AI Governance in Comparative Perspective, Theory and Practice: China, U.S. and E.U.-- Lectures at the East China University of Political Science and Law (May 2026)

 

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Introduction:

I was delighted to have had the opportunity to present a series of Lectures  hosted by the East China University of Political Science and Law (ECUPL) at the end of May. My thanks to my hosts and especially to Sun Yuhua for organizing these opportunities to engage with colleagues. 

 

The overall theme (and thus the title) of the lectures was AI Governance in Comparative Perspective, Theory and Practice: China, U.S. and E.U, With a Sideways Glance at the U.N. The subject of the lectures requires little by way of introduction: Artificial intelligence is the broad term that has come to represent a growing cluster of non-human and digitalized processes and operations that has as its primary task the constitution of non-human systems capable of performing tasks that were once thought to require human intelligence. AI has come to dominate , or infect, depending on one’s point of view, virtually every aspect of the organization and operation of collective human systems—as well as shaping the lives of individuals who are plugged into virtual systems of decision making or automated processes that can provide everything from entertainment, to advice, to interaction with other humans and organizational structures.  This is well known as is its capacity for literal impact. One is reminded of Norbert Wiener’s reference to the classic horror tale, the Monkey’s Paw, in his book God & Golem (MIT Press, 1964, pp. 58-60). The tale describes the risk of wishing for or demanding something from a source that is entirely literal minded, which in the case of the Monkey’s Paw was meant to grant three wishes, the means to those ends were undefined. When a person wished for  a sum of money, the wish was granted, in the form of a settlement by their son’s employer as a consequence of an accident that killed the son.  In Wiener’s words: “The magic of automation, and in particular the magic of automatization in which devices learn, may be expected to be similarly literal. If you are playing  a game according to certain rules  and set the playing-machine to play for victory, you will get victory if you get anything at all, and the machine will not pay the slightest attention to any consideration except victory according to the rules.” (Ibid.); unless, of course the rules are constantly changing to embed more and more complex considerations. When the machine becomes self-learning, it can develop its own mechanisms for adding or subtracting considerations as well (rules, norms, values, etc.).   

 

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And so is the impulse to manage, control, exploit, embed, understand, and regulate these processes, systems, and perhaps eventually non-human consciousness with a huge potential to undertake many of the computational tasks (the mathematical and logical processing of data) that were once the sole domain of and perhaps defined what it meant to be human. That is the point where things get interesting. It is at the point where the development of machines, that is of non-human systems, capable of performing tasks that were once thought to require human intelligence, collide with regulatory structures meant to manage, contain, constrain, liberate, embed, project and exploit such non-human systems, whether they are traditional or emerging, public or private regulatory systems, that human collectives and the machine-systems they have created now find themselves. It is the point, as well, where such collectives are floundering even as these machine-systems become ever more sophisticated and ever more embedded in the life of human collectives and the engagement of individual humans with the world.   One moves here from "The Monkey's Paw" to "Three Thousand Years of Longing" where AI is the genie and his container is regulation, and the lonely professor given three wishes the consumers and producers of AI, that is the genie. 
 

The point of this collision, especially among human sub-systems, the cognitive orientation of which are becoming increasingly better defined and distinct as against the others, that serves as the point of departure for the series of lectures that together constitute AI Governance in Comparative Perspective, Theory and Practice: China, U.S. and E.U, With a Sideways Glance at the U.N. There are eight lectures: 

Lecture 1—From Algorithms to Foundation Models: What Contemporary AI is “Made of”
Lecture 2—What Are We Actually Governing When We Govern AI?
Lecture 3—The “Markets State”: U.S. Approach
Lecture 4—The “Rights State”: EU Approach
Lecture 5—The “Guided State”: The Chinese Approach
Lecture 6—Courts, Companies, and the Legal Construction of AI
Lecture 7—AI Narratives: Palantir; Anthropic; Open AI; and Leopold Aschenbrenner
Lecture 8—Putting It All Together: Trends, Trend Lines, and Regulatory Dialectics

 The Lectures start from the premise that before it is even possible to speak about regulation and regulatory systems, and even more so to speak of such systems in or as some sort of comparison (against what standard is yet another problem of course), one must first have firmly in mind two of the critical elements on which any such discussion might be organized. The first requires  an effort to grasp, or perhaps better to approach an understanding of, the object of regulation. The second is to have some better sense of the regulatory enterprise, especially its forms, placement, approaches, characteristics and logic; and noy just its forms but its sources and the character of its authority within regulatory collectives including but not limited to the governmental apparatus.

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Once one understands the complexity and interconnectivity of regulatory subjects (actors within a legal system, that might now also include AI) and objects (the things that can be acted upon, including, perhaps the regulators themselves), one can then approach the enterprise of regulation of AI in context. This starting point is not merely   an effort in taxonomy of regulatory subject and object, which then, as is traditionally undertaken, serves as a basis for the sort of matrix within which it is possible to consider those permutations and combinations of connections between subject and object, thus disaggregated, that serves some purpose or other. Each reflects the other in a certain sense.  AI is a creature made in the image of its creator; the Biblical reference as well as reference to Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein (creating something in the image of the creator) hides the computational element in both, as well as their inter-subjectivity (here in the sense of constant and mutual inter-penetration, sometimes as a form of dialectic). But all of this interactivity, and its consequential impulse to build AI in particular ways and to regulate it in equally peculiar ways, suggests an underlying fundamental set of cognitive patterns that may be reflected in both AI object and regulatory subject.  The regulatory object reflects its subject; it is its own subject. To regulate AI, then, suggests its character as the regulation of the self, now detached and reconstituted as a virtual representation of the self. Regulation is, in this sense, an effort in self control, but where the self has been detached (in this case the collective regulatory self) from and operates on the its physical representation (discussed from a conceptual perspective in 'The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Person, and the “Human” Condition').    

