Reflections on Measures on Cyberspace Security Supervision and Inspection by Public Security Organs (《公安机关网络空间安全监督检查办法》); Text and Comparison with U.S., E.U., and Brazilian Measures

 

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(Family members, relatives and friends of criminal secret agents, you must supervise and urge criminals to register and turn over a new leaf!"; 1950)

On 6 August 2026, Wang Xiaohong, Minister of Public Security, had promulgated the Measures for the Supervision and Inspection of Cyberspace Security by Public Security Organs [《公安机关网络空间安全监督检查办法》](Ministry of Public Security Order No. 176), to take effect on October 1, 2026 at which time the 2018 "Provisions on the Supervision and Inspection of Internet Security by Public Security Organs" (Ministry of Public Security Order No. 151) would be repealed. The new measure consists of 23 articles, covering aspects such as the subjects, methods, content, and mechanisms of supervision and inspection, the application of inspection results, and legal liabilities. [这是《公安机关网络空间安全监督检查办法》（公安部令第176号）的官方原文页面。该办法于2026年8月6日由公安部部长王小洪签署公布，自页面包含完整正文（共23条），内容涵盖监督检查对象、方式、内容、机制、结果运用及法律责任等。].

Ministry of Public Security Order No. 176 will prove controversial and their scope and application at home and abroad have yet to be revealed. With the aid of Grok, this post includes (1) a summary of the new measures; (2) an analysis of the provisions of Ministry of Public Security Order No. 176 in the context of Chinese law; (3) an initial consideration of possible breadth of application to individuals and enterprises; and (4) an initial consideration of a comparison of Ministry of Public Security Order No. 176 with what may come close to being equivalent measures in the United States, the European Union, and Brazil.

1. Summary Measures for the Supervision and Inspection of Cyberspace Security by Public Security Organs (Ministry of Public Security Order No. 176)

Promulgated on 6 August 2026 by Minister Wang Xiaohong after approval at the 2nd Ministry of Public Security ministerial meeting on 1 July 2026. The Measures take effect on 1 October 2026 and simultaneously repeal the 2018 Provisions on the Supervision and Inspection of Internet Security by Public Security Organs (MPS Order No. 151).

Purpose and Scope (Articles 1–2) The Measures aim to safeguard national security and public interests, protect the legitimate rights of citizens, legal persons and other organizations, standardize public security organs’ cyberspace security inspections, and prevent/combat cyber-related illegal activities and crimes. They are enacted pursuant to the People’s Police Law, Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations, Network Data Security Management Regulations, and Internet Information Services Management Measures.

They apply to public security organs’ inspections of network operators, data processors, personal information handlers and others regarding their fulfilment of statutory cybersecurity, data security and information security obligations. “Cyberspace security” is expressly defined as encompassing cybersecurity + data security + information security.

Guiding Principles and Coordination (Article 3) Inspections must be conducted under the leadership of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission and related bodies, following the principles of lawful and scientific management that both ensures security and promotes development. Public security organs must strictly observe statutory authority and procedures, improve enforcement methods, and establish coordination mechanisms with competent industry regulators. For routine on-site inspections where an industry regulator exists, the industry regulator shall normally take the lead. A graded and classified inspection system must be established, subject to supervision by inspected entities and the public.

Inspection Methods (Article 4)

• Online patrols: network information monitoring, information-review capability testing, vulnerability scanning and similar non-disruptive methods within the jurisdiction. Advance notice (3 working days) is required for information-review capability tests.
• Remote testing (municipal-level and above public security organs): vulnerability probing and penetration testing of network facilities and information systems other than critical information infrastructure, again with 3 working days’ prior notice, no disruption of normal operations, and notification to the same-level cyberspace administration and industry regulators. Special rules apply to basic telecommunications networks under the Critical Information Infrastructure regulations. Risks discovered online or remotely must be verified; on-site inspection may be used when necessary.

Jurisdiction (Article 5) On-site inspections are conducted by the county-level or higher public security organ of the place where the inspected entity’s operational institution is located (actual main place of operations, management office, network facilities, or industrial/commercial registration). For individuals, the place of habitual residence applies. Jurisdictional disputes are resolved by the common superior organ. Higher-level organs supervise lower-level ones and may elevate or organize inspections.

Inspected Entities (Article 6) Public security organs may inspect: (1) Internet service providers (access, data centres, CDN, domain-name, information services, etc.); (2) public Internet access service providers; (3) network operators and their builders/maintainers; (4) critical information infrastructure operators and their builders/maintainers; (5) network product and service providers; (6) data processors; (7) personal information handlers; (8) other entities subject to inspection by law.

Entities that have previously suffered security incidents or have been administratively punished for non-compliance and failed to rectify are priorities.

Inspection Content (Articles 7–8) Routine inspections focus on 11 categories of statutory obligations, including: network unit filing and user/log retention; security management systems; multi-level protection scheme (MLPS) obligations; critical information infrastructure protection; technical measures against viruses/attacks; vulnerability remediation; content filtering for prohibited information; algorithm security responsibilities; data security and personal information protection obligations; and technical support/assistance to public security organs for national security, counter-terrorism and criminal investigation.

During major national security protection tasks (or for key counter-terrorism targets), special inspections examine contingency plans, risk assessments, emergency drills, additional protective measures and incident reporting.

Frequency, Coordination and Burden Reduction (Articles 9–10) Routine on-site inspections are coordinated under national cybersecurity and data-security mechanisms to avoid duplication. Level-3 (and above) MLPS networks and critical information infrastructure operators receive one routine on-site inspection per year; results of inspections already conducted by other competent authorities in the same year are reused. Special or case-related inspections proceed as needed under statutory procedures.

Multi-industry/department routine inspections ordered by the Ministry of Public Security require Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission approval (with additional coordination for data security or content/ideology issues). Basic telecommunications network inspections are conducted at municipal level or above. Inspections of telecommunications, energy, transport, water conservancy, finance, defence science & industry and similar sectors require 5 working days’ prior notice to the cyberspace administration and industry regulators, who may request joint inspections. Results are promptly shared with those departments.

On-site Powers and Procedures (Articles 11–15) At least two people’s police officers must participate and present police credentials plus a written inspection notice issued by a county-level or higher public security organ. Powers include: entering premises/machine rooms; questioning responsible persons or security managers; inspecting and copying relevant materials; examining technical protective measures; and conducting vulnerability probing/penetration testing.

Public security organs may engage qualified cybersecurity service institutions or specialists for technical support (subject to higher-level filing). Such personnel operate under police command, must sign confidentiality undertakings covering trade secrets, personal privacy and personal information, and undergo background checks for penetration-testing work. For critical information infrastructure, the industry regulator must be informed.

Inspections must be objective and impartial; no fees may be charged and no designated products/services may be required. Written records must be prepared and signed by the officers and the inspected entity’s representative (or noted if signature is refused). Remote-testing records are signed by the officers; technical-support personnel also sign when involved. Materials are archived.

Outcomes and Follow-up (Articles 16–19) Risks and hazards are noted and the entity is guided to eliminate them. Non-compliance triggers legal liability under the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law and related regulations.

Where risks do not yet constitute illegal/criminal conduct, public security organs may:

• issue a “Public Security Reminder Letter” (公安提示函) to the entity (county level and above);
• issue a reminder letter to the industry regulator (municipal level and above);
• issue a non-entity-specific public notice (provincial level and above).

