Saturday, June 06, 2026

OMFIF Broadcast: "Global Financial Stability: Digital Assets and Next Generation Cross Border Payments" (25 June 2026)

 

 

The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), which styles itself an independent research group for central banking, economic policy and public investment, providing a neutral platform for public and private sector engagement worldwide, organizes sometimes quite interesting events around its core mission and aspirations. 

For 25 June 2026, OMFF has organized one such event:  "Global Financial Stability: Digital Assets and Next Generation Cross Border Payments" as a virtual discussion with Martin Moloney, deputy secretary general of the Financial Stability Board, on global financial stability in the context of rapid developments in digital assets – including stablecoins – and next-generation cross-border payments. 

This promises to be interesting, if only to (re)encounter the sensibilities and cognitive frameworks of one element of the old global system of financial stability, the response to the last great crisis of which in 2007ish produced the Financial Stability Board (on which I had at one point written a little abut from a structuralist and regulatory perspective: “Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the  Global Governance Order”, Indiana Journal Global Legal Studies 18:751-802 (2011)).  Those sensibilities, now in a global regulatory context that appears to be moving away from the foundational political line that gave birth to the FSB, but one that still requires the old convergence forms if only for transactional infrastructures from increasingly re-nationalized spaces, makes the conversation even more interesting.  The old analysis now acquires a new meaning:

Pix credit (Recreating the famous mirror sequence in 1933's movie "Duck Soup"
 The analysis produces irony: to save the state, the state itself must adapt to the governance frameworks of private transnational governance bodies. Thus reconstituted, a new set of arrangements might well arise, in which amalgamations of the most powerful states and private regulatory bodies assert authority once reserved to states alone. But it also suggests more: in particular, the weakening of the border between hard and soft law even within public sector governance. The convergence of form suggests a functional convergence of governance-the private corporation with public obligations, and the regulatory state that participates in markets. Public and private corporate bodies, once divided by an insurmountable conceptual barrier, now become mirrors of one another. (“Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State, p. 759) 

Stabilization through control mechanisms; control mechanisms through a dense layering of compliance and expectations permeating an aligned system of institutional actors across ecologies of private and public systems that are grounded on the value of fuzziness and personalized through a solidarity based techno-bureaucratic order that serves stability in ways that align with the fundamental premises of the cognitive cage that signify these terms and premises in ways that produce a rationalized interpretive system. But perhaps not. . . . 

Registration links and more information follows below and may also be accessed HERE.  

 

Friday, June 05, 2026

OMFIF’s Gender Balance Index 2026







The OMFIF has released the latest iteration of its Gender Balance Index. Thery summarize its results this way:
For 12 years, OMFIF’s Gender Balance Index has analysed the state of gender parity in leadership roles across the financial sector. This year’s central banks recorded significant gains: Central banks saw the biggest improvements within leadership positions in the index this year.
The number of women governors reached a historic score of 35, six of whom head the regional Federal Reserve Banks.
This is the highest number of women who have led the regional Feds in a single year.Αt a critical moment when US federal and private organisations were under pressure to remove diversity, equity and inclusion information and abandon related initiatives, these trends suggest that progress in gender representation within central banks has continued.





The report reflects the sensibilities and taxonomies of the 2oth century transformation of identity based politics into the economic, social, cultural, and political spheres. And yet at the same time it is a marker of the obsolescence of those taxonomies and their semiotics—that is the obsolescence of the signification of sex and gender within a set of binary significs—male and female; man and woman.

The identity politics of the 20th century and its more formidably powerful insemination of cultural production within the generative fields of negotiations between individuals and collectives respecting the (re) construction of the female and with it the category woman continues. But it has been upended by the explosion of the binaries of the categorizations of the human, and the fusion of biology with its social signification, and then its reconstitution enhanced by advances in technologies, into a fluidity og both biology (that can be chemically and surgically altered); psychology (which can be a bridge between the body and the identity of the mind within a physical body), and the possibilities of multiple existence within physical and virtual spaces.

Read in this way, and in the spirit of the sensibilities of the ruling group within the normative framework of which these initiatives have been crafted, signified and provided pathways for communal interpretation, one might come to wonder whether, indeed, it replicates the hierarchies of sex and gender, and the semiotics of the signification (and constraints) of both within the cognitive cages of a society in which neither sex nor gender easily conforms to the forms and pathways that make reports like this entirely meaningful within its own cognitive normative premises.

