Corporate Governance, The Party's Fundamental Working Style and Socialist Modernization at the Operational Level: 国家开发银行党委研究部署深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育工作 [The Party Committee of the National Development Bank has studied and deployed the study and education work on the in-depth implementation of the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations]

 

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Established in 1994, the China Development Bank is a state-funded and state-owned development finance institution. As an independent legal entity directly overseen by the State Council, it is dedicated to supporting China’s economic development in key industries and under-developed sectors. (Website of the China Development Bank)

China has a socialist market economy system. The establishment of the Communist Party Committee (CPC) in SOEs ensures that the ruling party is involved in corporate management, which is the most prominent feature of Chinese CG. In the course of economic reform and industrialization, China is not simply transplanting foreign systems, such as those of Europe, the United States, or Japan, but is constantly enhancing the key position of the CPC in enterprises, which means that the CPC significantly influence enterprises’ operation, management, and decision-making. (Shengbin Wang, Jiafeng Zheng, and Yongqian Tu, "The Communist Party of China embedded in corporate governance and enterprise value: Evidence from state-owned enterprises," Chinese Research Letters 54:103766 (2023))

Chinese law in general, and as it related to corporate governance (and good governance expectations) specifically, might be understood as a web of interconnected rules and expectations the fundamental purpose of which is to fulfill the policy expectations of the political vanguard. In the case of corporate governance, that includes the inter-connections among corporate law (either for private or state owned/controlled enterprises), state policy objectives (including objectives to maximize economic productivity, sustainability and development goals, and contributing to the state's focus on the preferred forms of economic activity), and the governance alignment of the Communist Party and operating enterprises. It is this last connection that tends to be lost in analysis of corporate governance, and sometimes the importance of the alignment between enterprise and the ecologies of Party organization and expectations tends to be minimized. Not there there wasn't good reason for that in the period of the leadership of the Party before the start of the leadership of General Secretary Xi. But things have changed in the New Era. And those changes include a re-invigoration of coordinated (at all levels of governance) alignment between the public duty of Party cadres (and of the Party organization) within enterprises and the expectations for good corporate governance (including sound choices in corporate operations that further corporate purpose. These are, in turn, all coordinated within the emerging principles of socialist modernization and its re-framing of the signification of high quality productivity from the 3rd Plenum of the 20th Congress in July 2024.

The role of the Party Committees in both State owned and private enterprises is in most cases a function of both the application of the CPC Basic Line as a general matter, and of the specific guidance and leadership policies and objectives that may be applied specifically to the corporate circumstances within which a Party Committee operates. A critical element of the Party Committee is the practice of the appropriate working style in its activities within and for the enterprise in which it is embedded. The contemporary version of a good chunk of that working style has been incorporated into the "Eight Provisions" [八项规定] of the Central Committee, in their current form since the 18th CPC Congress (and reproduced below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation). A set of learning materials were produced in 2022 and the core of leadership emphasized their utility (学习资料 | 中央八项规定及其实施细则) [Study Materials | The Central Eight Regulations and their Implementation Rules] (the text of which follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation).

 党的作风就是党的形象，关系人心向背，决定党和国家事业成败。党的十八大以来，以习近平同志为核心的党中央从制定和落实中央八项规定开局破题，坚持自上而下、以上率下，解决了新形势下作风建设抓什么、怎么抓的问题。八项规定一子落地，作风建设满盘皆活，党风政风焕然一新，社风民风持续向好，我们党以作风建设新气象赢得了人民群众信任拥护。[The Party's style is the Party's image, which affects the people's support and determines the success or failure of the Party and the country's cause. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core has made a breakthrough by formulating and implementing the eight central regulations, insisting on top-down and leading by example, and has solved the problem of what to do and how to do it in the new situation. The implementation of the eight regulations has brought the style of work to life, the style of the Party and the government has been completely renewed, and the social and folk customs have continued to improve. Our Party has won the trust and support of the people with the new atmosphere of style of work.] (学习资料 | 中央八项规定及其实施细则)

 Since its current manifestation as the eight regulations, the CPC has sought to strengthen implementation in all collectives in which the CPC committees are embedded, including enterprises. 

Pix credit here: The Hogs of the Commune Must be Raised to be Fat and Big! (1956)

2025年3月12日，中央党的建设工作领导小组召开会议。党中央决定，自2025年全国两会后至7月在全党开展深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育。会议强调，要充分认识这次学习教育的重要意义，教育引导党员、干部锲而不舍贯彻中央八项规定精神，推动党的作风持续向好，推动党中央各项决策部署落到实处，为推进中国式现代化贡献智慧和力量。[On March 12, 2025, the Central Leading Group for Party Building held a meeting. The Party Central Committee decided to carry out in-depth study and education on the implementation of the eight central regulations from the 2025 National People's Congress to July. The meeting emphasized that we must fully recognize the significance of this study and education, educate and guide party members and cadres to persevere in implementing the eight central regulations, promote the continuous improvement of the party's work style, promote the implementation of various decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee, and contribute wisdom and strength to the promotion of Chinese-style modernization.]

Details for that renewed push were set out in the document:  中央党的建设工作领导小组召开会议 研究部署深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育工作 蔡奇主持并讲话 李希出席并讲话 [The Central Party Building Leading Group held a meeting to study and deploy the study and education work on the in-depth implementation of the Central Committee's eight regulations. Cai Qi presided over the meeting and delivered a speech. Li Xi attended the meeting and delivered a speech.]. AT its core was the alignment of the development of the CPC's working style principles with the core of socialist modernization and its focus on the revitalization of productive forces.

会议强调，开展深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育，是巩固深化主题教育和党纪学习教育成果、纵深推进全面从严治党的重要举措，是密切党群干群关系、巩固党的执政基础的必然要求，是推进中国式现代化的有力保障。[ The meeting emphasized that carrying out in-depth study and education on the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations is an important measure to consolidate and deepen the achievements of thematic education and party discipline study and education, and to deepen the comprehensive and strict governance of the party. It is an inevitable requirement for strengthening the relationship between the party, the masses, cadres and the masses, and consolidating the party's ruling foundation. It is a powerful guarantee for promoting Chinese-style modernization. ] (中央党的建设工作领导小组召开会议 研究部署深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育工作 蔡奇主持并讲话 李希出席并讲话 )

Chinese companies have come to an embrace of this working style in their own ways, and socialist modernization as well in a highly contextual space. But the coordinating element of the embedded CPC Committee is meant to ensure a measure of coordination and a focus on the core goals of socialist modernization as re imagined in the 3rd Plenum of the 20th CPC Congress.

Recently the China Development Bank Party Committee which was described in a widely circulated document, 国家开发银行党委研究部署深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育工作 [he Party Committee of the National Development Bank has studied and deployed the study and education work on the in-depth implementation of the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations]. The short description provides a window in the ways that enterprises are attempting to develop the discursive template through which the work style principles can be embedded in their operations, and through them, into the corporate governance of the enterprise.  It provides a quite interesting window into the way in which central directives are received by line enterprises.  It is here, at the operational level that one can begin to see the way in which the alignment of the Party's work style, the role of the Party Committee to embed that at the core of corporate governance, and socialist modernization toward both high quality production and economic activity might converge. The ext of the essay follows below in the original Chine and a crude English translation. 

