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| Pix credit here |
There are various non-proletarian ideas in the Communist Party organization
in the Fourth Red Army which greatly hinder the application of the Party's
correct line. Unless these ideas are thoroughly corrected, the Fourth Army
cannot possibly shoulder the tasks assigned to it in China's great revolutionary
struggle. The source of such incorrect ideas in this Party organization lies,
of course, in the fact that its basic units are composed largely of peasants
and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin; yet the failure of the Party's
leading bodies to wage a concerted and determined struggle against these
incorrect ideas and to educate the members in the Party's correct line is
also an important cause of their existence and growth. In accordance with
the spirit of the September letter of the Central Committee, this congress
hereby points out the manifestations of various non-proletarian ideas in
the Party organization in the Fourth Army, their sources, and the methods
of correcting them, and calls upon all comrades to eliminate them thoroughly.(Mao Zedong, On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party; December 1929)
Xinhua News Agency reported that on 7 March 7 2026 Communist Party of China General Secretary Xi Jinping attended the plenary meeting of the delegation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Police Force to the Fourth Session of the 14th National People's Congress and delivered remarks important enough to merit wide circulation. 习近平在出席解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议时强调 充分发挥 政治建军特有优势 凝心聚力推动国防和军队现代化行稳致远 [Xi Jinping, while attending a plenary meeting of the delegation of the People's Liberation Army and the Armed Police Force, emphasized the need to fully leverage the unique advantages of building a politically strong military and to unite efforts to steadily advance the modernization of national defense and the armed forces.]
The meeting and the speech come at an important moment in the history of the relationship between the military and the CPC.
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| Pix credit here (Tracking China's Military Purges) |
On January 24, 2026, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the military’s top general, Zhang Youxia, and the chief of the Joint Staff Department, Liu Zhenli, had been placed under investigation for serious disciplinary and legal violations. * * * The removal of Zhang, Liu, and several other generals from the Central Military Commission (CMC) has left only one general, Zhang Shengmin, serving on China’s top military decisionmaking body alongside Xi. However, the purges within the CMC are only the tip of the iceberg. Since 2022, over 100 senior PLA officers from across virtually all areas of the armed forces have been swept aside or gone missing, amounting to an unprecedented purge of China’s military. The scope and depth of these purges showcase Xi’s resolve to renovate the PLA, root out corruption, eliminate obstacles to his ambitious military modernization objectives, and ensure absolute political loyalty.(CSIS here).
The speech provides a framework for understanding what areas of focus, what sort of analytical lens, may be framing the rectification of Chinese military leadership at a time when military preparedness is critical. While one may be tempted to compare the contemporary Chinese purges with Stalin's "great purge" of the 1930s, the analogy may not work except at a very high level of generality. A recent examination by Alexei Zakharov and Konstantin Sonin, entitled “The Anatomy of the Great Terror: A Quantitative Analysis of the 1937-38 Purges in the Red Army,” suggests the limits of comparison.
“Very little is known about the logic behind these sweeping episodes of elite repression, despite their fame,” Sonin said. “Stalin did not leave memoirs, and most of the records remain closed to the public in modern-day Russia. This paper allows us to look inside this black box and attempt to understand what Stalin intended and how he went about executing his plan.” The scholars’ analysis suggests that Stalin’s actions were preventive rather than reactive, aiming to neutralize possible challengers before they could gain any real power. One key finding of their study is the likelihood of repression of younger officers and those who had achieved high ranks at a young age. This challenges conventional wisdom by suggesting that Stalin’s purges were not entirely driven by loyalty or political affiliation, but rather by a desire to eliminate competent officers who might pose a potential threat to his rule.
What General Secretary Xi emphasized was Party loyalty, and the alignment of military reform with the broad aims of socialist modernization, high quality production (and innovation), and political work within the military. That is, to be an effective fighting force, General Secretary Xi suggests, the military must first be an efficient CPC lead political force, and second, it must be filly integrated in the CPC's basic line on modernization as elaborated in the 3rd and 4th Plenum documents of the 20th CPC Congress. That suggests that functional differentiation within the various elements of the state apparatus is, in the first instance, merely a consequential division of function within a politically unified single political mass. "军队是拿枪杆子的,军中绝不能有对党怀有二心之人,绝不能有腐败分子藏身之地,必须坚定不移推进反腐败斗争。" [ The military wields the gun; there must be no one in the military who harbors disloyalty to the Party, and there must be no hiding place for corrupt elements. We must resolutely advance the fight against corruption.] (习近平在出席解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议时强调 充分发挥 政治建军特有优势 凝心聚力推动国防和军队现代化行稳致远 ).
There is thus an economic element to political objectives; a patriotic military force, then, must be politically aligned with the CPC and must evidence that not just with respect to military preparedness but in the business of being ready to defend the State. "要完善促进人才发展的制度和条件,体系推进联合作战指挥、新型作战力量、高层次科技创新、高水平战略管理“四类人才”培养,实现人的能力素质同强军实践协调发展。" [We
must improve the systems and conditions for promoting talent
development, systematically advance the cultivation of four types of
talent: those in joint operations command, new types of combat forces,
high-level scientific and technological innovation, and high-level
strategic management, and achieve coordinated development of personnel
capabilities and qualities with the practice of building a strong
military.] (Ibid.).