More information about the report with links to acquiring a copy is provided below.

Klasus Larres: What Europe's Tunnel Vision Misses: despite continuing tension with the Trump administration, a new pragmatism is essential. Insights from the GlobSec 2026 Forum

 


 My friend and colleague Klaus Larres has just published a quite interesting take on the state of Europe, or perhaps better put the state of the crisis in Europe, one that is only now becoming clearer. That crisis touches not just on the state of European economies and integration, but also on its political cultures, its institutional cultures of governance, and the ideological neural networks of its fundamental political line.  All of this at a time when many in Europe appear willing to reconsider who their friends and enemies arte among the larger powers that keep nudging themselves into European political life. 

 Here is his description: 

"WHAT EUROPE'S TUNNEL VISION MISSES"  is a new essay which I have just published on my Substack. "What Europe's Tunnel Vision Misses:  Despite Continuing Tension with the Trump Administration, a new Pragmatism is Essential. Insights from the GlobSec 2026 Forum."

 

The essay is a slightly revised English version of an op ed published in German in my column "Understanding America" for the German daily newspaper 'Koelner Stadtanzeiger' (Monday, June 1, 2026).  If you like the essay, then please subscribe to my Substack for Free And feel free to ask your friends and family to do so too. https://klauslarres.substack.com/

The point is fairly straightforward: in the face of what the  Europeans and fellow traveler  global elites perceive as the incompetence of the Trump Administration, what is to be done with or without the U.S. And yet oddly they continue to rehash increasingly other worldly iterations of historical hand wringing about the status of Ukraine in and as Europe (especially with respect to NATO and EU membership). And the contempt for the US-Israeli actions in the middle east appeared to be generally shared, and with it, an assessment: "So far, China has been the strategic winner of Trump’s misguided Middle East policy. The U.S. is increasingly viewed—not least in the non-Western world—as a hotbed of chaos and a source of war and instability, while China is able to position itself as a supposed pole of stability and reliability." They continue to fret about the pervasiveness of Russian influence on their political discourse and cultures. And so on.

The problem (for Europe) of course, is that all of this analysis is plausible only from and within the cognitive cage within which Europeans continue to operate.  In essence they both neither understand nor can tolerate the fundamental shift in cognitive orientation of the U.S. from that of an institutional-bureaucratic form to that of the merchant-transactionalist cognitive orientation (see, discussion at The Conceptual Architecture of America First—Ideological Transactionalism and the Case of Cuba). From the institutional perspective they are of course absolutely correct; but from that of the merchant-transactional their anaysis is certainly less relevant and unlikely to resonate with the Americans. Bu that may be the point. The hope is that the Trump Administration's approach to the transformation of the fundamental political line of the Republic will not outlast the Trump Presidency and that one must prepare for some sort of return to "cognitive normalcy" after 2028. It is not clear, though, that this is likely to occur. While the European conversation is vitally important on its own terms, and on that basis respected and considered, it also suggests the current failures of US-European dialectics and the necessary independence of European action on their own terms (something that ironically enough, the Americans appear to be encouraging--as long as trade and markets are not too badly affected).  Though from a different perspective Larres point is well taken: "OVERALL: Europe must become more pragmatic and creative—and quickly. Lamenting missed opportunities and venting anger over the Trump administration’s enormous incompetence may provide emotional relief, but they achieve nothing."

The Essay, which may be accessed in its original form here, is reproduced below.

 

 

Global SWF June 2026 Report and Interview With Border to Coast Pensions Partnership (Fund of the Month)

 


   

Our friends at Global SWF have announced the distribution of their June 2026 Report. They summarize its contents this way:

 

Sovereign Investors had a very strong May, with US$ 26.2 billion in 70 transactions, the highest volume since March 2024. Read all about the deals, results, new funds, and appointments at the Global SWF Times. In fact, Gulf SWFs have not slowed down and have maintained a stronger investment pace in the past quarter, than in the five years prior to the start of the war in Iran – as shown by the infographic of the month.

We celebrate the 50th and 45th year anniversaries of ADIA and GIC, respectively, by comparing two of the world’s largest allocators. The latter has played safer and has generated a lower return than the former. In addition, we have a look at the recent reform of the Local Government Pension Schemes (LGPS) in the UK, and the resulting map of pensions per county and how they are all pooled into different schemes.

