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| Allegory of the first partition of Poland, showing Catherine the Great of Russia (left), Joseph II of Austria (middle) and Frederick the Great of Prussia (right) quarrelling over their territorial seizures. Pix credit here |
I have been writing a bout about both the transformative turn in American Presidential sensibilities from the "bureaucrat" type to that of the "merchant" type, connecting that to its ancient caste/culture manifestations in ancient cultures (here). I have suggested the ways in which America First represents the expression of a merchant lens on matters of state that, from that lens, appears in the guide of markets/transactional challenges. I have also written a bit about the 2nd phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War, a war effectively lost in its 1st phase commenced on the 100th anniversary of the start of the (self) destruction of Europe in 1914 ( Russia-Ukraine2022). I have been suggesting from the start that neither Europe nor the US had the will anymore to sustain its old ambitions and drive toward the sort of imperial hegemonies (now expressed through global production rather than through territorial control) that were based on ordering relations within its spheres of convergence. The American merchant presidency discounted the value of territory as irrelevant either to deal making or to its own territorial security--at least as far as Europe was concerned; and they had little taste the observance of the old 17th-19th century expectations around the management of the borderlands separating a semi-Asiatic and brittle quasi-European Russia and the Anglo-American-Euro hegemony once manifested in territorial borders. The Europeans, in a constant state of self-actualization requiring waves of self destruction and re creation, each variation of which proving more challenging than the last increasingly came to represent the borderlands of a hegemony the hub of which had moved decidedly to the Western shores of the Atlantic.
From this, what follows is something like an overwhelming sense of sadness, one made more acute by the enormity of the loss that will only much later come to be appreciated by those who have yet to be born. For it appears, and appearances mean more than actuality in the world of the first third of the 21st century--that America First has evolved from a set of State protective markets organizing principles grounded in fair opportunity and the protection of American interests in transactional spaces, to one in which the Republic will sell itself to advance the public and political agendas of those with enough funds to hire it out. That moves the Chinese principle of win-win, which is also a central element of America First from economic to political transactional space (and from markets in goods and services to markets for levering State power for a fee).
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Within these old parameters, one the theme emerged. That was the theme of dissipation which, like syphilis, lurked for decades unfelt within a body politic outwardly directly toward a (post-1945 normative which was belied by the decrepitude to that body politic oozing out of that body as a result of the accumulation of the sins of dissipation, the pustules of which exploded in an unavoidable way after August 1914) in ways that were outwardly and spectacularly luxurious and inwardly violently pathological (one need only consider the frolic in Europe and the U.S. that marked the 1960s-early 1980s politically). Not that other parts of the world fared much better; indeed, the resonance form this core of hegemonic power were felt in culturally and contextually appropriate ways all over the world (including within the South Asian and Chinese imperia, and Global South cultural/hegemonic spheres), producing the destabilization of the "insides" of social and political orderings that the settlement of 1945 appeared to have made irrelevant, but which merely pushed underground the continuation of the process of decay that was made irrevocable with that e gunshot in Sarajevo in 1914.
In this context the breakup of that last Euro-Asian Empire, that of the Soviets, and its satellites, merely continued the process of decay the process of the putrification of which was evidenced by a return to the good old fashioned values for humanity has long claimed a universal hegemony, one whicvh, unlike most of the positive values at the forefront of formal efforts at normative global convergence actually had a unifying effect globally--mass killings in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia (among other places but those stood out in legacy media), etc. And through it all what had seemed a certainty--the "settlement of Europe" in its new configuration under a US-Soviet, and then US umbrella--provided a foundation for stability in which Europe could be free to engage in political self-actualization of its higher virtues. And so it did, outwardly, for a while.
The start of the Russo-Ukrainian war of 1914-2026 brought this cognitive reverie to a halt (though it took until the 2nd phase of the war in 2022 to bring this home to European elites so deeply invested in their dreaming that they did not see the continuation of what they had started in 1914 now move toward another, and perhaps decisive, stage. Ukraine was a test as much for Europe as it was for the United States, but with quite different stakes.
