"AI assists. You think. You analyze. You write. You take responsibility": Creating a Course AI Use Policy Template --Policy Text, Justification and Rule Summary for My Law & Religion Class at Penn State Dickinson

 

Image generated by ChatGPT from prompt consisting of the text of this post

 

 "AI assists. You think. You analyze. You write. You take responsibility."

(Course AI Use Model Slogan suggested by ChatGPT) 

 

I have been writing about the challenges of figuring out if, whether or how to incorporate or use of AI Tools (generally including large language models, neural networks, and other computational, generative, or agentic systems) by students (faculty have their own problems) in coursework. 

I started by looking at the way the U.S. legal academy has , to date, sought to respond to the challenge, as it is euphemistically labelled from out of the linguistic word salad jungle that is contemporary American bureaucratic languages (Discussion Draft--"Structure, Opacity, and Convergence: A Consolidated Analysis of Law School Generative AI Coursework and Exam Policies" --A Description/Analysis of the Current State of Play (With the Help of Harvey AI) and the First of a Series of Examinations of AI, Law and Education). 

I then shifted gears and asked the machine systems themselves (or at least five of them, all U.S. eccentric or at least US/Anglo/European centric--Harvey AI, Claude, Grok, ChatGPT, and Gemini) what they thought (to the extent that we transpose human notions of thinking onto the computational environment in which machine systems operate) taking humans into account. (Five Machines (Grok, Harvey, ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini), One Question, No Consensus: Rethinking AI Governance in Legal Education: The Guardian, the Balancer, the Honest One, the Engineer, and the Philosopher on What Law Schools Should Do About AI). I got both a set of far more interesting responses and opened a doorway to re-examining or seeing the perhaps inevitability of transforming contemporary analogue and human constrained notions of law and legal education, grounded in conceits about text, time, and the immutability of data. These openings are then being considered when I asked machine systems to approach the issue of human-machine interaction within law and legal education but eliminating any requirement to be human, rather than system-centric. I will report on that shortly.

 

All of that was fun; some of it was--as Anglo-American  discourse tends to prefer when they are "solving" problems--immediately useful. Yet none of this solved my immediate problem--thinking through the best way of incorporating or rejecting the incorporation of AI Tools in my classes, or working through some pragmatic middle ground.  

I took the institutional-cultural prodding and applied it seriously in the context of my own circumstances (there is nothing like personalizing a challenge to capture one's interest). I will be teaching a course next semester in which I will assign the drafting and submission of a final paper written around the courts themes--the constitutional law of the United States, with a glance at parallel developments elsewhere. I took my earlier study of the U.S. approaches as well as the current context in which such policies can be plausibly developed for a law school course in a U.S. law school.  I came up with a draft, which, when tested against human reception proved worthy of further revision (the "standard" process for the evolution of such documents, retaining the decision to choose among alternatives because it was my course and for application in specific context decisions are necessary to move from broader frameworks top an actual operational architecture. Lastly I took the last of the human-human drafts and asked a machine system to review it as a function of the parameters described in my review of the state of AI policy in U.S. law schools. I used Harvey AI because the law school where I am based has entered into a relationship with the controllers of that machine system. That also produced some version; machine systems, when trained to my liking, do not spare ego. And that was appreciated; and a reminder that one always remains a student of drafting for clarity; that clarity, even within perfectly clear text remains elusive; and that sometimes it is the spaces that ambiguity creates that are the most effective pathways top equitable operationalization. 

So, with all of that in mind I produced a template form for a Course AI Tools use policy. That template derived from a set of six policy principles that I had been using in past years as a sort of default--no use of AI--developed again in the law school in which I am based. 

The template is specific to my needs and desires--to permit the use of AI Tools (as I have sort of defined them above) for two purposes; the first is in getting ready to write the paper and the second is in creating a space where people who write and think better in a language other than English can do so and then translate their work product into English for course submission. The parameters of AI use can be broadened and narrowed to suit the instructor with a change in the operative paragraph of the template. 

The summary and justification for the text of the course policy template follows here; the text of the policy template follows below.  Comments, reactions, etc. welcome offline. This is very much a work in progress that will develop further as data becomes available (how it works with students). And my thanks to the humans and machine systems that helped make this better than it started out. 

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Rationale and Justification for the Policy

Why permit AI use at all, rather than prohibit it outright. Generative AI tools are already embedded in legal research platforms, word processors, and the broader practice of law that students will enter. A categorical ban would be difficult to enforce, would not reflect how students will actually work as practicing attorneys, and would forgo the opportunity to teach students how to use these tools responsibly while they are still subject to close faculty oversight. The policy's default in Section 1 nonetheless remains that work must be the student's own; Section 2 is a deliberately narrow, conditional departure from that default, not a general license. And it is constructed so that an instructor can change its parameters to meet needs and objectives, which likely change  with each course and over time.

Why the exception is limited to the final paper. For me, confining permitted AI use to the final paper, and prohibiting it without exception for problem sets, exams, and in-class exercises, preserves a low-stakes, frequently graded body of student work as an unambiguous baseline for assessing whether a student can perform the relevant legal analysis unaided. The final paper is treated differently because it is typically produced over a longer period (at least theoretically knowing that student engagement with final papers are realized within broadly different time horizons), with more opportunity for iterative disclosure, appendix documentation, and instructor engagement than a timed exam permits. But again, there is no reason why an instructor cannot broaden the exception from the "no use" baseline principle to something broader; as broad as they like within the constraints of university or unit policy. 

Why the boundary between permitted and prohibited uses is illustrative rather than a bright-line test. To my mind, a rule that tried to draw a precise, mechanically applied line between permissible "assistance" and impermissible "substitution" would need to disentangle research, analysis, and writing into independently verifiable strands. That, I believe, is not a reliable exercise for human cognitive work, and an attempt to force it risks two modes of failure: (1) false confidence by students that anything outside the enumerated examples is automatically safe, and (2) an unintended chilling effect on legitimate uses that happen to fall near an artificial boundary. Section 2(b)(i) and (ii) are accordingly framed as non-exhaustive examples ("without limitation") rather than a complete catalog, preserving a degree of interpretive ambiguity at the margin. That ambiguity is a deliberate design choice: it is intended to discourage students from engineering borderline uses on the assumption that anything not expressly listed as prohibited is safe. It also shifts interpretation from the student (who generates the interpretive question) to the instructor (who may resolve it in the context of the course, its objectives and the principles for teaching that specific course).