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Neural networks (pattern finding) and large language models (predicting sequences) may provide a useful (or at least interesting) basis for giving some form to that inter-subjectivity between regulatory subject and object—that are also object and subject. Neural networks might provide a useful conceptual basis for understanding , or at least framing, the iterative and dialectical structures within which human collectives as well as computing systems, are organized to process data (inputs, irritants, requests, etc.) through layers of weights, values, biases and activation functions in order not just to identify patterns but to use those patterns to rationalize data and respond to stimulus. In the case of political economic systems, the neural network analogy makes it easier to understand such systems as computing systems that identify and reinforce patterns, and that rationalize the environment in which they operate, through the identification and application of a series of foundational values, biases, and recognized units for receiving, processing and passing along data that together constitute the parameters within which it is possible to receive process and identify objects received. For the purposes of these lectures extracting the fundamental elements of the “hidden layers” of the political-economic “neural network” of a state system is essential for understanding the way in which the regulating body both understands the object of regulation and processes that object in terms of the biases and values of the system to determine the form and direction of regulation. This serves as the structure against which it might be possible to consider the (inevitable?) and distinctive regulatory pathways to identify and respond to "challenges" and "threats"-- take for example the challenge of AI "risk", that might be conceived as risk to rights in Europe, risk to markets in the US and risk to socialist modernization guided forward along its socialist path in China. Each of these reductionist expressions hides and embeds a much more potent (and effectively hidden) layer of analytics, premises, and ordering frameworks that make the reduction appear at some level "natural;" and so it is within the community of believers--Fides et Ratio, perhaps more than Magnifica humanitas (the former conceptual, the later operational).
  

For purposes of these lectures the focus is on three of the more influential subjects of regulation: the United States (Lecture 3), the European Union (Lecture 4), and China (Lecture 6). Mere description of regulatory approaches is no longer particularly useful, since AI programs can now produce descriptive summaries that may be better than anything a human can do (controlling for the hallucinations of either). Each discussion of national legislation starts with an effort to grasp the characteristics of each state’s neural network embedded in and as its political economic model.  Those characteristics then shape the approach of each state toward the regulatory object and the character and objectives of regulatory responses.  In that context, the United States might be labelled (or named; 鬼谷子 (Guiguzi's) ming-ming (明名 intelligent naming)) as the “markets state,” the European Union as the “rights state,” and China as the “guiding state.” These labels suggest the baseline weights and values, the scope of what each system identifies and processes, how it perceives value and threat and accordingly regulates. The US is markets driven and suspicious of state interference (for the most part though reshaped by reconstituting efforts after the 1920s and its openness to techno bureaucratic leadership). The European Union may be rights driven and trusting of state leadership the purpose of which might be understood to protect and enhance rights and prevent negative impacts. China is development driven with a specific objective (forward movement along a Socialist Path) guided and led by a vanguard of social forces in the context of which all productive forces of the state might be embedded. These “hidden layers” of the national neural networks then shape the way each formulates the “issue” of AI and fashions a response that both reaffirms the patterning of its foundational structures and in the process reinforces them. 

 

Lectures 6 and 7 then consider  two critical areas that have a significant effect on any regulatory project. The first focuses on courts, enterprises, and the legal construction of AI in and as law. Its principle focus is on the way that AI related litigation is both changing traditional areas of jurisprudence (tort, contract, property and the like) and is being changed by it. The second, Lecture 7, then considers the way in which leaders of AI production are seeking to influence approaches to the conceptualization of the relationship between AI and the state, and in the process offer a window into the way that AI leaders re-envision the relationship between AI, the State and the regulation of both.To those ends the recent "concept exercises" or manifestos of Palantir, Anthropic, and Open AI, along with the reflections of an influential voice within the AI elite mainstream, Leopold Aschenbrenner, are considered. 

 

Lecture 8 then attempts to draw the bigger picture. It suggests the way that a shared vocabulary can cover quite substantial differences in approach, values, and objectives in the context of AI and AI regulation. And it suggests the way that weighting the objectives of innovation, risk, and the role of the state affects  the way in which  common regulatory focus of safety, security, transparency, accountability, innovation, and infrastructure, each with sometimes substantially different regulatory characteristics as a function of the core differences in national “neural networks.”  One comes at last to the understanding of the fundamental contradiction of AI and its regulation: the development of a common language  across political systems the neural networks of which overlap but are fundamentally incompatible producing conceptions of AI and law that can be coordinated but which cannot converge. That seems to be the template for coordinated governance for the 2nd quarter of the 21st century. I noted the effect of patterns of conceptual homonyms in the context of the convergence project of the  International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation has released its IFRS Foundation 2025 Annual Report—Fit for the Future (31 March 2026):.

