Just Distributed--Academe Vol 112(1) (Winter 2026): What is Academic Labor Now?

 

 

 Delighted to pass along the announcement of the availability of Vol. 112(1) of Academe, the magazine of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). This from their Press Release:

The winter issue of Academe—edited by Alissa Karl, associate professor of English at SUNY Brockport and vice president for academics of United University Professions—considers the structure and conditions of academic labor today. Who performs the type of knowledge work we call academic labor, of what does it consist, and what might its appropriate aims be? Contributors to the issue examine the realities of teaching, research, and service within a highly tiered and increasingly contingent academic workforce; graduate students and the reproduction of academic labor; the stakes of AI for faculty work; and the demographic changes that are transforming the academic labor movement.

 The featured articles, with links, follows below, along with Alissa Karl's essay: From the Guest Editor: What Is Academic Labor Now?. The essays provide a very useful starting point for considering the sociology and politics of labor and value in a society where both are being transformed. The difficultly, and a common one, is that sometimes  one tends to engage in analysis holding for time; or more often of attempting an analytics in which one element in a dialectal ecology is dynamic and the rest are assumed to stay in ace (and time), The surprise always comes when these premises do not reflect the realist on the ground. It is at that point that one may be inclined to invoke normative principles, and more specifically, a specific set of objectives derived from an application of those normative premises, as the basis of critique or in the service of a normative politics of j'accuse. Both are perfectly reasonable, and indeed ought to be expected. These then frame the larger issues within worthy discourse, like that in this volume, may be better situated and on that basis produce an even more profound contribution to knowledge.   

Reflections on a Chinese Reflection on Davis--不能任由世界滑向“无规则”深渊（寰宇平） [The World Cannot Be Allowed to Slide into the Abyss of "Lawlessness" (Global Perspective)]

 

Pix credit here (Zhang Qing, Past & Future,1998)

 The 2026 Davos speeches has appeared to energize even those propaganda organs that tends to ignore it if ony because there is often very little at Davos that is "masses consumable" ready. One rarely sees much reporting on Davos in the popular Western legacy or new information engagement organs, and usually even less in Marxist Leninist organs. Not that Davos is ignored entirely--it is usually best harvested for its celebrity and imagery--a pageant of power, a celebration of celebrity,  that rivals the  US Oscars or the their European equivalents. Davos is useful for the masses only as a function of its utility to more deeply embed the signalling of power and its vanguardist collectivity--with just a smidgen of analysis for near intellectuals who wish to feel "9in the loop" in a near celebrity kind of way. Delightful. .  . and ancient performative semiotics.  

 But apparently not entirely true this year. 

 China's People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,  may sometimes be a useful barometer of the public facing positions--and the discursive tropes of fundamental importance to--the Chinese political vanguard.  In that way it also provides some insight into the way in which the core of leadership of the nation reflect on and understand critical elements of Leninism evolving into its mature form in this new era of Chinese historical development. And recently it focused on Davos. Not the celebrity; not the pageant; but rather the offal, the odors of which now appear to have stung th4e sensitive nostrils of people in the Chinese homeland.  That, more than the content of the message suggests that the frolic in Davos this year appears to be important enough to be taken seriously in China; and more importantly, that this notice is spiced with a chagrin--a chagrin at the possibility that at the point of a Chinese Leninist insinuation into the interstices of international institutionalism as law, culture, and bureaucracy, someone else has come along and effectively has sought to make that, and undercut the value of the entire enterprise.  That would be bad enough, certainly, but hardly worth any effort that reaches the masses.  What makes this worthy of mass line dialectics is the way that  the alternative suggests the value of a chaos and instability that directly threatens the core ontological premise of Chnese Leninism in its new era. THAT, certainly, is worth a response. 

Pix credit here (1972, The American Nuclear Bomb is nothing but  a paper tiger)

That intervention and response was set out in a prominently situated ion an opinion article: 不能任由世界滑向“无规则”深渊（寰宇平） [The World Cannot Be Allowed to Slide into the Abyss of "Lawlessness" (Global Perspective)]. 

"Although the 2026 World Economic Forum annual meeting has concluded, the concerns raised during the meeting about the world sliding into an era of "lawlessness" continue to resonate in the international community." [世界经济论坛2026年年会虽已落幕，但年会期间关于世界正滑向“无规则”时代的忧虑仍在国际社会持续发酵。] (不能任由世界滑向“无规则”深渊). The criticism. of course, was directed not at the middle powers, whose alarm warmed the hearts of the ancien regime intellectuals and those who look nostalgically at what could have been but for the failing, incompetence, shortsightedness, se4lfishness, and arrogance of the humans charged with its fulfillment (see here). Rather it is directed who rejecting the fundamental organizing managerialism of the bureaucrat and institutionalist, jas robusytñy put forward a sort of post global imperial transactional anarchy (order without a center) that would not merely compete with but seek to upend the structures and premises of the order that China itself has invested heavily and that reflects its own cognitive cages of global management and rationalization. 

Some countries pursue a logic of might makes right and self-serving dominance, and their bullying behavior is undisguised and unrestrained, whether towards their neighbors or allies. History and reality show that in a world without the constraints of international rules, the foundation of peace and development will inevitably be shaken, and contradictions and conflicts will become increasingly apparent. The international community must rediscover the spirit of unity, jointly safeguard international order and international law, and jointly resist the risks and challenges brought about by hegemonism and power politics. [个别国家奉行实力至上、唯我独尊的逻辑，其霸凌行径无论是对其近邻抑或盟友皆不加掩饰、毫不克制。历史和现实昭示，一个失去国际规则约束的世界，和平与发展的根基必将动摇，矛盾冲突将日益显现。国际社会必须重拾团结精神，共同维护国际秩序和国际法，共同抵御霸权主义、强权政治带来的风险挑战。] (不能任由世界滑向“无规则”深渊).

But, of course, China doesn't care about "some countries"--it cares very much about the conceptual rearrangement that once mocked bit which has become dangerous to it that becomes the foundation of the American rebooting of the global order to its own liking.  

