Sunday, November 14, 2021

The Semiotic Mummy of US-Cuba Relations in the Shadow of Popular Unrest in Both States--Thoughts on Domingo Amuchastegui, "Colisión Inminente" [Imminent Collision] and the Protests in Cuba

Pix Credit: MRT



It is always interesting to see how in the U.S. one of the representative great sounding boards of the people and institutions with power and influence congruent with their wealth and position but not hardly congruent with their numbers (that is after all the essential characteristic of elite minus the hierarchical implications) or necessarily with the power of their thought, have thrust themselves onto the great conversation among Cuban people with each other and with the apparatus of the state and its political vanguard in the run up to the planned protests of 15 November 2021. Karen DeYoung, "Planned islandwide march could influence U.S. policy on Cuba," The Washington Post (14 November 2021) at p. A12. 

As is appropriate for the leading elements of the United States as they seek to report and in so doing influence policy, the focus was not centered on Cuba but rather on its intrusion (felicitously or not--no need to let someone else's crisis go to waste domestically) into the battlegrounds of the civil and political wars with which the United States has saddled itself for the greater part of the 21st century.  The reporting, of course, starts with the actions of Cuban state security as it now brags (again) about the ways in which it serves as a ruthless instrument of the political order.  It then suggests that the Biden Administration, having observed that cocktail made from a heady mix of that old tenancy and the inevitable social explosions that arose at the moment of generational change after decades of policy failure "as the tip of a turning point in Cuba." ( DeYoung, supra). Certainly it may be a tipping point for the Americans, and most certainly for the strategic calculations of the Biden Administration--the point of virtually the rest of the article and its analytic perspective. That was underlined by Jake Sullivan's  deliciously ambiguous comment the "'circumstances had changed' on the island" (Ibid.) prompting the Biden Administration to hold off on any change (assuming any was significantly in the offing) in its commitment to Trump Administration policy (without the tweeting). None of this, of course, was driven by politics--the assurance of which was belied by the insistence otherwise of the National Security advisor Sullivan. But to some extent the statement was correct, politics is not the driver but cvontests over the way the United States sees itself reflected in Cuba that is very much at the center of what passes for the now monotonously bathethic dialogue that is Cuba policy.

Cuba, in this sense, has become the way in which Americans can talk about themselves when they appear to be talking about Cuba.  This is an old semiotic trick that Americans have used since the antebellum period. And the Cubans oblige by an equal semiotics trick--to talk about themselves through the mirror that is the United States.  And thus the great oddity of the relationship between the Cuban and the Americans--each looking at themselves through their construction of the other. This semiotic entanglement, in which both states serve as the means of their own signification through their construction of the other, has been a hallmark of the discourse (and politics) of both states since before the start of the last century.  The perverse results have been written in the history of both peoples, but especially in the folly of their vanguards, now so mummified on both sides of the Florida Straits by more than a century of such oblique meaning making (and its incarnation as internal and external policy) that one hardly needs facts to be able, with some certainty, to predict precisely what every one of the players will say (what they think is almost irrelevant in this semiotic mummy) and what they will do.  What is missing is only the great eruption that will permit them both to reset the pieces of the mutually reflecting mirrors that is the state of their relations and to start once again collectively engaging in self reflection within the image produced by our reflection of ourselves in the effort to respond to the other.The Americans certainly hope that they might ascribe such a meaning to the 11 July eruption now solidified in the planned 15 November manifestations. The Cuban state also sees it as a transformative moment--when the "black hand " (黑手) of foreign interference  and liberal democratic internationalism can be both exposed and suppressed, and with it any real hope for (even Leninist) change for the better. (see, Los Difuntos, la disonancia y el desafío a los órdenes establecidos: pensamientos en vísperas de las protestas planificadas en Cuba el 15 de noviembre de 2021). To that end the arrests, detentions and diffusion of popular manifestations will serve the interests of both Cuba and the United SDtates reflected in each other's actions and their respective projections of themselves through the other.

