and calls for violence to be avoided.
The G7 expressed the wish that violence
be avoided. That is something any reasonable person would want. In the
first part of the statement, the Group of Seven merely said that the
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration exists and it is important to them.
The first part of the sentence says that:
The G7 reaffirms the existence and importance of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984
Existence is the fact that an object has
its own place in the real world. That the Joint Declaration is as a
part of objective, material reality, regadless of any judgment about the
effects this document produces. Importance is the fact that something
is valuable or significant to someone. So this statement can be
paraphrased as follows:
The Group of Seven once more say in
public, and with emphasis, that the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration
is a document that exists in the real world, and that this document is
valuable and significant to the Group of Seven.
The G7 did not refer to any specific
part or clause in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, or in its Annexes.
That document does not bind several of the states who voiced their
support for it. The contracting parties to the Sino-British Joint
Declaration are only the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the People’s Republic of China.
But, the Joint Declaration enshrines a
principle — One Country, Two Systems — with a reach beyond the narrower
limits of international "hard law". For
one, the European Union has acknowledged the principle of ‘one country,
two systems’ independently of the agreements reached between the United
Kingdom and China. The European Commission has on different occasions
stated that it adheres to the ‘one China policy’ and supports the principle of ‘one country, two systems’. According to the EU,
‘one country, two systems’ it is also a principle under which the
relations between the EU and Hong Kong exist. Yet, the principle does
not exist in the Treaty of the European Union, as one of the principles
of the common foreign policy. However, several members of the EU have
adhered to the ‘one China policy’ independently, in their bilateral
relations with China. Their committment to the ‘one China policy’ has
been made through soft law documents. These soft law documents, in turn,
are among the building blocks of the edifice of bilateral relations.
At the time of writing, the People’s
Republic of China has terminated its participation in the Joint
Declaration. China's response to the G7 Declaration came on August 27,
through the spokesperson of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That
response is similar in tone and content to an earlier response issued in
2007 (see below).
If the G7 joint statement and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs are placed side by side, one immediately
notices a clear difference in the administrative rank of the speakers.
The Group of Seven is an intergovernmental organization, while the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an organization subordinated to the State
Council of the PRC. The ‘deploration’ and the ‘firm opposition’ to the
content of the G7 joint statement did not directly originate from the
State Council. They came through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the responsibility to “(…) conduct information-related work about important diplomatic activities, organize public diplomacy activities
(...)”, among others. But, the Ministry is not the only government
institution with the power to comment on the statement of an
intergovernmental organization. Comments on the Sino-British Joint
Declaration could have been made by institutions ranking above the
ministerial level. The State Council, however, remained silent on this
issue. And so did other political institutions. The power to “decide on
the ratification or abrogation of treaties and important agreements
concluded with foreign states” belongs to the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress — so does article 67 of the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of China say.
The Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress has not abrogated the Joint Declaration. The
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, in the meantime, has
envisaged a role for Hong Kong as part of the Hong Kong-Guangdong-Macau
Greater Bay Area. And of the Belt and Road Initiative. The ‘one country,
two systems’ principle — a cornerstone of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration — has not been denounced. It continues to exist as a
principle enshrined in the Statute of the Chinese Communists Party, and
in other documents.
The idea of 'one country, two systems'
may be accepted or rejected. It may be commented upon in an impartial
way, it may be derided or criticized. Yet that idea has acquired its own
existence outside and beyond the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
Together with the 'one China policy', it is one of the principles
shaping relations between the
European Union, its member states, and the People’s Republic of China.
But also between China and several of its members in the Belt and Road
Initiative.
Some readers may dispute this point of
view, and advance a different intepretation of the value of all the
bilateral documents enshrining the ‘one China policy’ and 'one country
two systems'. After all, none of those documents is binding. Given they
are not binding, the ‘obligations’ they pose — if any — are entirely
voluntary.
But, in retrospect, those voluntaristic
committments have contributed to the global diffusion of the principle
of ‘one country, two systems’. That principle was originally created to
regulate a matter belonging to the internal affairs of China. But then,
it was endorsed also by countries that China are not. The global
diffusion of the ‘one China policy’ and ‘one country two systems’ took
place slowly and gradually, over a 40-years time-span. Today, the ‘one
China policy’ and ‘one country two systems’ are more or less generally
accepted by European Union member states as principles that regulate
their trade, investiment, political, and cultural relation with China. Today, the ‘one China principle’ and ‘one country two systems’ are broadly shared by the nation-states we live in.
