"El Encuentro entre la Gobernanza Empresarial y los Principios Rectores de la ONU sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos": Discusro Pronunciado en la Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia, 19 March 2026

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ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE

A continuación, se presenta el texto ampliado de la intervención realizada en la Universidad ICESI (Cali, Colombia) el 19 de marzo de 2026. Agradezco a los organizadores del evento y, especialmente, a los estudiantes del Semillero, cuyo trabajo es verdaderamente extraordinario y con quienes espero colaborar más estrechamente en el futuro.

Más abajo se incluye el resumen (en inglés y español) y se puede acceder al texto completo.

Foto crédito acquí

Resumen (Español): Este ensayo examina la intersección crítica entre la gobernanza empresarial y los Principios Rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos (PRNU), derivado de una conferencia dictada por Larry Catá Backer en 2026. Superando los marcos tradicionales de cumplimiento técnico, la obra problematiza este campo al interrogar la naturaleza fundamental, la autoridad y el propósito socioeconómico de la empresa moderna. Se analiza la fricción constante entre tres paradigmas doctrinales en disputa: la teoría de la concesión, la teoría de la propiedad y la teoría de la entidad real. Asimismo, el texto explora cómo la globalización económica ha erosionado el poder estatal territorial, creando un panorama de gobernanza policéntrico donde el derecho público y el ordenamiento contractual privado se interpenetran. Al trazar la evolución histórica desde las fallidas Normas de la ONU de 2003 hasta el "pragmatismo de principios" de John Ruggie en los PRNU de 2011, el ensayo detalla cómo este marco alinea distintos registros institucionales. Descompone sistemáticamente la arquitectura asimétrica de los tres pilares: el deber vinculante del Estado de proteger, la responsabilidad de exhortación de las empresas de respetar y el acceso al remedio. Se otorga especial énfasis a la debida diligencia en derechos humanos como un eje operativo que despliega múltiples funciones institucionales. Finalmente, la obra concluye que la interpenetración de estos pilares desestabiliza las doctrinas clásicas del derecho corporativo —como los deberes fiduciarios y la elección de la ley aplicable—. De este modo, demuestra que la gobernanza empresarial y la regulación transnacional de los derechos humanos ya no pueden evaluarse de forma aislada, ya que se acoplan estructuralmente para rediseñar la legitimidad del orden económico global.

Abstract (English): This essay examines the critical intersection between corporate governance and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), derived from a 2026 lecture by Larry Catá Backer. Moving beyond traditional, checklist-oriented compliance frameworks, the work problematizes the field by interrogating the fundamental nature, authority, and socio-economic purpose of the modern enterprise. It analyzes the ongoing friction among three competing doctrinal paradigms: concession theory, property theory, and real-entity theory. The text explores how economic globalization has eroded territorial state power, creating a polycentric governance landscape where public law and private contractual ordering interpenetrate. Tracing the historical shift from the failed, state-centric 2003 UN Draft Norms to John Ruggie’s "principled pragmatism" in the 2011 UNGP, the essay details how the framework aligns distinct institutional registers. It systematically unpacks the asymmetric architecture of the three pillars: the binding State duty to protect, the expectation-based corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedy. Special emphasis is placed on human rights due diligence as an operational hinge performing multi-layered institutional functions. Ultimately, the work concludes that the interpenetration of these pillars destabilizes classical corporate law doctrines—such as fiduciary duties and choice of law. It demonstrates that corporate governance and transnational human rights regulation can no longer be evaluated in isolation, as they structurally couple to reshape the legitimacy of the global economic order.

Quizás se pueda llegar al núcleo de la discusión de esta manera:  Un tratamiento convencional del derecho de las empresas y los derechos humanos procedería de forma taxonómica: identificaría el instrumento (los Principios Rectores), expondría su contenido (tres pilares) y catalogaría su implementación (planes de acción nacionales, legislación sobre debida diligencia, regímenes de divulgación). Tal tratamiento sería preciso pero incompleto, porque daría por sentado precisamente lo que el método problematizador insiste en interrogar —a saber, si la "gobernanza empresarial" y los "derechos humanos" nombran dos dominios regulatorios separados y estables que simplemente pueden ponerse en contacto, o si ambos son en sí mismos constructos inestables cuyo encuentro produce algo genuinamente nuevo.

La investigación se despliega a lo largo de seis ejes interconectados: el carácter fundamental de las empresas y de los objetivos económicos; el efecto de la globalización y de los regímenes comerciales sobre las fronteras de la autoridad estatal; las "paletas" (palettes) resultantes de ordenamiento normativo público y privado; el problema general de la corporación y de la gobernanza empresarial como tal; la manifestación específica de ese problema en el dominio de los derechos humanos corporativos, incluidos sus antecedentes históricos y su cristalización en los Principios Rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos (PRNU); y, finalmente, las conexiones, alineaciones y transformaciones que vinculan la doctrina del gobierno corporativo con el marco de los derechos humanos. Lo que sigue aborda cada uno de estos puntos a su vez, antes de considerar lo que el encuentro entre ambos campos —la gobernanza empresarial y las empresas y los derechos humanos— sugiere sobre la condición actual de la regulación económica transnacional.