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The Flaming Sword of Contradiction: President Trump Issues Direction to the Attorney General and Homeland Security: "Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court "

 

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Genesis 3:24 speaks about a flaming sword  which was entrusted to the cherubim by God to guard the gates of Paradise (or in the Hebrew version and perhaps more accurately to prevent access to the Tree of Life (וַיַּשְׁכֵּן מִקֶּדֶם לְגַן-עֵדֶן אֶת-הַכְּרֻבִים, וְאֵת לַהַט הַחֶרֶב הַמִּתְהַפֶּכֶת, לִשְׁמֹר, אֶת-דֶּרֶךְ עֵץ הַחַיִּים), also picked up in the Vulgate: et flammeum gladium, atque versatilem, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitae) after Adam and Eve were banished. from the Garden of Eden. That flaming sword was one "which turned every way." It was the means by which humanity was to be kept, not from the knowledge of good and evil (and thus be as the divine), but from Eden and especially the Tree of Life. It protected the integrity and order of a system in which normative power was as detached from human caprice, but in which that normative power reflected and could only be realized through human agency, over and over again, as the knowledge of good and evil remained eternal but its application remained temporal. Law, and its rule, provides a mechanism for reaching that divine state of normative good and evil, detached from the the humanity of those who sought some way of evading the flaming sword and creating some sort of eternal if only signified collective version of themselves (From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems). Virtual eternity--and divinity--that is the essence of the cognitive foundations of rule of law; it serves as a sort of incarnation of the human community from and in itself, through the transfiguration of text as a bridge over the flaming sword  to at least a proximity to the Tree of Life. 

Of course no one speaks about these things--and especially rule of law--that way.  Why should anyone  try--except maybe those transposing the essence of rule of law systems into the structures of big data tech and its self-consciously eternal autonomous version in and as generative artificial intelligence. Instead one speaks about the humanity of rule of law, assuming some sort of transcendent eternity to the law which is meant to rule. If the law is as close to aggregated human perfection as is possible outside of Paradise, then the problem, as always, lies with the human structures meant to transpose them to ordinary life, and the humans who keep failing its promise of ordered and perfect harmony between norm and action. Here is where politics, and human drama lie. And here is where Americans, especially, tend to spend a lot of their time--especially in the context of the ordering of their collective public structures. And at the center of these human drama, again in the United States, lie the courts and the actors around whom the virtual perfection of law can be incarnated and applied to the affairs of human individuals and their power/rights/duty arrangements. 

Every once in a while the need to consider and reconsider the mechanisms by which the courts are meant to protect the integrity of their system, and discipline the lawyers who must do what they must (within ethical and good faith bounds) in their representation of their clients. But it is both the courts and representative elected officials, each within their state organs, who have the responsibility for developing the rules based system within which it is possible to speak of cages of trust producing systems and actors that might be trusted--at least as a matter of law. Law, then is both created in and through itself, and in that creating (constituting), also creates the structures within which its creation may be manifested and protected against itself by those entrusted with its application.  That dialectics, between text that has a much longer life than the mortals who are entrusted with its care and application, tends to produce a temporal dialectics that produces contradiction between text and performance requiring adjustment to suit the times and the context. 

All of this is nicely, and perhaps easier to grasp on an operational level, by recalling the history and generational revisions of one of the great instruments for trust building and protection within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--its Rule 11 on attorney sanctions which required what was then considered significant amendment in 1983, and then again in 1993 ostensibly to clean up the interpretive mess created in the aftermath of the 1983 amendments.  At the time of the 1983 Amendments, Judge Robert L. Carter, then serving as a Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York noted both the need for amendment and its objectives.

The intent of Rule 11 as originally promulgated was also to deter frivolous actions. It required attorneys to certify that there were good grounds for their pleading. In addition, the Rule provided for the imposition of sanctions for violations. The Rule's provisions applied to motions and other papers through incorporation by reference in Rule 75 However, for reasons I will discuss in a moment, the old Rule 11 simply did not work. The new 1983 amendment was designed to put teeth into the old rule. (Carter, "The History and Purposes of Rue 11,"54 Fordham L. Rev. 4 (1985))

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Neither need nor objective have changed much since then.  What has also remained constant has been the oppositions built into adversarial systems (and incentivized by the serendipity of the law of malpractice) in which someone (usually the courts) must mediate (at some point and in this case usually in the course of litigation) between abuse (of the system and in the particular context) and the cultivation of a zealous and sometimes creative (and thus oppositional) advocacy for clients. There are lots of assumptions built into this system. Some of the perhaps more important include the presumption that (1)  judges are competent to oversee their courts and that they are both dispassionate and neutral as judges (whatever personal demons or angels roil their souls); (2) that there is consensus about the meaning and incidence of abuse; and (3) that there is consensus about both the meaning and the performance of advocacy by lawyers.  Judges, of course, are one dimension of the issue--the other touches on the lawyer-client relation, and there the driving disciplinary force is the client rather than the court in many instances.  Here the rule of law of ethics serves as a supplement to the disciplinary power of the performance of actors in courts. It is a potent one, but perhaps one driven by market incentives as well--the law of malpractice and the practice of its carriers may have as much to say as ethics officers about shaping of lawyer expectation in the zealous advocacy etc. of lawyers.

All of this may be true from time to time within a generational cohort and in a coherent historical period of national development.  But al of this may fall away as the encrustations of a prior generation and a prior time begin--like mussels on a turtle--to eventually drown the creature on whose body their own lives depend. The difficulty, and a general one for societies everywhere, is the absence of both a rule book or a definitive and deeply engaged external force that can provide both guidance and assurance, or that can warn when systemic contradictions require engagement. What we have, instead, is politics--in whatever forms suits a social collective--and in most societies, a politics that is increasingly embedded within and draws its language and cognitive forms of action, on the very thing that is its own object. Less formally--that the care and protection of rule of law structures are bound by rule of law premises that sometimes produce a looping from out of which a necessary reform or evolution (or whatever own might want to call it) maybe necessary to align its cognitive forms and practices to those of the communities it serves. Judge Carter was perhaps more elegant and practical in the assessment he provides. But the problem, and its contradictions, are unavoidable and never capable of an eternally relevant solution.

Pix Credit "Good Omens" here

At the root of all of this is trust--the flammeum gladium of the enterprise of law within its operational  core in the courts. In a sense, one might consider the principle or ideology (depending on one's approach) of the rule of law as dependent on a trust that is, with every iteration of its purported application by the lawyer and the judge, each in their own sphere and then together within the cognitive cages of the court and its processes, contingent an an aggregated performance of trust among the community of lawyers and judges.  Political conditions become less stable when both elements of trust structures are challenged--the lawyers and the courts.  And that is precisely the challenge that President Trump now appears to be directing both to the courts (and their ability to adequately police their own spaces, as well as the limits of their remedial powers,but that is a story for another day) and the lawyers who, quite rightly, have taken the hint that law and its rule is now, to some extent, the language and cognitive cage of politics, and that zealous advocacy might require not just "pushing the envelop" but also using the courts as one of, and perhaps the most useful (given the core role of law in politics), means of engaging in the politics of national reform through law (my earlier discussion of the politics of law in courts here, here, here, and here. This is the apotheosis, perhaps, of a trend and a set of incentives that is more than a century old, but has perhaps reached the point where discussion outside the courts may now be necessary (at least in the opinion of some.  But discussion, even necessary discussion, may not be triggered without a provocation--and that has been a particular element of the political culture in the United States.