Such is the power of soft regulation, a
form of regulation that plays an increasingly important role in the
birth of new modes of governance.
___________________________________
August 27, 2019 statement of the spokesperson of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excerpt).
Q: The G7 joint statement "reaffirms the
existence and the importance of the 1984 Sino-British agreement on Hong
Kong and calls for avoiding violence". Do you have a comment on this
report?
A: We deplore and firmly oppose such
wanton comment in the G7 joint statement. As we've emphasized time and
again, Hong Kong affairs are China's internal affairs. No foreign
governments, organizations or individuals have any right to interfere.
The marches, demonstrations and violent
activities have been going on for more than two months, which have
severely undermined Hong Kong's rule of law, social order, economic
well-being and international image. No one cherishes the SAR's
prosperity and stability more than the Chinese people, including Hong
Kong citizens. We will manage our own affairs properly. I would like to
say this to the G7 members: no more meddling with ill intentions.
With respect to the Sino-British Joint
Declaration, I would like to reiterate that its ultimate purpose and
core content is to affirm China's recovering of Hong Kong and resumption
of exercise of sovereignty over it. With the return of Hong Kong to the
motherland, the Chinese government exercises jurisdiction over it in
accordance with the Constitution and the Basic Law. Under international
law and basic norms governing international relations, no country or
organization has any right to use the declaration as a pretext to meddle
in Hong Kong affairs.
Now Hong Kong has returned to the
motherland’s embrace for 20 years, the Sino-British Joint Declaration,
as a historical document, no longer has any practical significance, and
it is not at all binding for the central government’s management over
Hong Kong. The UK has no sovereignty, no power to rule and no power to
supervise Hong Kong after the handover.
__________
Larry Catá Backer
Coalition for Peace & Ethics Working Group on Empire
30 Aug. 2019
(Pix Credit South China Morning Post, “Explainer: What is the Sino-British Joint Declaration
and what does it have to do with Hong Kong’s extradition crisis?”)
As the situation in Hong Kong has become more sensitive, and
even more dynamic, since the start of protests over an Extradition Bill that
the Hong Kong Government put forward (and then withdrew) and that the Central
Government (for its own reasons) desires whatever the costs, the international
framework within which Hong Kong—once ceded to the U.K by the then legitimate
government of China—was ceded again to China’s current legitimate government.
At the center of this formal transference of sovereignty was the Sino-British
Joint Declaration of 1984. It’s
provisions served as the international framework within which China constructed
its internal One Country Two Systems constitutional order. The Joint
Declaration, then, had both external and internal dimensions. And it tied the two states that had been in a
dynamic relation about the sovereignty (and control) of portions of the Pearl
River Delta since the first third of the 19th century.
The Joint Declaration (reproduced below) consisted of a
short main section of eight articles, and three substantive annexes. It’s
formal international character as treaty was emphasized by the formalities of
its construction and ultimately of its deposit into the authenticating vaults
of the United Nations in New York. It
promised many things, but the principal one perhaps was that all promises were
to terminate half a century from its signing.
In a sense, then, the Joint Declaration promised immediate sovereignty
and eventual control. It set the tone for what was to become the One Country
Two Systems Principle through the notion of a “high degree of autonomy” for
Hong Kong (through 2047) and specified in some details the structures within
which that autonomy would be maintained.
It also embedded an international element with a mechanism for
Sino-UK consultation the greatest
utility of which ended with the transfer of 1997. As we are now discovering in the face of the
clash between China’s New Era political-economic model (along with its Xi
Jinping Theory of Socialist (Positive Values) Empire and popular demonstrations
(with an audience of sympathetic international actors) grounded in the values
of post 1945 international imperialism (the vanguard role of the international
community under the core leadership of the victorious allies emerging after
1945) has both brought the ambiguities of the Joint Declaration to light and
suggested its contradictions in the face of crisis.
But
in many ways the new era of relations between China, the international community,
international legal structures, and more specifically the United Kingdom has
changed dramatically. China has sought to dump the Joint Declaration on the
trash heap of history and to attempt to pry Hong Kong out from its status as an
international protectorate. The United States (and less the UK) have sought to
revivify its terms both in the service of classical international law and its
post 1945 great principles, and at the
same time further their respective
national interests. This clash was notoriously made public during the
2017 commemoration of the ceding of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the UK to
China.