In that context, the fund of the month goes to Border to Coast Pensions Partnership. Do not miss our conversation with the pool’s CIO, Mr. Joe McDonnell, and Chief Stakeholder Officer, Mr. Ewan McCulloch. The June report can now be accessed at  https://globalswf.com/reports/june2026  (if your firm is a subscriber of Global SWF and you forgot your password, you can always reset it with your email at https://globalswf.com/password/reset). And if your firm is not a subscriber yet, feel free to reach out to us.

 

The Global SWF maintains a Global SWF Data Platform which focuses on State-Owned Investors, including Central Banks (CBs), Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and Public Pension Funds (PPFs).


Pix credit here (https://globalswf.com/)

 

The text of the SWF’s Fund of the month interview with the UK's  Border to Coast Pensions Partnership's Chief Investment Officer (Mr. Joe McDonnell) and its Chief Stakeholder Officer (Mr. Ewan McCulloch), follows below

 

Friday, May 22, 2026

《关于建立企业信用状况综合评价体系的实施方案》*Implementation Plan for Establishing a Comprehensive Evaluation System for Enterprise Credit Status*

 

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On 29 March 2026, the General Office of the State Council publicly released its  Implementation Plan for Establishing a Comprehensive Evaluation System for Enterprise Credit Status [《关于建立企业信用状况综合评价体系的实施方案》]. It provides general guidance to state functionaries respecting the evolving architecture of corporate or enterprise social credit scoring systems both within China and fort Chinese enterprises operating along their production chains. The text follows below in the original Chinese and in an English translation. For useful guidance see Corporate Social Credit System in China - Top 20 FAQ.

What makes this particularly interesting is the way in which tech based processes and analytics will play a critical role in developing the administrative oversight system necessary to create a functional corporate social credit system.  Everything from data generation, protection, and warehousing, to analytics producing scoring and the algorithms for assessing both--the digitization and digitalization of social credit scoring and its administrative response architectures will be driven by tech based and sometimes automated systems of decision making, gathering, categorizing and assessing. See, “The Future of a Smart Society with Chinese Marxist-Leninist Characteristics: Reflections on “Opinions on Completing/Improving the Social Credit System” issued by the General Offices of the State Council and the CPCCC”--Study Group Presentation PPT and Summary Essay (ECLResearch Hub).

 

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Thursday, May 21, 2026

The Venezuela Scenario and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Message to the Cuban People on Their Independence Day

 

Pix credit and access to video HERE

 Raúl Castro has been indicted; the Cuban State and its apparatus has been designated either a facilitator of criminal enterprises or a criminal enterprise in its own right or through its agents and organs.  On 1 May 2026 President Trump signed Executive Order 14404 imposing broad sanctions (see here). The time appears to be approaching for the 2nd phase of the Venezuela project. But this time it is not clear just how much leeway the Cubans will have to drive their own transformation.  

The Government of Cuba has taken extraordinary actions that harm and threaten the United States. The regime aligns itself with — and provides support for — numerous hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors adverse to the United States, including the Government of the Russian Federation (Russia), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Government of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. For example, Cuba blatantly hosts dangerous adversaries of the United States, inviting them to base sophisticated military and intelligence capabilities in Cuba that directly threaten the national security of the United States. Cuba hosts Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility, which tries to steal sensitive national security information of the United States. Cuba continues to build deep intelligence and defense cooperation with the PRC. Cuba welcomes transnational terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, creating a safe environment for these malign groups so that these transnational terrorist groups can build economic, cultural, and security ties throughout the region and attempt to destabilize the Western Hemisphere, including the United States. Cuba has long provided defense, intelligence, and security assistance to adversaries in the Western Hemisphere, attempting to thwart United States and international sanctions designed to enforce the stability of the region, uphold the rule of law, and safeguard the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Cuba continues to try to thwart United States efforts to address threats to the United States posed by hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors, including in the Western Hemisphere. (ADDRESSING THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA )

That is the context in which the Remarks of Secretary of State Rubio assumes an enhanced signification. The video may be accessed here. A transcript in English of the remarks delivered in Spanish follows below. Also below Marco Rubio's 7 May 2026 Press Statement on Cuba.

 

The American AI Legislative-Policy Action Plan: President Donald J. Trump Unveils National AI Legislative Framework in the Shadow of the AI Tec¡h Company Responses

 

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On March 20, 2026, President Trump posted to the White House Website his vision for AI policy-regulation: President Donald J. Trump Unveils National AI Legislative Framework. It is reproduced below.