And perhaps it is in that light that one might read with some fascination the Memorandum of 22 March 2025, directed by President Trump to the U.S. Attorney General and the Ranking Official of Homeland Security--Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court. And a provocation it is--one that might provoke not just the defenders of what is perceived as the defining characteristics of a status quo (one that has been remarkably flexible in some respects) but also (and President Trump perhaps appears to see himself within this group) of those who view the crisis of trust in the system to be sufficiently advanced that a challenge, and perhaps one that will require revisiting FRCP 11 must now be engineered. 

And the provocation is quite elegantly engineered. Mr. Trump directs (1) the Attorney General to seek sanctions against attorneys and law firms who engage in frivolous, unreasonable, and vexatious litigation against the United States or in matters before executive departments and agencies of the United States; (2) the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize enforcement of their respective regulations governing attorney conduct and discipline; (3) the Attorney General to take all appropriate action to refer for disciplinary action any attorney whose conduct in Federal court or before any component of the Federal Government appears to violate professional conduct rules, including rules governing meritorious claims and contentions, and particularly in cases that implicate national security, homeland security, public safety, or election integrity; and (4) that, when the Attorney General determines that conduct by an attorney or law firm in litigation against the Federal Government warrants seeking sanctions or other disciplinary action, and in consultation with the President, as assessment be undertaken for additional sanctions including the withdrawing of security clearances or termination of contract. These are broad directives, but perhaps less provocative than this one: that the Attorney General  review conduct by attorneys or their law firms in litigation against the Federal Government over the last 8 years.  If the Attorney General identifies misconduct that may warrant additional action, such as filing frivolous litigation or engaging in fraudulent practices, the Attorney General is directed to recommend to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, additional steps that may be taken. 

All of this is fodder for the courts, certainly. And more importantly in the long run, also fodder for the inevitable political discussions that it  (and the actions of the courts) will generate.  It is both natural and a pity that all of that discussion may be driven by interest and ideology.  Nonetheless, it is precisely interest and ideology that has appeared to serve as the driving force of vanguard politics in the United States since the early 20th century (at least in its modern form). In that sense, then, one might also have to consider the un-considerable--the nature and extent to which rule of law objectifications and fulfillment (in the way they are signified in the bodies and expectations of lawyers and courts) are themselves expressions of a more fundamental cognitive starting (and system rationalizing) point, one grounded in interest and ideology (hopefully within  a larger set of social collective solidification premises) the signification of both of which now appear to be very much objects of intense contestation.

The Text of resident Trumps Memorandum--Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court--and as a background the text of FRCP 11 and its annotations prepared by the Cornell University Legal Information Institute, follow below.  

Just Published--Enrique Dussel Peters "Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean (2025)

 

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 Enrique Dussel Peters has announced the availability of a new publication: MONITOR OF CHINESE OFDI IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2025 [2025 年中国在拉丁美洲和加勒比地区直接投资报告; Monitor de la OFDI china en América Latina y el Caribe 2025] and published by the Academic Network for Latin America and the Caribbean on China (Red ALC-China). The analysis (of around 10 pages) in 中文中文, Spanish and English is based on transaction level information and the full data set can be downloaded for free from Red ALC-China´s webpage. 

El monitor de la OFDI china en ALC es un esfuerzo de la Red ALC-China por comprender y analizar la salida de capital -OFDI (overseas u outbound foreign direct investment)- de China en la región. Con este objetivo se presentan estadísticas de diversas fuentes y niveles de agregación, metodologías de registro de la OFDI, publicaciones existentes en China y en América Latina y el Caribe (ALC), así como noticias vinculadas a la temática definida. Por el momento se ha enfatizado el caso de México y esperamos que en el futuro se integren otros investigadores, empresarios y funcionarios para mejorar la información y el análisis de otros países latinoamericanos. Estamos muy agradecidos con el Boletín Informativo Techint y la información brindada por la agencia de noticias Xinhua y la revista China Hoy, por su apoyo para realizar diversas tareas vinculadas; las opiniones expresadas son las de los coordinadores y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de las instituciones participantes.

The Chinese OFDI monitor in LAC is an effort by the ALC-China Network to understand and analyze the capital outflow -OFDI (overseas or outbound foreign direct investment)- from China in the region. With this objective, we present statistics from various sources and levels of aggregation, OFDI registration methodologies, existing publications in China and in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), as well as news related to the defined topic. For the moment, the case of Mexico has been emphasized and we hope that in the future other researchers, businessmen and officials will be included to improve the information and analysis of other Latin American countries. We are very grateful to the Techint Newsletter and the information provided by the news agency Xinhua and the magazine China Today, for their support in carrying out various related tasks; the opinions expressed are those of the coordinators and do not necessarily reflect the views of the participating institutions

中国在拉美和加勒比地区的对外直接投资监测是 ALC-China Network 为了解和分析中国在该地区的资本流出（即对外直接投资）而开展的一项工作。为此，我们提供了来自不同来源和汇总级别的统计数据、对外直接投资登记方法、中国和拉丁美洲及加勒比地区 (LAC) 的现有出版物以及与所定义主题相关的新闻。目前，我们重点关注墨西哥的案例，希望未来能纳入其他研究人员、商人和官员，以改进对其他拉丁美洲国家的信息和分析。我们非常感谢 Techint 通讯以及新华社和《今日中国》杂志提供的信息，感谢他们在执行各项相关任务时提供的支持；所表达的观点为协调员的观点，并不一定反映参与机构的观点. (Here)

The most interesting assessment in the report may be this (Report pp. 2.3):

The predominance of national security over the U.S. economy, explicitly around investment
flows; these investment flows from the U.S. already initiated profound changes since 2019.
In this confrontation, China, for its part, has emphasized technological development and its
new productive forces in disruptive innovations (including robotics, nanomanufacturing, large artificial intelligence models, quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, new
energy sources, and aeronautics and aerospace activities). China has already reached 2.6%
of its R&D expenditures in relation to its GDP, similar to its main competitors (Zhang 2024). It is relevant to understand that Chinese OFDI has become a relevant instrument to access new technology and, more recently, to overcome its productive overcapacity–for example, in some middle-income countries in electric cars (Brennan, Eszterhai and He 2024; Hanemann, Meyer and Goh 2025)–and in other cases to overcome trade restrictions (i.e., Chinese OFDI to substitute Chinese imports).

At least two recent aspects seem to be important for understanding global FDI and OFDI
flows. 

On the one hand, empirical research questions whether FDI could become an effective lever
for development considering that the massive repatriations of global profits (4.2% of the
global stock of FDI during 2005-2020)–originating in the Russian Federation, Brazil and
Nigeria, among others, and destined especially for the United States–not only impede the
development of the global South, but are also the cause of unequal development (Parnreiter,
Steinwärder and Kolhoff 2024). Second. The recent agreement by 135 countries (2021) to
impose a global minimum tax on the profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which
ensures that MNEs pay a rate of at least 15% regardless of the territory where they do
business, may become an important factor for future FDI and OFDI flows (Bradbury and
O'Reilly 2025).