For Europe, the question of Ukraine revolved around the nature and continuity of Europe as an object, a culture, a territory, an idea, and a space for political solidarity of values. Europe having come to the brink of self destruction during the most violent of its millennium long "Warring States" period, was given the opportunity to (re)build itself not just as an idea but as a concrete manifestation of its own normative values. But even that proved too much, it seems. First those values have been contested from the 1940s with no end in sight. Second European communities have been unable to resist the temptation to reassert ancient conflicts and make resolution complicated. Third, after the 1980s Europe appeared to abandon the idea of itself as a unit of stable solidarity for one on which Europe would dissolve into (and lead, of course) the transition from a State to a globally ordered system, a community of all states engage in the Elysian fields of UN based international institutions, within which borders would disappear, values would converge, and a string system of fatal co-decency would make the idea of the state system eventually dissolve in the way that European hegemony dissolved from 1914, but with less violent episodes. But it is always easy to forget that those Elysian fields are traditionally reserved for the dead. Russia was certainly not Europe--perhaps Europe adjacent, though with great capacity to contribute to European style arts and letters. But Ukraine occupied a space that had been on the borderlands of Europe after the transformation of the Roman Empire into its own virtual representation now carried forward by ways of settler migrants that remade the territories in which they displaced the older orders to produce something more in their own image. Was it part of Europe? Could Europe be defended? Was Europe now dependent on a hegemon more interested in itself than in European needs? Could they prevail on that hegemon? But to what ends--they liked the idea of defending Ukrainian borders--to a point, but less the idea of integrating Ukraine into Europe. They liked the idea of valiant defense but hated the inconvenience of warfare. So conflicted hedging was the only viable alternative to find a nexus point of some sort between European virtues and European realities. That only further spotlighted the advanced state of European dissipation, made clearer still by the returning waves of settler migrants now turned into instruments of destabilization, and a stubborn incapacity to assert a will to determine their own fate and the form that their survival (and perhaps thriving) in a "new" Europe might produce. None of this will affect the European heartland much--at first. But it confirms a trajectory which does appear to lead up, however one orients that vector. Thus even as the European leadership declares (after having indulged in the practice through the end of the last century) that "borders cannot be changed by force" (here), the historical trajectories and their own actions suggest a different outcome.
For the Americans, the question revolved around a two hundred year process of de-colonization its its most intimate cultural-normative senses--from Europe and the European problematic. It has also been the convenient (far away) physical space in which the Americans could confront who they were and who they wanted to be going forward. Whatever that is, it is clear that it will not either have a European feel or even one that even vaguely resembles the sensibilities of two centuries of careful crafting from the elites on whose shoulders contemporary zealotry hurls itsef forward, a movement that never stops to ask the question--should we? America First, by whatever name American Presidents since Barack Obama--the fist President to recognize and perhaps capitalize on what would emerge as an enormous break with the past, a past which ended its continuous run with the Presidency of George Bush II)--have chosen to mollify the American masses by suggesting that no break was occurring (only the fulfillment of whatever it is that they extracted from the past). Until Donald Trump. Perhaps it took a merchant, unschooled, inelegant, and deeply disconnected with the thick webs of individual and institutional forces that managed to maintain continuity since 1871(perhaps in part the American version of the Chinese literati) to give voice in a petulant and sometimes mean, but also naively innocent (in a religious sense) of the realities that he could not understand why everyone around him could not see (they saw of course, but were horrified sometimes by the raw reality exposed--they preferred their transformation more orderly and nicely wrapped in discursive whipped cream). The natural tendency was hedging--also between American values (though the tolerance for violence appears to be contextual--much lower than in Africa but perhaps higher than in MENA, or at least some MENA violence sites) and the American interest in making money one transaction at a time.
