Showing posts with label transparency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label transparency. Show all posts

Friday, April 24, 2026

ICoCA Newsletter January March 2026: "Local Solutions for Global Standards"

 


Accountability, transparency, and engagement are critical elements of any principles based system.  Those overarching principles are no longer easily applied through one-size-fits-all measures. Those concerns are nicely encapsulated in the January-March  2026 Newsletter of The International Code of Conduct Association – ICoCA--"Technology and the future of private security." These are framed in this way for the Newsletter:

Private security providers operate in diverse and often complex environments where risks and regulatory contexts vary significantly. Ensuring respect for international human rights standards therefore requires approaches that are adapted to local realities while remaining consistent in their application. This newsletter explores how ICoCA’s context-specific engagement is shaping responsible security practices in different regions.

ICoCA "is a multi-stakeholder initiative formed in 2013 to ensure that providers of private security services respect human rights and humanitarian law. It serves as the governance and oversight mechanism of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers." (ICoCA--About). The ICoCa summarizes its mission this way: "Our mission is to raise private security industry standards and practices that respect human rights and international humanitarian law and to engage with key stakeholders to achieve widespread adherence to the International Code of Conduct globally. Discover the benefits for each stakeholder group below."

Featured interventions include: (1) The end of plausible deniability: CSDDD and private security within the value chain; (2) Just transition through a community-based security model in Albania; (3) Empowering Mozambique's civil society for corporate accountability; (4) Towards stronger governance of private security in Nigeria; (5) Strengthening civil society advocacy in international decision-making processes; (6) Shaping private security governance in the Americas; and (7) ICoCA Responsible Security Awards 2025: Case studies highlights.

A French version of this newsletter is available here.


 

Monday, May 05, 2025

The Fulfillment of States of Regulatory Supervision in Context: European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) Circulates an Invitation to Submit Comments on its Consultation Paper on the Technical Standards under the Regulation on the transparency and integrity of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) rating activities




My colleague Andreas Rasche, Professor and Associate Dean at Copenhagen Business School, has circulated a reminder about an important consultation undertaken by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) relating to the implementation of  a Consultation Paper on the Technical Standards under the Regulation on the transparency and integrity of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) rating activities."  Rasche explains:
ESMA has published the draft standards for the EU ESG Ratings Regulation. The standards specify further the "methodologies, models and key rating assumptions" that need to be disclosed from 2026 onwards. The new rules also list criteria that must be met when rating providers want to offer other services (e.g. consulting).

The standards ask raters to show "how major new information is taken into account in a rating change" and also to specify how significant alternations of methods affect ratings. Whenever raters publish aggregated ESG ratings, they must include a separate assessment of the E, S, and G dimension. The standards also fix the sequence and structure which need to be met when disclosures are made.

The draft standards implement the EU Ratings Regulation which was adopted last year. Feedback on the standards is open until 20 June 2025, and a final document will be published by October 2025.

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Give Feedback: https://lnkd.in/dVz5w2nW


The basis for all of this work, and much more is coming, starts from the decision to implement, in their own contextually relevant way, international standards and administrative objectives around issues of sustainability, human rights and governance  (of people and markets in furtherance of those primary objectives) that have been built into a number of international initiatives, including but not limited to the UN 20230 Agenda and its Sustainability Development Goals. When these are combined with the much more contextually relevant initiatives that seek to transpose those administrative policies into the European context, one begins to see taking shape the forms and policies that have been  developed to create a fairly comprehensive system of regulatory supervision of the core elements of economic activity (and therefore of markets) within Europe. From that kernel of regulatory systemicity, as an expression of elaborated core values about political governance and the relationship of individuals to the state and its organs,  European officials whose own mission is to develop and more fully realize these emerging principles (like those of other greater powers in global spaces) have sought means of projecting their view and regulatory forms of governance well beyond their borders. In part, this is undertaken, thanks to the creativity of jurists a century or so ago and their development of "effects" standards, through systems of applying domestic standards to all actors with some connection or effect within the territories (understood physically and virtually) of the regulating entity (in this case the E.U.). 

The Technical standards are meant to fulfill the requirements of the  Regulation on environmental, social and governance (ESG) rating activities 2023/0177(COD) PE-CONS 43/24 and amending Regulations
(EU) 2019/2088 and (EU) 2023/2859 (about 141 pages including annexes). In their Press Release (5 and 14 February 2024) on agreement, the EU Council and EU Parliament explained:

ESG ratings provide an opinion on a company’s or a financial instrument’s sustainability profile, by assessing its exposure to sustainability risks and its impact on society and the environment. ESG ratings have an increasingly important impact on the operation of capital markets and on investor trust in sustainable products. The new rules aim to strengthen the reliability and comparability of ESG ratings by improving the transparency and integrity of the operations of ESG ratings providers and preventing potential conflicts of interests. Under the new rules, ESG rating providers will need to be authorised and supervised by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and comply with transparency requirements, in particular with regard to their methodology and sources of information. * * *

ESG rating providers established in the EU will need to obtain an authorisation from ESMA. ESG rating providers established outside the EU that wish to operate in the EU will need to obtain an endorsement of their ESG ratings by an EU authorised ESG rating provider, a recognition based on a quantitative criterion or be included in the EU registry of ESG rating providers on the basis of an equivalence decision in relation to the country of its origin and following a dialogue held between ESMA and the relevant third-country competent authority.
The object is to regulate commercial markets in ESG standards and ESG reporting, Left unattended, perhaps as the spaces now within which innovation and risk taking on development of standards and analytics may continue to evolve without State supervision, are those offered by NGOs (but only where these are provided without charge) and by "natural persons, including academics and journalists who publish and distribute ESG ratings for non-commercial purposes." (ESG Regulation, Preambular materials ¶¶23-24). One can presume that these exceptions are already subject to a distinct regime of regulatory supervision through EU and national systems of research and other grants (which can be effectively supervised as to form and content and which will be funded only if it advances whatever suits the donor), and journalists are understood as mere transmitters and thus subject to other systems of supervision (for example data protection, etc.).

In this context, the ESMA was tasked with a number of regulatory assignments to both flesh out the more technical aspects of regulatory supervision and to provide the basis for the intake necessary to develop  admission by actors into this regulatory universe.

