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| Pix credit here (Secretary of State Marco Rubio) |
For too long, these issues have festered due to a misguided U.S. foreign policy that never recalibrated from the fleeting triumphalism of the fall of the Iron Curtain. * * * How do we practice America First foreign policy? To start, we must be clear, concrete, and limited in the delineation of our core national interests. The United States is blessed with tremendous assets—physical, financial, military, geographical, and otherwise—but our resources are hardly infinite and the problems we face are many. We cannot hope to solve every issue, or to prevent every global tragedy. Success requires clear-eyed prioritization of the key interests in our diplomatic agenda.
Every political society manifests its core "political line" in some way or another. In European Marxist Leninist systems it was encased in and as the Генеральная линия партии
(eneral'naya liniya partii; the general line of the Soviet Communist Party and those of its satellites and dominions); and in Chinese Leninist systems it is referenced as the "b
asic or fundamental line"(党的基本路线). In liberal democratic states, and more specifically in the United States, the fundamental political line of an elected government as a specific expression of the ruling group within which their politics is located (e.g., the elected representatives of a political party supported by a a larger group of elite operatives and supporters in the leading
structures of governance--academia, think tanks, the larger enterprises
and civil society organizations, and their associated organs of media) is spread among a number of institutions and documents. These include official state documents (1) speeches like a State of the Union Address, (2) government platforms, budget proposal premises and legislative agendas), (3) official documents and platforms of the elected political party, (4) documents produced by elements of the state administrative apparatus that both describe and apply what they extract as functionally relevant aspects of the fundamental ruling political line, and (5) actions/explanations from the Executive authority (in the United States for example "Executive Orders"). That reality creates a political-normative framework in which the political line can be well understood in its most general terms (through liberal democratic sloganeering, for example) while leaving enough room for substantial operational variation to suit the more granular needs of time, space, and place.
This tension between the articulation of a general or fundamental political line, and the absence of enough of a set of details to provide a basis for assessment, has been particularly evident since 2016 in the birth, evolution and operation of America First. It has had its most valuable use as a slogan that justifies and projects any number if specific policy initiatives, and especially the choices made in advancing "America First "objectives" without the need to justify either as a function of the ruling ideology itself and its fundamental or basic line, and more importantly without providing a more solid basis in values and objectives against which specific actions may be assessed. This is nothing new to American politics, of course. That has been the great strength and also sometimes a weakness, of what is usually labelled "American political pragmatism" either as a compliment or as a criticism (for a recent expression from outside the political elite
here). And it has generally been viewed as a virtue among the chattering forces of the American elites (and in that way transmitted as general purpose knowledge for the masses) until it became inconvenient in the face of what appears to many to be the great fundamental transformations that became visible after 2016, a transformation that threatened the position, status, and power of those who had invested lifetimes in what now appeared to be receding into history or at least plausibly threatened to be so "receded."
These issues have been particularly acute respecting America First, at least from the time of the destruction of old order America with the
abandonment of the Trans Pacific Partnership framework for world
convergence and the emergence of what, at the time, I called "let's make a deal politics"). It is a term that appears to have been of greatest use as slogan. "From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first." (President Trump, Executive Order 20 January 2025, "America First Policy Directive to the Secretary of State"). It has also served well as a shield either to cover action contemplated or transformation of relationships that from the America First ideological lens appear to require adjustment.
What has been clear enough is that, whatever it is, America First was meant primarily and initially as a negative. It was meant to negative the dominant American fundamental political line as it was formed and projected from about 1990 to about 2016. What was meant to be negatived was that era's World-and-Cold-War-global triumphalism through a process of strategic transformation to a well managed global hegemon jealously advancing the interests of it own ideological empire. That, in turn, appeared to be the outward shell of a more fundamental transformation from a focus on systems and governance--from the grounding of national relations in and through the lens of an institutionalist/technocrat to that of a merchant, that is to one grounded in transactional relations meant to maximize the value of relations for the parties, each according to their own values (for a comparison and consequence of these different perspectives, see, e.g., here).