Pix credit here ["The Third World; the world's people can not be bullied; the people of China can not be intimidated." c. 1960s.]

 

It divides the criticism in three parts.

 Part one seeks to draw the discourse within tyhe now well developed Chinese tropes of US hegemonism, which themselves are well worm relics from the Cold War Era repurposes from its Soviet  ham handed utilization to something perhaps more elegant. 

The new changes in US policy towards Europe clearly demonstrate the logic of hegemony: nothing is off the table. The "powerlessness" that Europe is exhibiting in the face of these multiple shocks is, to some extent, the price it is paying for its long-term strategic dependence on the US. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's remarks reflect the mental adjustment Europe is undergoing: "Nostalgia is part of human history, but nostalgia cannot bring back the old order. And delaying things, hoping that everything will soon return to normal, will not solve our existing structural dependencies."  (不能任由世界滑向“无规则”深渊).

Part two then weaves the Davos criticisms within the also well developed discursive tropes of anarchism, and with it if lawlessness. This is not anarchism as order without a center; is is Soviet anarchism as disorder organized around a center that is an empty space. 

 An article on the website of the American bimonthly journal *Foreign Affairs* points out that the United States is leading the world into a state of anarchy "far more chaotic than ever before." * * * Although the international order established after World War II was not perfect, it played an important role in maintaining overall world peace, promoting relatively open global trade, and fostering international cooperation, and is the foundation for the orderly functioning of the world today.* * * Now, the risk of a "ruleless" world is forming a complex of interconnected and superimposed systemic risks in multiple areas, profoundly affecting the living environment of all members of the international community—From the perspective of political security, the principle of sovereign equality is being crushed by the logic of power.

 Part three then aligns the discourse of hegemony with the dangers of anarchy to suggest the emergence not of a post global system but of a state of constant lawlessness beyond the power of institutions to manage. The object is to transform the international order, its structures and systems,  into an anti hegemonic coalition against the United States.

"More and more people are realizing that we cannot return to the previous state of the international order," Michael Froman, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, remarked at the World Economic Forum annual meeting. * * *  Now, the United States' bullying and wanton destruction of the international order have caused widespread suffering in the international community. The international community must recognize the grave risks and jointly shoulder the responsibility. To prevent the world from sliding into the abyss of "lawlessness," international rule of law must be defended.

Behind all of this is an abhorrence of chaos.  That is a constant without the discourse of Chinese Leninism in the 21st century and perhaps the one great remembering of that period of sustained dialectic between the 1960d and the late 1970's. And it was the foundation of the great discursive turn in  response to the situation in Hong Kong in 2019. (here; Chapter 20: Monday 18 November  2019; Open-Shut (bai he 稗閤) Strategies: 习近平;止暴制乱 恢复秩序是香港当前最紧迫的任务 [Xi Jinping; Stopping the storm and restoring order is Hong Kong’s most urgent task at present] pp. 255-262). The critical normative  trope: 止暴制乱 (Zhǐ bào zhì luàn). This makes perfect sense from the Chinese perspective. It is increasingly incomprehensible in Washington whose core transactional organizing premises are fundamentally incompatible with the foundational ordering premises of institutionalist ordering systems. 

The text of  不能任由世界滑向“无规则”深渊（寰宇平） [The World Cannot Be Allowed to Slide into the Abyss of "Lawlessness" (Global Perspective)] follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation. For the relevant Davos Speeches: 

 

Pix credit here

1. Davos 2026 Part 1--Remarks of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney

2. Davos 2026 Part 2--Remarks of U.S. President Donald Trump

3. Davos 2026 Part 3--Remarks of  China's Vice Premier He Lifeng

4. Davos 2026 Part 4-- Remarks of EU President Ursula von der Leyen

5. Davos 2026 Part 5-- Remarks of Argentina President Javier Milei

6. Davos 2026 Part 6--Address by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy

 

OMFIF Report: Europe's Place in a Divided World (Feb. 2026)

 

  Happy to pass along this announcement of the availability of the OMFIF's February 2026 Bulletin:

Europe’s place in a divided world

Making accurate predictions on the political and economic outlook for a region is difficult at the best of times. During a period of sustained geopolitical instability, where it seems anything could happen, it is almost impossible. Europe, caught between the consequences of volatile and vengeful policy-making on one side and brutal military conflict on the other, is facing a year that could make or break it as a power on the world stage.

For that reason, this edition of the OMFIF Bulletin does not attempt to be a crystal ball into Europe’s future. Instead, it lays out the various problems facing the region – including demographic pressures, political fragmentation, defence needs and low growth – and focuses on what it will take for Europe to overcome these challenges. It draws on a vast network of experienced and expert views to offer up a vision of what Europe could become if it can get its act together.

The articles in this publication do not shy away from the fact that Europe is facing an uphill climb on several issues. Contributors from the European Stability Mechanism, BNY, Capital Group, Moody’s Ratings, UBS Asset Management, Scope Ratings, London School of Economics and EY among others examine the geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts underway, observing that there are opportunities for growth amid the uncertainty, if Europe can take advantage of the situation.

The next few years will be a time of political change in Europe as major players are set to come to the end of their terms. Whoever takes on the helm of the European Central Bank will need to navigate difficult waters. As this edition of the Bulletin makes clear, Europe’s strength lies in its numbers – but forming a united front is easier said than done.

The Bulletin is available through this link HERE. 

Brief Reflections on U.S: Council of Economic Advisors--Report: Artificial Intelligence and the Great Divergence (January 2026).