In 2024, global FDI fell by 8% (to $1.378 trillion), with marked regional differences. Europe (-45%), developed economies (-15%), LAC (-9%) and Asia (-7%) reflected the worst FDI performance in 2024; Africa (86%), and North America (13%), the most positive (UNCTAD 2025/a). In the case of China, FDI fell in 2024 for the second consecutive year and was 40% below its peak in 2022. For LAC, Brazil reflected one of the lowest dynamisms (-5% in 2024), in contrast to Central America and Mexico (11%).

 国家安全对美国经济以及投资流动具有主导地位；自 2019 年起，来自美国的投资已
经开始发生深刻的变化5。
在此次对抗中，中国则强调技术发展及其在颠覆性创新方面的新生产力（包括
机器人、纳米制造、大型人工智能模型、量子计算、先进半导体、新能源以及航空
航天活动）；中国研发支出占国内生产总值比重已达到 2.6%，与主要竞争对手相似
（Zhang 2024）。重要的是中国的对外直接投资已经成为获取新技术的重要工具，最
近还被用来解决产能过剩问题，例如将电动汽车的过剩产能带到一些中等收入国家
（Brennan、Eszterhai 和 He 2024；Hanemann、Meyer 和 Goh 2025），或者在其他情
况下应对贸易限制（即用中国的对外直接投资替代来自中国的进口）。
对于我们理解全球直接投资的流入和流出而言，至少有两个最新方面显得至关
重要。
一方面，实证研究质疑外国直接投资是否能成为有效的发展杠杆，因为大量全
球利润汇回（2005-2020 年期间占全球直接投资存量的 4.2%）——在俄罗斯、巴西和
尼日利亚等国产生的利润流回美国——不仅阻碍了全球南方国家的发展，而且也构
成了发展不平衡的原因（Parnreiter、Steinwärder 和 Kolhoff 2024）。第二，135 个国
家近期（2021 年）达成协议，对跨国企业的利润进行全球最低征税，确保无论在何
处经营都要缴纳至少 15% 的税率，这可能成为未来国际直接投资流入与流出的重要
影响因素（Bradbury 和 O'Reilly 2025）。
2024 年，全球直接投资流入下降 8%（至 1378 万亿美元），地区间差异显著。
2024 年表现最低迷的是欧洲（-45%）、发达经济体（-15%）、拉美和加勒比地区
（-9%）与亚洲（-7%）；非洲（86%）和北美洲（13%）表现最为活跃（UNCTAD
2025/a）。中国接收直接投资 2024 年连续第二年下降，比 2022 年的峰值低 40%。就
拉美和加勒比地区而言，巴西的增长最少（2024 年为 -5%），而中美洲和墨西哥则
为 11%。

Llama la atención la predominancia de la seguridad nacional sobre la economía de EU, explícitamente en torno a los flujos de inversión; estos
flujos de inversión desde EU ya iniciaron cambios profundos desde 2019.
En esta confrontación, China, por su parte, ha enfatizado el desarrollo tecnológico y sus
nuevas fuerzas productivas en innovaciones disruptivas (incluyendo robótica,
nanomanufactura, grandes modelos de inteligencia artificial, computación cuántica,
semiconductores avanzados, nuevas fuentes energéticas y actividades aeronáuticas y
aeroespaciales). China ya alcanzó el 2.6% de sus gastos en investigación y desarrollo con
respecto a su PIB, semejante a sus principales competidores (Zhang 2024). Es relevante
comprender que la OFDI china se ha convertido en un instrumento relevante para acceder a
nueva tecnología y, más recientemente, para sobrellevar su sobrecapacidad productiva –por
ejemplo, en algunos países de ingresos medios en autos eléctricos (Brennan, Eszterhai y He
2024; Hanemann, Meyer y Goh 2025)– y en otros casos para sobrellevar restricciones en el
comercio (es decir, la OFDI china para sustituir importaciones chinas).

Al menos dos aspectos recientes nos parecen importantes para comprender los flujos globales de IED y OFDI.

Por un lado, investigaciones empíricas cuestionan que la IED pudiera convertirse en una
efectiva palanca de desarrollo considerando que las masivas repatriaciones de ganancias
globales (del 4.2% del acervo global de la IED durante 2005-2020) –originadas en la
Federación Rusa, Brasil y Nigeria entre otras, y con destino a Estados Unidos,
particularmente– no sólo impiden el desarrollo del sur global, sino que son causa del
desarrollo desigual (Parnreiter, Steinwärder y Kolhoff 2024). Segundo. El reciente acuerdo
de 135 países (2021) para imponer un impuesto global mínimo sobre las ganancias de las
empresas multinacionales (EMN) –que garantiza que las EMN paguen una tasa de al menos
15% independientemente del territorio donde realizan sus actividades– podrá convertirse en
un importante factor para futuros flujos de IED y OFDI (Bradbury y O´Reilly 2025).

En 2024 la IED global cayó en un 8% (a $1,378 billones de dólares), con marcadas
diferencias regionales. Europa (-45%), las economías desarrolladas (-15%), ALC (-9%) y
Asia (-7%) fueron las que reflejaron el peor desempeño de la IED en 2024; África (86%), y
América del Norte (13%), el más positivo (UNCTAD 2025/a). Para el caso de China, la IED
cayó en 2024 por segundo año consecutivo y fue un 40% inferior al de su máximo en 2022.
Para ALC Brasil reflejó uno de los menores dinamismos (-5% en 2024), a diferencia de
Centroamérica y México (11%).

 

Pix credit UK National Archives here

 The introduction to the 2025 Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 2025 follows below in English, Spanish, and 中文. The data may be found HERE.

President Trump and the Paul, Weiss Law Firm Reach a Deal--The Presidential Directive Issued Against Them has been Withdrawn: The Outlines of a Merchant Transactional Phenomenology and the Role of Lawyers

 

Pix credit here

 

 There has been much attention paid to what for many is a necessary conflation between the rule of law and the expectations of governmental protection of the discretionary activity of lawyers and judges. The issues are complex, of course, and the baseline expectations tend to shift over time.  But the core of it tends to coalesce around the idea that there ought to be a substantial (how substantial changes in time and place)  discretionary space within which lawyers may fulfill both their business, legal-systemic, and social functions as one of the key objects through which contemporary conceptions of a law based social-political order is realized. That space, in part, is meant to be recognized and protected by the State and its apparatus. That space is particularly important where the state and its apparatus serves as the platform within which lawyers must fulfill their obligations to clients--through the invocation of the judicial system and its process, or as a source of information to which they are entitled by law. 