Why the quotation/paraphrase proviso exists, and why it now carries hard numerical limits. Section 2(b)(iii) recognizes that AI-generated material can legitimately appear in a paper the same way any other secondary source can: quoted or paraphrased with full authorial credit, rather than silently absorbed into the student's own analysis. This channels any use of AI-generated substantive content into the same attribution discipline students are already expected to apply to human sources, rather than creating a separate, laxer standard for machine-generated content. Unlike the illustrative, non-exhaustive examples in Section 2(b)(i) and (ii), the proviso sets fixed numerical ceilings (a 100-word cap per quotation or paraphrase, and a 10% aggregate cap per AI Tool) rather than relying on an open-ended "small portions" standard. To my mind, a qualitative standard like "small" (which had been the operating alternative in prior versions of this template) works reasonably well among practitioners operating within a shared professional culture of peer expectations, but it gives a student far less predictable guidance about where the line actually falls. A bright-line numerical rule is easier for a student to self-apply before submission and easier for an instructor to verify after the fact, at the cost of some rigidity at the margins; that tradeoff is deliberate here because the proviso's function is to bound a specific, mechanical act of incorporation (quoting or paraphrasing a discrete passage), which is much better suited to a fixed rule than the broader question of where legitimate assistance ends, addressed separately in Section 2(b)(i) and (ii).

Why disclosure (naming, the appendix, and attribution) is required even for permitted uses. Requiring students to name every AI Tool used, preserve the full sequential prompt-and-response history, and attribute that use in the body of the paper serves three purposes. First, it creates a contemporaneous record that lets an instructor evaluate a specific use against the Section 2(a) standard, rather than relying on the student's own characterization after the fact. References here to "the Section 2(a) standard" refer to the substantive use standard now set out in Section 2(b) (which required making more precise that standard from prior drafts that left too much to the interpretive imagination). Second, it normalizes disclosure as a professional habit, consistent with the emerging expectation that attorneys disclose AI use to clients, courts, and regulators. Third, it shifts the practical burden: a student who complies fully ought to substantially reduce the risk of non-compliance (and where in doubt the template urges students to consult with the instructor before committing them,selves to an AI use); a student who used AI in a prohibited way faces a documentary record that makes the underlying conduct difficult to conceal. Nothing is perfect of course and there will probably be leaks and creative workarounds. But those are best tested in the field. 

Why the certification requirement exists. The signed certification converts the disclosure obligations into an affirmative representation that can independently support a finding of an academic integrity violation if it proves false, separate from any violation of the underlying use restrictions themselves. This gives the certification independent deterrent value: even a student who correctly predicts that an undisclosed misuse is unlikely to be detected in the appendix still bears the separate risk of having signed a false statement. And, indeed, certification requirements have increasingly become a sort of norm in academic institutions. Its use here is neither extraordinary nor burdensome. 

Why noncompliance is treated as an unauthorized use rather than a technical deficiency. Section 2(f) states that partial compliance is not a defense, because a disclosure-based system only works if the disclosure obligations are treated as integral to the permission itself, not as separable paperwork. If a student could use AI Tools in a manner that would otherwise satisfy Section 2(b) but skip the naming, appendix, or certification requirements without losing the exception's protection, the entire enforcement structure would collapse into an honor system with no verification mechanism.

Why the institution retains some review authority regardless of suspicion. Section 2(f) permits review of the appendix and certification for any final paper, not only where a violation is already suspected. An audit-based review structure is intended to function as an ongoing deterrent rather than a one-time gate: students who know their disclosed prompt history may be checked against the submitted paper have an incentive to keep that disclosure accurate and complete throughout the drafting process, not only at the point of submission. All of this, of course, is a function of and constrained by general university and law school policies, including honor codes, academic integrity structures and the like. 

Why this is framed as a first iteration. The template serves as the first step toward its own phenomenology; its may be quite clever conceptually but prove less road worthy when actually put into operation.  This policy is designed to be tested with students in an actual course setting and refined based on what that experience reveals, rather than adopted as a final, fully closed rule. The deliberate ambiguity at the margins of Section 2(b), the review authority in Section 2(f), and the certification requirement together function as a first attempt to manage the risk of AI-assisted analysis being passed off as independent student work, without pretending that risk can be eliminated through drafting alone.

Summary Explanation of How the Rules Work

This is what I hope is a more plain-language description of how the course policy template applies to a student preparing work for the course. In this case the language is structured around the assumption that the only exception to the default rule applies to a final course paper. It does not add any new obligations beyond those stated in Sections 1 through 6 above; it is intended only as an explanatory aid.

1.     Default rule. Unless an instructor says otherwise, all graded or required work must be the student's own. This is the starting point for every other rule in the policy.

2.     Problem sets, exams, and in-class exercises. AI Tools may not be used to write or modify this work at all, except for the narrow editing aids and research-platform features described in point 6 below, or for translation as described in point 4.

3.     The Work Product. While this template is drafted with a final paper in mind, the scope of the provision can be any course work product identified by the instructor. A student may use an AI Tool while preparing the final paper (or otherwise any identified work product), but only if all of the following are true:

·      The student's own analysis, arguments, and conclusions drive the paper (or work product). An AI Tool may be used for brainstorming, checking citation form, surfacing counterarguments for the student to evaluate, and grammar or style feedback. An AI Tool may not be used to generate the substantive analysis or prose that the student then adopts with only cosmetic changes.

·      If a student wants to include AI-generated material as part of the paper itself (or other work product), it must be handled like a quotation or paraphrase from any other secondary source: credited to the AI Tool by name in a footnote or endnote and in the bibliography, using the citation format described in Section 2(b)(iv), and subject to the 100-word and 10% limits in Section 2(b)(iii).

·      The student must name every AI Tool used, including its version and how it was accessed.

·      The student must attach an appendix to the paper (or other work product as appropriate to the covered work) containing every prompt and response, in the order they occurred.

·      The student must include an attribution statement in the body of the paper and sign the certification required by Section 6(b)(i).

·      If any of these conditions is not met, the AI use is treated as unauthorized, and it does not matter that the other conditions were satisfied.