These are the thoughts, aided by the thew discourse of American grandees, that one might se echoed in analysis from the periphery of these aristocratic exercises of mummification.  Domingo Amuchastegui  in a recent essay, has provided a more granular view of this odd state of the articulation of relations.  He views this to the prism of that great meeting point of Cuban-U.S.- relations--the Cuban community resident in the United States--a mediating point that has served both actors well for as long as this perverse exercise in externalized self reflection has been going on. Cuba policy reflects our view of Cuba's reality which is itself understood as a function of the reflection of our idealized selves  in our reaction to the other.  We assess ourselves by assessing Cuba.  And the Cubans do the same--it is just that the ideal against which this measure is taken is quite the opposite. Thus, the Americans (quite rightly) purchase an opposition to the current government through intermediary exile groups as they have done since they sought to remove the (then evil) apparatus of Spanish colonial oppression.  Oppression remains the same, its character and the identity of its source changes from historical period to historical period.  Likewise the Cuban state works its own intellectual and elite friend network to destabilize a coherent construction of a singular  construction of Cuba as a reflection of the American ideal and thus contributes to the political fighting around what that ideal ought to look like. The Americans return the favor.  And all is as it should be.And in the middle--as they have always been--are the people--and in Cuba many of whom would likely be as happy with food, work, a safe environment, and some measure of accountability to ensure these objectives--whatever the ideological system within which this is embedded.

The essay in the original Spanish is republished here with permission, along with my translation. Domingo Amuchastegui has had a long and distinguished career. He has served as Cuba's Chargé d'Affaires in Guatemala, was Department Head of Socialist Countries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department Head of the Organization Department at the Tricontinental Organization (1960s-70s), Chief Analyst in the Intelligence Directorate and "Liberación", and a Professor of Contemporary History and Regional Conflicts at the Universidad Pedagógica and the Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales (Cuba). He is the author of Historia Contemporánea de Asia y Africa (4 volumes), Palestina: Dimensiones de un Conflicto, Angola in the XX Century (1988)and the co-author of Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition he has written hundred of articles and essays for Cuba News, Cuba Standard, and various Cuban publications. He participated in fact-finding missions throughout Africa, Asia and Chile, served as Chief analyst during Fidel Castro's visit to Chile and adviser to the Angolan Government (1986-1988). He has resided in the United States since 1994. 





COLISION INMINENTE

Por Domingo Amuchastegui (10/16/2021)

Las agrupaciones del exilio cubano con centro en Miami junto a las figuras de la “oposición pagada” en la isla se aprestan a medir fuerzas con el gobierno cubano este 15 de noviembre. Hablan de un paro nacional y de marchas pacíficas. Sus expectativas son las de reeditar los sucesos del 11 de Julio y así precipitar un clima de confrontación enfilado a precipitar el desplome del gobierno. Este último ha dado a conocer -en respuesta a los permisos solicitados- su negativa a tales permisos pues está claro el carácter desestabilizador de sus organizadores y objetivos.

Desde Miami todos los medios y organizaciones están sintonizados con intensidad diaria a anunciar semejante paro nacional. El beneplácito y apoyo de círculos congresionales y de la administración Biden (Juan González, director de Seguridad Nacional, y Brian Nichols, subsecretarioi de Estado) no han faltado. En Cuba, los habituales “pagados” instrumentan mensajes y convocatorias por medio de las redes sociales. El escenario está montado para una confrontación que se desea y espera que tenga la envergadura de impacto necesaria. Para todoss el punto de referencia sigue siendo el 11 de Julio.

La fecha escogida no es casual. Busca producir una imagen negativa para la temporada turística que se abrirá en ese dia y que, por otro lado, busca adelantarse (poco antes tenían previsto el paro para el 20/11) a la celebración del Dia de la Defensa (celebrada con regularidad antes de la pademia) entre los dias 18-20 de ése mes, acontecimiento éste que vieron los organizadores del paro como una advertencia peligrosa para sus preparativos iniciales.

