El triunfo de lo transaccional y el problema de la racionalización de la Tierra Firme Española del Caribe en la epoca contemporanea: EE. UU. y México regatean sobre el futuro de Cuba

Crédito de imagen aquí

ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE

¿Cómo se puede reiniciar los tropos discursivos tradicionales de la soberanía y el sistema estatal, profundamente arraigados en la cultura de los Estados y conmemorados inicialmente en la Convención de Montevideo de 1933, y basados ​​en la protección de los asuntos internos de los Estados por otros, la igualdad soberana, la integridad territorial y la autodeterminación? ¿Cómo se puede emprender este tipo de reinicio en un contexto en el que los tropos discursivos de la soberanía se han disipado por la globalización: todos, las empresas multinacionales (económicas y sociales, Apple Inc. y Amnistía Internacional), tal vez ahora tengan distintos "derechos" a la autodeterminación, si no al territorio? ¿Cómo se puede hacer ese reinicio cuando esos viejos tropos discursivos pueden ahora ser desplazados de manera decisiva por el discurso de la transformación de las premisas ordenadoras de lo global, de una que prioriza las instituciones, la gestión y el orden burocrático dentro de sistemas jerárquicamente organizados a una que se inserta en un ethos de discurso transaccional y los valores que ese discurso representa?

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Esas son, sin duda, una pregunta bastante larga. También se entiende mejor como un desafío (para los Estados y otros) a medida que la contradicción principal de las relaciones internacionales pasa de estar basada en la perfección de los Estados, su sistema y su lenguaje/valores (a través de tropos imbuidos del Estado de Derecho) a una en la que los comerciantes, en lugar de los burócratas, podrían sentirse más cómodos. Esto se complica porque incluso los términos antiguos adquieren ambigüedad en el contexto cubano contemporáneo (¿autodeterminación, incluyendo la diáspora cubana?, por ejemplo).

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Esta es una contradicción que México enfrenta ahora; una contradicción forjada a la sombra de sus siempre delicadas y sólidas relaciones con Estados Unidos, y ahora formulada dentro de esa "crisis de regalos que no cesa de dar" que es Cuba. Cuba siempre ha ocupado un lugar preponderante en la política exterior de Estados Unidos y México. Y, en ocasiones, sus respectivas acciones en Cuba y en torno a ella han servido como una forma indirecta de involucrarse en algunas de las áreas más divisivas de sus relaciones bilaterales (mucho más amplias). Tanto para Estados Unidos como para México, Cuba se entiende a veces más como la encarnación de un ideal, de una lucha ideológica y de un experimento que moldea lo mejor y lo peor de... El Estado, el sistema estatal y sus peculiaridades, en un contexto que, irónicamente, reproduce en cierto modo el conflicto fundamental entre los imperios inglés y español de los siglos XVII-XIX, pero ahora reformulado, modernizado y contextualizado entre Estados Unidos y México, representando el patrimonio heredado de imperios difuntos, del control y las disputas dentro de la Tierra Firme Española especialmente del Caribe. Pero Cuba no es el problema, es el objeto, cuyo uso anima una "conversación" mucho más importante; no es tanto Cuba lo importante, sino la idea de Cuba y su utilidad para moldear las relaciones entre grandes potencias, cuyas consecuencias se sentirán a lo largo de lesa Tierra Firme del Caribe Español, pero especialmente dentro de Cuba, la joya de su corona caribeña.

David Marcial Pérez resumió acertadamente el desafío y sus trampas para México:

Cuba se ha convertido en una de las principales prioridades de política exterior del gobierno mexicano. Desde el aumento Ante la presión estadounidense que ha llevado a la isla a una situación crítica, la presidenta mexicana, Claudia Sheinbaum, se ha pronunciado casi a diario para denunciar la restricción económica impuesta por el presidente estadounidense Donald Trump y reafirmar el apoyo de México a La Habana.

Más allá del delicado equilibrio con Washington, el apoyo a Cuba también resuena profundamente en Morena, el partido gobernante de México, donde se nutre de una larga tradición de afinidad política que se remonta a los antiguos gobiernos liderados por el Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) y que se reavivó bajo la administración anterior. Ninguna otra crisis regional, ni siquiera la acción militar estadounidense contra Venezuela, ha provocado una respuesta tan firme y persistente del gobierno mexicano. (Aquí)

 

Crédito de la imagen aquí (El País, "Ante el colapso económico, una Cuba acorralada se ve obligada a dialogar con Estados Unidos"). 

 

 Para la presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, probablemente una de las figuras políticas más capaces de la región y también alguien que está demostrando ser hábil para mediar entre el institucionalismo de viejo estilo, el regionalismo latinoamericano (como la manifestación contemporánea de las brasas de los oníricos paisajes imperiales españoles, no reinventados para adaptarse a los gustos modernos) y el transaccionalismo estadounidense, Cuba ha representado un desafío y una oportunidad. El desafío de la presidenta Sheinbaum puede incluir la necesidad de equilibrar los apegos tradicionales a la "idea" de Cuba (o al menos al gobierno revolucionario cubano y lo que podría representar en la política mexicana) con las realidades de la estabilidad regional ante un nuevo enfoque de Estados Unidos, uno que los estadounidenses ahora están dispuestos a poner en práctica, y uno que, si bien es indiferente a las sutilezas territoriales del "espacio" cubano (y venezolano), está bastante interesado en supervisar los espacios territoriales, las plataformas dentro y a través de las cuales ambos estados podrían estar abiertos al tipo de comercio e inversión, y en los términos y bajo las reglas que satisfagan los intereses de Estados Unidos (y quizás, en cierta medida, los de las empresas mexicanas también, aunque no necesariamente los de su antigua política).

El asunto ha alcanzado un punto crítico a medida que Estados Unidos se ha esforzado más por "reformar" una Cuba que se ha mostrado reacia a reformarse a sí misma a pesar de las súplicas de décadas de sus amigos y sus propias élites. La táctica es antigua: el asedio. Pero el asedio se ha vuelto más complejo en la era posterior a 1945: Gaza ha demostrado ser el modelo (a menos que, por supuesto, las normas del derecho internacional sean exclusivas para los judíos, pero eso no puede ser), y uno que distingue entre presionar (y asesinar, expulsar o neutralizar de alguna otra forma) a funcionarios institucionales y un trato de base a la población civil. Pero incluso ese cálculo es complicado en Cuba, donde, incluso a diferencia de Gaza, el propio aparato estatal parecía contentarse con institucionalizar la gobernanza de un Estado de Miseria en pos de sus propios objetivos (véase la discusión aquí en inglés). 

 Por otro lado, esto representa un beneficio para México que ahora no requiere casi nada más que una muestra de caridad para apaciguar la conciencia y cumplir con su deber ideológico y político interno. En todo esto, por supuesto, Cuba misma desempeña un papel secundario: un objeto de intervención estratégica en una dialéctica de larga data entre México y Estados Unidos, en la que es (y siempre es) un objeto colateral. Sin embargo, incluso los asedios modernos pueden ser efectivos. Véase, por ejemplo, Aerolíneas cortan vuelos a Cuba mientras el bloqueo de combustible estadounidense deja los aeropuertos sin combustible para aviones; Cunde el pánico entre los canadienses varados en Cuba; Rusia repatriará a ciudadanos varados en Cuba en medio de la crisis del combustible; Apagones continuos, escasez hospitalaria: Cómo el bloqueo petrolero estadounidense está impactando a Cuba.

Y así, México busca suministrar petróleo a Cuba, al menos una cantidad ostentosa, pero en ese momento cualquier cosa es mejor que nada; Estados Unidos se opone; y México suspende el suministro. Pero el petróleo es un producto con alta volatilidad en el panorama político estadounidense, y eso tiene sentido. La ayuda humanitaria, por otro lado, es diferente (de nuevo, Gaza como modelo: los seres humanos pueden aprender y aplicar ese aprendizaje de todo tipo de situaciones; todo lo que hay que hacer es estar dispuesto a articular y transponer el "aprendizaje"). Tanto México como Estados Unidos pueden proporcionarla, aunque a través de diferentes canales y con distintos efectos: el primero al pueblo, el segundo a través del Estado (por ejemplo, Cumpliendo nuestro compromiso: Asistencia estadounidense en caso de desastre al pueblo cubano; "Aviones y barcos fletados por el Departamento de Estado para entregar asistencia. Por lo tanto, trabajaremos con Catholic Relief Services y con Cáritas para brindar esa asistencia sobre el terreno" Aquí).

