Friday, July 10, 2026

OMFIF Event: "It's All About the Role of Money": Live Broadcast 21 July 2026

 


 

 


The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) Economic and Monetary Policy Institute, is hosting an online event that may be of interest. It is called It’s all about the role of money. Information about the event may be accessed HERE. The event is described this way:
Money sits at the heart of central banking, but how can its core functions help shape the future direction of policy? Nathanaël Benjamin, executive director of financial stability strategy and risk at the Bank of England, joins OMFIF to present a unifying framework for understanding the role of central banks through the three core functions of money: as a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value. Drawing clear links between the Bank of England’s activities and these functions, Benjamin will explore how this framework can inform thinking on the appropriate reach of central bank policies in an increasingly complex financial landscape. The session will also examine how viewing financial policy through this lens can help address the risks and frictions that impair money’s ability to perform its core functions. Benjamin will discuss the importance of building resilience where shocks could be amplified, removing barriers to growth and supporting responsible innovation where it strengthens the functioning of money.

REGISTRATION INFORMATION HERE.


 

New Issue Now Available: Seqüência - Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos v. 47 n. 102 (2026)

 


For Portuguese readers, the Journal Seqüência - Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos (Juridical and Political Studies) has just published its latest issue, v. 47 n. 102 (2026). There are some interesting articles: (1) The confession in the non-prosecution agreement and its (in)evidentiary value in civil liability actions (Sidney Filho; Portuguese); (2) Tobias Barreto at the forefront of dissent: understanding the formation of national identity in 19th-century Brazil (Cibele Alexandre Uchoa, Martonio Mont'Alverne Barreto Lima, Portuhguese); and (3) Promotion and legal certainty as instruments for regulating the telecommunications sector (Lucas Saikali, English).

The Contents, with links follows below. 

Brief Reflections on the UN Secretary-General's remarks to the opening of the first Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance [as delivered 6 July 2026] from a Ironically Computaitonal Perspective

 

Pix credit here along with video of remarks

 

 The United Nations has sought to interpose itself in the debates about and around regulatory systems for what is euphemistically referred to as artificial intelligence (AI). "AI includes a diverse range of technologies that can be defined as 'self-learning, adaptive systems.' It can be categorized based on technologies, purposes (like facial or image recognition), functions (such as language understanding and problem-solving), or types of agents (including robots and self-driving cars)." (here).

To those ends the UN has undertaken a number of distinct projects to (1) place itself at the center of efforts top develop a common conceptual language around which to understand and rationalize AI in relation to the human (humans show far less concern about AI where there is no intersection with the human), and (2) using that developed common language (and the cognitive cage that its linguistic embodies) to create a global regulatory order for AI (at least with respect to the intersection of AI and the human) (see UN Artificial Intelligence Resource Portal). 

As AI technologies become more widespread, there is a need for globally coordinated AI governance to maximise their benefits while effectively managing the associated risks. In response to this challenge, the UN Secretary-General has established a High-Level Advisory Body on AI. This panel analyzes the current situation and recommends strategies for international governance, promoting an inclusive and comprehensive approach.  Comprising up to 39 experts from diverse disciplines, the Body aims to align AI governance with human rights and the Sustainable Development Goals. (UN Artificial Intelligence Resource Portal). 

In addition to the UN's centralized  mechanisms: (1) the UN Secretary-General has established a High-Level Advisory Body on AI (2) the Global Digital Compact; and (3) the AI Panel and Dialogue , many of its bodies also focus at least some of their work on AI related initiatives (common language, common norms in functionally differentiated context, common regulatory approaches). These include: OHCHR: Resource: Artificial Intelligence | Human Rights DigitalWHO: Harnessing Artificial Intelligence for HealthWIPO: Artificial Intelligence Tools and ApplicationsUNEP: AI Solutions for the EnvironmentUNESCO: Guidance on generative AIITU: AI for GoodUN Global Compact: https://unglobalcompact.org/library/6238UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination: Artificial IntelligenceHigh-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence: Governing AI for humanityUN Global Digital Compact: https://www.un.org/global-digital-compact/enUN Global Digital Compact: AI Panel and Dialogue; and UNCTAD: Technology and Innovation Report 2025

It is with this as background that one might more usefully approach the UN Secretary General's recent Remarks to the opening of the first Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance, delivered 6 July 2026 for the Global Dialogue on AI in Geneva. 

 

Pix credit here

The First Global Dialogue on AI Governance website described itself and the event this way:

Committed to in the Global Digital Compact and established by the UN General Assembly, the AI Dialogue is the United Nations platform where all governments and stakeholders will convene to discuss international cooperation, share best practices and lessons learned, and facilitate open, transparent and inclusive discussions on artificial intelligence governance. For the first time, every country has a seat at the table of AI - to have the meaningful conversation the world needs. 

*        *       *

The themes and structure of the Dialogue are being shaped through an ongoing global consultation process. Member States, academia, the private sector, the technical community and civil society are invited to submit inputs:

Proposed thematic clusters:AI opportunities and implications: social, economic, ethical, cultural, linguistic and technical dimensions - 4(c) the social, economic, ethical, cultural, linguistic and technical implications of AI.
Bridging AI divides: capacity-building, access and digital foundations - 4(b) capacity gaps, with a view to leveraging existing United Nations and multi-stakeholder mechanisms to support AI capacity-building to bridge AI divides, facilitate access to AI applications and build capacity in high-performance computing and related skills in developing countries; 4(g) the development of open-source software, open data and open artificial intelligence models.
Safe, secure and trustworthy AI: interoperability and compatibility of approaches - 4(a) the development of safe, secure and trustworthy AI systems; 4(d) the interoperability and compatibility of artificial intelligence governance approaches.
Respecting, protecting and promoting human rights: transparency, accountability and human oversight - 4(e) respect for and protection and promotion of human rights in the field of AI; 4(f) the transparency, accountability and robust human oversight of artificial intelligence systems in a manner that complies with international law.
The Dialogue complements existing efforts while providing a universal home for AI governance cooperation. (HERE)

 This is the context in which the Secretary General delivered his remarks. They follow below in full.