Una nota sobre la traducción

Nota sobre la traducción: To accurately integrate the academic context and refine the nuances between the English common-law corporate tradition and the Spanish legal framework, the translation has been revised to strengthen key transliterations and functional equivalents. Key Transliteration & Terminology Enhancements: (1) Corporate Governance: Maintained as Gobernanza Empresarial in headings, but translated as Gobierno Corporativo within the text when discussing strict corporate law doctrine, matching standard Spanish academic usage. (2) Creature of the State / Real-entity theory: Rendered as criatura del Estado and teoría de la entidad real, which are the recognized academic equivalents in comparative corporate law. (3) Remedy: Transliterated contextually. While "remedio" is used in the official Spanish translation of the UNGPs, the academic text demands reparación or vías de recurso depending on whether it refers to the outcome or the mechanism. Both are utilized to capture the full semantic weight. (4) Due Diligence: Maintained as debida diligencia, the stabilized term in international law.

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"Encountering Corporate Governance and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights": Enhanced Remarks Delivered at Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia, 19 March 2026

 

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 Version en Español

The following is the extended  text of remarks delivered at Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia, 19 March 2026. I am grateful to the organizers of the event and especially to the students in the Semillero (Incubator) whose work is truly amazing, and with whom I hope to work more closely in the future.

The abstract follows (English and Spanish) and the full text may be accessed below.

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Abstract (English): These extended remarks examine the critical intersection between corporate governance and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), derived from a 2026 lecture by Larry Catá Backer. Moving beyond traditional, checklist-oriented compliance frameworks, the work problematizes the field by interrogating the fundamental nature, authority, and socio-economic purpose of the modern enterprise. It analyzes the ongoing friction among three competing doctrinal paradigms: concession theory, property theory, and real-entity theory. The text explores how economic globalization has eroded territorial state power, creating a polycentric governance landscape where public law and private contractual ordering interpenetrate. Tracing the historical shift from the failed, state-centric 2003 UN Draft Norms to John Ruggie’s "principled pragmatism" in the 2011 UNGP, the essay details how the framework aligns distinct institutional registers. It systematically unpacks the asymmetric architecture of the three pillars: the binding State duty to protect, the expectation-based corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedy. Special emphasis is placed on human rights due diligence as an operational hinge performing multi-layered institutional functions. Ultimately, the remarks suggest that the interpenetration of these pillars destabilizes classical corporate law doctrines—such as fiduciary duties and choice of law. It demonstrates that corporate governance and transnational human rights regulation can no longer be evaluated in isolation, as they structurally couple to reshape the legitimacy of the global economic order.


Resumen (Español): Este ampliado discurso examina la intersección crítica entre la gobernanza empresarial y los Principios Rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos (PRNU), derivado de una conferencia dictada por Larry Catá Backer en 2026. Superando los marcos tradicionales de cumplimiento técnico, la obra problematiza este campo al interrogar la naturaleza fundamental, la autoridad y el propósito socioeconómico de la empresa moderna. Se analiza la fricción constante entre tres paradigmas doctrinales en disputa: la teoría de la concesión, la teoría de la propiedad y la teoría de la entidad real. Asimismo, el texto explora cómo la globalización económica ha erosionado el poder estatal territorial, creando un panorama de gobernanza policéntrico donde el derecho público y el ordenamiento contractual privado se interpenetran. Al trazar la evolución histórica desde las fallidas Normas de la ONU de 2003 hasta el "pragmatismo de principios" de John Ruggie en los PRNU de 2011, el ensayo detalla cómo este marco alinea distintos registros institucionales. Descompone sistemáticamente la arquitectura asimétrica de los tres pilares: el deber vinculante del Estado de proteger, la responsabilidad de exhortación de las empresas de respetar y el acceso al remedio. Se otorga especial énfasis a la debida diligencia en derechos humanos como un eje operativo que despliega múltiples funciones institucionales. Finalmente, la obra concluye que la interpenetración de estos pilares desestabiliza las doctrinas clásicas del derecho corporativo —como los deberes fiduciarios y la elección de la ley aplicable—. De este modo, demuestra que la gobernanza empresarial y la regulación transnacional de los derechos humanos ya no pueden evaluarse de forma aislada, ya que se acoplan estructuralmente para rediseñar la legitimidad del orden económico global.

Perhaps one can get to the heart of the discussion this way: A conventional treatment of business and human rights law would proceed taxonomically: identify the instrument (the Guiding Principles), state its content (three pillars), and catalogue its implementation (national action plans, due diligence legislation, disclosure regimes). Such a treatment would be accurate but incomplete, because it would take for granted precisely what the problematizing method insists on interrogating—namely, whether “corporate governance” and “human rights” name two separate and stable regulatory domains that can simply be brought into contact, or whether both are themselves unstable constructs whose meeting produces something genuinely new.

The inquiry unfolds along six interlocking axes: the fundamental character of enterprises and of economic objectives; the effect of globalization and trade regimes on the borders of state authority; the resulting “palettes” of public and private normative ordering; the general problem of the corporation and of corporate governance as such; the specific manifestation of that problem in the domain of corporate human rights, including its historical antecedents and its crystallization in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP); and, finally, the connections, alignments, and transformations that link corporate governance doctrine to the human rights framework.What follows takes up each of these in turn, before considering what the encounter between the two fields—corporate governance and business and human rights—suggests about the present condition of transnational economic regulation.

The full text may be downloaded HERE.

