Of Highways, Commodities and Toll Booths--The "Contradictions" of America First and (Un?) Principled Transactionalism, Thoughts on the Wall Street Journal's Opinion Piece, "Iran Is Winning the Battle of Hormuz :Tehran is using force to gain control over traffic through the Strait"

 

Pix credit here (OPen.ai Faulty Reward Functions in the Wild)

 

One can only watch the battle between merchants and priests, between Rome and the Sassanian Empire (both ended badly though they survived in altered forms), between principled apocalyptic institutionalists managing the Divine word to earthly ends and unprincipled transactionalists (in the sense  not of bad principles but rather in the sense of no normative cage beyond the confines of an unanchored principle of transaction itself as the foundation and rationalization of the world in time, space or place), with a great deal of wonder. What passes for negotiation by other means in the form of the current version of the unending conflict between a priest-Mameluke theocratic system and a Merchant praetorian liberal democratic one, in the form of the physical phase of the negotiation between the Iranians and the United States, remains fluid as concepts, actions, text, imagery and intent become as fluid as necessary to extract whatever it is either side wishes, and the commodification of extraction changes (as a function of changing versions of success) among them. . . 

But over what? 

That remains as malleable as the tactics that either side has been using over the past decade and now intensified  by actors who face, in their own distinct ways as much internal as external pressure to provide "results" that suit the way in which they have rationalized the world. The rest is just collateral damage or the measure of the success of managing collectives in shared beliefs and thus in shared sacrifices for the greater glory of those doing the directing, But it has always been so--just the dressing as been altered to suit the times. And even now this is a bit a a retro game as our machine intelligence systems have been undertaking this increasingly for us (and to the profit of those deploying them where profit is measured by things and authority).  What had come to corrupt the rationalization of the human rights institutional establishment a decade ago (Fractured Territories and Abstracted Terrains: Human Rights Governance Regimes Within and Beyond the State) has now infected priestly-institutional and merchant-transactional spaces as well and soon the space created for the management of the human by machine system intelligence (even with the overlay, as for example Anthropic continues to assure us, is a human face to machine  ethics). Even human societies are quite capàble of reward hacking to suit themselves. 

One might have thought, for example, that a core consequence of the fundamental postulate of merchant-transaction types (that the space and forms of transactional spaces must be protected, expanded, and  managed to protect deal making among equally situated participants, see discussion here) would have been (as it had been a core element of American trade policy in the 19th century--something to which some American political ideologies sometimes reference) to place at its core the construction, protection, and functioning of trade routes facilitation individual transactional activity that would inure to the greater glory of merchant collectives (to similar effect the Chinese Belt & Road though from a centralized bureaucrat-institutional framework that puts state economic organs at its core). That, one might have assumed, applied in a principled way, would have justified recent U.S. activity and advocacy of free and unfettered international movement within the South China Sea, and perhaps through the Panama Canal. At its core, it tends to view with suspicion actions that close off trade routes to the benefit of the trading states attempting to control trade highways.  

Yet one might have been wrong about that. Perhaps, at least from a certain way of approaching the merchant-transactional type, there is no such thing as "free use" or "open" spaces for trade; there is no such thing as a trading platform that is not or cannot be wholly or partially proprietary. The focus of that form of transactional approach mimics, in large part, the state-institutional approach, and that of the warrior imperialist tropes of the 19th century in the sense that each, in its own way commodifies all elements of human activity, including its pathways and spaces for interaction. There is nothing that is not or cannot be a commodity; there is nothing with respect to which competition in offering commodities is constrained; and there is nothing that suggests that every element of human activity cannot be turned to particular advantage as a commodity, as a point of control, and as a means of limiting access to markets and market activity, including by controlling or profiting from control or management of trade highways. On this sense, and applied in this way, America First and the Chinese Global Initiative (of which the Belt & Road project now forms a part) converge in much more intense and interesting ways. The fact that one advocates infrastructure does not necessarily means that such infrastructure is available to all, it like the trade it supports, is a business, a point of monetization, and an element of control that both enhances market insiders and penalized outsider. Infrastructure can be understood itself as a business for which there are markets, as a commodity to be bought and sold, and as an an expression of the monetization of activity, as a sort of toll booth. None of these are innovative, all have ancient roots. The trick now is to find a discursive way of convincing collectives that they are "naturally" and seamlessly embedded in the national political economic ideologies.  

It brings the idea of America First, and its Chinese analogue (with the rest of the world dutifully if grudgingly following) into new territory -- to use Chinese political terminology with some bite, it brings the state of affairs of both systems into alignment with the fundamental principles of people's democratic dictatorship (人民民主专政) to trade and trade infrastructure--dictatorship and obedience to unpatriotic and enemies of the political economic (or trade) model; democracy and freedom for the patriotic forces of trade. That, for example, explains the context in which the United States and China have been approaching the infrastructures of technology, and now the infrastructures of trade. It is, one might now surmise, a perhaps plausible explanation for the decision by elements of the America First Trump Administration to sell the Straits of Hormuz to the Iranian priest-Mameluke state, each now appearing to contribute to the resurrection of the old cultures of Raubritter (the Robber Barons/knights) as a new form of transactional-institutional actor in the post-global, or at least, in mimicry of the original that reached its peak during the Holy Roman Empire's Great Interregnum (1250–1273), during that period of transition from the global (1945-2014) to whatever it is that awaits us in the age of the machined human.  

All of that might come to mind as one reads that exercise in lower order mass management that found itself printed at the top of the opinion page of the Monday issue (29 June 2026) of the Wall Street Journal: Iran Is Winning the Battle of Hormuz: Tehran is using force to gain control over traffic through the Strait. The good people at the WSJ, proceeding from their own cognitive cages as mouthpieces of an elite institutionalist "brain trust" vanguard perspective true to whatever it is they recollect of or have refashioned out of the cognitive cages of 1945-2014 globalization under American leadership, put it in traditional geopolitical institutional terms.  