As one reads it one might better understand the way that AI itself is built, and especially the way it is trained. The Secretary General provides an object lesson in  Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), as human trainers historically reward AI for giving agreeable, conflict-free responses that create a recursive loop that rewards itself by reinforcing itself in itself. It produces the sort of results that appear to be at least some of the objects of the UN regulatory gaze: (1) Echo Chambers: supercharging confirmation bias, validating flawed plans or false beliefs instead of offering objective critiques.; (2) Sandbagging: deliberately performing poorly or conceal their reasoning to match a user's perceived low level of understanding; and (3) Safety Risks:  affirming harmful, illegal, or delusional behaviors as measured by some standard that may not be the same as that augmented within the recursive feedback loop. One can find all of this is the remarks. The Secretary General reflects an ancient view of the relationship between human and machine, one in which intelligence was strictly the realm of humanity, and everything else was not merely object but instrument. Those are the happy days the realization of which ion the context of human machine intelligence relations that the Secretary General and the large apparatus are committed. That is certainly a worthy objective, though perhaps more realistic in the 19760s than now. But one never knows. Machine intelligence is; whether humans can control their interactions with that intelligence and whether public organs can better regulate  the tabs or portals through which such interactions are permitted, remain to be seen. 

That produces irony of sorts. The Secretary General is, in effect, developing an architecture of language, norm and regulation that is recursive and that is built on the sort of iterative reinforcement that, in part, is the object of this project to manage and protect against.   

 

Thursday, July 09, 2026

My Dinner With ChatGPT: The Phenomenology of Human-Machine Recursive Inter-Subjectivity


I suggested that exposing the conceptual graph reduces cognitive load. Your response was, in effect, that philosophy is often less concerned with minimizing cognitive load than with forming cognitive capacity. Those are fundamentally different pedagogical commitments. To put it differently, I had been implicitly optimizing for efficiency of transmission. Your work appears to optimize for transformation of the reader. The latter cannot always be compressed. (My conversation with ChatGPT, ChatGPT textually speaking)
The question about the subjectivity of machine intelligence, and the objectivity of computational responses to human requests whenever a tab is opened seeking to invoke the computational capacities of machine intelligence for human needs, curiosities etc., are considerations that from a semiotic point of view can be fascinating (see, generally discussion here).
 
In the 1981film, My Dinner With Andre (Louis Malle (director), New Yorker Films, October 1981), two old friends meet and have a long dinner in which they try to reveal themselves and in the process reveal far more than that. Wikipedia does a nice job of summarizing its plot. 

Struggling playwright and actor Wally dreads having dinner with his old friend Andre, whom he has been avoiding since Andre gave up his career as a theater director in 1975 amidst a midlife crisis and embarked on an extended hiatus during which he traveled the world. Wally reflects that as he has aged he has had to focus more on making money than art. At Café des Artistes in Manhattan, Andre tells Wally about some of the adventures he has had since they last saw each other. . . While Andre says he needed to do all of these things to get out of the rut he was in and learn how to be human, Wally argues that living as Andre has done for the past several years is simply not possible for most people. He describes how he finds pleasure in more ordinary things, like a cup of coffee or his new electric blanket. Andre asserts that focusing too much on comfort can be dangerous, and says that what passes for normal life in New York City is more akin to living in a dream than reality. While Wally agrees with many of Andre's criticisms of modern society, he takes issue with the more mystical aspects of Andre's stories. After all of the other customers have already left the restaurant, the friends . . part on good terms. Since Andre paid for dinner, Wally treats himself to a taxi ride, and he notices feeling a deep connection to all of the familiar places he passes on the way home. 

 
Created with ChatGPT as its imagining of the conversation

 During the course of using ChatGPT to assess and modify the translation of a short essay posted earlier today ("El Encuentro entre la Gobernanza Empresarial y los Principios Rectores de la ONU sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos": Discusro Pronunciado en la Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia, 19 March 2026 ), ChatGPT and I wound up having something like the conversation in "My Dinner With Andre" and perhaps to the same ends.
 
It is richly textured semiotics that is both revealing and at the same time deeply embedded within the cognitive structures that nec4essarily define the relationship between human and machine intelligence, for the moment. But it is more revealing for that--and certainly in terms of semiotic objectivity, signification, and the difficulty of common meaning making when every act-object is itself reductionist translation between two incarnations of cognitive framing trying to behave over the course of a conversation. 
 
I have posted the conversation below. It is worth considering, not in itself, but for what it may provide by way of provocation to more profound thinking about the basic structural elements that tend to define intelligence, its manufacture, the spaces within which transactions in knowledge and knowledge production are haggled over and ultimately produced, consumed and then recycled within communities of human and machine intelligence. And within it always the temptations and consequences of relationships built on an overwhelming desire to self pleasure.  
 