Note on the Spanish translation: To accurately integrate the academic context and refine the nuances between the English common-law corporate tradition and the Spanish legal framework, the translation has been revised to strengthen key transliterations and functional equivalents. Key Transliteration & Terminology Enhancements: (1) Corporate Governance: Maintained as Gobernanza Empresarial in headings, but translated as Gobierno Corporativo within the text when discussing strict corporate law doctrine, matching standard Spanish academic usage. (2) Creature of the State / Real-entity theory: Rendered as criatura del Estado and teoría de la entidad real, which are the recognized academic equivalents in comparative corporate law. (3) Remedy: Transliterated contextually. While "remedio" is used in the official Spanish translation of the UNGPs, the academic text demands reparación or vías de recurso depending on whether it refers to the outcome or the mechanism. Both are utilized to capture the full semantic weight. (4) Due Diligence: Maintained as debida diligencia, the stabilized term in international law.

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国家互联网信息办公室关于《互联网信息服务管理办法（修订草案征求意见稿）》再次公开征求意见的通知 [Notice from the Cyberspace Administration of China on Seeking Public Comment Again on the "Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services (Draft for Comment—Revised Draft)" 3 July 2026]

 

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On July 3, 2026, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released for comment a new draft of a substantial revision of its "Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services Law" [《互联网信息服务管理办法》]. Geopolitechs has provided a quite useful English language summary and analysis of its provisions, including an English language translation of the provision. That summary and analysis may be accessed from their website HERE. 

I add only the following comments.

developed in conversation with Google Gemini

 As one considers this addition to the constellation of Chinese AI regulatory production (itself an element and a factor in the ability of China to appropriately develop its productive forces in ways that align with its current understanding the of historically appropriate general contradiction within the guardrails of the 3rd and 4th Plenum focus on the trajectories of development and its character). Within these overarching constraint structures, China’s regulatory architecture operates on two distinct regulatory axes. The first is the Ideological/Value Axis: Driven by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and Party leadership, this track ensures that generative outputs, algorithmic recommendations, and multi-channel distribution adhere tightly to mainstream socialist values. This is executed through binding mechanisms such as algorithmic filing, security assessments for systems with public mobilization capabilities, and strict generation/synthesis watermarking. The second is the Technical/Industrial Axis: Coordinated via ministries like MIIT and the Ministry of Science and Technology, this track focuses on infrastructure, compute allocation, standardizing large model toolchains, and data security classification (e.g., the recent Network Data Security Risk Assessment Measures).

Here is my own summary of the Law--the complexity of which, along with its layering in and ar0und the growing stable of related or applicable law, regulation, and instruction on administrative application begin to reveal a regulatory foundation which, eventually (and like their European counterparts through the elaboration of their culturally necessary performance of regulatory supervision) can be understood, synthesized, aligned  and eventually driven by and through the computational capabilities of a machine systems. The result, as in Europe is the continued evolution of textually based simulacra, or instruction manual, from which simulation or virtualized instruction set for an idealized and deeply programmed performative rationality human collectives, their interactions and the role of individuals within it may be programmed. Indeed, what these measures suggest is merely another layer of the larger project of textually programming human behaviors by developing not law but a set of computational parameters that can be encoded onto the human (collective) body and the performance of humans within it. Perhaps it cannot be helped; and perhaps it is a vision of the what lies ahead as humans march toward the detachment of their idealized reality from the human condition, and thus detached of enhancing the role of vanguard human elements as the priest/experts/technician types of a scientifically ordered world the genius of which is now safeguarded in and as the idealized simulacra of the world which will represent the physical simulation of the the simulacra of perfection. 

Overview and Administrative Framework

The document consists of two main parts: an official notice issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China (简称“国家网信办”) dated July 3, 2026, announcing a public comment period ending August 2, 2026; the full text of the revised draft regulation (comprising 6 chapters and 94 articles); and an accompanying explanatory note detailing the rationale behind the revisions.

Chapter 1: General Provisions (Articles 1–7)

The first chapter establishes the statutory basis, scope, and foundational principles of the Measures.

• Statutory Basis and Scope (Articles 1–2): The regulation is formulated pursuant to upper-level laws including the Cybersecurity Law of the PRC. It applies strictly to any internet information services conducted within the territory of the PRC, as well as the supervision and management of those services.

• Core Principles (Article 3): Service providers and regulators must adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, use Socialist Core Values as guidance, and follow the principles of human-centric design, classified management, collaborative progression, and innovative development. The explicit goal is to create a positive, healthy, and "clear" cyberspace.

• Regulatory Matrix (Article 4): The draft codifies a multi-agency horizontal division of regulatory authority:

  • National Cyberspace Administration (网信部门): Responsible for overarching coordination of national cybersecurity and the direct supervision, management, and enforcement of internet information content.

  • State Council Telecommunications Department (电信主管部门/MIIT): Responsible for industry management, market access, market order, network resources, and network infrastructure security.

  • State Council Public Security Department (公安部门): Responsible for physical network security protection, maintaining public order in cyberspace, and punishing cybercrimes.

  • State Security Agencies (国家安全机关): Responsible for combating internet activities that endanger national security.

  • Other Departments: Exercise supervision within their respective portfolios, while local authorities' duties are determined by state regulations.