But rationalization is difficult to deny for long--at least enough rationalization to provide an operational blueprint for the development of aligned objectives and the institutional structures best matched to fulfilling those objectives. The difficulty for rationalization is in the choice of the cognitive baseline, that is in providing a collective semiotics for the imposition of a fundamental political line. Having effectively abandoned the old post 1945 institution building and guiding American global lens driven by intermeshed castes of global techno-bureaucracies in favor of a transactional lens centered on the national "enterprise" led by transactional public/private "entrepreneurs" and fueled through the consumption of (rather than driven by or for) directed expertise and technocracies, it is now possible to proffer some sort of rationalization for America First. That rationalization is not anti-institutional, but it may suggest the forms through which the institution building impulse is subordinated to transaction building structures within an Administration with transformational agendas grounded in "breaking" or undoing the leading role of institutions as the focus of government in favor of (perhaps hierarchically consequential) transactional drivers. In the U.S. Department of State
Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026), one might, at last, have stumbled upon such a coherent statement--one worthy of study, support, or opposition on its own terms and with respect to the guiding ideology the objectives of which it seeks to fulfill. And oddly enough, it is bound up not just in narrative but in the semiotics of systems theory that sets out an architecture within which the transactional revolution that serves as the foundation of the Trump Administration may be embedded, and thus embedded projected inward into the Republic, and outward among the Republic's friends and not-friends. One may well avoid institutions, but one cannot evade systems for long. (
The
"Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The
Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the
U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux). Transactional systems, however, do not manifest the same way as institutional systems; different lens, different values; different objectives; different policy.
The result of all of this, thanks in large part to the staff and expertise of the U.S. State Department under the leadership of Secretary Marco Rubio, is system, wrapped in institution, and manifested in a set of categorical objectives that themselves expose by their systematic organization, the underlying premises that produce their organizaiton and their goals, and that, a their most fundamental also permit a glimpse at the reality ordering lens from which all of this is spun out in ways that, in accordance with their terms, premises, and assumptions, "make sense."
Together the various parts of this plan can be used advantageously to begin to understand the core elements of the outward facing American basic or fundamental political line during the time of the leadership of the Trump Administration. It can be understood in as comprising seven elements: (1) narrative linking external and internal political models; (2) sovereignty as the animating or grund-norm of the political model; (3) The inner concentric circle of external relations; (4) the west of the US--Asia and points west; (4) the American "east", and civilizational parents; (5) the sovereignty of technology; and (8) the triumph of the transactional in inter-governmental relations.
The U.S. Department of State Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026) is worth reading carefully by both friends of the Trump Administration and those who mean either to preserve the old order (or whatever parts of might might be salvaged and repurposed) and those with opposition on their minds. It is closely linked to the National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025) (discussed here: America
First as the Essence of National Security and the American
Post-Colonial 'Howl': Reflections on the 2025 National Security Strategy
of the United States (2025)) with which it ought to be read together.
Whatever one's stance, there is value in making an effort to understand the document and the ideas, agendas, and action plans they represent. An initial effort in that direction is the object of the brief reflections that follow.