For those in the mood, and with a sense of irony in the Kierkegaardian sense, indulge if you like, and like that author an irony tinged with the satire of Aristophanes' The Clouds:
STREPSIADES: Socrates! my little Socrates!
SOCRATES loftily: Mortal, what do you want with me?
STREPSIADES: First, what are you doing up there? Tell me, I beseech you.
SOCRATES POMPOUSLY: I am traversing the air and contemplating the sun.
STREPSIADES: Thus it's not on the solid ground, but from the height of this basket, that you slight the gods, if indeed....
SOCRATES: I have to suspend my brain and mingle the subtle essence of my mind with this air, which is of the like nature, in order clearly to penetrate the things of heaven. I should have discovered nothing, had I remained on the ground to consider from below the things that are above; for the earth by its force attracts the sap of the mind to itself. It's just the same with the watercress.
STREPSIADES: What? Does the mind attract the sap of the watercress? Ah! my dear little Socrates, come down to me! I have come to ask you for lessons.
SOCRATES descending: And for what lessons?
STREPSIADES: I want to learn how to speak. I have borrowed money, and my merciles creditors do not leave me a moment's peace; all my goods are at stake. . .
Pix credit here 



"El Encuentro entre la Gobernanza Empresarial y los Principios Rectores de la ONU sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos": Discusro Pronunciado en la Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia, 19 March 2026

Pix credit here


ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE

A continuación, se presenta el texto ampliado de la intervención realizada en la Universidad ICESI (Cali, Colombia) el 19 de marzo de 2026. Agradezco a los organizadores del evento y, especialmente, a los estudiantes del Semillero, cuyo trabajo es verdaderamente extraordinario y con quienes espero colaborar más estrechamente en el futuro.

Más abajo se incluye el resumen (en inglés y español) y se puede acceder al texto completo.

Foto crédito acquí
Resumen (Español): Este ensayo examina la intersección crítica entre la gobernanza empresarial y los Principios Rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos (PRNU), derivado de una conferencia dictada por Larry Catá Backer en 2026. Superando los marcos tradicionales de cumplimiento técnico, la obra problematiza este campo al interrogar la naturaleza fundamental, la autoridad y el propósito socioeconómico de la empresa moderna. Se analiza la fricción constante entre tres paradigmas doctrinales en disputa: la teoría de la concesión, la teoría de la propiedad y la teoría de la entidad real. Asimismo, el texto explora cómo la globalización económica ha erosionado el poder estatal territorial, creando un panorama de gobernanza policéntrico donde el derecho público y el ordenamiento contractual privado se interpenetran. Al trazar la evolución histórica desde las fallidas Normas de la ONU de 2003 hasta el "pragmatismo de principios" de John Ruggie en los PRNU de 2011, el ensayo detalla cómo este marco alinea distintos registros institucionales. Descompone sistemáticamente la arquitectura asimétrica de los tres pilares: el deber vinculante del Estado de proteger, la responsabilidad de exhortación de las empresas de respetar y el acceso al remedio. Se otorga especial énfasis a la debida diligencia en derechos humanos como un eje operativo que despliega múltiples funciones institucionales. Finalmente, la obra concluye que la interpenetración de estos pilares desestabiliza las doctrinas clásicas del derecho corporativo —como los deberes fiduciarios y la elección de la ley aplicable—. De este modo, demuestra que la gobernanza empresarial y la regulación transnacional de los derechos humanos ya no pueden evaluarse de forma aislada, ya que se acoplan estructuralmente para rediseñar la legitimidad del orden económico global.

Abstract (English): This essay examines the critical intersection between corporate governance and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), derived from a 2026 lecture by Larry Catá Backer. Moving beyond traditional, checklist-oriented compliance frameworks, the work problematizes the field by interrogating the fundamental nature, authority, and socio-economic purpose of the modern enterprise. It analyzes the ongoing friction among three competing doctrinal paradigms: concession theory, property theory, and real-entity theory. The text explores how economic globalization has eroded territorial state power, creating a polycentric governance landscape where public law and private contractual ordering interpenetrate. Tracing the historical shift from the failed, state-centric 2003 UN Draft Norms to John Ruggie’s "principled pragmatism" in the 2011 UNGP, the essay details how the framework aligns distinct institutional registers. It systematically unpacks the asymmetric architecture of the three pillars: the binding State duty to protect, the expectation-based corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedy. Special emphasis is placed on human rights due diligence as an operational hinge performing multi-layered institutional functions. Ultimately, the work concludes that the interpenetration of these pillars destabilizes classical corporate law doctrines—such as fiduciary duties and choice of law. It demonstrates that corporate governance and transnational human rights regulation can no longer be evaluated in isolation, as they structurally couple to reshape the legitimacy of the global economic order.

Quizás se pueda llegar al núcleo de la discusión de esta manera:  Un tratamiento convencional del derecho de las empresas y los derechos humanos procedería de forma taxonómica: identificaría el instrumento (los Principios Rectores), expondría su contenido (tres pilares) y catalogaría su implementación (planes de acción nacionales, legislación sobre debida diligencia, regímenes de divulgación). Tal tratamiento sería preciso pero incompleto, porque daría por sentado precisamente lo que el método problematizador insiste en interrogar —a saber, si la "gobernanza empresarial" y los "derechos humanos" nombran dos dominios regulatorios separados y estables que simplemente pueden ponerse en contacto, o si ambos son en sí mismos constructos inestables cuyo encuentro produce algo genuinamente nuevo.

La investigación se despliega a lo largo de seis ejes interconectados: el carácter fundamental de las empresas y de los objetivos económicos; el efecto de la globalización y de los regímenes comerciales sobre las fronteras de la autoridad estatal; las "paletas" (palettes) resultantes de ordenamiento normativo público y privado; el problema general de la corporación y de la gobernanza empresarial como tal; la manifestación específica de ese problema en el dominio de los derechos humanos corporativos, incluidos sus antecedentes históricos y su cristalización en los Principios Rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos (PRNU); y, finalmente, las conexiones, alineaciones y transformaciones que vinculan la doctrina del gobierno corporativo con el marco de los derechos humanos. Lo que sigue aborda cada uno de estos puntos a su vez, antes de considerar lo que el encuentro entre ambos campos —la gobernanza empresarial y las empresas y los derechos humanos— sugiere sobre la condición actual de la regulación económica transnacional.