(Pix Credit, South China Morning Post, “Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong ‘no longer
has any realistic meaning’, Chinese Foreign Ministry says”)
The
US noted its own reading of the meaning of the One Country Two Systems
Principle as one grounded in international law with respect to which the
international community was entitled to monitor and engage in its legitimate
enforcement. The UK through Boris Johnson
praised the then current state of affairs but noted as well the need to
move One Country Two systems toward a greater degree of democratic and
accountable government in Hong Kong measured by international standards which
were built into Hong Kong’s constitutional model. In effect, both states,
following traditional models of international law, viewed Hong Kong’s status as
one that touched both on China’s sovereign prerogatives, and on China’s ceding
of some of the prerogatives of control in return for a ceding to it of
sovereignty over territory. In effect,
what both the UK and US noted was the disconnection between sovereignty and
control. In this case control ceded
willingly in exchange for sovereignty.
After
the publication of remarks by the UK and US governments on the anniversary of
the ceding of Hong Kong, China responded in perhaps too honest a way: “The
Chinese Foreign Ministry has declared the Sino-British Joint Declaration, that
laid the groundwork for Hong Kong’s handover, a “historical document that no
longer has any realistic meaning”, after Britain and the United States spoke of
the binding effect of the 1984 treaty on China and the city.” (South China
Morning Post, “Sino-British
Joint Declaration on Hong Kong ‘no longer has any realistic meaning’, Chinese
Foreign Ministry says” (““It also does not have any binding power on how
the Chinese central government administers Hong Kong. Britain has no
sovereignty, no governing power and no supervising power over Hong Kong. I hope
relevant parties will take note of this reality.””)).
(Pix Credit, South China Morning Post, “Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong ‘no longer
has any realistic meaning’, Chinese Foreign Ministry says”)
The Foreign Ministry Statement was eventually “clarified.”
Yet the essence of the statement appeared to survive except in the rarified
world of diplomatic nuance.
“He [Lu Kang Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson] said ‘it no longer has realistic meaning’. This is understandable
when we look at the issue against the background that some country was trying
to use the joint declaration for pointing fingers,” Xu said. “But we have never
denied the fact that the joint declaration is a treaty.” While acknowledging the
document registered with the United Nations was “not without [legally] binding
effect”, he pointed out that its main text only mentioned Britain would
“restore” Hong Kong to China, but included no provision for its rights and
responsibilities after the handover. (“Beijing:
Hong Kong Handover Treaty Still Binding,” China Digital Times ( quoting Xu
Hong, director general of the Chinese foreign ministry’s treaty and law
department)).
This was made clear at the time of the 2017 commemoration, when
Xi Jinping also sought to redefine the product of the Joint Declaration from
its international to its domestic character (South China Morning Post, “Full
text of President Xi Jinping’s speech on ‘one country, two systems’ and how
China rules Hong Kong”). His point
was the same as that raised more bluntly by the Chinese foreign ministry but
the message was the same—to the extent there was an international element
within the relationship of the central authorities and Hong Kong it was to be
understood as an internal matter of empire rather than as an external matter of
international protectorate. He
emphasized four critical points. First
he inverted the relationship between the Joint Declaration’s structure of the
relationship between Hong Kong and the central government. For him it was critical to understand that
the Joint Declaration must be read in the light of the One Country Two Systems
principle rather than the other way around.
AS central element of this position was the development of a “correct”
understanding of One Country two Systems as grounded in the relationship
between the central government and its territories rather than the embedding of
international expectation about the ordering of a dependency through the
structures of international agreement. He thus sought to transform the
international character of Hong Kong (through 2047 at least) into one of a
domestic (imperial )order in which the central authorities reserved to
themselves the power to organize and order the relations between itself and its
territories. Second, that ordering was
to be implemented in accordance with the constitutional documents of the
central authorities rather than by reference to international instruments.
Third, that for the central authorities the animating objective of the “two systems”
portion of the principle was to ensure development (a modified application of
the socialist modernization which anchored the Hong Kong variant within the
Pearl River amalgam). And fourth that this two system model could only survive
as long as a “harmonious and stable social environment” was maintained.