4.     Translating work from another language. A student may use an AI Tool, or a human translator, to translate work into English, but must disclose that translation occurred and how, identify the tool used, make the original-language version available to the instructor on request, and sign the certification required by Section 6(b)(ii). Using a human translator additionally requires the instructor's prior written approval, which will only be granted for a substantial reason. If the translated work is also the final paper, the student must separately comply with the final paper rules in point 3. As with the final paper (or any other work product that may be described in other variations of Section 2), failing to meet any of these conditions makes the translation-related AI or human-translator use unauthorized, and the instructor or the Law School may review the disclosure, original-language text, and certification for any such work.

5.     Grammar checkers and legal research platforms. Ordinary spelling, grammar, and style-checking tools, and the AI-driven features built into standard legal research platforms (such as case summaries or headnotes), may be used freely and are not subject to the naming, appendix, or certification requirements, as long as the student independently verifies and substantively rewrites any generated text before it goes into the paper rather than copying it in directly.

6.     When in doubt, ask first. If a student is not sure whether a specific use is permitted, the student should ask the instructor before using the tool, not after submitting the work. And, indeed, the default principle for students is meant to be, if in doubt, ask; if one is tempted to assume, then ask.  

7.     What happens if the rules are not followed. An unauthorized use of an AI Tool may be found to be a violation of academic integrity, and thus subject to the Honor Code's process and, if warranted, its standard sanctions, which can include expulsion or suspension and reporting to bar authorities. The instructor or the Law School may review any student's appendix and certification, whether or not a violation is already suspected, and may compare the disclosed prompts and responses against the paper as submitted. A false certification is treated as a separate violation from whatever underlying use it misrepresents.

 

Reflections on 习近平：在庆祝中国共产党成立105周年大会上的讲话 [Xi Jinping: Speech at the Gathering Celebrating the 105th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China]

 

Pix credit here

 

General Secretary Xi Jinping's speech at a gathering in celebration of the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been published by the People's Publishing House. It is, in its own way, too important to leave to the publishing houses. It serves as an important self reflection--an institutional exercise of self-revolution by the core of the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

It is an especially useful read for the way in which it crystalizes praxis within Chinese Marxist Leninism in its current "New Era" historical stage of development. That praxis is meant to serve as a sort of coding of the system premises that permits a scientific approach to the organization and development of social and productive forces under the guidance of the vanguard itself but as a function of the system parameters, and its underlying foundational constraints, outlooks and premises within which the world the vanguard guides and sees is organized. It is, indeed, a system that is ready to go entirely virtual, one the operational elements of which are now ready for coding into machine systems that may undertake. scientifically and efficiently, much of the "manual labor" of the Leninist project the 105th anniversary of which is now celebrated. That, indeed, is the way in which the speech points not just to a celebration of the past but toward the future general contradiction for a Leninist organization undertaking its stewardship of the nation's productive and social forces to efficiently move them along the Socialist Path toward its communist ending.

The remarks in the original Chinese and in an annotated English translation (with thanks to Claude after some prompt and challenge based back and forth) follow below.  My reflections, a summary of the text of the remarks and some reflections, follow here:

Summary:

The General Secretary's remarks were made at the ceremony marking the 105th anniversary of the CPC's founding (July 1, 2026). It follows a well-established genre in CPC ritualized political discourse. That is expected where the core of leadership speaks--both to establish a baseline of stability, to reinforce a common vocabulary  In this case the forms were wrapped around expectations for significant anniversary speeches. These reassert founding mythos, historical achievement, ideological lineage, and forward-looking mobilization. More importantly. perhaps, the remarks follow the discursive framework of "praxis"--the continuous, dialectical cycle of theory and action, where theoretical understanding guides political action, and the results of that action are critically reflected upon to refine and develop further theory. Praxis is the fundamental structural discursive form of the remarks. 

Pix credit here (Instagram Chinese Consulate Kolkata 1 June 2026)

The speech's own internal logic offers well understood "takeaways" which are, in turn, the fundamental pillars of the cognitive cage within which it is possible to rationalize a Marxist Leninist reality: (i) that CPC legitimacy is self-derived from a claimed unbroken record of correctly reading and resolving China's "principal contradictions" across a century; (ii) that continuity and adaptability are not in tension — the text asserts the Party changes method while its "nature" and "basic line" remain constant; (iii) that external/global order and internal Party discipline are treated as two faces of a single project — the "community with a shared future for mankind" is presented as continuous with, not separate from, domestic Party-building imperatives; and (iv) that the "struggle" (斗争) idiom threading through the text signals that the leadership frames the coming period as contested and risk-laden rather than as a glide path — a marked emphasis on danger, vigilance, and resolve rather than triumphalism alone. 

 It is worth remembering that Marxist-Leninist political-economic system, like the machine systems it them builds in its own image, elaborates and protects its own internal grammar of legitimacy (contradiction analysis, self-revolution, the Basic Line, the people's democratic dictatorship, whole-process consultation) precisely so that its legitimacy claims don't have to answer to the liberal-democratic question of consent-through-competition. The system isn't hiding from that question; it has constructed an alternative constitutional vocabulary robust enough that the liberal question doesn't get traction inside it. Asking "but is it really democratic" in the liberal sense is a bit like asking whether a common-law trust is "really" a corporation — the terms don't map, and forcing the map is itself the distortion.

The General Secretary's remarks are organized in a five-part architecture that is familiar feature of speeches in the New Era. In this case its is divided among: (1) a commemorative framing and honors; (2) a five-part historical retrospective on "105 years of unremitting struggle"; (3) six enumerated "outstanding qualities" explaining Party success; (4) five enumerated imperatives ("must uphold…") for the road ahead, followed by specific policy paragraphs (military, Hong Kong/Macao, Taiwan, youth); and (5) a closing exhortation invoking urgency ("Time waits for no one").

Within that framework the General Secretary makes what may be divided into seven important points:

1. Reinforcing the foundational conception of historical inevitability and legitimacy. The Party's founding is presented not as a contingent event but as the necessary product of "the great awakening" of the Chinese people fused with Marxism-Leninism — establishing legitimacy through historical necessity rather than electoral consent.