Durante su conferencia matutina, la mandataria explicó que México ha planteado tanto al Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos como a la embajada estadounidense en territorio mexicano su disposición a contribuir a un acercamiento, siempre bajo el principio de respeto a la soberanía de Cuba y la autodeterminación de los pueblos. (Cibercuba)

Estados Unidos desea un acuerdo transaccional con Cuba (sea cual sea su forma de gobierno, pero sujeto a las limitaciones de la legislación estadounidense). En ese caso, México servirá de mediador, una voz de la razón que represente al lado latino de las Américas, mientras ambos consideran maneras en que Cuba pueda volver a encajar en esas fronteras del viejo imperio que, en sus rescoldos, conserva cierto prestigio. Informes recientes publicados en Facebook (que, para quienes no lo conozcan, Estados Unidos no es sólo una herramienta para mantener conectados a los abuelos) sugieren las estrategias, bastante interesantes, de la presidenta Sheinbaum ante estos desafíos:

foto crédito acquí

La presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum, insistió este jueves 12 de febrero en que su Gobierno está dispuesto a facilitar el "diálogo" entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, en medio de las tensiones por las sanciones anunciadas por Washington a los países que suministran petróleo a la isla y la aguda crisis económica que atraviesa el país caribeño.

"Ya lo hemos hecho. Depende de los dos países. Nosotros, tanto al Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos como a través de la embajada (de Cuba) en México, hemos planteado que México ponga todo de su parte para poder generar un diálogo que permita en el marco de la soberanía de Cuba", afirmó la mandataria durante su conferencia de prensa matutina. El gobernante mexicano subrayó que esta postura responde a los principios tradicionales de la política exterior mexicana. “Porque eso es muy importante, porque es además nuestro principio, la autodeterminación de los pueblos. Generar las condiciones para un diálogo pacífico y que además Cuba, sin que ningún país tenga la sanción, pueda recibir petróleo y sus derivados para su funcionamiento cotidiano”, sostuvo. México ha mantenido en las últimas semanas un papel activo frente a la crisis cubana, con envíos de ayuda humanitaria y posicionamientos diplomáticos ante las sanciones de Washington.


Precisamente este jueves, dos buques de la Marina mexicana arribaron a La Habana con alimentos y productos básicos en medio de la crisis energética que sufre la isla, agravada por restricciones y tensiones en torno al suministro de petróleo. Asimismo, el Gobierno mexicano ha confirmado que continuará enviando asistencia humanitaria y coordinando esfuerzos con organizaciones civiles para mitigar los efectos de los apagones y la situación económica en Cuba, que se ha deteriorado por el embargo estadounidense y la escasez de combustible. En este contexto, Sheinbaum reiteró que México busca un papel constructivo en la región. "Como lo he dicho, nosotros estamos enviando distinta ayuda, distinto apoyo, ya el día de hoy llegan los barcos. En cuanto regresen vamos a enviar más apoyo de distinto tipo", aseveró. (web de Panorama)

Crédito de la imagen aquí

La pelota está en la cancha de Estados Unidos. O actúa con decisión o vuelve al patrón de esfuerzos tibios estadounidenses, interrumpidos por largos períodos de letargo acompañados de elementos teatrales para entretener a sus masas y a las élites, sin ánimo de hacer mucho más que mantener el statu quo. Sería una lástima. Cuba debería poder reformarse. Ciertamente, sus propias élites internas han trazado varias maneras en que esto podría lograrse, incluso preservando la esencia del modelo político-económico actual, al igual que los cubanos en la diáspora (mis pensamientos al respecto aquí ("Fundamentos Legales-Institucionales para la Reconstrucción en una Cuba Post-Revolucionaria: Un Ejercicio Conceptual", Comentarios preparados para ser entregados en la Conferencia Anual de 2025 de la Asociación para el Estudio de la Economía Cubana, Miami, Florida, 25 de octubre de 2025)). Pero la esclerosis soviética todavía puede resultar fatal para las élites que, a su manera, continúan viviendo en una burbuja de su propia creación (considerada más teóricamente en el breve ensayo Ciudades Prohibidas; situación actual aquí). Pero aquí Cuba puede seguir siendo su peor enemigo; consideremos esta pequeña disimulación a la luz de las declaraciones de México:

“Todo parece indicar que el Secretario de Estado le ha hecho creer al presidente Trump el cuento de las negociaciones”, dijo Gómez, quien añadió que se trataría de “una manipulación descarada” y de la fabricación de un “pretexto peligroso”. . . Las declaraciones forman parte de la narrativa oficial del régimen, que niega la existencia de negociaciones formales con Washington mientras acusa a sectores del gobierno estadounidense de promover una escalada contra la isla. (Oficialismo cubano desmiente rumores y dice que Rubio manipuló a Trump con “cuento” de negociaciones)

El cambio de régimen podría llegar a Cuba, pero en este momento la causa es tanto la falta de voluntad de la elite para reformarse a sí misma como el entusiasmo de los extranjeros por reformar a Cuba a su propio gusto. Parece que lo único que sigue funcionando bien dentro de la nomenclatura es su aparato de propaganda, alimentado y potenciado por una red global de simpatizantes (p. ej., aquí; aquí). Es una lástima, pero también una señal de los peligros que Cuba se ha creado desde que abandonó sus propias políticas reformistas marxistas-leninistas tras el VII Congreso del Partido. En este punto, las opciones para los líderes cubanos son uniformemente desagradables, pero se están volviendo cada vez más incontrolables. Quizás la alternativa menos disruptiva sería un retorno al gobierno revolucionario anterior a 1976 (dirigido por los militares) con el mandato de reformar y ofrecer un sistema gubernamental modernizado, quizás un sistema socialista orientado al mercado; quizás un sistema que incluya un espacio para el liderazgo del Partido Comunista (pero ciertamente no en su forma actual), y lo más doloroso de todo: una apertura de sus mercados internos a los extranjeros, ciertamente controlada hasta cierto punto, pero ya es demasiado tarde para el sistema más modulado de apertura gradual mediante la expansión de las revistas económicas espaciales. El gran reinicio, por supuesto, también sería difícil: la legitimación de la economía informal y el uso de esas estructuras y normas como base para la reforma económica y legal del sector de consumo. Y subyacente a todo esto se encuentra una rectificación ardua de la Nomenclatura y las normas para la participación de la diáspora en la reconstrucción de la República sin tomar el control. Estas serán las tareas más difíciles de todas; ojalá alguien en algún lugar del mundo de los funcionarios haya estado pensando en esto...

 

The Triumph of the Transactional and the Problem of Rationalizing the Spanish Main --The U.S. and Mexico Haggle Over Cuba's Future

 

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How does one reboot the now traditional discursive tropes of sovereignty and the state system, one deeply embedded in the culture of States and memorialized initially in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, and one grounded in the protection of the internal affairs by states by others, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and self-determination; how does one engage in this sort of reboot in a context where the discursive tropes of sovereignty, have been dissipated by globalization--everyone, multinational enterprises (economic and societal, Apple Inc., and Amnesty Int'l), perhaps now have varying "rights" to auto-determination, if not territory; how does one do that rebooting where those old discursive tropes may now be perhaps dispositively displaced by the discourse of the transformation of the ordering premises of the global from one foregrounding institutions, management, and bureaucratic ordering within hierarchically arranged systems, to one embedded within an ethos of transactional discourse and the values that discourse represents?

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These are, indeed, a longish set of questions. They are perhaps also better understood as a challenge (for states and others) as the primary contradiction of international relations shifts from one grounded in the perfection of States, their system and their language/values (through Rule of Law infused tropes, to one in which merchants rather than bureaucrats might be more comfortable. It is made more difficult because even the old terms acquire ambiguity in the contemporary Cuban context (auto-determination including the Cuban diaspora?; for example).

