Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (May 15, 2026)

 

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 It was reported in Al Jazeera that the BRICs meeting recently concluded  failed to issue a Jint Statement, producing instead only a Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (May 15, 2026).

The BRICS alliance of major developing economies has failed to issue a joint statement after their two-day meeting in India, amid internal divisions over the Iran war which is affecting several members. India hosted the foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi and currently chairs the alliance. BRICS brings together core members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as newer members Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia and the UAE. India said on Friday that “there were differing views among some members” regarding the conflict in the Middle East. (Al Jazeera)

One can parse through the Chair’s Statement  which is rich not just in what was stated but perhaps more importantly was remained unstated or written between the lines. The Chair’s Statement  is posted below without comment, but with the suggestion that it reflects the complexities  of a multi-polar world of hierarchically arranged power structures still searching for a se of ordering premises. 

 

Comunicado conjunto sobre la situación en Cuba Brasil, España y México [Joint Statement on the Situation in Cuba] Issued by the La IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia [IV Summit in Defense of Democracy] Barcelona el 16-17 Abril

 

 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE.

 

 Los líderes de los gobiernos de España, México y Brasil emitieron la siguiente comunicación en el transcurso de su IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia, celebrada en Barcelona los días 16 y 17 de abril de 2026. Dicha comunicación, titulada «Sobre la situación en Cuba», se produce tras los informes de que la presidenta de México buscaba articular una postura común al respecto. 

Crédito de imagen aquí

La presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum, anunció el sábado, durante la IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia celebrada en Barcelona, ​​que propondrá una declaración formal en oposición a cualquier intervención militar en Cuba, instando a que prevalezcan el diálogo y la paz por encima de la confrontación, en un contexto marcado por las amenazas y el bloqueo energético por parte de Estados Unidos. «A día de hoy, al referirnos a esa pequeña isla caribeña, creemos que ningún pueblo es pequeño, sino grande y estoico cuando defiende su soberanía y su derecho a una vida plena», añadió. Al intervenir en la inauguración del encuentro —convocado por el presidente del Gobierno de España, Pedro Sánchez, y el presidente de Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—, Sheinbaum formuló este llamamiento ante una docena de líderes progresistas, entre los que se encontraban los presidentes de Colombia, Sudáfrica y Uruguay.

La presidenta mexicana aprovechó su intervención para reafirmar que los principios constitucionales de la política exterior de su país conservan plena vigencia en el actual escenario global. Citó la no intervención, el respeto a la autodeterminación, la solución pacífica de controversias, el rechazo al uso de la fuerza, la igualdad jurídica entre los Estados y la búsqueda permanente de la paz como los pilares de la identidad diplomática de México. Advirtió contra cualquier definición de la libertad que implique la sumisión a intereses externos o que reduzca a las naciones soberanas a la condición de colonias modernas, insistiendo en que la libertad carece de sentido sin justicia social, soberanía y dignidad de los pueblos. (aquí) 

El lenguaje empleado no se desvía de la postura que las autoridades mexicanas han mantenido desde el inicio de la actual crisis en Cuba; de hecho, sus elementos ya formaban parte del discurso de la presidenta Sheinbaum a raíz de las acciones emprendidas por Estados Unidos en Venezuela a principios de 2026. Estos tres elementos son: (1) la centralidad de la ayuda humanitaria y la mitigación del sufrimiento de la población; (2) la igualdad soberana y la integridad territorial; y (3) el respeto a los derechos humanos, el multilateralismo en el marco del sistema de las Naciones Unidas y el diálogo respetuoso.

Resulta interesante observar que estos tres elementos son compartidos, a su vez, por los Estados Unidos. El problema, por supuesto, radica en que el significado —tanto de estos principios comunes como del texto empleado para expresarlos, así como de los términos y valores con los que se invisten— separa a Estados Unidos de México, España y Brasil, tanto como el texto común parece unirlos en un proyecto compartido. Estados Unidos centra la ayuda humanitaria en la asistencia directa al pueblo de Cuba, administrada a través de organizaciones no gubernamentales, y ha realizado esfuerzos en este sentido; las premisas cognitivas institucionalistas tradicionales de América Latina, por su parte, evaluarían y operacionalizarían dicha ayuda a través de órganos estatales, procurando no emitir juicios excesivos sobre la eficiencia o las decisiones estratégicas relativas a su distribución (un problema que se repite en otras regiones, como, por ejemplo, en Oriente Medio y el Norte de África, o en el continente africano). Asimismo, Estados Unidos mantiene una postura favorable respecto a la igualdad soberana y la integridad territorial; sin embargo, este enfoque se ve moldeado por el carácter transaccional de la iniciativa «America First» (Estados Unidos Primero). Ambas posturas comparten un profundo rechazo hacia las ambiciones territoriales (con algunas excepciones... pues siempre existen excepciones). No obstante, los partidarios del enfoque transaccional aceptan la premisa de que las proyecciones de poder —incluidas aquellas de carácter violento— hacia el interior de otro Estado pueden resultar necesarias y ventajosas, siempre dentro del marco de su propia interpretación de las «normas» que rigen los ordenamientos jurídicos internos. Los institucionalistas, en cambio, tienden a no distinguir diferencia alguna entre las proyecciones externas de poder hacia otro Estado y las situaciones de tensión territorial: ya sea el libre sobrevuelo de los cielos de un Estado (como en los casos de Irán, el Líbano, etc., en el contexto de esfuerzos por negociar cambios sustanciales en las relaciones —situaciones en las que no cabe hablar de «inocencia» por parte del Estado sobre el cual se proyecta estratégicamente dicho poder—); la proyección de fuerza militar con el fin de extraer a determinadas personas (como en el caso de Venezuela, donde el Estado agresor calificó a dichas personas como miembros de una banda criminal); o bien una invasión al estilo ruso sobre otro país con el propósito de anexionarse su territorio. Este último supuesto constituye, naturalmente, el más problemático para Estados Unidos, en la medida en que representa precisamente aquello que el antiguo orden institucionalista pretendía evitar. Irónicamente, la concepción estadounidense del multilateralismo —entendida como un mero intergubernamentalismo— se asemeja más a la postura tradicional de Brasil y China que a la de las antiguas élites de Estados Unidos, o a la de países como México y España; salvo, claro está, cuando se analiza desde la perspectiva de la comunicación entendida como discurso.

 

En un sentido más general, los términos que constituyen el núcleo de la comunicación misma no solo están cargados de ambigüedad; su precisión depende, en gran medida, de las premisas cognitivas orientadoras dentro de las cuales resulta posible forjar un consenso comunitario respecto a los valores inherentes a dichos términos y a las intenciones que estos encarnan, particularmente en aquellos casos en que un Estado busca basarse en su significado para actuar o abstenerse de hacerlo. Y, por supuesto, la naturaleza de tales términos reviste un significado singularmente relevante en el Sur Global —especialmente en América Latina—, de un modo que tal vez no resuene de igual forma ni en Estados Unidos ni en China; salvo, quizás, como mero texto. Estas diferencias fueron expuestas con gran lucidez en el discurso que la presidenta Sheinbaum pronunció ante los líderes de la Cumbre, cuyo video puede consultarse debajo de la imagen que figura a continuación..