1. Every system needs a narrative. The narrative is set out in Secretary Rubio's Foreword, which is actually not a foreword but the elaboration, in orderly form, of the core premises that together constitute at least one version if America First, and from out if which it is possible both to discern a system and from it to build an apparatus through which system goals can be articulated and realized. It starts from the usual starting point at this point of the 2nd Trump Presidency: the President Washington invoking premise of "peace through strength" and what to some might sound like an American version of the Chinese New Era principle of national rejuvenation, in its American version is expressed as "domestic renewal . . . . [which] will usher in a new era of American greatness." (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
An objective of "domestic renewal" which will "usher in a new era of American greatness" must be measured against something. That something is presented as the consequence of the long term elaboration of an American fundamental political line that did more harm than good to the body of the Republic, indeed, a political line that produced the sort of instability and chaos within which it was both impossible to govern or to engage in transactional relations:
systematic infringements on our sovereignty; the return of multi-faceted great power competition unlike any we have seen since the end of the Cold War; rampant abuse and exploitation in the global trading system; a post-war global order increasingly plagued with anti-Western ideology and weaponized against us; the erosion of our borders and an epidemic of unchecked global mass migration; and global chaos, instability, and armed conflict of a scale not seen in decades. (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
Perhaps the Republic could have navigated within transnational instability and chaos. Things became more difficult and dangerous, as this narrative elaborates, when these trajectories were projected inward and deeply embedded in American mass politics and socio-economic relations in ways that causes social and economic weakness. "We have been growing increasingly dependent on foreign supply chains. We have become increasingly ashamed of our own culture, identity, and values. And, in many quarters, there is a creeping fatalism about the future of American power and prosperity." (Ibid), This was a set of conditions that might even be thought more advanced within the traditional allies of the Republic with which, at one point at least, there was a unity of values as well as interests. And the "big bang" of all of this was the arrogant triumphalism that infected the Republic's leading groups--its vanguard elements as vanguardism was deployed in the Republic from the time of Woodrow Wilson at least (discussed here)--from the time of the disintegration of the Soviet empire. That line produced an "agenda committed to multilateralism, globalization, and to remaking—often by force—disparate parts of the world in the image of Western democracies." (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
These choices and that post-Soviet American political line put the Republic "on a path towards civilizational and geopolitical suicide." (Ibid.). It is important to note the twin elements of the suicide formula of the American post Soviet line--it was both political and societal-cultural. It was rooted in a foreign policy that "consistently elevated the interests of the “global community” and the “rules-based order” above the national interests of the United States and our people." (Ibid.). The Republic's suicide,then, was a draught of globalism laced with a multilateral rules based order that required for its ultimate triumph the obliteration of the United States (and China etc.) as something apart from and autonomous of the global community into which it would sink, except perhaps for things that might matter less--cuisine, language, folkways that were not otherwise offense to the emerging global aggregate.
The original sin of globalism is that it denied American exceptionalism and deluded us into becoming ashamed of our history, strength, and prosperity. . . At our core, we are a proud people—proud of our country, our might, and our culture. A truly American foreign policy ought to reflect this indominable spirit. (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 3).
That is the narrative vision. It was a vision that, like its Chinese counterpart (and one speaks here to the formulation of the basic or fundamental political lines of hegemonic powers that are in no hurry to cede authority or their sense of their place in the world) required a thing against which it could define both danger and possibility. In the case of the Americans (and to some extent the Chinese post 1949), the danger was national obliteration either as a historical reality from out of which a national rejuvenation was necessary or a pathway forward to obliteration fro which a national renewal was a necessary antidote. The cure for that would be quite different in each state--but cure there must be to their respective national-civilizational maladies. For the Republic,
"Correcting course demands a rapid return to a pragmatic diplomacy committed to advancing the national interests of the United States and our people. In other words, it requires a foreign policy that puts America First." (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
And there it is.
America First has a story; it has a lens; and it has the capacity for self-referencing structuring through systems grounded in a set of core premises from out of which a collective normative structure can be built, its objectives specified and the policies and other tools necessary for its realization marshaled. Cultural and political integrity must be protected--the autonomous body of the Republic must be preserved. Here one comes to a hegemonic version of the post-colonial ideal, now transposed onto the fundamental self-understanding of the hegemon itself. Collective life and its cognitive frameworks provides irony that keeps on giving. Perhaps that, at its most basic, is the human condition.
And so Secretary Rubio then makes the obvious more so for those who have not yet gotten the point: First, that the renewing political line is focused on action rather than theoretical elaboration; that its basis is on the elaboration of the the core dual objects that every State must protect: (1) its political sovereignty; and (2) its cultural/societal sovereignty. Left unsaid, of course, is the further duty of a State to constantly consider the meaning nature and expression of those dual sovereignties across time. But that is a second order consideration. First things first--one must get one's sovereignty houses in order. And here again a conflation of America First as a transactional global strategy in protection of the Republic's sovereignty with the Republic's National Security Strategy for 2025, one that aligns foreign policy with internal objectives built around the protection of the State against challenges, internal and external--that is the essence of and the purpose for the State.