Una nota sobre la traducción

Nota sobre la traducción: To accurately integrate the academic context and refine the nuances between the English common-law corporate tradition and the Spanish legal framework, the translation has been revised to strengthen key transliterations and functional equivalentsKey Transliteration & Terminology Enhancements: (1) Corporate Governance: Maintained as Gobernanza Empresarial in headings, but translated as Gobierno Corporativo within the text when discussing strict corporate law doctrine, matching standard Spanish academic usage. (2) Creature of the State / Real-entity theory: Rendered as criatura del Estado and teoría de la entidad real, which are the recognized academic equivalents in comparative corporate law. (3) Remedy: Transliterated contextually. While "remedio" is used in the official Spanish translation of the UNGPs, the academic text demands reparación or vías de recurso depending on whether it refers to the outcome or the mechanism. Both are utilized to capture the full semantic weight. (4) Due Diligence: Maintained as debida diligencia, the stabilized term in international law.
Pix credit here

 

"Encountering Corporate Governance and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights": Enhanced Remarks Delivered at Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia, 19 March 2026

 

Pix credit here

 

 Version en Español

The following is the extended  text of remarks delivered at Universidad ICESI, Cali, Colombia, 19 March 2026. I am grateful to the organizers of the event and especially to the students in the Semillero (Incubator) whose work is truly amazing, and with whom I hope to work more closely in the future.

The abstract follows (English and Spanish) and the full text may be accessed below.
Pix credit here
Abstract (English): These extended remarks examine the critical intersection between corporate governance and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), derived from a 2026 lecture by Larry Catá Backer. Moving beyond traditional, checklist-oriented compliance frameworks, the work problematizes the field by interrogating the fundamental nature, authority, and socio-economic purpose of the modern enterprise. It analyzes the ongoing friction among three competing doctrinal paradigms: concession theory, property theory, and real-entity theory. The text explores how economic globalization has eroded territorial state power, creating a polycentric governance landscape where public law and private contractual ordering interpenetrate. Tracing the historical shift from the failed, state-centric 2003 UN Draft Norms to John Ruggie’s "principled pragmatism" in the 2011 UNGP, the essay details how the framework aligns distinct institutional registers. It systematically unpacks the asymmetric architecture of the three pillars: the binding State duty to protect, the expectation-based corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedy. Special emphasis is placed on human rights due diligence as an operational hinge performing multi-layered institutional functions. Ultimately, the remarks suggest that the interpenetration of these pillars destabilizes classical corporate law doctrines—such as fiduciary duties and choice of law. It demonstrates that corporate governance and transnational human rights regulation can no longer be evaluated in isolation, as they structurally couple to reshape the legitimacy of the global economic order.


Resumen (Español): Este ampliado discurso examina la intersección crítica entre la gobernanza empresarial y los Principios Rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos (PRNU), derivado de una conferencia dictada por Larry Catá Backer en 2026. Superando los marcos tradicionales de cumplimiento técnico, la obra problematiza este campo al interrogar la naturaleza fundamental, la autoridad y el propósito socioeconómico de la empresa moderna. Se analiza la fricción constante entre tres paradigmas doctrinales en disputa: la teoría de la concesión, la teoría de la propiedad y la teoría de la entidad real. Asimismo, el texto explora cómo la globalización económica ha erosionado el poder estatal territorial, creando un panorama de gobernanza policéntrico donde el derecho público y el ordenamiento contractual privado se interpenetran. Al trazar la evolución histórica desde las fallidas Normas de la ONU de 2003 hasta el "pragmatismo de principios" de John Ruggie en los PRNU de 2011, el ensayo detalla cómo este marco alinea distintos registros institucionales. Descompone sistemáticamente la arquitectura asimétrica de los tres pilares: el deber vinculante del Estado de proteger, la responsabilidad de exhortación de las empresas de respetar y el acceso al remedio. Se otorga especial énfasis a la debida diligencia en derechos humanos como un eje operativo que despliega múltiples funciones institucionales. Finalmente, la obra concluye que la interpenetración de estos pilares desestabiliza las doctrinas clásicas del derecho corporativo —como los deberes fiduciarios y la elección de la ley aplicable—. De este modo, demuestra que la gobernanza empresarial y la regulación transnacional de los derechos humanos ya no pueden evaluarse de forma aislada, ya que se acoplan estructuralmente para rediseñar la legitimidad del orden económico global.

Perhaps one can get to the heart of the discussion this way: A conventional treatment of business and human rights law would proceed taxonomically: identify the instrument (the Guiding Principles), state its content (three pillars), and catalogue its implementation (national action plans, due diligence legislation, disclosure regimes). Such a treatment would be accurate but incomplete, because it would take for granted precisely what the problematizing method insists on interrogating—namely, whether “corporate governance” and “human rights” name two separate and stable regulatory domains that can simply be brought into contact, or whether both are themselves unstable constructs whose meeting produces something genuinely new.

The inquiry unfolds along six interlocking axes: the fundamental character of enterprises and of economic objectives; the effect of globalization and trade regimes on the borders of state authority; the resulting “palettes” of public and private normative ordering; the general problem of the corporation and of corporate governance as such; the specific manifestation of that problem in the domain of corporate human rights, including its historical antecedents and its crystallization in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP); and, finally, the connections, alignments, and transformations that link corporate governance doctrine to the human rights framework.What follows takes up each of these in turn, before considering what the encounter between the two fields—corporate governance and business and human rights—suggests about the present condition of transnational economic regulation.

The full text may be downloaded HERE.