Crédito de imagen y video YouTube aquí

 

 En esencia, el texto de la comunicación invita al lector a adoptar una comunidad de significado y construcción de significado que permite una única lectura ortodoxa de su propia concepción y una única aplicación ortodoxa de sus declaraciones, sin molestarse en exponer esas premisas ni debatir su forma e interpretación. Esto es justo; también es política; y remite a la disputa más amplia e importante del control de cualquier tipo de significado colectivo y de las expectativas de comportamiento que se derivan de él, algo que, si bien se reconoce, solo se vislumbra en los márgenes y entre líneas. Esa contienda, en su forma actual, tiene una historia muy larga; y la probabilidad de una resolución decisiva es ilusoria (aunque contribuye a alimentar la intensidad de la creencia necesaria para gestionar y desplegar a los combatientes de cada bando). A pesar de ello, sigue siendo importante. Es importante porque sugiere una diferencia, quizás sustancial, en los principios de ordenamiento entre el Sur Global en América Latina (construido sobre la riqueza de sus propias experiencias y deseos, tal como los perciben, o al menos como los perciben sus élites) y los de Estados Unidos y China. Estos dos últimos se alinean cada vez más, aunque partiendo de puntos de vista fundamentalmente diferentes, y esa alineación marca cada vez más una brecha entre el Sur Latinoamericano y las dos potencias mundiales.

Nada de esto, por supuesto, tendrá un efecto sustancial en la resolución de la crisis cubana; lo que sugiere que incluso las diferencias sustanciales y fundamentales en la forma en que se ordena la realidad en función de los principios y los valores se verán atenuadas por el pragmatismo. Resulta significativo que México haya liderado esta iniciativa, manteniendo una estrategia discursiva y normativa a largo plazo, incluso adaptándose a las realidades de la situación en la que se encuentra en esta etapa del desarrollo histórico de la región (considérense los comentarios de la Presidenta Sheinbaum; Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia: Presidenta propone programa global de reforestación y declaración contra intervención militar en Cuba. Sin embargo, este pragmatismo, por razones propias, no puede ser compartido por los actuales líderes de España y Brasil, cada uno con sus propias agendas y un bagaje histórico bastante distinto (y no irracional). En este contexto, el discurso del derecho internacional y la intervención humanitaria, adornado con los tópicos de la igualdad soberana y la integridad territorial dentro de densos marcos normativos de restricciones multilaterales que pretenden tener un efecto supraconstitucional (y, por lo tanto, legal), tendrá que enfrentarse a un problema quizás igualmente interesante: la gestión de sistemas de Estados colectivizados (ya sea desde un marco estructural transaccional o institucional). El problema de los Estados fallidos y el deber, ya sea del colectivo de Estados (independientemente de su organización y concepción) o de algunos de sus elementos, de asumir la responsabilidad (sea lo que sea que esto signifique). Es precisamente a este último aspecto al que se dirige gran parte del discurso, aunque sea de forma indirecta, y ese es, por supuesto, el problema fundamental. Se trata de un problema ideológico y cognitivo crítico para los gobiernos de México, España y Brasil, precisamente porque, en mayor o menor medida, cualquier admisión de fracaso estatal en Cuba debilitaría (o podría debilitar) el poder normativo de las ideologías que comparten y que son fundamentales para el avance de sus propias ortodoxias normativas, tanto dentro de sus países como en su papel de fundamento ortodoxo del orden internacional. Proteger a Cuba de los fracasos de su propio gobierno es, en ese sentido y hasta cierto punto, una protección de su propia legitimidad normativa. O al menos así podrían tender a pensar…

Sin embargo, a través de la lente transaccional de los EE. UU., hacia la que se dirige gran parte de esto, el desempeño discursivo tendrá consecuencias para las relaciones entre estos cuatro estados de maneras que aún no están claras, excepto que es probable que las relaciones entre los EE. UU. y España y Brasil empeoren antes de mejorar (a falta de un cambio de gobierno); las que tienen con México seguirán siendo pragmáticas y transaccionales, y es probable que sea México el que sea más eficaz sirviendo como intermediario y puente hacia otros estados. Y esos cambios afectarán sustancialmente las relaciones con Europa, pero más importante aún con China, como tal vez el actual gobierno de España ha tratado de demostrar, inadvertidamente por supuesto, al tratar de vivir los valores de su gobierno. En ese último caso, tal vez valga la pena considerar el paralelismo entre la política inconformista del Sr. Orbán en Hungría y la del Sr. Sánchez en España (Apártate Hungría: España es el nuevo mejor amigo de China en la UE). Si son miméticos, esto apunta tanto a su importancia como a su longevidad, en aquellos casos en que cualquiera de estos aspectos se halle desincronizado respecto a movimientos cognitivos más amplios y poderosos entre los órganos de los Estados colectivizados.

A continuación, se presenta el texto de la Comunicación.

Comunicado conjunto sobre la situación en Cuba Brasil, España y México [Joint Statement on the Situation in Cuba] Issued by the La IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia [IV Summit in Defense of Democracy] Barcelona el 16-17 Abril

 

 VERSION en Español Aquí

 

The leaders of the governments of Spain, Mexico and Brazil issued the following communication during the course of their  IV Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia [IV Summit in Defense of Democracy] which was held in Barcelona 16-17April 2026. The Communication, On the situation in Cuba, follows reports that the President of Mexico was seeking to develop a common position.

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Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum announced Saturday during the IV Summit in Defense of Democracy in Barcelona that she will propose a formal declaration opposing any military intervention in Cuba, urging dialogue and peace to prevail over confrontation amid U.S. threats and energy blockade. “To this day, speaking of that small Caribbean island, we believe that no people are small, but rather great and stoic when defending their sovereignty and the right to a fulfilling life,” she added. Speaking at the opening of the gathering convened by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Sheinbaum made her call before a dozen progressive leaders including the presidents of Colombia, South Africa, and Uruguay

 The Mexican president used her address to reaffirm that her country’s constitutional foreign policy principles remain fully relevant in the current global landscape. She cited non-intervention, respect for self-determination, peaceful dispute resolution, rejection of force, legal equality among states, and the enduring pursuit of peace as pillars of Mexico’s diplomatic identity. She warned against any definition of freedom that implies submission to external interests or reduces sovereign nations to the status of modern colonies, insisting that liberty holds no meaning without social justice, sovereignty, and the dignity of peoples. (here)

The language does not deviate form a position that the Mexicans have taken from the start of the current crisis in Cuba, its elements already part of discourse of President Sheinbaum in the wake of the U.S. action in Venezuela at the start of 2026. The three elements are (1) the centrality of humanitarian aid and the minimization of popular suffering, (2) sovereign equality and territorial integrity; and (3) respect for human rights, multilateralism within the context of the UN system, and respectful dialog.