That is a contradiction that Mexico faces now; one fashioned in the shadow of its always delicate and robust relations with the United States, and now one formulated within that "gift that keeps on giving crisis that is Cuba. Cuba has always loomed large in the foreign policy of the United States and of Mexico. And at times their respective actions in and around Cuba has served as an indirect way of engaging in some of the more divisive areas of their (much larger) bilateral relations. Both for the United States and Mexico Cuba is sometimes understood more as the incarnation of an ideal, of an ideological struggle, and of an experiment shaping the best and worst of the state, the state system and its peculiarities, in a context in which, ironically, in some ways reproduces the fundamental conflict between the English and Spanish Empires of the 17th-19th centuries, but now recast, modernized, and contextualized  between the United States and Mexico, representing patrimony bequeathed to the children of dead empires, of the control and contests within he Spanish Main. But Cuba is not the issue, it is the object, the use of which animates a far more important "conversation;" it is not so much Cuba that is important, but the idea of Cuba and its utility in shaping the relations between larger powers, the consequences of which will be felt all along the Spanish Main but especially the Caribbean jewel in its imperial crown. 

Pix credit here (El País, "Facing Economic Collapse, a Cornered Cuba is Forced into Dialogue With the United States)

 

David Marcial Pérez nicely summed up the challenge and its traps for Mexico:

Cuba has become one of the Mexican government’s top foreign‑policy priorities. Since the increase in U.S. pressure that has pushed the island into a critical situation, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has spoken out almost daily to denounce the economic squeeze imposed under U.S. President Donald Trump and to reaffirm Mexico’s support for Havana.

Beyond the delicate balancing act with Washington, backing Cuba also resonates deeply inside Morena, Mexico’s ruling party, where it taps into a long tradition of political affinity dating back to the old governments led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and revived under the previous administration. No other regional crisis — not even the U.S. military action against Venezuela — has prompted such a firm and persistent response from the Mexican government.

For Mexico's President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, probably one of the ablest political figures of the region and also one who is proving adept at mediating between old style institutionalism, Latin American regionalism (as the contemporary manifestation of the embers of Spanish Imperial dreamscapes not rebooted to suit modern tastes), and US transactionalism, Cuba has presented a challenge and an opportunity.  President Sheinbaum's challenge may include the need to balance traditional attachments to the "idea" of Cuban (or at least of Cuban revolutionary governance and what it might stand for in Mexican politics) against  the realities of regional stability in the face of a new approach of the United States, one that the Americans are ow willing to operationalize, and one which, while it is indifferent to the territorial niceties of Cuban (and Venezuelan) "space"  it is quite interested in overseeing the territorial spaces, the platforms within and through which both states might be open to the sort of trade and investment, and on the terms and under the rules that satisfy U.S. interests (and perhaps, to some extent, those of Mexico's enterprises as well, though not necessarily of its ancient politics). 

The issue has reached a critical point as the Americans have moved more vigorously to "reform" a Cuba that has been unwilling to reform itself despite the decades old pleas of its friends and its own elites. The tactics are ancient--siege. But siege has become more complicated in the post 1945 era--Gaza has proved to be the template (unless of course the rules of international law are unique for Jews, but that cannot be), and one that distinguishes between pressuring (and killing, extracting, or neutralizing in some other form) institutional officials and baseline treatment of the civilian population. But even that calculus is complicated in Cuba where, even unlike Gaza, the State apparatus itself appeared to be content to institutionalize the governance of a State of Misery in the pursuit of its own aims (see discussion here).  

On the other hand that is a benefit to Mexico requiring almost nothing now than a show of charity to appease the conscience and undertake one's ideologically and internally politically necessary duty. In all of this, of course, Cuba itself plays a secondary role--an object of strategic intervention in a long running dialectic between Mexico and the US in which it is (and is always) a collateral object. Yet even modern day seiges can be effective. See, e.g.,  Airlines Cut Cuba Flights As U.S. Fuel Blockade Leaves Airports Without Jet Fuel; Panic Spreads Among Canadians Stranded in Cuba; Russia to repatriate citizens stranded in Cuba amid fuel crisis; Rolling Blackouts, Hospital Shortages: How the U.S. Oil Blockade Is Impacting Cuba. 

And so Mexico seeks to supply petroleum to Cuba, at least a showy amount, but at its point anything is better than nothing; the United States objects; and the Mexican's pause delivery.  But petroleum is a highly charged commodity within the political starscapes of the U.S. and that makes sense. Humanitarian aid, on the other hand is different (again, Gaza as a template--human find it possible to learn and apply that leaning from all sorts of situations, all one has to do is be willing to articulate and transpose the "learning). That both Mexico and the US can provide, though through different channels and for different effect--the former to the people, the later through the State (eg Delivering on Our Commitment: U.S. Disaster Assistance to the Cuban People; "State Department-chartered aircraft and boats to deliver assistance. And so we’ll be working with Catholic Relief Services and with Caritas to deliver that assistance on the ground" here).

Durante su conferencia matutina, la mandataria explicó que México ha planteado tanto al Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos como a la embajada estadounidense en territorio mexicano su disposición a contribuir a un acercamiento, siempre bajo el principio de respeto a la soberanía de Cuba y la autodeterminación de los pueblos. [During her morning press conference, the president explained that Mexico has expressed to both the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Mexico its willingness to contribute to a rapprochement, always under the principle of respect for Cuba's sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples. (Cibercuba)] (Cibercuba)

The United States wants a transactional arrangement with Cuba (whatever its form of governance but subject to the constraints of US legislation) then Mexico will serve as a mediator, a voice of reason representing the Latin side of the Americas as both consider ways in which Cuba can again fit into those borderlands of old empire that in its embers retains a certain cachet. Recent reporting posted to Facebook (which for those outside the United States is not just a tool to keep grandparents connected) suggest the strategies, quite interesting, of President Sheinbaum in the face of these challenges:

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La presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum, insistió este jueves 12 de febrero en que su Gobierno está dispuesto a facilitar el "diálogo" entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, en medio de las tensiones por las sanciones anunciadas por Washington a los países que suministren petróleo a la isla y la aguda crisis económica que atraviesa el país caribeño.

“Ya lo hemos hecho. Depende de los dos países. Nosotros, tanto al Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos como a través de la embajada (de Cuba) en México, hemos planteado que México pone todo de su parte para poder generar un diálogo que permita en el marco de la soberanía de Cuba”, afirmó la mandataria durante su conferencia de prensa matutina.
La gobernante mexicana subrayó que esta postura responde a los principios tradicionales de la política exterior mexicana. “Porque eso es muy importante, porque es además nuestro principio, la autodeterminación de los pueblos. Generar las condiciones para un diálogo pacífico y que además Cuba, sin que ningún país tenga la sanción, pueda recibir petróleo y sus derivados para su funcionamiento cotidiano”, sostuvo. México ha mantenido en las últimas semanas un papel activo frente a la crisis cubana, con envíos de ayuda humanitaria y posicionamientos diplomáticos ante las sanciones de Washington.

Precisamente este jueves, dos buques de la Marina mexicana arribaron a La Habana con alimentos y productos básicos en medio de la crisis energética que sufre la isla, agravada por restricciones y tensiones en torno al suministro de petróleo. Asimismo, el Gobierno mexicano ha confirmado que continuará enviando asistencia humanitaria y coordinando esfuerzos con organizaciones civiles para mitigar los efectos de los apagones y la situación económica en Cuba, que se ha deteriorado por el embargo estadounidense y la escasez de combustible.En este contexto, Sheinbaum reiteró que México busca un papel constructivo en la región. “Como lo he dicho, nosotros estamos enviando distinta ayuda, distinto apoyo, ya el día de hoy llegan los barcos. En cuanto regresen vamos a enviar más apoyo de distinto tipo”, aseveró. (Panorama's web)

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum insisted this Thursday, February 12, that her government is willing to facilitate dialogue between the United States and Cuba, amid tensions over sanctions announced by Washington against countries that supply oil to the island and the severe economic crisis facing the Caribbean nation.

“We have already done so. It depends on both countries. We, both to the U.S. State Department and through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, have stated that Mexico is doing everything possible to foster a dialogue that respects Cuba's sovereignty,” the president affirmed during her morning press conference.