Major risks affecting Level-3+ networks, critical information infrastructure or important data are promptly reported to industry regulators and the cyberspace administration. Severe regional or sectoral risks threatening national security, public security or the public interest are reported to the people’s government and higher public security organs, with possible public notices.

Provincial-level or higher public security organs may interview the legal representative or principal responsible person of a network operator that presents significant risk or has suffered an incident. County-level or higher organs may interview relevant organisations or individuals concerning data- or personal-information-related risks/incidents. Interviewees must rectify.

Confidentiality and Liability (Articles 20–22) Public security personnel and engaged technical-support providers must protect state secrets, work secrets, trade secrets, personal privacy and personal information obtained during inspections; such information may be used only for cyberspace security purposes. After inspection, technical-support providers must return or destroy materials as directed.

Abuse of power, dereliction of duty or favouritism by public security personnel leads to disciplinary or criminal liability. Technical-support providers who engage in illegal intrusion, disruption, data theft or unauthorised disclosure of secrets/privacy face administrative or criminal penalties.

Entry into Force (Article 23) Effective 1 October 2026; the 2018 Internet Security Inspection Provisions are repealed.

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2. Analysis of Provisions in the Context of Chinese Law

These Measures represent a significant evolution of China’s cybersecurity regulatory architecture and the role of the public security organs (公安机关) within it.

From “Internet Security” to “Cyberspace Security” The 2018 Provisions (Order No. 151) focused narrowly on “internet security.” The 2026 Measures deliberately broaden the concept to “cyberspace security,” explicitly encompassing cybersecurity, data security and information security. This mirrors the post-2016 legislative expansion: Cybersecurity Law (2017), Data Security Law (2021), Personal Information Protection Law (2021), Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations (2021) and Network Data Security Management Regulations (2024/2025). The public security organs’ inspection mandate is thereby aligned with the full suite of modern Chinese digital-security legislation rather than remaining limited to the older “internet” framing.

Integration into the Multi-Layer Governance System Article 3 places inspections under the leadership of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (and related mechanisms). This reflects China’s dual-track governance model in which the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC / 网信办) holds overall coordination and content/ideology responsibilities, while public security organs retain strong enforcement, technical-inspection and criminal-investigation powers. The Measures carefully allocate roles: industry regulators take the lead on routine on-site checks where they exist; public security organs coordinate rather than unilaterally dominate; and multi-sector inspections require Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission approval. This reduces inter-agency friction and responds to long-standing industry complaints about overlapping inspections.

Expansion of Inspected Subjects and Content The list of inspectable entities (Article 6) is broader than the 2018 version and now expressly includes data processors and personal information handlers—directly implementing the Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law. Inspection content (Article 7) adds algorithm security responsibilities, data-security and personal-information protection obligations, and the duty to provide technical assistance for national-security, counter-terrorism and criminal investigations (echoing Cybersecurity Law Art. 28 and related provisions). Special inspections during major security tasks and for counter-terrorism targets further embed the Measures in China’s national-security and counter-terrorism legal framework.

Procedural Safeguards and Burden Reduction Compared with the 2018 rules, the 2026 Measures contain more detailed procedural protections: advance notice for remote testing and capability tests; requirement of two officers and written notice; prohibition on fees and designated products; reuse of other regulators’ inspection results; and explicit coordination to avoid duplication. These provisions respond to both the Administrative Licensing Law / Administrative Penalty Law principles of proportionality and fairness and to practical business concerns about regulatory burden. The graded/classified approach and annual-inspection ceiling for high-level systems further operationalise risk-based supervision.

Enforcement Toolbox and Soft-Law Instruments The introduction of the “Public Security Reminder Letter” (公安提示函) and non-entity-specific public notices (Article 17) creates a graduated response short of formal administrative penalties—consistent with the broader trend in Chinese administrative law toward “soft” compliance tools before hard sanctions. Interview/约谈 powers (Article 19) continue the well-established practice under cybersecurity and data-security laws. Major-risk reporting obligations (Article 18) feed into the national risk-early-warning and incident-reporting systems required by the Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law.

Confidentiality, Technical Support and Accountability Articles 20–22 strengthen confidentiality obligations (aligning with Personal Information Protection Law and state-secret rules) and impose background checks and full-process management on third-party technical supporters. This addresses practical risks of data leakage during penetration testing while preserving public security organs’ ability to leverage external expertise. Liability provisions for both public security personnel and technical providers reinforce the accountability mechanisms already present in the People’s Police Law and Criminal Law.

Overall Significance The Measures complete the transition of public security organs’ role from primarily “internet police” under the 2018 framework to a comprehensive cyberspace-security supervisor operating within the modern tripartite (network–data–information) regulatory system. They balance expanded substantive powers with procedural constraints and inter-agency coordination, reflecting both the heightened national-security emphasis of recent years and the policy goal of reducing unnecessary burdens on digital-economy participants. Implementation from October 2026 will test how effectively the coordination mechanisms and burden-reduction rules function in practice across China’s multi-level public security apparatus and sectoral regulators. 

3. Breadth of Application 

1. Individuals in China (Chinese citizens and foreigners) Article 5 of the Measures expressly contemplates natural persons as inspection subjects and assigns jurisdiction to the public security organ of the individual’s habitual residence. Article 6’s functional categories (network operators, data processors, personal information handlers, etc.) are not limited by nationality.

Caveat / interpretive note: The Measures do not contain an explicit statement that ordinary private, non-commercial use of networks by individuals falls within scope. In practice, inspection of pure personal users appears unlikely unless the individual performs one of the listed functional roles at scale. Whether low-level or incidental processing triggers inspection remains an enforcement-practice question rather than a clear textual rule.

2. Domestic and foreign economic and nonprofit entities The language of Articles 2 and 6 is functional rather than organisational-form-specific. Entities performing the listed roles—whether Chinese companies, foreign-invested enterprises, representative offices, or nonprofits—are covered if they operate within the territorial jurisdiction rules of Article 5.

Caveat: The Measures themselves do not contain a detailed list of covered legal forms. Coverage of nonprofits and foreign-invested entities follows from the functional definitions plus the place-of-operations test; it is a reasoned reading rather than an express enumeration.

3. Extraterritorial effects The Measures are drafted as territorial enforcement tools. Jurisdiction is tied to the location of the operational institution or the individual’s habitual residence inside China (Article 5). There is no freestanding grant of authority for public security organs to conduct physical inspections outside Chinese territory.

Interpretive assessment (flagged as such): Meaningful extraterritorial effects can arise indirectly through the underlying statutes the Measures implement—particularly PIPL Article 3 and Data Security Law Article 2—when foreign entities target Chinese users, process data of persons in China, or maintain a local operational footprint. How aggressively public security organs will use local affiliates, data centres, or staff as the practical entry point for inspection is an enforcement question on which the Measures themselves are silent. Purely overseas activities with no China nexus remain outside the text of these particular inspection powers. 

4. Comparative Analysis (E.U.; U.S. and Brazil)

China’s Measures (MPS Order No. 176, effective 1 October 2026) give public security organs broad, proactive powers to conduct online patrols, remote vulnerability/penetration testing, and on-site inspections of network operators, data processors, personal information handlers, critical information infrastructure (CII) operators, and related entities. The focus is on cybersecurity + data security + information security obligations, with graded inspection frequency, inter-agency coordination requirements, soft tools (reminder letters, interviews), and strong confidentiality rules.