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| Pix credit China Poster.net (1967; "Hold High the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought; turn our army into a truly great school of Mao Zedong Thought") |
That, perhaps, might explain the close connection between loyalty to the CPC and its expression within the language and operational expectations of socialist modernization under the 3rd & 4th Plenums.
“十五五”一开局就要立起从严监管硬规矩,紧盯资金流向、权力运行和质量管控等关键环节,加强重大项目监管,强化军地融合监督,确保在监管前提下搞建设。要推进军费预算管理改革,搞好军费供需动态平衡,强化经费使用全链条管控和绩效评估,把每一分钱都用在刀刃上。[At the outset of the 15th Five-Year Plan, strict supervision and regulations must be established, closely monitoring key aspects such as fund flows, power operation, and quality control. Supervision of major projects must be strengthened, and integrated military-civilian supervision must be reinforced to ensure construction is carried out under strict oversight. Reform of military budget management must be promoted, a dynamic balance between military expenditure and demand must be achieved, and full-chain control and performance evaluation of fund usage must be strengthened to ensure every penny is used effectively. ] (习近平在出席解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议时强调 充分发挥 政治建军特有优势 凝心聚力推动国防和军队现代化行稳致远 ).
Military, political. and economic performance are thus aligned, and all under the leadership and guidance of the CPC. Put differently, again, functional separation is a contextual expression of an aligned and coordinated system in which every part draws on the functional work of the others; there is no strict functional differentiation that suggests autonomy; there is only differentiated work that expresses a unified whole directed by, through, and under the CPC. "习近平指出,要加强革命化专业化人才队伍建设,坚持不懈用党的创新理论铸魂育人,打牢官兵听党话、跟党走的思想根基,确保现代化武器装备掌握在革命化人才队伍手中。"[Xi Jinping pointed out that we must strengthen the construction of a revolutionary and professional talent pool, unswervingly use the Party's innovative theories to cultivate and educate personnel, solidify the ideological foundation for officers and soldiers to listen to the Party and follow the Party, and ensure that modern weaponry and equipment are in the hands of a revolutionary talent pool.] (Ibid.)
All of this suggests the interplay between politics, economics, and technology in the military context, but also of the central role of coordination built from out of the core of the CPC and its leadership apparatus. In a sense, it is all about socialist modernization, and socialist modernization is all about moving forward along the Socialist Path, and moving forward can only be undertaken by tose committed to accepting the guidance and leadership of the CPC. "Xi Jinping emphasized that ultimately, achieving the modernization goals of national defense and the armed forces during the 15th Five-Year Plan period depends on the leadership and advancement of Party organizations at all levels." [习近平强调,完成“十五五”时期国防和军队现代化目标任务,归根到底要靠各级党组织来领导和推进。] (习近平在出席解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议时强调 充分发挥 政治建军特有优势 凝心聚力推动国防和军队现代化行稳致远 ). All of this is organized around political work; nevertheless it is disciplined through the traditional devices of CPC supervision: anti-corruption, educational campaigns, rectification, criticism/self-criticism now better understood as a military variant of self-revolution and social revolution (see (1) Social
Revolution (社会革命) as Self-Revolution (自我革命) and the New Quality
Production of CPC Modernization: 习近平 深入推进党的自我革命 [Xi Jinping, Deepen the
Party's Self-Revolution] (Part of a speech at the Third Plenary Session
of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 8,
2024)); (2) Brief
Reflections on 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》[Thoroughly study and implement the
"Regulations on Ideological and Political Work of the Communist Party
of China"]). In the language of Secretary General Xi: 要坚持党管军事、党管干部、党管行业,提高科学决策能力,在攻坚重大任务、化解突出矛盾、解决发展难题过程中发挥关键作用,把党的领导优势转化为发展优势。[We must adhere to the Party's leadership over military affairs, cadres, and industries, improve our ability to make scientific decisions, play a key role in tackling major tasks, resolving prominent contradictions, and solving development problems, and transform the Party's leadership advantages into development advantages.] (习近平在出席解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议时强调 充分发挥 政治建军特有优势 凝心聚力推动国防和军队现代化行稳致远 ).
And there it is:
Xi Jinping emphasized that it is essential to vigorously inherit and carry forward the fine traditions of our Party and our army, promote the construction of a strong military culture in the new era, strengthen the cultivation and incentive of advanced models, ensure that the red gene is passed down from generation to generation, and make the new atmosphere and positive spirit even more abundant. [习近平强调,要大力传承和弘扬我党我军优良传统,推进新时代强军文化建设,加强先进典型培养和激励,让红色基因代代相传,让新风正气更加充盈。] (Ibid.)
It is only in this way that the military can serve as a capable fighting force, not just in technical terms, but also as a political force in tune with the working style of socialist modernization, by "attaching importance to fundamental, long-term, and sustainable work, and laying a more solid foundation for the construction and combat effectiveness of the armed forces" [重视抓好管根本、利长远、增后劲的工作,把部队建设和战斗力基础打得更加牢靠] (Ibid.). In that respect little has changed from the 1920s, at least with respect to the structural premises around which the CPC organizes and leads those elements necessary first for the furthering of revolution, and then, for the appropriate forward movement along the Socialist Path for patriots for which the defense of the nation is also necessary from internal and external threat.
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| Pix credit here ("I listen to Chairman Mao's words, my gun listens to me", 1966) |