How do we practice America First foreign policy? To start, we must be clear, concrete, and limited in the delineation of our core national interests. . . We cannot hope to solve every issue, or to prevent every global tragedy. Success requires clear-eyed prioritization of the key interests in our diplomatic agenda. . . Moreover, no significant structure can stand without a robust foundation; a safe, secure, and prosperous United States is a prerequisite for a powerful global presence. Domestic renewal begins by reasserting American sovereignty—over our territory, our people and commercial enterprises, and our state.(Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, pp. 1-2).
From these consequential principles (that is from principles that follow from the core premises--preserve and realize political and cultural/societal sovereignty) it is possible to sketch out the initial policy and structural actions/agendas necessary to fulfill the America First basic line: (1) territorial integrity (migration; bandit gangs and "narco-terrorist criminal organizations" and their strongholds markets for suppressed goods and services and within dissident communities); (2) economic autonomy and solidity (independence, perhaps of the sort that was the ideal of the post-colonial States through the 1970s, it is not clear); (3) technological independence and supremacy. All of this is wrapped up in Goal 1 of America First (Ibid., pp. 4-7).
These three foundational agendas then generate their own derivative agendas which, when aggregated, will constitute the ecology of action/objective that is America First in this first era of its operation. These include a strong market oriented Western Hemisphere (the near periphery of the Republic) elaborated in Goal 2 (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, pp. 2, 7-9). It also includes a general principle of promoting "shared prosperity with these friendly states" (Ibid., p. 2) and "competition with China or other geopolitical adversaries" (Ibid.), from one perspective bringing memories of Chinese people's democratic dictatorship but in a transactional universe in which there is trade for friends and competition for adversaries. It is here that the transactional lens is at its most visible: "Once more, commerce will play a critical role in forging alliances and partnerships. American enterprise is the root of our global power and our domestic prosperity." (Ibid., p. 3).
Commerce has a public dimension. "[W]e will embrace the President’s dealmaking ethos and forge new ventures,
compacts, and trade agreements that will bring about fair and mutually
beneficial trade and economic partnerships with our friends and allies" (Ibid., p. 3). Just as it can guide the Republic back to prosperity if well managed, so can it serve as a foundation for a sound public policy projected outward:
Doing this will require that we shrewdly allocate resources to the most pressing challenges. . . Prudence and prioritization are essential to ensuring a quiet resolve that deters, rather than invites, foreign aggression. To this end, we will also empower strong and self-sufficient allies, ensuring that our friends are able to contribute their fair share towards collective security and welfare. . allowing the United States to prioritize strategic imperatives. Our allies will also play key roles helping us push back against anti-Americanism in international organizations, protect free and open sea lanes and commercial corridors, and prevent foreign powers from dominating key regional resources and domains. (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, pp. 2-3)
All of this, of course, is based on an assumption, the continuing relevance of which is the essence if America First: that "the United States is still the indispensable nation" (Ibid., p. 3). That is the challenge of America First. And the challenge is to be undertaken in the transactional spirit of pragmatism. That "means deal making in the shadow of first principles. And that translate into the transactional matrix of America First: "rejecting the arrogant paternalism of thinking we can or should change the customs or politics of foreign nations where there is not a direct benefit to doing so. It means dealing in the art of the possible and not wishing away constraints—whether they be natural,geographical, geopolitical, economic, or social. " (Ibid.).
That is the challenge now better elaborated to the large enterprise of the Republic's post 1945 vision for a global order by those who now seek to move, in the current era of the Republic's historical development, to a vision that is, in many respects impossibly incompatible with that which came before. Whatever happens, and however successful this is, it is unlikely that it will be possible to turn the clock back before 2016. And in that lies the greatest challenge both to the proponents and opponents of the America First era of the Republic (cf., 'White House National -Security Strategy Reflects Vance's Thinking).