The comparison treats the Chinese Measures as one model among several. Statements about relative “breadth,” “proactivity,” or “strength” are interpretive judgments, not objective rankings.

The closest E.U. analogues are the NIS2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2555) for cybersecurity of essential and important entities, and the GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) for personal data protection. National competent authorities (often cybersecurity agencies or data-protection authorities) exercise the powers. In contrast, in the U.S., there is no single comprehensive equivalent. The US system is highly fragmented across voluntary frameworks, sector-specific regulation, and law-enforcement investigative powers. Lastly, in Brazil, the main instruments are the LGPD (Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados, Law 13.709/2018) enforced by the ANPD (Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de Dados), plus a more fragmented cybersecurity landscape (National Cybersecurity Policy, sector-specific rules from Central Bank, ANATEL, etc.). Brazil lacks a single police-led cyberspace inspection regime comparable to China’s.

European Union (NIS2 + GDPR) 

 NIS2 gives national competent authorities powers of on-site inspection, security audits, and security scans; essential entities face more proactive (ex ante) supervision than important entities. GDPR Article 58 grants data-protection authorities access to premises and processing equipment.

Similarities: Both systems authorise on-site inspections and technical reviews of cybersecurity / data-security obligations.

Differences (interpretive): The Chinese model places primary authority with public security organs and expressly contemplates remote vulnerability/penetration testing with prior notice. EU supervision is generally exercised by specialised civilian or independent regulatory authorities rather than police. Whether the Chinese coordination rules (industry-regulator lead on routine checks, result-reuse) will prove more effective at reducing burden than EU mutual-assistance mechanisms is an empirical question that cannot yet be answered from the text alone.

United States 

 No single federal statute creates a routine, police-led administrative inspection regime comparable in structure to the Chinese Measures. CISA possesses limited administrative subpoena authority for identifying owners of certain vulnerable systems; continuous monitoring programmes such as CyberSentry are consent-based; most on-site or remote access by law enforcement requires a warrant.

Interpretive note: The absence of a direct equivalent does not mean U.S. authorities lack tools—sectoral regulators and criminal investigative powers exist—but the institutional design (fragmented, partnership-oriented, warrant-constrained) differs markedly from the centralised administrative model in the Measures. Claims that one system is “stronger” or “weaker” overall depend on the metric chosen (routine reach versus constitutional limits, for example) and are therefore judgments rather than textual facts.

Brazil 

 The ANPD possesses investigatory powers under the LGPD, including the ability to request information, conduct audits, and access premises and systems. Cybersecurity obligations remain more sectoral and less centralised than in China.

Caveat: Brazil has been moving toward more active oversight, but the ANPD model remains that of an independent data-protection authority rather than a public-security organ with integrated cybersecurity, data-security, and information-security inspection powers. Direct parallels should therefore be drawn cautiously.

Overall Framing Caveats

• The Measures are new (promulgated August 2026, effective October 2026). Actual enforcement practice, resource allocation, and inter-agency coordination behaviour will only become clear over time.
• Many operational details (exact thresholds for “priority” inspection, frequency of remote testing, willingness to issue reminder letters versus formal penalties) are left to implementation and are not fixed by the text.
• Comparative statements about “breadth,” “proactivity,” or institutional philosophy are analytical observations, not definitive legal conclusions. Different legal systems prioritise different values (centralised administrative efficiency versus institutional independence and warrant requirements); ranking them requires explicit normative criteria that the Measures themselves do not supply.
• Each set of measures will be interpreted and applied  in ways that align to national ideologies, the way in which each understands  key terms, and the overall fundamental political lines of each state, especially when transposed into cultures of national security; all of this strongly suggests but does not "prove that these measures will signal as well as permit a much more comprehensive approach to the protection of naitonal security and a significantly broader ambit of state "permission" to observe, categorize, determine, and punish infraction. 
• The breadth of ambiguity will prove substantial space, within the confines of national practice, culture, expectations, and political and constitutional constraints, to exercise discreiton in the application of the measures, and in the process, where these discretionary actions become routinized or expected, to effectively make or create de facto regulation, in the process adding depth  but also substance to the measures .
• Where these measures intersect, or where efforts are made to project the measures outward into another jurisdiction, one can expect substantial and sharp countermeasures, These will not be confined to the legal-administrative sphere but will have substantial political and strategic effects.  

Below is a more comprehensive effort to compare 《公安机关网络空间安全监督检查办法》with what I might suggest are the closest frameworks in the US, EU, and Brazil.  The full text of Ministry of Public Security Order No. 176 in the original Chinese and in English also follow below.

Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (May 15, 2026)

 

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 It was reported in Al Jazeera that the BRICs meeting recently concluded  failed to issue a Jint Statement, producing instead only a Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (May 15, 2026).

The BRICS alliance of major developing economies has failed to issue a joint statement after their two-day meeting in India, amid internal divisions over the Iran war which is affecting several members. India hosted the foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi and currently chairs the alliance. BRICS brings together core members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as newer members Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia and the UAE. India said on Friday that “there were differing views among some members” regarding the conflict in the Middle East. (Al Jazeera)

One can parse through the Chair’s Statement  which is rich not just in what was stated but perhaps more importantly was remained unstated or written between the lines. The Chair’s Statement  is posted below without comment, but with the suggestion that it reflects the complexities  of a multi-polar world of hierarchically arranged power structures still searching for a se of ordering premises. 

 

Comunicado conjunto sobre la situación en Cuba Brasil, España y México [Joint Statement on the Situation in Cuba] Issued by the La IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia [IV Summit in Defense of Democracy] Barcelona el 16-17 Abril

 

 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE.

 

 Los líderes de los gobiernos de España, México y Brasil emitieron la siguiente comunicación en el transcurso de su IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia, celebrada en Barcelona los días 16 y 17 de abril de 2026. Dicha comunicación, titulada «Sobre la situación en Cuba», se produce tras los informes de que la presidenta de México buscaba articular una postura común al respecto. 

Crédito de imagen aquí

La presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum, anunció el sábado, durante la IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia celebrada en Barcelona, ​​que propondrá una declaración formal en oposición a cualquier intervención militar en Cuba, instando a que prevalezcan el diálogo y la paz por encima de la confrontación, en un contexto marcado por las amenazas y el bloqueo energético por parte de Estados Unidos. «A día de hoy, al referirnos a esa pequeña isla caribeña, creemos que ningún pueblo es pequeño, sino grande y estoico cuando defiende su soberanía y su derecho a una vida plena», añadió. Al intervenir en la inauguración del encuentro —convocado por el presidente del Gobierno de España, Pedro Sánchez, y el presidente de Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—, Sheinbaum formuló este llamamiento ante una docena de líderes progresistas, entre los que se encontraban los presidentes de Colombia, Sudáfrica y Uruguay.