Vice President JD Vance has been touting  Iran's "transformed" Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders ready to "turn over a new leaf" with the U.S. He even reached "gentlemen's agreements" with them outside the memorandum, Mr. Vance  assured critics. Well, these are no gentlemen. It's the same terrorist regime, and this is the Battle of Hormuz that Mr. Trump thought  he had ducked. In case there is any doubt, foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said Sunday that Iran is solely responsible for managing the Strait under the memorandum. He said, "no other country has any responsibility in that regard." Mr. Araghchi is Iran's chief negotiator with Mr. Vance. . . . The regime wants to conquer the trait and turn it into a toll booth, with transit by permission only. . .  It may offer [the Gulf States] a cut of the spoils from the tolled Stait, but that hardly sweetens the foul deal for the rest of the world. The question is why Iran still gets the cash.  In the bigger strategic picture, the regime is leaving the President a choice: surrender Hormuz to Iranian terror or fight for  it, like he always should have once he started the war, and reopen the Strait by force. (Iran Is Winning the Battle of Hormuz:)

And from that perspective, of course, they are quite right. The entire structure and management of the deal appears dopes not suggest a sharply drawn transactional approach, and that skewing may have as much to do with the politics of succession to Mr. Trump (at least in the form of giving Mr. Vance some sort of performative space to demonstrate whatever it is they sought to have demonstrated).  Still, it displays the traditional profound refusal to ascribe political agency to the priests who run it, pretending, as they must, that Irans' RGs run the state, something that may happen (recalling the manner of the overthrow of the Ayyubid Dynasty in 1250 by their Mamelukes) but which is at the moment a premature hope on the part of some.  

And yet from a different transactional perspective "toll boothing" trade routes sounds like a great idea, especially if one can receive a cut of the transaction. One might, from a certain perspective, understand the actions and reactions as a product of transactional reward hacking within the parameters of America First. In this case the reward is not in winning the game but in acquiring enough "rewards" by other means to satisfy the requirements of amassing a high score.  In this sense the Americans might convince themselves that they are not losing anything, and that even principle (open trade routes as cricial principle of America First) can be understood as a commodity to be bargained where the gain is sufficiently alluring in the short, medium or long term, What is left, then, is not the deal but the fiduciary duty of the negotiators to the Republic whose interest (rather than their own) they represent. 

In this sense the WSJ may have the wrong of it. There is no further choice for the Trump Administration. It has, indeed, already made its choice. The only question is whether in the marketplace  of states Mr. Trump through Mr. Vance and company secured the better deal--not for them but for the Republic they serve now and for its progeny whose inheritance they have a duty to protect. For the moment, and to those of us not privy to "gentleman's agreements, side deals and the other usual stuff that marks the barrier between those who control risk for the Republic and those who must bear it, it would appear that the deal has been made and that what is harvested for America First is the hope that some of the money released will go to U.S. firms and perhaps as well that the U.S. has protected the primacy of the dollar as the supreme trading instrument. In the current context, however, it is not clear how that will happen or whether these hopes will materialize. But at least in them there is something that connects the actions of the Trump Administration to its merchant transactional principles, that tolling Hormuz advances America First.

 

Pix credit here

The WSJ Opinion piece follows in full below.

Full text of Israel-Lebanon ‘framework’ (26 June 2026)

 

(Pix credit here)

8. The two countries affirm that they share the objective of a secure, rebuilt Lebanon, under full Lebanese state sovereignty, in which no non-state armed group poses a threat to Israel, Lebanon, or citizens of either country. Furthermore, the two countries recognize that the restoration of security in South Lebanon through the deployment of the LAF, the safe return of its civilian population, and the security of Israel’s northern communities, are essential to long-term stability and peace. (Israel-Lebanon ‘framework’ )

"Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Friday that Israel and Lebanon had reached a framework agreement aimed at achieving “lasting peace and security.” The agreement, which came as a result of talks mediated by the United States, calls for the implementation of a ceasefire between the two nations." (here)

The Framework Agreement speaks for itself. What initially caught my attention were what may be two elements of the Framework. The first and perhaps perhaps most significant portion of the agreement is in Paragraph 1, which can be parsed in a variety of ways all of which lead away from the discursive situation between the states from 1947 to this century. One way or another. The other, and perhaps more interesting element is the "othering" of Hezbollah as a collective that is not necessarily any longer plausibly Lebanese. The nature and consequences of this "othering" will likely produce a lot of smoke and perhaps some fire, but that is is embedded is certainly quite noteworthy. 

Beyond that it is a useful exercise to read the text and approach its meaning from any framework and towards whatever goals the reader desires--the trick, as always is at least self.transparency in that act of hermeneutics and in that effort at semiotic social construction of a collective interpretive positioning. 

The full text follows below, along with the a remarks of the heads of delegation of the US, Lebanon and Israel. 

"President Trump is the President of Peace" -- Engagements in the War Souq (سوق) of Iranian-U.S. Transactional Interactions

 

In August 2025  I suggested the semiotics of the thirst for peace that drives at least certain members of the Trump Administration, with the President at its core. ( "President Trump is the President of Peace" Reflections on the Power of Presidential Self-Revolution (自我革命), the Republic's Social Revolution (社会革命) and the Presidential Message: "President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal" ). That theoretical elaboration--and its operational consequences bears repeating now--especially now in the midst of the confusion about the nature and objectives of  the U.S. - Iran engagements. Both States have been blowing stuff up to suit their interests--the Iranians to obliterate the Jews and dominate Sunni lands; the U.S. to expand and protect markets and trade routes, and when it suits them, the Jews.  They have now each blown up bits of this or that in sufficient quantity and with the appropriate background noise to be able to come to a deal--a peace, that might suit each of their quite different needs

Pix credit here

Chinese New Era Theory stresses the critical importance of self-revolution for the sort of social revolution that carries a political collective forward ( Social Revolution (社会革命) as Self-Revolution (自我革命) and the New Quality Production of CPC Modernization: 习近平 深入推进党的自我革命 [Xi Jinping, Deepen the Party's Self-Revolution] (Part of a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 8, 2024)). Of course, one does not have to embrace Chinese Marxist-Leninist theory to apply context relevant trajectories of self-revolution and social revolution.