 The framework weaves together a number of strands that have been developed (see discussion here). Particular focus in that respect is the work of Michael Kratsios, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. I have posted about those developments earlier. I note as well the interweaving of positive US AI policy and the growing connection to national security, especially as against the  Republic's most potent competitor.  On April 23, 2026, for example, Mr. Kratsios issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and age4ncies cautioning them about AI piracy that threatens US national security and technological dominance.

 

The Policy addresses six key objectives: (1) Protecting Children and Empowering Parents (Parents are best equipped to manage their children’s digital environment and upbringing); (2) Safeguarding and Strengthening American Communities (AI development should strengthen American communities and small businesses through economic growth and energy dominance); (3)  Respecting Intellectual Property Rights and Supporting Creators (The creative works and unique identities of American innovators, creators, and publishers must be respected in the age of AI); (4)  Preventing Censorship and Protecting Free Speech (The Federal government must defend free speech and First Amendment protections, while preventing AI systems from being used to silence or censor lawful political expression or dissent); (5) Enabling Innovation and Ensuring American AI Dominance (The Administration is calling on Congress to take steps to remove outdated or unnecessary barriers to innovation, accelerate the deployment of AI across industry sectors, and facilitate broad access to the testing environments needed to build and deploy world-class AI systems); (6) Educating Americans and Developing an AI-Ready Workforce (The Administration wants American workers to participate in and reap the rewards of AI-driven growth, encouraging Congress to further workforce development and skills training programs, expanding opportunities across sectors and creating new jobs in an AI-powered economy).

It is useful to read this policy against the suggestions recently put forward by Palantir (Alex Karp and Nicholas Zamiska's "The Technological Republic" (2025), and particularly its 22 point reduction posted to X ; discussed here); Anthropic (Statement from Dario Amodei on our discussions with the Department of War; and 2028: Two scenarios for global AI leadership; discussed here); and Open AI ("Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First"; discussed here).

 

Open AI: "Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First" (April 2026)

 


 

I have been looking at the way in which the various elements of the tech vanguard has sought to project their efforts to constitute both a common language and a common vision of a future dominated by the products, processes, and structures they develop, first to advance human collective development, and then perhaps to reshape it, that is to oversee the elaboration of systems at one point were instruments of human development and then may become the drivers of development in humans are the instruments and objects.  There is profit to be made either way, even if that profit is manifested in the privileges of a managerial or oversight vanguard (perhaps identified by their "ownership" of economic collectives that tend to tech based organisms and their components. 

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Palantir sought to engage in the discussion from the perspective of the organization of human collectives, leaving for later the relationship between that human collective and the collection of tech based organisms created and deployed or in conversation with those human collectives.  Reflections on the Palantir "Manifesto": The Oracular Semiosis of a "Technological Republic" Within its Own Cage of Techno-Modernization. Anthrop/c, on the other hand, it reduces technology to a tool the deployment of which is a critical instrument in competition among different and divergent normative political-economic models. Science Fiction Double Feature: Anthrop\c's "2028: Two scenarios for global AI leadership," in the Shadow of Palantir's "Manifesto". Both seek a common language, even if that language hides the fracture in the meanings and values represented by words or other communicative symbols, actions, devices, etc. A Common Language Containing Differentiating Meanings Within Evolving International Standards for Sustainability Disclosure in Financial Statements: IFRS Foundation 2025 Annual Report—Fit for the Future. These represent variations on a global conversation about development. That conversation, like our common language is separated by the differences in the cognitive cages  within which political-economic systems can be crafted from out of the ideology necessarily produced from within the ordering of reality possible within such cages. Reflections on 张冠梓: 从世界历史纵深把握中国式现代化的时代价值 [Zhang Guanzi, Grasping the Contemporary Value of Chinese Modernization from the Depth of World History ]--The Marxist Variation on Leninism and the Constitution/Realization of Modernization. Each in its own way worries about the construction of barriers that preserve a space for their own variation of modernization, while preventing subversion of that project by others with different realities and objects. 肃清反动分子的任何阴谋破坏活动 [Eliminate any act of conspiracy or sabotage by reactionary elements]: 中华人民共和国反外国不当域外管辖条例 [Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States].