Todo ello tiene lugar en un contexto internacional particularmente hostil para el gobierno cubano, agudizado justamente como resultado de los acontecimientos del 11 de Julio y cómo estos fueron recibidos e instrumentados por EEUU y la Unión Europea, en especial mediante la continuación de la guerra económica de Trump y que ahora mantiene con toda agresividad la administración Biden. Todo esto impacta de manera particularmente negativa la grave situación económica y social por la que atraviesa el grueso de la población cubana.

Esta última puede o no discernir correctamente que tanto de responsabilidad corresponde a los graves errores y resistencia a profundizar los cambios del lado de las autoridades cubanas y cuanta responsabilidad es inseparable de las acciones de parte de Washington. O sea, puede culpar al gobierno por la inflación prevaleciente y las agigantadas escaseces que poco o nada tienen que ver con EEUU, pero no puede ignorar tampoco el enorme peso y consecuencias de la actual guerra económica que pesa sobre el país. Pero, lo cierto hasta ahora es que el índice acusatorio de la mayoría se enfoca en el recurrente desempeño probadamente inoperante del sistema.

Y hoy en dia llegamos al extremo de que no pocos cubanos en la isla -en sintonía con el mensaje de Miami- vean con buenos ojos una intervención de EEUU como solución extrema. No es por casualidad que no pocos ilustres patriotas se inclinaran por semejante hipótesis durante nuestras luchas contra España y las primeras décadas del siglo pasado; no por casualidad, los términos “anexionismo” y “plattista” ocuparon un notable espacio de nuestra historia y muchísimo antes de que entrara en escena Fidel Castro.

Pero hoy, la convocatoria al paro nacional y marchas del 15 de noviembre inspiradas en el ejemplo del 11 de Julio debe examinarse a la luz de cuatro premisas bien diferentes:

a. El estallido social del 11 de Julio fue, esencialmente, una explosión social eminentemente espontánea de raíces internas, inesperada para todos, en tanto que para las autoridades cubanas siguen insistiendo en que los sucesos de ése dia “fueron gestados, organizados y financiados desde EEUU” y en caracterizarlos como una suma de “disturbios y hechos vandálicos, intentando así descalificar inútilmente lo acontecido.

b. Ahora la factura para el 15 de noviembre es bien transparente: Made in the U.S.A. incluyendo sus principales actores externos e internos, desde la recién “aparecida” organización denominada “Archipiélago,” Inspira, Directorio Democrático y otras de las más antiguas.

c. Mientras, el gobierno cubano ha introducido algunas reformas parciales encaminadas a mejorar en algo las ofertas de alimentos, conducido múltiples encuentros con diferentes sociales y en especial con los olvidados barrios marginales, manejo eficaz dela pandemia y otras, aunque todavía impotente para detener y reducir la inflación desbocada. Difícil resulta evaluar en qué medidas semejantes pasos han atenuado las tensiones que alentaron el 11 de Julio, y si las mismas aceleran o disminuyen las posibilidades de algo similar o mayor. Tentativamente, puede considerarse que dichas iniciativas tienden a aminorar tensiones por el momento.

d. Las autoridades cubanas están perfectamente advertidas de lo que puede avecinarse y, como es elemental, despliega desde ya todo su arsenal de posibilidades y recursos de naturaleza preventive, además de la atmósfera de movilización que suponen los preparativos para los Dias de la Defensa. En este contexto se hace difícil imaginar o apostar por desenlace exitoso.



Echando mano al refranero popular como fuente de conocimiento, rememoro para nuestros lectores la famosa frase: “Guerra avisada, no mata soldado.”