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The three elements, interestingly enough are shared  by the United States. The problem, of course, is that the meaning that these common principles and the text used to express them of the terms and the values with which they are invested separate the United States from Mexico, Spain and Brasil  as much as the common text appears to join them in a common project. The United States  centers humanitarian aid on direct aid to the people of Cuba administered through non-governmental organizations, and has made efforts in that respect; traditional Latin American institutionalist cognitive premises would  assess and operationalize that aid through State organs and make an effort not to be too judgy about efficiencies or strategic choices respecting distribution (a problem repeated elsewhere, e.g., in MENA and Africa). The United States is also positive about sovereign equality and territorial integrity; that focus is shaped by the transactionalism of the America First Initiative, Both share a strong distaste for territorial ambitions (with some exceptions. . . there are always exceptions). Transactionalists, however, accept the premise that projections, including violent projections into another State may be necessary,  and advantageous, within the ambit of their reading of the "rules" of internal law frameworks. Institutionalists tend to see no difference between outward projections of power into another state and territorial stress--whether it is freely roaming over the skies of a state (Iran, Lebanon, etc. as part of efforts to  negotiate substantially important changes in relations where there is no innocence on  the part of the state onto which such power is projected strategically) or projecting military power to extract persons (in the case if Venezuela  characterized as part of a criminal gang by the projecting state) and a Russian style invasion if another country for the purpose of annexing territory.  The last, of course is the most problematic for the U.S. in the sense that it is intended by the old institutionalist order. The US understanding of multilateralism as inter-governmentalism is ironically closer to the traditional Brazilian and Chinese position than that of the old US elites or that of Mexico and Spain--except as seen in the communication as discourse. 

More generally, the terms that form the core of the communication themselves  are not just larded with ambiguity, their precision depends in large part on the orienting cognitive premises within which it is possible to develop communal agreement as the the values inherent in those terms and the intentions that they embody where a state seeks to rely in their meaning to act or refrain from acting.   And of course, the nature of those terms is distinctly meaningful in the Global South, especially in Latin America, in ways that may not resonate either the US or China; except as  perhaps as text. Those differences were nicely elaborated in the speech of President Sheinbaum before the Summit leaders, the video of which may be accessed below the image that follows.

Pix and video posted to YouTube HERE

 

At its core, then, the text of the communication invites its reader to embrace a community of meaning and meaning making that permits only one orthodox reading of its sense of itself, and only one orthodox application of its pronouncements--without the bother of exposing those premises or debating their form and interpretation. That is fair; it is also politics; and it goes to the broader and much more important contest of the control of any sort of collective meaning and from leaning expectations of behavior, and which is acknowledged, is only visible in the margins and between the lines of text. That contest, in turn, in its current form, has a very very long history; and the likelihood of its decisive resolution is fantasy (though one that helps fuel the intensity of belief necessary to manage and deploy the foot soldiers of each of these camps).  For all that it is still important. It us important for the way it suggests a perhaps substantial difference in ordering premises between the Global South in Latin America (built on the richness of its own experiences and desires as they perceive them, or at least as their elites perceive them) and those of the United States and China. The latter two increasingly align though from fundamentally different starting points, and that alignment increasingly marks a gap between the Latin American South and the two apex powers. 

None of this, of course, will have a substantial effect on the resolution of the Cuban crisis; and that suggests that even substantial and fundamental differences in the way in which  the ordering if reality as a function of premises and values will be softened by pragmatism. In that it is telling that Mexico has been leading this endeavor, continuing to play a discursive and normative long game beyond Cuba even as it bends to the realities of the situation in which it finds itself in this stage of the region's historical development (consider remarks of President Sheinbaum Cumbre en Defensa de la Democracia: Presidenta propone programa global de reforestación y declaración contra intervención militar en Cuba). But it is a pragmatism that, for their own reasons cannot be shared by the current leaders of Spain and Brazil, each of which has their own and quite distinct (and not irrational) agendas and historical baggage. And here, the discourse of international law and humanitarian intervention, garnished with the tropes of sovereign equality and territorial integrity within dense normative frameworks of multilateral constraints that are meant to have supra-constitutional (and thus legal) effect (of some kind) will have to confront a perhaps equally interesting problem of the management of systems of collectivized States (whether from an transactional or institutional structural framework)--the problem of failed states and the duties of either the collective of states (however organized and conceived) or of some of their elements, to take responsibility (whatever that means). It is in this latter respect that much of the discourse speaks to, if only obliquely--and that, of course is the fundamental problem. It is a critical ideological and cognitive problem for the governments of Mexico, Spain, and Brasil precisely because, to some greater or lesser extent,   any admission respecting State failure in Cuba would  (or could) weaken the normative power of the ideologies that are both shared among them and central to the advancing of their own normative orthodoxies both within their own countries and as the orthodox foundation of international ordering. To protect Cuba against its failures of its own government is, in that respect and to some extent, a protection of their own normative legitimacy. Or so they might be inclined to think. . . (Cf., here, here, and here especially from the Cuban side).  

All the same, through the transactional lens of the US, to which much of this is directed, the discursive performance will  have consequences for the relations between these four states in ways that are not yet clear--except that relations between the US and Spain and Brazil are likely to get worse before they get better (absent a change of government); those with Mexico will remain pragmatic and transactional, and it is likely that it will be Mexico that will be most effective in serving as  an intermediary and bridge to other states. And those changes will substantially affect relations with both Europe, but more importantly China, as perhaps the current government of Spain has sought to demonstrate, inadvertently of course, as it seeks to live the values of its government. In that latter case it may be worth considering the parallelism between the maverick politics of Mr. Orban in Hungary and that of Mr. Sanchez in Spain (Move Over, Hungary: Spain Is China’s New Best Friend in the EU). If they are mimetic, that points both to its importance, as well as its longevity where either is out of sync with larger and more powerful cognitive movements among the organs of collectivized states.  

The text of the Communication follows below.  

Novos artigos publicados na RCA Vol 27 [New Articles Published Vol 27 Revista de Ciências da Administração]

 

 

Delighted to pass along information about a series of quite interesting essays just published in  Revista de Ciências da Administração, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Departamento de Administração, Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil. The articles are published in Portuguese and english.