The details follow. These represent the current expression of system manifestation of its global objectives, crafted to maximize value under current circumstances and likely to change as cintext changes. And that detailing takes up the bulk of the Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030. Most of them are further elaborated in the National Security Strategy for 2025, discussed America
First as the Essence of National Security and the American
Post-Colonial 'Howl': Reflections on the 2025 National Security Strategy
of the United States (2025)The difference is that this is a pragmatic document that seeks, in its own way, to reveal more precisely the scope, form, and prioritization of national public goals projected outward in furtherance of national goals and aspirations. And in that respect, as well, it takes on the character of the core initiative of its fraternal hegemon evidenced in the framework of China's Silk Roads structures; the difference is on the way in which the structures and operations of the international order is to be used. For Chinese institutionalists these are valuable productive forces; for the United States these are impediments to systems if transactional production. (Xi proposes Global Governance Initiative at largest-ever SCO summit). See China’s
Three Global Initiatives: China’s Solutions to Addressing Global
Challenges——Speech by Chinese Ambassador to PNG Yang Xiaoguang at
the“China’s Global Initiative and China-PNG Cooperation” Symposium (13 March 2025).
2. The semiotics of sovereignty.
The first job of the U.S. government, including the Department of State, is to ensure the continued survival of our nation as a self-governing republic that defends the safety and interests of Americans. . . The Department will advance the sovereignty of our nation, at the core of which is control of our borders. . . (Ibid., p. 4)
We will advocate for the sovereignty of our citizens—their safety at home and abroad, and their reedom from foreign efforts to curb their rights—and of our businesses, which are regularly subject to unfair practices around the world. As the Department restores the sovereignty of the United States, it will reduce deference to multilateralism and global bureaucratic consensus, which too often reflect destructive ideologies and strategic misalignment with U.S. interests. (Ibid.)
Objective 1.1: Secure America’s borders and the American people’s right to decide who to admit and on what terms.
In collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and other relevant U.S. government agencies, the Department will continually improve our screening and vetting policies and procedures for those who seek immigration benefits. This includes ensuring that applicants do not pose any risks to public safety or national security, do not bear hostile attitudes toward our citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, or show other signs of anti-Americanism. . . Remigration and border security are central to our diplomatic engagements, especially to those in our hemisphere.(Ibid., pp. 4-5).
Objective 1.2: Ensure all Americans can exercise their rights free from foreign interference.
The Department will oppose efforts by foreign countries, international organizations and NGOs, and activist groups that seek to censor Americans in their own country. We will counter these efforts through all appropriate means including visa and financial sanctions. At the same time, the Department will scrutinize attempts by foreign powers to exercise influence within the United States. These efforts are not new, but now seek to manipulate American public life through a widening spectrum of influence operations. This includes lobbying and lawfare; NGO activities, including through think-tanks, cultural centers, and educational institutions; and media manipulation, including paid media and social media campaigns. (Ibid., p. 5).
Objective 1.3: Engage in international organizations only when it advances America’s national interests.
International organizations exist to advance the interests of sovereign nations. They are not global legislatures or independent sources of moral, political, or legal authority. They stray from their proper purpose when they develop their own constituencies and seek to advance agendas that no citizen can approve or reject. (Ibid., p.5)
The Department will no longer fund or support international organizations or conventions that act contrary to America’s interests or that erode our sovereignty. We will no longer defer to unelected international bureaucrats who run them. We will not permit international organizations to become weapons in the hands of our adversaries, deployed to target Americans and citizens of partner nations such as Israel. Instead, we will focus on increasing American influence and driving reform in organizations whose work affects our concrete national interests, particularly the standard-setting bodies, while imposing real accountability on those who threaten Americans, our national interests, or those of our allies. . . Declarations of international bodies inconsistent with U.S. sovereign law cannot and will not constrain our decision making. (Ibid., p. 6)
3. The ordering of the near periphery (or building a wall around the apex sovereign).
Our status as a global superpower was built on this foundation: without serious enemies or conflicts at our borders, we have been able to project power abroad unhindered. Over recent decades, however, we have let these pillars of our strength erode . . . the United States has re-established absolute primacy in our hemisphere—both by bringing anti-American and rogue states to heel, and by forging powerful new security and economic partnerships with likeminded states. (Ibid., p. 7).
Objective 2.1: Counter and reverse our competitors’ influence in the Western Hemisphere.