 

For those who missed it, the U.,S. Council of Economic Advisors distributed, in January 2026, their Report: Artificial Intelligence and the Great Divergence; Press Release HERE). The analysis is grounded on  a powerful analogy:

For centuries, most of the world’s economies grew at a similarly slow rate. However, a “Great Divergence” occurred with the Industrial Revolution, causing industrializing nations to accelerate their growth relative to the rest of the world. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a potentially transformative technology that is often compared to the Industrial Revolution. However, we are witnessing clear leaders in AI investment, performance, and adoption metrics across different nations. The Trump administration is laying the groundwork for American AI dominance by accelerating innovation, infrastructure development, and deregulation while establishing global dominance through technology exports. If the AI revolution is as transformative as the Industrial Revolution, should we expect this to lead to a second Great Divergence? (Artificial Intelligence and the Great Divergence)

The object, of course, is not merely dominance, but the protection of a space in which the state can further its ability to ensure the protection of the objectives of its political-economic model--managed protection of individual autonomous self fulfillment in and through markets based interactions in all spheres of social relations. To some significant extent its serves as the great power bookend to similar efforts to consider and situate  the tech revolution  within the cognitive cages of Chinese Marxist-Leninism and its political-social imperatives, which speaks in terms of high quality production fueling a socialist modernization that would push the nation farther along the Socialist Path (eg., here,  here, and here).

At the same time, its consequences for the rest of the world can be understood as deeply divergent. That was the object of the UNDP Report (December 2025), The Next Great Divergence: Why AI May Widen Inequality Between Countries (see also here). This produces a counter analogy, one that focuses not on the consequences of transformative divergence among the great powers, but its effects on those beneath:

Artificial Intelligence is advancing rapidly, yet many countries remain without the infrastructure, skills, and governance systems needed to capture its benefits. At the same time, they are already feeling its economic and social disruptions. This uneven mix of slow adoption and high vulnerability may trigger a Next Great Divergence, where inequalities between countries widen in the age of AI. (The Next Great Divergence:)

Divergence. One word, two meanings; one concept, two lenses; one evolutionary trajectory, two normative approaches;  one factual reality, two analytical perspectives; one challenge, two policy responses. That divide, then, produces variation in values, signification, and approaches that will fundamentally shape policy and the legal structures within which states will seek to shepherd  this challenge/opportunity in ways that advance their interests--or perhaps better put, the positive effects of these changes to their populations as a function of the goals and responsibilities of these states as measured against their ideologies. 

Pix credit Lib Congress

Taken together one begins to perceive the emergence of two simultaneously significant divergences. The first is temporal and analogical--a new (or the next) iterative occurrence of divergence that must be embraced and informed by whatever can be extracted from the last historical occurrence of an analogous divergence (the industrial revolution). This produces a cognitive cage the bars of which are premised on inductive informed risk taking and the premise of acceleration of of the occurrence itself. This cognitive ordering framework is already well advanced in the Chinese  lebenswelt and expressed in its 3rd and 4th Plenum documents centering socialist modernization in a revolutionary stage of historical development (e.g., here and here). It finds similar expression, with American characteristics, in the 2nd Trump Administration's conceptual documents orchestrated through  Director Kratsios' Office and discussed here, and also embedded in its America First strategies here. The essence in both cases is a race--against each other--to perfect or at least advance the capabilities of tech for the greater glory of the competing systems. See, e.g., "Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan" (July 2025)--A Reverie on Building and Racing on A.I.'s Structural "Fury Road".

The AI revolution, with its parallels to the Industrial Revolution, presents a profound economic inflection point with the potential to significantly increase the GDP of countries that embrace it. We are witnessing clear leaders in AI investment, performance, and adoption metrics across different nations. The United States, as demonstrated by the comprehensive AI Action Plan and related executive orders from the Trump administration, is pursuing a strategy focused on accelerated innovation, infrastructure development, and establishing global dominance through technology exports and deregulation in order to lay the groundwork for American AI dominance. (Artificial Intelligence and the Great Divergence; p. 26).

The second is re-distributive, capacity sensitive, and risk averse--a cautious approach to technological revolution that value of which is measured against its costs, and the costs of which are measured against a set if value generating premises that tend to balance technological advancement against a specific set of human costs grounded in a specific set of adverse impact valuation measures. That is the essence of the UN approach in its  The Next Great Divergence. But it also fuels middle power and Global South approaches There are variations given the position of the advocates and their place in global political, economic, and other hierarchies. Its lens is capacity, but also in the normative project of global normative ordering--one that foregrounds risk aversion through the foundational inculcation of the primacy of prevention, mitigation, and remedial strategies that in turn foreground prevention. The essential risk aversion and human centered approach suggests much of what passes for AI regulation, for instance, and is much in evidence in the approaches of the EU (eg here). But it also centers capacity--or relative capacity of human collectives and that, in turn, is understood through the lens of equality that then shapes the discourse of capacity building (and the shifting if its costs). 

 Sections 1 and 2 of the Report: Artificial Intelligence and the Great Divergence follow below and the entire report may be accessed HERE.  And below is its semiotics as imagery.

Pix credit here

 

OMFIF: Gender Balance Index 2026

 

 

Happy to pass this along.

Gender Balance Index 2026

Live broadcast | Virtual | Wednesday 22 April 2026 | 14:00 – 15:30

OMFIF’s Gender Balance Index 2026 analyses the state of gender parity in senior leadership roles across the financial sector. This edition examines how far we are from achieving gender balance, drawing data from more than 300 institutions and 6,000 individuals. Be the first to explore these insights at the virtual launch event.

Reserve your spot now

Last year, for the first time, three organisations – Banco Central de Chile, Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan and Norges Bank Investment Management – achieved perfect scores of 100, though they represent just 1% of the total sector. Will this year do better? Join us for the Gender Balance Index 2026 launch event to explore the findings and discuss the path forward.

Secure your place

 

The Four Advantages [四大优势] of Chinese Style Modernization in the New Era; Reflections on 深刻理解“十五五”时期我国经济社会发展优势更加彰显 《红旗文稿》2025/23 张占斌 [A Deeper Understanding of the Even More Prominent Advantages of China's Economic and Social Development During the 15th Five-Year Plan Period," Red Flag Journal, 2025/23 Zhang Zhanbin]

 

Pix Credit here (1956, "Today's Soviet Union is Our Tomorrow")

 

Times change; so do the general contradictions that frame the realities of political-economic systems. . . at least those political-economic systems with a strong desire to survive. 

The advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, the advantages of a super-large market, the advantages of a complete industrial system, and the advantages of abundant talent resources together constitute the strong foundation and solid support for Chinese development during the 15th Five-Year Plan period. These four advantages are closely interconnected and mutually reinforcing, forming an organic whole, which will enable China to gain strategic initiative in a complex and ever-changing international environment and inject strong impetus into achieving the grand goal of socialist modernization. 中国特色社会主义制度优势、超大规模市场优势、完整产业体系优势、丰富人才资源优势，共同构成了“十五五”时期我国发展的强大底气和坚实支撑。四大优势紧密相连、相互促进，形成一个有机整体，将为我国在复杂多变的国际环境中赢得战略主动，为实现社会主义现代化建设的宏伟目标注入强大动力。(Commentary [要论], 深刻理解“十五五”时期我国经济社会发展优势更加彰显 /张占斌 [A Deeper Understanding of the Increasingly Prominent Advantages of China's Economic and Social Development During the 15th Five-Year Plan Period / Zhang Zhanbin].)

 And so it is with that great engine of Leninist Marxism applied to a population that must be guided scientifically by its vanguard of leading forces  toward the inevitable establishment of a communist society but faster through the equally inevitable historical stages of development in which, in the case of China in the 1940s, the nation lagged its advanced capitalist peers.  The initial model was Soviet, what Stalin had wrested from the ideological ideas of Lenin and Trotsky (the later a name that could not be uttered in polite Leninist society not just form the moment of Trotsky's exile in the 1920s but most definitively from the time of his apotheosis into the firmament of Leninist Gods  by Stalin's hammer blows in Mexico in 1940); the ideological model German encrusted with the bar5nacles of the Soviet mind and in that form bequeathed to China's vanguard from the 1920s. 

Pix credit here

That gave Leninism a vessel--modernization--into which it could pour manifestations of developing not just the appropriate consciousness among the proletariat and all like minded peoples including those of the intelligentsia infused with the spirit of Yan'an. But it also gave modernization a purpose--to serve as the conceptual infrastructure on which it would be possible to move forward along the Socialist Path under the leadership and guidance of the vanguard of social forces whose task it was to ensure that movement was scientifically precise. To those ends, economic activity was initially critical--and by the 21st century central--to the larger project of developing the proper Marxist spirit that aligned economic progress with progress in the reshaping of social, cultural, and political consciousness that moved toward its Marxist ideal. 

To those ends scientific approaches were necessary. Because time has a way of changing everything, and because forward movement itself was both change and its catalyst, such planning was required to be undertaken in temporal segments. Among the most important were the 5 year planning cycles that were meant to serve as the expression of the dialectics between realization, manifestation, and theorization of the Leninist project of this forward movement in concrete terms. It was, in effect, the carrot dangling before the donkey held by the driver that represented the cart of productive forces now moving along the proper path at the proper speed and toward the proper ends. 

And so the Five year plans have become the great clock and timer of socialist modernization, and with it the means of measuring progress along the Socialist Path toward Communism. And with that, of course, a means of measuring the effectiveness of the Communist Party's fundamental line as applied in any fice year cycle, and with that (phew) the means for assessing the forward movement of the Communist Party itself as the model, not just a vanguard, but the incarnation of the sort of working style and productive modes toward which the nation ought to aspire. Each five year plan, then, becomes an important assessment and policy element of each cycle of the Congresses of the Communist Party of China. 

The 4th Plenum of the Central Committee of the 20th CPC Congress was one such node in this sequence of planning. Like others in these cycles, it incorporated the policy and theoretical bases for approaching modernization in each nodal stage of historical development produced in the 3rd Plenum (traditionally focusing in the applied theory of  modernization) and turned that work product into working documents focusing on application--via governance, rule of law, and party building, which could then be implemented in more precisely measurable ways by cadres and patriots across the nation. 

In his 深刻理解“十五五”时期我国经济社会发展优势更加彰显 [A Deeper Understanding of the Even More Prominent Advantages of China's Economic and Social Development During the 15th Five-Year Plan Period] (Red Flag Journal, 2025/23), Zhang Zhanbin [张占斌 ] elaborated these old notions its new form wrapped around the concept of the 四大优势 [Four Major Advantages] . "Achieving socialist modernization is a step-by-step, continuously developing historical process. The 15th Five-Year Plan period holds a crucial position in the process of basically achieving socialist modernization, serving as a critical period for consolidating foundations and making comprehensive efforts." [实现社会主义现代化是一个阶梯式递进、不断发展进步的历史过程。“十五五”时期在基本实现社会主义现代化进程中具有承前启后的重要地位，是夯实基础、全面发力的关键时期，] [ 深刻理解“十五五”时期我国经济社会发展优势更加彰显 ].

Underlying this structure, and supporting the contemporary forms of socialist modernization are the advantages that China enjoys. These constitute the  四大优势 [Four Major Advantages]:

长期向好的支撑条件和基本趋势没有变，中国特色社会主义制度优势、超大规模市场优势、完整产业体系优势、丰富人才资源优势更加彰显。这四大优势，是我国在长期发展过程中积累的宝贵财富，是应对外部挑战、实现内部发展的底气所在，更是推动我国经济社会持续健康发展、实现社会主义现代化的关键支撑。[ 深刻理解“十五五”时期我国经济社会发展优势更加彰显 ]. [The underlying conditions and fundamental trends supporting long-term positive development remain unchanged. The advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, the advantages of a super-large market, the advantages of a complete industrial system, and the advantages of abundant human resources are becoming even more prominent. These four advantages are valuable assets accumulated during China's long-term development, the source of confidence in responding to external challenges and achieving internal development, and crucial support for promoting the sustained and healthy development of China's economy and society and realizing socialist modernization.]