(Pix Credit: South China Morning Post, “Full
text of President Xi Jinping’s speech on ‘one country, two systems’ and how
China rules Hong Kong”)
At the time the war of words was more rhetorical and
abstract than anything else—provided for the amusement of the ruling castes of
all stakeholders as they sought to play to internal and external audiences to
further their own interests, all of which were complex. But the fuss has taken
on a much more important character with the evolving situation in Hong
Kong. The central authorities have
sought to transforms the Joint Declaration’s international supervision into the
allegation of black hand interference or colonialism with increasingly less
persuasive allusions to the weakness of China by reference to its decrepit
Manchu era government (about which we have written here, here, here). The UK
(and more potently the US) have sought to emphasize the international
protectorate obligations in the Joint Declaration as a means of ensuring that
the governmental framework it crafted remains undisturbed (at least until
2047).
But let us consider the Joint Declaration on the broader
context of Empire.
1. To some extent, the central authorities are now
implementing Xi Jinping’s “New Era” vision of the One Country-Two Systems
principle in relation to Hong Kong. What
the situation in Hong Kong has done is to accelerate central authority planning
for the eventual incorporation of Hong Kong within its political and economic
model.
2. But formalities
are still important. It will be for the
authorities in Hong Kong to seek the aid of the central authorities. But Hong Kong authorities will also be
expected under One Country Two Systems to petition the central authorities for
help. That help need not come in the form of direct intervention by force, but
will come from “support” for actions developed under the leadership of the
central authorities (the arrests of leaders of the protests; the identification
of foreign elements in Hong Kong government and culture, and the planning for
the excision of both).
3. In this context, the Joint Declaration will retain its
formal authority as a treaty. In that
sense it will continue to be respected as an obligation of the central
authorities in international law. But
those obligations are increasingly viewed as fulfilled. And once fulfilled, the binding hold on the
treaty itself fades into history. It is
for that reason, in part, that the central authorities view continued
international interest in Hong Kong as an illegal interference since whatever
obligation it might have had under the Joint Declaration have passed. Western states, global civil society
elements and others, of course, take the opposite view. And both tend to advance their views with
increasing force.
(Pix Credit: National Geographic, “How
Hong Kong’s Complex History Explains Its Current Crisis With China”)
4. The central authority’s position on the Joint Declaration
suggest its view on the construction of a double imperialism theory. One is
external and the other is internal. Externally,
the construction of the post 1945 global order and its principles of international
law bound up in the power of the community of states led by its leadership core
(one can quibble over membership in the core but not into its existence)
represents a new stage in imperial organization that sought (successfully to
shed the debilitating elements of pre-1945 internationalism in military force,
racism, ethno-centrism, and exploitation (at least overt)). But that global
imperial system is thought to reflect the values and cultures of both liberal
democracy and markets based capitalism. Internally,
the construction of regional and ideological coherent sovereignty and control
based relationships among sub-communities of states (and ethnicities)
represents a new form of imperial organization that now seeks to development
win-win structures of solidarity on the basis of mutual interest contextually
based on power relations. That system,
in turn, requires the acknowledgement of a core state (e.g., China or the U.S.)
as a hub from out of which spokes can be developed that brings within the
collective all states and other actors who converge around a singular vision of
relations (in whole or in part) built on economics (Belt and Road Initiative;
America First, etc.) or otherwise.
5. New Era imperial
order has an internal and an external element.
The periphery of the core (hub) of the New Era imperial system is built
around autonomous regions each of which is accorded a distinct range of
flexibility depending on context. These
are ordered within the language of sovereignty and internal constitutionalism.
Beyond the internal periphery of the core are the spoke relations with states
with various degrees of dependence on the core. These are ordered within the language of extra-sovereign
instruments—contract (Memoranda of understanding and other instruments; loan
and economic exploitation agreements etc.); and ore formally international
legal instruments. The extent of dependency and control depends
on the relationship of the dependency to the core. Hong Kong falls well within the periphery of
the core and is thus adjudged as an internal matter for the system of
sovereignty and control that is the new form of empire.
6. Given this
conceptual framework, it is unlikely that the central authorities will deviate
from its development of a notion that all foreign interventions must be
opposed. More importantly it will
accelerate a progress of de-culturalization in which Hong Kong will lose its
hybrid character and increasingly adopt the custom and practices of a
peripheral territory of the core. This is particularly true with respect to the
Twelve Core Socialist Values and the relationship of the economic and political
model of this core-periphery to the core itself. In this context, the situation
in Hong Kong serves as affirmation of the dangers of internationalization on
the two levels of foreign interference and cultural development. It is in this
context that all protest can be re-framed as the expression of the foreign, and
all deviation increasingly as a bacillus that threatens the economic and
political order of the core.