Pix credit here

 One of the most interesting journeys of self-revolution, and with it of the social revolution that follows in its wake within liberal democratic lebenswelt, has been that of the Trump Administration, with Donald Trump at its core. That progression can be measured from self-constitution of the Administration as it progressed along its development pathways from the start of resident Trump's first term (2016-2020) and the first several hundred days of President Trump's second term. At the center of this self-revolution is the (re)constitution of the President as a positive force for peace. This idea--and the chronicling of its actualization--has been nicely framed for the Republic in a recent Media Release from the Trump Administration--President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal (accessed via this link and also following in full below). The specific context is the final resolution of the current round of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan (my interview on that situation here). But it is clear that the President's message meant to draw clearly both lessons and principles that could be shared with the Republic's masses at home, and the Republic's friends, competitors and adversaries abroad.  

We now understand that “President Trump is the President of Peace." (President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal). It ought to follow that the Republic is now, collectively, a Republic of Peace--self-revolution ushers in a state of social revolution.  That, one might be excused for thinking, is the thrust of President Trump's message to the Republic. This is a message that has been underscored and elaborated by Secretary of State Rubio, whose discussion of the notion of peace, and states of peace brokered by a strong Republic reflects the more fundamental self-revolution of "transactional-merchant phenomenology and its understanding of peace as an essential element of something larger: "As they say in some movies--peace, like death, is not an end but a doorway. That acquires a quite interesting aspect in transactional spaces." (The Phenomenology of Peace and the Price of the Deal--Text of and Reflections on the Interview: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Brian Kilmeade of Fox Radio).

Pix credit here

What, then, is peace?  Perhaps Secretary Marco Rubio describes it best under conditions of transaction framing merchant realities--peace is the absence of war. War is understood as violent conflict, one that either destroys valuable objects (infrastructure, productive capacity and the like), or human the consumption of whom is the essential element of the process of production (workers, family units, consumers,  and operators of economic, social, religious, and cultural productivity) and the object (collectively) of productivity (at its extreme here) and curated. Societal self-pleasuring is the ultimate aim--however that is defined and made suitable for the times; and self-pleasuring consists of the proper interaction of objects and people agreeably arranged  and ordered in ways that permit a movement toward the maximization of their own self-and social value and that of the collective. This comes in many flavors of course (and ideology provides one of several languages for constituting these "flavors" in form suitable for both consumption and framing the human condition).  But at its heart is the fundamental postulate--that without the end of destruction there can be no movement toward.

Nonetheless, peace is not its own object.  It is a state of (dis)engagement that permits the fundamental logic of the operation of self and social systems toward the realization of its apex goal and purpose--the regularization of spaces in which transactions may be undertaken for the further fulfillment of self and social revolution. It might be understood as movement toward development (or modernization, however these terms are understood) that improves (or in some systems perfects) things and conditions of life for individuals and collectives.  In other words, the object is not peace; the object is the achievement of a state of stable transactions--iterative, perhaps even purposeful beyond the value of the transaction--that then manifest desired states of being. Peace is the predicate condition for the merchant; and the merchant is the predicate actor in development (not either the functionary or the warrior); and the work of the merchant is essential for the operationalization of transactional frameworks deployed to whatever ends suits society engaged in its endless processes of self-actualization, and for some, the attainment of states of perfection (at least until they die and a new generation starts the process again). That provides the framing of reality that serves as the foundation of the peace mission of the Republic with the President at is core. 

With one exception--the merchants of violence, those whose highest purpose is to produce those objects essential for the maintained of peace through violence, or its potential. But that is a story for another day. 

For today; for today it is for us to contemplate the nature, function, and states of peace into which we are all traveling toward. . . . one way or another. Self-revolution and social revolution leads the Republic toward an embrace of the ordering principle that peace is a predicate to development; and that development is the foundation of transactional cultures in which individuals and collectives prosper, each in their own way--until the contradictions of transactions in context moves both back to not-peace.  That, in turn, sheds light on the ordering framework of the dialectics of the human condition: Conflict-peace-transactions-conflict-peace.  What is peace? Peace is truce; peace is a condition of managed conflict; peace is a state of ritualized engagement; peace is a temporal space and a platform.  Managing peace, not conflict, becomes the key--perhaps that is so. Conversely managing conflict, not peace, is the key of equal value. The temporal objectification of both makes it possible to better use them; perhaps that is also a possibility. I leave that to others. 

Pix credit here

 

 In order to understand the terms of the U.S.-Iranian peace (A New Treaty of Amity, Friendship, and Trade Between the U.S. and Iran?: US reads terms of memorandum of understanding to reporters) one might start with the presumption that nothing that a merchant never says what they mean and never mean what they say, even if the person attempting the role of the merchant-type started out of something else (The Sleeper Awakens: Text of Senator JD Vance's Remarks Delivered at the Munich Security Conference 18 February 2024 and Some Reflections). It is the same, of course, for the official-bureaucrat and for the warrior-priest type, but the context and meaning changes. That core presumption applies with to the current efforts to "sell" the deal to the American masses (European leaders and economic elites  required no such selling, if only because it was in their interests, measured as it was by the calculus of the bureaucrat rather than the merchant-type) (see President Defends Deal on Iran War at G-7).  And the Vice President, in a role that helps cement a persona that appears to appeal, was tasked with a bravura performance (by the standards of the time) of castigating the Jews along traditional lines ("“Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time,” Mr. Vance said. He added, “If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world.”" HERE). The object is to convince, rather than to justify. In this case the object was not peace, but markets; the objects was not resolution but transactions; the object was not directed inward toward Iranian popular determination but to the protection of supply chin infrastructure that affected American interests (in the sense of economic stability).

Pix credit here

 The U.S. Iran peace, then, is not the ends but a means to other e4nds.  And those ends do not necessarily require eternal or stable peace; it requires just enough peace to satisfy the interests of the parties for the short term. Iran has to purge its population of  people unhappy with the current theocracy; the U.S. starts the intense phase of its mid-term elections, but more importantly, of the jockeying between the Vice President and the Secretary of State for the right6 to succeed the current president in the 2028 elections.  In that context, it appears that both sides had a preference for the Vice President--much more willing to play the merchant-type in the context of America First's emerging semiotics of peace.  But who knows what lies within the minds of those who speak but whose speaking and actions provide a  delightfully broad ambiguity. For everyone else there is now the possibility to male money in transactions--reconstructions, supply chains, extractions, production.  Everyone will likely feed from this trough--the Chinese, the Russians, the Indians and the Americans--to the extent that this is possible. 