These draft technical standards establish key elements of the regulatory framework in a number of areas. First, they set out the information that should be provided in the applications for authorisation and recognition of an ESG rating provider. * * * Second, they set out the measures and safeguards that should be put in place to mitigate risks of conflicts of interest within ESG rating providers who carry out activities other than the provision of ESG ratings. * * * Third, they specify in greater detail the information that is to be disclosed by ESG rating providers to the public, rated items, issuers and the users of ESG ratings. (Consultation Paper on the Technical Standards under the Regulation on the transparency and integrity of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) rating activities."p. 5)

The ESG regulatory architecture is a small but telling part of this (re)construction of a vision of governing grounded, in large measure by an increasingly well developed set of principles and practices around the notion of "regulatory supervision." That notion is grounded, in turn, on the fundamental idea that political bodies--almost invariably techno-bureaucracies of functionally differentiated expertise, have a fundamental duty to protect political collectives with respect to key areas of activity through programs of standard setting, oversight, and management to ensure fundamental principles--starting, of course with stability, and then moving on from there to the fulfillment of all sorts of positive values/objectives--happiness, creativity, self-actualization, fairness, peace, etc. which is presented through principles and in language that is relatable to members of the managed collective. There is nothing odd about this; most states have adopted variations on this theme, for example in their regulation of disclosure in securities transactions. Nonetheless, the effort to develop more comprehensive and interlinked systems of supervision that, when coordinated, can effectively shift discretionary authority in core matters from actors to regulators, is something that, outside the Marxist-Leninist realms is only now assuming a workable form.

As such, there is something at its core that distinguishes this form of regulatory supervision from those of other liberal democratic markets driven collectives--the idea that the highest form of authoritative and legitimate political power lies in the duty/responsibility of public organs to manage all aspects of private life. And it brings the project closer to contemporary Marxist-Leninist sensibilities on the use of the market and private actors as a complement to the political projects of the State and the fulfillment of State objectives, all under principles of regulatory supervision. And thus the core of the characteristic that distinguishes what appears to be an evolving form of regulatory supervision from other variations of liberal democracy is centered on the allocation of autonomy in decision and action. Other forms of liberal democracy might adhere more closely to a fundamental premise that the aggregated action of private actors ought to drive policy, an autonomy that ought to be protected, as against one that more vigorously embraces an ordering premise  that public policy drives private (aggregated) desire. At a deeper level this points to an ongoing conversation about the relationship between technical and scientific expertise and political discretion. That divide continues ot generate sometimes lively debate even within the technocracies of the EU (see egDavos Discourse 3: Europe between Between Eagle, Bear, and Dragon and No Place to Go--Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum). The ongoing conversation, in turn, is now deeply affected by the ways in which technologies makes both technocracy and politics inherently manipulable concept.  Perhaps in the end Nietzsche was right to suggest that there is no free will, even with respect to scientific "truths"--if so one reverts to the politics of control.

It is in unpacking this sense of the project that these documents are fascinating and worthy a read for what it tells us about the governance philosophy that is being manifested through these regulatory measures. Indeed the question of the principles, nature, and manifestation of regulatory supervision provide a critically useful framework for approaching issues of the way that political systems understand and fulfill principles of democratic governance within their territories. As pieces of the architecture of regulatory supervision they may or may not work as effectively as they could.  It is likely that given the complexity of the system, and the need to integrate ESG governance into the larger framework for managing economic activity in Europe in accordance with and to further public policy,  

For all of that, one ought to be encouraged to submit comments on the proposal.  If one embraces  the cognitive parameters of European regulatory supervision models, one ought, as well, to contribute to its perfection. It is only in that way that the system. closer to perfection, can rise to meet is aspirations or fail in that enterprise, and in failing provide the basis for again moving forward to shape and fulfill the resulting values system that emerges.



Thursday, August 01, 2024

Brief Reflections on the Release of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, "2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment"

 


 The U.S. Army War College, through its Strategic Studies Institute, publishes an annual estimate of the strategic security environment in which the U.S. finds itself.  Ordinarily I don't bother passing these along--the usual crowd of those with a use for this ordinarily know when and how to get their copy. This, though, is an interesting year. Trajectories of actions and the ending point of contradictions and end points all point to the substantial possibility that all sorts of people and the institutions they control may, for a variety of reasons, believe that now may be the time to take action because, in their calculus--however wrongheaded--the risk reward ratios are at their apex, and in their favor. When multiple people/institutions believe this it is likely that perhaps up to half will get it very wrong.  But these people/institutions tend to be risk controllers; the are not risk bearers.  The polity is.

It is for that reason that the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute's 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment, published 24 July 2024 may be of particular interest to many who don't ordinarily have little interest in the security environment of which many may be oblivious as they go about their lives. As in past years, its primary objective is internal--it is "designed to guide the collective defense community to research and write about critical national security challenges." (Introduction). 

Its description lays out the framework of analysis through the lens of the role of the Army within the broader strategic objectives:

Description

The 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment sets the foundation for cutting-edge research to understand the ever-evolving security environment domestically and internationally. Competition with the People’s Republic of China continues to dominate the strategic narrative, with global implications for US national interests. The Russia-Ukraine War and the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, however, present immediate and political challenges that will undoubtedly influence US military efforts abroad. At the same time, the United States faces domestic challenges in navigating civil-military relations, and the Army is working diligently to overcome institutional hurdles. The United States published its first National Defense Industry Strategy in January 2024, focusing on resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence. Additionally, the Army released the 2024 white paper “Army Force Structure Transformation,” which lays the groundwork for creating new capabilities, initiates new recruitment modernization efforts, and justifies challenging personnel reductions across the force. Finally, the prevalence of competition in new and maturing arenas (such as space and the polar regions) may impact a delicate balance among the great powers. This balance, and the potential relative advantage the United States maintains over its adversaries, is further challenged by emerging technologies, many of which have yet to realize their impact on defense operations.

A mobile-friendly version of the Annual Estimate can be found here.

 That, in turn, may  reflect a service-specific application of relevant overall themes and thematic structures from the National Security Strategy (NDS) (October 2022) (on NSS, its legal basis, and prior iterations see here), and with it, its talk about "inflection points." (NSS, J. Biden, Intro, p. 1).