• State Encouragement and Obligations (Articles 5–7): The state protects citizens' and organizations' rights to use internet services, encourages foundational research, and prioritizes IPv6 adoption. Providers must fulfill cybersecurity obligations, observe commercial and social ethics, and accept public supervision. Industry organizations are encouraged to establish self-regulatory codes. Article 7 mandates state monitoring and mitigation of domestic and overseas threats to national security, public interests, or citizen rights.

Market Access and Operational Establishment

Chapter 2: Establishment (Articles 8–13)

This chapter regulates the entry barriers, licensing tracks, and personnel requirements for operating an internet information service.

• The Approval Mandate (Articles 8–9): No entity may engage in internet information services without prior approval from the telecom department. If the service constitutes a commercial telecommunications business, the operator must secure a Telecommunications Business Operation License.

• License Revocation and Data Reporting: If an approved provider fails to conduct relevant business for two consecutive years, or ceases to meet the licensing criteria, the telecom department will cancel the license. Providers are also required to report network resources and operational metrics to assist market monitoring systems.

• Technical Compliance and Standards (Article 10): Services must utilize telecom-compliant network resources and deploy information security management systems and technical safeguards that meet mandatory national standards.

• Sector-Specific Pre-Approvals (Article 11): For specialized content areas—specifically news, culture, publishing, audio-visual programs, education, religion, and finance—operators must obtain explicit administrative permission from the respective sector-specific ministry prior to filing for telecom approvals or licenses.

• Personnel Qualifications (Article 12): Employees must maintain correct political, value, and public opinion orientations. Crucially, personnel in internet news information services must obtain specific professional qualifications and undergo mandatory training and assessments organized by national news, publishing, and cyberspace departments. Platforms must systematically train internal information security reviewers.

• Corporate Modifications (Article 13): Operators ceasing business must cancel their permits. Any changes to licensing parameters caused by mergers, acquisitions, or corporate restructuring require formal modification procedures with the original approving organ.

Operational Regulations and General Intermediary Duties

Chapter 3, Section 1: General Operational Provisions (Articles 14–40)

This section lays out the baseline compliance rules for day-to-day operations, applying across infrastructure, domain, and content service layers.

• Infrastructure and Domain Integrity (Articles 14–15): Network access providers (ISPs) are forbidden from providing hosting or connection services to any platform lacking a valid telecom approval number. The establishment of domain root servers, root registries, and recursive resolution services requires explicit telecom licenses. Domains must be legally owned by the operator, cannot contain legally prohibited content, and must be updated or cancelled upon corporate expiration. IP address allocation operates under a strict filing registry; ISPs cannot provide connections to unverified or false IP allocations.

• Public Filing and Labeling Display (Articles 16–17): Providers must file their operational indexes with local public security bureaus within 30 days of network connectivity. Platforms must clearly display their license numbers, approval IDs, and public security filing numbers in conspicuous locations. Operating outside the approved scope of services is strictly prohibited.

• Internal Governance and User Verification (Articles 18–19): Platforms must maintain robust internal structures, including user registration controls, account management, content review protocols, public patrol systems, emergency response capabilities, and content orientation management. They must verify user-submitted credentials if the user operates in a field requiring specific professional qualifications.

• Real-Name Identity Verification (Articles 19–21): Access providers, domain registrars, and information platforms must verify the true identity of users via national public network identity authentication services, resident identity cards, or unified social credit codes. Services must be withheld if a user refuses to provide valid identity info. Special verification measures must be deployed for minor users. Article 20 outlaws identity evasion tactics, such as using false credentials, misappropriating external accounts, or providing technical support to bypass real-name gates. Platforms must run dynamic verifications on existing accounts; accounts inactive for over six months must be flagged, prompted, or subjected to functional restrictions, suspension, or closure. Platforms must also support unlinking phone numbers when line ownership changes.

• Crime Prevention and Content Promotion (Articles 22–23): Intermediaries must deploy technical checks to prevent their services from facilitating criminal activity and report violations to public security organs. Conversely, Article 23 explicitly encourages the production and dissemination of content that elevates Socialist Core Values, traditional Chinese culture, revolutionary history, national unity, and achievements in socio-economic development.

• Prohibited and Adverse Content (Articles 24–25): Article 24 contains nine distinct bans on content that opposes constitutional principles, threatens national security or state secrets, incites subversion or secession, promotes terrorism/extremism, damages ethnic unity, desecrates revolutionary martyrs, devalues the military, spreads obscenity/gambling, propagates rumors disrupting economic order, or violates civil rights (reputation, privacy, intellectual property). Article 25 targets "adverse information" (不良信息), such as sensationalizing major policy adjustments, sudden emergencies, or high-profile criminal cases, as well as content harming minors. Such information cannot be highlighted or placed in prominent high-traffic sections.

• Market and Information Order (Articles 26–30): Article 26 explicitly bans malicious traffic manipulation, including illicitly publishing, deleting, or suppressing links for pay; automated algorithm gaming; bulk account creation; generating fake clicks, votes, rankings, or comments; hijacking traffic; or deliberately bypassing state regulatory technical controls. If prohibited or adverse information is detected, platforms, electronic message blasters, software download portals, and ISPs must immediately sever transmission, delete or block content, restrict account monetization or functionality, preserve logs, and report to authorities (Articles 27–29). Overseas entities generating content that damages national security or public interests face targeted state countermeasures. Article 30 bans providing data, tools, hosting, billing, or advertising assistance to anyone known to be violating these provisions.

