I have been writing a bout about both the transformative turn in American Presidential sensibilities from the "bureaucrat" type to that of the "merchant" type, connecting that to its ancient caste/culture manifestations in ancient cultures (here). I have suggested the ways in which America First represents the expression of a merchant lens on matters of state that, from that lens, appears in the guide of markets/transactional challenges. I have also written a bit about the 2nd phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War, a war effectively lost in its 1st phase commenced on the 100th anniversary of the start of the (self) destruction of Europe in 1914 ( Russia-Ukraine2022). I have been suggesting from the start that neither Europe nor the US had the will anymore to sustain its old ambitions and drive toward the sort of imperial hegemonies (now expressed through global production rather than through territorial control) that were based on ordering relations within its spheres of convergence. The American merchant presidency discounted the value of territory as irrelevant either to deal making or to its own territorial security--at least as far as Europe was concerned; and they had little taste the observance of the old 17th-19th century expectations around the management of the borderlands separating a semi-Asiatic and brittle quasi-European Russia and the Anglo-American-Euro hegemony once manifested in territorial borders. The Europeans, in a constant state of self-actualization requiring waves of self destruction and re creation, each variation of which proving more challenging than the last increasingly came to represent the borderlands of a hegemony the hub of which had moved decidedly to the Western shores of the Atlantic.
From this, what follows is something like an overwhelming sense of sadness, one made more acute by the enormity of the loss that will only much later come to be appreciated by those who have yet to be born. For it appears, and appearances mean more than actuality in the world of the first third of the 21st century--that America First has evolved from a set of State protective markets organizing principles grounded in fair opportunity and the protection of American interests in transactional spaces, to one in which the Republic will sell itself to advance the public and political agendas of those with enough funds to hire it out. That moves the Chinese principle of win-win, which is also a central element of America First from economic to political transactional space (and from markets in goods and services to markets for levering State power for a fee).
Within these old parameters, one the theme emerged. That was the theme of dissipation which, like syphilis, lurked for decades unfelt within a body politic outwardly directly toward a (post-1945 normative which was belied by the decrepitude to that body politic oozing out of that body as a result of the accumulation of the sins of dissipation, the pustules of which exploded in an unavoidable way after August 1914) in ways that were outwardly and spectacularly luxurious and inwardly violently pathological (one need only consider the frolic in Europe and the U.S. that marked the 1960s-early 1980s politically). Not that other parts of the world fared much better; indeed, the resonance form this core of hegemonic power were felt in culturally and contextually appropriate ways all over the world (including within the South Asian and Chinese imperia, and Global South cultural/hegemonic spheres), producing the destabilization of the "insides" of social and political orderings that the settlement of 1945 appeared to have made irrelevant, but which merely pushed underground the continuation of the process of decay that was made irrevocable with that e gunshot in Sarajevo in 1914.
In this context the breakup of that last Euro-Asian Empire, that of the Soviets, and its satellites, merely continued the process of decay the process of the putrification of which was evidenced by a return to the good old fashioned values for humanity has long claimed a universal hegemony, one whicvh, unlike most of the positive values at the forefront of formal efforts at normative global convergence actually had a unifying effect globally--mass killings in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia (among other places but those stood out in legacy media), etc. And through it all what had seemed a certainty--the "settlement of Europe" in its new configuration under a US-Soviet, and then US umbrella--provided a foundation for stability in which Europe could be free to engage in political self-actualization of its higher virtues. And so it did, outwardly, for a while.
The start of the Russo-Ukrainian war of 1914-2026 brought this cognitive reverie to a halt (though it took until the 2nd phase of the war in 2022 to bring this home to European elites so deeply invested in their dreaming that they did not see the continuation of what they had started in 1914 now move toward another, and perhaps decisive, stage. Ukraine was a test as much for Europe as it was for the United States, but with quite different stakes.
For Europe, the question of Ukraine revolved around the nature and continuity of Europe as an object, a culture, a territory, an idea, and a space for political solidarity of values. Europe having come to the brink of self destruction during the most violent of its millennium long "Warring States" period, was given the opportunity to (re)build itself not just as an idea but as a concrete manifestation of its own normative values. But even that proved too much, it seems. First those values have been contested from the 1940s with no end in sight. Second European communities have been unable to resist the temptation to reassert ancient conflicts and make resolution complicated. Third, after the 1980s Europe appeared to abandon the idea of itself as a unit of stable solidarity for one on which Europe would dissolve into (and lead, of course) the transition from a State to a globally ordered system, a community of all states engage in the Elysian fields of UN based international institutions, within which borders would disappear, values would converge, and a string system of fatal co-decency would make the idea of the state system eventually dissolve in the way that European hegemony dissolved from 1914, but with less violent episodes. But it is always easy to forget that those Elysian fields are traditionally reserved for the dead. Russia was certainly not Europe--perhaps Europe adjacent, though with great capacity to contribute to European style arts and letters. But Ukraine occupied a space that had been on the borderlands of Europe after the transformation of the Roman Empire into its own virtual representation now carried forward by ways of settler migrants that remade the territories in which they displaced the older orders to produce something more in their own image. Was it part of Europe? Could Europe be defended? Was Europe now dependent on a hegemon more interested in itself than in European needs? Could they prevail on that hegemon? But to what ends--they liked the idea of defending Ukrainian borders--to a point, but less the idea of integrating Ukraine into Europe. They liked the idea of valiant defense but hated the inconvenience of warfare. So conflicted hedging was the only viable alternative to find a nexus point of some sort between European virtues and European realities. That only further spotlighted the advanced state of European dissipation, made clearer still by the returning waves of settler migrants now turned into instruments of destabilization, and a stubborn incapacity to assert a will to determine their own fate and the form that their survival (and perhaps thriving) in a "new" Europe might produce. None of this will affect the European heartland much--at first. But it confirms a trajectory which does appear to lead up, however one orients that vector. Thus even as the European leadership declares (after having indulged in the practice through the end of the last century) that "borders cannot be changed by force" (here), the historical trajectories and their own actions suggest a different outcome.