So, the United States will continue to defend democracy around the world, even as we continue to do the work at home to better live up to the idea of America enshrined in our founding documents. . . This is a 360-degree strategy grounded in the world as it is today, laying out the future we seek, and providing a roadmap for how we will achieve it. None of this will be easy or without setbacks. But I am more confident than ever that the United States has everything we need to win the competition for the 21st century. We emerge stronger from every crisis. There is nothing beyond our capacity. We can do this—for our future and for the world. (Ibid., p. 2).

 Also relevant is strategy document: The National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS): Enabling a Modernized Defense Industrial Ecosystem (2023; released January 2024) It "offers a strategic vision to coordinate and prioritize actions to build a modernized defense industrial ecosystem that is fully aligned with the NDS. It also calls for sustained collaboration and cooperation between the entire U.S. government, private industry, and our Allies and partners abroad." (Fact Sheet: National Defense Industrial Strategy). These are organized into four "strategic priorities": (1) resilient supply chains; (2) workforce readiness; (3) flexible acquisition; and (4) economic deterrence. The strategy is grounded on a core premise: "A robust and resilient industrial base provides the enduring foundation for military advantage." (NDIS, supra, p. 7). To that end it is necessary to rethink the old suspicion about the military-industrial complex expressed by President Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell Address, and replace it with a compliance and accountability based system of mutual interpenetration. 

The NDS showed that building enduring industrial advantages through a resilient defense
ecosystem is imperative, to include supporting our allies and partners with key capabilities to
strengthen integrated deterrence. * * * Achieving our priorities depends on the numerous stakeholders in national security and the defense industry – executive branch departments and agencies, government owned facilities, traditional defense contractors, non-traditional companies, and our global Allies and partners—to effectively collaborate in surmounting the complex known and unknown technical, manufacturing, and logistical challenges. (NDIS, ¶¶ 1.1.1; 1.1.2).

This ordering premise is picked up in important ways in the the 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment. "Modern war will increasingly demand the integration of civilian and military capabilities—from artificial intelligence (AI) to cyber operations to space to a re-invigoration of the defense industrial base." (2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment; p. 36). To these ends a robust system of interlocking public and private techno-bureaucracies will be necessary. These mirror those already being constructed to oversee the relationship between the deployment of productive forces and human rights based state management. (See here, here, here, and here).  

And, indeed, these strategic documents begin to reveal just what lies on the other side of the inflection point to which President Biden pointed in the 2022 National Security Strategy, though it is unlikely that the process was organic and responsive rather than active and guided. In any case here the United States finds itself: in a world in which the premises of the "military-industrial complex" has given way, decisively, to one grounded in the necessity of both inter-penetration and solidity between military and industrial complexes. The question for the emerging age also changes, as do the challenges: how does one build a guiding framework of compliance and accountability that permits an effective engagement with the emerging forms and practices of combat/competition/conflict (or whatever other linguistic trope will be invented to describe whatever it is that is to be undertaken by naming it appropriately while preserving the values and practices for which these technologies, relationships, and undertakings are "activated"--that is a hard task, made more interesting within liberal democratic regimes precisely because, as the 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment reminds its readers (p. 21): "The hardening of ideological positions in the United States has led to deep political and cultural divides that the election will likely not heal, presenting a danger as significant as any external threat."  Both remain a challenge:

“Today, senior military leaders struggle to articulate the ways in which the military can integrate AI, machine learning techniques, and other algorithms into war waging. As a result, senior military leaders depend upon actors in private industry to develop both strategies and solutions—yet private-industry actors are not steeped in professional ethics and norms as military officers are over the course of their careers. (Ibid, pp.36-37).

The Introduction follows below along with the Fact Sheet: National Defense Industrial Strategy, and a reminder of the deeper challenges for the new civilian military order reflected in the warnings of an age of historical development that is quickly receding into history--that portion of President Eisenhower's Address on the military-industrial complex.

The inflection point noted by President Biden in the 2022 NDS appears to have come and gone. One must deal with the new realities; and these are strikingly dissimilar from the foundations of the organization of national defense that were at the core of U.S. policy in the now rapidly receding so-called Post War Era. A significant  challenge for the military  in its role of protecting the American people from foreign threats (whether they are manifested within or beyond the territories and jurisdiction of the United States), then may be in the way in which it can (1) develop an appropriate conception of the normative framework, the institutional structural system, and the compliance-assessment-accountability structures of the emerging civilian-military interpenetrated techno-bureaucracies, increasingly assisted by technology (and eventually autonomously generative tech) (eg here on the Chinese normative basis HERE);  (2) attempt to develop multi-level systems for objectives based quality control, international transparency, coordination, assessment, and accountability (eg HERE); (3) re-imagine accountability itself must be understood as a multi-vector project including the accountability of accountability measures (HERE; HERE) .

 

Monday, March 04, 2024

National Small Business Association v. Janet Yellen, Case 5:22-cv-01448-LCB (NDAla, slip op. 1 March 2024): Corporate Transparency Act Unconstitutional Pending Appeal

Pix credit here

 

In a 53 page opinion, the United States District Court for Northern Alabama has ruled, in National Small Business Association v. Janet Yellen, Case 5:22-cv-01448-LCB (NDAla, slip op. 1 March 2024) that the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) is unconstitutional beaucause it exceeds Congress's legislative authority. This is a 53-page decision that considered first issues of standing and then "the Government’s proffered justifications for the CTA’s constitutionality—that the CTA falls within the ambit of the Commerce, Taxing, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, along with Congress’ foreign affairs and national security powers. After a close look at each of these putative justifications, the Court concludes that the CTA is not authorized by the Constitution." (NSBA v. Yellin, slip op. at p. 9).

As explained in an ABA Backgrounder, "the Corporate Transparency Act requires certain business entities (each defined as a “reporting company”) to file, in the absence of an exemption, information on their “beneficial owners” with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) of the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) (here). The information will not be publicly available, but FinCEN is authorized to disclose the information:

The act became effective Jan. 1. Congress hoped it would help stop money-laundering by rooting out the use of anonymous shell companies and would track the flow of illicit money and protect U.S. national security interests. The law creates a beneficial ownership database and reporting requirements for companies to file ownership information to the U.S. Treasury Department, similar to existing requirements in the U.K. and the European Union. The law focuses primarily on small and private companies and applies to more than 32 million small businesses nationwide. (Judge Strikes Down Law Requiring Corporate-Ownership Disclosure)

The press reporting noted that: "The legal challenge points to the friction between maintaining privacy rights and the government’s effort to uncover sources of criminal activity, especially as the U.S. has attempted to sanction Russian oligarchs and wealthy friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin following the start of his invasion of Ukraine." (Small Business Reporting Requirement Found Unconstitutional by Alabama Federal Judge).