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Both European and American merchant princes, then, are interested in preserving and expanding the scope and operational capacity of deal making. For them, at this point, Russia matters, the EU might have, had it consolidated enough to speak with a single voice, and Ukraine exists merely as a space in and through which transactions may be undertaken. To facilitate deals one must sacrifice the less important. That sacrifice includes everything--values, conduct, and old principles. The Americans had a merchant president of that sort once before--in Franklin Delano Roosevelt one also incarnated an American sensibility ready to deal away the barbarities of the Stalinist Soviets (at least as measured by what then were ostensibly U.S. values, except perhaps in the salons of the rich and among political zealots well ahead of their time) and equally willing to trade territory, sovereignty, displace peoples, and cut deals to create the space necessary to build his transactional (global markets driven aggregation of public and private power) that survived in one form or another for a relatively long while (as those things are measured in human terms).
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US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has insisted that a proposed 28-point plan to end the Ukraine war, which has been widely viewed as favourable to Russia, was "authored by the US". It comes after a group of senators said they had been told by Rubio that the draft - which one said he described as a Russian "wish list" - did not reflect Washington's position. Rubio later distanced himself from those claims and said the plan came from the US, and was "based on input" from both Russia and Ukraine. His intervention came as he flew to Geneva in Switzerland for talks with Ukrainian and European security officials on the plan, which US President Donald Trump has called for Kyiv to agree to swiftly. (US insists it authored Ukraine peace plan after claims of Russian 'wish list')
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| Pix credit here (The Godfather; "Tell Mike it was only business") |
But for Europe another marker of the pathway it embraced in that glorious summer of August 1914. We have al realized in this document that state of a "man without qualities" (Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften)--one whose who has no character except as a reflection of responses to the stimuli around him. But what a deal--here the U.S. selling its services as a State, with collateral benefits for merchant trading, but effectively positioning itself not as a deal maker but as the paid agent of other State's deal making. This is a service that appears to be increasingly offered in the marketplace of inter-governmental trading. Perhaps even the Chinese can purchase American power to advance their ends. That, certainly would be the limiting consequence of an (to state unstated) element of America First which to the uninitiated (like me)
Some detail may reveal much. The American guarantees are worthless:
10. The U.S. guarantee:
a. The U.S. to receive compensation for the guarantee;
b. If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee;
c. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn;
d. If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg then, the security guarantee will be considered null and void.
The transactions potential, however is priceless for the U.S.:
12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:
a. Creation of Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries including technology, data centers, and AI efforts.
b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which includes its pipelines and storage facilities.
c. A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Mineral and natural resource extraction.
f. A special financing package will be developed by The World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts.
The Europeanization of Ukraine is given short shrift (¶ 119. And Russia is again open for business with all of its actions forgiven and "forgotten" (¶¶ 13, 26). This is only a transaction that a merchant can make. We will see if there is transactional gold at the end of this rainbow. For Europe, on the other hand, there is a reminder that the path they set out on in August 1914 has yet to run its course, and they continue to drive it in the direction it is going.
The 28 points of the draft US deal (Draft of US-backed peace proposal for Ukraine), follows below with thanks to Reuters for publishing it and with my own brief (very very cheeky) reaction/responses with a fidelity to America First (as a thought project) in RED.