The articles include 

Vera L. Cançado, Alinne Freitas Frade Drumond, Sistema de aprendizagem organizacional em uma empresa pública: validação de modelos da relação entre os estoques e fluxos de aprendizagem com o desempenho de negócio [Organizational learning systems in a public company: model validation of the relationship between stocks and flows of learning with business performance]

 Quezia Rosa, Ana Maria Machado Toaldo, Processo de estratégia de desenvolvimento de novos mercados: uma abordagem de capacidades em um contexto inter-regional [New market development strategy process: a capabilities approach in an interregional context]

 Guilherme Gustavo Holz Peroni, Priscilla de Oliveira Martins-Silva, Etarismo e suas implicações sob a ótica dos servidores públicos mais velhos [Ageism and its implications from the perspective of older public servants]

 Marisa Delfino, Ana Burcharth, Maria Elisa Brandão Bernardes, O papel do líder operacional para o desenvolvimento da ambidestria dinâmica em uma empresa tradicional: a AcerlorMittal Brasil [The Role of the Operational Leader for the Development of Dynamic Ambidexterity in a Traditional Company: AcerlorMittal Brasil]

 

 

Perspectives on Brazilian Constitutionalism: v. 46 n. 101 (2025): Seqüência - Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos

 

Delighted to pass along two quite interesting articles just published in v. 46 n. 101 (2025): Seqüência - Estudos Jurídicos e Político. The Theme is Brazilian constitutionalism.

Paulo Marcio Cruz, Marcos Fey Probst  consider the possibilities of constitutional symmetry in Brazilian federative constitutional ideology (Simetria constitucional: que federação estamos construindo?  [Constitutional Symmetry: What kind of federation are we building?]). The authors consider decades of Supreme Court opinions constructing the Brazilian form of federalism against the principle of symmetry and constitutionally necessary minimum degrees of autonomy. 

Dimitri Dimoulis, Soraya Gasparetto Lunardi cinsider the contemporary forms of the Brazilian constitutional crisis (A Constituição brasileira em crise (2015-2022): perda de substância normativa e eficácia seletiva) [The Brazilian Constitution in crisis (2015-2022): loss of normative substance and selective effectiveness)] which adds a layer to the variations of crisis in other liberal democratic constitutional systems. They suggest that from the 2015 international and economic crisis and under the leadership of Presidents Temer and Bolsonaro, the 1988 Constitution was applied to reduce its normative substance in ways that aggravated its selective effectiveness under neoliberal policies.

Both are worth reading and considering. The abstracts of both follow below in English and the original Portuguese along with links to the articles follow below.

In the Face of a Merchant President Mexico Bargains and Brazil Administers; President Claudia Sheinbaum, "Evitamos el aumento de aranceles y logramos 90 días para construir un acuerdo de largo plazo" [We avoided tariff increases and achieved 90 days to build a long-term agreement: President Claudia Sheinbaum: "We have the best possible agreement, even compared to other nations; that is, investing in Mexico remains the best option": Chief Executive]

 

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I have considered the difference among states in their ability, and disposition, to engage with the Trump Presidency's America(s) First Initiative (Merchants Negotiate and Officials Manage Discretion Fueled Legal Structures--While Mexico Bargains Brazil Adopts Countermeasures). The difference is not merely a matter of temperament, though that plays a part. The trajectories to power and authority of President Sheinbaum and President Lula da Silva  have been quite different. And though they both are  liberal politically, that category stretches quite a bit to include them both within it. 

President Lula represents old style left of center politics; it is bound up in the frenzy and intellectual currents of the second half of the 20th century--with its ideological purities, its pragmatic ruthlessness, and its state centered institutionalism in which the State and its organs, fueled by officials exercising discretion in the serve of grand top down plans (for the people) (eg here and here). It is institutional, suspicious of private actors, and fond of democratic centralism centered on the State and its organs.  It is decidedly democratic, to be sure--and robustly so--but it is also a creature of institutional foundations and administrative cultures that tend to vaunt the official (and in the case of Brazil post dictatorship, the judiciary) into an apex position.  None f this is either bad or good--but it does have consequences when it encounters oppositional forces of distinctive characteristics. 

President Sheinbaum may well represent a post 20th century Latin American liberalism. It is More pragmatic and objectives driven, though at the same time it is fiercely protective of the foundational political and social principles. It is also fiercely heterodox in its hybridity--one that extends to virtually all sectors of social collectivism. Ideology is a tool of that heterodoxy, to be sure, but it creates a space rather than a path. One sees this, for example, in the constitution of a commission to undertake a deep review of the Mexican electoral system "Esta comisión tendrá por objetivo la elaboración de un diagnóstico profundo del estado en el que se encuentra el modelo electoral y de partidos, y como segunda tarea el confeccionar una reforma legislativa que esté acorde con los tiempos actuales en México, en donde se ponga en el centro la democracia y el pueblo." [The objective of this commission will be to elaborate a deep diagnostic s of the electoral system and of political parties within it, and as a second task to present a package of legislative reform that is in line with the current times in Mexico, where democracy and the people are placed at the centre.] (Tarjeta informativa 34/2025: El Gobierno de México, que preside la Jefa del Ejecutivo federal, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, anuncia la creación de la Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma Electoral, que será encabezada por Pablo Gómez Álvarez).

But it is more acutely visible in the transactional platform within which President Sheinbaum and President Trump seek to engage in what the Chinese call win-win negotiations to develop a framework (the principal transaction) within which it is possible for  Mexico and the United States to do business in ways that are respectful of the core principles and norms around which each is centered.  That is a nice way of saying that Mexico may be as adept as the United States in deploying America First to its own benefit within the context of current power relations between the U.S. and Mexico, and with an eye toward Mexico's leading position within Latin American regionalist and integrationist circles. See Evitamos el aumento de aranceles y logramos 90 días para construir un acuerdo de largo plazo: Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum: “Tenemos el mejor acuerdo posible, comparado incluso con las demás naciones; es decir, invertir en México sigue siendo la mejor opción”: Jefa del Ejecutivo Federal [We avoided tariff increases and achieved 90 days to build a long-term agreement: President Claudia Sheinbaum: "We have the best possible agreement, even compared to other nations; that is, investing in Mexico remains the best option": Chief Executive] In that text President Sheinbaum presents  a glimpse at the mindset and framework that now drive Mexican engagement with the United States under this administration. Mexico perhaps realizes what Brazil may not--that at the end of the day popular assessment will be undertaken as a function of personal welfare; ideological purity is more compelling on a full stomach, with work to go to, fuel in the car and a house to live in. At the same time pragmatism works only to the extent that core principles are protected. That is is a self-consciously deliberate strategy is undeniable--but one made possible only because of the structire of political culture. The trick, of course, is to make good on all of this. For Mexico, that means a fairly large porfolio of win-win arrangements. The ideal would entail such arrangement of win-win transactions that can be used to create a web of pathways in. among and through them. The object is not to re-create an America First or Belt & Road Initiative structire, but to use the genius of both or either in the interests of Mexican goals. 

The text of the remarks follow below in the original Spanish and in an English translation. 

Merchants Negotiate and Officials Manage Discretion Fueled Legal Structures--While Mexico Bargains Brazil Adopts Countermeasures

 

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Latin America is as varied as its peoples. What they appear to share in common is adaptation to the substantial changes in the forms, cultures, and cognitive cages within which the United States seeks to deal with its Hispano-Lusitanian-Indigenous neighbors. 