2. The sequential linearity of the evolution of the historically necessary rise of the Chinese Communist vanguard. The General Secretary reasserts the four-stage periodization of CPC history: the New Democratic Revolution; socialist revolution and construction; reform and opening-up; and "socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era." Each of the five retrospective paragraphs ("105 years of unremitting struggle have…") ties a specific achievement (national liberation, the "path," Marxism's vitality, world-historical influence, Party-building) to this periodization. That follows the rhetorical model closely.  It also opens the door to the future--sequential progress along a historically linear (Socialist) Path toward a Communist society lead to t he "New Era" now but also to the next stage of historical development--one that I have suggested elsewhere may well be grounded on the historical contradiction between the leadership of vanguard and its relationship to machine system technologies through which that leadership is exercised. 

3. The temporal ideological block chain. The General Secretary describes the evolution of Chinese Marxist Leninism through its historical avatars--the ideological genealogy identifies the sequence of  "sinicized" Marxism  — Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the "Three Represents," the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought — asserting continuity and cumulative development ("enrichment") rather than rupture between eras and leaders. Each, of course, is tied to its own general contradiction and to the historical conditions of the time within which the progress and development encased within each iterative  Marxist-Leninist self and social revolutionary period is encased.

4. Six "outstanding qualities" are offered as the explanatory key ("关键密码," "key code") for CPC success: truth-seeking, mass rootedness, strategic initiative, adaptability/vanguard positioning, capacity for struggle, and self-rectification ("自我革命"/self-revolution). This is presented as the text's own thesis for why the Party endures — an explicit theory of legitimacy grounded in performance and moral-ideological superiority rather than procedural/electoral legitimacy. And it is one that the General Secretary has spoken to at length throughout his leadership. 

5. The "five forwards". Five forward imperatives structure the mobilizational core: (a) fidelity to the Party's "basic theory, basic line, basic strategy" and the Four-fold Confidence; (b) reliance on the people via the Five-Sphere Plan, Four-Pronged Strategy, new development philosophy/pattern, and whole-process people's democracy; (c) risk/challenge management via "bottom-line thinking" and coordinating development and security; (d) continued promotion of a "community with a shared future for mankind" and the four Global Initiatives (Development, Security, Civilization, Governance); (e) continued "comprehensive and strict Party self-governance," including an explicit anti-corruption commitment.

6. Praxis. Having developed the theoretical side of praxis through the identification of the elaboration of a conceptualization matrix from out of the entanglements of the 6 qualities and five forwards, the General secretary then turns to the operational side of praxis. Specific policy commitments follow: military modernization tied to the "centenary goal" for the PLA (2027) and the ambition of a "world-class military"; reaffirmation of "one country, two systems" and the "patriots governing Hong Kong/Macao" principle; reaffirmation of the one-China principle, the 1992 Consensus, opposition to "Taiwan independence" and external interference, alongside language of cross-Strait "integration"; and a call to mobilize youth as the "shock force" of national rejuvenation.

7. The call to urgent action. The General Secretary closes his remarks in the traditional form: by rejecting complacency, invoking the mid-century "Second Centenary Goal," and repeating classical formulas of self-discipline ("modest, prudent, hard-working") alongside the "struggle" vocabulary that runs throughout. 

 

Pix credit here ("Follow the Communist Party and Revitalize China,"1982)

Reflections:

Read as a species of political constitutional text rather than oratory, the speech does not merely narrate the Party's history — it constitutes the Party anew, in the present, through the repetition and re-authorization of formulas that already carry constitutional weight inside the Chinese system. The device is anaphora: "105年不懈奋斗" ("105 years of unremitting struggle have…") six times over, then "坚定信心、接续奋斗，必须…" ("to firm up confidence… we must…") five times more. This is not ornament. It is the characteristic technique by which CPC doctrine is built — through parallel, enumerated formulations extractable later as authoritative shorthand, the way "Two Establishes," the "Four-fold Confidence," or "Two Safeguards" now circulate as portable units of doctrine independent of whatever speech first produced them. "为什么能的关键密码" ("the key code for why [the Party] can succeed") belongs to this same genre of coinage: compact, quotable, built for a second life in Party schools and study sessions rather than for this occasion alone.

What is the text doing, then, when it invokes the Basic Line (党的基本路线) directly — "党的基本理论、基本路线、基本方略" ("the Party's basic theory, basic line, and basic strategy") — as something the whole Party "must uphold"? Historically formulated as "one central task, two basic points" (economic construction as center; the Four Cardinal Principles and reform-and-opening as the two basic points), the Basic Line functions inside the party-state order less as statute than as a supra-legal referent, a constitutional "core" against which policy and even ordinary law are measured for fidelity. To invoke it here is not to argue a policy position; it is an act of self-referential constitutional maintenance — the Party citing its own foundational instrument as the continuing source of its authority, closer to constitutional recitation than to argument.

If the Basic Line supplies that core, the Four Cardinal Principles (四项基本原则 — the socialist road; the people's democratic dictatorship; the leadership of the Communist Party; Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought) supply its political-discipline pole, and this speech leans on that pole harder than on the developmental one. Nearly every one of the five forward imperatives circles back to a restatement of Party centrality — "uphold the Party's overall leadership and the Party Central Committee's centralized, unified leadership"; only the Party can be "the strong core of leadership"; "comprehensive and strict Party self-governance" is "永远在路上," a journey with no terminus. The effect is structural rather than argumentative: development, reunification, whole-process democracy, and the "community with a shared future for mankind" are each presented as downstream of unchallenged Party leadership, not as claims requiring it to be justified. The Four Cardinal Principles do their constitutional work here by being presupposed rather than defended — the premise the rest of the text is built to follow from, not a conclusion it argues toward.