Note on the Spanish translation: To accurately integrate the academic context and refine the nuances between the English common-law corporate tradition and the Spanish legal framework, the translation has been revised to strengthen key transliterations and functional equivalentsKey Transliteration & Terminology Enhancements: (1) Corporate Governance: Maintained as Gobernanza Empresarial in headings, but translated as Gobierno Corporativo within the text when discussing strict corporate law doctrine, matching standard Spanish academic usage. (2) Creature of the State / Real-entity theory: Rendered as criatura del Estado and teoría de la entidad real, which are the recognized academic equivalents in comparative corporate law. (3) Remedy: Transliterated contextually. While "remedio" is used in the official Spanish translation of the UNGPs, the academic text demands reparación or vías de recurso depending on whether it refers to the outcome or the mechanism. Both are utilized to capture the full semantic weight. (4) Due Diligence: Maintained as debida diligencia, the stabilized term in international law.
Pix credit here

 

Tuesday, July 07, 2026

国家互联网信息办公室关于《互联网信息服务管理办法(修订草案征求意见稿)》再次公开征求意见的通知 [Notice from the Cyberspace Administration of China on Seeking Public Comment Again on the "Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services (Draft for Comment—Revised Draft)" 3 July 2026]

 

Pix credit here (Rene Magritte)

On July 3, 2026, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released for comment a new draft of a substantial revision of its "Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services Law" [《互联网信息服务管理办法》]. Geopolitechs has provided a quite useful English language summary and analysis of its provisions, including an English language translation of the provision. That summary and analysis may be accessed from their website HERE

I add only the following comments.

developed in conversation with Google Gemini

 As one considers this addition to the constellation of Chinese AI regulatory production (itself an element and a factor in the ability of China to appropriately develop its productive forces in ways that align with its current understanding the of historically appropriate general contradiction within the guardrails of the 3rd and 4th Plenum focus on the trajectories of development and its character). Within these overarching constraint structures, China’s regulatory architecture operates on two distinct regulatory axes. The first is the Ideological/Value Axis: Driven by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and Party leadership, this track ensures that generative outputs, algorithmic recommendations, and multi-channel distribution adhere tightly to mainstream socialist values. This is executed through binding mechanisms such as algorithmic filing, security assessments for systems with public mobilization capabilities, and strict generation/synthesis watermarking. The second is the Technical/Industrial Axis: Coordinated via ministries like MIIT and the Ministry of Science and Technology, this track focuses on infrastructure, compute allocation, standardizing large model toolchains, and data security classification (e.g., the recent Network Data Security Risk Assessment Measures).

Here is my own summary of the Law--the complexity of which, along with its layering in and ar0und the growing stable of related or applicable law, regulation, and instruction on administrative application begin to reveal a regulatory foundation which, eventually (and like their European counterparts through the elaboration of their culturally necessary performance of regulatory supervision) can be understood, synthesized, aligned  and eventually driven by and through the computational capabilities of a machine systems. The result, as in Europe is the continued evolution of textually based simulacra, or instruction manual, from which simulation or virtualized instruction set for an idealized and deeply programmed performative rationality human collectives, their interactions and the role of individuals within it may be programmed. Indeed, what these measures suggest is merely another layer of the larger project of textually programming human behaviors by developing not law but a set of computational parameters that can be encoded onto the human (collective) body and the performance of humans within it. Perhaps it cannot be helped; and perhaps it is a vision of the what lies ahead as humans march toward the detachment of their idealized reality from the human condition, and thus detached of enhancing the role of vanguard human elements as the priest/experts/technician types of a scientifically ordered world the genius of which is now safeguarded in and as the idealized simulacra of the world which will represent the physical simulation of the the simulacra of perfection. 

Overview and Administrative Framework

The document consists of two main parts: an official notice issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China (简称“国家网信办”) dated July 3, 2026, announcing a public comment period ending August 2, 2026; the full text of the revised draft regulation (comprising 6 chapters and 94 articles); and an accompanying explanatory note detailing the rationale behind the revisions.

Chapter 1: General Provisions (Articles 1–7)

The first chapter establishes the statutory basis, scope, and foundational principles of the Measures.

  • Statutory Basis and Scope (Articles 1–2): The regulation is formulated pursuant to upper-level laws including the Cybersecurity Law of the PRC. It applies strictly to any internet information services conducted within the territory of the PRC, as well as the supervision and management of those services.

  • Core Principles (Article 3): Service providers and regulators must adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, use Socialist Core Values as guidance, and follow the principles of human-centric design, classified management, collaborative progression, and innovative development. The explicit goal is to create a positive, healthy, and "clear" cyberspace.

  • Regulatory Matrix (Article 4): The draft codifies a multi-agency horizontal division of regulatory authority:

    • National Cyberspace Administration (网信部门): Responsible for overarching coordination of national cybersecurity and the direct supervision, management, and enforcement of internet information content.

    • State Council Telecommunications Department (电信主管部门/MIIT): Responsible for industry management, market access, market order, network resources, and network infrastructure security.

    • State Council Public Security Department (公安部门): Responsible for physical network security protection, maintaining public order in cyberspace, and punishing cybercrimes.

    • State Security Agencies (国家安全机关): Responsible for combating internet activities that endanger national security.

    • Other Departments: Exercise supervision within their respective portfolios, while local authorities' duties are determined by state regulations.

  • State Encouragement and Obligations (Articles 5–7): The state protects citizens' and organizations' rights to use internet services, encourages foundational research, and prioritizes IPv6 adoption. Providers must fulfill cybersecurity obligations, observe commercial and social ethics, and accept public supervision. Industry organizations are encouraged to establish self-regulatory codes. Article 7 mandates state monitoring and mitigation of domestic and overseas threats to national security, public interests, or citizen rights.

Market Access and Operational Establishment

Chapter 2: Establishment (Articles 8–13)

This chapter regulates the entry barriers, licensing tracks, and personnel requirements for operating an internet information service.