• User Rights, Vulnerable Groups, and Specialized Frameworks (Articles 31–40):

  • Fact-Checking: Platforms must maintain mechanisms to actively refute online rumors (辟谣机制).

  • Fair Competition: Operators are prohibited from blocking competitors' legal links, interrupting app installations/upgrades, or using misleading buttons to divert users without consent (Article 32).

  • Consumer Protection: Pricing and service items must be fully transparent; bundled or forced subscription alterations are forbidden (Article 33).

  • Customer Service: Providers must supply human customer service staff scaled to their user base to handle complaints and appeals within reasonable windows (Article 34).

  • Minor Protection: The development of specialized "minor modes" and anti-addiction systems is heavily incentivized (Article 35).

  • Accessibility: Services must provide dedicated features and safety interfaces for elderly and disabled citizens (Article 36).

  • Security Assessments: Any service possessing public opinion attributes or social mobilization capabilities must complete a formal administrative security assessment (Article 37).

  • Special Management Shares: Media and publishing platforms may be subject to the state's special management share ("golden share") system (特殊管理股制度) (Article 38).

  • Log Retention: Platforms must preserve user registrations, published information records, and network logs for a minimum of 6 months, including NAT (Network Address Translation) registries for shared access points (Article 39).

  • Open Source: Operators are encouraged to prioritize open-source operating systems for app development (Article 40).

Specialized Intermediate Frameworks: Platforms and AI

Chapter 3, Section 2: Platform Information Services (Articles 41–54)

This section introduces precise obligations for platform service providers acting as structural intermediaries.

• Rule Transparency and Credit Grading (Articles 41–42): Platforms must visibly display their community guidelines, rulebooks, and terms of service on homepages or application settings. Alterations require formal public comment periods. Regulatory authorities can order revisions of non-compliant rules. Platforms must track user accounts via credit-grading systems and report these metrics to the CAC.

• Public Account ("We-Media") and MCN Management (Articles 43–46): For accounts operating in regulated professional domains (e.g., medicine, law, finance, education, military), platforms must verify their professional backgrounds and certifications, applying specific visual tags to their accounts. Public account homepages must display the operator's actual identity, unified social credit code, contact info, IP location, and their associated Multi-Channel Network (MCN) agency. High-impact public accounts are forbidden from spreading prohibited or adverse content; platforms must deploy strict penalties (monetization suspensions, account caps, bans) against violators. High-impact account registries and livestreaming platforms must file their background rosters with provincial cyberspace departments within 30 days of operation.

• Anti-Cyberbullying Mandates (Article 47): Platforms must build algorithmic detection models, feature databases, and risk-warning alerts to identify cyber-violence. If risk is detected, platforms must dynamically re-verify account identities, throttle traffic, or issue warning pop-ups. They must also provide users with immediate defensive tools: one-click blocking of specific users, disabling trackbacks/comments, rejecting direct messages, and automated evidence preservation features.

• MCN Agency Accountability (Articles 52–53): Content content distribution networks and MCNs must register as formal businesses, appoint content directors, maintain sufficient review staff, and publicize internal rules. If their contracted accounts violate content laws due to the MCN's lack of oversight, the MCN faces shared legal liability. MCNs are prohibited from organizing, inducing, or assisting accounts in violating rules, and platforms must penalize non-compliant MCNs via service restrictions or blacklist bans.

• Large-scale Internet Platforms (Article 54): Defined specifically as platforms possessing over 50 million registered users or more than 10 million monthly active users (MAUs). They are legally required to:

  1. Maintain independent compliance departments and dedicated compliance officers, conducting regular open security reviews.

  2. Publish distinct platform rules protecting the rights of internal vendors and platform-dependent laborers.

  3. Resolve complaints regarding prohibited content or adverse behavior within an accelerated 24-hour window.

  4. Publish annual corporate social responsibility reports tracking data safety, privacy, and minor safety.

  5. Report adjustments in major shareholders, actual controlling individuals, or primary business vectors to local cyberspace bureaus.

  6. Refrain from utilizing data, proprietary algorithms, or platform rules to disadvantage competitors or harm consumer rights.

 

Pix generated with Google Gemini

Chapter 3, Section 3: Smart Information Services (Articles 55–64)

This section regulates the development and hosting of artificial intelligence and algorithmic recommendation systems.

• Development Incentives and General Transparency (Articles 55–56): The state balances safety with development, supporting high-quality datasets, algorithm standards, and AI model training. Smart service operators must publicly disclose the basic technical principles, core deployment mechanisms, training data sources, and intended objectives of their models.

• Algorithmic Filings and Data Lineage (Articles 57–59): Models with public opinion or mobilization capabilities must undergo independent security reviews, complete formal algorithm filings (算法备案), and track subsequent updates or cancellations. Apps accessing smart hardware systems must undergo compatibility and security testing. Training data data processing must rely on legal data and verified base models. If a smart service generates news content, its training corpora must be sourced exclusively from units officially authorized by state regulations.

• Synthesized Content and Recommendation Restraints (Articles 60–61): Generated or synthetically altered content must feature permanent watermarks complying with national technical standards; altering, removing, or hiding these labels is prohibited. Recommendation engine providers must allow users to easily opt-out of personalized profiling or select entirely non-personalized alternatives. Algorithms must favor mainstream values in high-visibility areas (landing pages, hot-searches, pop-ups) and are prohibited from tagging users with illegal interest keywords, manipulating search rankings, over-recommending content, or engineering fake trending topics.