By the start of the second quarter of the 21st century, however, the common language, like written Chinese, covered a wide variation in how it would be "spoken" and the signification with which common use terms would be infused. take transparency, for example. Within the cognitive cages of early 21st century convergence globalization transparency could be read broadly to require disclosure of virtually everything but trade secrets and protected know how--and even that might require some disclosure as a function, for example of its connection with adverse human rights or sustainability impacts (as these terms were to be developed by international institutions through hard and soft measures, norms, declarations, finds, etc.)--subject to increasingly narrowed exceptions for national security, development and the like. A quarter century later, transparency remains a presumption but now much more tightly constrained and perhaps sieved through superior obligations (many generated through domestic legal orders of States) respecting, national security, sanctions, data protection and data sovereignty, anti-espionage statutes, and blocking legislation to counter extraterritorial projections of regulatory systems. Transparency remains the same; its signification is now fractured and defined as a function of higher ranking signified principles, rules, and expectations. The same applies, with substantially more bite, to the construction and deployment of the concept of "risk."
One can then, and with enthusiasm, embrace a common language, while at the same time investing that language with regional or other contextual meaning, and constrain it through higher order local values, especially those encased in domestic (or regional) rules and legislation. The imaginaries of unity are preserved, and, indeed, a platform within which such values and contestations of values, may be produced and consumed, without enforcing a centralizing fundamental political or normative line. Yet that also is a step forward. A single language encasing difference may not have been the goal at the start of the 21st century, but language binds all the same--it binds enough that difference may be constrained by the outer boundaries of rational learning inside a cognitive cage that through its language objects effectively defines both that rationality and its limits. And it is that common language that provides all that is necessary to achieve the fundamentally critical element of this project: comparability and communication across and despite of difference. The rest might come later; or it might not. That convergence is no longer necessary where a common language has been substituted for common norms, beliefs, practices, and expectations. (A Common Language Containing Differentiating Meanings Within Evolving International Standards for Sustainability Disclosure in Financial Statements). 

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In the posts that follow I will post summaries of the lecture notes and the PowerPoint of each of the lectures which can be accessed by following these links:

 Lecture 1—From Algorithms to Foundation Models: What Contemporary AI is “Made of”
Lecture 2—What Are We Actually Governing When We Govern AI?
Lecture 3—The “Markets State”: U.S. Approach
Lecture 4—The “Rights State”: EU Approach
Lecture 5—The “Guided State”: The Chinese Approach
Lecture 6—Courts, Companies, and the Legal Construction of AI
Lecture 7—AI Narratives: Palantir; Anthropic; Open AI; and Leopold Aschenbrenner
Lecture 8—Putting It All Together: Trends, Trend Lines, and Regulatory Dialectics

National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-11

 

On 5 June 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum--National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-11, rescinding the Biden Presidency's National Security Memorandum-25 and associated guidance. It was accompanied by an explanatory Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Signs Historic Directive on AI in the National Security Enterprise. This adds another layer to the emerging strategies and principles for implementing the new national security framework within which AI development in markets is to be undertaken (See my discussion in Brief Reflections on the Cognitive Semiotics of President Trump's Executive Order; Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security (2 June 2026). And, ironically it recalls key arguments in Leopold Aschenbrenner's 2024 reflection, "Situational Awareness" (see, e.g., Satyricon, or Tragedy at Play--Artificial Intelligence and the New World Order: Leopold Aschenbrenner, "Situational Awareness").

As understood by its authors, the National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-11 is meant to attain the following objectives:

The Memorandum directs the national security enterprise to accelerate AI adoption to meet surging demand, adapt the best commercial and open-source technologies for mission use, assure that fielded systems are robust, steerable, controllable, and preserve clear lines of accountability under the Constitutional chain of command.

The Memorandum strengthens national security capabilities, directing the rapid onboarding of the most advanced AI models from multiple vendors, driving the buildout of next-generation, high-security computing facilities to run future AI systems at scale, and bolstering the talent pipeline, including by establishing an AI National Security Strategic Reserve of top non-governmental experts.

The Memorandum directs the Secretary of War to issue an updated directive on autonomy in weapon systems and requires annual review of key guidance across the national security enterprise to keep pace with the rapidly advancing AI frontier. 

The Memorandum directs departments and agencies to ensure that no entity, commercial or otherwise, can disable, degrade, or modify an AI system that American warfighters depend on without prior approval. It also offers new partnerships with willing private-sector companies to secure America’s cutting-edge AI against global threats. 

The Memorandum rescinds and replaces the Biden Administration’s NSM-25, an outdated document that burdened American AI adoption with ideological mandates and fostered dangerous single-vendor dependencies that left our warfighters exposed. (Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Signs Historic Directive on AI in the National Security Enterprise)

 President Biden's NSM-25, which is reproduced below,  was closely aligned with President Biden's own Executive Order rationalizing AI within its national security context, Executive Order 14110—Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. That document, in turn, was closely incorporated the critical objectives of the Biden Administration with respect to safe, secure and ethical AI the development and deployment of which would be grounded in a labor and civil rights and equity based framework.  Indeed, the Trump and Biden Administration emphasized different priorities reflected in the approach to implementation. The Biden Administration's NSM 25 emphasized among other things the need to balance civil rights against national security, in ways that could be respectful of markets. :

(h) In this effort, the United States Government must also protect human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety, and lay the groundwork for a stable and responsible international AI governance landscape. Throughout its history, the United States has been a global leader in shaping the design, development, and use of new technologies not only to advance national security, but also to protect and promote democratic values. The United States Government must develop safeguards for its use of AI tools, and take an active role in steering global AI norms and institutions. The AI frontier is moving quickly, and the United States Government must stay attuned to ongoing technical developments without losing focus on its guiding principles.