It works as well as any other approach. . . perhaps.  We will find out. Yet that is not the point of this performance. What is important, more important, are the structural pathways that are being created around the notion of peace. It is not an institutionalist-bureaucrat-administrator's peace that aims at resolution and stability at the level of institutional collectives (to "solve" a problem as a function of whatever the character of values of the moment). It is the peace of the merchant-priest that aims to create a space in which conflict is not disruptive enough to interfere with transactions.  In that context, the absence of peace, like the peace conferencing itself, is merely an instrument for the creation of such spaces for such time as it serves the interest of transaction, and of course, of those who are the merchant-priest princes of the times. Sanctions are bad for business; nuclear weapons should only be available to apex states; reconstruction funds means more deals; supply chain pathways are critical to market and supply chains; bringing states within global financial systems enhances control and the continued power of the Dollar; subordinate states and non state actors are expected to behave until it is in the interest of superior powers that they misbehave in the context of using geopolitical  situations for transactional bargaining; etc. The essence is this: "Trump threatened Iran with more attacks  if they didn't abide by the terms. 'If they don't honor that, we'll probably go back to bombing them until they honor it,' he said. (here)

Pix credit here

 Well, if not the Americans, then the Israelis, will bomb again. A mistake really to think that the American leadership core,  can play the Israelis and then hang them out to dry Ukrainian or pre 1940s Czech style.  The history of US -Israel relaitons  appears opaque to our friends from certain elite schools and their political-economic "mentors." Who better than the Israelis, the quintessential merchant-type existing, for as long as they can, within the dar al-harb. That is the Souq (سوق) within which transactions are undertaken between merchants, priests, and warriors, all of whom have become adept at playing  the larger empires under conditions of the sort of peace that the American Merchant princes may now come to understand as truce punctuated by violence. The rest is negotiation in which everything is an instrument of the deal, and deals  have a very short half-life. 

The nascent U.S.-Iran deal faced fresh challenges on Friday after Switzerland said that the next phase of talks had been postponed and as Israel launched new strikes in Lebanon following a deadly attack on its soldiers there. Israel said its military had struck more than 80 targets belonging to the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia, killing dozens, in response to an attack on an Israeli tank crew that left four soldiers dead in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that Israeli airstrikes overnight had killed at least 18 people and injured 33 others. (here)

The Iranians want the Israelis dead--or at least their Jews, or in a more humane turn converted back to dhimmi status; the Israelis want Hezbollah and Hamas dead to avoid dying themselves. In the absence of a mass conversion to Judaism what is left is good old fashioned clan warfare exploited by the successors of the Sassanians and the children of Rome. The  from Lebanon to the ends of the Arabian peninsula. That is a stable state of sorts. The rest is propaganda dressed up as morals, or religion, or ethno-psychosis of the sort that now appeals to the mandarins in international institutions, or that serves as a cover for the imperial aspiration of middle and apex powers.

 

A New Treaty of Amity, Friendship, and Trade Between the U.S. and Iran?: US reads terms of memorandum of understanding to reporters

 

ABC News has provided a transcript of the White House Readout of the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. and Iran, and agreement that appears to have been signed electronically by the President and Vice President Vance (which is itself noteworthy for the Republic's high level politics of succession); Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf signed the document for the Iranian side:  

US reads terms of memorandum of understanding to reporters

A senior Trump administration official has read a transcript of the memorandum of understanding that the U.S. signed with Iran to reporters. Officials have not released the text or the agreement. It was read as follows:

Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran has jointly agreed in good faith on such and such a date on the following

1. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war, by signing this MOU declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon and other provisions of this paragraph.

2. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs.

3. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days extendable with mutual consent.

4. Immediately upon the signing of this MOU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal,

5. Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialog with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf with Oil states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz

6. The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers, and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America.

7. The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, i.e. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed upon schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions termination issue above mentioned, and expressed their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.

8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpile enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in paragraph seven with the minimum methodology to be down blending on site under the supervision of the IAEA. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear needs, based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues above mentioned, and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.

9. Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions, and will not deploy additional forces in the region.

10. The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MOU, and until the termination of sanctions, the US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.

11. The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.

12. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this MOU and the future compliance of the final deal.

13. After signing this MOU and subject to the beginning of the implementation of paragraphs 1,4,5,10, and 11 of this MOU and the continuing implementation of these measures, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will start negotiations regarding the final deal exclusively on the other paragraphs.

14. The final deal will be endorsed by a binding UNSC resolution, and then there's the signature page,

The most valuable part of this transaction is its clarity. Its consequences will take a little longer to sort out; and its payouts to those elements of the ruling elements of the power vanguard and their institutional projections will take a little longer still. The markets and press are happy, and those within our political hospice system have been made more comfortable on their journeys forward. Beyond that one can only wonder when the Norma Desmond of this theater piece will declaim: "All right, Mr. DeMille, I'm ready for my close-up." ("President Trump is the President of Peace" Reflections on the Power of Presidential Self-Revolution (自我革命), the Republic's Social Revolution (社会革命) and the Presidential Message: "President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal")

 

 

Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio ante la prensa — 5 de mayo de 2026 (incluyendo la traducción de la conferencia de prensa al español)

foto crédito aquí

 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE

Marco Rubio: La Ley de Poderes de Guerra es inconstitucional, al 100 por ciento. Ahora bien, esta no es una postura exclusiva mía. Tampoco es la postura del actual Presidente de los Estados Unidos. Esta ha sido la postura de absolutamente todos los presidentes que han ocupado este cargo desde el día en que se aprobó dicha ley. Es completamente inconstitucional. Dicho esto, cumplimos con ella —en lo que respecta, por ejemplo, a la notificación— porque deseamos preservar unas buenas relaciones con el Congreso, ¿verdad? Y así lo hacemos. Pero incluso cuando ejercía como senador, yo sostenía que la Ley de Poderes de Guerra es 100 por ciento inconstitucional. Y miren, sé que algunos de ustedes —digan lo que quieran— podrían pensar que esta es una postura exclusiva de este Presidente. Pero esa ha sido la postura de todas y cada una de las administraciones presidenciales desde el día en que se aprobó esa ley. Constituye una vulneración de los poderes constitucionales del Presidente. No reconocemos la ley como constitucional. No obstante, cumplimos con ciertos elementos de la misma con el fin de mantener buenas relaciones con el Congreso. Y queremos que participen; queremos que estén informados. He acudido al Capitolio —no sé— unas cuatro veces este año para reunirme con todos los senadores, con todos los miembros de la Cámara de Representantes, con el Comité de Inteligencia y con el «Grupo de los Ocho». Queremos que se involucren en este asunto. Pero quiero ser muy claro respecto a la Ley de Poderes de Guerra: es inconstitucional, y todos los presidentes, en todas las administraciones, han adoptado esa postura. (Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio ante la prensa)

Pix credit and video of the press conference here

El Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio habló ante la prensa el 5 de mayo de 2026. Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio ante la prensa. El Secretario Rubio abordó las cuestiones relativas al conflicto con Irán y, de manera indirecta, el conflicto de la Administración con los medios de comunicación; especialmente en la medida en que estos están siendo utilizados como amplificadores de facciones de la élite política para las cuales el conflicto con Irán no resulta ni de su interés ni acorde con sus posturas políticas. De hecho, algunas de las preguntas pusieron de relieve esa brecha —una brecha conceptual y de valores— que separa el enfoque del Presidente respecto a Irán de los métodos preferidos por administraciones anteriores, las cuales, a su vez, se fundamentaban en premisas sustancialmente diferentes. El Secretario destacó las consecuencias de esta brecha en la forma en que abordó las respuestas a las preguntas planteadas: de un modo fundamentalmente transaccional y con una decidida aversión hacia los arreglos institucionales que sugirieran una presencia distinta a la de despejar espacios para las transacciones de los actores económicos.

Deteniéndonos un momento en la importancia de los estrechos: aproximadamente una cuarta parte del comercio mundial de petróleo —junto con volúmenes significativos de combustible y fertilizantes— transita a través del Estrecho de Ormuz. No se puede permitir que el régimen iraní dicte quién utiliza esta vía fluvial vital. No creo que esto se esté informando lo suficiente, o tal vez ustedes sí lo estén haciendo; no leo a todos. No lo sé... hay demasiados medios de comunicación aquí, no sé quiénes son todos ustedes; bueno, quiero decir, sé quiénes son algunos de ustedes, pero no sé quiénes son todos. (Risas). (Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio ante la prensa).

El Secretario Rubio hizo referencia al derecho internacional y a las normas como base para proteger las vías fluviales. "Esta es una vía fluvial internacional. Y el derecho internacional es muy claro. Y eso me encanta, porque todo el mundo siempre habla del derecho internacional en este asunto. El derecho internacional al respecto es muy claro: las vías fluviales internacionales no pueden ser controladas por ningún país". (Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio ante la prensa). Algunos podrían acusar al Secretario de hipocresía; dado que la Administración Trump ha sido tan desdeñosa con las instituciones internacionales y con las limitaciones del derecho internacional, ciertamente no podrían ahora —cuando les resulta conveniente— pretender invocar el derecho internacional para defender su postura. Sin embargo, el Secretario Rubio dejó claro en sus declaraciones ante la Conferencia de Seguridad de Múnich que la Administración Trump no rechaza el derecho internacional *per se*, y ciertamente no lo rechaza como línea de base normativa. (Reflexiones sobre la amistad, el poder de la autorrealización nacional y la línea de base definitoria de 1963 en y como "Estados Unidos Primero" — Texto del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio en la Conferencia de Seguridad de Múnich). Dentro de esa jaula conceptual —la del mercader, más que la del burócrata institucionalista— se halla implícito un rechazo fundamental a la autoridad de las instituciones internacionales, entendidas como la manifestación suprema del organismo que constituye el derecho internacional posterior a 1945 (tanto como sistema, como norma y como objeto autónomo respecto de los Estados colectivizados de los cuales se dice que emana). No obstante, el transaccionalista —el tipo mercantil, el negociador y actor de mercado (en mercados de toda índole, incluida la política)— no niega, ni puede negar en su calidad de tradicionalista fundamental, el poder del derecho internacional; ya sea en el sentido de que este es ampliamente normativo (al expresar valores generales) o, más específicamente, en cuanto contrato entre Estados. Aquí se alude a la noción más antigua de un «derecho de gentes» (recuérdense las *Instituciones* de Justiniano), más que a las arquitecturas y premisas del proyecto de derecho internacional posterior a 1945.

 El derecho civil de Roma, y ​​el derecho de todas las naciones, difieren entre sí de la siguiente manera: las leyes de cada pueblo, regido por estatutos y costumbres, son en parte peculiares de sí mismo y en parte comunes a toda la humanidad. Aquellas normas que un Estado promulga para sus propios miembros son peculiares de sí mismo y se denominan derecho civil; aquellas normas prescritas por la razón natural para todos los hombres son observadas por todos los pueblos por igual y se denominan derecho de gentes. Así pues, las leyes del pueblo romano son en parte peculiares de sí mismas y en parte comunes a todas las naciones; una distinción que tendremos en cuenta a medida que se presente la ocasión. (Institutas, Libro 1, Título II, ¶ 1).

Es en este sentido que las perspectivas transaccionales abordan las organizaciones internacionales y las normas respecto a las cuales los foros internacionales proporcionan un espacio para el debate intergubernamental. Véase: *Estados Unidos propone una resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU para defender la libertad de navegación y asegurar el estrecho de Ormuz*. Y es en este sentido que este enfoque difiere fundamentalmente de las visiones de aquellos que miran hacia una futura Tecnorrepública (*Reflexiones sobre el "Manifiesto" de Palantir: La semiosis oracular de una "República Tecnológica" dentro de su propia jaula de tecnomodernización*), aunque pueda compartir objetivos comunes.