 On that basis the  follow seamlessly, and reflexively:

1. The Advantages of the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics: A Solid Cornerstone for National Stability and Prosperity. The socialist system with Chinese characteristics is a scientific system formed through the arduous exploration of the Communist Party of China leading the Chinese people in long-term revolutionary, construction, and reform practices. [一、中国特色社会主义制度优势是定国安邦的坚固基石. 中国特色社会主义制度，是中国共产党带领中国人民在长期革命、建设与改革实践中艰辛探索形成的科学制度体系]

2.  The advantage of a super-large market is a powerful engine driving domestic demand. It acts as a "booster" for the dynamic balance of supply and demand. China's super-large market advantage has become a key force in promoting healthy interaction between supply and demand. [二、超大规模市场优势是内需驱动的强大引擎. 供需动态平衡的“助推器”。我国超大规模市场优势成为促进供需良性互动的关键力量。]

3. The Advantage of a Complete Industrial System: Building a Solid Foundation for the Real Economy. The "accelerator" of cost and innovation synergy. China's complete industrial system demonstrates strong cost control and collaborative innovation capabilities in the manufacturing of complex products. For example, the production of new energy vehicles involves multiple key systems such as batteries, motors, and electronic controls, as well as the supply of numerous components and raw materials.  [三、完整产业体系优势筑牢实体经济的坚实底盘. 成本与创新协同的“加速器”。我国完整的产业体系在复杂产品制造中展现出强大的成本控制与创新协同能力。比如，新能源汽车的生产涉及电池、电机、电控等多个关键系统，以及众多零部件和原材料的供应]

4.  Abundant Talent Resources Constitute the Core Driving Force of Innovation. A "vanguard" for scientific and technological self-reliance and self-improvement. China's abundant talent resources play a pivotal role in the process of achieving scientific and technological self-reliance and self-improvement. [丰富人才资源优势构成创新驱动的核心动力. 科技自立自强的“先锋队”。我国丰富的人才资源在科技自立自强进程中发挥着中流砥柱的作用。] [ 深刻理解“十五五”时期我国经济社会发展优势更加彰显 ].

What then are the four advantages? Ideological clarity, large unified market, integrated and self-contained supply chains, and self-perpetuating vanguard talent. And this loops back on itself: vanguard talent makes possible the development and operation integrated suppl chains, that enhance market power within a single territorial unit, that then strengthens ideological clarity from practice.

The essay follows below in its original Chinese and in an English translation.    

 

 

Video of Krasno Global Event Series Gareth Evans (fmr. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia) with Prof. Klaus Larres - “Navigating between the Giants in a World Under Stress: Dealing with the US, China & Russia in the Indo-Pacific, Ukraine and elsewhere"

 

A quite interesting conversation with one of the great personages of the ancien regime.  I suppose that "dealing with" is the appropriate signifier here, though not without a bit of irony.

The Krasno Global Event Series welcomes The Hon. Prof. Gareth Evans (fmr. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia) in discussion with Prof. Klaus Larres - “Navigating between the Giants in a World Under Stress. Dealing with the US, China & Russia in the Indo-Pacific, Ukraine and elsewhere" Gareth Evans was a Cabinet Minister throughout the Hawke and Keating Australian Labor Party Governments from 1983-96, including as Foreign Minister from 1988-96, where he played central roles in the Cambodian peace process, the creation of APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and in bringing to conclusion the Chemical Weapon Convention. After leaving politics he was President of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group from 2000-09, and Chancellor of the Australian National University from 2010-19, where he is now Distinguished Hon. Professor. He co-chaired the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), which initiated the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept, and the Australia-Japan International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (2009), and has written or edited fourteen books, including Good International Citizenship: The Case for Decency (2022), Incorrigible Optimist: A Political Memoir (2017), The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (2008) & Cooperating for Peace (1993). For further information, see Gareth Evan's personal website: www.gevans.org/

The video of the event may be accessed HERE.  

¡Vamos a regatear!; ¿Al borde del abismo o un simple tropiezo en las relaciones disfuncionales? Cuba se prepara para la guerra total; el presidente Trump y el "acuerdo con Venezuela"; la orden ejecutiva "Abordando las amenazas a Estados Unidos por parte del gobierno de Cuba"

 

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ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE 

 Cuba se prepara ahora para lo que su actual liderazgo podría considerar el desenlace final. Por supuesto, no tiene por qué ser así; pero el liderazgo, como lo ha hecho durante mucho tiempo, se ha visto impulsado implacablemente por las inevitabilidades inherentes a su forma de ver el mundo y, a partir de ella, a construir las alternativas que sus valores le presentan.

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En cierto sentido, la vanguardia cubana se ha estado preparando para este día durante mucho tiempo. Es, quizás, uno de los últimos vestigios de la era de los líderes heroicos (de izquierda y de derecha) del siglo XX, líderes que vieron en los estados y sistemas que construyeron una gran pira funeraria en la que se consumirían sus propias esperanzas, sueños y aspiraciones. En esto, quizás, los siglos XVIII y XX representan los extremos de los conceptos políticos limitantes de la Ilustración y sus jaulas cognitivas racionalizadoras. El siglo XVIII llevó a su máximo nivel de desarrollo el "despotismo ilustrado" en la monarquía absoluta. El siglo XX vio el surgimiento de la ideología despótica ilustrada encarnada en un aparato vanguardista. En todas partes... desde "el Estado soy yo" hasta "de muchos, uno" o quizás "unidad en la diversidad" y sus variaciones leninistas.

Las autoridades cubanas ya han tomado medidas públicas para poner a la República en pie de guerra, esperando una guerra total del pueblo. Discutido AQUÍ: " "Al imperio que nos amenaza le decimos: ¡Cuba somos millones!:" Discurso pronunciado por Miguel Mario Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de la República."

Ahora Estados Unidos ha intervenido. El 29 de enero, el presidente Trump emitió una orden ejecutiva: Abordando las amenazas a Estados Unidos por parte del Gobierno de Cuba. Esta orden ejecutiva estuvo acompañada de un documento complementario: Hoja informativa: El presidente Donald J. Trump aborda las amenazas a Estados Unidos por parte del Gobierno de Cuba.