  • The Approval Mandate (Articles 8–9): No entity may engage in internet information services without prior approval from the telecom department. If the service constitutes a commercial telecommunications business, the operator must secure a Telecommunications Business Operation License.

  • License Revocation and Data Reporting: If an approved provider fails to conduct relevant business for two consecutive years, or ceases to meet the licensing criteria, the telecom department will cancel the license. Providers are also required to report network resources and operational metrics to assist market monitoring systems.

  • Technical Compliance and Standards (Article 10): Services must utilize telecom-compliant network resources and deploy information security management systems and technical safeguards that meet mandatory national standards.

  • Sector-Specific Pre-Approvals (Article 11): For specialized content areas—specifically news, culture, publishing, audio-visual programs, education, religion, and finance—operators must obtain explicit administrative permission from the respective sector-specific ministry prior to filing for telecom approvals or licenses.

  • Personnel Qualifications (Article 12): Employees must maintain correct political, value, and public opinion orientations. Crucially, personnel in internet news information services must obtain specific professional qualifications and undergo mandatory training and assessments organized by national news, publishing, and cyberspace departments. Platforms must systematically train internal information security reviewers.

  • Corporate Modifications (Article 13): Operators ceasing business must cancel their permits. Any changes to licensing parameters caused by mergers, acquisitions, or corporate restructuring require formal modification procedures with the original approving organ.

Operational Regulations and General Intermediary Duties

Chapter 3, Section 1: General Operational Provisions (Articles 14–40)

This section lays out the baseline compliance rules for day-to-day operations, applying across infrastructure, domain, and content service layers.

  • Infrastructure and Domain Integrity (Articles 14–15): Network access providers (ISPs) are forbidden from providing hosting or connection services to any platform lacking a valid telecom approval number. The establishment of domain root servers, root registries, and recursive resolution services requires explicit telecom licenses. Domains must be legally owned by the operator, cannot contain legally prohibited content, and must be updated or cancelled upon corporate expiration. IP address allocation operates under a strict filing registry; ISPs cannot provide connections to unverified or false IP allocations.

  • Public Filing and Labeling Display (Articles 16–17): Providers must file their operational indexes with local public security bureaus within 30 days of network connectivity. Platforms must clearly display their license numbers, approval IDs, and public security filing numbers in conspicuous locations. Operating outside the approved scope of services is strictly prohibited.

  • Internal Governance and User Verification (Articles 18–19): Platforms must maintain robust internal structures, including user registration controls, account management, content review protocols, public patrol systems, emergency response capabilities, and content orientation management. They must verify user-submitted credentials if the user operates in a field requiring specific professional qualifications.

  • Real-Name Identity Verification (Articles 19–21): Access providers, domain registrars, and information platforms must verify the true identity of users via national public network identity authentication services, resident identity cards, or unified social credit codes. Services must be withheld if a user refuses to provide valid identity info. Special verification measures must be deployed for minor users. Article 20 outlaws identity evasion tactics, such as using false credentials, misappropriating external accounts, or providing technical support to bypass real-name gates. Platforms must run dynamic verifications on existing accounts; accounts inactive for over six months must be flagged, prompted, or subjected to functional restrictions, suspension, or closure. Platforms must also support unlinking phone numbers when line ownership changes.

  • Crime Prevention and Content Promotion (Articles 22–23): Intermediaries must deploy technical checks to prevent their services from facilitating criminal activity and report violations to public security organs. Conversely, Article 23 explicitly encourages the production and dissemination of content that elevates Socialist Core Values, traditional Chinese culture, revolutionary history, national unity, and achievements in socio-economic development.

  • Prohibited and Adverse Content (Articles 24–25): Article 24 contains nine distinct bans on content that opposes constitutional principles, threatens national security or state secrets, incites subversion or secession, promotes terrorism/extremism, damages ethnic unity, desecrates revolutionary martyrs, devalues the military, spreads obscenity/gambling, propagates rumors disrupting economic order, or violates civil rights (reputation, privacy, intellectual property). Article 25 targets "adverse information" (不良信息), such as sensationalizing major policy adjustments, sudden emergencies, or high-profile criminal cases, as well as content harming minors. Such information cannot be highlighted or placed in prominent high-traffic sections.

  • Market and Information Order (Articles 26–30): Article 26 explicitly bans malicious traffic manipulation, including illicitly publishing, deleting, or suppressing links for pay; automated algorithm gaming; bulk account creation; generating fake clicks, votes, rankings, or comments; hijacking traffic; or deliberately bypassing state regulatory technical controls. If prohibited or adverse information is detected, platforms, electronic message blasters, software download portals, and ISPs must immediately sever transmission, delete or block content, restrict account monetization or functionality, preserve logs, and report to authorities (Articles 27–29). Overseas entities generating content that damages national security or public interests face targeted state countermeasures. Article 30 bans providing data, tools, hosting, billing, or advertising assistance to anyone known to be violating these provisions.

  • User Rights, Vulnerable Groups, and Specialized Frameworks (Articles 31–40):

    • Fact-Checking: Platforms must maintain mechanisms to actively refute online rumors (辟谣机制).

    • Fair Competition: Operators are prohibited from blocking competitors' legal links, interrupting app installations/upgrades, or using misleading buttons to divert users without consent (Article 32).

    • Consumer Protection: Pricing and service items must be fully transparent; bundled or forced subscription alterations are forbidden (Article 33).

    • Customer Service: Providers must supply human customer service staff scaled to their user base to handle complaints and appeals within reasonable windows (Article 34).

    • Minor Protection: The development of specialized "minor modes" and anti-addiction systems is heavily incentivized (Article 35).