 The Trump Administration kept much of the old structure, its architecture hard hired into the neural network of the American system--markets driven ("national security enterprise shall adapt commercial or open-source AI technologies, leveraging the most cutting-edge capabilities available from diverse suppliers across the private sector, large and small, while ensuring that AI technologies chosen are optimized for their intended use" National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-11, §2(b)), refashioning the terms of the Biden Administration (safe, secure, and ethical markets that is competitive in the way that the Biden Administration understood that term)--to align with his America First principles in which economic policy and national security are fused, mediated by markets driven innovation (elaborated in The Conceptual Architecture of America First—Ideological Transactionalism and the Case of Cuba). In this version, the  specifies objectives that are sector specific.

AI will be among the most transformative technologies for national security in American history. Used appropriately, it can help protect troops on the battlefield, enable precise operations that minimize harm to civilians, and ensure the United States maintains technological overmatch against every adversary.

The national security enterprise will never develop or deploy AI to censor free speech, embed ideological bias, or conduct unlawful surveillance against the American people. Civil liberties and Constitutional protections are non-negotiable.

The Memorandum makes accountability a central pillar of AI adoption, reinforcing a chain of command that runs from the American people through their elected President to the warfighter. Commanders, directors, and agency heads remain accountable for ensuring these obligations are met at every level. (Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Signs Historic Directive on AI in the National Security Enterprise)

Section 2 sets oput the normative framework and objectives. Section 3 is the operative provision. Section 3(a)directs the "Secretary of War [to] issue an update to DOD Directive 3000.09 on Autonomy in Weapon Systems, to be reviewed annually to account for the rapidly evolving capabilities of AI systems, to ensure the deliberate adoption of AI systems that respect the chain of command and operational authorities." Section 3(b) directs contract termination for default or for convenience contracts with companies that have repeatedly demonstrated a pattern of conduct that is inconsistent with policies laid out in section 2 of this memorandum. Section 3( c) directs the development of an appropriate policy for governance of AI use in national security systems, including implementation and reporting requirements, consistent with .AI governance requirements for non-national security systems, such as that in OMB guidance OMB memorandum M-25-21. Section 4 then targets national security capabilities through intense interactions (really the interpenetration) of the national security and AI sectors, one private and markets centered, the other public and grounded in a very broad understanding both of national defense and of the character of threat.  

 

 

Now Available Vol 39(5) Vol. 38(5) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law/ Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique (IJSL)--"Exploring Tensions in Law and Legal Semiotics"

 

 

I am delighted to announce that Volume 39(5) of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law is now available online.  It is a special issue, the theme of which is "Exploring Tensions in Law and Legal Semiotics" guest edited by Wei Yu, Kieran Tranter, and René Cornish. This Special Issue brings together a diverse range of contributions examining the tensions, complexities, and interconnections that shape law, legal language, and legal semiotics in contemporary societies.

The editors have this to say in the opening chapter (Tensions in Law: Contestation and Interconnection):

 The inherent tensions of law lie in the competing understanding towards the legal concepts and principles. However, the understanding of the representation of the legal content, namely legal texts, can be different from judge to judge and from lawyer to lawyer. Opposing opinions get negotiated and settled under the legal framework. For example, in the judicial decisions of the common law legal system, judges who have different interpretations of legislation express their dissenting opinions in legal judgments. Such complex interpretations add another layer of tension for the legal disputes. And the representation of legal content itself can be different from the legal ideals in mind as well, as discussed above.

 Many of the articles are open access.  Titles, authors  and links are provided below.  

 

Marxist Theory as a Productive Force of Social Revolution (社会革命); Considering 秦宣 邱安琪, 在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展 [Promoting the High-Quality Development of the Discipline of Marxist Theory Through Upholding Integrity and Innovation]

 

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  Qin Xuan, Director of the Institute of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era at Renmin University of China, and Qiu Anqi, Lecturer at the School of Marxism at Renmin University of China have published a most interesting essay. Entitled 在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展 [Promoting the High-Quality Development of the Discipline of Marxist Theory Through Upholding Integrity and Innovation], the essay was originally published in 光明日报 [Guanming Daily] (21 May 2026) .  

Everything is under construction in China. That is as it ought to be. And it ought to be as a function of the fundamental political line of Chinese Marxist Leninism--a fundamental political line built into the driving force of socialist modernization as the core premise of the political economic model and of the task around which Chinese Marxism and Chinese Leninism is both constructed and developed as China proceeds along the socialist path toward the establishment of a communist society under the leadership and guidance of the Communist Party.  In that respect, both Marxism and Leninism might be understood each as one of the productive forces of the nation; and since the 3rd Plenum of the 20th CPC Congress, all productive forces are understood to be further developed within the framework of high quality production that favors innovation. That had been the thrust of remarks made at a conference held at Renmin University in September 2026: "A Question on Chinese Modernization and the Vanguard Party” [“关于中国现代化和先锋党的问题”] (focusing on the constitution of socialist modernization and its relationship to the new important concept of new quality development of productive forces. With that as a framework, the remarks focused on a consideration of  the ramifications of this form of development theory for governance.")