Senator Henry Clay

That very American cognitive cage, sometimes referenced as America(s) First, posits a normative triumph of the transactional. That is, it returns the United States to a political-cultural position closer to that of the middle of the 19th century--markets driven, trading focused, and grounded on the notion that the State served the nation best as a large and multi-purpose Import-Export Bank and insurance enterprise, one that included a military wing for the protection of a trading environment centered in the nation but extending outward through investment transactions and transactions in goods and services, that serves the nation by creating wealth. Americans (at least the current crop of leadership) are now merchants again. One recalls Henry Clay and the tripartite economic organization of the nation built around tariffs and the win-win of a functionally differentiated economic Republic --Southern planters for export and supply of raw materials to domestic manufacturers, Northern industrialists and merchants for trading in goods and services and participating in domestic supply chains, and western farmers to feed the nation, and perhaps the rest of the world (Henry Clay, The American System, Speech Delivered in the Senate of the United States 2-3 and 6 February 1832). It is no longer 1832, the union has become a more unified State, tariffs are no longer the critical source of revenue for the general government, and functional differentiation within the Republic has become exceedingly multi-layered and partitioned, as well as deeply embedded in the foreign adventures of the Republic's economic actors. Nonetheless the ghosts of the antebellum Republic continue to haunt--spectres that remind us that cultural types--merchant, official, warrior, and farmer--may transcend the peculiarities of a stage of historical development to  appear and reappear as the dominant vision for an age (The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux). 

The response to these  changes in national leadership socio-political cultural "personality" by its neighbors has been one of the great sports of regional history. It also serves to unmask the cognitive cages, trip wires and rationalizing predilections of those sovereign enterprises that must deal both with foreign merchants, adventurers, investors and traders, while sending out their own to their own ends.  

On the one hand, Mexican leaders, through their President Claudia Sheinbaum, have adapted to these personality changes through a well developed process of flexibility that both mimics the ruling American archetype of a time and then reflecting it back in ways that serve the Mexican national interest. ("Vamos a llegar a un acuerdo con el gobierno de EUA; no se negocia nunca la soberanía de nuestro país: Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum" [We will reach an agreement with the US government; our country's sovereignty is never negotiable: President Claudia Sheinbaum]; also here and here). The power imbalances between Mexico and the U.S. of course shape the nature of that interaction, but they do not make it either impossible or of some value to the Mexican Republic, itself a powerful regional actor within its own sphere of primary operation. And of course, Mexican elites have the capacity of transactional merchant cultures that in some ways equal or sometimes exceed that of the merchant types of their northern neighbor. The point, though is that Mexican political elites tend to be in the flow of their neighbor, and have learned to exploit it to the extent possible from time to time. In the age of the merchant, in the time of the triumph of the transaction, Mexico might become a saavy merchant and its transactions can be both defensive and offensive. In the latter respect one need only consider the way Mexico leverages both regional power and serves as a counterbalancing conduit for principal tiers competitors of its North American neighbor--for the moment particularly in its relations with China (here). 

On the other hand, Brazil, that other Latin American power, has tended to adopt a quite different approach. That difference, grounded in wariness and built on a need to preserve its cognitive borders (physically manifested, of course, through the State and its legal-administrative apparatus) against what it views as interference by foreigners, especially disfavored or ideologically threatening foreigners. If Mexico can flexibly move between the cognitive sensibilities of the merchant and the official, Brazil appears less able or willing to do so.  Probably less willing given its won development of a political culture around which the State apparatus has been built. In the current era, wariness of the United States--whether in its apparent  in the cultures of the official or the merchant--runs deep, and to some extent is both ideological and personal in a way the dogmatics of which are more powerful than in either the United States or Mexico. One might start the current history of those dogmatics from the time that Brazil helped spearhead the demise of the U.S. based Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2008 (an irony, really, considering the enthusiasm, less than half a generation later, for the arrangements of the Chinese Belt & Toad Initiative). But that speaks to ideology as well as economic interest--and to an attachment of Brazil (though not necessarily its masses beyond the intellectuals and officials) for European and "South" sensibilities over that of the North Americans. Fair enough, of course, and one, at least among segments of its intelligentsia long cultivated by deep connections with Cuban political ideology and European intellectual currents. 

The differences between Mexico and Brazil then tend to be quite showy, especially in moments of transition or crisis (both in the United States an in Brazil or Mexico). The showiest element, and the core triggering element of transactional discourse in both states touches on sovereignty.  Like every other Latin American State, the issue of sovereignty, its discourse, and the way in which it is made meaningful in culture, politics, and economics, is central to the way in which States approach their relations with others. Sovereignty, in this sense acquires a profoundly semiotic and cognitive character.  It is an object that incarnates the ideal of the State, but at the same time it is a way in which the State's ideal acquires significance, and through this signification (what does sovereignty mean in context and with respect to specific relations) it may be applied or interpreted expressed in the actions and policies of the State, as well as in the form of a conceptual framework within which it is possible to understand and abide by the "rules" and limits of actions  that trigger taboo negative impacts on sovereignty. But the practice of sovereignty, that is, the way that sovereignty is articulated, and thus articulated manifested as a form of that articulation,  is also a function of the history and national context in which it may be applied--even where the national feeling (the patriotic solidarity) among states may be viewed as equivalent. Mexican sovereignty, in this sense, is largely internalized. It is expressed within the self conception, and thus the action drivers, of its collective organs. Might it be possible to suggest that Brazilian sovereignty is more visible an an externalized force--projected outward through the expressions of an ideology of sovereign prerogative in law and discretionary actions  leveraged outward bit applied to those invited in. Mexican sovereignty can thus be expressed in and as transactions in a way that would be difficult for their Brazilian counterparts, for which a more formal legal-administrative language of the culture of the official (rather than the merchant) predominates. No judgment here--either works--but it makes sense to acquire some sort of understanding of the language and cognitive frameworks within which relationships might be approached with either or both. 

It is no surprise, then, that as President Sheinbaum negotiates, President Lula da Silva--ironically taking a page from the Executive playbook of President Trump, though within the cultural spaces of Brazilian approaches to these things--exercises administrative discretion within an apparatus of state. The result is inevitable--for Mexico the challenge of bargaining for a good deal; for Brazil, the start of a chess game of opposition and regulatory (as well as discursive) stances.  

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Monday signed the decree regulating the Trade Reciprocity Law, Chief of Staff Rui Costa confirmed in a statement from the Planalto Palace. The measure is to be published in a regular edition of the Federal Diário Oficial da União (Official Gazette - DOU). The new rule authorizes the Brazilian government to adopt trade measures against countries that impose unilateral barriers on Brazilian products in the global market. It could be used to respond to the 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States (US) as of August 1, as announced last week by US President Donald Trump. (HERE)

More specifically, the "Economic Reciprocity Law, approved by the Brazilian Congress in April and now formally implemented, allows the government to suspend trade concessions, investments and even intellectual property rights of countries that impose unilateral measures against Brazilian interests." (Here). To that end, President Lula da Silva promulgated DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025. The Decree establishes an Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures, of a deliberative and executive nature, under the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services. The Committee is authorized to consider adoption of provisional countermeasures referred to in Art. 6 of Law No. 15,122, of April 11, 2025; and to monitor negotiations to overcome unilaterally imposed measures detrimental to Brazil's international competitiveness. Chapter IV sets out the procedures for the adoption of provisional countermeasures and is worth a read. 