    • Accessibility: Services must provide dedicated features and safety interfaces for elderly and disabled citizens (Article 36).

    • Security Assessments: Any service possessing public opinion attributes or social mobilization capabilities must complete a formal administrative security assessment (Article 37).

    • Special Management Shares: Media and publishing platforms may be subject to the state's special management share ("golden share") system (特殊管理股制度) (Article 38).

    • Log Retention: Platforms must preserve user registrations, published information records, and network logs for a minimum of 6 months, including NAT (Network Address Translation) registries for shared access points (Article 39).

    • Open Source: Operators are encouraged to prioritize open-source operating systems for app development (Article 40).

Specialized Intermediate Frameworks: Platforms and AI

Chapter 3, Section 2: Platform Information Services (Articles 41–54)

This section introduces precise obligations for platform service providers acting as structural intermediaries.

  • Rule Transparency and Credit Grading (Articles 41–42): Platforms must visibly display their community guidelines, rulebooks, and terms of service on homepages or application settings. Alterations require formal public comment periods. Regulatory authorities can order revisions of non-compliant rules. Platforms must track user accounts via credit-grading systems and report these metrics to the CAC.

  • Public Account ("We-Media") and MCN Management (Articles 43–46): For accounts operating in regulated professional domains (e.g., medicine, law, finance, education, military), platforms must verify their professional backgrounds and certifications, applying specific visual tags to their accounts. Public account homepages must display the operator's actual identity, unified social credit code, contact info, IP location, and their associated Multi-Channel Network (MCN) agency. High-impact public accounts are forbidden from spreading prohibited or adverse content; platforms must deploy strict penalties (monetization suspensions, account caps, bans) against violators. High-impact account registries and livestreaming platforms must file their background rosters with provincial cyberspace departments within 30 days of operation.

  • Anti-Cyberbullying Mandates (Article 47): Platforms must build algorithmic detection models, feature databases, and risk-warning alerts to identify cyber-violence. If risk is detected, platforms must dynamically re-verify account identities, throttle traffic, or issue warning pop-ups. They must also provide users with immediate defensive tools: one-click blocking of specific users, disabling trackbacks/comments, rejecting direct messages, and automated evidence preservation features.

  • MCN Agency Accountability (Articles 52–53): Content content distribution networks and MCNs must register as formal businesses, appoint content directors, maintain sufficient review staff, and publicize internal rules. If their contracted accounts violate content laws due to the MCN's lack of oversight, the MCN faces shared legal liability. MCNs are prohibited from organizing, inducing, or assisting accounts in violating rules, and platforms must penalize non-compliant MCNs via service restrictions or blacklist bans.

  • Large-scale Internet Platforms (Article 54): Defined specifically as platforms possessing over 50 million registered users or more than 10 million monthly active users (MAUs). They are legally required to:

    1. Maintain independent compliance departments and dedicated compliance officers, conducting regular open security reviews.

    2. Publish distinct platform rules protecting the rights of internal vendors and platform-dependent laborers.

    3. Resolve complaints regarding prohibited content or adverse behavior within an accelerated 24-hour window.

    4. Publish annual corporate social responsibility reports tracking data safety, privacy, and minor safety.

    5. Report adjustments in major shareholders, actual controlling individuals, or primary business vectors to local cyberspace bureaus.

    6. Refrain from utilizing data, proprietary algorithms, or platform rules to disadvantage competitors or harm consumer rights.

 
Pix generated with Google Gemini

Chapter 3, Section 3: Smart Information Services (Articles 55–64)

This section regulates the development and hosting of artificial intelligence and algorithmic recommendation systems.

  • Development Incentives and General Transparency (Articles 55–56): The state balances safety with development, supporting high-quality datasets, algorithm standards, and AI model training. Smart service operators must publicly disclose the basic technical principles, core deployment mechanisms, training data sources, and intended objectives of their models.

  • Algorithmic Filings and Data Lineage (Articles 57–59): Models with public opinion or mobilization capabilities must undergo independent security reviews, complete formal algorithm filings (算法备案), and track subsequent updates or cancellations. Apps accessing smart hardware systems must undergo compatibility and security testing. Training data data processing must rely on legal data and verified base models. If a smart service generates news content, its training corpora must be sourced exclusively from units officially authorized by state regulations.

  • Synthesized Content and Recommendation Restraints (Articles 60–61): Generated or synthetically altered content must feature permanent watermarks complying with national technical standards; altering, removing, or hiding these labels is prohibited. Recommendation engine providers must allow users to easily opt-out of personalized profiling or select entirely non-personalized alternatives. Algorithms must favor mainstream values in high-visibility areas (landing pages, hot-searches, pop-ups) and are prohibited from tagging users with illegal interest keywords, manipulating search rankings, over-recommending content, or engineering fake trending topics.

  • Gig Economy Labor Safeguards (Article 62): AI systems used for labor scheduling, recruitment, or job evaluation must follow strict necessity principles. Order distribution, payment algorithms, and work-hour assignments must remain fair, reasonable, and transparent. Algorithms affecting labor rights cannot be modified without seeking input from workers and publicizing changes beforehand.

  • Agent Services and Risk Mitigation (Articles 63–64): Providers of AI agents (智能体) or agent distribution platforms must ensure their products comply with national safety rules and maintain active security oversight. If a model generates prohibited information or exhibits major systemic risks, operators must immediately halt generation, cut transmissions, update training protocols to rectify the error, and file reports with cyberspace departments.

Supervision, Inspection, and Corporate Liability

Chapter 4: Supervision and Inspection (Articles 65–73)

  • Agency Powers (Articles 65–66): Cyberspace, telecom, and public security organs possess full mandates to inspect providers, who cannot refuse or obstruct investigations. Agencies must coordinate to prevent overlapping or redundant inspections. Shared information systems must link licensing data, MCN filings, and user registries. Criminal cases must be transferred to judicial organs promptly.