For the Americans, the question revolved around a two hundred year process of de-colonization its its most intimate cultural-normative senses--from Europe and the European problematic. It has also been the convenient (far away) physical space in which the Americans could confront who they were and who they wanted to be going forward. Whatever that is, it is clear that it will not either have a European feel or even one that even vaguely resembles the sensibilities of two centuries of careful crafting from the elites on whose shoulders contemporary zealotry hurls itsef forward, a movement that never stops to ask the question--should we? America First, by whatever name American Presidents since Barack Obama--the fist President to recognize and perhaps capitalize on what would emerge as an enormous break with the past, a past which ended its continuous run with the Presidency of George Bush II)--have chosen to mollify the American masses by suggesting that no break was occurring (only the fulfillment of whatever it is that they extracted from the past). Until Donald Trump. Perhaps it took a merchant, unschooled, inelegant, and deeply disconnected with the thick webs of individual and institutional forces that managed to maintain continuity since 1871(perhaps in part the American version of the Chinese literati) to give voice in a petulant and sometimes mean, but also naively innocent (in a religious sense) of the realities that he could not understand why everyone around him could not see (they saw of course, but were horrified sometimes by the raw reality exposed--they preferred their transformation more orderly and nicely wrapped in discursive whipped cream). The natural tendency was hedging--also between American values (though the tolerance for violence appears to be contextual--much lower than in Africa but perhaps higher than in MENA, or at least some MENA violence sites) and the American interest in making money one transaction at a time.
It is no surprise, then, that the "merchant hegemon" led by President Trump and his team, might be said to care less about abstractions and the intensely felt problematics of the political official. Merchants believe that in the marketplace for power one survives for as long as one can, give one's will, and in that context sovereignty and the larger question of Europe and political ordering become not merely remote but incomprehensible. The
lumpen elements of American society, perhaps represented best in a dressed up and better educated sort of way by elements within the Presidential entourage, might agree, as do those who will be long dead by the time the bill comes due for the true cost of their transactional approach. Not that merchant mentality or transactional approaches to global ordering is bad--it is just that one ought to be quite clear headed about the actual costs and benefits of transaction not just in the short term but for the survivors of all of this deal making.
Both European and American merchant princes, then, are interested in preserving and expanding the scope and operational capacity of deal making. For them, at this point, Russia matters, the EU might have, had it consolidated enough to speak with a single voice, and Ukraine exists merely as a space in and through which transactions may be undertaken. To facilitate deals one must sacrifice the less important. That sacrifice includes everything--values, conduct, and old principles. The Americans had a merchant president of that sort once before--in Franklin Delano Roosevelt one also incarnated an American sensibility ready to deal away the barbarities of the Stalinist Soviets (at least as measured by what then were ostensibly U.S. values, except perhaps in the salons of the rich and among political zealots well ahead of their time) and equally willing to trade territory, sovereignty, displace peoples, and cut deals to create the space necessary to build his transactional (global markets driven aggregation of public and private power) that survived in one form or another for a relatively long while (as those things are measured in human terms).
But what, exactly are they selling. That is the fundamental question raised by the 28 Point Plan. The plan appears more suited to advancing the Russian position than for ending the conflict on terms equally disagreeable to all parties. Read neutrally one might find it hard to escape the thought that what has been sold is American power to realize Russian ambitions. That thinking may be difficult to overcome after parsing what appears to be the Russian document put forward as an American initiative, designed to "end" the conflict in Ukraine--ending Ukraine with it as well, and perhaps Europe as well. I wrote that a day before the news exploded--whether as a tactic of contestation, or a reflection, not unjustified, and a worry, that the 28 Point Plan was more an
American expression of Soviet Patriotism the seneschal of which is encased in a Russian-State with Byzantine pretensions, rather than an expression of the essence of
American patriotic globalism that at least discursively was supposed to serve as the core of AmericaFirst (whether practiced through the lens of a Trump, Biden, Obama, or successor regime). One can gather a glimpse of the issue from some of the reporting that exploded onto social media space in the hours before Ukraine was to participate in a ritual of negotiation that veiled the ceremonies of capitulation and sacrifice on the alter of other interests (eg
here).