La presidenta mexicana aprovechó su intervención para reafirmar que los principios constitucionales de la política exterior de su país conservan plena vigencia en el actual escenario global. Citó la no intervención, el respeto a la autodeterminación, la solución pacífica de controversias, el rechazo al uso de la fuerza, la igualdad jurídica entre los Estados y la búsqueda permanente de la paz como los pilares de la identidad diplomática de México. Advirtió contra cualquier definición de la libertad que implique la sumisión a intereses externos o que reduzca a las naciones soberanas a la condición de colonias modernas, insistiendo en que la libertad carece de sentido sin justicia social, soberanía y dignidad de los pueblos. (aquí) 

El lenguaje empleado no se desvía de la postura que las autoridades mexicanas han mantenido desde el inicio de la actual crisis en Cuba; de hecho, sus elementos ya formaban parte del discurso de la presidenta Sheinbaum a raíz de las acciones emprendidas por Estados Unidos en Venezuela a principios de 2026. Estos tres elementos son: (1) la centralidad de la ayuda humanitaria y la mitigación del sufrimiento de la población; (2) la igualdad soberana y la integridad territorial; y (3) el respeto a los derechos humanos, el multilateralismo en el marco del sistema de las Naciones Unidas y el diálogo respetuoso.

Resulta interesante observar que estos tres elementos son compartidos, a su vez, por los Estados Unidos. El problema, por supuesto, radica en que el significado —tanto de estos principios comunes como del texto empleado para expresarlos, así como de los términos y valores con los que se invisten— separa a Estados Unidos de México, España y Brasil, tanto como el texto común parece unirlos en un proyecto compartido. Estados Unidos centra la ayuda humanitaria en la asistencia directa al pueblo de Cuba, administrada a través de organizaciones no gubernamentales, y ha realizado esfuerzos en este sentido; las premisas cognitivas institucionalistas tradicionales de América Latina, por su parte, evaluarían y operacionalizarían dicha ayuda a través de órganos estatales, procurando no emitir juicios excesivos sobre la eficiencia o las decisiones estratégicas relativas a su distribución (un problema que se repite en otras regiones, como, por ejemplo, en Oriente Medio y el Norte de África, o en el continente africano). Asimismo, Estados Unidos mantiene una postura favorable respecto a la igualdad soberana y la integridad territorial; sin embargo, este enfoque se ve moldeado por el carácter transaccional de la iniciativa «America First» (Estados Unidos Primero). Ambas posturas comparten un profundo rechazo hacia las ambiciones territoriales (con algunas excepciones... pues siempre existen excepciones). No obstante, los partidarios del enfoque transaccional aceptan la premisa de que las proyecciones de poder —incluidas aquellas de carácter violento— hacia el interior de otro Estado pueden resultar necesarias y ventajosas, siempre dentro del marco de su propia interpretación de las «normas» que rigen los ordenamientos jurídicos internos. Los institucionalistas, en cambio, tienden a no distinguir diferencia alguna entre las proyecciones externas de poder hacia otro Estado y las situaciones de tensión territorial: ya sea el libre sobrevuelo de los cielos de un Estado (como en los casos de Irán, el Líbano, etc., en el contexto de esfuerzos por negociar cambios sustanciales en las relaciones —situaciones en las que no cabe hablar de «inocencia» por parte del Estado sobre el cual se proyecta estratégicamente dicho poder—); la proyección de fuerza militar con el fin de extraer a determinadas personas (como en el caso de Venezuela, donde el Estado agresor calificó a dichas personas como miembros de una banda criminal); o bien una invasión al estilo ruso sobre otro país con el propósito de anexionarse su territorio. Este último supuesto constituye, naturalmente, el más problemático para Estados Unidos, en la medida en que representa precisamente aquello que el antiguo orden institucionalista pretendía evitar. Irónicamente, la concepción estadounidense del multilateralismo —entendida como un mero intergubernamentalismo— se asemeja más a la postura tradicional de Brasil y China que a la de las antiguas élites de Estados Unidos, o a la de países como México y España; salvo, claro está, cuando se analiza desde la perspectiva de la comunicación entendida como discurso.

 

En un sentido más general, los términos que constituyen el núcleo de la comunicación misma no solo están cargados de ambigüedad; su precisión depende, en gran medida, de las premisas cognitivas orientadoras dentro de las cuales resulta posible forjar un consenso comunitario respecto a los valores inherentes a dichos términos y a las intenciones que estos encarnan, particularmente en aquellos casos en que un Estado busca basarse en su significado para actuar o abstenerse de hacerlo. Y, por supuesto, la naturaleza de tales términos reviste un significado singularmente relevante en el Sur Global —especialmente en América Latina—, de un modo que tal vez no resuene de igual forma ni en Estados Unidos ni en China; salvo, quizás, como mero texto. Estas diferencias fueron expuestas con gran lucidez en el discurso que la presidenta Sheinbaum pronunció ante los líderes de la Cumbre, cuyo video puede consultarse debajo de la imagen que figura a continuación..

Crédito de imagen y video YouTube aquí

 

 En esencia, el texto de la comunicación invita al lector a adoptar una comunidad de significado y construcción de significado que permite una única lectura ortodoxa de su propia concepción y una única aplicación ortodoxa de sus declaraciones, sin molestarse en exponer esas premisas ni debatir su forma e interpretación. Esto es justo; también es política; y remite a la disputa más amplia e importante del control de cualquier tipo de significado colectivo y de las expectativas de comportamiento que se derivan de él, algo que, si bien se reconoce, solo se vislumbra en los márgenes y entre líneas. Esa contienda, en su forma actual, tiene una historia muy larga; y la probabilidad de una resolución decisiva es ilusoria (aunque contribuye a alimentar la intensidad de la creencia necesaria para gestionar y desplegar a los combatientes de cada bando). A pesar de ello, sigue siendo importante. Es importante porque sugiere una diferencia, quizás sustancial, en los principios de ordenamiento entre el Sur Global en América Latina (construido sobre la riqueza de sus propias experiencias y deseos, tal como los perciben, o al menos como los perciben sus élites) y los de Estados Unidos y China. Estos dos últimos se alinean cada vez más, aunque partiendo de puntos de vista fundamentalmente diferentes, y esa alineación marca cada vez más una brecha entre el Sur Latinoamericano y las dos potencias mundiales.

Nada de esto, por supuesto, tendrá un efecto sustancial en la resolución de la crisis cubana; lo que sugiere que incluso las diferencias sustanciales y fundamentales en la forma en que se ordena la realidad en función de los principios y los valores se verán atenuadas por el pragmatismo. Resulta significativo que México haya liderado esta iniciativa, manteniendo una estrategia discursiva y normativa a largo plazo, incluso adaptándose a las realidades de la situación en la que se encuentra en esta etapa del desarrollo histórico de la región (considérense los comentarios de la Presidenta Sheinbaum; Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia: Presidenta propone programa global de reforestación y declaración contra intervención militar en Cuba. Sin embargo, este pragmatismo, por razones propias, no puede ser compartido por los actuales líderes de España y Brasil, cada uno con sus propias agendas y un bagaje histórico bastante distinto (y no irracional). En este contexto, el discurso del derecho internacional y la intervención humanitaria, adornado con los tópicos de la igualdad soberana y la integridad territorial dentro de densos marcos normativos de restricciones multilaterales que pretenden tener un efecto supraconstitucional (y, por lo tanto, legal), tendrá que enfrentarse a un problema quizás igualmente interesante: la gestión de sistemas de Estados colectivizados (ya sea desde un marco estructural transaccional o institucional). El problema de los Estados fallidos y el deber, ya sea del colectivo de Estados (independientemente de su organización y concepción) o de algunos de sus elementos, de asumir la responsabilidad (sea lo que sea que esto signifique). Es precisamente a este último aspecto al que se dirige gran parte del discurso, aunque sea de forma indirecta, y ese es, por supuesto, el problema fundamental. Se trata de un problema ideológico y cognitivo crítico para los gobiernos de México, España y Brasil, precisamente porque, en mayor o menor medida, cualquier admisión de fracaso estatal en Cuba debilitaría (o podría debilitar) el poder normativo de las ideologías que comparten y que son fundamentales para el avance de sus propias ortodoxias normativas, tanto dentro de sus países como en su papel de fundamento ortodoxo del orden internacional. Proteger a Cuba de los fracasos de su propio gobierno es, en ese sentido y hasta cierto punto, una protección de su propia legitimidad normativa. O al menos así podrían tender a pensar…