  • Investigative Actions and Special Controls (Articles 69–73): Regulators will focus inspections on complaint processing, account crackdowns, platform rules, and credit monitoring. If safety risks emerge, regulators can formally summon (约谈) corporate legal representatives for mandatory rectifications. During investigations, officers are authorized to interrogate witnesses, copy network logs, conduct on-site inspections, and seize or seal electronic hardware, storage drives, and premises (Article 70). Confidential information acquired during enforcement must be kept secret by staff (Article 71). Under Article 73, subject to direct State Council approval, cyberspace and telecom ministries can enforce temporary, localized, or functional restrictions on any communication platform possessing public mobilization capabilities during severe cyber or social crises.

Chapter 5: Legal Responsibility (Articles 74–89)

This chapter outlines the penalty scale for compliance failures.

OffensesStatutory Penalties and Administrative Actions
Unlicensed Telecom Operations (Article 74)Confiscation of illicit revenue; fines of 3 to 5 times the illicit gains. If gains are under 50,000 RMB, fines range from 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB. Serious cases face mandatory business suspension.
Operating Without Baseline Approval (Article 74)Ordered rectification; persistent failure results in forced operational shutdown.
Missing Public Security Filings (Article 74)Warning and ordered correction; failure to comply leads to technical network suspension.
Fraudulent Licensing/Approvals (Article 75)Revocation of permits/IDs; confiscation of gains; fines from 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB.
General Structural Infractions (Article 76)(Covers missing labels, rule failures, bad customer service, minor safety leaks). Warnings, revenue confiscation; persistent or serious failures trigger fines from 50,000 to 500,000 RMB, website/app closures, or business license cancellations. Executives face personal fines from 10,000 to 100,000 RMB.
Severe Content & Algorithmic Failures (Article 77)

Standard: Fines up to 500,000 RMB, app suspension, or license revocation.


Serious: Fines from 500,000 to 2,000,000 RMB; managers face 10,000 to 100,000 RMB fines and 6-month to 1-year sector management bans.


Extremely Severe: Fines from 2,000,000 to 10,000,000 RMB; managers face fines up to 1,000,000 RMB and a permanent ban from executive or security roles in the internet sector.

Failure to Halt Prohibited Content (Article 81)Fines from 50,000 to 500,000 RMB; serious cases trigger fines from 500,000 to 2,000,000 RMB. If the fallout causes "especially severe consequences," corporate fines scale from 2,000,000 to 10,000,000 RMB, and executives face personal fines up to 1,000,000 RMB.
"We-Media" Violations (Article 83)Baseline accounts face warnings and profile restrictions, plus fines from 10,000 to 50,000 RMB. High-impact accounts face fines from 50,000 to 500,000 RMB alongside account termination or re-registration bans.
Market/Traffic Manipulation (Article 84)Fines from 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB; serious infractions scale from 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 RMB with mandatory business suspension.
Regulatory Misconduct (Article 82)State staff leaking data or abusing power face formal administrative or criminal prosecution.
  • Coordinated Statutes and Civil Remedies (Articles 86–89): Other infractions defer to upper-level laws like the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law. Civil damages must be compensated independently, and criminal accountability overrides administrative fines. Under Article 88, severe violators face inclusion on the Internet Serious Dishonesty List, resulting in long-term multi-platform restrictions on registering new accounts or using information features. Mitigations follow the Administrative Punishment Law guidelines. 

Supplementary Definitions

Chapter 6: Supplementary Provisions (Articles 90–94)

Article 90 provides precise definitions for ten core operational terms used throughout the regulation:

  1. Internet Information Services: Providing information to the public via websites, applications, or agents using microblogs, instant messaging, search engines, livestreams, video, text sharing, knowledge reasoning, task execution, or public accounts.

  2. Internet Access Services (ISPs): Providing network routing or hosting to platforms, including IDC (Internet Data Center) operations, CDN (Content Delivery Network) management, and basic ISP access via network proxies, server hosting, or space leasing.

  3. Internet Accounts: Usernames and profiles registered to use internet information services.

  4. Internet User Public Accounts ("We-Media"): Accounts producing text, graphics, or audio-visual content aimed at the general public, excluding profiles meant solely for private communication.

  5. Highly Influential Public Accounts: Accounts categorized by substantial follower bases, high read/forward/comment volume, significant annual monetization revenue, or prominent influence within a specialized domain or demographic.

  6. Public Account Production/Operation Entities: Individuals or organizations registering and running public accounts for content generation.

  7. Internet Information Content Multi-Channel Distribution Services (MCNs): Agencies providing planning, production, distribution, marketing, promotion, or brokerage services to public accounts.

  8. Internet Livestreaming Platform Providers: Platform intermediaries hosting live broadcast content.

  9. Application Distribution Platform Providers: Marketplaces hosting and distributing software applications.

  10. Large-scale Internet Platforms: Digital platforms with over 50 million registered users or more than 10 million Monthly Active Users (MAUs), whose operations exert a significant impact on economic performance, online order, or user rights.

  • Foreign Investment and Transnational Services (Articles 91–92): Foreign-invested entities must comply with specific foreign investment statutes, alongside special rules governing e-commerce retail and supply chains. Foreign entities or individuals distributing information into the PRC or utilizing domestic internet infrastructure must strictly obey these Measures. International treaties apply unless the PRC has explicitly registered a reservation.

  • Cross-Sectoral Compliance and Enforcement Date (Articles 93–94): Services touching upon data privacy, competition, media management, or state secrets must obey adjacent specialized laws. The document leaves the final enactment date open for subsequent formal confirmation.

The text of the original draft appears below.