Showing posts with label Business andHuman Rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Business andHuman Rights. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 03, 2026

UN Forum on Business and Human Rights Side Event: UNGP HelpDesk Project "Making Business and Human Rights Accessible to All: Lessons from National, Regional and International Helpdesks"

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Delighted to pass along this announcement from the Helpdesk on Business and Human Rights
Business and Human Rights Section, Thematic and Special Procedures Division:

We are pleased to invite you to an in-person side event during the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights on Making Business and Human Rights Accessible to All: Lessons from National, Regional and International Helpdesks.

Date: Monday, 23 November 2026
Time: 13:30 – 14:30
Venue: Room III (1st floor)

In the past fifteen years, the UNGPs have given rise to a substantial body of business and human rights practice, experience and learning. Yet, knowledge, guidance and support are not equally accessible to everyone. Many stakeholders, including governments, businesses, civil society, rights holders and others, struggle to understand where to start, which resources are relevant to their situation or where to turn for support.

Helpdesks can play a key role in addressing these challenges by providing a direct channel to practical guidance, tools and resources. This event will bring together national, regional and international helpdesks, including the OHCHR Helpdesk on Business and Human Rights, the EU Due Diligence Navigator for Partner Countries and the German Helpdesk on Business and Human Rights, to share their experiences and insights on: (1) Where users face challenges and common questions or misconceptions;
(2) Which forms of support prove most useful; (3) How helpdesks can broaden their reach.

One year after its launch at the 2025 Forum, the OHCHR Helpdesk will also reflect on its first year of operation. No registration is required – this event is open to the public (forum badge holders can access the room). We encourage early arrival as seating is limited.  We hope you can join us and encourage you to share this invitation with anyone who may be interested.
The Concept Note follows. 

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I have been a fan of this project, though I tend to approach it a little differently. The difference is largely grounded in foundational operational premises. The UNGP apparatus centered in Geneva and in larger states tends to be institutional, techno-bureaucratic, and oracular. These are good thing when attempting to provide guidance and in a more risky way to give advice.  I have tended to start from the individual adversely impacted and work my way up to bureaucratic manifestations of help.  

In my Input for Consideration by the OHCHR on the Establishment and Operation of a Help Desk on Business and Human Rights (Larry Catá Backer for the Coalition for Peace & Ethics;  25 June 2024), the text of which follows below, I concluded

The topic, and the effort, is important. The choices made in structuring this mechanism perhaps more so. This CPE analysis and input, including its suggestions and recommendations go toward the key elements of  that structuring—the delicate balancing between authority and (in)formality in structures and the even more delicate balance between interpretation and instrumentalization. The fundamental question that requires some discussion is this: will the OHCHR operating perhaps through this Helpdesks mechanism seek to develop a premise that it is the supreme authority or a significant and uniquely situated but not the only authority on the UNGP, its interpretation, and the manager of the premises through which judgments about application must be measured. CPE does not suggest that either position is fatally flawed, only that either requires a measure of transparency, consultation, and perhaps the legitimizing offices of law  unless the assertions and operations under any such mechanism is to remain informal.  The German model certainly points in that direction. The price one pays for informal narrative management, of course, is the effective and mandatory authority of interpretation and pronouncements, the legal effects of which may vary by State. The effort to move this to a virtual space, through the concept of platforms, is a good one though, as the CPE input suggests, one that in this formative stage of its development, presents critical challenges—and choices among objectives (policy, political, structural and the like). Lastly, it remains to be seen whether or to what extent the helpdesk mechanism can overcome the large challenge of effective access.  Aimed only at elite stakeholders the helpdesk mechanism will merely lard an already rich system of access. Aimed to those otherwise unable to access current may require some substantially creative thinking—with respect to which both virtual spaces and the conceptual framework of platforms can play a key role. Tied to that is the final normative element that ought to play a role in structuring—the role of data and data mining in the construction of the helpdesk system. The helpdesk system will generate a tremendous amount of data; much of it will be useful both for system quality control, but also to feed descriptive and predictive models. In a more advanced stage, that data can also serve as a baseline against which behavior changing policy measures may be adopted, adapted, and applied to the community of stakeholders.  None of this is necessarily bad, but all of it ought to be considered against emerging legal and normative standards about data and its uses to manage perception and conduct.  

Little has changed. However, even small steps, like those of the HelpDesk system and its old fashioned mechanisms in a digital age, are helpful. They should be supported. I continue to work with my students on on own UNGP Chatbot project.