Scott Greytak, director of advocacy at anticorruption group Transparency International U.S., said that Judge Burke’s ruling failed to recognize the national security interests that were the basis for the CTA. “Instead, Judge Burke’s opinion imagines a world in which international money laundering simply doesn’t exist,” Greytak said in a statement, adding that the group expects the ruling to be appealed and overturned by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. (Judge Strikes Down Law Requiring Corporate-Ownership Disclosure)

This is hardly the last word.  It is expected that the case will be appealed and that the Government will move that the injunction be paused.  Ordinarily neither would be remarkable.  But this year may be different.   The text of the Corporate Transparency Act may be accessed HERE. The ABA Business Law Section Backgrounder may be accessed HERE.


Wednesday, November 15, 2023

Parallel Barking Podcast: "Fake AI Images of Israel-Hamas Conflict Served Up by Adobe Stock Photo Service"

  

 

Episode description: The problem with selling fake photos is that people may not know they are fake. Blatant deception seems to be the name of the game and if money is involved, then it's open season. But the issue may be less abut AI.I. and its capabilities as much as it opens a window on the way in which humans manifest a strong desire to believe what they believe--and to use technology to render that belief in images, and then to use those images to transform belief into something more concrete. This suggests a new expression of intersubjectivity in the age of virtual realities. Holographic realities now seep into the physical world the way it had always poured into the virtual. The interactions between them produce hybrid cognition of the4 real in which belief is now better able to make itself more concrete--more felt, in the physical world (discussed in "The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Person, the “Human” Condition, and its Social Constitution --An Encounter with Jan M. Broekman, Knowledge in Change: The Semiotics of Cognition and Conversation (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023)", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, forthcoming 2023).


 Access podcast HERE.

For background:

Adobe is selling AI-generated images depicting the Israel-Hamas war. While some are pretty obviously computer generated, others are more realistic, including one image that has been shared online by some smaller websites and in social media posts — drawing concerns the AI-generated content could contribute to misinformation, Australian outlet Crikey and Vice's Motherboard reported. . . Adobe Stock, which sells images submitted by individual artists, requires that all AI-generated images on the platform be labeled as such. But some of the images for sale are marked as AI-generated only in the fine print, not in their titles. (Business Insder access here).

Pix Credit here

 

 

Monday, June 12, 2023

Conference: "Just Transitions and International Law"; University of Dundee (Scotland) 7-8 September 2023

 

I am delighted to pass along information about what promises to be a marvelous conference. The University of Dundee is organising a conference on Just Transitions and International Law to be held on 7-8 September 2023.The Organizing committee includes Prof. Jacques Hartmann; Dr. Claire Methven O'Brien; Dr. Sufyan El Droubi; and Joanna Kyle, Dundee International Law Society. The Conference is conference is supported by the Society of Legal Scholars Small Projects and Events Fund.

Just Transitions and International Law conference


 
Conference Concept Note:

Climate change threatens humanity and supporting ecosystems. International and regional legal and policy frameworks, governments, development actors and the private sector are striving to deliver a global green energy transition. Several international instruments affirm that this transition must be ‘just’ and align with wider sustainable development objectives and human rights norms. The 2015 Paris Agreement, for example, acknowledges ‘the imperatives of a just transitions of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities’, while the UN 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals combine green energy transition and other environmental objectives with wide-ranging social and economic targets. Self-evidently, measures to secure a systemic shift toward a lower carbon economy affects all countries, regions, industries, and communities.

The idea of a just transitions evokes policies that are designed and implemented in line with international principles, such as equity, participation, transparency and inclusion, and international human rights. But the law, policy and scholarship on ‘just transitions’ is nascent and fragmented. There are sizeable knowledge gaps over the underlying conceptual architecture, economic, institutional, and social implications of a just transitions, at international, regional and national levels.

The conference will analyse challenges raised by just transitions to a low-carbon economy in, and for, international law. These challenges will be considered in six panels, focusing on: Human Rights and Just Transitions
--Just Transitions and Business
--Just Transitions and International Economic and Investment Law
--Just Transition and Energy Law
--Global Perspectives on Just Transitions
--Just Transitions Litigation

The conference includes two keynote speeches delivered by Judge Tim Eicke, the European Court of Human Rights, and Professor Freya Baetens, Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, University of Oxford.

More on the keynote speakers follows.

Wednesday, December 07, 2022

A look at the Emerging Human Rights, Sanctions, and Trade Policy Nexus: Report: "Driving Force:Automotive Supply Chains and Forced Labour in the Uighur Region" (2022) 

 


 

One of the most interesting developments in the field of business and human rights is the way in which the project now seeks to leverage sanctions regimes and markets limiting strategies deployed in liberal democratic states.  More interesting still is the way that liberal democratic states, once lukewarm to the BHR project, now may find it an especially valuable weapon in its sanctions  and import restriction based foreign policy regimes. These are advanced to serve the interests of states first, and consequentially, that of human rights in economic activity.

The questions that emerge center on (1) the nature of the connection between human rights and sustainability reporting by CSOs and academic organizations and the sanctions and trade regimes interposed by states (like the US and EU); (2) the extent to which funding, especially by states, may bend foundation and governmental award work to more closely align with the implementation of trade based and sanctions regimes; (3) the autonomy of human rights  and sustainability conversations where sanctions and trade regimes may begin to drive the discourse; and (4) the role of international bodies in coordinating and managing the rise of these state based sanctions and trade regimes with the global discourse on human rights and sustainability principles. 

A recent example evidences this new symbiotic relationship may emerge in the shadow of the publication of the report, Driving Force:Automotive Supply Chains and Forced Labour in the Uighur Region (2022) and US trade and sanctions regimes. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) was signed into law by President Biden on December 23, 2021. It "directs the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force to develop a strategy for supporting enforcement of the prohibition on the importation of goods into the United States manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor in the People's Republic of China, especially from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or Xinjiang." (UFLPA website). It is operationalized by "a rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang or by an entity on the UFLPA Entity List are prohibited from U.S. importation under 19 U.S.C. § 1307." (Ibid.). 