Sin embargo, a través de la lente transaccional de los EE. UU., hacia la que se dirige gran parte de esto, el desempeño discursivo tendrá consecuencias para las relaciones entre estos cuatro estados de maneras que aún no están claras, excepto que es probable que las relaciones entre los EE. UU. y España y Brasil empeoren antes de mejorar (a falta de un cambio de gobierno); las que tienen con México seguirán siendo pragmáticas y transaccionales, y es probable que sea México el que sea más eficaz sirviendo como intermediario y puente hacia otros estados. Y esos cambios afectarán sustancialmente las relaciones con Europa, pero más importante aún con China, como tal vez el actual gobierno de España ha tratado de demostrar, inadvertidamente por supuesto, al tratar de vivir los valores de su gobierno. En ese último caso, tal vez valga la pena considerar el paralelismo entre la política inconformista del Sr. Orbán en Hungría y la del Sr. Sánchez en España (Apártate Hungría: España es el nuevo mejor amigo de China en la UE). Si son miméticos, esto apunta tanto a su importancia como a su longevidad, en aquellos casos en que cualquiera de estos aspectos se halle desincronizado respecto a movimientos cognitivos más amplios y poderosos entre los órganos de los Estados colectivizados.

A continuación, se presenta el texto de la Comunicación.

Comunicado conjunto sobre la situación en Cuba Brasil, España y México [Joint Statement on the Situation in Cuba] Issued by the La IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia [IV Summit in Defense of Democracy] Barcelona el 16-17 Abril

 

 VERSION en Español Aquí

 

The leaders of the governments of Spain, Mexico and Brazil issued the following communication during the course of their  IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia [IV Summit in Defense of Democracy] which was held in Barcelona 16-17April 2026. The Communication, On the situation in Cuba, follows reports that the President of Mexico was seeking to develop a common position.

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Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum announced Saturday during the IV Summit in Defense of Democracy in Barcelona that she will propose a formal declaration opposing any military intervention in Cuba, urging dialogue and peace to prevail over confrontation amid U.S. threats and energy blockade. “To this day, speaking of that small Caribbean island, we believe that no people are small, but rather great and stoic when defending their sovereignty and the right to a fulfilling life,” she added. Speaking at the opening of the gathering convened by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Sheinbaum made her call before a dozen progressive leaders including the presidents of Colombia, South Africa, and Uruguay

 The Mexican president used her address to reaffirm that her country’s constitutional foreign policy principles remain fully relevant in the current global landscape. She cited non-intervention, respect for self-determination, peaceful dispute resolution, rejection of force, legal equality among states, and the enduring pursuit of peace as pillars of Mexico’s diplomatic identity. She warned against any definition of freedom that implies submission to external interests or reduces sovereign nations to the status of modern colonies, insisting that liberty holds no meaning without social justice, sovereignty, and the dignity of peoples. (here)

The language does not deviate form a position that the Mexicans have taken from the start of the current crisis in Cuba, its elements already part of discourse of President Sheinbaum in the wake of the U.S. action in Venezuela at the start of 2026. The three elements are (1) the centrality of humanitarian aid and the minimization of popular suffering, (2) sovereign equality and territorial integrity; and (3) respect for human rights, multilateralism within the context of the UN system, and respectful dialog.

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The three elements, interestingly enough are shared  by the United States. The problem, of course, is that the meaning that these common principles and the text used to express them of the terms and the values with which they are invested separate the United States from Mexico, Spain and Brasil  as much as the common text appears to join them in a common project. The United States  centers humanitarian aid on direct aid to the people of Cuba administered through non-governmental organizations, and has made efforts in that respect; traditional Latin American institutionalist cognitive premises would  assess and operationalize that aid through State organs and make an effort not to be too judgy about efficiencies or strategic choices respecting distribution (a problem repeated elsewhere, e.g., in MENA and Africa). The United States is also positive about sovereign equality and territorial integrity; that focus is shaped by the transactionalism of the America First Initiative, Both share a strong distaste for territorial ambitions (with some exceptions. . . there are always exceptions). Transactionalists, however, accept the premise that projections, including violent projections into another State may be necessary,  and advantageous, within the ambit of their reading of the "rules" of internal law frameworks. Institutionalists tend to see no difference between outward projections of power into another state and territorial stress--whether it is freely roaming over the skies of a state (Iran, Lebanon, etc. as part of efforts to  negotiate substantially important changes in relations where there is no innocence on  the part of the state onto which such power is projected strategically) or projecting military power to extract persons (in the case if Venezuela  characterized as part of a criminal gang by the projecting state) and a Russian style invasion if another country for the purpose of annexing territory.  The last, of course is the most problematic for the U.S. in the sense that it is intended by the old institutionalist order. The US understanding of multilateralism as inter-governmentalism is ironically closer to the traditional Brazilian and Chinese position than that of the old US elites or that of Mexico and Spain--except as seen in the communication as discourse. 

More generally, the terms that form the core of the communication themselves  are not just larded with ambiguity, their precision depends in large part on the orienting cognitive premises within which it is possible to develop communal agreement as the the values inherent in those terms and the intentions that they embody where a state seeks to rely in their meaning to act or refrain from acting.   And of course, the nature of those terms is distinctly meaningful in the Global South, especially in Latin America, in ways that may not resonate either the US or China; except as  perhaps as text. Those differences were nicely elaborated in the speech of President Sheinbaum before the Summit leaders, the video of which may be accessed below the image that follows.

Pix and video posted to YouTube HERE

 

At its core, then, the text of the communication invites its reader to embrace a community of meaning and meaning making that permits only one orthodox reading of its sense of itself, and only one orthodox application of its pronouncements--without the bother of exposing those premises or debating their form and interpretation. That is fair; it is also politics; and it goes to the broader and much more important contest of the control of any sort of collective meaning and from leaning expectations of behavior, and which is acknowledged, is only visible in the margins and between the lines of text. That contest, in turn, in its current form, has a very very long history; and the likelihood of its decisive resolution is fantasy (though one that helps fuel the intensity of belief necessary to manage and deploy the foot soldiers of each of these camps).  For all that it is still important. It us important for the way it suggests a perhaps substantial difference in ordering premises between the Global South in Latin America (built on the richness of its own experiences and desires as they perceive them, or at least as their elites perceive them) and those of the United States and China. The latter two increasingly align though from fundamentally different starting points, and that alignment increasingly marks a gap between the Latin American South and the two apex powers. 