• Gig Economy Labor Safeguards (Article 62): AI systems used for labor scheduling, recruitment, or job evaluation must follow strict necessity principles. Order distribution, payment algorithms, and work-hour assignments must remain fair, reasonable, and transparent. Algorithms affecting labor rights cannot be modified without seeking input from workers and publicizing changes beforehand.

• Agent Services and Risk Mitigation (Articles 63–64): Providers of AI agents (智能体) or agent distribution platforms must ensure their products comply with national safety rules and maintain active security oversight. If a model generates prohibited information or exhibits major systemic risks, operators must immediately halt generation, cut transmissions, update training protocols to rectify the error, and file reports with cyberspace departments.

Supervision, Inspection, and Corporate Liability

Chapter 4: Supervision and Inspection (Articles 65–73)

• Agency Powers (Articles 65–66): Cyberspace, telecom, and public security organs possess full mandates to inspect providers, who cannot refuse or obstruct investigations. Agencies must coordinate to prevent overlapping or redundant inspections. Shared information systems must link licensing data, MCN filings, and user registries. Criminal cases must be transferred to judicial organs promptly.

• Investigative Actions and Special Controls (Articles 69–73): Regulators will focus inspections on complaint processing, account crackdowns, platform rules, and credit monitoring. If safety risks emerge, regulators can formally summon (约谈) corporate legal representatives for mandatory rectifications. During investigations, officers are authorized to interrogate witnesses, copy network logs, conduct on-site inspections, and seize or seal electronic hardware, storage drives, and premises (Article 70). Confidential information acquired during enforcement must be kept secret by staff (Article 71). Under Article 73, subject to direct State Council approval, cyberspace and telecom ministries can enforce temporary, localized, or functional restrictions on any communication platform possessing public mobilization capabilities during severe cyber or social crises.

Chapter 5: Legal Responsibility (Articles 74–89)

This chapter outlines the penalty scale for compliance failures.

Offenses	Statutory Penalties and Administrative Actions
Unlicensed Telecom Operations (Article 74)	Confiscation of illicit revenue; fines of 3 to 5 times the illicit gains. If gains are under 50,000 RMB, fines range from 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB. Serious cases face mandatory business suspension.
Operating Without Baseline Approval (Article 74)	Ordered rectification; persistent failure results in forced operational shutdown.
Missing Public Security Filings (Article 74)	Warning and ordered correction; failure to comply leads to technical network suspension.
Fraudulent Licensing/Approvals (Article 75)	Revocation of permits/IDs; confiscation of gains; fines from 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB.
General Structural Infractions (Article 76)	(Covers missing labels, rule failures, bad customer service, minor safety leaks). Warnings, revenue confiscation; persistent or serious failures trigger fines from 50,000 to 500,000 RMB, website/app closures, or business license cancellations. Executives face personal fines from 10,000 to 100,000 RMB.
Severe Content & Algorithmic Failures (Article 77)	Standard: Fines up to 500,000 RMB, app suspension, or license revocation. Serious: Fines from 500,000 to 2,000,000 RMB; managers face 10,000 to 100,000 RMB fines and 6-month to 1-year sector management bans. Extremely Severe: Fines from 2,000,000 to 10,000,000 RMB; managers face fines up to 1,000,000 RMB and a permanent ban from executive or security roles in the internet sector.
Failure to Halt Prohibited Content (Article 81)	Fines from 50,000 to 500,000 RMB; serious cases trigger fines from 500,000 to 2,000,000 RMB. If the fallout causes "especially severe consequences," corporate fines scale from 2,000,000 to 10,000,000 RMB, and executives face personal fines up to 1,000,000 RMB.
"We-Media" Violations (Article 83)	Baseline accounts face warnings and profile restrictions, plus fines from 10,000 to 50,000 RMB. High-impact accounts face fines from 50,000 to 500,000 RMB alongside account termination or re-registration bans.
Market/Traffic Manipulation (Article 84)	Fines from 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB; serious infractions scale from 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 RMB with mandatory business suspension.
Regulatory Misconduct (Article 82)	State staff leaking data or abusing power face formal administrative or criminal prosecution.

• Coordinated Statutes and Civil Remedies (Articles 86–89): Other infractions defer to upper-level laws like the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law. Civil damages must be compensated independently, and criminal accountability overrides administrative fines. Under Article 88, severe violators face inclusion on the Internet Serious Dishonesty List, resulting in long-term multi-platform restrictions on registering new accounts or using information features. Mitigations follow the Administrative Punishment Law guidelines. 

Supplementary Definitions

Chapter 6: Supplementary Provisions (Articles 90–94)

Article 90 provides precise definitions for ten core operational terms used throughout the regulation:

1. Internet Information Services: Providing information to the public via websites, applications, or agents using microblogs, instant messaging, search engines, livestreams, video, text sharing, knowledge reasoning, task execution, or public accounts.

2. Internet Access Services (ISPs): Providing network routing or hosting to platforms, including IDC (Internet Data Center) operations, CDN (Content Delivery Network) management, and basic ISP access via network proxies, server hosting, or space leasing.