Now comes Open AI into the American conversation. In its April 2026 discursive object "Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First" (April 2026), Open AI seeks to signify technology, enterprise role in technology, the state, and the masses within the cognitive construct that is the political economic model of the U.S. Republic. Its fundamental ordering premise is an objectives based progress but one significantly different from that of Marxist-Leninist progress:

The drive to understand has always powered human progress—creating a flywheel from science to technology, from technology to discovery, and from discovery onward to more science. That inexorable forward movement led us to melt sand, add impurities, structure it with atomic precision into computer chips, run energy through those chips, and build systems capable of creating increasingly powerful artificial intelligence. ("Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First" p.2)

This drive now presents the possibility of disorienting change (and by disorienting one can mean a change in the orientation of society and its self-conceptions, as well as the mechanics and politics of its operations). "This shift will reshape how organizations run, how knowledge is created, and how people find meaning and opportunity. It will also highlight the limitations of today’s policy toolkit and the need for more ambitious ideas to keep people at the center of the transition to superintelligence." (Ibid.).

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As Lenin never tired of asking, then, "What is to Be Done?." Lenin of course suggested  the constitution of professional revolutionaries which eventually became as the victorious elements of a vanguard of social forces, the driving force in the management of social modernization toward the constitution of a communist society. What does Open AI want? It wants a transformed society in which the society remains insulated from the consequences of transformation. It wants from artificial intelligence the continuity of an artificial society that can preserve the outward appearance of, not continuity, but sameness within a social system marked specifically by foundationally transformative change.

While we strongly believe that AI’s benefits will far outweigh its challenges, we are clear-eyed about the risks—of jobs and entire industries being disrupted; bad actors misusing the technology; misaligned systems evading human control; governments or institutions deploying AI in ways that undermine democratic values; and power and wealth becoming more concentrated instead of more widely shared. Indeed, we highlight these risks here to raise awareness of the need for policy solutions to address them. Unless policy keeps pace with technological change, the institutions and safety nets needed to navigate this transition could fall behind. Ensuring that AI expands access, agency, and opportunity is a central challenge as we move towards superintelligence. We should aim for a future where
superintelligence benefits everyone,

That is indeed a tall order.  It is one in which Baudrillard's notion of simulacra is inverted in a sense, where the object of artificial intelligence is not to create simulacra but to transform humanity into a living simulation of itself. 

To those ends Open AI offers a program, or better put a path--not the Socialist Path of Marxist Leninism that carriers its travelers toward a communist society, but an AI Path that leads to a hyper static social order made more palatable through the miracle of technology. That is not a bad thing, it is just that such a vision can be understood only be reference to the dialectics and the transformations that the path grounded in non-transformative transformation must lead--both for human and virtual collectives. 

What are the markers of this path?: (1) Share prosperity broadly; (2) mitigate risk; and (3) democratize access and agency. ("Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First" p.3). That provides the basis for a "New Industrial Policy.":

Society has navigated major technological transitions before, but not without real disruption and dislocation along the way. While those transitions ultimately created more prosperity, they required proactive political choices to ensure that growth translated into broader opportunity and greater security. * * * History shows that democratic societies can respond to technological upheaval with ambition: reimagining the social contract, mediating between capital and labor, and encouraging broad distribution of the benefits of technological progress while preserving pluralism, constitutional checks and balances, and freedom to innovate. The transition to superintelligence will require an even more ambitious form of industrial policy, one that reflects the ability of democratic societies to act collectively, at scale, to shape their economic future so that superintelligence benefits everyone. On this path to superintelligence, there are clear steps we need to take today. People are already concerned about what AI will mean for their lives—whether their jobs and families will be safe, and whether data centers will disrupt their communities and raise energy prices.(Ibid., pp. 3-4).

To those ends a vanguard is needed--not markets ("In normal times, the case for letting markets work on their own is strong. * * * But industrial policy can play an important role when market forces alone aren’t sufficient—when new technologies create opportunities and risks that existing institutions aren’t equipped to manage. It can help translate scientific breakthroughs into scaled industries and broad-based economic growth." Ibid., p. 4). The "State" then is necessary (ibid., pp. 4-5), one well informed by a vanguard of techno-leading forces committed to the (re)constitution of the ideal of the American golden age. (See my discussion "Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress: Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat and "The Golden Age of American Innovation"). This may also require a great democratic patriotic campaign. See "The golden age of America begins right now": Text of Mr. Trump's 2nd Inaugural Address 20 January 2025 and Brief Reflections." But this new State leadership is to be crafted as a united front of institutionalized collective consultative democracy.