None of this, of course, will have a substantial effect on the resolution of the Cuban crisis; and that suggests that even substantial and fundamental differences in the way in which  the ordering if reality as a function of premises and values will be softened by pragmatism. In that it is telling that Mexico has been leading this endeavor, continuing to play a discursive and normative long game beyond Cuba even as it bends to the realities of the situation in which it finds itself in this stage of the region's historical development (consider remarks of President Sheinbaum Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia: Presidenta propone programa global de reforestación y declaración contra intervención militar en Cuba). But it is a pragmatism that, for their own reasons cannot be shared by the current leaders of Spain and Brazil, each of which has their own and quite distinct (and not irrational) agendas and historical baggage. And here, the discourse of international law and humanitarian intervention, garnished with the tropes of sovereign equality and territorial integrity within dense normative frameworks of multilateral constraints that are meant to have supra-constitutional (and thus legal) effect (of some kind) will have to confront a perhaps equally interesting problem of the management of systems of collectivized States (whether from an transactional or institutional structural framework)--the problem of failed states and the duties of either the collective of states (however organized and conceived) or of some of their elements, to take responsibility (whatever that means). It is in this latter respect that much of the discourse speaks to, if only obliquely--and that, of course is the fundamental problem. It is a critical ideological and cognitive problem for the governments of Mexico, Spain, and Brasil precisely because, to some greater or lesser extent,   any admission respecting State failure in Cuba would  (or could) weaken the normative power of the ideologies that are both shared among them and central to the advancing of their own normative orthodoxies both within their own countries and as the orthodox foundation of international ordering. To protect Cuba against its failures of its own government is, in that respect and to some extent, a protection of their own normative legitimacy. Or so they might be inclined to think. . . (Cf., here, here, and here especially from the Cuban side).  

All the same, through the transactional lens of the US, to which much of this is directed, the discursive performance will  have consequences for the relations between these four states in ways that are not yet clear--except that relations between the US and Spain and Brazil are likely to get worse before they get better (absent a change of government); those with Mexico will remain pragmatic and transactional, and it is likely that it will be Mexico that will be most effective in serving as  an intermediary and bridge to other states. And those changes will substantially affect relations with both Europe, but more importantly China, as perhaps the current government of Spain has sought to demonstrate, inadvertently of course, as it seeks to live the values of its government. In that latter case it may be worth considering the parallelism between the maverick politics of Mr. Orban in Hungary and that of Mr. Sanchez in Spain (Move Over, Hungary: Spain Is China’s New Best Friend in the EU). If they are mimetic, that points both to its importance, as well as its longevity where either is out of sync with larger and more powerful cognitive movements among the organs of collectivized states.  

The text of the Communication follows below.  

Novos artigos publicados na RCA Vol 27 [New Articles Published Vol 27 Revista de Ciências da Administração]

 

 

Delighted to pass along information about a series of quite interesting essays just published in  Revista de Ciências da Administração, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Departamento de Administração, Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil. The articles are published in Portuguese and english.

The articles include 

Vera L. Cançado, Alinne Freitas Frade Drumond, Sistema de aprendizagem organizacional em uma empresa pública: validação de modelos da relação entre os estoques e fluxos de aprendizagem com o desempenho de negócio [Organizational learning systems in a public company: model validation of the relationship between stocks and flows of learning with business performance]

 Quezia Rosa, Ana Maria Machado Toaldo, Processo de estratégia de desenvolvimento de novos mercados: uma abordagem de capacidades em um contexto inter-regional [New market development strategy process: a capabilities approach in an interregional context]

 Guilherme Gustavo Holz Peroni, Priscilla de Oliveira Martins-Silva, Etarismo e suas implicações sob a ótica dos servidores públicos mais velhos [Ageism and its implications from the perspective of older public servants]

 Marisa Delfino, Ana Burcharth, Maria Elisa Brandão Bernardes, O papel do líder operacional para o desenvolvimento da ambidestria dinâmica em uma empresa tradicional: a AcerlorMittal Brasil [The Role of the Operational Leader for the Development of Dynamic Ambidexterity in a Traditional Company: AcerlorMittal Brasil]

 

 

Perspectives on Brazilian Constitutionalism: v. 46 n. 101 (2025): Seqüência - Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos

 

Delighted to pass along two quite interesting articles just published in v. 46 n. 101 (2025): Seqüência - Estudos Jurídicos e Político. The Theme is Brazilian constitutionalism.

Paulo Marcio Cruz, Marcos Fey Probst  consider the possibilities of constitutional symmetry in Brazilian federative constitutional ideology (Simetria constitucional: que federação estamos construindo?  [Constitutional Symmetry: What kind of federation are we building?]). The authors consider decades of Supreme Court opinions constructing the Brazilian form of federalism against the principle of symmetry and constitutionally necessary minimum degrees of autonomy. 

Dimitri Dimoulis, Soraya Gasparetto Lunardi cinsider the contemporary forms of the Brazilian constitutional crisis (A Constituição brasileira em crise (2015-2022): perda de substância normativa e eficácia seletiva) [The Brazilian Constitution in crisis (2015-2022): loss of normative substance and selective effectiveness)] which adds a layer to the variations of crisis in other liberal democratic constitutional systems. They suggest that from the 2015 international and economic crisis and under the leadership of Presidents Temer and Bolsonaro, the 1988 Constitution was applied to reduce its normative substance in ways that aggravated its selective effectiveness under neoliberal policies.

Both are worth reading and considering. The abstracts of both follow below in English and the original Portuguese along with links to the articles follow below.

In the Face of a Merchant President Mexico Bargains and Brazil Administers; President Claudia Sheinbaum, "Evitamos el aumento de aranceles y logramos 90 días para construir un acuerdo de largo plazo" [We avoided tariff increases and achieved 90 days to build a long-term agreement: President Claudia Sheinbaum: "We have the best possible agreement, even compared to other nations; that is, investing in Mexico remains the best option": Chief Executive]

 

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I have considered the difference among states in their ability, and disposition, to engage with the Trump Presidency's America(s) First Initiative (Merchants Negotiate and Officials Manage Discretion Fueled Legal Structures--While Mexico Bargains Brazil Adopts Countermeasures). The difference is not merely a matter of temperament, though that plays a part. The trajectories to power and authority of President Sheinbaum and President Lula da Silva  have been quite different. And though they both are  liberal politically, that category stretches quite a bit to include them both within it. 

President Lula represents old style left of center politics; it is bound up in the frenzy and intellectual currents of the second half of the 20th century--with its ideological purities, its pragmatic ruthlessness, and its state centered institutionalism in which the State and its organs, fueled by officials exercising discretion in the serve of grand top down plans (for the people) (eg here and here). It is institutional, suspicious of private actors, and fond of democratic centralism centered on the State and its organs.  It is decidedly democratic, to be sure--and robustly so--but it is also a creature of institutional foundations and administrative cultures that tend to vaunt the official (and in the case of Brazil post dictatorship, the judiciary) into an apex position.  None f this is either bad or good--but it does have consequences when it encounters oppositional forces of distinctive characteristics. 

President Sheinbaum may well represent a post 20th century Latin American liberalism. It is More pragmatic and objectives driven, though at the same time it is fiercely protective of the foundational political and social principles. It is also fiercely heterodox in its hybridity--one that extends to virtually all sectors of social collectivism. Ideology is a tool of that heterodoxy, to be sure, but it creates a space rather than a path. One sees this, for example, in the constitution of a commission to undertake a deep review of the Mexican electoral system "Esta comisión tendrá por objetivo la elaboración de un diagnóstico profundo del estado en el que se encuentra el modelo electoral y de partidos, y como segunda tarea el confeccionar una reforma legislativa que esté acorde con los tiempos actuales en México, en donde se ponga en el centro la democracia y el pueblo." [The objective of this commission will be to elaborate a deep diagnostic s of the electoral system and of political parties within it, and as a second task to present a package of legislative reform that is in line with the current times in Mexico, where democracy and the people are placed at the centre.] (Tarjeta informativa 34/2025: El Gobierno de México, que preside la Jefa del Ejecutivo federal, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, anuncia la creación de la Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma Electoral, que será encabezada por Pablo Gómez Álvarez).