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Draft of US-backed peace proposal for Ukraine
Nov 21 (Reuters) - Here is the text of a draft version of the 28-point peace plan for Ukraine backed by the United States, according to a copy seen by Reuters
1. Ukraine's sovereignty to be reconfirmed. [The text is worthless; States do not need reconfirmation of something that is the province of the UN system. If some sort of performative text is necessary to set the stage then perhaps Ukraine and Russia both declare an intention to reconfirm their respective sovereignty. Amplification: clearly recognition is important, but the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations, and certainly since the 1990s, has been to use recognition as a sort of spigot the Russian side can turn on and off. n that sense Russian recognition is worthless precisely because they can as easily form some excuse to "take it back" as they can honor it while it suits them ]
2. There will be a total and complete comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered resolved. [The objective is innocuous in itself, though incomprehensible except as public facing sentiment, yet it merely substitutes one set of (manufactured) ambiguities for another. It must be read with ¶ 3; as an aside "Europe" does not exist in the way that this suggests; one can assume shorthand though this is not the document in which such shorthand is useful. Amplification: again the same caveat applies here as in ¶ 1; as 19th century diplomats used to say about some treaties and agreements--they may not be worth the paper they were printed on. On the other hand, since the3 United States is in the market to acquire additional territories, and since Ukraine is being partitioned (see ¶ 21) then perhaps the United States should acquire Ukraine as a 51st State and move the core of American first strike capabilities to the new US-Russian border. That brings one back to the state of affairs in July 1914; Russia tends to respect though also test, borders between great powers. Ukraine in that sense does not exist. Either it is absorbed into "Europe" (2nd best from a defense position) or it is acquired by the Americans; then the Russians can have whatever territory they believe they can grab as part of the price of sitting next to a giant they actually fear enough to respect (or at least expend a great deal of effort to manipulate/de-stabilize) ]
3. There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbours and NATO will not expand further. ["Expectation"??!!! That is high comedy indeed! And even more worthless than ¶ 1; but it does suggest the underlying threat--if NATO expands Russia will invade--where it will invade remains. . . .ambiguous; comedy indeed, Russian style. One imagines that the drafters meant expand into Ukraine, but what about other States; one imagines the Russians seek to halt all expansion. That works IF there is a principle of mutuality (not win-win)--that mutuality would freeze all security arrangements by Russia and NATO, yet that itself is both complicated and ultimately unworkable. Amplification: this provision aligns with American unhappiness with an alliance structure that the current core of Ameruican leadership has determined no longer suits the time. It serves as a perfect opportunity to agree and at the same time put in place a new security architecture which, to suit the times might be called the Trump America First Armed Opportunity Alliance]
4. A dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States, will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment to ensure global security and increase the opportunities for connectivity and future economic opportunity. ["Dialog" is among the favorite word/concepts of Marxist-Leninist States and has been used effectively, but it is meaningless within the context in which it is formally used (not colloquially as it is used here. It is a concept deal to officials, alien to warriors, and a distraction to merchants. The problem is that merchants and warriors tend to undervalue the utility of dialog as a means of undermining the opponent. The Americans used to understand that as an essential component of the Cold War tactics architecture that helped wear down the Soviet Empire, providing a space where it could collapse form the weight of its own contradictions. But no more it seems. A pity, especially since the Americans get very little of value from this except the sort of performative sycophancy of "moderation" controlled elsewhere. Unless the Americans can fins a strategic positive use for this, the concept will have to be reworked substantially or it is worth less than avoiding it entirely. There is in that reworking some plausible value (but one which the Americans appear yet incapable of grasping) if it is understood as built around the creation of a space where Russia and "NATO" (now treated a s a sort of State) around which the U.S. would (be paid to) serve as a moderator, though the US is also in NATO, unless this suggests that the US will leave NATO. So much drama in so few words". Better still would be an arrangement of the sort Russia and Israel developed in order to police Assad's Syria in a way that suited both states. In any case, as drafted, it is meant to appeal to the ego of merchant presidents (something of less value to the Republic that is meant to be served thereby in an of itself--there is nothing wrong with ego stroking as long as it also produces value for the enterprise that ego is supposed to serve) and transactional oriented approaches to inter-governmental relations]
5. Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees. [Hahahaha. The first thing one thinks about are the 1990s security guarantees that (see ¶ 1-2) were not worth the paper used to print them on. It is otherwise hard to comment other than that provision is meaningless. It does, however, make for excellent propaganda that can be projected outward to destabilize public opinion within liberal democratic states and widen rifts in domestic politics; it is curious that the U.S. would consider a proposal that contributes to political instability, but then people have different tastes and appetites for instability one might guess]