A new industrial policy agenda should use government's existing toolbox for aligning public and private activities: research funding, workforce development, market-shaping tools, and targeted regulation. But governments should not act alone. Nongovernmental institutions should pilot new approaches, measure what works, and iterate quickly, then governments should reinforce successes by aligning incentives and scaling what works through procurement, regulation, and investment. This public-private collaboration should stave off regulatory capture and centralized control, instead preserving the freedom to innovate while ensuring that the onset of superintelligence isn’t dominated by the most powerful forces in society. "(Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First" p.4).

And beneath this exterior analytics is fear--a fear of a world in which the necessary balance between consumers and producers is upended and producers, having shorn themselves of income absorbing consumers will have no one to consume the products that are now created by non-human life forms (Silicon Valley Is Bracing for a Permanent UnderclassBehind the Curtain: A white-collar bloodbath).  And then the fantasy becomes real (AI firms should face 'minimum wage for robots' to limit job cuts, says tech boss).

This is the American analogue to the Chinese  modernization of Leninist democracy, but one with American characteristics meant to elaborate American values.  (On the Chinese variation see Larry Catá Backer, A Democratic Consultative Constitutionalism for Marxist-Leninist (Socialist) Political Systems—The Theory and Structure of “Whole(Socialist) Political Systems—The Theory and Structure of “Whole
Process People’s Democracy” (全过程人民民主)
). The structure of this preservative transfornmaiton includes several parts: (1) building an open economy (Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First" pp.4-8); (2) building a resilient society (ibid., 9-12). Each is elaborated  with policy suggesitons that mean to keep the structures of the social order and its cognitive cages even as it transforms some or all of its "insides." A nice conservative approach.

But I leave the assessment of these plans to the reader. The  Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age: Ideas to Keep People First" may be accessed online HERE. It also follows below.

From the Open Society Foundation Ideas Letter: Quinn Slobodian, "Digital Bandung" (14 May 2026)

 

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 Quinn Slobodian, professor of international history at Boston University, has written a quite interesting essay, "Digital Bandung" which appeared on the website of the Open Society Foundation Ideas Letter (14 May 2026). It is reposted below.

Quinn Slobodian argues that contemporary critiques of AI, Big Tech, and digital capitalism increasingly rely on the language of “empire” and “colonialism,” but that these metaphors are often more emotionally powerful than analytically precise. He traces the rise of terms like “digital empire” and “data colonialism” in recent scholarship and journalism, noting that they replaced earlier critiques centered on psychology and manipulation—such as “surveillance capitalism” and behaviorist models of social control. The newer imperial framework, he argues, usefully foregrounds questions of power, territory, infrastructure, and sovereignty, especially given the global dominance of a handful of US technology firms.

Still, one might want to underestimate the power of emotion and its metaphors. They make possible the shift in perspective that no amount of precision in analysis might overcome. Semiotics suggests that, at least with respect to mass politics and the politics of collective meaning making it is precisely the values, premises, expectations and framing of the language used to approach a subject that may well be dispositive in shaping as well the precision of analysis that derives its power from the language of the collective.  The language, the cognitive cages of "empire", of "colonialism", ironically enough may not displace but rather situates more precisely the earlier language (one with which leading intellectual forces in developed states are more comfortable) of "surveillance capitalism" which is itself meant as a signifier of a whole ideology of meaning and with its a necessary set of "marching orders" that are meant ot take a society"forward" toward whatever goals the language itself embeds. . .in and as itself.  

Slobodian's examination, though, takes him down a different path.  He suggests that much of the “digital empire” literature oversimplifies both historical empires and present-day digital capitalism. Empires historically were not systems of total centralized domination but depended on delegation, local intermediaries, and complex exchanges. Likewise, Big Tech companies do not operate outside states; rather, they are deeply intertwined with governments and regulatory systems. Calling these arrangements “empires,” he suggests, often adds rhetorical force without increasing explanatory clarity. This, though not wrong, may be perhaps too literal (situating the notion of empire as a sort of museum piece  embedding in time, place and space. But it is also too narrow. Still as the necessary foundation for the argument he advances it serves a useful purpose. 

A major theme of the essay is that contemporary critics frequently cast users as passive victims analogous to colonized peoples. Slobodian argues this analogy is strained. Unlike subjects of classical colonialism, digital users often derive real pleasure, convenience, and economic benefit from digital systems. He emphasizes that many people in wealthy countries are financially entangled with Big Tech through pensions, mutual funds, and stock ownership. That point does fit comfortably within the orthodox narratives of historical empire and colonialism--especially (since the term appears to be reduced to this one and singular instance of colonialism in the current historical era) to European colonialism of the 19th century.  For Slobodian this appears to make users not simply “digital natives” being exploited, but something closer to “digital creoles”: populations simultaneously shaped by, benefiting from, and subordinated to digital capitalism. Others might suggest a different perspectives when one de-links the language and sensibilities of colonialism and empire from its singular focus on Europeans in the 19th century. 