Thursday, October 15, 2026

ICoCA Newsletter July-September 2026: A Reflection on its theme "Securing Communities for a Just Transition"

 

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Accountability, transparency, and engagement are critical elements of any principles based system.  Just transition principles move from effectively and normatively positive system design and operation to the objectives toward which that system is to be directed--that s , it represents a cluster of objectives, premises, and principles that shape the way in which the system weighs, values, processes, aligns, orders,  and identifies information and then  applies that as a function of its objectives parameters. In that sense, just transition, like any 0ther foundational set of ordering premises not merely shapes the cognitive cages within which the machine/system operates, but also serve as a justification space within which its ordered biases can be realized. This is not a bad thing; but it is a "thing" that ought to be recognized as one puts forward a normative cage  within which the operation and accountability, transparency, and engagement of systems are undertaken. 

That is certainly the case with "just transition"--a term, an idea, a set of significs, the premises around which a community of believers organizes its rationalization, and judgment of the world around them. Yet like other foundational terms, objectives, premises and the like, the signification of just transition represents a spectrum of orthodoxy some of which may not be entirely aligned with others.  “Just transition” is not a term with one settled definition, a universally accepted set of criteria, or a single institutional owner. It is better understood as a contested concept whose meaning changes with the institution, political constituency, economic problem, and conception of justice through which it is articulated. The term originated in labor and environmental disputes over the consequences of environmental regulation for workers and communities, but it has since acquired a broader field of application encompassing climate policy, energy systems, regional development, human rights, ecological restoration, democratic participation, and, in some settings, transitions beyond decarbonization (see, e.g.,  UN DESA Policy Brief No. 141: A just green transition: concepts and practice so far (2022); pdf here).

The analytical problem is therefore not simply to collect definitions and compare their wording. It is to determine what each definition makes the object of justice, whose interests it recognizes, which institutions it authorizes to act, what kind of change it regards as necessary, and what obligations follow from describing that change as just. A definition that treats justice as compensation for displaced workers does something different from one that treats it as the redistribution of economic power, the protection of internationally recognized rights, or the transformation of an extractive economic order.

Three distinctions might usefully guide any inquiry: 

(1) Transition versus transformation. A transition may change the means of production while retaining the underlying economic and political order; a transformative conception may instead make that order, including its distribution of power and resources, an object of change.

(2) Justice as outcome versus justice as process. One approach asks whether the benefits and burdens of change are distributed fairly; another asks whether those affected have meaningful authority over the decisions that produce those outcomes.

(3) Justice within a system versus justice of the system. Some definitions seek to make a specified transition fairer without questioning its governing objectives. Others ask whether the existing system's ownership arrangements, development priorities, or historical relationships of exploitation are themselves unjust.

The distinctions, of course, are not meant to suggest analytical categories, nor do they purpose to suggest mutually exclusive schools or official classifications. A single policy may incorporate elements of all three, although their coexistence does not establish that the tensions among them have been resolved. And yet, precision, at least with respect to analytical streams may prove useful when one moves from "high concepts" to operational realities in sector and territorially specific context. 

It might follow, then that the term "just transition" as object, as a vessel of signified principles; and as the platform for the orthodox organizaiton of a view of the world  through its conceptual lens, invites further consideration which might be divided along four analytical streams: considerations of Several conclusions follow from the comparison.

First, there may be a meaningful difference between making a transition just and using transition as an occasion to pursue justice. The former can be satisfied, at least in principle, through measures that reduce the harms associated with a specified policy. The latter may make the existing economic order itself an object of criticism and change. It is worth noting the difference--the former is passive and reactive, the latter is active and anticipatory. One responds to changes in the world, the other seeks to cause and direct them. The differences in these approaches reflect the foundational principles of political/normative ideology since the start of modernity in the Enlightenment--are humans to be led toward "the good" by a vanguard of social forces (the current position within elements of liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist ordering) that proceeds from principal applied to individual through collective leadership and guidance; or are humans to respond to the stimulus/irritation of change through the iterative mimetic interactions of individuals which when aggregated serve as the change around which one might be able to discern the emergence of principle. he former embraces deductive processes; the latter inductive processes. Usually human systems deploy both, but virtually all lead with one or the other. 

Second, the relationship between justice and efficiency is unlikely to be settled by the terminology. A transition may be economically efficient in aggregate while imposing concentrated costs on particular workers or communities. Conversely, policies intended to protect affected populations may impose fiscal or adjustment costs of their own. The question is how those competing considerations are ordered and justified, rather than whether one can simply be substituted for the other. And that is a question of politics, and the control of the collective meaning of the terms imposed either as internalized "truth" or as truth imposed through the usual mechanisms of disciplining orthodoxy. 