Neither the Apil 2025 Law nor its implementaiton within the structures of a State organ vested with substantial (though interlinked) discretionary authority is unexpected, nor aberrational within the cultural cultures and approaches of Brazil's elites. It is just interesting to see how, in context, it may play out for the moment.  Again, there is a measure of the personal, the cultural and the political that spices things up. President Trump favors the mortal enemy of President Lula da Silva, who suffered personally (as well as politically including his protege) at the hands of former President Jair Bolsonaro. And internet content oozing into (or from) Brazil on matters related to that feuding--including in its judicial forms--has irritated an influential sector of Brazilian leadership and raised old sensibilities anew. President Trump has also been a bit aggressive in response to the provocative (though not unexpected) discourse emerging from the BRICS summit of a few weeks ago. 

Although the decree does not mention the U.S., its publication on Tuesday is widely seen as a response to the tariff escalation pushed by Trump, who framed the sanctions as a response to a Supreme Court case against former President Jair Bolsonaro, calling it a "witch hunt." On Monday, Brazil’s Office of the Prosecutor General recommended Bolsonaro’s conviction, along with seven others, for attempting a coup d’état. The new law applies in three scenarios: when a foreign country interferes in Brazil’s sovereign decisions, violates existing trade agreements or imposes environmental restrictions stricter than Brazil’s legislation. That includes, for instance, unilateral barriers on Brazilian commodity imports based on non-negotiated environmental standards. (Here).

One does not negotiate--one responds, formally and through the instrumentalities of State and law. ""Now the country has a legitimate and autonomous legal tool to respond more effectively to unfair trade practices,” he said. “Responses can be faster, more coordinated and based on objective criteria. That strengthens both the legal and political legitimacy of any retaliation, even before international bodies.”" .(Here quoting Igor Machado, a tax attorney at São Paulo-based firm Meirelles Costa Advogados).  Early in the return of President Trump to Office, Welber Barral, a partner at the consultancy BMJ and Brazil’s foreign trade secretary from 2007 to 2011,explained the fundamental approach: "For trade policymakers in capitals everywhere, the issue is no longer whether to retaliate, but how to do so wisely. A poorly calibrated countermeasure risks harming domestic industries more than its intended target, while a well-crafted response can tilt the scales back toward negotiation." (here)

None of this is good or bad; it just is in the sense that it both reveals the nature and imperatives of cognitive cages and also the way that those cages make responses both inevitable and predictable. In the process it also serves as a reminder that cognition helps shape the way that people and collectives view, understand and respond to each other, that discourse sometimes provides a glimpse into the mindset that propels those relations, and that this knowledge can either be exploited or produces sometimes unfortunate though not unforeseen consequences.  In this case, it is likely that the personal and the ideological shape U.S. Brazil relations in ways that are not transposable to the U.S. Mexican relationship. It is likely to endure until President Lula da Silva and Trump's time in office (and that of the leaders in their factions) disappear from the scene. But that is years in the future. And there is much to be learned from the Brazilian legal architecture in a world that is increasingly redefined by layered hub and spoke platforms of economic-political relations with the two apex powers at the top. All states eventually will have to make a space for themselves somewhere in this layered universe of functionally and politically differentiated global platforms. Brazil provides one approach; Mexico another, and both in the shadow of the structural frameworks developed by China and the United States. 

And, of course, this is a U.S. Administration that is always eager to engage in leader play in the style of merchants negotiating transactions; President Lula da Silva, of course, will return the fvor, but in the style of the ideologiocally committed official thinking in terms of institutions and jurisdictional prerogatives seeking a positive stable state. The two styles are unlikely to align--and that may be the preference of both actors. And thus the American move:

Today, the Office of the United States Trade Representative initiated an investigation of Brazil under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The investigation will seek to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Brazil related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption interference; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.

“At President Trump’s direction, I am launching a Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s attacks on American social media companies as well as other unfair trading practices that harm American companies, workers, farmers, and technology innovators,” said Ambassador Greer. “USTR has detailed Brazil’s unfair trade practices that restrict the ability of U.S. exporters to access its market for decades in the annual National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report. After consulting with other government agencies, cleared advisers, and Congress, I have determined that Brazil’s tariff and non-tariff barriers merit a thorough investigation, and potentially, responsive action." (Office of the US TRade Representative)

 The language is one of disadvantageous tariffs on the U.S. side. "Greer accused Brazil of disadvantaging American exports by offering lower tariffs to other trade partners. Investigators will look into alleged attempts by Brazil to penalise US companies involved in digital trade and services for not censoring political speech." (BBC)

 The text of  Lei nº 15.122 de 11 de abril de 2025 and of DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025 follow below in the original Portuguese and in a crude English translation. The Statement of the U.S. Trade Representative of 15 July, Brazil’s Unfair Trading Practices, also follows below. 

 

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"Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance"--17 BRICS Summit Declaration 6 July 2025

 

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I have previously posted the addresses of Presidents Lula da Silva and Putin, along with the suggestion that, beyond the discursive finery, groups of States appear to continue an ancient process of rearranging  the furniture in a palace that no one has an intention of vacating. In that context, not the result but the discourse ought to have pride of place. Pride is the operative word, of course, in the sense of a hubris born of the notion that linguistic aggregations can change the world, even as the world remains, at a macro level, substantially unchanged. And yet, the discursive language of transformation does have an effect. In the word of actions, objects, people, and transaction those changes are palpable at the margins.  The effect is personal and idiosyncratic but eventually discernible  empirically--at the margins. More important, perhaps, discursive hubris does produce its own triumph--changing the linguistic building blocks through which the world is understood, rationalized, and valued. Words change and with changing words, value markers change, and as vale markers change, so does rational behavior--and rebellion.

It is with that in mind that the 17th BRICS Summit Declaration, "Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance," and President Trump's response in discourse and action, might be usefully consumed. One uses the word consumed instead of read, precisely because the document is prepared for consumption rather than as a site for engagement. These serve as a catechism of sort--one that is to be internalized and naturalized, the way one consumes a nice plate of rice and beans on a winter day. With one's belly full of this instruction, one can then face the word--expend energy, do things, make judgments, fueled by what has been consumed, and thus consumed, absorbed. The document, then, is the model of post.modern semiosis. It is an object with heft--substantial enough to suggest authority and comprehensiveness. It is a vessel within which a way of looking at the world and the principal players within it may be signified. This object explains BRICS, but to a large degree is is BRICS. It is the linguistic structures within which BRICS acquires form, purpose, effect, and place in tangible as well as intangible spaces. And perhaps most importantly for the political leadership on whose behalf these efforts are expended, the document provides a basis for providing BRICS with purpose, drive, direction for movement, and the values used to assess all of this as the signified vessel-object is guided toard a particular tangible and intangible place propelled in that direction through the language that provide the rails on which this train will travel inevitably wherever it is that the rails take it. 