To deepen the analysis, Slobodian introduces three underused concepts from imperial history:

  • Compradors: local intermediaries who collaborated with imperial systems and facilitated exchange. He argues digital capitalism similarly depends on users, contractors, local elites, and states that actively participate in platform economies.

  • Creoles: populations who occupy ambiguous positions between colonizer and colonized. Digital users in advanced economies often fit this role because their financial welfare is linked to the success of tech firms.

  • Counter-colonization: strategies of resistance that resemble national sovereignty movements more than popular revolt. He points to efforts such as data localization, digital sovereignty policies, and coordinated state regulation as examples.

Quite interesting is Slobodianis suggestion that the tendency among some theorists to "see" (that is to understand and by understanding imbuing a word/concept with a particular ideology of values and presumptions)  colonialism as an unending structure that survives all formal independence. While acknowledging enduring inequalities, he warns that this framework can make every solution appear futile or co-opted. Instead, he suggests shifting from purely political metaphors toward economic and class analysis.

That brings one back to the great third rail of contemporary political theory--class. Drawing on Vili Lehdonvirta’s work, Slobodian proposes that digital capitalism may be producing new forms of class formation rather than straightforward imperial domination. Gig workers, software engineers, and tech employees increasingly organize collectively, developing forms of political consciousness and labor resistance. Ideas such as platform cooperatives, data trusts, and worker organizing may therefore offer more practical avenues for contesting digital power than the language of empire alone.

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Slobodian suggests that society may not be moving (back) toward the lived realities of feudal imperialism now under the overlordship of the masters of techno-empires (territory is a 20th century thing) or of techno-feudalism, but under modern capitalism in a new digital form. I only note that the West's infatuation with that protean term "capitalism" continues to fascinate--another detritus of 1968--see my discussion in The Vulgarization of the French Post-Modern, "Truth", Irony, and "First Principles": A Reflection on a Short Essay (an Apologia) Posted to X by Brivael Le Pogam).  Thus the suggestion, in the essay of avoiding grand gestures of denunciation of “digital empires,” but focus on knowledge and action (to understand the complicated ways people are simultaneously exploited by, invested in, dependent on, and capable of resisting the structures of digital capitalism).

 Professor Slobodian's essay follows in full below. 

The Little Engine that Might Not?: NHS Analysts Together: Open Letter regarding the Federated Data Platform and Palantir Technologies

 

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As data workers, we reject a false distinction between the ethics of a supplier and the effectiveness of the tools we use. The quality of our datasets is useful only when staff, patients and the public trust the NHS to hold their data securely.

NHS England is demanding that data workers across the NHS, from local hospitals to national teams, put huge amounts of sensitive health data into Palantir's FDP. Meanwhile, Palantir's UK CEO, Louis Mosley, publicly confirmed that if Reform UK wins the next election with a “clear public mandate” to share health data for the purposes of mass deportation efforts, the company will adhere to this. (Open Democracy: We’re NHS analysts organising together against Palantir. Here’s why )


 I have been considering the ways in which the leading, or vanguard, forces of tech based productive forces have sought to add considerably to the form, content, and direction around the role, value, use, and "realities" of tech based measures, constructs, methods, systems, etc. as they become a foundational element of human collective organization, to a greater or lesser degree among states as a function of their stage of development. Two of the more interesting voices were projected from out of the institutional organs of Palantir and Anthrop\c. 

In  Reflections on the Palantir "Manifesto": The Oracular Semiosis of a "Technological Republic" Within its Own Cage of Techno-Modernization, I suggested that Palentir approached the question from an institutional and collective disciplinary space--on the (re)constitution of a social ordering the collective expresison of which must be managed in a specific way to meet both internal and external threat projections--but in a sort of tragically conventional way, that is by deploying traditional tropes and signified objects projections. This was oracular, programmatic, institutional, and permeated with the sort of traditional combination of hubris, principle, and good intention that sets up the triadic dialectic of our Anglo-European cognitive foundations. Palantir was coding the generative architecture of physical beings as the magisterium that then aligned that coded natural order with the mimetic ordering of the virtual spaces of their animated virtual realities.  