That statute has been made easier to implement by the work of civil society organizations, academics, and universities, serving in the capacity of monitors and data managers. 

In a six-month investigation undertaken by Laura T. Murphy, Kendyl Salcito, Yalkun Uluyol, Mia Rabkin, and a team of anonymous researchers, analysis of publicly available documents revealed massive and expanding links between western car brands and Uyghur abuses, in everything from the hood decals and car frames to engine casings, interiors and electronics. . . Consumers do not want cars made through exploitation. But a combination of weak enforcement of forced labour laws and the government’s blind eye to environmental standards in China, paired with convoluted supply chains has left the automotive industry reliant on abusive suppliers. Every major car brand – including Volkswagen, BMW, Honda, Ford, GM, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, Stellantis brands (like Fiat, Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep), Tesla and NIO - is at high risk of sourcing from companies linked to abuses in the Uyghur region. (Sheffield Hallam University Driving Force).

The report, Driving Force:Automotive Supply Chains and Forced Labour in the Uighur Region (2022)  was produced by Helena Kennedy Centre at SHU and Nomogaia, an independent CSO.  It will likely prve invaluable to advance US policy against China (in the larger venues of their trade relationships and battles for normative global dominance), while also advancing, to some exctent, the operationalization of human rights based sensibilities in production.  

The Executive Summary and Recommendations follow below.


Sunday, July 24, 2022

Reflections on "Meta Human Rights Report: Insights and Actions 2020-2021", 14 July 2022

 


 Meta recently delivered its quite polished "Human Rights Repoirt: Insights and Actions 2020-2021" (Meta Report), which it made available to anyone interested in delving through its 83 pages of polished text and even more polished photos. 

In March of 2021, Meta adopted its Human Rights Policy in which we commit to reporting annually on how we are addressing our human rights impacts, including relevant insights arising from human rights due diligence, and the actions we are taking in response. This is our first annual report, covering our learnings and progress from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021. The scope of this report is Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly known as Facebook, Inc.) and our assessment of what we consider to be the company’s salient human rights risks, defined by the scale, scope, irremediable character and likelihood of impact. Our salience assessments are complemented by an additional materiality assessment included in Meta’s 2021 Sustainability Report. This report is inspired by Principle 15 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights which makes it clear that companies must “know and show” that they respect human rights.

 The reaction from important sectors of the non-governmental community was  not unexpected. It had that rehearsed quality of an opinion merely waiting for the predicate action to occur in order for it to be delivered.  "After the publication of Meta's report, digital rights defenders and the media outlets criticised the company for failing to address key human rights concerns around content moderation, hate speech and misinformation." (here) In this case, though, the tepid response may serve as a window to larger issues in the context of human rights engagements by business within the structures of current expectations. These are not issues of or  critiques about  the way that Meta may have deviated from one form of another of an ideal human rights report, even one adhering to the letter and spirit of the UN Guiding Principles (as they attempted here). Instead they point to a more fundamental set of challenges--semiotic challenges--about the way that human rights  is now performed within chains of global production. 

"Awesome collectibles" Pix Credit here
1. Human Rights Reports as objects. The essence of corporate human rights engagement is bound up in the production of objects.  The object centerpiece is the Human Rights Report along with reports of other kinds. These are understood in their semiotic sense of firstness--they are the thing that is the palpable manifestation of the alpha and omega of the project of human rights. Reports are the objectified ends of the human rights due diligence project--the thing that stands for the memory of what is, was, happened, was done, must be done, and the like. But what is important is the thing itself--the report--for its very "thingness." One values a Human Rights Report because it exists. That value is independent of what lies within its pages. And value exists beyond the realities, histories, which are the objects of its text and images. The Human Rights Report is a valuable object for its heft, for its cover, and as the concretization of ideas that it represents. In this sense, the value of the Human Rights Report is not within its pages; one does not necessarily read these Human Rights Reports. . . . one collects them. The Meta Report is a long essay or small book at 83 pages. It has heft as an object; its weight may indicate its value. This is not uncommon in human approaches  to objects--one values them by the characteristics of the vessel first; and perhaps last. Like a reliquary, it is the container that may be more valuable than the sacred object it is meant to house.

Foot Reliquary of St Blaise; pix credit here
The Human Rights Report as object, then, is itself a sign, but one that requires signification. It must produce a reaction in those who chance upon it, or who have been looking for it, with signals of what it stands for. It signifies an embrace of a particular activity (human rights reporting and perhaps even its substantive compliance, for example). It represents a chronicle of engagement and the proof of the resources lavished on and the good faith of the entity producing it.  It's signification then invites meaning-making: what it means within the meaning expectations of the communities to which it is directed (for other communities it is either a threat or incomprehensible since there is no basis for approaching its signification and as a result, of providing the object with meaning).  Here the object is enough to produce both significance and meaning.  One does not have to take the trouble  open its pages (or scroll down a pdf on one's computer) to understand what is meant ot be conveyed in its many. . . . many. . . pages: concern, compliance, fidelity to community expectations. . . .success, or at least good faith striving. 

Once that rationalizing premise is accepted one is sucked into the lifeworld of the Human Rights Report. And that is where most people start and stop.  One engages with the object as object, and one thus becomes bound within the rules and expectations of its "objectivity"--one does go beyond the object--rather one approaches the object to judge it as against some conception of the perfect object it ought to have been.  And one does that within the logic that produced the object itself.  These are then "inside" jobs the value of which is to protect the sensibilities and lenses through which the analytic exercise is undertaken. And one can almost program a system to write a critique simply by imputing the critical elements of the ideal embraced by a critical community and them measuring the distance between that ideal and what is preferred in the Human Rights Report object.  While is binary is critically important in defining the relationship between large entities producing Human Rights Reports as defensive objects, and human rights collectives seeking to project their vision of perfection within the operational life of the defensive entity, it may be less useful for any other objective.