7. But, because the territory is still peripheral and a
bridge to other spoke-hob empires, the way in which Hong Kong will be
disciplined will be contextually distinct. This is not the Turkish periphery.
Hong Kong’s history will likely produce the foundation for its further
incorporation.
8. Lastly, it is
worth remembering that 20147 is not too far off. And that the only thing may matter survive
this long and drawn out transformation are the conceptual theories of empire
which it has helped produce.
__________
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China have
reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two
Governments and peoples in recent years and agreed that a proper negotiated
settlement of the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is
conducive to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and
to the further strengthening and development of the relations between the two
countries on a new basis. To this end, they have, after talks between the
delegations of the two Governments, agreed to declare as follows:
1. The
Government of the People's Republic of China declares that to recover the
Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories,
hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire
Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty
over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.
2. The
Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong Kong to
the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.
3. The
Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the basic policies
of the
People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong are as follows:
(2) The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign
and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's
Government.
(3) The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws
currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.
(4) The Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The
chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the
basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally.
Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's
Government. Chinese and foreign nationals previously working in the public
and police services in the government departments of Hong Kong may remain in
employment. British and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve
as advisers or hold certain public posts in government departments of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(5) The current social and
economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the
life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of
the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of
correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and
of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate
right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.
(6) The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will retain the status of a free port and a separate
customs territory.
(7) The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will retain the status of an international financial
centre, and its markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures
will continue. There will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will
continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.
(8) The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will have independent finances. The Central People's Government
will not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(9) The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations
with the United Kingdom and other countries, whose economic interests in Hong
Kong will be given due regard.
(10) Using the name of 'Hong Kong,
China', the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain
and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements
with states, regions and relevant international organisations.
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong.
(11) The maintenance of public
order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be the
responsibility of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
(12) The above-stated basic
policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the
elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated,
in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic
of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.
4. The
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic
of China declare that, during the transitional period between the date of the
entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government
of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong
with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and
social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China
will give its cooperation in this connection.
5. The
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic
of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth transfer of government in
1997, and with a view to the effective implementation of this Joint
Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up when this
Joint Declaration enters into force; and that it will be established and will
function in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to this Joint
Declaration.
6. The
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic
of China declare that land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters will
be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint
Declaration.
7. The
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic
of China agree to implement the preceding declarations and the Annexes to
this Joint Declaration.
8. This
Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on
the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place
in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall
be equally binding.
Done in duplicate at Beijing on 19 December 1984 in the
English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.
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Elaboration by the government of
the People's Republic of China of its basic policies regarding Hong Kong
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The Government of the People's
Republic of China elaborates the basic policies of the People's Republic of
China regarding Hong Kong as set out in paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration
of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
Kong as follows:
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Establishment of the Hong Kong
S.A.R.
The Basic Law
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China
stipulates in Article 31 "that the state may establish special
administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in
special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the
National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." In
accordance with this Article, the People's Republic of China shall, upon the
resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997,
establish the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of
China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred
to as the Basic Law) in accordance with the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China, stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies
shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and
that Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain
unchanged for 50 years.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly
under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for
foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central
People's Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including
that of final adjudication. The Central People's Government shall authorise
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct on its own those
external affairs specified in Section XI of this Annex.
Chief Executive. Principal
Officials. The Legislature
The government and legislature of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of local
inhabitants. The chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally
and be appointed by the Central People's Government. Principal officials
(equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and appointed by the Central People's
Government. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by
the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.
Language
In addition to Chinese, English
may also be used in organs of government and in the courts in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
Regional flag and emblem
Apart from displaying the national
flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region may use a regional flag and emblem of its own.
Laws previously in force
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the
common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and
customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic
Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region legislature.
Legislative power
The legislative power of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the legislature of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The legislature may on its own
authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and
legal procedures, and report them to the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress for the record. Laws enacted by the legislature which are
in accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as
valid.
Laws of the SAR
The laws of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall be the Basic Law, and the laws previously in
force in Hong Kong and laws enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region legislature as above.