That brings me to the question for which I hope this group of eminent scholars and officials may help me consider correctly. The question: Is the Communist Party itself the manager or supplier of national productive forces or is the Communist Party also a superior productive force? The question thus focuses on the extent and manner to which the Party must itself apply the principles of socialist modernization, especially as they have been thoroughly explained by the General Secretary, to its own organization and to the contribution of its own productive forces to China’s forward movement along the Socialist path.

Under the leadership of the General Secretary and at the core of the 3rd Plenum’s consideration of developing socialist modernization theory, it has become clear that the need to meet the challenge of the current general contradiction requires the focusing of all of the nation’s productive forces. Those productive forces, in turn, serve as the engine of socialist modernization itself by embracing the entirety of the productive capacities of the social, cultural, economic and political spheres. It is also aligned with China’s international relations.

It is now well understood that these necessary evolutionary changes also required a change in conception— from productive to New quality productive forces. The emphasis is on innovation, being in accord with the times, bring the past forward and moving into the future. Nonetheless new quality production applies comprehensively, suggesting the path forward for the current realization of socialist modernization. It is in this respect that the issue of the way in which the principles of socialist modernization, and especially of its concepts of new quality production apply to the work of the Party and its organs. "A Question on Chinese Modernization and the Vanguard Party” 

 It is to that question--one built around a conceptual problem of "the relationship between being a productive force and directing or supplying productive forces for the nation,[and a supposition that both] might be considered a central element in evolving Chinese Marxist-Leninist theory!" (Ibid.)--to which much of the essay, 在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展 , is devoted. 

The object is to consider the construction--the modernization--of a Chinese Marxist system, attended to and directed through principles of Chinese Leninism. The necessity of Marxist theoretical production is made clear from its characterization as the the core Leninist element, the leading force driving and guiding the fields of philosophy and the social sciences.  " Discipline construction serves as the foundational undertaking for conducting basic research, applied research, and frontier exploration. The discipline of Marxist theory stands as the leading discipline within China's system of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics. " [学科建设是开展基础研究、应用研究、前沿探索的基础工程。马克思主义理论学科是中国特色哲学社会科学学科体系中的领航学科。] (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展). Philosophy and the social sciences are elements of knowledge production the acceleration of the development of which is dependent on the leading role of Marxist theory. Philosophy and the social sciences, then, become extensions of, they express in practical terms philosophy and the social sciences in its most productive and efficient forms--as productive forces the highest and best use of which is as contributors to forward movement along the Socialist Path. In that critical objective, the development of Marxist theory with Chinese characteristic serves as the guiding element.  " Over the past decade, the construction of the discipline of Marxist theory has achieved substantial progress, and its leading role within the system of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics has become increasingly prominent. " [十年来，马克思主义理论学科建设取得长足发展，在中国特色哲学社会科学学科体系中的引领作用日益凸显。]  (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展). 

Qin and Qiu then explore this high quality production of Marxist theory in two sections: (1) Substantial Progress Achieved in the Construction of the Discipline of Marxist Theory [马克思主义理论学科建设取得长足发展]; (2) Opportunities and Challenges Facing the Development of the Marxist Theory Discipline [多策并举推进马克思主义理论学科高质量发展]； 爱你的（3) Take Multiple Measures to Promote high-Quality Development of Marxist Theoretical Discipline [多策并举推进马克思主义理论学科高质量发展].

With respect to the first, Qin and Qiu disaggregates  the role of Marxist theoretical development into two distinct spheres: serving national strategies and consolidating the guiding status of Marxism in the ideological sphere. "Upholding the commitment to serving national strategies, thereby powerfully consolidating the guiding status of Marxism in the ideological sphere. [坚持服务国家战略，有力巩固马克思主义在意识形态领域的指导地位。] (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展). 

First, scientific research has yielded even more fruitful results, providing academic support for driving the Party's theoretical innovation. A vast body of theoretical workers has focused their research on classic Marxist texts, fundamental Marxist theories, and the latest achievements in the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism; in doing so, they have produced a collection of high-caliber, exemplary works that have played a pivotal role in elevating the level of Marxist theoretical understanding throughout the entire Party and the theoretical community. Second, the research and interpretation of the Party's innovative theories have deepened significantly, providing a crucial guarantee for enhancing the effectiveness of theoretical study and publicity. The development of the Marxist theory discipline has consistently prioritized its vital role in rallying hearts and forging souls. [一是科学研究取得的成果更加丰硕，为推动党的理论创新提供学理支撑。广大理论工作者聚焦马克思主义经典文本、马克思主义基础理论、马克思主义中国化时代化最新成果进行研究，推出了一批有较高学术水平的精品力作，为提高全党和理论界的马克思主义理论水平发挥了重要作用。二是研究阐释党的创新理论更加深入，为提升理论学习宣传实效提供了重要保障。] (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展). 