2. Human Rights Reports as text and image. The Human Rights Report, then, is a reliquary object.  It0's essence, as object, is to contain something greater, and in that containment to become itself greater in the glory of the object contained. "Believers in the miraculous power of relics promoted a sumptuous form of artwork by commissioning resplendent cases to surround the often minuscule fragments. Sometimes the framework would echo the source of the relic (an arm, a foot, a head). In other instances, relics were preserved in containers of more traditional form" (here). The objects of power in the Human Rights Report Reliquary are sacred text and images.  Text and images acquire their sacred character by a connection of the sources of holy power--in this case for Meta in the form of the UN Guiding Principles and along with it, a host of named and unnamed international normative rules and law. Here one notes that one not only collects Human Rights Reports--one situates them (virtually) within a cathedral of reporting museum of reporting. But in the first third of this century it has also become a doorway to other (usually virtual) containers. The hyperlink becomes the thread that connects one container to another.  This aggregation of containers than becomes even grander for the connections. 
Pix Credit here

Nonetheless, the principal content of the vessel are text and pictures--the representation of thoughts, analysis and facts (producing an image of the past, the present, and the future).  They are meant to evoke response as well as to give meaning. They are the objects that reassure, excite, comfort, enrage, enlighten, and describe a meaning universe within which they are situated and within which they situate the reader/viewer. 

The character, and power, of these pictures and text are evident from the first (cover) page of the Human Rights Report. The images are meant to reassure, to show concern, to create feelings of safety, warmth and protection.  The graphics are meant to reassure--to explain, and to guide the reader to appropriate ends. It almost doesn't matter what is depicted--it is the emotive response that is important.  And indeed, from the perspective of the content of the Human Rights Report, the images do appear delightfully random. But to students of visual stimulation, to Nietzsche's prototypical "psychologist"--they are potent objects, the signification of which is meant to reinforce  the undertones of meaning conveyed in the text and info-graphics conveniently provided. 

If the imagery is emotive, the text is not.  If one could sum its direction, that sum would approach zero. The text both is suggestive but also cautious.  It makes statements that it then suggests have precisely little effect. It gives the appearance of certainty and direction and then walks that back in provisos, exceptions, and ambiguity. It is meant to evoke compliance without giving a potential litigant much to draw on for the interposition of a lawsuit. . . anywhere. Text is object and process of mummification. It is the linen that is used to wrap the body of information after the vital organs have been extracted and placed in the ceremonial vessels depicted in the imagery. 

pix credit here
This sentence is typical: "Most of all, we strive for our efforts to make a difference, and for our human rights commitments to be reflected in today’s technologies and in the metaverse to come."  (Meta Report, p. 13).  Read as a whole the sentence evokes strength and a willingness to move forward decisively to further human rights in business operation.  It draws on common catch phrases in English that have become part of the mantra's of the human rights NGO communities. But parsed, the meaning changes.  First, "we strive for our efforts to make a difference." The company strives only. It fulfills its commitment by striving, in the way that would be impossible if one merely strives to pay workers at the end of every pay period.  Striving reduces risk of liability while appearing to convey positive trajectories of action. Second, the striving has an objective, "to make a difference." But that phrase is meaningless, even in context.  How does one measure or value difference?; difference from what? and in comparison to whom? These and other questions reduce the phrase to a textual emoticon.

Beyond that, there are general statements of overarching goals, and a limited number of heroic examples.  Text and image here assume a wholly qualitative character.  But that is what the underlying ideology values--a textual expression of fidelity to the governing ideology and its key texts; statements expressing the way in which such textual declaration of fidelity are them transposed to operational text; and examples of the way that it can work. Text provides another form of imagery.  They describe in very general terms the translation of ideology and principles into goals.  in the process text becomes as emotive as the images that accompany it.  One is invited to infer; and one is managed into a positive state of mind by the detailed histories of triumph. Nonetheless, operational systemic is not very much on display.  It is technical; it is boring; and its precise description can produce a basis for liability. Consider in this light footnote 5 on Meta Report page 24 with respect to HRIA's (human Rights Impact Assessments, especially purchased from 3rd party providers):

05. For more on HRIAs, see Part 02.II of this report. Meta’s reference in this Report to third party diligence assessments cannot be construed as admission, agreement with, or acceptance of any of the findings, conclusions, opinions or viewpoints identified in those assessments, or the methodology that was employed to reach such findings, conclusions, opinions or viewpoints. Likewise, while Meta references steps it has taken, or plans to take, which may correlate to points assessors raised or recommendations they made, these also cannot be deemed an admission, agreement with, or acceptance of any findings, conclusions, opinions or viewpoints.

pic credit here
3. Due Diligence as a performative act. Due diligence is at the center of the human rights performativity of the Meta Report, its bio-politics.  It must be understood, however, that the performance is directed inward, at the self-reflexivity of the performance circling in on itself--and outward, not to operations, but to conformity with what Meta assumes are the requirements of the UN GPs as they relate to diligence in its 2nd Pillar (¶¶16-21). The object appears not so much to embed human rights through a due diligence process, but to use due diligence as a quality control device that minimizes exposure to liability or threats to its products.  That is perfectly sound policy.  But it represents an interesting twist on the use of due diligence in the service of current forms of order in production. That is also perfectly reasonable, but it is in tension with the inference that due diligence is meant to operationalize transformation in the way in which product production and consumption is meant to be structured within the Meta platforms. It is, indeed, the way one can talk revolution as an exogenous variable or object while creating those structures that are meant to reduce its endogenous effects. One uses tools on others, not on oneself.  And Meta is right to approach due diligence in this way.  It is precisely what Meta has been taught by those who presume to guide the operationalization of the UNGP, at least as they are embraced by states.  In some ways, indeed, the Meta report reflects the sensibilities of state National Action Plans--as a tool by which one can express fidelity to international human rights but apply that commitment outward, not inward (see here).