3. Internet Accounts: Usernames and profiles registered to use internet information services.

4. Internet User Public Accounts ("We-Media"): Accounts producing text, graphics, or audio-visual content aimed at the general public, excluding profiles meant solely for private communication.

5. Highly Influential Public Accounts: Accounts categorized by substantial follower bases, high read/forward/comment volume, significant annual monetization revenue, or prominent influence within a specialized domain or demographic.

6. Public Account Production/Operation Entities: Individuals or organizations registering and running public accounts for content generation.

7. Internet Information Content Multi-Channel Distribution Services (MCNs): Agencies providing planning, production, distribution, marketing, promotion, or brokerage services to public accounts.

8. Internet Livestreaming Platform Providers: Platform intermediaries hosting live broadcast content.

9. Application Distribution Platform Providers: Marketplaces hosting and distributing software applications.

10. Large-scale Internet Platforms: Digital platforms with over 50 million registered users or more than 10 million Monthly Active Users (MAUs), whose operations exert a significant impact on economic performance, online order, or user rights.

• Foreign Investment and Transnational Services (Articles 91–92): Foreign-invested entities must comply with specific foreign investment statutes, alongside special rules governing e-commerce retail and supply chains. Foreign entities or individuals distributing information into the PRC or utilizing domestic internet infrastructure must strictly obey these Measures. International treaties apply unless the PRC has explicitly registered a reservation.

• Cross-Sectoral Compliance and Enforcement Date (Articles 93–94): Services touching upon data privacy, competition, media management, or state secrets must obey adjacent specialized laws. The document leaves the final enactment date open for subsequent formal confirmation.

The text of the original draft appears below. 

El caldero de la sabiduría: vislumbres de las transformaciones en la investigación para los productores de conocimiento y la horticultura de datos.

 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION 

 Ya no son solo los estudiantes quienes descubren el valor de las fuentes de investigación en línea —incluidos compiladores, modelos de lenguaje de gran tamaño (LLM), sitios de recomendación y sistemas similares a los *chatbots*— que facilitan la labor operativa de generar conocimiento en plataformas dedicadas al consumo y la producción de datos, los cuales los seres humanos a veces interpretan como conocimiento. Estas plataformas se disponen en capas dentro de un espacio tridimensional entre los productores de conocimiento (organizados a su vez en jerarquías sociales y económicas: académicos, *influencers*, líderes de opinión, manipuladores, propagandistas, teólogos, agitadores, la "gente común", organismos económicos, sociales y culturales, entre otros). Cada uno de estos grupos impone sus propias reglas de producción y consumo y, a menudo, se encuentra profundamente interconectado con los demás (mediante dinámicas de acoplamiento estructural, irritación o interpenetración —alineadas con intersubjetividades totales o parciales—). En conjunto, estas dinámicas impulsan ahora a los sistemas colectivos humanos hacia la gestión o la búsqueda de estructuras más conscientes para ordenar sus "jaulas cognitivas" y, a partir de ahí, ordenar a los seres humanos agregados que constituyen sus consumidores y productores —ya sea en la producción económica, social, cultural o política—, sirviendo además como el medio por el cual la cognición y el ordenamiento humanos pueden volverse colectivos, estables y objeto de una disciplina (a veces extrema). Dicha disciplina adopta ahora una forma virtual, manifestándose a través de los tropos heredados de antiguas formas de apostasía, herejía, desviación, conductas rebeldes y similares; elementos que siempre han servido como objetos de datos e información para las plataformas destinadas a mantener no al individuo humano, sino necesariamente al colectivo humano (aquí, aquí, aquí, aquí, aquí, aquí, aquí y aquí se encuentran enlaces a reflexiones sobre diversos aspectos de esto).

Sin embargo, es en la organización de la base de producción de conocimiento de esta industria fundamental —dedicada a la protección, producción y disciplina de la colectividad estable en la era de lo virtual, donde la inteligencia de las máquinas comienza a asumir el papel de guardia pretoriana colectiva—, donde estos impulsos vuelven a resultar interesantes. Estas reflexiones surgieron al considerar una publicación bastante interesante y útil en "X":

Emrullah @emrullahai 

Traducido del turco
SITIOS QUE LOS ACADÉMICOS Y ESTUDIANTES DE DOCTORADO UTILIZAN SIEMPRE, PERO QUE NO QUIEREN QUE TODO EL MUNDO CONOZCA. Guarden esto sin falta. No necesitan seguir pagando constantemente en el ámbito académico. Los sitios que figuran a continuación serán más que suficientes para ustedes. 1. http://annas-archive.org La biblioteca abierta más grande del mundo. Casi todos los libros de texto asignados por sus profesores están disponibles aquí de forma gratuita. 2. http://scispace.com Un motor de búsqueda de artículos académicos. Ordenen los resultados por citas para encontrar las investigaciones de mayor impacto. 3. http://papernity.com Un motor de generación de tesis y artículos académicos. Redacción de secciones sin alucinaciones. 4. http://semanticscholar.org Buscador de artículos impulsado por IA, desarrollado por el Allen Institute. Resalta cada cita en su contexto. 5. http://connectedpapers.com Introduce un artículo y visualiza todos los trabajos relacionados en un gráfico. Revela qué leen realmente los expertos en conjunto. 6. http://elicit.com Un asistente de investigación basado en IA. Haz cualquier pregunta y obtén tablas de artículos estructuradas junto con hallazgos clave. 7. http://consensus.app Combina los resultados de miles de artículos en una única respuesta. Evita la selección sesgada de datos (*cherry-picking*). 8. http://researchrabbit.ai El Spotify de los artículos. Sugiere nuevas investigaciones basadas en lo que ya has leído. 9. http://litmaps.com Visualiza cadenas de citas. Muestra cómo una idea se ha propagado a lo largo de décadas de investigación. 10. http://scite.ai Indica qué artículos respaldan, refutan o mencionan una afirmación concreta. Ahorra horas de verificación de datos. 11. http://core.ac.uk 200 millones de artículos de acceso abierto en un único índice de búsqueda. El archivo académico gratuito más grande del mundo. 6:24 a. m. · 30 de junio de 2026·391,1 mil visualizaciones (Fuente citada AQUÍ; original en turco AQUÍ)