The Mexican leader emphasized that this stance reflects the traditional principles of Mexican foreign policy. “Because that is very important, because it is also one of our principles: the self-determination of peoples. To create the conditions for peaceful dialogue so that Cuba, without any country being sanctioned, can receive oil and its derivatives for its daily operations,” she maintained. In recent weeks, Mexico has maintained an active role in the Cuban crisis, sending humanitarian aid and taking diplomatic stances against Washington's sanctions.

Just this Thursday, two Mexican Navy ships arrived in Havana with food and basic supplies amid the island's energy crisis, exacerbated by restrictions and tensions surrounding oil supplies. The Mexican government has also confirmed that it will continue sending humanitarian assistance and coordinating efforts with civil organizations to mitigate the effects of the blackouts and the economic situation in Cuba, which has deteriorated due to the US embargo and fuel shortages. In this context, Sheinbaum reiterated that Mexico seeks a constructive role in the region. "As I've said, we are sending different kinds of aid, different kinds of support. The ships are arriving today. As soon as they return, we will send more support of different types," she stated.

 

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The ball is in the court of the U.S. It either acts decisovely or it returns to the pattern of American half-hearted efforts punctuated by long periods of lethargy accompanied by theatircal elements to entertain its masses and the elites with no real stomach for doing much but reserve the status quo. That would be a pity. Cuba ought to be able to reform itself. Certainly its own internal elites have charted any number of ways in which that could be done, even while preserving the essence of the current political-economic model, as have Cubans in the diaspora (my thoughts on that here ("Legal-Institutional Foundations for Reconstruction in a Post-Revolutionary Cuba: A Conceptual Exercise," Remarks prepared for delivery at the 2025 Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami, Florida, 25 October 2025)). But Soviet sclerosis may yet prove fatal to the elites who, in their own way, continue to live in a bubble of their own making (considered more theoretically in the short essay Forbidden Cities; current situation here). But here Cuba may remain its own worst enemy--consider this little bit of dissimulation in light of the statements from Mexico: 

“Todo parece indicar que el Secretario de Estado le ha hecho creer al presidente Trump el cuento de las negociaciones”, dijo Gómez, quien añadió que se trataría de “una manipulación descarada” y de la fabricación de un “pretexto peligroso”. . . Las declaraciones forman parte de la narrativa oficial del régimen, que niega la existencia de negociaciones formales con Washington mientras acusa a sectores del gobierno estadounidense de promover una escalada contra la isla. (Oficialismo cubano desmiente rumores y dice que Rubio manipuló a Trump con “cuento” de negociaciones)

Regime change might come to Cuba, but at this point the cause of that is as much the elite's unwillingness to reform itself as it is the eagerness of outsiders to reform Cuba to its own liking. It appears that the only thing that continues to work well within the nomenklatura is its propaganda apparatus fueled by and leveraged through a global network of supporters (eg here; here). That is a pity but also a sign of the dangers that Cuba has created for itsef since it abandoned its own Marxist Leninist reform  policies after the 7th Party Congress.  At this point the choices for the Cuban leadership are uniformly unpalatable but increasing out of their control. Perhaps the least disruptive alternative would be a reboot--a return to the revolutionary government before 1976 (run by the military) with a mandate to reform and offer up a modernized governmental system--perhaps a markets oriented socialist system; perhaps a system that includes a space for leadership by the Communist Party (but certainly not in its current form), and most painful of all--an opening of its internal markets to foreigners--certainly controlled to come extent but it is too late for the more modulated system of gradual opening through expanding spacial economic zines. The big reboot, of course would also be hard--the legitimization of the informal economy and the use of those structures and rules as the basis for economic and legal reform of the consumer sector. And underlying all of this is a hard rectification of the Nomenklatura and the rules for the engagement of the diaspora in the reconstruction of the Republic without taking it over. These will be the hardest tasks of all; hopefully someone somewhere in the lands of officials have been thinking about this. . . . . . . It is in this context that perhaps between the US and Mexico the problem of Cuba can be stabilized--having waited too long, having sought refuge in the past, Cuba will now be propelled into a future for which its elites are unprepared; and those who are unprepared ought to prepare to become irrelevant. 

黎智英是中国公民 [Jimmy Lai is a Chinese Citizen] (China Foreign Ministry)-- and Restated Framework: "Hong Kong: Safeguarding China’s National Security Under the Framework of One Country, Two Systems": The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China

Pix credit here (China Dailñy 2019)

The trial, conviction, and sentencing of Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong is important for a number of reasons beyond the personal, though that ought to be a central consideration. Those series of events were public performances in the sense perhaps that Foucault tried to explain their characteristics in 18th century France. They inscribe a ruling narrative on the body of a person significant enough to project not just the narrative but its principles, teaching, premises and, in the case of China, its fundamental political line, both to its internal population and against its external peers, competitors, enemies and opponents. That was made clear in the sentencing and as the gloss that Chinese authorities quite consciously and publicly provided not just to home audiences but also projected into areas of foreign relations and the ideological battlefields that they represent, one in which the United States, particularly, as taken a vigorous oppositional stance as narrative, as performance, as politics, and as economics.

This short reflection provides the performative text from the Chinese side--remarks made at a Foreign Ministry Press Conference and a State Council paper restating the Chinese post-2020 position on and in Hong Kong. Links to the US position are also provided.

法新社记者：香港特区法院今天宣布黎智英犯有危害国家安全的罪行，对其判处20年监禁。黎是英国公民，英国首相斯塔默近期访华期间提及此案，此前美国总统特朗普也要求中方释放他。外交部对此有何评论？

林剑：黎智英是一系列反中乱港事件的主要策划者和参与者，其行为严重冲击“一国两制”原则底线，严重危害国家安全，严重损害香港繁荣稳定和市民福祉，理应受到法律严惩。香港是法治社会，特区司法机关依法履职尽责，维护法律权威，捍卫国家安全，合情合理合法，不容置喙。中央政府坚定支持特区依法维护国家安全、惩治危害国家安全的犯罪行为。实践已经证明，香港国安法实施得越好，香港社会就越稳定、越安全，香港广大居民的权利和自由就越能得到保障，香港“金字招牌”才能越擦越亮，“一国两制”实践才能行稳致远。黎智英是中国公民。有关司法案件纯属香港特区内部事务，我们敦促有关国家尊重中国主权，尊重香港法治，不得就特区司法案件审理发表不负责任的言论，不得以任何形式干预香港司法、干涉中国内政。

AFP Reporter: The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) court today sentenced Jimmy Lai to 20 years in prison for endangering national security. Lai is a British citizen, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer recently raised the case during his visit to China. US President Donald Trump also previously demanded his release. What is the Foreign Ministry's comment on this?

Lin Jian: Jimmy Lai is a key planner and participant in a series of anti-China and pro-chaos events in Hong Kong. His actions severely undermine the bottom line of the "One Country, Two Systems" principle, seriously endanger national security, and severely damage Hong Kong's prosperity, stability, and the well-being of its citizens. He should be severely punished by law. Hong Kong is a society governed by the rule of law. The HKSAR's judiciary is fulfilling its duties in accordance with the law, upholding the authority of the law, and safeguarding national security. This is reasonable, justifiable, and lawful, and brooks no dissent. The Central Government firmly supports the HKSAR in safeguarding national security and punishing crimes that endanger national security in accordance with the law. Practice has proven that the better the Hong Kong National Security Law is implemented, the more stable and secure Hong Kong society will be, the more the rights and freedoms of the vast majority of Hong Kong residents will be protected, the brighter Hong Kong's reputation will shine, and the more steadily and effectively the "One Country, Two Systems" practice will proceed. Jimmy Lai is a Chinese citizen. The judicial cases in question are purely internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. We urge relevant countries to respect China's sovereignty and the rule of law in Hong Kong, and not to make irresponsible remarks about the handling of judicial cases in the SAR, nor to interfere in Hong Kong's judiciary or China's internal affairs in any form.2026年2月9日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会 [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian held a regular press conference on February 9, 2026.]

I have been considering the recent sentencing of Jimmy Lai for violation of the Hong Kong National Security Law. The conviction was in December 2025; concerning occurred in February 2026. My focus was on conseqeunce, and in this case the reaction of the US authorities, and specifically the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Issues Statement on the Sentencing of Jimmy Lai and Full Text of the Hong Kong High Court Sentencing Judgment ).