In Science Fiction Double Feature: Anthrop\c's "2028: Two scenarios for global AI leadership," in the Shadow of Palantir's "Manifesto", I suggested that f Palantir sought to code human collectives in dialectical mimesis with the creators they created and with which they now engage in  (for the monument) dependence based action iterations, then Anthrop/c, on the other hand, it reduces technology to a tool the deployment of which is a critical instrument in competition among different and divergent normative political-economic models.  It seeks to reduce its creation, and the ecologies in which virtual life operates, to an instrument, the maintenance and improvements of which are of critical importance to human, not human-machine dialectical mimesis. If Palantir was Greek in its semiotic orientations (that is the way they signify and interpret, and thus rationalize the world around them), the Anthrop\c was comfortably Hebrew in their approach to the fundamental constitution of the lifeworld (lebenswelt) in which the human and their creation could be situated in ways that domesticated  the "soulful machines" they have a hand in creating. 

Both views, of course, invite counter thrusts. And one begins to find that counter thrust from emerging Soviets of counter-leading forces dedicated not to the eradication of the modalities of the coming technologically enhanced digitized organization of human collectives, but rather on the nature of the control relations within that rising ordering. Within those control relationships of course would be embedded the core values, sensibilities and biases of the vanguard group, the essence of which is oppositionally incompatible with those of the major forces of institutional tech power that they seek to resist, and once resisted, to displace. So it is that these counter-vanguards might reasonably be assumed to have collectives like Palantir in their cross hairs. 

And so they do.  Recently elements of the technologically oriented labor forces of the U.K. NHS distributed for signature (until 5 June 2026), and solidarity a declaration in the form of an open letter, NHS Analysts Together: Open Letter regarding the Federated Data Platform and Palantir Technologies.

This letter is organised by a collective of NHS data and digital professionals known as NHS Analysts Together. It is open to signatures from NHS analysts, engineers and any staff who work with NHS data and digital systems at the national, regional, ICB and local level. (Open Letter)

One is told that the effort is supported by a number of aligned organizations:  United Tech and Allied Workers Union; UNISON, Greater Manchester Mental Health; UNISON, Homerton Health; Unite, The Christie NHS Foundation Trust; and the NHS Muslim Women's Network. (Ibid.). Their opposition is not to digitzation and the analytics of digitalization producing  further movement along the based based decision making pathways of the current era of tech development. Instead the Open Letter 

expresses "serious professional, ethical and practical concerns regarding the Federated Data Platform (FDP) and NHS England’s contract with Palantir Technologies. We do so not in opposition to digital transformation – we have dedicated our careers to exactly that – but because we believe the FDP in its current form represents a risk to patient trust, staff wellbeing, data quality, national sovereignty and the long term integrity of NHS data infrastructure."(Open Letter) . 

 The object, then, and the enemy, is Palantir. "But analysts and other data workers continued to be quietly outraged at the NHS's willingness to work with a company known for its role in military operations, deportations and surveillance." (Open Democracy: We’re NHS analysts organising together against Palantir. Here’s why ). That political opposition presumes a judgment of institutional character and fears the consequences that their sense of Palantir's character will have of their values, which, they believe, ought to be the ones embraced by the institutional actors representing the Crown in (and perhaps as) Parliament and its administrative apparatus. 

The NHS Constitution states that “The NHS is accountable to the public, communities and patients that it serves”, and it is in this spirit that we outline below our objections to collaborating with Palantir Technologies on the Federated Data Platform.  We believe that Palantir’s FDP is regressive in many organisational contexts; that data completeness will be compromised by the erosion of patient trust; that data privacy protections are inadequate; and that data structures are at risk of misuse. We also register our ethical concerns regarding Palantir Technologies. (Open Letter) . 

The Open Letter then explains why. I leave that to my readers--the full text of the Open Letter follows below. What is clear, however, is that tech and tech development, remains as much a n object for capture, and instrumentalization with all groups vying for the power of translating their own imaginaries, their moral premises, their value judgments, and the enhancements of all of these projected back out from tech onto the human population affected by those technologies.

Now that is politics. . . which remains human for the moment. But perhaps not for long. And it is to the coding, the imprinting, of appropriate values, judgments, sensibilities etc. within the digitized realities from out of which human affecting processes will emerge that now appears to have become the great prize of politics at this moment.