Previous judicial system
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, the judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong
shall be maintained except for those changes consequent upon the vesting in
the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of
final adjudication.
Judicial power; Precedents
Judicial power in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the courts of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. The courts shall exercise judicial power
independently and free from any interference. Members of the judiciary shall
be immune from legal action in respect of their judicial functions. The
courts shall decide cases in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and may refer to precedents in other common law
jurisdictions.
Appointment and removal of judges
Judges of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region courts shall be appointed by the chief executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the
recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons
from the legal profession and other eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen
by reference to their judicial qualities and may be recruited from other
common law jurisdictions. A judge may only be removed for inability to
discharge the functions of his office, or for misbehaviour, by the chief
executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance
with the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief judge of the
court of final appeal, consisting of not fewer than three local judges.
Additionally, the appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e. those of
the highest rank) shall be made by the chief executive with the endorsement
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature and reported to
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. The
system of appointment and removal of judicial officers other than judges
shall be maintained.
Power of final judgment
The power of final judgment of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the court of final
appeal in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which may as required
invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of
final appeal.
Prosecutions
A prosecuting authority of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions
free from any interference.
Legal practitioners
On the basis of the system
previously operating in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government shall on its own make provision for local lawyers and
lawyers from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to work and
practise in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Reciprocal juridical assistance
The Central People's Government
shall assist or authorise the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government to make appropriate arrangements for reciprocal juridical
assistance with foreign states.
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Public servants and members of
judiciary previously serving in H.K.
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, public servants previously serving in Hong Kong in all
government departments, including the police department, and members of the
judiciary may all remain in employment and continue their service with pay,
allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than
before. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall pay to
such persons who retire or complete their contracts, as well as to those who
have retired before 1 July 1997, or to their dependants, all pensions,
gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less favourable
than before, and irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.
Foreign nationals in public
service
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may employ British and other foreign
nationals previously serving in the public service in Hong Kong, and may
recruit British and other foreign nationals holding permanent identity cards
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to serve as public servants at
all levels, except as heads of major government departments (corresponding to
branches or departments at Secretary level) including the police department,
and as deputy heads of some of those departments. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may also employ British and other foreign
nationals as advisers to government departments and, when there is a need,
may recruit qualified candidates from outside the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region to professional and technical posts in government
departments. The above shall be employed only in their individual capacities
and, like other public servants, shall be responsible to the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government.
Appointment and promotion of
public servants
The appointment and promotion of
public servants shall be on the basis of qualifications, experience and
ability. Hong Kong's previous system of recruitment, employment, assessment,
discipline, training and management for the public service (including special
bodies for appointment, pay and conditions of service) shall, save for any
provisions providing privileged treatment for foreign nationals, be
maintained.
Budget
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall deal on
its own with financial matters, including disposing of its financial
resources and drawing up its budgets and its final accounts. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall report its budgets and final accounts to
the Central People's Government for the record.
Taxation and public expenditure
The Central People's Government
shall not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial revenues
exclusively for its own purposes and they shall not be handed over to the
Central People's Government. The systems by which taxation and public
expenditure must be approved by the legislature, and by which there is
accountability to the legislature for all public expenditure, and the system
for auditing public accounts shall be maintained.
Economic and trade system.
Ownership of property
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade
systems previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government shall decide its economic and trade policies
on its own. Rights concerning the ownership of property, including those
relating to acquisition, use, disposal, inheritance and compensation for
lawful deprivation (corresponding to the real value of the property
concerned, freely convertible and paid without undue delay) shall continue to
be protected by law.
Free port and free trade policy
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall retain the status of a free port and continue a
free trade policy, including the free movement of goods and capital. The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop
economic and trade relations with all states and regions.
Customs territory.
GATT.
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may
participate in relevant international organisations and international trade
agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding international trade
in textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements
obtained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be enjoyed
exclusively by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall have authority to issue its own
certificates of origin for products manufactured locally, in accordance with
prevailing rules of origin.
Trade missions
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may, as necessary, establish official and semi-official
economic and trade missions in foreign countries, reporting the establishment
of such missions to the Central People's Government for the record.
Previous monetary and financial
systems
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall retain the status of an international financial
centre. The monetary and financial systems previously practised in Hong Kong,
including the systems of regulation and supervision of deposit taking
institutions and financial markets, shall be maintained.