US
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has insisted that a proposed 28-point
plan to end the Ukraine war, which has been widely viewed as favourable
to Russia, was "authored by the US". It
comes after a group of senators said they had been told by Rubio that
the draft - which one said he described as a Russian "wish list" - did
not reflect Washington's position. Rubio
later distanced himself from those claims and said the plan came from
the US, and was "based on input" from both Russia and Ukraine. His
intervention came as he flew to Geneva in Switzerland for talks with
Ukrainian and European security officials on the plan, which US
President Donald Trump has called for Kyiv to agree to swiftly. (US insists it authored Ukraine peace plan after claims of Russian 'wish list')
Assuming that Secretary Rubio is truthful, and there is every reason to take him at his word, then, indeed, one might be excused for thinking that this represents a fundamental shift in America First. That shift appears to recenter the energies and function of the State from one devoted to enriching its people through markets and market access on terms of mutual benefit to one in which the State itself, or at least its services, are also on the market, to be purchased (if one can afford them) by other States.
That, certainly might be one way of approaching the 28 Point American Plan. Its 28 provisions expand Russian transactional space, but with it also returns territories to a reactionary second order imperial apparatus that has yet to cross the time barrier between the 19th ad the 21st centuries. It will in due course, but it is unlikely to happen pacifically. Ukraine becomes the Poland of the 21st Century, and like Poland, continues to undergo partitions and absorption to suit the tastes and needs of empires that matter at the time the partitions occur. For the Ukrainians there is little to do but accept the reality of rejection by Europe, the unwillingness of other states to extend political solidarity with it. . . and migration. Perhaps as part of the deal President Trump will create a Ukrainian adjustment program bringing talent back to America. . . . . Or we are back to the world of "
Mr. Jones" where a Democratic elite in 1933 was well disposed to overlook Stalinist "policy" for their own transactional ends.
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| Pix credit here (The Godfather; "Tell Mike it was only business") |
For the United States this is just another deal--though perhaps it is a Russian deal for which the American merchant is being paid, in one way or another. That is, if, indeed, this is a deal desired by Russia, the terms of which reflect virtually all of their objectives,
then perhaps America First has been transformed not in a means of rationalizing U.S. centered global markets deal making, but rather the possibility that deals include the purchase of U.S. power by other states for their own aims. Either way it is odd for the President to then accuse the Ukrainians of ingratitude in the middle of a transactional negotiation (
Trump Says Ukraine Has 'Zero Gratitude' for Peace Plan ("Writing on Truth Social on Sunday, Trump avoided blaming
Russia for the war. Instead, he said his predecessor, Joe Biden, was responsible and had given “everything” to Kyiv for “free free free”. Trump added: “UKRAINE ‘LEADERSHIP’ HAS EXPRESSED ZERO GRATITUDE FOR OUR EFFORTS, AND EUROPE CONTINUES TO BUY OIL FROM RUSSIA.”")). Both the characterization of a deal as including as a quid pro quo some manifestation of gratitude, and ingratitude are both irrelevant in a transactional context (what the Americans want) that is, as it was once famously quipped, "it was only business;" (
here) but then so is the strategy of (in)gratitude. From a transactional perspective all is fair play in order to induce the other side to give in, give up or cough up. None of this is bad per se, only business. Still, it makes sense for those in it to recognize it for what it is.
But for Europe another marker of the pathway it embraced in that glorious summer of August 1914. We have al realized in this document that state of a "man without qualities" (Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften)--one whose who has no character except as a reflection of responses to the stimuli around him. But what a deal--here the U.S. selling its services as a State, with collateral benefits for merchant trading, but effectively positioning itself not as a deal maker but as the paid agent of other State's deal making. This is a service that appears to be increasingly offered in the marketplace of inter-governmental trading. Perhaps even the Chinese can purchase American power to advance their ends. That, certainly would be the limiting consequence of an (to state unstated) element of America First which to the uninitiated (like me)
Some detail may reveal much. The American guarantees are worthless:
10. The U.S. guarantee:
a. The U.S. to receive compensation for the guarantee;
b. If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee;
c.
If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military
response, all global sanctions will be restored and recognition for the
new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be
withdrawn;
d. If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg then, the security guarantee will be considered null and void.
The transactions potential, however is priceless for the U.S.:
12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:
a. Creation of Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries including technology, data centers, and AI efforts.
b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore,
grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which
includes its pipelines and storage facilities.
c. A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Mineral and natural resource extraction.
f. A special financing package will be developed by The World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts.
The Europeanization of Ukraine is given short shrift (¶ 119. And Russia is again open for business with all of its actions forgiven and "forgotten" (¶¶ 13, 26). This is only a transaction that a merchant can make. We will see if there is transactional gold at the end of this rainbow. For Europe, on the other hand, there is a reminder that the path they set out on in August 1914 has yet to run its course, and they continue to drive it in the direction it is going.
The 28 points of the draft US deal (Draft of US-backed peace proposal for Ukraine), follows below with thanks to Reuters for publishing it and with my own brief (very very cheeky) reaction/responses with a fidelity to America First (as a thought project) in RED.