Yet the reaction on the part of the Chinese authorities is perhaps equally if not more telling of the consequence of Jimmy Lai and his transformation from a human story to the symbolic representation of the battle for normative control of the idea of Hong Kong that had been fought first on the streets in 20'19, and then within the more abstracted halls of institutions in China, the UN and the US (my take in Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems'; purchase softback here).

My friend and colleague in Hong Kong, Pui-yin Lo, suggested two quite interesting sources of the C hnese reaction and their framing of the verdict and the general relation of the national security law to the question of Hong Kong. The first was highlighted in the comments of Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian held a regular press conference on February 9, 2026 [2026年2月9日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会], the critical text of which is quoted above. The second was in the much lengthier State COuncil paper of February 2026, Hong Kong: Safeguarding China’s National  Security Under the Framework of
One Country, Two Systems.

The first situated  the issue of Jimmy Lai within the core of China's internal affairs. As such it was a matter that was not of concern to foreigners. It was also grounded in the emerging nature and practice of national security in the context of people's democratic dictatorship, which ion its core distinguishes between patriots and reactionary or unpatriotic citizens. That was true enough with respect to projections of power inward. But of course it says nothing of the power of foreign states to react to internal affairs decisions within China as they choose--and that may include consideration of the nature and basis of their relations with Chins. But then China is also quite practiced in this difference in its own foreign relations.  None of this is new bit it is important to note its vigorous reaffirmation int his particular context.

The State Council Paper requires more thought.  . . . and careful reading. It breaks no new ground bit refines and restates the narrative of Hong Kong that emerged from the turmoil of 2019--a actually starting in 2014 with the Umbrella movement. For that reason alone it is worth reading carefully. The most interesting evolution is the situating of Hong Kong more closely within the national efforts at new era socialist modernization and its emphasis on high quality production--and with it the focus on foregrounding national security not just in economics but in development generally. To those ends Hong Kong as a specific function, but one within China rather than aside it or beyond. It follows that the general principles of people's democratic dictatorship also become relevant. The issue then is the meeting point of two [economic] system within one country--coordinated and aligned but not identical. That remains a work in progress. 

2026年2月9日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会 [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian held a regular press conference on February 9, 2026.] (in the original Chinese and in English), along with the Chinese State Council Information Office  Hong Kong: Safeguarding China’s National  Security Under the Framework of One Country, Two Systems n (10 February 2026). 

 

Panel on Health, Corporate Governance, and Climate Change 11 February 2026

Delighted to pass this along for those interested.  Great speakers:

 

 

Panel on Health, Corporate Governance, and Climate Change

The panel will explore the intersection of health, corporate governance, and climate change-examining how the medical field addresses the human health impacts of climate change and the responsibilities corporations hold in this context.

CHAIR
Leah Vosko, York University

PANELISTS
Hassan Ahmad, Osgoode Hall Law School
Selina Lee-Andersen, McCarthy Tetrault LLP
Peter Menikefs, University of Toronto
Uchechukwu Ngwaba, Toronto Metropolitan University
Myles Sergeant, McMaster University

 Date: 

Time: 2:30 pm - 4:00 pm

Location: Room 2027, Osgoode Hall Law School

REGISTER

 

Tugrul Keskin: Brief Reflections on ByteDance’s release of the AI video generation model Seedance 2.0, with my very brief additional Thoughts

 

 

My friend and colleague, the remarkable Tugrul Keskin has recently produced a very short reflection that is worth some consideration. With his permission I repost here:

The attached video of ByteDance’s (https://www.bytedance.com/en/) AI video generation model Seedance 2.0 (https://openart.ai/video/i2v/seedance-v1) signals a transformation that extends beyond a routine technological upgrade. Rather than merely exemplifying “technology with Chinese characteristics,” it points to the emergence of a new movie industry with Chinese characteristics, increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence. When viewed through Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s concept of the culture industry, this development reflects an advanced phase of the rationalization and standardization of cultural production—now mediated by algorithms rather than traditional studios.

Walter Benjamin’s notion of art in the age of mechanical reproduction offers a complementary lens. AI-generated video further diminishes the uniqueness and “aura” of cultural artifacts by making high-quality visual production infinitely reproducible, editable, and scalable. As the video demonstrates, AI-driven filmmaking reorganizes creative labor and aesthetic processes within global technological systems that transcend national boundaries, even as they are embedded in China–US competition over AI leadership. Together, these perspectives suggest that contemporary AI innovations are accelerating long-term structural changes in the global political economy of culture. The broader implications—particularly for labor, authorship, and cultural value—are likely to become visible earlier than previously anticipated, potentially well before 2030.

 

 In one sense the movement toward tech art represents a manifestation, in the sphere of cultural production, of innovation in the service of collective power. It fits nicely into China's 3rd Plenum high quality productivity within socialist modernization initiatives, but also those of the United States and Europe with respect to tech based dominance of production in all spheres of human activity. In this sense, one can understand Seedance 2.0 as the competitor and analogue to Open AI's Sora 2. Both efforts , and those lesser known efforts either being developed in the global informal sector or by "middle powers" as the Canadian Prime Minister calls them (see here), suggest that one has passed the point of no return in the production of producers of objects in all spheres of human consumption. 

That opens the question raised, in another era of mechanical reproduction, by Benjamin--but perhaps changes its trajectories. Two brief points here. First Benjamin was worried about reproduction--the mimetic quality of something that was deliberately meant to copy to produce again something that had been undertaken before and then produced again. That touches not just on the mimetic, but also on the temporal--reproduction is a means of overcoming time by recapturing the essence of a thing or event in time  in the present. It is also spatial in the sense that, at least with respect to reproduced objects--it is meant to have it occupy more than one space at a time. Yet the essence of the "problem" in the cultural sphere is the mimesis itself ("The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of
authenticity." Banjamin, p. 3) which can never be the same as the original. 

But what happens when one moves from reproduction to displacement? That is Keskin's central point. Keskin focuses on the uniqueness of cultural actions/performances/artifacts, and thus the intimate connection with the essence of Benjamin's almost a century old worry/critique. That focus draws attention to the premise--which had been so fundamental to avoid conscious attention until recently--of the intimate connection between human production and the essential humanity of culture. One moves from human structures of cultural production built around (the sometimes constraining and always annoying) human institutions of power leaching onto and managing both production and the cognition of the value of production, to one in which what drives and produces cultural objects are coded programs that may be increasingly self-reflexive, even if the structures of power remain (somewhat) human. Thus the reference to a movie industry with Chinese characteristics (the same insight may apply to movie industries elsewhere with distinctive political-economic models). 

Yet even with Seedance 2.0 and Sora 2, etc., the human remains in the loop--these are producers of culture (movies in this case) with human characteristics that are directed and the authority for the distribution of which remains firmly entrenched in human authority organs. The effects, though, as Keskin correctly notes, will be significant. While the human may well remain in the center, the role of humanity in the production of cultural objects will change, and perhaps dramatically changing the forms of production, its economics, and of course, its consequential power relationships. Much has been written about this, but it is especially important, and powerful, in cultures which have invested significant resources in the mechanics of celebrity and celebrity culture, as well as in its management--with national characteristics. Yet it may be important to note that like all things, there is no binary here--one encounters, at least at the beginning, a sort of hybridity that my itself produce cultural innovation (see, e.g., Movies you didn’t know used AI!).

Keskin is correct in this view, and in the process invites one to reflect further. Is it possible to distinguish between reproduced cultural objects and cultural objects that displace the human not at the center but as the direct source of creation? One the one hand, it may be worth distinguishing between mechanical reproduction and AI or tech based production that displaces the human as the direct creator of the cultural object/performance etc. Indeed, one may understand  these new technologies as cultural production n two levels--first at the level of the coding of the structures of production (its mechanics) and two in the form of the cultural objects produced from within it. Two thoughts may follow from that. The first is that  what displacement produces is a distance between the creation and its human input. That is that Seedance and Sora 2 are still means of human cultural production, but now that production is in direct int he sense that its mechanics are not directly the product of human intervention. The second is that one now has to consider that it means for humans to engage in cultural production--and certainly in the production of "art". If displacement makes the resulting production inhuman then one might be required to consider the relationship of tech based mechanisms, including self reflexive and auto generating intelligence to the human (see here). 