6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be capped at 600,000. [Not worth a comment except this--a provision like this is viable if the Ukrainians agree, for example, to limit the size of their forces to a number no larger than the size of all Russian military forces and capacities (especially since they will be responsible for their own security. Of course, if the United States incorporates Ukraine into its federal Republic (something this proposal does not prohibit), or is incorporated into "Europe" this proposal becomes effectively meaningless. The state of Russo-Ukrainian history one might be tempted to add a provision that Ukrainian armed forces may not be smaller and double the size of Russian forces and capacity. ]
7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to pass in its bylaws not to accept Ukraine at any point in the future. [The corollary to ¶ 3; it is worth considering especially if (and the if relates to the cleverness of the Americans which has yet to be displayed to ant positive effect) the Americas agree to dismantle NATO and create a new security architecture. In that case Ukraine may join that post-NATO alignment without joining NATO. Alternatively, Europe may seek to develop its own military architecture which, if it not formally "NATO" though aligned with it, makes the provision useful as a face saving for the Russians bit otherwise of little practical effect. ]
8. NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine. [See ¶ 7; note that this does not prevent a future US president form stationing American troops in Ukraine or for Ukraine, Russian style, to station the armed forces of a non-NATO state in its border; perhaps the North Koreans, always in search of economic opportunity might agree to send troops to fight in both Ukraine and Russia (a joke). The Americans, however, may station troops in Ukraine even if only to protect their investments (eg, ¶]12
9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland. [One cannot even begin to understand this both in its micro-objectives and for what the intent is that is meant to be read into this ; Given ¶ 1 it appears to be a breach of sovereignty to tell the Poles what exactly it is that they might do in their own territories--but then Russia has historically had a "unique" view of both Polish nationality, sovereignty and the firmness of its borders; they might well recall with longing the borders pre-1914; who knows. . . ]
10. The U.S. guarantee:
a. The U.S. to receive compensation for the guarantee;
b. If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee;
c. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn;
d. If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg then, the security guarantee will be considered null and void. [Aahh the money bit, but it suggests a substantial flabbiness in the value that the Americans will get for engaging in this deal. . . . Not worthy, even as a starting point for a first year business school student. The problem here is that our merchant may not be getting value for money, likely undercharging or most likely charging the wrong party. All a betrayal of the fundamentals of America First, even if it is expanded to include the Republic itself as a money making agent through the sale of its own military power to serve the interests of others]11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will get short-term preferred market access to the European market while this issue is being evaluated. [This is a European problem that is its own minefield, though it need not have been except for the webs of history within which Europe appears to be stuck. The problem, or revelation, is the way that both the Russians and Americans (and likely the Chinese) think of Europe as a power lower on the rankings of States than Russia itself. The EU and Ukraine acquire an equivalence that makes their aggregation of little military interest to Russia--for the moment. Europeans, of course, are not at the table--they sit at the "children's table" allowed to comment when the "parents" are done crafting the basics of the decisions they will impose; Ukraine, of course, is not a state (like most of the Global South, but an object that the imperium of "real" states may shape as they like]
12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:
a. Creation of Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries including technology, data centers, and AI efforts.
b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which includes its pipelines and storage facilities.
c. A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Mineral and natural resource extraction.
f. A special financing package will be developed by The World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts. [In order to make money in and from Ukraine it is necessary to make it presentable or at least interesting to transactional activity; but even that task is a means of making money, and perhaps everyone, maybe even the Ukrainians, might profit from reconstruction--which the Russians would finance for about $100 billion, ¶ 14 which would be "managed" by the Americans. . . transactions a-go-go in a nice value framework. At this point the Americans might as well recognize where this leads--to Ukrainian statehood, or to the partitioning of Ukraine in ways that are operationalized in ways that align with the ruling principles of both sides--the Russians having a taste for good old fashioned control; the Americans pretending that there is a transactional relationship and that Ukraine is "free" to do as they like beyond those relationships. But of course they can't. Fir the most cynical it might remind of the difference between slavery and non-slave exploitative relations among labor lumpenproletariat ]