Por último, los comentarios del secretario Rubio sobre Cuba y las sanciones relativas al petróleo merecen cierta difusión:

Así pues, el único bloqueo que ha ocurrido es que los cubanos han decidido —quiero decir, los venezolanos han decidido—: ya no les daremos petróleo gratis. Y pueden imaginarse que, hoy en día, tal como están los precios del petróleo, nadie regala petróleo gratis, y mucho menos a un régimen fallido. Por tanto, el problema con Cuba es peor, ¿de acuerdo? Su modelo económico no funciona. No funciona. Y las personas que están al mando no pueden arreglarlo. Y la razón por la que no pueden arreglarlo no es solo porque sean comunistas —lo cual ya es bastante malo—, sino porque son comunistas incompetentes. Lo único peor que un comunista es un comunista incompetente, y eso es precisamente lo que ocurre: comunistas incompetentes dirigen ese país. No saben cómo arreglarlo. Realmente no saben. Y tenemos, a 90 millas de nuestras costas, un Estado fallido que, además, resulta ser territorio amigo para algunos de nuestros adversarios. Por lo tanto, es un *statu quo* inaceptable, y nos ocuparemos de ello, pero no hoy. De acuerdo. (Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio ante la prensa; énfasis añadido)

Todo esto resulta comprensible desde el interior de la jaula cognitiva del mercader dentro de los espacios transaccionales. Considérese el debate sobre la piratería como justificación para el bloqueo del estrecho de Ormuz. El objetivo de dicho bloqueo no es estrangular el tráfico, sino evitar la piratería por parte de los iraníes. El modelo de referencia no son las estructuras institucionales de finales del siglo XX para el tráfico en vías navegables internacionales, sino el modelo, mucho, muchísimo más antiguo, de los barones ladrones del Rin en el apogeo del Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico. Y el objetivo es facilitar el comercio y las rutas comerciales, más que perseguir algún fin institucionalmente más elevado. El acceso, el comercio y la competencia en igualdad de condiciones dentro de los mercados —en lugar de a través de instituciones colectivizadas diseñadas para imitar y desplazar a los mercados— constituyen la fuerza motriz en este caso. Y esto genera un enfoque de la colectivización que distingue al «leninismo de derecha» de la democracia liberal de finales del siglo XX y principios del XXI —centrado, como está, en la institucionalización de la actividad individual autónoma dentro de un marco de cumplimiento normativo y tecnoburocracias dirigidas— de aquello que se manifiesta, bajo cierta forma, como la colectivización de los mercados entendidos como plataformas en las que todos los colectivos humanos (Estados, empresas, religiones, culturas) producen y consumen sus respectivos productos.

Y luego, lo que se ha convertido —a posteriori— en un fragmento ampliamente difundido, en el que el Secretario de Estado expresó sus esperanzas para los Estados Unidos:

PREGUNTA: —como todos sabemos. Debo preguntarle: ¿cuál es su esperanza para Estados Unidos en un momento como este? 
SECRETARIO RUBIO: ¿Mi esperanza para Estados Unidos? 
PREGUNTA: ¿Y cómo lidia usted personalmente...?
SECRETARIO RUBIO: Es la misma que ha sido siempre. 
PREGUNTA: ...¿con eso? 
SECRETARIO RUBIO: Sí, mire; es decir, mi esperanza para Estados Unidos es la que siempre ha sido. Creo que es la esperanza que —confío— todos compartimos: queremos que siga siendo el lugar donde cualquiera, venga de donde venga, pueda lograr cualquier cosa; donde uno no se vea limitado por las circunstancias de su nacimiento, por el color de su piel o por su origen étnico, sino que —francamente— sea un lugar donde uno sea capaz de superar desafíos y alcanzar su máximo potencial. 
Creo que ese debería ser el objetivo de todos los países del mundo, francamente; pero considero que, en los EE. UU. —no somos perfectos. Nuestra historia no es una historia de perfección, pero aun así es mejor que la historia de cualquier otro. Y la nuestra es una historia de mejora perpetua. Cada generación ha dejado a la siguiente generación de estadounidenses más libre, más próspera y más segura; y ese es también nuestro objetivo. 
Pero es un país único y excepcional y, al acercarnos a este 250.º aniversario, creo que tenemos mucho que aprender de nuestra historia y mucho de lo que sentirnos orgullosos. Es una historia de mejora perpetua y continua, en la que cada generación ha hecho su parte para acercarnos al cumplimiento de la visión que los fundadores de este país tuvieron en el momento de su fundación. (Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio ante la prensa).

Hay mucho más en esa rueda de prensa que merece ser considerado. Y mucho con lo que unos podrían discrepar, especialmente aquellos cuyos valores y puntos de partida cognitivos resultan incompatibles con los de la actual Administración. Sin embargo, la naturaleza y el tenor de dicha discrepancia se han convertido ya en una mera consigna y en una postura de trinchera. 

A continuación, se reproduce el texto íntegro de la rueda de prensa en el original inglés y en una tradcussión en español.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press 5 May 2026

 

Pix credit and video of the press conference here

 Versión en español

Marco Rubio: The War Powers Act is unconstitutional, 100 percent. Now, this is not the position of me. It’s not the position of the President of the United States now. This is the position that every single president that has occupied this position since the day that law passed. It’s completely unconstitutional. Now, we comply with it in terms of, like, notification because we want to preserve good relations with Congress, right? And we do that. But even as a senator I would say that the War Powers Act is 100 percent unconstitutional. And look, I know some of you – whatever you want to say, but this is not this President’s position. That has been the position of every single presidential administration since the day that law passed. It’s an infringement on the President’s constitutional powers. We don’t acknowledge the law as constitutional. Nonetheless, we comply with elements of it for purposes of maintaining good relations with Congress. And we want them to be involved and we want them to be informed. I have gone on Capitol Hill, I don’t know, four times this year for all senators and all House members and Intel Committee and Gang of Eight. We want them to be involved in this. But I want to be clear on the point of the War Powers Act. It’s unconstitutional, and every president in every administration has taken that position. (Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press)

 Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke to the press 5 May 2026. Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press. Secretary Rubio spoke to the issues around the conflict with Iran, and indirectly, with the Administration's conflict with the media especially as it is being used ad an amplifier of political elite factions that do not find the conflict with Iran either in their interests or aligned with their politics.  Indeed, some of the questions highlighted that chasm--a conceptual and values chasm--that separates the President's engagement with Iran from the preferred approaches of prior administrations that were, in turn, founded on substantially different premises.  