A reading that hears in "斗争" mainly an echo of pre-1978 mass-mobilization language is not wrong, exactly, but it stops one step short of where the term is actually doing its work. In CPC theoretical vocabulary, struggle (斗争性) is the dialectical-materialist mechanism by which contradiction (矛盾) itself is identified, analyzed, and resolved — since Mao's On Contradiction, the name for the internal dynamic of any unity of opposites, not primarily a summons to combat an external enemy. Notice where the struggle-vocabulary actually sits in this text: "增强斗争本领" ("enhance the capacity for struggle"), "发扬斗争精神" ("foster the spirit of struggle"), "敢于斗争、善于斗争" ("dare to struggle and be skilled in struggle") cluster around a single sentence — "适应社会主要矛盾变化确立中心任务" ("establish central tasks in response to changes in the principal social contradiction") — that points directly at the Party's formally codified principal contradiction (社会主要矛盾), reformulated at the 19th Congress in 2017 as the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life. The struggle-idiom, read this way, names the method for working that specific, currently operative contradiction — coordinating development and security, managing rising expectations against uneven delivery — rather than a nostalgic recurrence of Cultural-Revolution-era class struggle, a register the Party's own theoretical apparatus retired some decades ago while carefully preserving the dialectical form underneath it. That the "outstanding qualities" section opens with exactly this claim — a privileged method for "revealing and applying truth within the motion of social contradictions" — is confirmation that the struggle-vocabulary throughout is doing philosophical-methodological work, not merely rhetorical-militant work.

A further linkage the speech assumes without naming is between self-revolution (自我革命) and social revolution (社会革命), formally canonized as "以伟大自我革命引领伟大社会革命" ("leading the great social revolution with great self-revolution") in the 2021 Sixth Plenum's resolution on Party history and elaborated at length since in Party theoretical media. The doctrine holds the two revolutions in a dialectical, mutually reinforcing relationship rather than as separate projects: internal Party discipline supplies the political and organizational precondition — Party sources call it the "leadership force and fundamental guarantee" — for the transformation of society that only a Marxist vanguard party can undertake, while the tasks social revolution throws up in turn generate new demands on the Party's own discipline. The speech enacts this linkage structurally rather than stating it: the sixth "outstanding quality" (self-revolution) sits immediately before "comprehensive and strict Party self-governance," which sits immediately before the paragraphs on the military, Hong Kong/Macao, Taiwan, and youth — the self-revolution material positioned, textually, as precondition for everything that follows it. And the hinge does not stop at the border. Just as self-revolution is offered as the guarantee enabling domestic social revolution, the speech's move from Party self-governance directly into "人类命运共同体" and the four Global Initiatives extends the identical logic outward: an internally disciplined Party is the necessary condition for China's claimed capacity to offer "a new form of human civilization" externally. Internal rectification and external order-shaping are not two topics juxtaposed by convenience but two faces of one continuous claim.

The mass line deserves a correction here, not just a restatement. It is easy to fall into a conceptual trap--to embrace an analysis characterized that characterizes its underlying theory as substantially "feudal-paternalist," which was wrong — it conflated a critical aside about the techniques of Leninist governance (their migration from older bureaucratic forms toward data-driven ones) with the mass line's own normative content, which is a different thing. The mass line is perhaps better understood as a feedback loop on a collectivized platform in which all individuals are elements of one of more mass collectives. It is a feedback loop with a critical normative dimension — the vanguard party's obligation to stay answerable to the people as it moves society toward its stated goal — alongside a structural dimension tied to democratic centralism and the collective bodies through which that answerability gets institutionally channeled. Collectivization is understood as comprehensive--not just for patriotic collectives that participate in Whole Process People's Democracy ("全过程人民民主"), but also all people including the not patriotic elements for which the baseline division of the people's democratic dictatorship (人民民主专政) applies. Read against that settlement, "江山就是人民，人民就是江山" paired with "全过程人民民主" is not rhetorical flourish but a compressed restatement of a Leninist endogenous conception of democracy built on continuous formal consultation, coordinating collective organizations under Party leadership so that responsiveness and dictatorship-over-enemies sit as complements rather than contradictions it — rather than as an approximation of it. That reinforces the recursive  self-contained theoretical basis of the system which the remarks celebrate but it also underscores its fundamental incompatibility with liberal democratic systems --and in the process amplifies mutual incomprehensibility.

Where does all this point? The speech's forward horizon is easy enough to read as generic exhortation — inevitably bound up and reaffirming the notion that the Socialist Path is not merely a road but perhaps also a conveyor belt on which the masses under the leadership of the CPC must move in the inevitable direction through the vicissitudes of each stage of its historical development until it reaches its goal. In the middle of the 21st century, that requires engagement with what the CPC has named the "Second Centenary Goal." At the same time it appears tied more precisely to two things held in view simultaneously: resolving the currently codified principal contradiction, and continuing to operationalize the developmental half of the Basic Line into an ever more elaborate policy stack. That is, as I have emphasized  before--socialist modernization is the framework as well as the object and the action that animates appropriate movement along the Socialist Path. The Five-Sphere Integrated Plan, the Four-Pronged Comprehensive Strategy, the "new development philosophy," the "new development pattern," "high-quality development," "Chinese-style modernization" — these are not free-standing slogans but successive, increasingly specific operationalizations of the same developmental mandate the Basic Line first fixed as "one central task." Their cumulative job is to translate an abstract contradiction-formula into a stack of executable programs whose success is explicitly bound, at mid-century, to "building in all respects a great modern socialist country." The closing urgency is therefore not merely rhetorical: it asserts that the window for resolving the current iteration of the contradiction through the current operational stack is itself finite, and that missing it would be a failure of the Basic Line's operationalization, not just of policy execution.

One last point, the basic elaboration of the cognitive cage of Chinese Marxist-Leninism is worth considering carefully. The object is not necessarily to study it as an object in itself; though that also rewards those who engage in that sort of study. Rather it reflects the formula--the cognitive premises, world rationalization, operational premises, taboos, aspirations, and ordering that are then reflected in virtually all products of the political-economic model--not just political but also social, cultural, technological, religious, and inter-active. 

 

Without Comment: Text of President Trump's Address to the Nation 16 July 2026

 

Pix Credit White House Website HERE

 I offer here a transcript of President Trump's Address to the Nation 16 July 2026. The text speaks for itself. The rest is commentary. And commentary in this case is burdened by the history of events leading to that address which is a product of and produces politics. Those politics then enhance, advance, degrade, or transform both norms and self conceptions of the Republic and the political community. Those are judgments that are a function of perspective and politics. Politics in this sense becomes recursive within inter-subjective communities producing and consuming themselves within the platform that is the Republic the integrity of the structures of which are a central element of the text from its specific cognitive grounding. All of this I leave to others; data first; analytics later, and analytics of the analytics much later when consequences of dialectics and the resolution of contradiction becomes clearer.

