The term "artificial intelligence" has acquired a protean quality--it is at once fetish, invocation, curse, and shorthand for a range of hoped for or feared transformation not just in social relations in the physical world, but for the transformation of the mechanics of ordering reality through which social relations may be conceived and manifested. All political and normative organs, especially those created to express and manage human social relations in accordance with whatever cognitive model they mean to manifest, believe that, having created artificial intelligence in their own image, they can, with nothing more than the flip of a textual legal-institutional switch, bend that construct to its will and enslave to as an instrument of to do with as they wish.
An yet that fundamental premise--that humanity is at the center of all of its creations, and thus centered in control-- is only the beginning rather than the end point of analysis. That is because while humans share this notion of humanity at the center of things, human collectives express this, construct its meaning and realize that meaning through the collective organs that they establish for that purpose, in vastly different ways. Those "ways" in turn, are an expression of quite distinct ordering premises bound up in ideology--the political-economic models through which human collectives rationalize the world around them (in normative and utilitarian ways). It is the materialization of that rationality, bounded in turn on the generative human conceit, that produce the structures of hopes, fears, desires, approaches and solutions that are proffered up within a spectrum of "good" to "bad", vales that themselves reflect both the fundamental conceit and their specific rationalizing premises built into collective orders (eg here).
And so it is with that most peculiar creation of humanity, constructed out of generative conceit in our own image--generative intelligence and its ecologies of tech enhanced computation. Three of the most interesting ordering regimens to have emerged both reflect and further refine three of the most significant conceptual cages for human cognitive collective building--(1) liberal democratic ordering; (2) Marxist-Leninist ordering; and (3) anarchist-fractured autonomous ordering. The first obsesses about risk impacting behaviors that adversely affects rights holders and the self-actualization of individuals organized as identity collectives. If the first em,beds risk aversion as the primary principle of governance the second embraces risk taking as the organization of collectives around markets the protection of the integrity of which provides the only basis for managing behaviors. The third starts form the opposite end of the spectrum--the collective rather than the individual--adds a purpose to collectivization (the realization of a communist society)and devotes its primary energy to the development necessary to direct all human activity towards the deployment of productive forces along a Socialist path toward its communist goal. If the first fears risk, the second embraces it, and the third embeds risk within a more complicated balancing in which risk is not the center but a factor in its analytics of development (in the Chinese sense--modernization).
The first has settled on a risk centered rationalization of the conceptual spaces for the generation, creation, development, interconnection and autonomy and autonomy of tech enhanced autonomous decision making and generative intelligence; and not just tech (eg
here). Liberal democratic collective spaces like to have things done for them, but they also like to see themselves in control, especially of those who serve them, whether these servants take physical or virtual form. In the process the generative ordering of collectivity has become risk aversion. and they have become absurdly risk averse. That has become the principal ordering premise of the organization and operation of the entirety of liberal democratic society. One grounds its ordering on the elaboration of rights, spaces, behaviors, identities the condition and forms of which must be preserved at virtually all costs. Regulation, and systems, are all a function of the prevention, mitigation, and remediation of adverse impacts on these behaviors, identities, conditions and autonomous. Politics revolves around the generation of those things that are the objects of impacts analysis; and the state (as well as non-state sectors) may operate only as a function of avoiding negative impact. Politics, then, becomes a function of defining categories of things, behaviors, conditions, etc. the impacts of which become the core of regulatory supervision. And those behaviors, conditions, expectation, innovation that produce negative impact (as these conditions and effects are also measured, itself another critical element of norm and technical-standards politics) may be regulated or suppressed (unless that is inconvenient, of course; eg
here). That, in essence, is the spirit of instruments like the EU AI Act, and various variations within the liberal democratic sphere. The EU and UN elites have embraced this approach with vigor that resembles in some respects the zealotry of those who have "found" religion (eg
here,
here,
here here,
here,
here). It was a sensibility that the Biden Administration also shared (
here).
The second takes liberal democratic spaces, as well as those spaces uncomfortable with the warm embrace of liberal democratic ordering projected form out of developed States in anther direction. This approach to generative and tech enhanced innovation, use, and projection, is grounded on the protection of autonomous decision making rather than on collective risk management. It tends to be aligned with markets driven collective formation and operation, one in which the managerial role of the State recedes before the aggregated iterative activities of autonomous individuals pursuing their own agendas, bumping up against each other, and in the aggregate producing inductive, a sense of the collective expectations, behaviors, values, and protections of the market spaces within which such autonomy is protected and operates. Here markets rather than the State take pride of place--the State itself can be reconstructed as the aggregation of a layered set of operating instructions for the maintenance of the good order of market spaces and the protection of its principles--transparency, protection of rights in property and against fraud and deception, and fairness as a collective principle. This is a space in which autonomous and generative intelligence may be developed and deployed in an environment in which producers may assess, and bear the risks of whatever it is they develop. It is a system that can operate only where the State can tax these activities enough to maintain capacity to police and operate organs in which people may resolve disputes in ways that affirm collective expectations, and one that can discipline behaviors that threaten the integrity of this iterative, inductive collectivity. It is also one in which the role can be undertaken not just be the State but by non-State actors: indigenous communities, like minded collectives, and the like. The Americans tend to long for this position as an ideal but tend to practice something like a markets Leninism (eg,
here,
here,
here,
here,
here,
here).