The broader implications, as Keskin correctly notes, remains.  Like the printing press, or the plow, etc., but perhaps at a faster rate, these tech based transformations will produce substantial changes in the organizaiton and undertaking, in the valuation, of human activity within their collectives. It will also put pressure on political-economic models to manage their theoretics to suit the times, or to become irrelevant. People ave been debating this for decades--but perhaps it may be time to shift the analytics from its framing in and through the Industrial Revolution of the 18th through 20th century, and understand that the current focus on innovation may require some adjustment to the way in which the human approaches their relationship to themselves, their tools, and the objects around which they understand themselves as themselves and in relation to the world. . . . Or, as Benjamin suggested as the essence of reproduction, to choose to reproduce culture and cultural reproduction itself as and at some ideal point sometime back in time. That has also been done before; and often within the great cultural civilizations.  Nonetheless its success, as Benjamin suggested, is to to travel back to the original but in the replication to create something new in its shadow That has all the makings of a silver rather than a golden age. 

 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Issues Statement on the Sentencing of Jimmy Lai and Full Text of the Hong Kong High Court Sentencing Judgment

 

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by the U.S. Congress in 2000 "with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress. The Commission consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior Administration officials appointed by the President." (CECC About). The CECC FAQs provide useful information about the CECC. See CECC Frequently Asked Questions. They have developed positions on a number of issues.

CECC tends to serve as an excellent barometer of the thinking of political and academic elites in the United States about issues touching on China and the official American line developed in connection with those issues. As such it is an important source of information about the way official and academic sectors think about China. As one can imagine many of the positions of the CECC are critical of current Chinese policies and institutions (for some analysis see CECC).

CECC periodically publishes Statements of relevance to its mission. These include statements of actions that would be undertaken through Congress in light of the subject of the Statement. 

Pix credit here

CECC has been following the legal proceedings against Jimmy Lai for some time. CECC has been particularly interested in the prosecution of Jimmy Lai under Hong Kong's National Security Law. Links to the several interventions respecting Jimmy Lai by CECC can be found below. See also the related Press Release:  Chairs’ Statement Condemning Jimmy Lai’s Conviction. Hong Kong Courts recently sentenced Mr. Lai after his conviction (Hong Kong Court Sentences Jimmy Lai to 20 Years: The media tycoon, a Chinese-born British citizen, had been a persistent critic of Beijing. The sentence is the harshest penalty so far under a national security law). For the text of the sentencing judgment see here (China Daily): Full text: High Court judgment sentencing Jimmy Lai.

In he wake of the determination of sentence by the Hong Kong courts, the CECC released its Statement: Chairs Condemn Sentencing, Seek Medical Parole for Jimmy Lai. Two elements if the statement stand out. The first was the call to have Mr. Lauireleased for medical reasons: "We call on the Hong Kong authorities to grant Jimmy Lai medical parole and release him immediately and unconditionally. After years of arbitrary detention and worsening health due to harsh prison conditions, he should not spend one more night behind bars." The second and perhaps more consequential element was to align the condemnation of the sentence to legislative efforts in the US with effects on the US-Hong King relationship:  

In light of today’s event, we urge our Congressional colleagues to advance bipartisan legislation swiftly—including the Hong Kong Judicial Sanctions Act (S.1755), HKETO Certification Act (S.3655 / H.R.2661), and the Jimmy Lai Way Act (H.R. 2522)—to hold officials accountable for unjust prosecutions and detentions, and to ensure Hong Kong’s U.S. trade offices are not falsely promoting a version of judicial independence and free speech protections that no longer exist. 

The full text of the Statement appears below along with the China Daily version of the sentencing judgment. 

 

Just Published Voñ 39 Issue 2 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law

 

We’re delighted to announce that Volume 39, Issue 2 of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law is now available!

This issue brings together a rich and diverse collection of articles that contribute new insights, thoughtful analysis, and timely discussions in the field. The contributions reflect the breadth and depth of current scholarship, addressing important theoretical questions while also engaging with pressing contemporary concerns. We hope this issue will stimulate further dialogue and inspire ongoing research.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks to all authors for their excellent submissions, to the reviewers for their careful and constructive evaluations, and to everyone involved in the editorial and production process. Their commitment and expertise have made this issue possible.

You can explore the full Table of Contents (ToC) here:
https://link.springer.com/journal/11196/volumes-and-issues/39-2

The links follow below. 

Of particular interest may be the quite interesting open access essay:  Pierangelo Blandino, Metaphorical Correspondences Between Law and Data

Abstract: This study proposes a new lens for thinking about data law by combining legal semiotics with metaphor. It begins by questioning how legal systems represent data which can be referred to as an entity that is inherently shifting, relational, and abstract. Hence, metaphor is used not just for illustration, but as a method for rethinking legal meaning itself. Drawing from classical exegetic traditions and contemporary legal theory, the paper shows how interpretive flexibility can help navigate emerging challenges, particularly in contexts like that of blockchain technology. Here, legal concepts often fall short, given the transnational, decentralised nature of digital transactions. By resorting to devices like Broekman’s concept of conversion and the logic of differential calculus, the paper suggests ways legal meaning can adapt without losing coherence. In doing so, it offers a framework for transposing traditional legal principles into the infosphere; one that protects rights and preserves dignity, while acknowledging the fluid, interconnected nature of data in rapidly evolving social and technological landscapes.

 It is particular interesting for its use of semiotic approaches to bring data and data environments back into law; perhaps it might be as useful to thinking about using semiotics to further propel law and legal environments into data, into what Jan Broekman and I have suggested, though from slightly different perspectives, as rethinking law not as command, but as coded analytics and privileged pathways  supporting judgments that are favored and thus directing  what Broekman calls the flow and I call the signal (here, see also here).  

 

From Axios: "White House plans Board of Peace meeting in D.C. on Gaza reconstruction"

 

Pix credit here

The Hamas-Israel war centered in Gaza has become, and especially so during the 2nd Administration of President Trump, a focal point for both the transformations that the Trump Administration is trying to drive and the rallying point for all of the global apparatus, public, private, intellectual, still deeply committed to what had been the status quo since 1948. And in a sense, perhaps, that is the point--if one seeks to reject the post 1945 world order, at least as it had acquired its contemporary form after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, then one of its most significant performative theaters, one participation in and around which has been irresistible and one that provokes virtually everyone into an opinion of some sort or another respecting some aspect of it or another, has been the ethno-religious-clan wars between the Jews and the people resident in a part of the w0orld in which many many groups have some sort of claim. 

 The new order, for the territory of Gaza and more generally for the world, is meat to embed and naturalize the transactional ordering premises of ceasefire, understood as peace, through which conflict can be managed not as an institutional issue but as a basis for transactional activity that substitutes itself for the ordering of managers (America First as a Template for the Global: Text of the U.S. Cease-Fire Plan for Gaza). But even transactions require an institutional apparatus--and Gaza does not disappoint. 

Trump at the Board of Peace unveiling in Davos. Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Image

 President Trump unveiled the Board of Peace--an institution with a growing mandate, but the origens of which might be traced to the Gaza peace plan the President put forward and that received notice from the UN apparatus. (Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, 16 January 2026). It was constituted officially at Davos in January 2026. Initial members included  Its initial members include the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey, Hungary, Morocco, Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria, Argentina, Paraguay, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Indonesia and Vietnam (here).

Pix credit here

Earlier meetings suggested the possibilities for a new Gaza--a futuristic space that would substitute the fields of commerce for4 that of ethno-religious conflict. The plan was resisted, even before it was unveiled by the losers in the last round of the Hamas-Israel war and their supporters; none of them had anything to gain from the transformation or from a transactional Gaza that could not wallow in its ancient self-actualization. The UN apparatus also objected, though one could hardly blame them--they have become not merely irrelevant but effectively erased, And that works to the benefit of the Trump Administration's objectives to evidence the failure of the current UN system and more specifically of its complicity in violence rather than peace, even if peace is not eternal. All of that was enough to earn the suspicions of the Europeans and the opposition of the Chinese, precisely because they might have thought that what was at stake was far more important than the lives and welfare of the people there; what was at stake was, on the one hand the post 1945 international global institutional order, or on the other hand to control that order to suit its own political-economic imperatives. This, of course, has energized rather than thwarted the Americans. 