 This, the author's argue, have facilitated the internalization of Marxism as the foundational premise of the Chinese cognitive cage. It also provides  intellectual support for Chinese modernization. Marxist theory with Chinese characteristics, then, can be understood as the theoretical structuring of socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics. Marxist theory is the conceptual framework within which it is possible to operationalize itself as Chinese (socialist) modernization, That modernization, under the guidance of the CPC (and the parallel guidance of Chinese Marxist theory) provides the Leninist  operational element.  Marxist theory, then focuses on Marxist (socialist) development as the primary task; the task of socialist Modernization and Marxism itself, then, is an expression of Leninist organization and application. " Over the past decade—driven by the deepening and expansion of disciplinary development—the field of Marxist theory has achieved substantial progress in terms of layout optimization, scale expansion, platform construction, and institutional standardization. " [十年来，伴随学科建设纵深推进，马克思主义理论学科在布局优化、规模拓展、平台建设、制度规范等方面取得长足进步。一是学科布局持续优化。] (Ibid.). Much of this is reflected in the institutionalization of the educational structures of theoretical Chinese style Marxism. "The attainment of these achievements has enabled the discipline of Marxist Theory to establish a comprehensive and efficiently functioning institutional framework, laying a solid foundation for it to fulfill its leading role within China’s system of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics." [四是思政课教学成效显著提升。通过精心设立实践教学基地，持续举办思政课骨干教师研修班，创新举办覆盖全国思政课教师的高校思政课集体备课会，切实提升了高校思政课教学的针对性和实效性。] (Ibid.). 

The projection of all of this theory and its practice is to be undertaken through Ideological and Political Theory Courses (IPTCs). "  Over the past decade, the discipline of Marxist Theory has consistently regarded the support of IPTC development as a core mission; consequently, it has made significant strides in terms of developmental philosophy, reform and innovation, pedagogical methods, and educational outcomes. "[十年来，马克思主义理论学科始终将支撑思政课建设作为学科发展的重要使命，在建设理念、改革创新、教学方法、教学成效等方面取得显著进展。]. (Ibid.). And thus Marxist development and deployment of the productive forces of Marxism itself through its Lemni9nist elee3mt--the constitution of a n institutional vanguard that is meant to apply Leninist theory (democratic centralism and the mass line) to the teaching and incorporating of Marxist productivity in shaping and directing philosophy and the social sciences. What that needs is a functionally differentiated sub-collective of dedicated talent. "Over the past decade, the discipline of Marxist Theory has made concerted efforts in both team building and talent cultivation, providing a solid foundation of human resources for its sustainable development." [十年来，马克思主义理论学科在队伍建设和人才培养上双向发力，为学科可持续发展提供了坚实人才保障。] (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展). And thus Leninist recursivity in the production of cadres that serve as the front line developers and teachers of Marxist theory that drives modernization--both of the productive forces of the nation and the education cadres as elements of the productive forces of education.

This produces opportunities and challenges.  That is the subject of the second section of the essay, Opportunities and Challenges Facing the Development of the Marxist Theory Discipline [多策并举推进马克思主义理论学科高质量发展]. This is divided into four sections. The first, touches on the strategic leadership opportunities arising from the expansion of the discipline's mission. This focuses on the construction of an independent knowledge systems for philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics, that is for knowledge production that in all its elements is Marxist. That in turn suggests the quite conscious effort to construct a quite specific cognitive cage of Chinese Marxist theory which then is the basis for rationalizing the entirety of Chinese reality. "In particular, the call to "accelerate the construction of an independent knowledge system for philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics" has further expanded the functional positioning and mission of the Marxist theory discipline, providing strategic impetus for the discipline to plan its future development from a higher vantage point and within a broader framework." [特别是“加快构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系”的提出，进一步拓展了马克思主义理论学科的功能定位和职责使命，为学科在更高站位、更大格局中谋划发展提供了战略牵引。]

The second explores opportunities for theoretical innovation arising from magnificent practical achievements. Practice serves as the foundation of theory. This focuses on the use of Marxist dialectics and especially in the form of the mass line element of Chinese Leninism. "The great practice of Chinese modernization in the new era—along with the full demonstration of the institutional strengths of China—has provided the discipline of Marxist theory with a wealth of empirical material and new points for theoretical growth; consequently, the conditions are now more mature than ever to "It has provided a wealth of empirical material and new points of theoretical growth for the discipline of Marxist theory, and the conditions for "summarizing Chinese experience through Chinese principles and elevating that experience into Chinese theory" have become increasingly mature." [为马克思主义理论学科提供了丰富的经验素材和新的理论生长点，“用中国道理总结好中国经验，把中国经验提升为中国理论”的条件更加成熟。]. (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展).

The third returns Marxism to the Communist international. It suggests the possibilities of developing Marxist theory with Chinese characteristics in a way that produces a foundation for a new international. "This presents a brand-new historical opportunity for the discipline of Marxist theory to go global, tell China's story well, and enhance its international academic influence." [这为马克思主义理论学科走出国门、讲好中国故事、提升国际学术影响力提供了全新历史机遇。]. (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展).

The fourth touches on innovation and development opportunities brought about by digital technology empowerment. "The rapid development of digital technology has provided strong technical support for the digital compilation of classic documents, paradigm innovation in academic research, intelligent transformation of ideological and political teaching models, and precise access to theoretical dissemination, and has opened up a new space for the high-quality development of Marxist theoretical disciplines." [数字技术的飞速发展，为经典文献的数字化整理、学术研究的范式创新、思政课教学模式的智能化变革、理论传播的精准化触达等提供了强大技术支撑，为马克思主义理论学科高质量发展打开了全新空间。] (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展).