So, what precisely does Meta have to say about human rights due diligence (Meta Report, p. 24)? First, that HRDD reflects the suggestion of the UNGPs (¶17) and that it instructs companies creating regimes of HRDD to prioritize their actions. One can infer from that Meta will strive to adhere to the formal structuring of HRDD, but that it assumes flexibility in its implementation grounded in company specific assessments of priority, and sensitive to the need to avoid actions that produce liability (an intimation discussed above). Second, HRDD is a historically evolving process reflecting Meta's assessment of what pinches most. Third, that the modalities of human rights due diligence can be procured by vendors better able to  provide the service.  The current high end form of this procurement policy are HRIA--a methodological baseline that also evolves as priorities and technology changes.  The most interesting aspect of that, of course, is that human rights is disaggregated from other parts of the production process.  It remains exogenous--an effect that must be prevented, mitigated, and remedies, rather than one that must be embedded as a component in the production of the goods and services that Meta sells. Meta is not wrong--and the NGO community has itself, in part, to blame for the strategic exploitation of this approach.  Having made human rights special, companies cannot be faulted for treating it as special.  And in this case special means something that sits outside of production though with effects on it and its consumption. The resulting interaction, of course, ought to be frustrating to those who wish for embedding but who  cannot grasp the relationship between embedding and the commodification of human rights in the way that labor is commodified. This is a conundrum that merits substantial discussion and reform--but that is hardly to be undertaken on the pages of the Meta Report. 

pix credit here
Third, the exogenous process of HRDD involves the transformation of the stakeholder engagement model into a human rights focus group model.  One can hardly blame Meta.  Focus groups have become central to the politics of liberal democratic states; as consultation has become an important element of Leninist whole process democracy.  Consultation and focus grouping also suggest something more interesting still--the move toward modeling and simulation--to descriptive and predictive analytics as a substitute for or the overlay of real time communication with the entirety of affected communities.  Clearly such a broad stakeholder engagement is impossible--but modelling it is not: and what better way for an American enterprise than through the new technologies of focus groups? And yet there is a tension here between the implications of of a stakeholder approach to due diligence and the substantially qualitative approach to due diligence itself. Moreover, focus groups work both ways: in one sense it is a vehicle for assessing sentiment from the focus community, in another it provides a vehicle for the proper training  and socialization of the community itself by the way that the focus group is used. 

Fourth, HRDD appears to be organized  territoriality.  That is useful, for example, when one must deal with states with quite different legal regimes affecting human rights.  But it also provides a way of disaggregating human rights so that what is important in one place becomes impossible in another--the universality of human rights is lost--except in the rhetorical flourishes of parts of the Meta Report. Fifth, HRDD is also an alert system used to detect potential crises. That is precisely how the system is supposed to work, of course. Yet it does not suggest the sensitivities involved in the construction of such systems based on the devouring and analysis of data. And, indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the Meta Report is the way that the quantitative measures that must underlie much of the system it speaks to lies beneath the qualitative text of the Meta Report itself. One has very little sense of the quantitative measures used, the systems for data protection and integrity, and the assumptions and use of data analytics.  It is there, to be sure, in part--but one must follow the right hyperlinks. Sixth, transparency and assessment is incorporated in Meta's HRDD.  That is necessary and important to be sure. The machinery for transparency is complicated--and requires substantial investment in technology and in the capacity to use it--beyond the ability to write on someone's "wall" in "Facebook." That no doubt is a future challenge.  More pressing, though, may be the difficulty of penetrating the immense bureaucratic structures built around the projects of monitoring, and assessment--either of substantive assessment within the operation of the operations of the company, or assessment of the ways in which those processes function. As a result--both assessment and accountability--internal and external--remain an elite project and one  populated by insiders.  It is thus no surprise that the entirely of the HRDD process might be challenged as captured in the sense that a small group of highly networked individuals operating in the same socio-political space seem to be the key or only participants in the process.  

_____

These are the impression that may be possible as one reads through the Meta Report.  At least those are the impressions the Meta Report made on me.  Others may read the Report differently.  If read like I have, one comes away from the Meta Report visually stimulated ans textually dulled.  One appreciates the extraordinary attention to formal constitution of systems and the veiling of the quantitative measures tat may or ought to be used to drive the system.  The human rights due diligence system conforms to expectation.  It supplies exactly what its outside stakeholders crave--stories.  HRDD within the parameters if qualitative structures of transparency and compliance is ultimately reduced to storytelling; and the spinning of stories is precisely the great task to which the Meta Report is pointed. Not that storytelling is unimportant--quite the opposite: storytelling is the way in which societal structures and self knowledge are built. It is the way that the great movements in social expectations--in its consciousness and valuation of its components and in the construction of its behavior taboos are built--one story at a time. Courts tell stories (discussed here). And the lessons of stories are the building blocks for legitimate exercises of administrative discretion.  That is the essence of a qualitative system built on the exercise of discretionary authority by an agent outside of the processes that are to be examined and judged and against which the authority of the administrator-prosecutor--judge, is to be applied.

One understands that the bedrock of the system is qualitative.  And that qualitative systems rely on the ancient administrative-bureaucratic model of operation.  The Facebook Oversight Board is one such incarnation of that ideology. These entities are constituted to serve as  Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production. That such a system relies on the production of large vats of rules which are then administered by a system of external (that is of external to users) officials.  These officials include regulators, investigators, assessors, judges and enforcers. It works the way the modern bureaucratic administrative state operates--but one designed to maximize administrative measures and minimize liability.  That is reassuring but also frustrating.  Operating a platform, and embedding human rights into systems, may not be particularly successful, where it is based on a system that externalizes human rights. But that is a choice that appears to have been embraced by key actors on all sides of the issue.  As a consequence, one can expect HRDD to reflect this externalization.  It follows that the criticisms of the Meta Report are both unremarkable but also inevitable given the guiding principles within which such systems are built.  One is then left with production values--emotive images, careful text, and an object that is meant symbolically to declare fidelity to a project the implementation of which is constrained by its own framework.  One goes back to the human rights report as a ritual vessel--a reliquary for human rights

 The Executive Summary follows:

Sunday, June 19, 2022

“三不腐” [Three No Corrupts]; The Chinese Core of Leadership's Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Campaign Focus on Individual Agency, Institutional Function, and Ideological Embedding

 

Pix Credit HERE

 

The fight against corruption is the biggest political struggle that affects people's hearts and minds. It is necessary to deepen the understanding of the construction of party conduct and clean government and the fight against corruption under the new situation, improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of not daring to be corrupt , not being corruptible, and not wanting to be corrupt [the “三不腐” (Three No Corrupts)], and comprehensively winning the tough and protracted battle against corruption. [反腐败斗争关系民心这个最大的政治,是一场输不起也决不能输的重大政治斗争。要加深对新形势下党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争的认识,提高一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐能力和水平,全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战、持久战] ("Xi Jinping emphasized during the 40th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of "three non-corruption", and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption" ["习近平在中共中央政治局第四十次集体学习时强调: 提高一体推进“三不腐”能力和水平 全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战"]) People's Daily 20 June 2022).