It is now set to meet. Reporting by Axios detailed the agenda. Scoop: White House plans Board of Peace meeting in D.C. on Gaza reconstruction.  And even the meeting is loaded with signification. The meeting will be held at the old offices of the old U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), a Reagan era form of peace advancing that served as the target for Trump Administration downsizing--and litigation--from the start of his 2nd Administration. The story is summarized here and is ongoing. One form of American peace advancement--institutional, convergence internationalism-- has now been displaced by another--transactional and market oriented-- and not just theoretically but in terms of the occupation of the space in institutional Washington set aside for those endeavors. 

 The text of Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Board of Peace Charter Signing Ceremony follows below along with the reporting from Axios (Scoop: White House plans Board of Peace meeting in D.C. on Gaza reconstruction. ) on the upcoming meeting, and President Trump's Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict all follow below. 

Brief Reflections on 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》[Thoroughly study and implement the "Regulations on Ideological and Political Work of the Communist Party of China"]

 

[General Line Propaganda Poster 11 - Ideological work and political work are always the soul and the commander of all work

总路线宣传画 11 - 思想工作和政治工作永远是一切工作的灵魂和統帥] Pix credit here (1958)

 I have been considering some, perhaps important, components of Chinese new era Leninism as it is incarnated within the systems and structures of its political-economic model both internally and externally.  

 To Promote the Constitution One Must First Promote the Leadership of the Party!--Reflections on 持续推动宪法深入人心 [Continuously Promoting the Constitution to Take Root in People's Hearts] and 抓住“关键少数”的理论意蕴 [Grasping the Theoretical Implications of Focusing on the "Key Few"]

 Reflections on a Chinese Reflection on Davis--不能任由世界滑向“无规则”深渊（寰宇平） [The World Cannot Be Allowed to Slide into the Abyss of "Lawlessness" (Global Perspective)]

 The Four Advantages [四大优势] of Chinese Style Modernization in the New Era; Reflections on 深刻理解“十五五”时期我国经济社会发展优势更加彰显 《红旗文稿》2025/23 张占斌 [A Deeper Understanding of the Even More Prominent Advantages of China's Economic and Social Development During the 15th Five-Year Plan Period," Red Flag Journal, 2025/23 Zhang Zhanbin]

 For Those who Missed This: 中华人民共和国外交部--中国对拉丁美洲和加勒比政策文件 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC--China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean]

This reflection is the last of them. It focuses on the Communist Party of China's refinement of the rules and approaches to  engaging in ideological and political work: 田训龙 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》[Tian Xunlong, Thoroughly study and implement the "Regulations on Ideological and Political Work of the Communist Party of China"] which appeared in of Red Flag (or perhaps more comprehensively transliterated as Revolutionary Banner) Journal 《红旗文稿》2025年第23期 (on the semiotics of flags, banners and the like, see here). The nature of political and ideological work is an old one:  "Ideological education is the key link to be grasped in uniting the whole Party for great political struggles. Unless this is done, the Party cannot accomplish any of its political tasks." (Mao Zedong, "On Coalition Government" (April 24, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 315). 

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Its origins might be traced to the development of Mao Zedong's theory if the two types of contradiction: "社会主义社会的矛盾反映在政治上可以划分为敌我矛盾和人民内部矛盾两类。" [In a socialist society, contradictions, as reflected in the political sphere, can be divided into two categories: contradictions between the enemy and the people, and contradictions among the people themselves.] (CPC Central Committee essay, "Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" [毛泽东《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》]. Contradictions among the people was "explicitly defined as the theme of national political life, and a series of policies for resolving these contradictions were formulated." [把正确处理人民内部矛盾明确规定为国家政治生活的主题，并制定出解决人民内部矛盾的一系列方针。] (Ibid.). The forms of this resolution evolved over time reflecting the emphasis of the then dominant general contradiction. But all of it remains tied to the correct deployment of productive forces in the service of socialist modernization directed toward forward movement along the Socialist Path. 

This binary is closely connected to the underlying premises of People's democratic dictatorship (here and here), one that separates patriots from enemies and builds responsive political structures and tasks on those categorizations (e.g., 党的十九届六中全会《决议》学习问答 13.为什么说人民民主专政的国家政权为国家迅速发展创造了条件？[Q&A on the Resolution of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee: 13. Why is it said that the people's democratic dictatorship created conditions for the rapid development of the country?]). It is, in a sense, the glue that binds politics to administration, and thus the CPC to the state apparatus, textualized through hierarchically arranged written pronouncements at the apex of which are the (state) constitution as the operating code by which the fundamental political line is implemented and fulfilled, and the  CPC General Program as the general line itself.  

Its challenges have been an institutional policy issue (and with it the role of the CPC within the administrative structures it was building to manifest its leadership of the country as the vanguard of the advanced social forces of the masses) almost from the time of the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. A key element of overcoming contradiction among the people was embedded into the theory and dialectical architecture of the mass line. Those, in turn, were transposed into pragmatic programs within the CPC fundamental political and ideological work:

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Recently there has been a falling off in ideological and political work among students and intellectuals, and some unhealthy tendencies have appeared. Some people seem to think that there is no longer any need to concern oneself with politics or with the future of the motherland and the ideals of mankind. It seems as if Marxism was once all the rage but is currently not so much in fashion. To counter these tendencies, we must strengthen our ideological and political work. Both students and intellectuals should study hard. In addition to the study of their specialized subjects, they must make progress both ideologically and politically, which means that they should study Marxism, current events and politics. Not to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul . . .. All departments and organizations should shoulder their responsibilities in ideological and political work. This applies to the Communist Party, the Youth League, government departments in charge of this work, and especially to heads of educational institutions and teachers. (Mao Zedong, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (February 27, 1957); 1st pocket ed., pp. 43-44).

 These ideas remain vibrant. For example they serve as a core of the 2020 "Staying True to our Founding Mission" campaign (习近平在“不忘初心、牢记使命”主题教育总结大会上的讲话 [Xi Jinping's speech at the summary meeting of the "Staying True to Our Founding Mission" thematic education campaign]), closely tied to self-revolution and social revolution campaigns. (e.g., here, and here).  

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These themes are much in evidence in a recent essay that is meant to draw mass attention, once again, to the centrality of political and ideological work as a core element of Chinese political life, its expression in and as the mass line, and through that within whole process people's democracy, and the fulfillment of the fundamental political line contextualization realized in every stage of Chinese historical development. All of those structures and trajectories then provide the context within which one might approach the (state) constitution as an element and the articulation of that fundamental political line as a disciplinary tool and as the realization of the fundamental line through the institutional interaction between people , state, and party (as another element of the mass line). And above it all, socialist modernization as the driving element directed toward its perfection as a predicate to the establishment of a communist society.  

That, perhaps, is one way of approaching the theory. And the essay,  深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》[Thoroughly study and implement the "Regulations on Ideological and Political Work of the Communist Party of China"] brings all of these themes together in the maturing new era of Chinese Leninism. They focus on the recent (September 2025) amendments to the "Regulations on Ideological and Political Work of the Communist Party of China" issued by the CPC Central Committee (中共中央印发的《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》). It is divided into three parts:

As is customary in documents of this type, Part 1 connects the regulation and its modification to the ongoing work of keeping Chinese Leninism current under the leadership of Xi Jinping. 