But it is more acutely visible in the transactional platform within which President Sheinbaum and President Trump seek to engage in what the Chinese call win-win negotiations to develop a framework (the principal transaction) within which it is possible for  Mexico and the United States to do business in ways that are respectful of the core principles and norms around which each is centered.  That is a nice way of saying that Mexico may be as adept as the United States in deploying America First to its own benefit within the context of current power relations between the U.S. and Mexico, and with an eye toward Mexico's leading position within Latin American regionalist and integrationist circles. See Evitamos el aumento de aranceles y logramos 90 días para construir un acuerdo de largo plazo: Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum: “Tenemos el mejor acuerdo posible, comparado incluso con las demás naciones; es decir, invertir en México sigue siendo la mejor opción”: Jefa del Ejecutivo Federal [We avoided tariff increases and achieved 90 days to build a long-term agreement: President Claudia Sheinbaum: "We have the best possible agreement, even compared to other nations; that is, investing in Mexico remains the best option": Chief Executive] In that text President Sheinbaum presents  a glimpse at the mindset and framework that now drive Mexican engagement with the United States under this administration. Mexico perhaps realizes what Brazil may not--that at the end of the day popular assessment will be undertaken as a function of personal welfare; ideological purity is more compelling on a full stomach, with work to go to, fuel in the car and a house to live in. At the same time pragmatism works only to the extent that core principles are protected. That is is a self-consciously deliberate strategy is undeniable--but one made possible only because of the structire of political culture. The trick, of course, is to make good on all of this. For Mexico, that means a fairly large porfolio of win-win arrangements. The ideal would entail such arrangement of win-win transactions that can be used to create a web of pathways in. among and through them. The object is not to re-create an America First or Belt & Road Initiative structire, but to use the genius of both or either in the interests of Mexican goals. 

The text of the remarks follow below in the original Spanish and in an English translation. 

Merchants Negotiate and Officials Manage Discretion Fueled Legal Structures--While Mexico Bargains Brazil Adopts Countermeasures

 

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Latin America is as varied as its peoples. What they appear to share in common is adaptation to the substantial changes in the forms, cultures, and cognitive cages within which the United States seeks to deal with its Hispano-Lusitanian-Indigenous neighbors. 

Senator Henry Clay

That very American cognitive cage, sometimes referenced as America(s) First, posits a normative triumph of the transactional. That is, it returns the United States to a political-cultural position closer to that of the middle of the 19th century--markets driven, trading focused, and grounded on the notion that the State served the nation best as a large and multi-purpose Import-Export Bank and insurance enterprise, one that included a military wing for the protection of a trading environment centered in the nation but extending outward through investment transactions and transactions in goods and services, that serves the nation by creating wealth. Americans (at least the current crop of leadership) are now merchants again. One recalls Henry Clay and the tripartite economic organization of the nation built around tariffs and the win-win of a functionally differentiated economic Republic --Southern planters for export and supply of raw materials to domestic manufacturers, Northern industrialists and merchants for trading in goods and services and participating in domestic supply chains, and western farmers to feed the nation, and perhaps the rest of the world (Henry Clay, The American System, Speech Delivered in the Senate of the United States 2-3 and 6 February 1832). It is no longer 1832, the union has become a more unified State, tariffs are no longer the critical source of revenue for the general government, and functional differentiation within the Republic has become exceedingly multi-layered and partitioned, as well as deeply embedded in the foreign adventures of the Republic's economic actors. Nonetheless the ghosts of the antebellum Republic continue to haunt--spectres that remind us that cultural types--merchant, official, warrior, and farmer--may transcend the peculiarities of a stage of historical development to  appear and reappear as the dominant vision for an age (The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux). 

The response to these  changes in national leadership socio-political cultural "personality" by its neighbors has been one of the great sports of regional history. It also serves to unmask the cognitive cages, trip wires and rationalizing predilections of those sovereign enterprises that must deal both with foreign merchants, adventurers, investors and traders, while sending out their own to their own ends.  

On the one hand, Mexican leaders, through their President Claudia Sheinbaum, have adapted to these personality changes through a well developed process of flexibility that both mimics the ruling American archetype of a time and then reflecting it back in ways that serve the Mexican national interest. ("Vamos a llegar a un acuerdo con el gobierno de EUA; no se negocia nunca la soberanía de nuestro país: Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum" [We will reach an agreement with the US government; our country's sovereignty is never negotiable: President Claudia Sheinbaum]; also here and here). The power imbalances between Mexico and the U.S. of course shape the nature of that interaction, but they do not make it either impossible or of some value to the Mexican Republic, itself a powerful regional actor within its own sphere of primary operation. And of course, Mexican elites have the capacity of transactional merchant cultures that in some ways equal or sometimes exceed that of the merchant types of their northern neighbor. The point, though is that Mexican political elites tend to be in the flow of their neighbor, and have learned to exploit it to the extent possible from time to time. In the age of the merchant, in the time of the triumph of the transaction, Mexico might become a saavy merchant and its transactions can be both defensive and offensive. In the latter respect one need only consider the way Mexico leverages both regional power and serves as a counterbalancing conduit for principal tiers competitors of its North American neighbor--for the moment particularly in its relations with China (here). 

On the other hand, Brazil, that other Latin American power, has tended to adopt a quite different approach. That difference, grounded in wariness and built on a need to preserve its cognitive borders (physically manifested, of course, through the State and its legal-administrative apparatus) against what it views as interference by foreigners, especially disfavored or ideologically threatening foreigners. If Mexico can flexibly move between the cognitive sensibilities of the merchant and the official, Brazil appears less able or willing to do so.  Probably less willing given its won development of a political culture around which the State apparatus has been built. In the current era, wariness of the United States--whether in its apparent  in the cultures of the official or the merchant--runs deep, and to some extent is both ideological and personal in a way the dogmatics of which are more powerful than in either the United States or Mexico. One might start the current history of those dogmatics from the time that Brazil helped spearhead the demise of the U.S. based Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2008 (an irony, really, considering the enthusiasm, less than half a generation later, for the arrangements of the Chinese Belt & Toad Initiative). But that speaks to ideology as well as economic interest--and to an attachment of Brazil (though not necessarily its masses beyond the intellectuals and officials) for European and "South" sensibilities over that of the North Americans. Fair enough, of course, and one, at least among segments of its intelligentsia long cultivated by deep connections with Cuban political ideology and European intellectual currents. 