That struggle against corruption now centers on a more comprehensive approach to corruption that focuses on the individual and individual agency (不敢腐),  institutional structures (不能腐), and the ideological framework within which individuals make decisions and institutions function (不想腐进行).  In the process, corruption itself acquires a new more comprehensive meaning, one ties to overarching integrity and trustworthiness campaigns (and with it the development of social credit and monitoring-nudging systems), as well as with the core socialist values and its political expression as New Era ideology-operationalization. The initial focus is on the rectification of cadres at all levels, and then the state apparatus along with public and private mass organizations. More broadly, they are meant to provide a foundation, which if successful can also be used as a model to export along the spokes of the Belt & Road, and from there as a basis for Chinese interventions in international forums.

Even as Mr. Xi was underscoring the central importance of anti-corruption efforts to the high priory policy to enhance the integrity and trustworthiness of government, the  Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision Commission (中央纪委国家监委网站 发布时间) released to its Website (Release time: 2022-06-18 18:02) a graphic to improve the ability and level of promoting the "three non-corruptions" in an integrated manner, and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption (图解 | 提高一体推进“三不腐”能力和水平 全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战).

This was at the direction of Mr. Xi.

习近平指出,纪检监察机关要主动应对反腐败斗争新形势新挑战,深化对管党治党规律、反腐败斗争规律的认识,不断提高工作能力和水平,主动接受党内和社会各方面的监督,以自我革命精神坚决防止“灯下黑”。纪检监察干部要做到忠诚坚定、无私无畏,始终以党性立身,秉公执纪、谨慎用权,敢于善于斗争,真正做到让党中央放心、让人民群众满意。[Xi Jinping pointed out that the discipline inspection and supervision organs should take the initiative to respond to the new situation and new challenges in the fight against corruption, deepen their understanding of the laws of governing the Party and the laws of the fight against corruption, continuously improve their work ability and level, and take the initiative to accept supervision from all aspects of the Party and society. Resolutely prevent "darkness under the lights" with the spirit of self-revolution. Discipline inspection and supervision cadres must be loyal, firm, selfless and fearless, always stand in the spirit of the party, exercise discipline impartially, exercise power prudently, and dare to be good at fighting, so as to truly reassure the Party Central Committee and satisfy the people.] ("Xi Jinping emphasized during the 40th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of "three non-corruption", and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption" ["习近平在中共中央政治局第四十次集体学习时强调: 提高一体推进“三不腐”能力和水平 全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战"]) People's Daily 20 June 2022).

And it was directed at Party officials, especially senior cadres.  The projection of the effort in that direction is important--especially in the run up to the October meetings, and in preparation for the next Communist Party Congress. 

习近平强调,要从源头着手,完善管权治吏的体制机制,更加常态化、长效化地防范和治理腐败问题。要着力减少腐败机会,抓住政策制定、决策程序、审批监管、执法司法等关键权力,严格职责权限,规范工作程序,强化权力制约,减少权力对微观经济活动的不当干预。[Xi Jinping emphasized that it is necessary to start from the source, improve the system and mechanism for the management of power and officials, and prevent and control corruption in a more normalized and long-term manner. Efforts should be made to reduce opportunities for corruption, seize key powers such as policy formulation, decision-making procedures, approval and supervision, and law enforcement and judiciary.] (Ibid.)

It is even more important in terms of the more long term project to promote Socialist whole process democracy and the Socialist path toward governance (and with it stability and prosperity) (see Discussion Draft Posted for Comment: "Linking People to Governing Institutions Through Leninist Political Parties: 全过程民主 (Whole Process Democracy), Socialist Consultative Democracy, and 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System)". The stakes are high, time is short, and the likelihood of quite targeted rectification now much higher. And behind this, perhaps, some frustration at the effectiveness of implementation of the national zero COVID  policy.

 The key element in this campaign is the “三不腐” [Three No Corrupts];

反腐败斗争取得压倒性胜利并全面巩固,但形势依然严峻复杂。我们对腐败的顽固性和危害性绝不能低估,必须将反腐败斗争进行到底。一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐,必须三者同时发力、同向发力、综合发力,把不敢腐的强大震慑效能、不能腐的刚性制度约束、不想腐的思想教育优势融于一体,用“全周期管理”方式,推动各项措施在政策取向上相互配合、在实施过程中相互促进、在工作成效上相得益彰 [The fight against corruption has won an overwhelming victory and has been consolidated in an all-round way, but the situation remains grim and complex. We must not underestimate the stubbornness and harmfulness of corruption, and we must carry out the fight against corruption to the end. To promote the one that does not dare to be corrupt, cannot be corrupt, and do not want to be corrupt, the three must exert their efforts at the same time, in the same direction, and comprehensively, so as to combine the powerful deterrent effect of not being corrupt, the rigid system constraints that cannot be corrupt, and the ideological and educational advantages of not wanting to be corrupt. Integrate into one, and use the "full-cycle management" approach to promote various measures to cooperate with each other in terms of policy orientation, promote each other in the implementation process, and complement each other in terms of work results.] ("Xi Jinping emphasized during the 40th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of "three non-corruption", and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption" supra)
To understand the new forms of Chinese anti-corruption efforts, then, it will be useful to understand the way that efforts will be undertaken to integrate individual, institutional, and ideological/educational measures. What this means remains to be seen, though it will be likely to draw on and coordinate the large number of measures already in place. The shape of the anticipated rectification will be comprehensive--and it is likely to be both data driven, and guided by a quantitative set of accountability measures. Senior cadres, bit much more middle level officials at the senior and senior provincial and provincial level officials are likely to feel the effects in a new set of measures designed to manage their behaviors and decision making, and to refine the ideological pathways by which both are undertaken in ways that can be assessed. More importantly, the suggestion of institutional measures points to reform in the operation of the political and administrative apparatus--these will likely align with the evolving principles of whole process democracy.

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision Commission graphic follows in the original Chinese.