Historically, the Monroe Doctrine focused primarily on the expulsion of extra-hemispheric military and political influence. The Donroe Doctrine expands this principle to purge unchecked economic, migration, and drug interference and to stamp out malign influence from extra-hemispheric powers, trans-national criminal organizations and rogue regional actors alike. by those outside the hemisphere. The United States does not—and has never— sought a closed economic system in the Western Hemisphere, but we will no longer permit foreign adversaries to use commerce and investment as a stalking horse for control of the region’s critical infrastructure and strategic territory (Ibid., p. 7).
Objective 2.2: Strengthen strategic partnerships in the Western Hemisphere.
Our allies will no longer feel isolated against China or any other extra-hemispheric power, and the United States will remain the region’s partner of choice on the issues that matter most. Even amid any intra-regional disagreement, it should always remain common ground that no one’s interest would be served were the Western Hemisphere to become a theater of serious great-power competition. (Ibid., 8).
In that capacity, we will cooperate on issues of mutual concern, including combatting intra-regional challenges like narcotics trafficking. We will also prioritize trade deals in the Western Hemisphere and near-shore key industries in neighboring countries with comparative advantages—not as charity, but because doing so improves the security of our own supply chains. (Ibid.)
Objective 2.3: Suppress narco-terrorist gangs and cartels.
We will no longer tolerate this scourge or the extra-hemispheric entities and states that often enable and profit from it. We will recognize cartels and gangs as the foreign terrorist organizations that they are. We will continue to apply sanctions and other economic tools against these entities—as well as against any state or non-state actors who provide them succor. Finally, we will not hesitate to use force if necessary and appropriate. （Ibid。）
4. Protecting the Western flank of the Republic's sovereignty.
How the United States responds to the rise of China will be the defining story of the 21st century. This is due not only to the global nature of economic competition, but to the U.S.’ own national interests in the Indo-Pacific. The United States is a Pacific nation and has traded there practically since our founding. . . . We are unambiguous that regional peace and stability benefit the United States irrespective of competition with countries such as China. We seek closer economic and military ties with Indo-Pacific allies and partners that benefit U.S. strength, not which come at our expense. . . as with America First foreign policy everywhere, we will pursue policies in the Indo-Pacific that support economic strength in our own country and deter aggression abroad. (Ibid., p. 9).
Objective 3.1: Strengthen the Indo-Pacific economic system to support U.S. reindustrialization and reinforce ties with allies.
The United States will advance an economic system in the Indo-Pacific that is both free from external coercion and open to the American people. We will advance policies in the region that support U.S. reindustrialization through broad commercial advocacy efforts, the development of secure and resilient supply chains, and the spread of American and trusted alternatives to Chinese-created dependencies. (Ibid., p. 9)
The United States will also seek to build and reinforce our allies and partners in the region through fair, high-impact bilateral trade deals to advance shared prosperity. We will support efforts by innovative American companies to win markets across the Indo-Pacific region and removal of bureaucratic red tape that restrict our companies. . . We will prioritize innovative deals to secure critical minerals and will work closely with allies and partners to protect our technological advantages and safeguard our innovation from hostile exploitation. (Ibid. p. 9-10)
Objective 3.2: Deter aggression and establish favorable military balance across the region.
The United States must establish a favorable military balance in the Indo-Pacific to keep the trade routes free and open and to deter aggression. . . We will secure the vital lanes of commerce which run through the region, keeping them open for our ships to navigate unimpeded. If obstructed, we will ensure the United States has appropriate capacity to counter these efforts so that these crucial lanes are not able to be taxed or closed by any one country. (Ibid., p. 10)
5. The Eastern flank; nostalgia and impatience.
The nations of Europe are America’s oldest allies. The United States was born of Western European parentage and, far beyond mere geopolitics, we are bound to Europe through shared traditions, cultural heritage, political values, and familial ties. To succeed against today’s challenges, the United States must help European partners recommit themselves to a new American transatlantic civilizational alliance. . . . (Ibid., p. 11)
Meanwhile, the elite came to espouse increasingly radical conceptions of globalism and pan-humanism that led them to reject and undermine the core tenets of Western civilization: Western faith and values, national sovereignty, free expression, free markets, and belief in the polity. It is time for European nations to wake up. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that Europe continues to face grave security threats and must re-militarize to ensure its security. Likewise, Chinese economic coercion has shown that European countries must also reindustrialize and deregulate to secure their economic future. (Ibid.)