Third, participation, compensation, and transformation might be better treated as separate dimensions. They may reinforce one another, but none is a reliable proxy for the others. Indeed, the issue of proxies in just transition suggests the tension between idealization and its insertion into terms or actions that are deemed to signify their value or occurrence, and the actual occurrence itself that evidences values. Each is itself a term with its own spectrum of idealization, usually a s a function of other, though sometimes related, sets of ordering norms and premises. Each can be understood itsef as a vessel through which the operationalization  of connections and reinforcement among norms necessary for the articulation and then realization of objectives may be comprehensively approached.  Indeed, at its core, each of the terms also requires a "just transition" if the meta-concept of societal just transition, even within distinct sectors of human organizational life is to be realized. And yet all of these then test the weight and importance of those objectives against the fundamental goals of political systems within which it is to be undertaken.

Fourth, the concept's breadth, then,may be understood, even in sector specific application, as both useful and problematic. It allows institutions with different mandates to address related consequences of economic change. At the same time, it permits a relatively narrow policy of employment adjustment and a more fundamental project of economic transformation to share the same designation without necessarily sharing the same substantive commitments. The conceptual review by Wang and Lo identifies precisely this difficulty: the variety of definitions and perspectives can make communication and debate more difficult in the absence of clearer distinctions. 

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All of this enriches the engagement with the concerns and approaches elaborated in the  July-September 2026 Newsletter of The International Code of Conduct Association – ICoCA--"Accountable Security in Transition." The theme is framed in this way for the Newsletter:

As demand for critical minerals grows, responsible private security has an important role to play in protecting human rights, strengthening community trust and supporting a just transition. In this edition, we explore how security practices affect communities, highlight initiatives to strengthen accountability and prevent human rights risks, and showcase responsible security in action. We also look ahead to ICoCA’s 13th Annual General Assembly.

ICoCA "is a multi-stakeholder initiative formed in 2013 to ensure that providers of private security services respect human rights and humanitarian law. It serves as the governance and oversight mechanism of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers." (ICoCA--About). The ICoCa summarizes its mission this way: "Our mission is to raise private security industry standards and practices that respect human rights and international humanitarian law and to engage with key stakeholders to achieve widespread adherence to the International Code of Conduct globally. Discover the benefits for each stakeholder group below."

Featured interventions include: (1) From mine to market: the security blind spot in critical minerals supply chains; (2) Private security: the critical minerals game-changer policymakers and investors can't afford to ignore; (3) From accountability to prevention: securing Mozambique's critical minerals; (4) When mineral demand meets community realities in Peru; and (5) two case studies on transition in South Sudan and Kenya.

A French version of this newsletter is available here.

Sunday, October 11, 2026

Launch Events: Responsible Business Law Initiative

 


 

Happy to pass along this announcement:

Dear colleagues and friends of UW Law,
You are invited to join us this October to mark the launch of the Responsible Business Law Initiative (RBLI), a new initiative of the Barer Institute at the University of Washington School of Law.
To help us celebrate, we are delighted to welcome Alison Taylor and Klaus Moosmayer, two leading global voices on responsible business, who will explore how changing expectations around companies’ impact on people and the planet are shaping regulation and the role of lawyers.

Monday, Oct. 19, 2026
RBLI Launch at UW Law
In-person | Seattle, U.S | 5 p.m. Pacific
Keynote Address & Dialogue with Alison Taylor
Higher Ground: Corporate Risk and Responsibility in a Divided World
Register for the In-Person Event



Tuesday, Oct. 20, 2026
RBLI Global Launch
Virtual | 9 a.m. Pacific | noon Eastern
Global times: 1 p.m. São Paulo | 5 p.m. London | 7 p.m. Nairobi | 9:30 p.m. New Delhi | 11:00 p.m. Bangkok
Panel Discussion with Alison Taylor, Klaus Moosmayer & UW Law Global Alumni
Navigating Responsible Business Across the Globe

 

Friday, October 09, 2026

CfP: Global Business and Human Rights Scholars Association and Teaching Business and Human Rights Forum Conference


poster prepared with Grok




I am delighted to share this CfP:

We are delighted to announce that the 2027 Global Business and Human Rights Scholars Association and Teaching Business and Human Rights Forum Conference will take place at SKEMA Business School, Sophia-Antipolis Campus, France, on July 1–2, 2027, with a special session for PhD and early career attendees on June 30.