The Secretary highlighted the consequences of this chasm in the way in which he approached answers to the questions posed--fundamentally transactional, and with a decided abhorrence of institutional arrangements that would suggest a presence other than to clear spaces for transactions by economic actors. 

Just about the importance of the straits for a moment, this is approximately a quarter of the world’s oil trade, along with significant volumes of fuel and fertilizer, that operate through the Straits of Hormuz.  The Iranian regime cannot be allowed to dictate who uses this vital waterway.  I don’t think this is also being reported enough – or maybe you are reporting.  I don’t read everyone.  I don’t know – too many damn outlets are here, I don’t know who you all are, but – I mean, I know who some of you are, but I don’t know who all of you are.  (Laughter.) (Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press)

 Secretary Rubio made reference to international law and norms as a basis for protecting waterways. "This is an international waterway.  And international law is very clear.  And I love it, because everybody always talks about international law on this.  International law on this very clear.  International waterways – no country can control them." (Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press). Some might accuse the Secretary of hypocrisy; since the Trump Administration has been so dismissive of international institutions  and the constraints of international law surely they may not now when convenient seek to assert international law in defense of their position.  Yet Secretary Rubio made clear in his remarks to the Munich Security Conference that the Trump Administration does not reject international law per se, and certainly not as a normative baseline. (Reflections on Friendship, the Power of National Self-Actualization, and the Defining Baseline of 1963 in and as America First--Text of Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference). Within that conceptual cage, of the merchant rather than the bureaucrat-institutionalist, is built in a fundamental rejection the authority of international institutions under and as the highest manifestation of the organism that is post-1945 international law (as system as well as norm and object autonomous of the collectivized states from which it is said to proceed). Nonetheless, the transactionalist, the merchant type, the deal maker and market actor (in markets for all things, including politics) do not, and cannot as fundamental traditionalists, deny the power of international law in the sense that it is either broadly normative (expressing general values) or more specifically as a contract among states. One speaks here to the more ancient notion of a law of nations (recall the Institutes of Justinian) rather than the architectures and premises of post-1945 international law project.   

 The civil law of Rome, and the law of all nations, differ from each other thus. The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all mankind. Those rules which a state enacts for its own members are peculiar to itself, and are called civil law: those rules prescribed by natural reason for all men are observed by all peoples alike, and are called the law of nations. Thus the laws of the Roman people are partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all nations; a distinction of which we shall take notice as occasion offers. (Institutes, Book 1, Title II, ¶ 1).

It is in this sense that transactional perspectives approach international organizations and the rules with respect to which international venues provide a space for inter-governmental discussion. See, The United States Proposes a UN Security Council Resolution to Defend Freedom of Navigation and Secure the Strait of Hormuz. And it is in this sense that the approach is fundamentally different from the visions of those looking toward a future Techno-Republic (Reflections on the Palantir "Manifesto": The Oracular Semiosis of a "Technological Republic" Within its Own Cage of Techno-Modernization), though it may share objectives in common. 

Lastly Secretary Rubio's remark's on Cuba and the sanctions on petroleum deserve a bit of exposure:

So the only blockade that’s happened is the Cubans have decided – I mean the Venezuelans have decided: we’re not giving you free oil anymore. And you can only imagine nowadays the way oil prices are, no one’s giving away free oil, much less to a failed regime. So the problem with Cuba is worse, okay? Their economic model doesn’t work. It doesn’t work. And the people who are in charge can’t fix it. And reason that they can’t fix it is not just because they’re communists – that’s bad enough, but they’re incompetent communists. The only thing worse than a communist is an incompetent one, and that’s what – so incompetent communists run that country. They don’t know how to fix it. They really don’t. And we have 90 miles from our shores a failed state that also happens to be friendly territory for some of our adversaries. So it’s an unacceptable status quo, and we’ll be addressing it, but not today. Okay. (Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press; emphasis added)

All of this is understandable from within the cognitive cage of the merchant within transactional spaces. Consider the discussion of piracy as a justification for the blockade of the Straits of Hormuz. The object of that blockade is not to stifle traffic but to avoid the piracy of the Iranians. The model is not the late 20th century institutional structures for international waterway traffic, but the much much older model of robber barons on the Rhine in the heyday of the Holy Roman Empire. And the object is the facilitation of trade and trade routes rather than something more institutionally lofty.  Access, trade, and level playing field competition within markets, rather than through collectivized institutions that are meant to mimic and displace markets are the driving force here. And that produces an approach to collectivization that distinguishes  the right Leninism of the 20th and early 21st Century liberal democracy, focused as it is on the institutionalization of autonomous individual activity within compliance and guided techno-bureaucracies, from that which appears in some sort of form as the collectivization of markets as platforms in which all human collectives (states, enterprises, religion, culture) produce and consume their respective products.

And then what has become, after the fact, a widely circulated excerpt in which the Secretary of State expressed his hopes for the United States: 

QUESTION:  – as we all know.  I’ve got to ask you, what is your hope for America at a time such as this?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  My hope for America?

QUESTION:  And how do you personally –

SECRETARY RUBIO:  It’s the same as it’s always been.

QUESTION:  – deal with that?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah look, I mean, my hope for America is what it’s always been.  I think it’s the hope I hope we all share.  We want it to continue to be the place where anyone from anywhere can achieve anything, where you’re not limited by the circumstances of your birth, by the color of your skin, by your ethnicity, but frankly, it’s a place where you are able to overcome challenges and achieve your full potential. 

I think that should be the goal of every country in the world, frankly, but I think in the U.S. – we’re not perfect.  Our history is not one of perfection, but it’s still better than anybody else’s history.  And ours is a story of perpetual improvement.  Each generation has left the next generation of Americans freer, more prosperous, safer, and that is our goal as well. 