 

 IMMINENT COLLISION
By Domingo Amuchastegui (10/16/2021)

The Cuban exile groups based in Miami together with the figures of the "paid opposition" on the island are preparing to meet with the Cuban government on November 15. They speak of a national strike and peaceful marches. Their expectations are to reissue the events of July 11 and thus precipitate a climate of confrontation aimed at precipitating the collapse of the government. The latter has made known - in response to the requested permits - its refusal to such permits as the destabilizing nature of its organizers and objectives is clear.

From Miami all the media and organizations are tuned in with daily intensity to announce such a national strike. The approval and support of congressional circles and the Biden administration (Juan González, director of National Security, and Brian Nichols, undersecretary of State) have not been lacking. In Cuba, the usual "paid" implement messages and calls through social networks. The stage is set for a confrontation that is desired and expected to have the necessary scale of impact. For all of us, the reference point is still July 11.

The chosen date is not accidental. It seeks to produce a negative image for the tourist season that will open on that day and which, on the other hand, seeks to anticipate (shortly before the strike was scheduled for 11/20) to the celebration of Defense Day (held regularly before of the pademic) between days 18-20 of that month, an event that the organizers of the strike saw as a dangerous warning for their initial preparations.

All this takes place in a particularly hostile international context for the Cuban government, exacerbated precisely as a result of the events of July 11 and how they were received and implemented by the United States and the European Union, especially through the continuation of the economic war of Trump and who is now aggressively maintaining the Biden administration. All this has a particularly negative impact on the serious economic and social situation that the bulk of the Cuban population is going through.
The latter may or may not correctly discern how much responsibility corresponds to serious errors and resistance to deepening changes on the side of the Cuban authorities and how much responsibility is inseparable from actions on the part of Washington. In other words, it can blame the government for the prevailing inflation and the huge shortages that have little or nothing to do with the United States, but it cannot ignore the enormous weight and consequences of the current economic war that weighs on the country. But, the truth so far is that the accusatory index of the majority focuses on the recurring, proven inoperative performance of the system.

And today we reach the point where not a few Cubans on the island - in tune with the message from Miami - see a US intervention favorably as an extreme solution. It is not by chance that not a few illustrious patriots were inclined towards such a hypothesis during our struggles against Spain and the first decades of the last century; not by chance, the terms "annexationism" and "plattist" occupied a notable space in our history and long before Fidel Castro entered the scene.

But today, the call for the national strike and marches of November 15 inspired by the example of July 11 must be examined in the light of four very different premises:

a. The social outbreak of July 11 was, essentially, an eminently spontaneous social explosion with internal roots, unexpected for everyone, while for the Cuban authorities they continue to insist that the events of that day "were conceived, organized and financed from the United States." and in characterizing them as a sum of “riots and vandalism, thus trying to uselessly disqualify what happened.

b. Now the invoice for November 15 is very transparent: Made in the U.S.A. including its main external and internal actors, from the recently “appeared” organization called “Archipiélago,” Inspira, the Democratic Directorate and other older ones.

c. Meanwhile, the Cuban government has introduced some partial reforms aimed at improving the food supply somewhat, conducted multiple meetings with different social groups and especially with the forgotten marginal neighborhoods, effective management of the pandemic and others, although still powerless to stop and reduce the runaway inflation. It is difficult to evaluate by what measures such steps have lessened the tensions that fueled July 11, and whether they accelerate or diminish the possibilities of something similar or greater. Tentatively, it can be seen that such initiatives tend to ease tensions for the time being.

d. The Cuban authorities are fully aware of what may lie ahead and, as is elementary, has now deployed all its arsenal of possibilities and resources of a preventive nature, in addition to the atmosphere of mobilization that the preparations for the Defense Days suppose. In this context, it is difficult to imagine or bet on a successful outcome.

Drawing on the popular proverb as a source of knowledge, I remind our readers of the famous phrase: "forewarned is forearmed" [more literally "A warning of war avoids killing soldiers"].


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