That protection extends, in large measure, though not completely, to actions by the state apparatus and its officials that appear to inhibit or chill the ability of a lawyer to pick and choose clients, to serve clients in good faith to the full extent of the ethical expectations of such representation, and to interpose claims and defenses and use strategically or instrumentally all of the mechanisms provided by, through, and as manifestations of a rule of law state in the service of their clients. Those protections are not cost free--reputations rise and fall to some extent on the way in which lawyers operate within the space permitted them under rule of law principles--as incarnated in and through law and ethical expectations. At the same time, the lawyer does not automatically or universally occupy a privileged space as against clients. Just as a lawyer may not be inhibited in freely choosing clients or declining representation; so clients might also be protected in their right to hire and terminate relationships with lawyers. In both cases the law mediates but also provides a privilege space for that interaction that seeks to avoid corruption or at least substantial deviation from the rule of law  system based ideal. 

At the same time, the expectations of the state, and the extension of rule of law obligations to the state and its organs and officials, also permits or ought to permit, the state to pick and choose, to hire and fire, and to develop opinions about and contribute good faith opinions available to the the larger community within which legal reputation is formed enhanced or impaired, where the state operates as a client within the marketplace for legal services. Unless the state is different (see, e.g. here). And it might be argued that the state is different--at least with respect to issues of access--to the mechanisms of dispute resolution and tights protection, certainly, but also as to access to information ans testimony on terms generally available to everyone in like circumstance and subject only to law. It might extend less to issues of hiring and firing, and perhaps less to officials (in the name of the sort of transparency that is cherished when exercised by clients) expressing their opinions about the character and quality of specific representations or lawyers--subject of course to the limiting principles of libel and defamation, and also grounded in good faith and the avoidance of the "abuse of position" to materially interfere with business relations (perhaps). Law might be used to narrow that discretion--perhaps reputational issues ought to be limited to making complaints to the proper lawyer regulatory body.  But that is for the legislature to decide, or the courts if that authority has been properly delegated. 

These are some of the issues swirling around President Trump's invocation of Presidential speech (opinion sharing) and presidential authority (prohibiting the hiring of certain firms by executive branch organs and non-cooperation, and revocation of security clearances) (President Trump on "Addressing Risks from Paul Weiss" and the Relationship Between Government and Outside Counsel). Law firms affected have appeared to follow one of three paths. One is to do nothing and find ways to mitigate potential damage (the private client analogue). Another is file a lawsuit effectively arguing tortuous or malicious interference with business relations and abuse of or exceeding authority (the direct challenge method). This was the path chosen by Perkins Coie.  Now Paul Weiss has charted a third path--compromise and settlement. It was reported that shortly after the issuance of the directive, Addressing Risks from Paul Weiss, Paul, Weiss Chairman, Brad Karp met with the President and satisfied him that the law firm no longer posed the sort of threat to the State suggested in that directive, subject to a set of conditions.

Today, President Donald J. Trump agreed to withdraw his March 14, 2025 Executive Order regarding the Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP law firm (“Paul, Weiss”), which has entered into the following agreement with the President:
 

1. Paul, Weiss agrees that the bedrock principle of American Justice is that it must be fair and nonpartisan for all. Our Justice System is betrayed when it is misused to achieve political ends.

Lawyers and law firms play a vital role in ensuring that we live up to that standard as a Nation. Law firms should not favor any political party when it comes to choosing their clients. Firms also should not make decisions on whom to hire based on a person’s political affiliation. To do otherwise is to deny some Americans an equal opportunity for our services while favoring others.  

Lawyers abandon the profession’s highest ideals when they engage in partisan decision-making, and betray the ethical obligation to represent those who are unpopular or disfavored in a particular environment.  

2. Paul, Weiss affirms its unwavering commitment to these core ideals and principles, and will not deny representation to clients, including in pro bono matters and in support of non-profits, because of the personal political views of individual lawyers.  

3. Paul, Weiss will take on a wide range of pro bono matters that represent the full spectrum of political viewpoints of our society, whether “conservative” or “liberal.”

4. Paul, Weiss affirms its commitment to merit-based hiring, promotion, and retention, and will not adopt, use, or pursue any DEI policies. As part of its commitment, it will engage experts, to be mutually agreed upon within 14 days, to conduct a comprehensive audit of all of its employment practices.

5. Paul, Weiss will dedicate the equivalent of $40 million in pro bono legal services over the course of President Trump’s term to support the Administration’s initiatives, including: assisting our Nation’s veterans, fairness in the Justice System, the President’s Task Force to Combat Antisemitism, and other mutually agreed projects.

Statement from the White House: “The President is agreeing to this action in light of a meeting with Paul, Weiss Chairman, Brad Karp, during which Mr. Karp acknowledged the wrongdoing of former Paul, Weiss partner, Mark Pomerantz, the grave dangers of Weaponization, and the vital need to restore our System of Justice.”

In response to the President’s announcement, Paul, Weiss’s Chairman Brad Karp said: “We are gratified that the President has agreed to withdraw the Executive Order concerning Paul, Weiss. We look forward to an engaged and constructive relationship with the President and his Administration.” (Donald Trump Truth, Social Post)

One might wonder about the ethics within a law firm of cutting a former partner loose in this way, though it is likely that there are many stories, mostly unpublished, about this sort of  cutting of a finger to save the hand strategy within the American bar.  And it is possible that this strategy could be undertaken with confidence if the sacrificed person (in this case) might have already found of a way of protecting their position--a sort of principled pragmatism approach.  For some of the reporting on "the deal" see New York Times; the Independent; and more colorfully TMZ). The New York Times reported a statement by Mr. Pomerantz:

In a statement, Mr. Pomerantz denied he had done anything wrong. “I engaged in no wrongdoing by working as a prosecutor to uphold the rule of law,” Mr. Pomerantz said on Thursday evening. Along with Mr. Pomerantz’s status as a former partner, the firm represented him as recently as 2023 in connection with efforts by congressional Republicans to question him as they sought to undermine charges brought against Mr. Trump by prosecutors in Manhattan. (New York Times).

All of this accords with the general pattern of action that marks this Administration. That pattern perhaps best understood as one grounded in a merchant transactional phenomenology against suggests the way in which ideology is driven by action, which then shapes ideology applied to further action.  It is action oriented, iterative, dialectic, and inductive in its patterns of behavior; a marked change from the last seventy of so years of deductive ideologically driven, systems techno-bureaucratic managerialism that marked the upper levels of elite conduct expectations in the United States. That change will have a dramatic effect on the way in which the concept "rule of law" is action oriented during the next several years.  And it suggests that merchant transactional patterns produce what may be substantial changes in approach if not in outcome to those that would be expected within patterns of system, techno-bureaucratic models. In all likelihood the greater change will be in method at least in this field.  But in others--especially the upcoming battle over the jurisprudence (and limits) of the judicial remedial power, probably also producing substantive change, one hinted at in the 1970s integration cases but now expanded and generalized. In the process the way one might approach rule of law may change substantially as well. At a minimum, it appears that the State may acquire greater leeway to act like a private client when it consumes services. It will likely have a much narrower ambit of action respecting cooperation and the suspension of privileges vis a vis the state if only on equal access and equal treatment grounds. That is fair one would imagine; but between action and its interdiction, the state may acquire a substantial space to use both to negotiate the nature of its relationships with lawyers. And it in this that space, and in the ethics of those negotiations, that the nature of the mutual obligations of lawyers, their duty, and the state may be re-imagined perhaps formally through law, or informally through patterns of action and expectation. In the process the older ideals of the expectation of discretionary room for lawyer discretion in the conduct of their work may evolve--at least with respect to the state. The nature of that evolution will likely emerge from the cocktail of silence (mitigation), litigation, and settlement.  