Monetary and financial policies
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may decide its monetary and financial
policies on its own. It shall safeguard the free operation of financial
business and the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. No exchange control policy shall be applied in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Markets for foreign exchange,
gold, securities and futures shall continue.
Hong Kong dollar
The Hong Kong dollar, as the local
legal tender, shall continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. The
authority to issue Hong Kong currency shall be vested in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may authorise designated banks to issue or
continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority, after
satisfying itself that any issue of currency will be soundly based and that
the arrangements for such issue are consistent with the object of maintaining
the stability of the currency. Hong Kong currency bearing references
inappropriate to the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China shall be progressively replaced and
withdrawn from circulation.
Exchange Fund
The Exchange Fund shall be managed
and controlled by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
primarily for regulating the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar.
Previous systems of shipping
management and regulation
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall maintain Hong Kong's previous systems of shipping
management and shipping regulation, including the system for regulating
conditions of seamen. The specific functions and responsibilities of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government in the field of shipping shall
be defined by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government on its
own. Private shipping businesses and shipping-related businesses and private
container terminals in Hong Kong may continue to operate freely.
Shipping registers and issue of
certificates
The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall be authorised by the Central People's Government
to continue to maintain a shipping register and issue related certificates
under its own legislation in the name of 'Hong Kong, China'.
Access to HKSAR ports
With the exception of foreign
warships, access for which requires the permission of the Central People's
Government, ships shall enjoy access to the ports of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
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ANNEX II
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1. In
furtherance of their common aim and in order to ensure a smooth transfer of
government in 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government
of the People's Republic of China have agreed to continue their discussions
in a friendly spirit and to develop the cooperative relationship which
already exists between the two Governments over Hong Kong with a view to the
effective implementation of the Joint Declaration.
2. In order
to meet the requirements for liaison, consultation and the exchange of
information, the two Governments have agreed to set up a Joint Liaison Group.
3. The
functions of the Joint Liaison Group shall be:
b) to discuss matters relating to
the smooth transfer of government in 1997;
c) to exchange information and
conduct consultations on such subjects as may be agreed by the two sides.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Joint
Liaison Group shall be referred to the two Governments for solution through
consultations.
4. Matters
for consideration during the first half of the period between the
establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 shall include:
b) action to be taken by the two
Governments to ensure the continued application of international rights and
obligations affecting Hong Kong.
5. The two Governments have agreed that in the second half
of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July
1997 there will be need for closer cooperation, which will therefore be
intensified during that period. Matters for consideration during this second
period shall include:
b) action to assist the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to maintain and develop economic and cultural
relations and conclude agreements on these matters with states, regions and
relevant international organisations.
6. The Joint
Liaison Group shall be an organ for liaison and not an organ of power. It
shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Nor shall it have any supervisory role over
that administration. The members and supporting staff of the Joint Liaison
Group shall only conduct activities within the scope of the functions of the
Joint Liaison Group.
7. Each side
shall designate a senior representative who shall be of Ambassadorial rank,
and four other members of the group. Each side may send up to 20 supporting
staff.
8. The Joint
Liaison Group shall be established on the entry into force of the Joint
Declaration. From 1 July 1988 the Joint Liaison Group shall have its
principal base in Hong Kong. The Joint Liaison Group shall continue its work
until 1 January 2000.
9. The Joint
Liaison Group shall meet in Beijing, London and Hong Kong. It shall meet at
least once in each of the three locations in each year. The venue for each
meeting shall be agreed between the two sides.
10. Members
of the Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities
as appropriate when in the three locations. Proceedings of the Joint Liaison
Group shall remain confidential unless otherwise agreed between the two
sides.
11. The Joint
Liaison Group may by agreement between the two sides decide to set up
specialist sub-groups to deal with particular subjects requiring expert
assistance.
12. Meetings
of the Joint Liaison Group and sub-groups may be attended by experts other
than the members of the Joint Liaison Group. Each side shall determine the
composition of its delegation to particular meetings of the Joint Liaison
Group or sub-group in accordance with the subjects to be discussed and the
venue chosen.
13. The
working procedures of the Joint Liaison Group shall be discussed and decided
upon by the two sides within the guidelines laid down in this Annex.