La orden ejecutiva es bastante interesante. Parece ofrecer a Cuba una solución similar a la venezolana que podría, efectivamente, permitirle mantener la esencia de su sistema de gobierno (al menos por un tiempo). Considere el objetivo de la Orden Ejecutiva, tal como se resume en la hoja informativa:

--La Orden impone un nuevo sistema arancelario que permite a Estados Unidos imponer aranceles adicionales a las importaciones de cualquier país que proporcione petróleo a Cuba, directa o indirectamente.
--La Orden autoriza al Secretario de Estado y al Secretario de Comercio a tomar todas las medidas necesarias, incluida la emisión de normas y directrices, para implementar el sistema arancelario y las medidas conexas.
--El Presidente puede modificar la Orden si Cuba o los países afectados toman medidas significativas para abordar la amenaza o alinearse con los objetivos de seguridad nacional y política exterior de Estados Unidos.

Los dos primeros objetivos representan las tácticas habituales de la segunda administración Trump. Es el tercer objetivo el que llama la atención. La clave está en el "acuerdo": si el gobierno cubano toma "medidas significativas para abordar la amenaza o alinearse con los objetivos de seguridad nacional y política exterior de Estados Unidos", entonces la Orden Ejecutiva puede modificarse (probablemente junto con otras medidas). La postura inicial de negociación se esboza en la hoja informativa:

--El régimen cubano se alinea con numerosos países hostiles y actores malignos, albergando sus capacidades militares y de inteligencia. Por ejemplo, Cuba alberga la mayor instalación de inteligencia de señales de Rusia en el extranjero, centrada en el robo de información sensible de seguridad nacional de Estados Unidos.
--Cuba proporciona refugio seguro a grupos terroristas transnacionales, como Hezbolá y Hamás, y apoya a adversarios en el hemisferio occidental, socavando las sanciones estadounidenses y la estabilidad regional.
--El régimen persigue y tortura a opositores políticos, niega la libertad de expresión y de prensa, se beneficia corruptamente de la miseria del pueblo cubano e incita al caos al difundir la ideología comunista en toda la región.

El punto crítico, por supuesto, es el petróleo. La primera fase eliminó los suministros venezolanos; En segundo lugar, la tradicional ayuda del gobierno mexicano (La presidenta mexicana dice que su país ha suspendido los envíos de petróleo a Cuba ("'Pemex toma las decisiones en la relación contractual que tiene con Cuba', dijo Sheinbaum en su rueda de prensa matutina. 'Suspender es una decisión soberana y se toma cuando es necesario'"). Y el senador Marco Rubio sugirió los contornos de la situación desde la perspectiva estadounidense: El senador estadounidense Marco Rubio no confirmó si la administración Trump buscaría activamente un cambio de régimen. Al testificar ante el Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, Rubio, al ser presionado sobre si Washington descartaría un esfuerzo respaldado por Estados Unidos para derrocar al actual liderazgo cubano, señaló que, de hecho, esa era una agenda establecida por el Congreso hace una generación. (Video: 'No lo descarto...': Marco Rubio sorprende a senador demócrata, rechaza compromiso de 'no cambio de régimen' en Cuba)

 

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Ahora... ¡hagamos un trato! ¡Vamos a regatear!

¿Es posible un acuerdo? Quizás. Sugerí los contornos de un espacio de acuerdo en mi discurso pronunciado en la Reunión Anual de la Asociación para el Estudio de la Economía Cubana en octubre de 2025: "Fundamentos Jurídico-Institucionales para la Reconstrucción en una Cuba Posrevolucionaria: Un Ejercicio Conceptual", discurso preparado para la Conferencia Anual de 2025 de la Asociación para el Estudio de la Economía Cubana, Miami, Florida, 25 de octubre de 2025. Lo planteé así:

El proyecto de transición no debe complacer a nadie; no debe estar orientado al beneficio estratégico de ningún grupo; y debe evitar la arrogancia, tan exhibida por los líderes de las últimas generaciones, pues son ellos los más indicados para declarar lo correcto, lo bueno y lo necesario, incluyendo la determinación del modelo político-económico de los pueblos soberanos y los sistemas institucionales-jurídicos creados para el cumplimiento de sus objetivos.

Esto no significa que la transición deba evitarse. Todos los estados se encuentran en un estado constante de transición; Basta con observar detenidamente la situación de Estados Unidos, Cuba y China desde 2008 para ver con claridad la inevitabilidad de esa trayectoria. El desarrollo de bases institucionales y legales sólidas, autorizadas y legítimas que faciliten la transición es vital. En el caso de Cuba, esto no debe acompañar transiciones que puedan situarse al margen de modelos político-económicos estables, sino en su núcleo mismo. Esto crea un elemento más dinámico en el que dichas reestructuraciones pueden ser profundas y profundamente transformadoras. Al mismo tiempo, no se debe satisfacer el ansia de colapso y caos, ni siquiera por parte de quienes se sientan tentados a trabajar por esos fines. En Cuba, la transición debe partir de la situación actual. Podría podar lo que obstaculiza y nutrir lo que impulsa el avance del Estado, el gobierno y la satisfacción de las necesidades populares. Esto requerirá un cambio en el modelo político-económico, un cambio que puede emprenderse incluso dentro del amplio paraguas del marxismo-leninismo. Pero la nomenclatura debe reformarse y su rol debe redefinirse, y el papel del mercado informal debe integrarse en el funcionamiento de la economía política de un Estado en transición.

Para ello, el sistema institucional jurídico cubano requiere ajustes, pero no una reforma integral; requiere el desarrollo de capacidades en el contexto del derecho administrativo (protección contra el abuso de discreción), en el derecho de los colectivos económicos que existen más allá del Estado y, especialmente, en el derecho contractual. Estos cambios requieren el desarrollo de capacidad institucional, la cual puede sentar las bases para la reeducación y la reorientación de la nomenclatura.* * *