The third, and for my purpose today the most interesting variation is presented by the engagement of Marxist-Leninist cognitive cages with tech based and generative intelligence. Both Marxist-Leninist and liberal democratic cognitive cages center the State as the virtual personification (incarnation really) of the people whose collective constitution is necessarily privileged over the individual, to which quite different spectra of behaviors may be tolerated (and regulated in different ways). Liberal democracy encourages a managed individual self-actualization; Marxist-Leninist States encourage collective actualization through which individual self-actualization may be realized. At the center of the engagement of Marxist-Leninism with tech enhanced analytics and decision making, as well as with generative intelligence, is the fundamental principle of development. Socialist modernization is the one key principle, and the one core element, of the integrity of the system and the fiduciary obligation of the vanguard of social forces organized as a Communist Party through which the masses may be brought forward from their less developed state to one in which it is possible to combine both material wealth and cultural readiness, for the establishment of something like a classical communist state of being. Tech and AI, then, are productive forces, all productive forces are pwned by the State, the use and development of which is a central concern for the exercise of leadership and guidance by the Communist Party vanguard in accordance with core principles of Socialist democracy (Whole process people's democracy in China). That gives tech based and AI generative system both a strong political dimension (the innovation of which is a key element for Socialist modernization grounded in high quality production) and a methodological one (tech and AI as a necessary element of modernization the risks of which must be understood as a function of the benefits for collective modernization). Risk, then, is a secondary element to the development of high quality production, and high quality production is valued as a function of its contribution of modernization as that may be assessed as against the goals of forward movement along the Socialist Path that shapes both production and the cultural development of the human (and collective humanity) preparing it for successful transitioning to Communist social organization. (see, eg
here,
here,
here,
here,
here,
here).
All of these streams of understanding in Marxist-Leninist engagement with tech and AI are evident in three documents that may be worthwhile to read. The is first, 石英, 智能社会”研究三题 【构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系】[ Shi Ying, Three Research Topics on "Intelligent Society" (Constructing an Independent Knowledge System for Chinese Philosophy and Social Sciences)]. It focuses on a Socialist engagement with the thinking about AI and tech- based production from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. That engagement, in turn, may be better understood by reference to two official pronouncements: The first is 国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见 (国发〔2025〕11号= [Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the Implementation of the "Artificial Intelligence+" Action; State Council Document No. 11 [2025]]; and the second is 以“人工智能+”开启中国特色智能化发展新篇章; 发布时间:2025/08/26 [Opening a New Chapter in China's Intelligent Development with "Artificial Intelligence+" (Published: 2025/08/26; Source: High-Tech Department National Development Reform Commission].
The State Council Opinions frames the issue for analysis:
In order to deeply implement the "Artificial Intelligence+" action, promote the extensive and in-depth integration of artificial intelligence with all sectors and fields of the economy and society, reshape the paradigm of human production and life, promote a revolutionary leap in productivity and a profound transformation of production relations, and accelerate the formation of a new form of intelligent economy and intelligent society characterized by human-machine collaboration, cross-border integration, and co-creation and sharing, the following opinions are hereby put forward. [为深入实施“人工智能+”行动,推动人工智能与经济社会各行业各领域广泛深度融合,重塑人类生产生活范式,促进生产力革命性跃迁和生产关系深层次变革,加快形成人机协同、跨界融合、共创分享的智能经济和智能社会新形态,现提出如下意见。]
The NDRC essay then situates the State Council Opinion within its operational development in and as modernization of both economic, cultural and human developmental.
As another strategic deployment by the state to promote technological revolution and industrial integration following "Internet+", the "Opinions" leverages China's three core advantages: a complete industrial system, a large market size, and rich application scenarios. It constructs a spiral development paradigm of "innovation driving application, application promoting innovation," accelerating the full-chain restructuring and deep coupling of artificial intelligence with the real economy, comprehensively stimulating new momentum for industrial transformation, cultivating a new paradigm of intelligent economy, forging a key fulcrum for seizing the commanding heights of global intelligent competition, and building a new pattern of high-quality development driven by new-quality productivity. 作为继“互联网+”之后国家推动技术革命和产业融合的又一战略部署,《意见》立足我国产业体系完备、市场规模庞大、应用场景丰富三大核心优势,构建“创新带应用、应用促创新”的螺旋式发展范式,加速人工智能与实体经济全链重构、深向耦合,全面激发产业变革新动能、培育智能经济新范式,为抢占全球智能化竞争制高点锻造关键支点,构筑新质生产力驱动的高质量发展新格局。
The contrast with liberal democratic and markets driven anarchic systems could not be more starkly revealed. And it doesn't really matter. Each is true to its own cognitive processes and their resulting rationalization of the world within which collectives are organized to manage humans in accordance with their respective logic. Soon, perhaps, a generative intelligence might do that better than the humans seeking to fulfill the promise of their respective cages of cognition manifested as political-economic ideologies of productive and human forces.
The text of the three documents, 石英, 智能社会”研究三题 【构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系】[
Shi Ying, Three Research Topics on "Intelligent Society" (Constructing
an Independent Knowledge System for Chinese Philosophy and Social
Sciences)]; 国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见
(国发〔2025〕11号= [Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the
Implementation of the "Artificial Intelligence+" Action; State Council
Document No. 11 [2025]]; and 以“人工智能+”开启中国特色智能化发展新篇章; 发布时间:2025/08/26
[Opening a New Chapter in China's Intelligent Development with
"Artificial Intelligence+" (Published: 2025/08/26; Source: High-Tech
Department National Development Reform Commission] follow below in the original Chinese and in English translation.