13. Russia to be re-integrated into the global economy:a. Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.
b. The United States will enter into a long-term Economic Co-operation Agreement to pursue mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal projects in the Arctic as well as other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia to be invited back into the G8. [The payout to Russia--they want to make money too, and especially in their dealing with the Americans, and through them in AmericaFrist-land; plus they will be allowed back into G8 and thus revive their status as at least a 2nd order power to be respected and if not respected feared, especially if they can continue to engage the Americans, and Chinese, for a price, to advance their interests. It is not clear that the Americans are getting full value for the trade--unless this s mean as some sort of Chinese style 11-11 sale event strictly for the Russians. Nit a reat way to run a business for a State the power of which is now understood as a function of being able to do transactions better than others. ]
14. Frozen funds will be used as follows:$100 billion of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a US-led effort to reconstruct and invest in Ukraine. The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will match this $100 billion contribution to increase the investment available to rebuild Ukraine. The European funds that are frozen will be released. The balance of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russia investment vehicle that will pursue joint United States Russia projects in areas to be defined. This fund will aim to strengthen the relationship and increase joint interests to build a strong motivation not to return to conflict. [Not much to say other than it is a bargain (see eg ¶ 13 lots of "deals" but only for the Russians it seems), for Russia the cost of which has already been built into the calculus of Russian losses. By the time one finishes with this paragraph one cannot help but wonder why the Americans have been whining so much about the unequal relationships with Europe that is a financial burden when they effectively recreate that unequal and subsidizing treaty relationship with the Russians. Another betrayal of America First, if that is what they mean to further.]
15. A joint US-Russian Security taskforce will be established to promote and enforce compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement. [This one is intriguing but it ignores the Chinese elephant in the room and may be more for show than for effect; on the other hand that would provide substantial opportunity for Russian penetration of American military establishments and for lower cost techno-espionage; but only their respective security apparatus understands this and they are not speaking.
16. Russia will legislatively enshrine a non-aggression policy towards Europe and Ukraine. [Laws are the easiest thing to craft (especially in Russia), then ignore and if not ignored then revised to suit the times; it effectively is a waste of the text and time taken to draft it except to the extent they can bamboozle the Americans into assuming that laws mean the same thing and are utilized in the same way in both states. Here the misapplication of American rule ogf law ideology will prove to be most useful to the Russians. At a minimum, America First suggests that the Russians ought to be willing to pay a fair price for this "goodie."]
17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation control treaties, including the START I Treaty. [The "reactionary turn" is always a delight to watch, but the way in which one appreciates old Broadway show tunes; as a memory of the past that CANNOT be recreated or pushed forward in the future. That is impossible, though highly useful as a propaganda mask for whatever it is that is being undertaken. But one worries that the Americans, so enraptured by the facade will not peek inside to see what is actually up with this reactionary provision. Again, one cannot time travel back (except in memory an evocation--Proust taught us that much at least, for those not asleep during their College years); one must negotiate something to suit the times; this then is another showboating provision empty effectively of content. ]
18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). [This is a variation of "been there, done that and see what I have to show for it." It would be more interesting if Russia also agreed to become non-nuclear or if Ukraine could be placed within the US nuclear umbrella; since one is drafting nonsense then be ought to be creative on the US side in equal measure to the creativity text like this shows on the Russian side]
19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be restarted under supervision of the IAEA, and the produced power shall be equitably in a 50-50 split between Russia and Ukraine. [Bathos; and in any case the irony--IAEA is overwhelming considering their utility/performance in Iran]
20. Both countries commit to education programs in schools and throughout their society that promotes the understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminates racism and bias:
a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules of religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.21. Territories:
b. Both countries agree to repeal all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
c. All Nazi ideology or activity should be renounced and forbidden. [Everyone loves a good Russification project, it seems; and this is cover for what it is. But if that what is on the table it should be expanded and a mirroring obligation crafted for Russia. Russia should also adopt relevant EU rules and remain an observant member of the European Human Rights convention; the Nazi stuff formalizes a propaganda position and might be broadened to include a constant and US verified effective Russian campaign to explain the evils of Stalinism and its effects on Ukraine, say in the 1930s ]a. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk to be recognized De-Facto as Russian, including by the United States.