Por último, y de crucial importancia, está la cuestión de la insularidad de Cuba. La construcción de la "Cuba Fortaleza" por parte de los militares y los elementos de poder de la nomenclatura sin duda ha servido a sus intereses a corto plazo. Sin embargo, en algún momento Cuba tendrá que abrirse. Esto también requiere el desarrollo de diversas instituciones y regímenes jurídicos. La cuestión se complica según la intensidad del deseo de evitar la inestabilidad. Es probable que la vía más segura sea una apertura gradual mediante la expansión, por etapas, del alcance y la operación de las Zonas Económicas Especiales, como Mariel. Estas pueden utilizarse, como hicieron los chinos hace una generación, como espacios donde el aparato pueda experimentar con la transición, desarrollar instituciones y regímenes jurídicos adaptados al contexto y luego extenderlos a las provincias y, posteriormente, al país. Al mismo tiempo, en este caso, el desarrollo institucional y jurídico podría beneficiarse más del modelo de doble circulación chino o de su versión estadounidense, como parte del proyecto "América Primero", como forma de proteger la integridad interna del Estado mientras se prepara para una mejor integración con el resto del mundo. En cualquier caso, dado el tamaño y la diversidad de experiencias de la comunidad diásporica, una comunidad cuya penetración en el territorio nacional es inevitable, un proyecto de desarrollo institucional y jurídico, un proyecto de ley de Zonas Económicas Especiales, puede desempeñar un papel vital a corto y medio plazo. * * *

No nos corresponde a nosotros determinar los detalles. Eso debería quedar en manos de la gente; Pero sí requiere una reconstitución del PCC, su estilo de trabajo y sus objetivos de maneras que quizás no estén dispuestos a aceptar. De ser así, la mejor opción sería una transición hacia un gobierno militar posrevolucionario. En resumen, sin embargo, es simple: a menos que se planee absorber la República Cubana en un Estado-imperio metropolitano más amplio, es improbable desarrollar con antelación un conjunto detallado de estructuras jurídicas institucionales que puedan aplicarse a la transición cubana. Dejo eso a utópicos, políticos y revolucionarios. (Fundamentos jurídico-institucionales para la reconstrucción en una Cuba posrevolucionaria: Un ejercicio conceptual)

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La respuesta del gobierno cubano fue necesaria y previsible (Cuba condena y denuncia nueva escalada del cerco económico de Estados Unidos; que se presenta a continuación. Sin embargo, las condiciones han cambiado y los caminos hacia la estabilidad, más allá de una gobernanza de la miseria, siguen siendo difíciles (Cuba y la Constitución de un Estado de Miseria Estable: Ideología, Política Económica y Disciplina Popular). Por mucho que le duela a la nomenklatura —tan desesperada por detener el tiempo y preservar aquellos gloriosos momentos de la década de 1970 y la transición del gobierno revolucionario al comunista (El marxismo caribeño de Cuba: Ensayos sobre ideología, gobierno, sociedad y economía en la era posterior a Fidel Castro; también aquí)—, quizás sea el momento de avanzar hacia un sistema de mercados socialistas o de retroceder a enero de 1959 y considerar un camino diferente para el gobierno revolucionario. En este sentido, las nociones chinas de autorrevolución y revolución social podrían ser dignas de consideración por parte del aparato administrativo y del Partido (Breves reflexiones sobre 坚定不移把党的自我革命向纵深推进 —习近平 [Xi Jinping, Avanzar con determinación en la autorrevolución del Partido a un nivel más profundo]). La esencia de este cambio requerirá la rectificación de la nomenklatura (difícil pero posible) y la incorporación de las costumbres y prácticas de la economía informal como nueva base para el desarrollo económico cubano, incluso con un marco socialista.

Los textos de la orden ejecutiva:  Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba. [Abordando las amenazas a Estados Unidos por parte del Gobierno de Cuba], y el documento complementario: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba [Hoja informativa: El presidente Donald J. Trump aborda las amenazas a Estados Unidos por parte del Gobierno de Cuba], se presentan a continuación, junto con la respuesta del gobierno cubano: Cuba condena y denuncia la nueva escalada del cerco económico de Estados Unidos.

 

On the Brink or a Blip in Dysfunctional Relations?--Cuba Prepares for Total War; President Trump and the "Venezuela Deal"; Executive Order "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba"

 

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 VERSIÓN EN ESPAÑOL AQUÍ

Cuba is now preparing for what its current leadership may believe to be an end game.  Of course it need not be; but the leadership has, as it has for a long time, been driven relentlessly by the inevitabilitties built into its way of looking at the world and from it constructing the alternatives which its values present top it. 

In a sense, the Cuban vanguard has been preparing for this day for a very long time. It is, perhaps one of the final markers of the 20th century's age of heroic (left and right) leader gods--leader gods that saw in the states and systems they built a very large funeral pyre on which their own hopes, dreams, and aspirations would be consumed. In this, perhaps, the 18th and 20th centuries represent the book ends of the political limiting concepts of the Enlightenment and its rationalizing cognitive cages.  The 18th century brought to its highest level of development the "enlightened despotism" in anbolute monarchy. The 20th century saw the rise of the enlightened despotic ideology incarnated in a vanguardist apparatus. Everywhere. . . from "l'etat c'est moi" to e pluribus unum or perhaps "unity in diversity" and its Leninist variations. 

Cuban authorities have already  taken public steps to put the Republic on a wartime footing, expecting a total war of the people. Discussed HERE: "Al imperio que nos amenaza le decimos: ¡Cuba somos millones!:" Discurso pronunciado por Miguel Mario Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de la República,

Now the United States has weighed in. On 29 January President Trump issued an executive order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba. That Executive Order was accompanied by a companion document: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba.

The Executive Order is quite interesting. It appears to provide Cuba with a Venezuelan solution that could, effectively, allow it to keep the substance of its governance system (at least for a little while). Consider the objective of the Executive Order as summarized in the Factsheet:  

• The Order imposes a new tariff system that allows the United States to impose additional tariffs on imports from any country that directly or indirectly provides oil to Cuba.
• The Order authorizes the Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce to take all necessary actions, including issuing rules and guidance, to implement the tariff system and related measures.
• The President may modify the Order if Cuba or affected countries take significant steps to address the threat or align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.

The first two objectives represent he standard issue tactics of the 2nd Trump Administration. It is the third objective that draws attention. The key is in the "deal"--if Cuba's government takes "significant steps to address the threat or align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives" then the Executive Order can be modified (likely along with other measures). The opening negotiating stance is roughed out in the Factsheet:  

The Cuban regime aligns itself with numerous hostile countries and malign actors, hosting their military and intelligence capabilities. For example, Cuba hosts Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility focused on stealing sensitive national security information from the United States.