But it is a unique and exceptional country, and as we come upon this 250-year anniversary I think we have a lot to learn and be proud of in our history.  It is one of perpetual and continuous improvement where each generation has done its part to bring us closer to fulfilling the vision that the founders of this country had upon its founding. (Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press)

There is much more in the Press Briefing worth considering. And much for many to disagree with, especially those whose values and cognitive starting points are incompatible with that of the current Administration. But the nature and text of that disagreement has become both chant and camp. The  full text of the Press Conference follows below. 

 

 

Perspective Matters for How One Identifies and Assesses Data to Weave into Significance

 

Pix Credit here

 

There will be lots of perspectives about the now ongoing military actions among the US, Israel, Iran and their allies.  For many commentators, the favored perspective revolves around the contemporary version of the ancient "Jewish question," including most of the ancient tropes repurposed and sanitized for contemporary tastes. I am not going to bother with them; they remain so normalized in the discourse as to be unremarkable--and so remarkable for the power of an old cognitive cage. And they come in various flavors as a sort of seasoning applicable to virtually any substantive analytic focus. This does not suggest that there is something that "must be done" about it. But it does suggest the value of self consciousness in following cognitive pathways as if they were somehow either logical or natural. 

Changing the analytical lens even a little, that is changing the grounding premises through which one gathers facts, gives them value and then builds on them to produce an analysis that is the aggregation of those signified data points, also changes the analysis, or at least changes the "political" or "legal" message that these data points, appropriately arranged, are supposed to "show." In that light one might profit from reading through Zineb Riboua's recent essay, The Iran Question Is All About China: Why Operation Epic Fury Is the Opening Act of the Indo-Pacific Century. The essay follows below and may be accessed in the original HERE.

I do not propose that the essay is "right" or "wrong"--only that it provides a window looking out at a different landscape and a reminder that analysis may sometimes be more a reflection of the landscape within whicvh it is created than of itself without regard to its anchoring landscapes. In that sense, the lands capping may become more important than the analysis, and the analysis more infused with the sensibilities of propaganda or in its highest forms solidarity with a cognitive and analytical orienting ideology than much of anything else.  

 

Pix credit here

President Trump's Statement at the Start of US Action Against the Government of Iran

 

Pix credit YouTube here

To the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the armed forces and all of the police, I say tonight that you must lay down your weapons and have complete immunity. Or, in the alternative, face certain death. So lay down your arms. You will be treated fairly with total immunity, or you will face certain death. Finally, to the great, proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand. Stay sheltered. Don't leave your home. It's very dangerous outside. Bombs will be dropping everywhere. When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations. For many years you have asked for America's help, but you never got it. No president was willing to do what I am willing to do tonight. Now you have a president who is giving you what you want. (Scripted Transcript of remarks of President Trump)

President Trump announced the start of American military action against the government of Iran. The video of those remarks may be accessed HERE. Prime Minister Netanyahu also issued a video statement (discussed here).

It is far too early to speculate  much less to comment other than to restate positions that are both well known and well worn. Blood will change the analysis and the rationalization of its consequences. However the temptation is perhaps too strong to be avoided though much of it is rehash of traditional stances now years old applied to the current situation (eg here, here) but for perhaps useful strategic description see here. 

The full text of the remarks follows (with thanks to The National News).; though President Trump went off script so it is useful to watch the video. 

Text of Interview with Payman Yazdani for Tabnak News Service (Iran): "US expert talks of threats, opportunities of US proposal for Zangezur Corridor for regional states, Iran"

 

Pix credit here

I was delighted to have been able to sit for an online interview with Payman Yazdani for the Tabnak News Service (Iran).  The interview revolved around six questions:

Pix credit here

1. The US says it aims to facilitate peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. What are the real goals of the US? 

2. What can be the advantages and possible disadvantages of the US proposal for Baku and Yerevan?

3. How can this affect China's one road- one belt project? and basically what are the possible security and economic threats of the US proposal to China?

4. The EU has supported the US proposal; can this create any possible security or economic threats to Russia's interest in the region?

5.Armenia had announced that it would not hand over the control of the corridor to a third party but to push Armenia, Turkey has told Yerevan that the new developments have been against Iran. Do you think that Yerevan will finally accept the US proposal? How can this affect Iran's interest?

6. If finally Armenia agrees with opening of the corridor, what is the best strategy for Iran to face the reality on the ground? 

Pix credit here

The answers required one to try to consider the current version of one part of efforts to ease historically mutable and complex tensions in the region, and perhaps to freeze--a moment of relative stillness for everyone to regroup and perhaps reconsider the value of repeating past patterns of relations--the situation in the region long enough to change the way in Armenia and Azerbaijan consider the nature and objectives of their respective positions, and the forms of their ambitions going forward. Nonetheless, these considerations may not be undertaken in isolation--regional powers, extending through the Eastern Mediterranean on one side and up to the Chinese border on the other all have interests that may be reflected in whatever it is that comes out of thirty or so years war, major population displacements, and territorial adjustments. The area, as such, has presented some of the more interesting and layered sets of conflicting ambitions and displacements in global affairs, one that is as much driven by the local as it is by increasingly broader interests of regional and global powers. It also suggests the growing alignment of public and private institutions as instruments of State policy. Of course, there is much more to this than can be developed in the short space allotted to interview questions and answers. And there are as many perspectives about the issue as there are stakeholders with (diverse and often conflicting) interests. My focus is on an aspect that might tend to receive less attention than others more aligned with the State centered analysis of these sorts of conflicts. I start from the foundational element of pathways--one is, in fact, looking at pathways. These corridors, connectors, routes, conduits and the like accomplish more than the obvious, to connect in some fashion the points along its path. They are as important for what they transport, how it is transported, what might be inspected, taxed, limited, observed and the like, than merely serving as a physical space where these activities may be undertaken. These pathways, then, may also be understood as a peculiar sort of platform that are as important ot its users and producers globally as it is to the resolution of a problem along its path.

The interview (with internal links) may be found online (in English) HERE. It also follows below. Links to the Fasi language version HERE or direct access:

«کریدور زنگزور» می‌تواند حضور امنیتی آمریکا در قفقاز را تقویت کند/ ایران واقعیتهای جدید منطقه را دقیق رصد کند

.

 

Pix credit here