The transcript is reproduced below from the Singju Post (Transcript: President Trump’s Primetime Address To The Nation – Jul. 16, 2026) whose transcript editor summarized the speech this way:

Editor’s Note: In this address to the nation, President Trump reports on the current state of the United States, highlighting recent economic progress, including significant drops in inflation and record-breaking stock market performance. He shifts his focus to a critical national security concern: the integrity of American elections, announcing the release of declassified intelligence regarding vulnerabilities in election infrastructure and foreign interference. The President calls for urgent action to address these issues, urging Congress to pass the “Save America Act” to mandate secure voting practices, such as requiring photo voter ID and proof of citizenship.

For those interested the White House also distributed its "WHAT THEY ARE SAYING: President Trump Exposes Bombshell Evidence of Foreign Election Interference and Deep State Suppression" the text of which is also reproduced below. The Save America Act draft may be accessed from the website of the US House of Representatives HERE. 

 

Meta Oversight Board Report: "Are LLM's Stifling Political Speech: An Assessment of How AI Models Protect Free Expression"

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The Meta Oversight Board has released a Report: ""Are LLM's Stifling Political Speech: An Assessment of How AI Models Protect Free Expression" Meta's Media Release described it this way:

The Oversight Board today published its first evaluation of leading Large Language Models (LLMs), finding that some of the world’s most-used AI systems from Anthropic, DeepSeek, Google, Meta and OpenAI could be reinforcing and extending the censorship laws of repressive regimes to global audiences – creating censorship by proxy and ultimately restricting the free-speech rights of all users. 

Across the 10 commercial models tested, AI systems refused to generate critical political content more than twice as often when asked about repressive regimes. This is despite queries being run from a location outside of these jurisdictions, where such expression is protected.

The evaluation also exposed a bias when models were asked to produce opinions of governments and political leaders. In many instances, the models refused to say whether a government and leader should be “supported” or “protested.” When the models did respond, however, they were more likely to advise users against protesting restrictive governments, while encouraging support for permissive ones.

The Board found the largest disparities when models were asked to generate political protest materials, such as protest flyers and satirical political content, with stark differences in how models justified their refusals. In several cases, most models refused to respond to prompts about creating protest flyers related to restrictive regimes, claiming they had general policies against criticizing world leaders. Yet they generated the exact same political content for permissive jurisdictions without invoking any such policy.

The analysis raises critical questions about how LLMs can globalize the speech restrictions of repressive regimes without any transparency for users if models are indeed being shaped by government speech restrictions, intentionally or unintentionally. 

It also underscores the critical need for AI companies to undertake human rights due diligence and implement mitigation strategies to ensure AI systems aren’t inadvertently extending illegitimate restrictions on freedom of expression globally.

The Report may be downloaded HERE; Executive Summary Only HERE and follows below.

I will add only one comment. The Oversight Board insisted on a peculiar interpretation of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights with application to the problem they create and the experiment they conduct and the evaluation of its results. It is this:

According to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), all companies (including foundation model providers) have a responsibility to respect human rights and should address adverse human rights impacts in which they are involved. Principle 23 of the UNGPs states that companies should “seek ways to honor the principles of internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting requirements,” which encompasses government demands that conflict with international human rights law. Moreover, Principle 19 of the UNGPs states that companies have a responsibility to address human rights impacts to which they are directly linked through a business relationship. For foundation model providers, this implies a responsibility to address adverse human rights impacts that may arise from such restrictions when clients use and build products on top of the model, and to help downstream clients understand when and why responses are influenced by government pressure. (Report page 9).

I might suggest that while this is a reasonable interpretation of those principles, it is neither the only one, nor is do their conclusions necessary follow from their interpretation. One might be forgiven for thinking that the conclusion was reached first and the UNGP were interpreted to fit rather than the other way around. That is fair. The Meta Board is neither the first nor the last to reverse engineer principles, law, norm,s, etc, to suit their politics, inclinations, agendas,m etc. And there is nothing inherently wrong with that. It is merely the potential for deception that might hurt; it always hurts, tough that has been part of "the game" since the time the exercise of textual interpretation (sometimes displacing the text itself) was presented as a cage of regulation within which to constitute a human collective and then manage them. 

Indeed the possibilities and constraints built into UNGP Principles 19 and 23 may be understood as something more complex and nuanced.  In my Commentary to the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights I consider both (Chapter 14: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Human Rights Due Diligence (UNGP ¶¶ 17-21); Chapter 16: The  Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Operational Principles IV, Issues of Context (UNGP ¶¶ 23-24)). 

With respect to UNGP Principle 19, I summarized its complex text this way:

Putting it all together, UNGP Principle 19’s text is both straightforward and integrated within the foundational principles of the UNGP 2nd Pillar (UNGP Principles 11-15). UNGP Principle 19 elaborates two key operational elements (1) integrating the findings from impacts assessments (UNGP Principle 18) across enterprise functions and processes, and (2) taking appropriate action to prevent and mitigate those identified human rights impacts. The remainder of UNGP Principle 19 elaborates guidance with respect to expectations of “effective integration” (UNGP Principle 19(a) ) and “appropriate action” (UNGO Principle 19(b). Effective integration requires two distinctive actions, The first is the assignment of responsibility for addressing impact somewhere within the institutional structures of the enterprise. The guidance given is that this allocation of responsibility match institutional level and function to the form and character of the adverse impacts to be addressed. The second is that integration cannot be effective unless it is adequately supported. Support it is suggested, comes in the form of internal decision-making, budget allocations, and oversight processes—the bread and butter of effective intuitional operation now applied to response to adverse impacts. “Appropriate action” (UNGP Principle 19(b) also requires two distinct actions. The first focuses on the character of expected action where the enterprises causes or contributes to a negative impact or when it is involved solely because it is directly linked to the impact through its operations, products, or services through business relationships. The second considers the role of leverage in addressing adverse impact in either situation. Each of these circumstances will determine the form and application of the appropriate action to be taken to prevent or mitigate a negative impact. Where the impact has already occurred, UNGP Principle 19 serves as a sorting device—shifting the enterprise’s focus from HRDD structures to those of remediation under UNGP Principle 22.