The  full text of the 17th BRICS Summit Declaration, "Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance,"follows below and may be accessed through the ink provided.  In some ways it is a marvelous historical document. For those with a historical sense it can be understood as a contemporary effort to cobble together a variety of efforts, failures at the time, of policy initiatives with origins during the three way battles of the 19660s-1980s between the Soviet bloc, the Western bloc and (to use the old term deliberately) the "Third" World. This sort of resurrection of the flesh of those ideological and conceptual efforts that had died but apparently, saintlike, retained their full corporeal composition, now rearranged for contemporary times, provides a panoramic view of the consolidation of over half a century of efforts to build an alternative version of contemporary society in its own shadow--sovereign debt, colonialism, migration, privilege, value, sovereignty, ethno-nationalism (when it suits its advocates), the politics of economic activity, the economic activity of politics, the values that these represent, and the nature of collective politics. There are echoes here of old Latin AMerican regionalism, of the Alianza Bolivariana (ALBA), of a  Caribbean Marxist Leninist elaboration of debt as an instrument of sovereign domination, of traditional views of mercantilist views now reframed as issues of development and human rights and embodied in the supremacy of Sate objectives to economic activities, and of the idea of private enterprise as a n instrument of State policy,   These are now modernized in the forms of Belt & Road Initiative sensibilities--but also of America First, and of the regulatory supervision theories emerging from the E.U. All this and more awaits those who choose to consume the plate now put before them. 

This is understood, as well, if only at a subliminal level, by the object of all of this change--the United States at the head of the OECD bloc. In response to the Statist challenge from BRICS, President Trump applied a response that is inherently transactional. 

United States President Donald Trump has threatened to hike tariffs against the BRICS economic bloc after the group offered indirect criticism of trade wars and the recent military attacks in Iran. On Monday, Trump took aim at the 10-member bloc, which seeks to strengthen emerging economies, framing its interests as adversarial to the US’s. “Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff,” Trump wrote in a post. “There will be no exceptions to this policy. Thank you for your attention to this matter!” (here)

As Fidel Castro noted decades ago--las ideas no se matan; loosely one cannot kill ideas. That applies in all directions. 

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Well, perhaps no so subliminally responsive. 

President Donald Trump announced Wednesday he planned to hit Brazil with a 50% tariff, in part because of the treatment of its former president Jair Bolsonaro, his political ally. In a letter on his Truth Social social media network, Trump told current President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva — known as Lula — that "the way Brazil has treated former President Bolsonaro ... is an international disgrace." * * * Trump accused the Brazilian government of "insidious attacks on Free Elections, and the fundamental Free Speech Rights of Americans" including censorship of "U.S. Social Media platforms." (CNBC)

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The now expected performance produced its own expected response: "A few hours later, Mr. Lula said that Brazil would reciprocate against the tariffs. “Brazil is a sovereign country with independent institutions that will not accept being abused by anyone,” he said in a statement. He added that the case against Mr. Bolsonaro “is the sole responsibility of the Brazilian Judiciary.” (New York Times). The relationship between the discourse and reality, however one might engage with that term, appears both fragile and a function of what one brings to the reality sorting table. There are no trade deficits; Brazil ought to run its electoral politics as it chooses; but politics is personal and what appears to be national actions may well be directed toward international consequences as States embrace the usual dysfunctions of their dynamic relations--choose a side, a way of seeing things and then let the discourse fly.

This Totentanz--using economic leverage to induce changes in a target state and then using the rhetoric of sovereignty and non-interference with internal affairs as the counter-discourse, has become the standard framework for relations between core States in the America First and BRI regions and supplies the rhetorical expectations behind which the usual negotiations are undertaken, and competitive strategies deployed. But of course, every interaction between states have consequences for the internal affairs of States--from tariffs to open borders and security and other cooperation. And every such interaction also affects the shape and forms of projections of State power, directly, or indirectly through its economic, social ad cultural organs (public and private) and their internal ramifications for the home State. So, in a sense, the discursive cage within which these realities are emphasized, or at least turned into instruments for communication and the management of mass opinion, is unsurprising, At the same time, its banality also serve to convert communication into noise, especially when directed toward through mass social media organs. And that, precisely, may be its greatest value--providing an instrument through which mass opinion may be managed and passions stoked, and at the same time providing a communications wall behnd which States will do what States do. 

 

 

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (As Delivered) Along with Brief Reflections

 

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 Secretary Hegseth recently attended the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue, where he gave what he hoped was an important speech. The event describes itself this way:

Held annually in Singapore, the Dialogue is Asia’s premier defence summit. It enables decision-makers from across the Asia-Pacific, North America, Europe and the Middle East to gather together to discuss the most pressing regional security issues and to share policy responses. It features plenary debates led by government ministers, as well as important opportunities for bilateral discussions among delegations. (here)

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Many leaders spoke at the event. They included (1) President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron delivers the Keynote Address; and (2) Special Address by Dato’ Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim, Prime Minister of Malaysia. There were many panel sessions where people of consequence spoke of many things that could then be summarized and presented to the masses for their consumption--and for the consumption of each other. Indeed, as is now common in thse sorts of events, the object appears to be to pack the speeches with enough text that some of it might prove of interest to the mass marketers of information and in that way contribute to (and influence) the way the event (and the remarks within the larger show) might drive thinking about whatever it is the speaker wishes the audience to think about. There is much that U.S. reality television teaches us about the event--not that it is trivial, but that it is contrived in a way that deeply illustrates the dialectic between leaders and the masses to whom they appeal, as well as the more interesting sub-dialectic among the speakers themselves as they perform for each other as well as for the viewers. This comparison does not make the event as less real or important--but then the same applies to the Real Housewives franchise as well--each driving important cultural and social expectations in their own way.  And each a cultural artifact that may be more important for the event than for the text of any of its speechifying. Still, the speeches, like the wardrobes of the actors on Real Housewives, can send critically important signals and reveal important things to those of us who can only stand and watch from the outside. And this year the drama was all about the attendance of the United States and China, where both acted out to provide an expected level of drama to the event.

China will not send its defense minister to this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, shunning a chance for a high-level meeting with US and Asian counterparts as tensions simmer with Washington. China announced Thursday it will instead be represented by a delegation from the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University, marking the first time in five years a high-level delegation from Beijing will miss Asia’s largest defense and security forum. The United States will be represented by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at the event, which often provides opportunities on the sidelines for rare face-to-face meetings between top generals and defense officials from the US and China. (here)

And, as expected, the Chinese rejected, in the usual colorful way, whatever it was the Secretary of Defense had to say.