Permítanme ser claro, aunque solo sea porque los impulsos actuales de ciertos sistemas cognitivos podrían interpretar esto como una forma de cebo de clics (*clickbait*) o de incitación a la ira (*rage bait*), bajo diversas perspectivas. En primer lugar, no me preocupa el valor de estas recomendaciones; no comparto la lista como un respaldo ni para fomentar comportamientos —éticos o no— en la producción o el uso del conocimiento, independientemente del sistema o el propósito con el que se utilicen estas herramientas potenciadas por máquinas. Dejo eso para quienes estén más interesados ​​en preservar la integridad de la "jaula cognitiva" en la que se encuentren inmersos.

Quizás lo más interesante sea la forma en que estas herramientas emergentes de producción de conocimiento mediante máquinas permiten vislumbrar cómo la generación de saber se desvincula de la experiencia humana. El conocimiento se convierte, cada vez más, en una mercancía —una materia prima— para la construcción de otros objetos (sociales, culturales, económicos, etc.) y para la creación de procesos y objetos de utilidad social; entre ellos, los bloques de conocimiento que permiten a la sociedad racionalizarse a sí misma y, en consecuencia, ordenar racionalmente sus fuerzas productivas —incluidos los seres humanos— en su seno. En este proceso, se invierten los planteamientos del posmodernismo y su crítica social.

Lo que constituía el elemento crítico de lo humano en la formación del *habitus* (Bourdieu), el poder-saber (Foucault) y el *Lebenswelt* o mundo de la vida (Husserl) está mostrando signos de transferir ese papel fundamental a los sistemas de máquinas y a sus crisoles de producción de conocimiento y datos —heredados o apropiados de los humanos—. Los expertos (médicos, psicólogos, académicos, criminólogos: esa clase experta de vanguardia) ya no pueden ejercer autoridad basándose en la apariencia discursiva de poseer hechos objetivos, desplegados con autoridad dentro de discursos históricamente establecidos (Foucault). En su lugar, se convierten en canales de autoridad, siempre y cuando resulte socialmente útil dotar a su función ministerial de tal significado. El conocimiento ya no se genera exclusivamente en plataformas especializadas (los campos de Bourdieu, el mundo académico, el derecho, la medicina) supervisadas por expertos que actúan como agentes cuyas percepciones y prácticas están moldeadas por su *habitus* (hábitos y disposiciones culturales arraigados) en una suerte de bucle intersubjetivo recursivo (Bourdieu). Pasan a ser facilitadores, operarios de una producción cuya intersubjetividad ocurre ahora en los crisoles del aprendizaje automático y en espacios computacionales (y pronto cuánticos), para luego ser traducida y simplificada para el consumo humano. Los expertos humanos pueden servir ahora de puente entre los «sistemas expertos» abstractos (como algoritmos, instituciones o ciencias formales) y las realidades intuitivas del mundo de la vida. Pueden aportar el contexto, la empatía y el criterio necesarios para aplicar el conocimiento teórico a escenarios humanos complejos del mundo real. Sin embargo, hay un paso muy breve entre preservar el papel del experto como canal y democratizar el canal mismo.

¿Y adónde conduce esto al colectivo humano? Quizás de vuelta a Nietzsche y a su *El crepúsculo de los ídolos*. Nuestras élites quedan reducidas nuevamente al arquetipo del sacerdote: esa vanguardia elegida, de algún modo, para interpretar o «escuchar» la voz de una fuente externa generadora de verdad; una verdad cuya creencia sirve de argamasa para racionalizar el mundo y organizar a los seres humanos colectivizados. Ahora es posible percibir la ironía en la célebre pregunta de Nietzsche: «Dios ha muerto. Dios sigue muerto. Y nosotros lo hemos matado. ¿Cómo nos consolaremos, nosotros, los asesinos de todos los asesinos?». La respuesta, al parecer, es la que advirtió en su día Mary Shelley: recreamos a Dios a nuestra propia imagen; hemos moldeado un dios a nuestra semejanza e insuflado vida humana a sistemas de máquinas a los que ahora serviremos, convirtiéndolos en un mecanismo más para que las vanguardias controlen a los seres humanos colectivizados (cuestión que se analiza más a fondo en el contexto cognitivo de la era de la inteligencia de las máquinas aquí: *The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Person, and the “Human” Condition*).

 

A continuación, se presenta la versión en formato póster de la primera imagen, a modo de resumen del argumento. Versión HTML AQUÍ.