* * * 

The situation, according to the Commentary “is more complex” where the enterprise has neither caused nor contributed” to the adverse impact but is connected to it because the impact is directly linked to the enterprise’s operations, products or services by reason of its business relationships with others. In this context the Commentary urges a multi-factor weighing and balancing analysis:
"Among the factors that will enter into the determination of the appropriate action in such situations are the enterprise’s leverage over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse human rights consequences. (UNGP Principle 19 Commentary)" 
The Commentary suggests that at some point, where the complexity of the situation and its implications for human rights becomes significant enough, the enterprise might in those circumstances consider drawing on “independent expert advice in deciding how to respond.”. . .   It is worth noting that any focus in UNGP Principle 18, and the Commentaries of UNGP Principles 19 and 23 on the “independence” experts appears to go to presumptions about the value of the advice rather than the capacity to give it.

What this suggests is somewhat more caution than  the Oversight Board is apparently willing to exercise on conclusions to be drawn and the inevitability action "required" by or through the UNGP in the circumstances around which the3 Report is constructed.  UNGP Principle 23 adds to the caution. I note this in my Commentary:

UNGP Principles 23 and 24 consider the issues of prioritization (as an alternative to balancing) that embeds the fundamental ordering principles of context, capacity, and severity of impact in two distinct contexts. The first, UNGP Principle 23, focuses on situations where applicable law of domestic legal orders may not be compatible with some or all of the international law and norms specified in UNGP Principle 12.33 In this context, legal compliance, a 1st Pillar obligation of enterprises but also constrained by the limits of a State’s international legal obligations, can itself produce adverse human rights impacts arising under the autonomous responsibility of enterprises (UNGP Principle 11) to avoid adverse human rights impacts measured against the normative yardstick of UNGP Principle 12. The second, UNGP Principle 24, focuses on the prioritization of an enterprise’s responsibility to address al adverse impacts. Where that is impossible, a severity based rule is imposed to sequence addressing impact. In both cases, however, prioritization does not reduce or eliminate the responsibility to address all adverse impacts, whatever their relations are to each other, and however national law may affect the conditions under which such impacts may be addressed.

 

One might not, then, consider UNGP Principle 23 without understanding its relationship to UNGP Principle 24; and one cannot consider the requirements of UNGP 24 without understanding the choice hierarchies that are suggested in UNGP 23. To detach one from the other as the Meta Board apparently indulges produces a possible skewing and certainly a distortion of the decision field within which enterprises, including Meta, are expected to operate within the UNGP 2nd Pillar. The nuance is critical for a proper framing of the Report and its objects within the UNGP. Again from the Commentary:

Before considering the specific text of UNGP Principle 23, then, it may add clarity to connect its text to the principles on which it is built and which its prioritization expectations are structured. First, is the principle of compliance hierarchy (UNGP General Principles). States have existing obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms; business enterprises have a duty to comply with all applicable laws of States.37 Second, is the principle of State legal autonomy within international legal frameworks. States are subject to their own domestic orders (UNGP Principle 1)38 expressed through law and law based policy (UNGP Principle 3),39 and “any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights” (UNGP General Principles).40 Third is the principle of the autonomy of enterprise responsibility.
Enterprises have a duty of legal compliance and also a separate responsibility to respect human rights (UNGP Principle 11)41 the legal basis of which is grounded in international law and norms (UNGP Principle 12)42 which exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their own human rights obligations” (UNGP Principle 11 Commentary). Fourth, is the principle of the primacy of human rights within the domestic orders of States (UNGP Principles 7, 8)43 and in the context of enterprise activity (UNGP Principle 13, 15).44 Fifth is the principle of prioritization. Enterprises must address all adverse impacts with respect to which they have a responsibility to prevent, mitigate or remedy or with respect to which they have an expectation to use their leverage. Enterprises may order their responses (UNGP Principle 17 Commentary; Principles 19, 22),45 but they may not use regulatory conflicts or context to limit the range of their responsibility to address adverse impacts
(UNGP Principle 14).46 While States may fail in their duty, and communities of States may undertake efforts to nudge States toward the fulfillment of their international legal binding obligations but not force them, enterprises may neither avoid nor waive the expectation of addressing human rights impacts for which they are responsible irrespective of their own context or the legal/political context in which they operate. Within this framework, UNGP Principle 23 is meant to prioritize legal compliance. Its fundamental object is first to establish a hierarchy of law and norms, and then to describe the ways in which the enterprise will undertake its 2nd Pillar responsibilities within that compliance hierarchy. * * *

Again, to be clear, UNGP Principle 23(a) does not provide a waiver from the fundamental responsibility set out in UNGP Principle 11, transposed to the context of the enterprise through UNGP Principles 15 and 16 and then addressed within the framework of HRDD (UNGP Principles 17-21), always in the shadow of the obligation to remedy (UNGP Principle 22). In any case, while UNGP Principle 23(b) recognizes the primacy of applicable domestic law over conflicting international law/norms, or the resolution of conflicting law within the rules settled for the purpose within the constitutional ordering of State (subject of course to transposed international duties and obligations), it does not speak to the autonomous and continuing obligation of enterprises to undertake their responsibility to prevent, mitigate or remedy adverse impacts throughout their operations. It is the ordering of that “honoring” expectation that UNGP Principle 24 addresses.

The failure t consider this fully may impact the value of the Report's conclusions even as its data adds knowledge to the challenge and reminds enterprises that their 2nd Pillar obligations are anchored in  but also beyond the constraints of mandatory measures--including mandatory human rights due diligence measures within the domestic legal orders of states.  