The text, Addressing Remedial Action by Paul Weiss, follows below. 

Interview: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Hugh Hewitt on China, Iran, Israel, Deportations, and Judicial Oversight/Interference

 

 Secretary of State Marco Rubio was recently interviewed by Hugh Hewitt. Mr. Hewitt is a popular radio talk show host, as well as the President and CEO of the Richard Nixon Foundation, on the faculty at the Chapman University School of Law, and a commentator on Fox News. 

The interview provided Secretary Rubio with an opportunity to elaborate on certain issues that are of particular concern to the Administration of President Trump. It was, perhaps, also a way in which Secretary Rubio, in the usual style of indirect speaking to institutions and officials not directly acknowledged, might be given an opportunity to signal intent or provide clues as to openings for the resolution of a variety of challenges with respect to which the U.S. has been particularly attentive. 

There were certain elements that might be worth underscoring.  

1. The first concerns China.  Secretary Rubio  echoed, but in a more refined way, some thinking that might echoes some thinking from prior administrations. Secretary Rubio stated it this way:

I think the Chinese believe that they are on a path towards becoming the most powerful nation on Earth, that it’s inevitable, it’s just a matter of time, and they seek to manage that rise in a way that – and avoid disruptions along the way if possible.  And look, if in fact they end up out-competing us, out-innovating us, outworking us, what have you, that’s one thing.

It is in the fairness of that competition, rather than in the competition itself, that this Administration is likely to take a substantially more aggressive stance.  That involves two distinct points. The first is that the Administration will tend to define fairness in its own terms.  Fair enough--the expectations of liberal democratic markets driven  competitive environments has been a long standing baseline for both democratic and republican administrations. It was a key element for the Obama Administration's decision to keep China out of TPP (The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S., and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order). Yet that was hardly enough in the Secretary's view:

There was this assumption that some made that if – that we should allow China to continue to cheat in rules of trade and commerce and intellectual property and that kind of thing, and if we let them do it, that eventually they’d become rich, and when they became rich they’d become just like us. Well, that’s not what happened. They became rich, but they’re not just like us.

The answer is engagement but not dependence and the protection of liberal democratic markets rules and expectations.  

2. That perspective on China, one that is indifferent to convergence of values but protective of interests and the rules that define the core national political-economic model drives U.S. engagement with China across the security field as well.  This is  a function of protection of markets, though not necessary of territory abroad.  And thus the sort of cheeky response to the question about U.S. reaction to Chinese opposition to the sale of Chinese corporate interests in the Panama Canal to U.S. interests: the "President has been abundantly clear about it, and that is that the Panama Canal cannot be an outpost for the Chinese, because we built it and we intend to have influence over it, and because we didn’t turn it – like I said, we didn’t turn it over to the Chinese. We turned it over to Panama, and that’s not the way it’s played out."

3. At the same time, the U.S. appears to be making a distinction between aggressive competition and the protection of its own political economic model respecting inbound investment and competition in foreign markets and issues of the territorial integrity of China.  Secretary Rubio appeared to be quite clear that U.S. policy remains  what it has been for more than half a century and there does not appear to be any inclination to change it. "Our policy is the same as it’s been; it’s been consistent. We believe that they status of Taiwan should not be changed by force or by extortion or compelled in any way. That’s the policy of the United States; that remains the policy of the United States. That’s been the policy of President Trump, and that will continue to be his policy. And when he makes policy decisions, he means them." But what that means is also that changes in Chinese policy will not produce changes in U.S. policy on this matter.  And that is where the friction will likely appear most acutely.

4. With respect to Iran, Secretary Rubio also suggested that Mr. Trump appears prepared to take a much more aggressive stance than Mr. Biden. That requires a reinterpretation of the meaning of the phrase "hold Iran responsible.

Well, I think the President’s been clear. He’s prepared to do whatever it takes to prevent Iran from ever having a nuclear weapon. He’s been abundantly clear. Now, he’s a president that wants to promote peace. If you asked him, he would tell you he would much prefer to work this out diplomatically without a war. And that’s his preference. That will always be his preference. But if you force him to choose between a nuclear Iran or taking action, the President’s been clear: He will take action. Whether other countries seek to join us in that endeavor or simply cheer us on, sometimes quietly from the sidelines, that’s another matter. But it certainly will not determine the steps we take,

 That provides signals both of predictability (the U.S. will act somehow) and uncertainty (ir is not clear exactly how the U.S. will respond, or in concert with whom). And certainly little is said here of the hard work necessary to ensure that the political branches 's position are sufficiently aligned with those of the President.  But that is a problem of all administrations. What ever action Mr Trump takes will, in any case, be controversial, produce domestic and international opposition, and also serve to more closely align those states and other actors whose interests align with U.S. objectives. Of course, none of this was discussed.

5. The American courts and foreign policy.  Secretary Rubio underscored the likely confrontation that is brewing between the President and the federal courts-or at least the practice of seeking federal intervention in what the President (and some before him) tend to view as within thee prerogatives of their office.  Secretary Rubio has taken a softer line than others in the administration, one that seems to echo the subtle suggestion made by Chief Justice Roberts--that the Supreme Court is constitutionally established as the primary line of defense against the over exuberant actions of the lower federal judiciary. And reported by the New York Times "Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. issued a rare public statement. “For more than two centuries,” the chief justice said, “it has been established that impeachment is not an appropriate response to disagreement concerning a judicial decision. The normal appellate review process exists for that purpose.” (New York Times). While generally reported as a "rebuke" it might as easily be characterized as a reminder of the courts authority to look after their own shop. As Secretary Rubio put it:

It is my view that judges do not have the right to conduct the foreign policy of the United States. Go beyond the immigration issues that people focus on. These are alien enemies in our country. They’re an organized group undermining the national security of the United States, and that needed to be dealt with. We made an arrangement with an international partner. * * *

Indeed, Secretary Rubio echoed both the Chief Justice and the President, who used his social media apparatus  to declare: "“Stop nationwide injunctions now, before it is too late,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “If Justice Roberts and the United States Supreme Court do not fix this toxic and unprecedented situation IMMEDIATELY, our Country is in very serious trouble!” (quoted in The Hill). Of course, the President added a threat absent from the remarks of the Chief Justice or the Secretary: it is also clear that should that clean up by the appellate courts prove to be insufficient in the opinion of the Executive, more provocative action may be in the offing. .

6. Each of these positions, of course, will be strongly opposed by people and groups both within the U.S: and among foreign elements.  That is to be expected, and to some extent welcomed as part of experience of the political discussions  in the U.S., one that exists irrespective of the Party or the ruling ideology being projected from out of the elected branches of government. My object here is not to judge those positions--others may find that more appealing. My goal is clarity in a context in which clarity is act oriented rather than a function of alignment between orthodox ideological positions and operationalization. The semiotics are quite different.  In the former one considers the way that action is a function of operating system; in the latter one looks at the way that action becomes the operating system. 