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to be frozen at the contact line, which would mean a De-Facto recognition at the contact line.
c. Russia to give up other agreed upon territories they control outside of the five regions
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk region that they currently control, and this withdrawal area will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone. [Bargaining like old grandmothers on the turnip markets of Eastern Europe is always spectacular and here, at least, one gets to some (more) of what Russia is paying for. It is certainly generous and conforms the trajectory of implicit US acquiescence from the time of the Obama presidency. It is ironic, though that it is President Trump that fulfills the objectives and desires of President Obama. A nice legacy and a sign of solidarity among the Euro-American political elite despite the rhetoric, a solidarity that replicates a similar one in the 1930s as the elites aligned themselves and embraced the sensibilities of those great powers that produced the 4th Partition of Poland in 1939 and normalization) . It might add more interest if, in return, Belorussian is partitioned and portions returned to Poland and to Ukraine in exchange for this nice slice of territory Russia acquires: THAT would make for a lively discussion! One might also make the old Pale of Settlement available for Jewish migration.]
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22. Once future territorial arrangements have been agreed, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this obligation. [There are, of course, other means, some of which have been pioneered by Russia--passport distribution followed by independent movements, or strategic migration for example; and destabilization is a nice peaceful means to move thing along in ways that will not ruffle the feathers of those who like change but not violence]
23. Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine's use of the Dnieper River for purposes of commercial activities and agreements will be reached for grain shipments to move freely through the Black Sea. ["shall not obstruct" is not the same thing as "shall facilitate"; perhaps control of the Dnieper River and its commerce should be transferred to the Americans under some sort of Treaty based contract. . . in perpetuity]
24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve open issues:
a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on the principle of 'all for all'.
b. All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.
c. There will be a family reunification program
d. Provisions will be made to address the suffering of victims from the conflict. [Nice words; but beneath it lots of less nice possibilities--children will not be returned from Russia "because they are Russian not Ukrainian; or 'lost';"no compensation program for the victims of all of this activity,; the notion of "suffering of the victims" can be managed in a way that it tilts toward creative Russian suffering; etc. ]25. Ukraine to hold elections in 100 days. [It is hard to square this with ¶1; but then the Americans have been quite unhappy with the current president and the Russians have not been successful in assassination or discrediting measures (even the latest Ukrainian corruption documents dump was not as effective as perhaps anticipated by its authors). It also serves as the perfect vehicle for Russia to repeat that quite brilliant strategy of Stalin's during the second half of the 1940s in which "elections" (so precious to the liberal democratic West) are used to undermine both the State and its political system. In this sense, all other provisions of the proposal become irrelevant if the Russians can use this one to accomplish what more than a decade of warfare failed to do--to effectively annex Ukraine (again)--all of it--in a Belorussian style way .]
26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions during the war and agree not to pursue claims or further settle grievances. [THE BIG PAYOUT for Russian bigwigs; as a collateral matter it would serve the interest of those who would see the architecture of the ICC wither away like states after a successful global proletarian revolution . . . . It ought to cost the Russians something--a payout to the Americans or to "victims" (see ¶ 24); perhaps they ought to cede Sakhalin Island to Japan. . . . ]For the moment the provision makes one wonder about the bargaining power of the Americans; ought one to worry about what this suggests for the quality, the fire power, of American negotiators or the American vision under an America First regime? ]
27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, Chaired by President Donald J. Trump. There will be penalties for violation. [The legally binding bit is hysterically ironic (and one means hysteria in its ancient sense of a neurotic condition once thought to originate in the "womb" but now better understood as the "gut"); the Board of Peace bit is, well, . . . . . where is the money to the (American) Republic?]
28. Upon all sides agreeing to this memorandum, a ceasefire will be immediately effective upon both parties withdrawing to the agreed upon points for the implementation of the agreement to begin. [Beyond its quite curious syntax, it is both ambiguous and unlikely to be implemented in any orderly way]
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