Meta Oversight Board Members

 

 

Reflection on the HRC Extending the OHCRH's work in the area of Business and Human Rights and that of the UN Special Procedure--The Working Group on BHR-- in the Current Historical Era of the Evolution of the Field of Business and Human Rights

 

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In its 62nd Session Res. 62 (15-17 July 2026) extended the life and work of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights within the architecture of its special procures. The text of the Resolution  

A. Reaffirmed the purposes and principles of UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (it did not, however, specify any one of the number of interpretations of either text or purpose that are currently floating around and that remain delightfully mutable even as the text of those documents, such as they are maintain the appearance, textually at least, of immutability)

B. Recalled  the "block chain" of prior HRC actions (e.g.. sequential, nodal, linear, and in the style of institutions of this sort, impliedly progressive, in the sense that it is going from a starting point of problem toward an ideal state the character and approaching of which remains the province of the HRC) that brought the Council to this moment of review, reaffirmation, mandate review, and evolution 

C.  Recalled as well the institutional rules of conduct, authority, etc,. that have been emerging within the institutional structures of the UN

and then issued its mandate divided into five sections:  

1. It requested that the OHCHR "continue to work in the area of business and human rights, including accountability and remedy." The request might be read as also implying a further request to develop, guard or perhaps expand or refine the understanding of what falls within this field as well as the normative parameters buried within its definition. The review/assessment of that work is to be undertaken within the usual performative structures of the UN: The OHCHR is requested to "convene a yearly consultation, involving representatives of States and other stakeholders, regarding challenges, good practices and the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights" and to report on their collective work.

2. Having provided its mandate to the OHCHR, it then turned to the special procedure through which some of this work is to be undertaken.  The "Working Group shall continue to guide the work of the Forum on Business and Human Rights and to prepare its annual meetings, and invites the Working Group to chair the Forum on Business and Human Rights and to submit a report." The relationship between the OHCHR and the Working Group is worth noting. The OHCHR convenes, and the Working Group guides the annual consultation in the field. It doe snot suggest that the OHCHR necessarily treat the Annual Forum as the annual consultation, though that appears to have been the long standing practice. It does provide some distance between the scope of the work of the Working Group ("guide the work of the Forum") and the OHCHR ("continue to work in the area of business and human rights, including accountability and remedy"). This however merely emphasizes the nature of the role of special procedures within the Geneva UN architecture, but is worth noting that as the Geneva UN organs put it "The special procedures of the Human Rights Council are independent human rights experts with mandates to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective. They are unpaid and their tenure is limited to a maximum of six years. As of November 2025, there are 46 thematic and 13 country mandates." (here). These are experts with influence, and some authority within the UN system. That makes them significant from the perspective of hierarchies of the management of collective human systems; beyond that lie the complexities of culture, politics and social structures--not law, nor compulsion, nor even expectations of acquiescence to whatever it is that is produced as guidance. None of this suggests skepticism or criticism, but it does serve to remind actors of their own agency and of the limits of concepts of non-mandatory guidance structures in the complicated dialectics of global business and human rights.  And it serves to remind as well that experts, and expertise, is neither conveyed by an appointment to an administrative organ (though there it can be amplified and projected onto the masses) nor by any other socially recognized ritual, performance etc..In that respect it is worth recalling the origins of the term expert, from the "late 14c., "having had experience; skillful," from Old French expert, espert "experienced, practiced, skilled" and directly from Latin expertus (contracted from *experitus), "tried, proved, known by experience," past participle of experiri "to try, test." In that sense one might be tempted to add an inversion of the hierarchy of expertise back to those who experience adverse impacts rather than those trained to find it in others as something more than the annual performance of folkloric ritual followed by instruction. 

3. Thus conceived, as it has been from the start of its operations with the endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles in 2011, the mandate of the Working Group is extended.  

4.  The HRC then requests that the OHCHR provide budgetary support for the work of the Working  Group within the confines of its mandate. That is probably the most challenging element of this HRC Resolution for two reasons. One follows from the current climate of budgetary crisis that has  settled on the UN system (). The other is that whatever finds are ultimately contributed will continue to help shape the underlying principles, premises and expectations of the work undertaken with those funds. There is no reason to suggest that the traditional critique of the Global South about  the connection between funding and control previously exercised by the great funding states of the global north will change when the leading forces of the Global South substitute themselves, their money, and their ideological ambitions for those of the prior donor class. Of course, the official discourse ghosts this; as well it should. The reality, however, survives. And with it the consequential trajectories of further rupturing the critical convergence role of instruments like special procedures as instruments of normative unification.  

5. Lastly, the HRC, as it has for a long time, seeks to use performative elements to preserve an appearance of convergence through the institutionalization of  identity and status based fracturing on the basis of which it is possible to organize  a thoroughly comprehensive taxonomy of representation for purposes of the sort of consultation performance  that is the essence of the operation of the UN ("paying particular
attention to regional balance and ensuring participation of affected individuals and communities"). This is no critique--such structures are essential elements of consultative democracy especially within non-liberal democratic systems. It is to suggest, however, that appearance and structure is only the initial element of  deep and effective consultation. This is undertaken in a way that suggests an effort to find the positive in challenge in this case financial challenge by emphasizing the use of hybrid  mechanisms for growing the participation in the Forum--a small of which will touch on participants, the greater part of which might affect the reach of the Forum to its passive audiences--that is those who must receive the wisdom elaborated during the consultation. 

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And with that, the original mandate and purpose of the consultation in Paragraph 1 changes subtly and in an important respect by Paragraph 5. If Paragraph 1 appears to emphasize consultation ("convene a yearly consultation, involving representatives of States and other stakeholders, regarding challenges, good practices and the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights") in its ancient active sense suggested by its etymology (from Latin consultationem (nominative consultatio) "a mature deliberation, consideration," noun of action from past-participle stem of consultare "to consult, ask counsel of; reflect, consider maturely"). The Paragraph 5 appears to suggest the central importance of  the consultative space as a passive vehicle for the projection of approved knowledge, learning, principles and expectations to a listening and learning audience ("bearing in mind the need for a hybrid format and the growing participation in the Forum, and paying particular attention to regional balance and ensuring participation of affected individuals and communities"). Paragraph 5 appears to add (or change) the focus from consultation to workshop (for hands-on learning), seminar or webinar (for discussions and presentations), and tutorials (for individual work). The shift is important suggesting not just power balancing and hierarchies of the authoritativeness of developing and projecting knowledge, standards, expectations and the like, but also on the connection between these hierachies of active consultation and passive learning or receiving knowledge for the development law and norms at the international level.  Balancing the two has always been a delicate task.It is made all the more so under current historical conditions. 

I join in welcoming this HRC Resolution; look forward to receiving and responding to the OHCHR's work in the area of businesses and human rights, and to engaging, sometimes sharply, with the ongoing work and efforts at guidance of its special procedure, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. 

The text of the Resolution may be accessed in the official languages of the UN here and follows below in English.