With clarity it is possible to engage in better analytics. And it is in the analytics that one can insert whatever normative, objectives based or perspective privileging lens appeals. What does emerge even more strongly here is the phenomenological element of Presidential engagement (here). That applies to what what is emerging as the America First Initiative--grounded in a merchant view of open borders that are manifested in an accumulation of win-win relationships (approaching, in some respects a portion fo the Chinese New Era model with its secondary focus on more comprehensive penetration to enhance national development on all sides of the equation). Those win-win relationships no longer are to be judged or valued with a uniform measure but are meant to be nationally relevant; at the same time the U.S: has adopted the  strategies of "unequal treaties" from the Chinese (with American characteristics) as a means of re-balancing those values where by U.S. measure the relationship is win-lose.  At the same time the notion of territorial imperium is shifting to one that mirrors  the territorialization of production, not through or grounded in national territories but in the territories of production, distribution, and supply. With exceptions--those exceptions touch on the protection of the inner realms of apex borderlands. That, in turn, does not depend on geographic proximity, but on a conception of territorial integrity that is both a function of territorial control but not of geography. It is for that reason, for example, that China might view the Arctic and Antarctic as critical territories in the way that the U.S. (in a more crude but honest expression) views Greenland and the Panama Canal (but not Panama itself). That is what appearances suggest--but who knows what is percolating within the brain casings of those making decisions. Secretary Rubio has offered a glimpse, but only a glimpse, the rest is speculation from the iterative activity of the apex states.  And so on.

And last but by no means least--this is an administration, like that of Franklin Roosevelt, that means to reshape government as well as the notions of government. Whether this Administration is up to that task remains to be seen--but that was the question in 1935 in a way that reflects the question in 2025, but from a historical perspective with the polarities reversed.  In both cases the targets were the courts, the extent of presidential (and Congressional to some extent) power, and the role of the national administrative apparatus (and public policy) within a re-emerging core sense of private action driving change with substantially fewer public policy overlays, controls, or protections. In the 1930s the battles were short, brutish, nasty, and focused on the authority of the national elected officials to craft and operate a national administrative apparatus with substantial regulatory authority. In 2025 the question touches on the extent and use of the judicial remedial power (at least to start). In the 1930s the the president won. It remains to be seen whether there will be a replay in 2025. The result will leave few entirely happy but the nation will continue its usual habit of criticizing everything and everyone as its traditional sociopolitical habitus. And so on.

The full text of the interview, as posted to the Department of State website, follows below.

European China Law Studies Association Annual Conference 2025 - Concept Note and Call for Abstracts

 

 I am delighted to pass along this Call for Papers for the  19th Annual Conference of the European China Law Studies Association will be held in Cork from 19 to 21 September 2025. The conference will be hosted and organized by the School of Law of University College Cork (UCC).

The Annual Conference Organizing Committee is now inviting the submission of paper and panel proposals for the 2025 ECLS Annual Conference. We welcome contributions addressing legal matters related to any China law topic such as – but expressly not limited – to the following:

Legal Issues concerning EU-China Relations
China and the International Legal Order
Legal Culture, Legal Traditions and Rule of Law Development
Chinese Jurisprudence and Legal History
Supreme People’s Court
Legal Aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
Gender Equality
Human Rights Protection
Chinese Law Emergency/Pandemic/Disaster Preparedness
Sustainable Development and the Role of Regulation in China
Legal and Economic Issues of International Trade and Investment
Developments in Chinese Corporate and Commercial Law
Cyber Security and Data Protection
Legal Technologies, Big Data and Smart Courts
Regulation of Artificial Intelligence
Cryptocurrencies and China’s Banking and Finance Law
Intellectual Property and Chinese Law
Social Credit and the Law in China
Labour Law Developments, Decent Work and Fundamental Labour Rights
Administrative Law and Administrative Procedure
Environment, Climate Change and Energy Law and Policies
Marine Environmental and Natural Resources Law
Developments in Chinese Maritime Law
Developments in Chinese Law of Obligations

The Organizing Committee invites the submission of paper abstracts and panel proposals by 18th April 2025. All submissions will undergo a peer-review process. Submissions should be entered via ECLS2025@ucc.ie.

Individual papers abstracts should be confined to 300 words, while panel proposals should not exceed 1,000 words. Submissions must include: (1) the title of the paper or panel, (2) the name, institutional affiliation, and email address of the author(s), and (3) up to five relevant keywords.

The Organizing Committee welcomes abstracts and proposals from emerging researchers, including PhD candidates and Masters students. Special sessions for emerging researchers will be organized in the form of roundtables, moderated by seasoned scholars to facilitate enriching discussions.

The CfP with links follows below.

“Discriminatory equity ideology” and the U.S. Department of State: President Trump Issues an Executive Order--"Removing Discrimination and Discriminatory Equity Ideology From the Foreign Service"

 

Pix credit portion of painting Fight Between Carnival and Lent 1559

 

Presidents have been complaining about the autonomy, culture, predilections, and loyalties of the foreign service and its diplomatic corps almost from the start of the Republic.  That is their right, of course; American tend to complain loudly and publicly about virtually everything, whether or not it is public or private in nature.  There is, of course, a resulting strong mutuality of sometimes low regard by the diplomatic corps either directed toward the sitting President or those officials appointed by him (and perhaps eventually her or them) to oversee their work--but of course more discretely (sometimes). At times, either or both have questions not just the loyalty but the merits of either to hold or occupy the positions to which they were elected or appointed.  That reflex is also as old as the Republic and, in the U.S. context at least, an essential part of the political culture of liberal democracy with American characteristics. It is, a least metaphorically, as Hobbes put it in his Leviathan and for another context: one of "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Leviathan, i. xiii. 9). 

Pix credit Peter Breughel Younger, Peasant Fight 1620

During times of stability, these engagements tend to serve the system well enough--and might be understood as an important element of the political contests that run deep, long, and endlessly within and as the U.S. political system, and which ensure that healthy tensions between factions (and their ideological campaigns and the zealotry that attends to them) produce tremendous costs to efforts to dominate the political field and eliminate opponents. That, anyway might be a good way of understanding what Mr. Madison had in mind in Federalist Papers No. 10 when he proposed the structural organization of the state in the form of perpetuate and endless debates within frameworks of fractured power--political. social, economic, religious, etc. However, in times of instability or transformation (instability being readily apparent at the time of its existence, transformation serving as a post facto judgment by those generally no involved), these political rituals, and the contests that they represent on a wider  social space, might become as overheated as the passions of the zealots who are compelled by their passions to move their projects forward. That amplification of passion in instability produces the melodrama of action that, in the customary American way, might in retrospect prove both hasty and insensitive to systemic vigor with national solidarity at its core. It may me that to some extent these sorts of overheated contests can sometimes destabilize that healthy (for the US) balance of oppositions that provide spaces for alignment and also for acceptable resistance by the peoples of the US.

Neither primary political faction is blameless or innocent; both might be said to have facilitated and embraced  strategies that augmented skewing behaviors away from a stabilizing core of balancing oppositions. And one might see in the passionate "reforms," on both the left and right (politically and culturally and socially) the consequences of excess that exuberance implied by the instability of the times might produce. As one might say in the current vernacular: hysteria is not a good look for the American political classes or the officials populating the administrative organs of state. In recent times that could be said of the leaders (and their factional supporters) on all sides (there are more than two of course) of the proverbial aisle sine at least the late 19th century (in its contemporary form. Everyone has their favorite--depending of course of where they situate themselves within the spectrum of available zealous causes. 