The Regulations closely revolve around the primary task of ideological and political work: "promoting the use of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to unite hearts and minds," and make a series of clear provisions, prioritizing the use of the Party's innovative theories to arm minds, unify thinking, build consensus, and guide practice. [《条例》紧紧围绕“推动用习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想凝心铸魂”这个思想政治工作的首要任务，作出一系列明确规定，把推动用党的创新理论武装头脑、统一思想、凝聚共识、指导实践放在首位。] ( 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》)

That moves the essay from foundational theory to the two methods of operationalize. This is to be undertaken through application of the "people centered approach" (坚持人民立场)  and the "problem oriented approach" (坚持问题导向) that have become a common theme under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The first speaks to the  and the expression of the contemporaneous mass line approach to contradictions among the people. Its most interesting element is pragmatic--the means by which the approach is to be manifested:

开展思想教育、政治引领、道德培养、精神激励、文化涵育、心理疏导、关怀服务等多样实践，精准把握不同社会群体的思想动态和心理特点，分类指导，确保思想政治工作入脑入心，其根本目的在于有效引领群众、组织群众、宣传群众、教育群众、服务群众，从而增强信心、凝聚民心、温暖人心、筑就同心，不断凝聚广大人民群众的智慧与力量。(It involves diverse practices such as ideological education, political guidance, moral cultivation, spiritual encouragement, cultural nurturing, psychological counseling, and caring services. It requires accurately understanding the ideological dynamics and psychological characteristics of different social groups, providing targeted guidance, and ensuring that ideological and political work resonates deeply with people. The fundamental purpose is to effectively guide, organize, publicize, educate, and serve the people, thereby strengthening confidence, uniting hearts and minds, providing comfort, and fostering solidarity, continuously pooling the wisdom and strength of the broad masses of the people.)( 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》)

The problem oriented approach then refines the people centered palette.  鉴于此，《条例》重点分析思想政治工作面临的新形势新任务，聚焦存在的突出问题，提出针对性、操作性强的措施办法。 [Therefore, the Regulations focus on analyzing the new situations and tasks facing ideological and political work, addressing prominent problems, and proposing targeted and practical measures.] ( 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》). These are deeply connected to the trajectories of socialist modernization and the contemporary focus on the development of high quality or innovative production--to overcome the disconnect between ideological and political work on the one hand and the niceties of production on the other ("比如，在企业领域，针对职工思想状况、价值观念多样以及思想政治工作与生产经营脱节等" [For example, in the corporate sector, addressing issues such as the diverse ideological perspectives and values ​​of employees, and the disconnect between ideological and political work and production and operation] (Ibid.)). 

Part 2 then considers the breadth of coverage. It answers the question "who does it (“谁来做”) and then organizes the work in ways that aligns with CPC structures and responsibility hierarchies, as well as the intermeshing of those hierarchies functionally. It answers the question "what to do" (“做什么”) by focusing on a three level (macro, meso, and micro) analysis ("中观和微观层面构建起结构完善"). Macro level political and ideological work focuses on theoretical structures and developing national approaches that incorporate the great ideological themes of the current stage of historical development--especially those of socialist modernization as a function of the great rejuvenation campaign. The approach is far more interesting at the meso level:

在中观层面，聚焦价值引导与制度认同，系统推进爱国主义、集体主义、社会主义教育和“四史”宣传教育；加强社会主义精神文明建设，弘扬中国特色社会主义文化，培育践行社会主义核心价值观，特别强调培育时代新风新貌，推进公民“四德”建设；开展党章党规党纪和社会主义法治宣传教育；深化形势政策和基本国情教育，等等。[At the meso level, they focus on value guidance and institutional identification, systematically promoting patriotism, collectivism, socialism education, and "four histories" (Party history, New China history, reform and opening-up history, and socialist development history) education; strengthening the construction of socialist spiritual civilization, promoting socialist culture with Chinese characteristics, cultivating and practicing socialist core values, and particularly emphasizing the cultivation of new social trends and customs and promoting the "four virtues" of citizens; conducting education on Party constitution, Party rules, Party discipline, and socialist rule of law; deepening education on current affairs, policies, and basic national conditions, and so on.]( 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》).

It is at this level that a more intimate connection is made and felt) between the people and the contexts in which they lead their lives and the CPC's political and ideological work. The meso level is an essential methodological element for the successful attainment of micro level objectives of political and ideological work--and also its most challenging element: "they focus on cultivating social attitudes and individual behavior, clarifying that ideological and political work should be carried out in conjunction with the actual circumstances of the unit's nature, industry characteristics, functions and responsibilities, and personnel composition, and so on." [注重社会心态培育与个体行为养成，明确开展思想政治工作应当结合单位属性、行业特点、职能职责、人员构成等实际情况，等等] ( 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》).

Lastly this Part 2 answers the questions "who to focus on" (“关注谁”) and "how to do it" (“怎么做”). With respect to the first, "who to focus on" (“关注谁”), differentiated and targeted objectives are developed. This consists of several arrangements. The first focuses on enterprise work, emphasizing the construction and promotion if model workers in model enterprises. The second focuses on rural work, emphasizing the alignment of a spiritual ideal (精神风) with the realities on rural life and work. The third focuses on the state apparatus and its workers, emphasizing the integration of political and ideological principles with a business centered approach to operations.The fourth focuses on educational work, emphasizing compliance with the CPC's educational line, cultivating virtue and integrating education for all sectors for productive and ideologically correct work. The fifth focuses on collective organs other than state organs, emphasizing "organizational functions of community-level Party organizations, building consensus, coordinating interests, resolving contradictions, promoting unity, and fostering harmony and stability." The sixth focuses emerging sectors of economic, social and employment groups, emphasizing the need to extend coverage to these emerging collectives. The seventh focuses on online spheres, emphasizing the instrumentalization of the internet "to organize, publicize, guide, and serve the public." For all of these sectors the notion of leveraging the advantages of the targeted groups within the sector and among them is emphasized as well. 

Having created a seven tier taxonomy the issue of "how to do it" (“怎么做”) is then addressed. Here the emphasis is on methodological innovation and the construction of an organically unified set of methods. These are, in turn, divided into six aspects connected to the three core fundamental tasks of political and ideological work:

理论学习教育、舆论氛围营造、主流价值引领、文化浸润滋养、榜样示范感召、关怀服务引导等6个方面，围绕坚持党的领导、贯彻党的主张、巩固党的执政基础和群众基础的根本任务，形成有机统一的方法组合 [Through six aspects—theoretical learning and education, creating a positive public opinion environment, guiding with mainstream values, cultural immersion and nurturing, exemplary role models, and caring service and guidance—an organically unified set of methods is formed, centered around the fundamental tasks of upholding the Party's leadership, implementing the Party's principles, and consolidating the Party's governing and mass base.] ( 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》).

These are understood to reflect a dialectical unity of exploit and implicit approaches to the political and ideological task (6个方面的方式方法体现“显隐结合”的辩证统一 Ibid.). They are meant to align systematic theoretical indoctrination with value guidance, as well as advance "subtle cultural influence and emotional identification ("6个方面的方式方法既注重直接系统的理论灌输和价值引导，也强调潜移默化的文化感染与情感认同")( 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》) .  The object is internalization the appropriate cognitive cage the consequence of which is the likelihood of appropriate action in furtherance of what has become natural. "有助于增强思想政治工作的亲和力与渗透力，整体上体现了思想政治工作“内化于心、外化于行”的本质要求，系统性提升了其科学化、专业化水平 [This helps to enhance the appeal and influence of ideological and political work, reflecting the essential requirement of "internalizing principles in the mind and manifesting them in actions," and systematically improving its scientific and professional level.]  (深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》).

Part 3 then focuses on supervision and institutional coordination of political and ideological work along the lines described. Six areas for emphasis (and funding) are specified: 《条例》从政策经费、阵地载体、调查评估和理论研究、表彰奖励、监督检查、责任追究等6个方面明确了推进思想政治工作的保障监督措施。(The Regulations specify safeguard and oversight measures for promoting ideological and political work in six areas: policy funding, platforms and resources, investigation and evaluation, theoretical research, commendation and rewards, supervision and inspection, and accountability.) 深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》). All of this is to be undertaken through a collaborative approach and team efforts. That last two likely suggesting an internal challenge that supervision and self-revolution techniques may be deployed.

And there it is. The ideological and political work of the CPC, deeply embedded in the operations of whole process democracy as its cognitive framing and elaborating the premise and principles on which the fundamental political line is expressed, both in the relationship of the CPC and the asses, but as well in the relationship between the C PC and its public institutional collective apparatus and framed in constitutional text. And over all of this are the foundational premises of socialist modernization and people's democratic dictatorship within which both constitution and political/ideological work must be understood. The text of  深入学习贯彻《中国共产党思想政治工作条例》in the original Chinese and in an English translation follows below.