Objective 4.1: Transfer primary responsibility for conventional European defense to allies and expand our joint Defense Industrial Base.
we must prioritize our resources to support stability in regions such as the Western Hemisphere or Indo-Pacific. Nonetheless, our commitment to European security and prosperity is evidenced by our push for NATO allies to spend five percent of GDP on defense. This is something European nations must address urgently. Without demonstrable progress, the American people cannot continue to care more about the security of far-off nations than the citizens of those nations do themselves. (Ibid., p. 12).
We will support NATO as the essential mechanism to guarantee shared deterrence, interoperability, and joint command, but need NATO to be a real alliance. As recent conflicts have clearly demonstrated, rhetoric does not win wars. The Department will advocate for the creation of tangible national capabilities as European states assume responsibility for their conventional defense and become net contributors to security in Africa and the Middle East. (Ibid.)
Objective 4.2: Rebalance U.S. trade with European allies and decrease their economic dependencies on adversarial powers.
The United States will unapologetically pursue balanced, reciprocal trade with European nations. We will resist the EU’s attempt to cast itself as a “regulatory superpower” and push back on rules which discriminate against U.S. businesses or have extraterritorial effects on U.S. consumers. (Ibid., p. 12)
The export of U.S. energy will be a central pillar in our economic collaboration with European nations. The United States has the resources to end energy dependency on Russia and spur economic growth. We will strongly support U.S. exports of natural gas, nuclear technology, and nuclear fuel, particularly in former Soviet-aligned states. China’s support for Russia and its invasion of Ukraine directly undermines security in Europe. The United States will support efforts to reduce dependence on China for critical supply chains and overreliance on China for economic growth. Chinese conomic leverage over European states erodes their reliability as U.S. allies. (Ibid., pp. 12-13)
Objective 4.3: Defend civilizational values and reassert national sovereignty.
The United States and European nations must be civilizational allies, first and foremost. As such, the United States will condemn anti-democratic actions which restrict free speech or the free exercise of religion and will oppose the use of lawfare to ban political opponents. . . Mass migration is a threat to national cohesion, social stability, and civilizational values and we will support European nations’ increasing recognition of this. (Ibid., p. 13)
6. Technology and the new sovereignty.
The United States will rescue our industries from unfair trade practices and illegitimate competition, promote American businesses through commercial diplomacy, and firmly reestablish America as the economic and technological juggernaut of the 21st century. . . U.S. power lies in both our military dominance and our leadership of the global economy. In a geopolitical context driven increasingly by economic statecraft, the future of U.S. supremacy lies in our future productive power. (Ibid., p. 14)
The United States extends our national power through a confluence of economic productive power, military power, and technological innovation.(Ibid., p. 16)
Objective 5.1: Reindustrialize the United States.
We will identify productivity-enhancing sectors and industries necessary for a vibrant economy, including energy, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, robotics, machine tools, shipbuilding, material sciences, critical and advanced infrastructure, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, space and aerospace, semiconductors, compute, artificial intelligence (AI), data storage, transportation logistics, unmanned and autonomous systems, biotechnology, and quantum science. Working in collaboration with the Department of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and other relevant agencies, we will identify dependencies in these areas and take steps to secure our supply chains and bolster our capacities. . . . (Ibid., p. 14)
Objective 5.2: Stop foreign actors’ abuse of the global trading system.
We will also not relinquish global dominance of these markets to foreign
powers. In addition to being vital to national security, increasing
productive power and market share over strategic sectors will boost the
entire American economy and create synergies with other sectors of the
economy, providing tangible benefits to the entire U.S. labor force,
financial markets, and the U.S. Treasury.(Ibid., p. 14)
The Department will ensure free and fair access to foreign markets by making commercial diplomacy the centerpiece of our economic strategy, and will help U.S. businesses secure foreign government contracts and tenders for key projects. Specifically, posts will encourage countries to reduce their dependence on Chinese investment offerings. The Department’s commercial diplomacy strategy will involve identifying American alternatives to Chinese investment. . . (Ibid., p. 15).