Then to the challenges. The first includes quality problems ("In individual places and universities, there is a tendency to emphasize form over content and performance over problems in subject construction"); the second touches on uneven quality of instruction among universities ("The problem of uneven subject development between the eastern and central and western parts of the country and between key universities and general universities is more prominent"); the third touches on the risks of reliance on subsidies and support from outside localities; the fourth touches on rigidity  in research and teaching that impedes innovation ("the homogeneity phenomenon in the subject research of Marxist theory is relatively serious, and the ability to use academics to talk about politics and conduct theoretical innovation based on practical innovation needs to be improved"); and the fifth touches on the need to transform Marxist theory and education through  the use of digital technologies ("The deep integration of digital technology and ideological and political teaching has not yet been effectively carried out"); 

The essay ends with the consideration of the application of Leninist measures to the further and scientific development of the structures within which  advances in innovative Marxist theory that is useful may be realized. These include the core praxis of Chinese Leninism--independent knowledge systems, democratic centralism, the mass line, collective knowledge production, the political as a productive force, working upwards from practice and downwards from theory, and Marxist internationalism.

But above all of that is a fundamental theory that Marxist theory is recursive, but that its iterative mimesis produces progress that is organic and inevitably leads forward along a Socialist path. 

"This is an era that needs theory and will be able to produce theory. This is an era that needs ideas and will be able to produce them. We cannot let down this era." To continue to promote the discipline construction of Marxist theory at a new historical starting point, we must objectively analyze the new situation facing discipline construction, persist in innovation, and follow the path of high-quality and connotative development. [“这是一个需要理论而且一定能够产生理论的时代，这是一个需要思想而且一定能够产生思想的时代。我们不能辜负了这个时代。”在新的历史起点上继续推进马克思主义理论学科建设，必须客观分析学科建设面临的新形势，坚持守正创新，走好高质量内涵式发展之路。] (在守正创新中推动马克思主义理论学科高质量发展).

The essay is remarkable, then, for advancing notions inherent in the 3rd Plenum on high quality productivity attached to the core premise of socialist modernization and attaching these in turn, to the characterization of the political work of the vanguard, including its work on the theoretical level, as a subject of high quality production essential to socialist modernization. One can quibble with its approach and analysis; but that is far less important than what appears to be at least one acknowledgement that everything, inclusion ideology and its institutional guardians, the vanguard of leading forces that is the CPC, are productive forces that must all contribute to and are part of the great national effort of socialist modernization with a purpose--to scientifically lead the masses in an accelerated way toward the goal of establishing a communist society. Ideology, and the vanguard itself, then, has two bodies. It is on the one hand the supplier of ideology, guidance and leadership through which socialist modernization can be properly undertaken along the socialist path. At the same time both are also the subjects of the same process of modernization and must lead by example--both theory and the institutions that guard and deploy them. It is to those ends that self- and social revolution becomes an instrument with a purpose--that purpose is to  produce a system of iterative recursivity in which the system must itself reflect the adjustments and transformations which it develops for the rest of the nation--making both object, signifier and interpreter simultaneously--and also a reminder that nothing is transformed without transforming itself (see, Social Revolution (社会革命) as Self-Revolution (自我革命) and the New Quality Production of CPC Modernization: 习近平 深入推进党的自我革命 [Xi Jinping, Deepen the Party's Self-Revolution] (Part of a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 8, 2024)).  This essay suggests its effects not just in the context of the construction of institutionalized education, but also in the construction and rationalization of the production of knowledge.  In that there is much resonance with the underlying thinking of post-modernity (See eg, Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences, Vintage Books 1994). 

The essay appears in full below in the original Chinese and in an English translation. 

 

Pix credit here (Long Live the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 1971)

European China Law Studies Association (ECLS) Summer Academy 2026 Law and Technology in China

 

 

I am delighted to pass along information about the European China Law Studies Association Summer Academy 2026, which this year has as its theme Law and Technology in China.  The Summer Academy is scheduled for 1-4 September 2026 on the campus of the University of Turin (Italy). 

Here is the description from the Summer Academy brochure:

Few legal systems engage as actively with the governance of emerging technologies as China’s does. It is developing regulatory frameworks for artificial intelligence, biotechnology and algorithmic decision-making, all the while building a comprehensive smart court system and integrating technology into its modes of governance. Making sense of this requires more than policy literacy. It requires familiarity with the underlying legal architecture and the specific tensions that shape how rules are made, applied, and contested in a distinct legal culture.
The Department of Law at the University of Turin, in collaboration with the European China Law Studies Association (ECLS), is presenting the second edition of the ECLS Summer Academy on Chinese Law and Technology. Over four intensive days, internationally acclaimed specialists will guide participants through the constitutional foundations, data governance, criminal law, biotechnology and more. The goal is not to provide an overview, but to facilitate a structured encounter with a legal system whose decisions regarding the regulation of technology are becoming increasingly important well beyond China’s borders. Participants will leave with sharper analytical tools and a firmer grasp of a field that is reshaping legal practice and scholarship worldwide.
The Academy is open to doctoral researchers, advanced students, and legal professionals seeking rigorous, first-hand engagement with Chinese law. 

It has a great faculty including Bjorn Ahl, Marianne von Blomberg, Daniel Sprick, Ge Chen, Monika Prusinowska, Simona Novaretti, Knut Banjamin Pissler, Viola Negro, Guo Zhiyuan, and Anna Maria Rizzo.

Brochure follows below. 

 

Open for Comment: OMB Revisions to "Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance"

 

Pix credit here

On 29 May 2026 the OMB (Office of Management and Budget) proposed a set of revisions and updates to the Uniform Guidance (2 C.F.R. § 200),  the government-wide framework issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that establishes administrative requirements, cost principles, and audit requirements for all federal grants, cooperative agreements, and pass-through awards. 