Cuba provides safe haven for transnational terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and supports adversaries in the Western Hemisphere, undermining U.S. sanctions and regional stability.

The regime persecutes and tortures political opponents, denies free speech and press, profits corruptly from the Cuban people’s misery, and incites chaos by spreading communist ideology across the region.

The choke point, of course, is petroleum. The first phase eliminated Venezuelan supplies; the second the traditional handout by the Mexican government (Mexican president says her country has paused oil shipments to Cuba ("'Pemex makes decisions in the contractual relationship it has with Cuba,' Sheinbaum said in her morning news briefing. 'Suspending is a sovereign decision and is taken when necessary.'"). And Secretary Marco Rubio suggested the contours of the situation from the U.S. perspective:  US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stopped short of confirming whether the Trump administration would actively pursue regime change. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rubio when pressed on whether Washington would rule out a US-backed effort to remove Cuba’s current leadership noted that, indeed, that was an agenda set by Congress a generation ago. (Video: ‘Won’t rule out…': Marco Rubio stuns Dem Senator, rejects ‘no-regime-change’ pledge on Cuba)

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Now. . . . let's make a deal!

Is a deal possible? Perhaps.  I suggested the contours of a deal space in my remarks delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy in October 2025: "Legal-Institutional Foundations for Reconstruction in a Post-Revolutionary Cuba: A Conceptual Exercise," Remarks prepared for delivery at the 2025 Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami, Florida, 25 October 2025. I left it this way: 

The project of transition ought to please no one; ought to be directed to the strategic benefit of no group; and ought to avoid the arrogance, so much on display by leaders of the past several generations, that they are best situated to declare what is right, good, and necessary, including the determination of the political economic model of sovereign peoples and the institutional-legal systems created for the fulfillment of its objectives.

That is not to say that transition is to be avoided. All states are in a constant state of transition; one need only look closely at the United States, Cuba, and China since 2008 to see quite clearly the unavoidability of that trajectory.  The development of strong, authoritative and legitimate institutional-legal foundations in aid of transition is vital. In the case of Cuba that is meant to accompany not transitions that may sit of the margins of stable political economic models, but at its very center. That creates a more dynamic element in which such restructurings may be profound and profoundly transformative. At the same time, a lust for collapse and chaos ought not be satisfied, even by those who might be tempted to work toward those ends. In Cuba transition must start from the current situation. It might prune that which impedes and nurture that which moves state, government, and the satisfaction of popular need forward. That will require a change in the political economic model, a change that can be undertaken even within the broad umbrella of Marxist-Leninism. But the nomenklatura must be  reformed and its role refashioned, and the role of the informal market must become part of the operation of the political economy of a state in transition.

To those ends, the Cuban legal institutional system requires tweaking but not comprehensive reform; it requires capacity building in the context of administrative law (protect against abuse of discretion), in the law of economic collectives that exist beyond the state, and especially in the law of contract. Those changes require the develop of institutional capacity, one with respect to which may provide a basis for the re-education and repurposing of the nomenklatura.* * * 

 Lastly, and of critical importance is the issue of the insularity of Cuba. The construction of “Fortress Cuba” by the military and nomenklatura elements of power  has certainly served their short term interests. However, at some point Cuba will have to open up. That also requires the development of a host of institutions and legal regimes. The issue is complicated depending on how strong the desire to avoid instability may be.  It is likely that the safest route is a gradual opening up by expanding, in stages, the reach and operation of Special Economic Zines, like Mariel. Those can be used, as the Chinese did a generation ago, as the spaces where the apparatus can experiment with transition, develop institutions and legal regimes to suit the context, and then role them out to provinces and then nationally. At the same time, here institutional and legal development might profit more from the dual circulation model of the Chinese or its American version as part of the America First project, as a way of protecting the internal integrity of the state while preparing for better integration with the rest of the world.  In any case, given the size and diversity of experience of the diaspora community, a community the penetration of which into the national territory is inevitable, such a project of institution-law building, a project of the law of Special Economic Zones, may play a vital role in the short and medium term. * * *  

It is not for us to make the determination of details. That ought to be left to the people; but it does require a reconstitution of the PCC and its work style and objectives in ways that they may not be willing to take. If that is the case then a transition back to a military post-revolution government may be the best way forward. The bottom line, though, is simple: unless one is planning to absorb the Cuban Republic into a larger metropolitan State-empire, it is improbable to develop before the fact any detailed set of institutional legal structures that might be applied to Cuban transition. I leave that to utopians, politicians, and revolutionaries. (Legal-Institutional Foundations for Reconstruction in a Post-Revolutionary Cuba: A Conceptual Exercise)

The Cuban government's response was necessary and predictable (Cuba condena y denuncia nueva escalada del cerco económico de Estados Unidos; which follows below. Nonetheless, conditions have changed, and the pathways to stability beyond a governance of misery remain difficult (Cuba and the Constitution of a Stable State of Misery: Ideology, Economic Policy, and Popular Discipline). As much as it may pain the nomenklatura--so desperate to stop time and preserve those glorious moments of the 1970s and the transition from revolutionary to Communist government (Cuba’s Caribbean Marxism: Essays on Ideology, Government, Society, and Economy in the Post Fidel Castro Era; also here)--it may be time now to move forward either toward a socialist markets system or to reset back to January 1959 and consider a different way forward from a revolutionary government. In that respect Chinese notions of self-revolution and social revolution might be worth considering by the administrative and Party apparatus of state (Brief Reflections on 坚定不移把党的自我革命向纵深推进——习近平 [Xi Jinping, Resolutely Advance the Party's Self-Revolution to a Deeper Level]).  The essence of this change will require the rectification of the nomenklatura (hard but possible) and the incorporation of the mores and practices of the informal economy as the new basis for Cuban economic development, even with a socialist overlay.

The texts of the executive order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba. and the companion document: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba follow below, along with the Cuban government response--Cuba condena y denuncia nueva escalada del cerco económico de Estados Unidos.