The differences between Mexico and Brazil then tend to be quite showy, especially in moments of transition or crisis (both in the United States an in Brazil or Mexico). The showiest element, and the core triggering element of transactional discourse in both states touches on sovereignty.  Like every other Latin American State, the issue of sovereignty, its discourse, and the way in which it is made meaningful in culture, politics, and economics, is central to the way in which States approach their relations with others. Sovereignty, in this sense acquires a profoundly semiotic and cognitive character.  It is an object that incarnates the ideal of the State, but at the same time it is a way in which the State's ideal acquires significance, and through this signification (what does sovereignty mean in context and with respect to specific relations) it may be applied or interpreted expressed in the actions and policies of the State, as well as in the form of a conceptual framework within which it is possible to understand and abide by the "rules" and limits of actions  that trigger taboo negative impacts on sovereignty. But the practice of sovereignty, that is, the way that sovereignty is articulated, and thus articulated manifested as a form of that articulation,  is also a function of the history and national context in which it may be applied--even where the national feeling (the patriotic solidarity) among states may be viewed as equivalent. Mexican sovereignty, in this sense, is largely internalized. It is expressed within the self conception, and thus the action drivers, of its collective organs. Might it be possible to suggest that Brazilian sovereignty is more visible an an externalized force--projected outward through the expressions of an ideology of sovereign prerogative in law and discretionary actions  leveraged outward bit applied to those invited in. Mexican sovereignty can thus be expressed in and as transactions in a way that would be difficult for their Brazilian counterparts, for which a more formal legal-administrative language of the culture of the official (rather than the merchant) predominates. No judgment here--either works--but it makes sense to acquire some sort of understanding of the language and cognitive frameworks within which relationships might be approached with either or both. 

It is no surprise, then, that as President Sheinbaum negotiates, President Lula da Silva--ironically taking a page from the Executive playbook of President Trump, though within the cultural spaces of Brazilian approaches to these things--exercises administrative discretion within an apparatus of state. The result is inevitable--for Mexico the challenge of bargaining for a good deal; for Brazil, the start of a chess game of opposition and regulatory (as well as discursive) stances.  

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Monday signed the decree regulating the Trade Reciprocity Law, Chief of Staff Rui Costa confirmed in a statement from the Planalto Palace. The measure is to be published in a regular edition of the Federal Diário Oficial da União (Official Gazette - DOU). The new rule authorizes the Brazilian government to adopt trade measures against countries that impose unilateral barriers on Brazilian products in the global market. It could be used to respond to the 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States (US) as of August 1, as announced last week by US President Donald Trump. (HERE)

More specifically, the "Economic Reciprocity Law, approved by the Brazilian Congress in April and now formally implemented, allows the government to suspend trade concessions, investments and even intellectual property rights of countries that impose unilateral measures against Brazilian interests." (Here). To that end, President Lula da Silva promulgated DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025. The Decree establishes an Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures, of a deliberative and executive nature, under the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services. The Committee is authorized to consider adoption of provisional countermeasures referred to in Art. 6 of Law No. 15,122, of April 11, 2025; and to monitor negotiations to overcome unilaterally imposed measures detrimental to Brazil's international competitiveness. Chapter IV sets out the procedures for the adoption of provisional countermeasures and is worth a read. 

Neither the Apil 2025 Law nor its implementaiton within the structures of a State organ vested with substantial (though interlinked) discretionary authority is unexpected, nor aberrational within the cultural cultures and approaches of Brazil's elites. It is just interesting to see how, in context, it may play out for the moment.  Again, there is a measure of the personal, the cultural and the political that spices things up. President Trump favors the mortal enemy of President Lula da Silva, who suffered personally (as well as politically including his protege) at the hands of former President Jair Bolsonaro. And internet content oozing into (or from) Brazil on matters related to that feuding--including in its judicial forms--has irritated an influential sector of Brazilian leadership and raised old sensibilities anew. President Trump has also been a bit aggressive in response to the provocative (though not unexpected) discourse emerging from the BRICS summit of a few weeks ago. 

Although the decree does not mention the U.S., its publication on Tuesday is widely seen as a response to the tariff escalation pushed by Trump, who framed the sanctions as a response to a Supreme Court case against former President Jair Bolsonaro, calling it a "witch hunt." On Monday, Brazil’s Office of the Prosecutor General recommended Bolsonaro’s conviction, along with seven others, for attempting a coup d’état. The new law applies in three scenarios: when a foreign country interferes in Brazil’s sovereign decisions, violates existing trade agreements or imposes environmental restrictions stricter than Brazil’s legislation. That includes, for instance, unilateral barriers on Brazilian commodity imports based on non-negotiated environmental standards. (Here).

One does not negotiate--one responds, formally and through the instrumentalities of State and law. ""Now the country has a legitimate and autonomous legal tool to respond more effectively to unfair trade practices,” he said. “Responses can be faster, more coordinated and based on objective criteria. That strengthens both the legal and political legitimacy of any retaliation, even before international bodies.”" .(Here quoting Igor Machado, a tax attorney at São Paulo-based firm Meirelles Costa Advogados).  Early in the return of President Trump to Office, Welber Barral, a partner at the consultancy BMJ and Brazil’s foreign trade secretary from 2007 to 2011,explained the fundamental approach: "For trade policymakers in capitals everywhere, the issue is no longer whether to retaliate, but how to do so wisely. A poorly calibrated countermeasure risks harming domestic industries more than its intended target, while a well-crafted response can tilt the scales back toward negotiation." (here)

None of this is good or bad; it just is in the sense that it both reveals the nature and imperatives of cognitive cages and also the way that those cages make responses both inevitable and predictable. In the process it also serves as a reminder that cognition helps shape the way that people and collectives view, understand and respond to each other, that discourse sometimes provides a glimpse into the mindset that propels those relations, and that this knowledge can either be exploited or produces sometimes unfortunate though not unforeseen consequences.  In this case, it is likely that the personal and the ideological shape U.S. Brazil relations in ways that are not transposable to the U.S. Mexican relationship. It is likely to endure until President Lula da Silva and Trump's time in office (and that of the leaders in their factions) disappear from the scene. But that is years in the future. And there is much to be learned from the Brazilian legal architecture in a world that is increasingly redefined by layered hub and spoke platforms of economic-political relations with the two apex powers at the top. All states eventually will have to make a space for themselves somewhere in this layered universe of functionally and politically differentiated global platforms. Brazil provides one approach; Mexico another, and both in the shadow of the structural frameworks developed by China and the United States. 

And, of course, this is a U.S. Administration that is always eager to engage in leader play in the style of merchants negotiating transactions; President Lula da Silva, of course, will return the fvor, but in the style of the ideologiocally committed official thinking in terms of institutions and jurisdictional prerogatives seeking a positive stable state. The two styles are unlikely to align--and that may be the preference of both actors. And thus the American move:

Today, the Office of the United States Trade Representative initiated an investigation of Brazil under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The investigation will seek to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Brazil related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption interference; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.

“At President Trump’s direction, I am launching a Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s attacks on American social media companies as well as other unfair trading practices that harm American companies, workers, farmers, and technology innovators,” said Ambassador Greer. “USTR has detailed Brazil’s unfair trade practices that restrict the ability of U.S. exporters to access its market for decades in the annual National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report. After consulting with other government agencies, cleared advisers, and Congress, I have determined that Brazil’s tariff and non-tariff barriers merit a thorough investigation, and potentially, responsive action." (Office of the US TRade Representative)

 The language is one of disadvantageous tariffs on the U.S. side. "Greer accused Brazil of disadvantaging American exports by offering lower tariffs to other trade partners. Investigators will look into alleged attempts by Brazil to penalise US companies involved in digital trade and services for not censoring political speech." (BBC)

 The text of  Lei nº 15.122 de 11 de abril de 2025 and of DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025 follow below in the original Portuguese and in a crude English translation. The Statement of the U.S. Trade Representative of 15 July, Brazil’s Unfair Trading Practices, also follows below. 

 

Pix Credit BBC