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposes to revise the Guidance for Federal Financial Assistance to improve government-wide policies and requirements related to the management of grants, cooperative agreements, and other forms of assistance. OMB is proposing revisions that would improve transparency, accountability, and oversight for Federal awards across the Federal Government. This includes ensuring that American tax dollars are not wasted or misused, activities performed under Federal awards are consistent with law and policy, and recipients are held accountable when they fail to meet relevant standards. The revisions also aim to ensure that basic American principles of equality and equal opportunity are upheld throughout all stages of the award making process and that unlawful discrimination is no longer permitted. Proposed changes also include providing further clarification on the regulatory status of the OMB requirements and on the process for future updates to the government-wide requirements. Finally, OMB also proposes changes to reduce recipient burden. The listed Federal grant-making agencies propose conforming changes to their respective adopting regulations, or, in the case of some agencies and other entities, establishing new adopting regulations or policies. The proposed changes reflect the administration's commitment to transparency, accountability, and proper oversight for the Federal grantmaking process. The proposed regulations seek to ensure that American tax dollars are ultimately used to serve the needs of the American public.

The proposed revisions are open for comments and reactions which may be delivered on or before 13 July 2026. Comments on this proposal must be submitted electronically before the comment closing date to www.regulations.gov. In submitting comments, please search for recent submissions by OMB to find docket OMB-2026-0034, which includes the full text of the proposed revisions and submit comments there. 

Institutional academia has not reacted well to the proposals, part of th Trump Administration's efforts to (1) remove the Biden Administration's regulatory efforts to embed their version of diversity, equity and inclusion measures within the grant awarding and administration process; and (2) reduce the aggregate grant payouts, especially to the extent that grant money subsidizes university or institutional operations. A useful summary of the changes and their effects on university fundraising and compliance responsibilities may be found at Key Issues within OMB Uniform Guidance Revision Proposal [Docket OMB-2026-0034], distributed by the Association of Public and Land Grant UIniversities. 

It ought to be no surprise that these proposed changes have been met with opposition from grant recipients and their institutional environments.  

Although research has bipartisan support in the US Congress, and trust in science is above 75% across the country, the Trump administration seems as determined as ever to mortally wound the nation’s scientific enterprise. After the scientific community persuaded Congress to restore most of the president’s draconian cuts to research funding last year, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), under Russell Vought, has found new ways to circumvent the will of Congress and starve American science.* * * The sweeping new regulations proposed by OMB would subject every federal research funding decision to political review. Peer review has never been formally binding, but this proposal would dramatically expand the power of political appointees to override expert assessments of scientific merit. Agencies could end multiyear grants with no due process. They also could use the vague criteria of Trump’s “gold standard science” to identify institutions for preferential treatment. International collaboration with countries identified solely by the administration would be prohibited under the new rules, but more notably, all research that involves the expenditure of funds outside the US would require case-by-case approval.(Another Red Alert for American Science).

The authors of that opinion piece then raise a call to arms, one that is likely top be met with much sympathy among those adversely impacted: 

The scientific community needs to flood OMB with responses during the public comment period, open until 13 July. Universities and associations must speak out as a united front to mobilize Congress and be ready to file lawsuits once the regulations are finalized. I was sympathetic to members of the scientific establishment who played it carefully during last year’s budget negotiations. Getting the budget deal done was crucial. But that was then. The red light is now flashing. All hands, report to stations."! (Another Red Alert for American Science).

 Of course they are right to do so. Scientific grants programs, like every other action of the State, are an overtly political action, in the sense that they represent a political conclusion that State intervention  (in this case subsidies for private research in aid of national goals and aspirations) serves the interests of the State. That State interests--or in American parlance the public interests--serves the financial, status, business, or status interests of others, including academics, researchers, unioversoities and the like in this case, is good but of secondary interest, even if the state interest is, from time to time, served by sunbsidizing the private interests of those objects and processes that are the object if public polñiocy, in this case the fruits of research that serves State interests. For a long time, those converghing interests were mediated largely through self-regulation--academics presiding over grant decisiopns coordinated with state fiunctiponaries. And the universities got their cut, all nicely justified by whatever justificatory logicv appealed to all parties. But the Trump Admionistraiton serves as a reminder that alignment is neithjer permanent nor non-political. The State interests may shift--and that is a matter for elected officials to determine. That shifting may have significant effects on the financial planning of subsidized enterprises and thier employees, as well as on the busoiness model of knowledge production. Yet those are factors in a political consideraiotn, the discretion for which--within the boundaries of due process and the regulaitons under which such susidy programs are organized--lie with political functionarties and not with the beneficiaries of these programs.  

The political nature of these determinations, however do not leave those affected powerless. Politics is a sport that American liberal democracy spreads widely acropss the populaiton. Adverse impacts of political discretionary decisionmaking may always be the subject of a counter politics; ones that may require political counter-responses. The object is to advance one's own interests as against the political intrerests of opponents. And the principal way of doing that in early 21st century Amerioca is to argume virtually anything but politics while denegrationg the opposition as narrowly political. That is fair. In politics. To aid those fforts, of course, one now must play politics in the ocurts, while defending the courts as the last bastion of non-politicalaction.  That is also a quintessentially American politics. 

 And thus, for those interested, or affected. by the proposed revisions, you have a chance to make your voice heard, to the extent that this is possible, through 13 July.  After that, one goes back to that now well embedded poliutical strategy --litigation.