China’s top official at a global defence dialogue on Saturday (May 31) rejected “accusations” made against the country as unfounded and politically motivated, and asserted its commitment to protecting and improving regional security. “We do not accept groundless accusations against China. Some of these claims are completely fabricated, some distort the truth, and some are outright cases of ‘the thief crying thief’,” said Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, who is leading a delegation from the National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. (Here)

Well, then, what was it that the Defense Secretary had to say as an official of the United States that produced the expected and necessary public reaction from the Chinese?  On balance, there was little in the speech that has not been said by officials of every administration since the Obama Administration.  And there is little about the longevity of U.S. interests in the Pacific that has not been established tentatively since the 1850s and more robustly (in contextually and historically acceptable ways) since the end of the 19th century. That, though is important.  There is now a longer term (measured  as these things are measured in the United States) and consistent emphasis on the Asian sector in terms of the interest of the United States in its contemporary form. The differences are of style of of the manifestation of that interest in the form of the variations in the politics and ideologies of the various administrations that have populated the White House since the first decade of this century. But the interest remains--whether in the form of the Trans Pacific Partnership, sanctions regimes against the Chinese,  the development of mutual defense pacts among states, or, if this administration actually has the stomach for it (the jury is still out on that) through an aggressive transactions oriented tariff and migration based strategy to  re-orient relations among the leading powers in the Pacific. 

Still, this version of the American vision for the Indo-Pacific (or whatever it is that the region must now be called--any name suits as long as it has the desired effect of constructing from it an acceptably shaped geographical reality that can then be used appropriately to everyone's benefit) reflects another step in shaping the content of the American New Era under the core of leadership of the President. That vision, like everything else in this Administration is transactional:

And under President Trump's leadership, the United States is committed to achieving peace through strength. That starts with deterring aggression around the world and here in the Indo-Pacific, here in our priority theater, here with you — our allies and our partners. The United States stands ready to work with any country that is willing to step up and preserve the global and regional peace that we all hold dear. (Secretary's speech)

One could expect nothing else from our merchant president; but it is also likely to be incomprehensible to the official and warrior castes that populate some of the leadership cultures of allies and opponents.  Merchants make deals with the willing and oppose competitors by any means at least with respect to those interests (the wealth augmenting transactions and perhaps relationships) that drive  the way they view the world.  For officials who prefer to see the world as something that is managed to enhance their objectives  or for warriors who view things in terms of crude power relations for which merchants and officials ought to be made to contribute (and for whose greater glory merchants and official exist in the first place)  deal making will have to be "translated" into their own reality affirming language in order to be useful and usefully responded. 

For merchants, on the other hand, warriors and officials exist merely to enhance the ability fo the merchant to operate.  The warrior is "muscle" and protection. The official services accounts and translates transaction into systems for exploiting productive forces (including labor, warriors and officials), and enhancing their ability to operate within platforms of transactions in which they can act as both producers and consumers of wealth through transactional activity.

And to that end from day one, President Trump gave me a clear mission at the Defense Department: achieve peace through strength. To accomplish this mission, our overriding objectives have been equally clear: restore the warrior ethos, rebuild our military, and reestablish deterrence. And it starts with the warrior ethos. All of us in this profession of arms understand that humans are far more important than hardware. So, we're focused on lethality, meritocracy, accountability, standards, readiness, and warfighting. (Secretary's speech)

But even warriors can be a profit center to someone. "Our second priority is rebuilding the military. We're equipping American warfighters with the most advanced capabilities so that we remain the strongest and most lethal fighting force in the world. . . We're reviving our defense industrial base and investing in our shipyards. We're rapidly fielding emerging technologies that will help us remain the world leader for generations to come. We are stronger — yet more agile — than ever before."  (Secretary's speech).

And every merchant, warrior, and official needs an adversary. For the United States, having done without a Great Adversary since the 1990s, now finds itself with a quite interesting adversary--a frenemy that has become the incarnation of the bete noir for the American elites--at once seduced by the possibility of transposing some of the techniques and sensibilities of Chinese Leninism into American liberal democracy, and at the same time leery of actually doing what it takes to become a Marxist-Leninist state with liberal democratic characteristics. 

Thus, on the one hand, the Secretary sounds like a Chinese official speaking to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization when he says :

 As President Trump also said in Riyadh, the United States is not interested in the moralistic and preachy approach to foreign policy of the past. We are not here to pressure other countries to embrace or adopt policies or ideologies. We are not here to preach to you about climate change or cultural issues. We're not here to impose our will on you. We're all sovereign nations. We should be able to choose the future we want to build. We respect you, your traditions, and your militaries. And we want to work with you where our shared interests align for peace and prosperity. On this sure foundation of mutual interests and common sense, we will build and strengthen our defense partnerships to preserve peace and increase prosperity.(Secretary's speech)

But in the next breath sounds like a merchant who is threatened by an adversary that chooses not to play by the rules but rather seeks not top compete but to dominate in the classical sense as a merchant might understand this:

we do not seek conflict with Communist China. We will not instigate nor seek to subjugate or humiliate. President Trump and the American people have an immense respect for the Chinese people and their civilization. But we will not be pushed out of this critical region. And we will not let our allies and partners be subordinated and intimidated. China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. No doubt. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. Through its massive military build-up and growing willingness to use military force to achieve its goals, including grey zone tactics and hybrid warfare, China has demonstrated that it wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo. * * * China uses its vast and sophisticated cyber capabilities to steal technology and attack critical infrastructure— in your countries and in the United States, as well. These actions not only compromise our countries, but endanger the lives of our citizens. (Secretary's speech)

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The irony, of course, is that is reflects, in military terms, the thinking that drove the shaping of the Trans Pacific Partnership terms by the Obama Administration  before 2016. And then, like a merchant, the Secretary reminded his audience that protection and power is not a charitable enterprise--and that the Trump Administration prefers payment in cash but perhaps in bartering exchanges as well.  "We ask — and indeed, we insist — that our allies and partners do their part on defense. Sometimes, that means having uncomfortable and tough conversations. Partners owe to it to each other to be honest and to be realistic. As many of you have been with me in the past few days and I with you. This is the essence of a pragmatic, common sense defense policy." (Secretary's speech). For the clueless, the Secretary `rovided an example: "look no further than to our growing defense relationship with India, where we pass new milestones by the day—from shared ventures of our defense industries to the increased operational coordination and interoperability between our two militaries." (Ibid.). Others followed as the Secretary wrapped up his remarks. Naming and praising strategies are always useful.

But perhaps it was what was not said that might have been the most important element of the speech--for those leaders in other parts of the world of interest to the United States--and especially Latin America, Europe, and MENA, the same pattern and expectations will likely dominate the relationships with the United States.  I expect that Brazil will resist, but that Mexico will be a far more effective player. That means that trade deals with added defense elements might prove to be more important in the near future, not just in Asia but elsewhere.

The text of the Secretary's speech follows below along with the perhaps more important official summary prepared by officials well versed in these sorts of tasks at the Department of Defense.