Working with other agencies, we will work with U.S. businesses to investigate and respond to unfair trade practices that limit market access to other countries. To ensure these measures are effective, we will especially focus on transshipment, whereby countries evade tariff duties by routing their exports through third countries not subject to tariff regulations.(Ibid.)
Objective 5.3: Drive the United State’s strategic leverage by increasing U.S. exports and investment.
To deepen countries’ economic connection to the United States and reduce their dependence on China, we will reindustrialize and become the world’s factory in the most critical sectors that determine the shape of the global economy. . . . The Department’s economic strategy will promote American exports and opening foreign markets to U.S. businesses. Posts will collaborate and coordinate with Departmental bureaus to identify and secure opportunities, especially where the U.S. market has competitive advantages, such as AI, energy, weapons systems, capital markets, and as we increasingly reindustrialize, advanced manufacturing goods. (Ibid., p. 16)
The Department will take leadership of efforts to promote the export and control of the American AI tech stack to trusted partners, such as Israel or others across the globe. As one of our greatest competitive advantages, AI is a key industry that other countries want and need; in exchange, we will ensure that only trusted partners enjoy these technologies, and that untrusted foreign technology does not proliferate at the risk of our security or influence. (Ibid.).
Objective 5.4: Strengthen U.S. technological edge and industry dominance.
We must therefore outcompete our rivals in technological development and dominance to win in the economic and military spheres as well. We will accomplish this by protecting our advantages and leadership in the science and tech ecosystem while also promoting U.S. technology exports to lead global market share. We will prevent our adversaries from gaining access to U.S.-developed and produced technologies, whereby they steal our trade secrets and use our technologies to beat us, including through dual-use applications that enable foreign militaries to threaten our national security. (Ibid., p. 16)
Protecting U.S. technology will not guarantee industry dominance if we do not also export our technologies abroad in place of adversaries. As instructed by President Trump’s Executive Order on AI exports, the Department will lead efforts with other agencies to aggressively promote the export of our technologies to as many trustworthy markets as possible to dominate global market share and build U.S.-aligned ecosystems. (Ibid., p. 17)
See also, Reflections on "'Accelerating American Exports'--Remarks by Director Kratsios at the APEC Digital and AI Ministerial Meeting"; CSIS EVENT: Unpacking the White House AI Action Plan with OSTP Director Michael Kratsios; CSIS EVENT: Unpacking the White House AI Action Plan with OSTP Director Michael Kratsios
7. The triumph of the transactional in and as inter-governmental relations.
The Department’s ongoing assistance programs fit into two basic categories: (1) lifesaving programs and (2) strategic investments. Lifesaving assistance includes time-limited health and humanitarian programs, such as disaster response, food security initiatives, and efforts to combat deadly diseases. Strategic assistance advances longer-term U.S. interests by providing allies with security assistance, foreign military financing and economic support and by promoting commercial and trade ties through programs that facilitate market access and U.S.-led infrastructure development. (Ibid., p. 18).
Objective 6.1: Leverage assistance as a tool of statecraft.
When evaluating assistance programs, we will start by ensuring it is going to groups or countries that actively advance our interests. Relevant factors will include military and security ties, cooperation on national security and migration / remigration priorities, voting in international organizations, and fair economic or trade interconnections. We will also deploy assistance to advance discrete and time-ound objectives and will quickly and effectively leverage assistance as a tool to advance discrete U.S. economic, security, and diplomatic objectives. . . Finally, refocusing on strategic objections will require realigning resources to priority regions and areas. (Ibid., pp. 19-20)
Objective 6.2: Promote and provide trade, not aid.
Our America First foreign assistance strategy will leverage assistance resources to champion American enterprise and infrastructure. . . . These new forms of assistance will help us better compete with our adversaries who seek to leverage investment to assert control over various developing economies. If done correctly, U.S. investments built on private sector principles of fair exchange, local control and mutual benefit will offer a clear contrast—and more appealing alternative to—exploitative models such as Chinese debt-trap diplomacy. . . We will diversify our implementing partner set away from the non-profit and international organization sectors and towards the American business community. (bBid., p. 19)
Secretary Rubio's Foreword follows below.