The relations between the President and the diplomatic corps are a sort of bellwether for the state of political engagement in the US on the level of operational solidarity. What animates it now, and amplifies that animation in the context of what may be understood as more tumultuous times (at least in terms of normative solidarity) is a normative factional conflict that has become a significant marker of factional differentiation in the contemporary political area, and perhaps a contributor to what might be perceived as a greater instability that in the era preceding it.  In the current era an important bellwether (an old one though now appearing in perhaps substantially distinctive form), and one again animating all sides of the political and social aisle), is what has now been reduced to a sort of orthodoxy and counter-orthodoxy (each with its own structures of discipline) that might at times be observed to be used to describe a cluster of attitudes and actions intended to be transformative (in accordance with whatever variant one adheres  or points to) as something like a supreme good or a supreme evil. That bellwether--diversity, equity, and inclusion, along with its ecologies of academic theorization, modalities of operationalization, and general approaches to the cognition of society, the state, and their ideal form--remains at the forefront of the political expression of the administration of Presidents Biden and Trump.  It is just that between them the polarities have been reversed. Thus, while between 2021 and 2025 there now appears to be a radical repositioning of factional positions on the issue--that is in terms of which faction controls the apparatus of state in a way to further their own views and operationalize them within government, and through government, elsewhere. 

It ought to come as no surprise then, that while Mr. Biden sought to both celebrate and embed what we can (for the moment) label DEI) within the structures of the state and from there throughout the nation, Mr. Trump is seeking both to undo that celebration and substitute it with one of his own, which comes under its own label--merit.  This dismantling and rebuilding is intended for embedding both within the structures of state organs and in the larger society. It is in this context that one can understand both the nature and form of Mr. Trump's 19 March Executive Order--Removing Discrimination and Discriminatory Equity Ideology From the Foreign Service (Presidential Actions). Its policy and purpose makes its nature and context unavoidable:

Over the last 4 years, divisive and discriminatory policies were systematically embedded into every part of the Federal Government, including hiring processes and employee performance evaluations in the Foreign Service. It is the policy of the Federal Government that hiring in foreign policy positions, like hiring in all other parts of the Government, shall be based solely on merit. (Removing Discrimination and Discriminatory Equity Ideology From the Foreign Service § 1)

And the ideological battleground is also clearly defined:  the President no longer speaks to DEI or its related terminologies, but rather to “discriminatory equity ideology”(Ibid., § 2(a)), which was defined in an earlier Executive Order (No. 14190—Ending Radical Indoctrination in K–12 Schooling). Just as DEI could be proffered as a curative tonic that would move the political, cultural, and political structures of the nation forward (putting aside for the moment the sometimes passionate disagreements within this normative ecology) so can it be recast as the poison that will undo the social, cultural and political structures of the nation. What was positive for one group becomes its antithesis for the other--subversive, anti-American, threatening to political liberties, radically transformative of traditional values, etc.

Imprinting anti-American, subversive, harmful, and false ideologies on our Nation's children not only violates longstanding anti-discrimination civil rights law in many cases, but usurps basic parental authority. For example, steering students toward surgical and chemical mutilation without parental consent or involvement or allowing males access to private spaces designated for females may contravene Federal laws that protect parental rights, including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA), and sex-based equality and opportunity, including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). Similarly, demanding acquiescence to “White Privilege” or “unconscious bias,” actually promotes racial discrimination and undermines national unity. (No. 14190—Ending Radical Indoctrination in K–12 Schooling; § 1).

 Perhaps equally important and not directly connected to Mr. Trump's 19 March Executive Order--Removing Discrimination and Discriminatory Equity Ideology From the Foreign Service (Presidential Actions was Section 4 of EO 14190. This section provided both for the resurrection of  President Trump's Advisory 1776 Commission but also more importantly, and in the style (ironically) of DEI norms naturalization measures within the population), for the ramping up of a patriotic campaign along the lines of instilling values that were the opposite of those now rejected. These anti-values were specified with some particularity in Section of  EO 14190.

When EO 14190 is transposed to the State Department as a normative operational baseline by a President that has been known to voice distrust (like his predecessors) of the those who serve the state under his leadership and guidance, the threat becomes aligned with the Presidents ability to project  his view of foreign relations through his officials (again not a unique event but one here amplified by the passions around the measure of solidarity  itself contributing to instability in transitions).  And thus the campaign to root this out under the current administration with a passion that perhaps aligns with that of Mr. Trump's predecessor for attempting the opposite. It will be interesting to see whether the Secretary of State also transposes the mechanisms of the patriotic campaigns already envisioned for the training of the nation's children to the diplomatic corps. Certainly that might be possible through a reading of Removing Discrimination and Discriminatory Equity Ideology From the Foreign Service § 3. And, indeed, while the battle on an important level is about normative structures of national solidarity and its basis, the more specific target in the State Department is the cultivation of a diplomatic corps more amenable to Mr. Trump's notion of America First and his potentially quite different agenda for foreign relations.

What makes this (again) interesting is the alignment between ideological campaigns in the US version of a liberal democratic social-political order  and the instrumentalization of the organs of government to first embed and then project factional battling through them into the population  on (or for) whom all of this is meant to produce some benefit. Certainly both the normative battles, and its structural consequences for the orderly operation of the state and its organs are important. But perhaps more important still is the way in which the normative factional battles both within and outside state organs now appear to be transforming, and with the transformation perhaps also reshaping the basic operational nature of the state and its organs. 

The text of  Removing Discrimination and Discriminatory Equity Ideology From the Foreign Service and of No. 14190—Ending Radical Indoctrination in K–12 Schooling follow below.

ICoCA Webinar: Ensuring the Responsible Use of Technology in Private Security

 

 

 

I am delighted to pass along information about an upcoming webinar that may be of interest to those who focus on issues of tech innovation and the provision of private security services. It is sponsored by the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA). Information and links follow:

Tech is transforming private security – but at what cost?

While innovations like CCTV, AI and cybersecurity have the potential to significantly improve security services, this rapid expansion into the digital age also brings new risks. These technologies raise important questions about human rights, international humanitarian law (IHL), civil liberties and democracy. Recognising the urgency of developing better governance and regulations, ICoCA is excited to convene security tech and legal experts for the second edition of its Responsible Security Forum (RSF) on 26 & 27 March 2025! This virtual forum will focus on the responsible use of technology in private security. 26 March will be dedicated to a consultative workshop by invitation only, but 27 March is open to everyone and will bring together industry leaders, experts and policymakers to drive responsible security in the digital age. Date: 27 March 2025 Time: 14:00-15:30 CET Location: Online As AI, cybersecurity, drones and automated intelligence reshape the industry, private security companies (PSCs) face new risks, regulatory gaps and ethical challenges. This 2nd RSF will explore: How tech is reshaping private security operations Risks to human rights and international law Key governance and accountability challenges Insights from the new ICoCA & ICT4peace Foundation Toolkit   Join the conversation!

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