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ANNEX III
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The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with effect from the entry
into force of the Joint Declaration, land leases in Hong Kong and other
related matters shall be dealt with in accordance with the following
provisions:
1. All
leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into force of the
Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance with paragraph 2
or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in
relation to such leases shall continue to be recognised and protected under
the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
2. All
leases of land granted by the British Hong Kong Government not containing a
right of renewal that expire before 30 June 1997, except short term tenancies
and leases for special purposes, may be extended if the lessee so wishes for
a period expiring not later than 30 June 2047 without payment of an
additional premium. An annual rent shall be charged from the date of
extension equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property at
that date, adjusted in step with any changes in the rateable value
thereafter. In the case of old schedule lots, village lots, small houses and
similar rural holdings, where the property was on 30 June 1984 held by, or,
in the case of small houses granted after that date, the property is granted
to, a person descended through the male line from a person who was in 1898 a
resident of an established village in Hong Kong, the rent shall remain
unchanged so long as the property is held by that person or by one of his
lawful successors in the male line. Where leases of land not having a right
of renewal expire after 30 June 1997, they shall be dealt with in accordance
with the relevant land laws and policies of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
3. From the
entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, new leases of
land may be granted by the British Hong Kong Government for terms expiring
not later than 30 June 2047. Such leases shall be granted at a premium and
nominal rental until 30 June 1997, after which date they shall not require
payment of an additional premium but an annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent
of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with
changes in the rateable value thereafter, shall be charged.
4. The total
amount of new land to be granted under paragraph 3 of this Annex shall be
limited to 50 hectares a year (excluding land to be granted to the Hong Kong
Housing Authority for public rental housing) from the entry into force of the
Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997.
5.
Modifications of the conditions specified in leases granted by the British
Hong Kong Government may continue to be granted before 1 July 1997 at a
premium equivalent to the difference between the value of the land under the
previous conditions and its value under the modified conditions.
6. From the
entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, premium income
obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from land transactions shall,
after deduction of the average cost of land production, be shared equally
between the British Hong Kong Government and the future Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong
Kong Government, including the amount of the above-mentioned deduction, shall
be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land
development and public works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government's share of the premium income shall be
deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and shall not be drawn on except
for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7(d) of this Annex.
7. A Land
Commission shall be established in Hong Kong immediately upon the entry into
force of the Joint Declaration. The Land Commission shall be composed of an
equal number of officials designated respectively by the Government of the
United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China together
with necessary supporting staff. The officials of the two sides shall be
responsible to their respective governments. The Land Commission shall be
dissolved on 30 June 1997.
The terms of reference of the Land Commission shall be:
b) to monitor observance of the
limit specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, the amount of land granted to
the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing, and the division
and use of premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex;
c) to consider and decide on
proposals from the British Hong Kong Government for increasing the limit
referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex;
d) to examine proposals for
drawing on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of
premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex and to make
recommendations to the Chinese side for decision.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Land
Commission shall be referred to the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Government of the People's Republic of China for decision.
8. Specific
details regarding the establishment of the Land Commission shall be finalised
separately by the two sides through consultations.
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In connection with the Joint
Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
question of Hong Kong to be signed this day, the Government of the United Kingdom
declares that, subject to the completion of the necessary amendments to the
relevant United Kingdom legislation:
b) No person will acquire BDTC
status on or after 1 July 1997 by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong. No
person born on or before 1 July 1997 will acquire the status referred to as
being appropriate in sub-paragraph (a).
c) United Kingdom consular
officials in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and elsewhere may
renew and replace passports of persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and may
also issue them to persons, born before 1 July 1997 of such persons, who had
previously been included in the passport of their parent.
d) Those who have obtained or been
included in passports issued by the Government of the United Kingdom under
sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) will be entitled to receive, upon request, British
consular services and protection when in third countries.
Beijing, 19 December 1984.
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Chinese Memorandum
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The Government of the People's Republic of China has
received the memorandum from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland dated 19 December 1984.
Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of
China, all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the
'British Dependent Territories Citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese
nationals.
Taking account of the historical background of Hong Kong
and its realities, the competent authorities of the Government of the
People's Republic of China will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese
nationals in Hong Kong who were previously called 'British Dependent
Territories Citizens' to use travel documents issued by the Government of the
United Kingdom for the purpose of travelling to other states and regions.
The above Chinese nationals will not be entitled to
British consular protection in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and other parts of the People's Republic of China on account of their holding
the above-mentioned British travel documents.
Beijing, 19 December 1984.
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