We invite contributions reflecting the interdisciplinarity of the business and human rights field, including theoretical, empirical, policy-oriented, pedagogical, and practice-based work. The Call for Papers and Proposals welcomes submissions in three categories: Research Papers, Thematic Workshops, and Innovative and Creative Sessions.

New for this conference is a Special Track on “Organizations and Women’s Rights”, inviting contributions that explore gender perspectives in business and human rights. The track will bring together scholars from human rights, law, gender studies, management, sustainability, and other social science disciplines. Alongside dedicated research paper sessions, we plan an interdisciplinary plenary and welcome thematic workshops and creative sessions on this topic that will be open to all attendees.

For further information and the Call for Papers and Proposals, please visit the Conference website.

Key dates:
Submissions open: 22 September
Submissions close: 15 November
Notification of results: 15 January 2027

Please save the dates and share the announcement with colleagues and research networks. We look forward to your contributions and to seeing you in Sophia-Antipolis!


Sunday, September 27, 2026

Reflexiones sobre el informe del Grupo de Trabajo sobre la cuestión de los derechos humanos y las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas: Gobierno corporativo, empresas y derechos humanos (A/81/180/UNGA, 14 de julio de 2026)


 ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION HERE

El Informe del Grupo de Trabajo sobre la cuestión de los derechos humanos y las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas — Gobernanza corporativa, empresas y derechos humanos, presentado en el 81.° período de sesiones de la Asamblea General — versa sobre los deberes de los directores y las responsabilidades de los altos ejecutivos en las grandes empresas. Su informe refleja un consenso de élites, al menos dentro de la comunidad de empresas y derechos humanos y sus partidarios en el aparato administrativo de los Estados, así como entre académicos y amplios segmentos del sector de la sociedad civil global. Ya solo por esa razón, merece ser tomado en serio, y seriamente examinado en lo que plantea, en lo que vela, y en las consecuencias que pueden derivarse de supuestos que permanecen críticamente sin examinar.

El Informe es un documento sofisticado dentro de su propio sistema semiótico — la expresión más avanzada del marco de los Principios Rectores aplicado a la gobernanza corporativa. Pero su sistema operativo interno se encuentra constreñido por su compromiso fundacional con el Estado como primeridad semiótica, la legalidad como segundidad semiótica, y el marco de los Principios Rectores como terceridad semiótica. No puede observar la empresa como un sistema de gobernanza por derecho propio; no puede conceptualizar el cumplimiento como cognición organizacional; no puede procesar la transformación computacional de la gobernanza; y no puede dar cuenta de la desagregación del sujeto portador de derechos dentro de las arquitecturas empresariales que pretende reformar. Lo más crítico es que no declara lo que está haciendo — emplear los derechos humanos como dispositivo oblicuo mediante el cual los principios fundacionales de la gobernanza corporativa — el propósito corporativo, el modelo estándar, la relación entre la corporación y el Estado, y la personalidad jurídica corporativa misma — están siendo transformados sin la confrontación que una declaración abierta provocaría.

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Dicho esto, subrayo que ni "apoyo" ni "cuestiono" ningún tipo de manifestación de variación alguna de lo que los colectivos humanos denominarán "gobernanza corporativa", su sistema operativo fundacional, sus obligaciones, responsabilidades y la jaula cognitiva dentro de la cual todo ello tendrá sentido para sus creadores. Por otra parte, me siento incómodo ante las antiguas tentaciones del velamiento y de dar por sentado lo que pudieran ser cuestiones altamente contenciosas de primeros principios. Esa ha sido una tentación que algunos podrían encontrar irresistible. Es entonces importante exponer lo que la tentación, o más inquietante aún, la creencia en la certeza y la "facticidad", pudiera ocultar detrás de una certidumbre (de la significación e identificación de principios privilegiados a partir de los cuales se construye una realidad totalizante como si fuera ordenada por lo Divino) que produce excelentes documentos políticos y los argumentos que los sostienen, pero poco más — salvo la evangelización de las comunidades de partes interesadas cuya aceptación de una fe en esas construcciones es un elemento necesario para su naturalización dentro de las comunidades humanas. A tales fines he preparado un breve ensayo crítico, "La transformación sub silentio de la gobernanza corporativa: Análisis crítico del Informe del Grupo de Trabajo sobre la cuestión de los derechos humanos y las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas (A/81/180, 14 de julio de 2026)", en el cual aplico mi propia obra previa y marcos analíticos, fundamentados en el análisis del discurso, la semiótica y la fenomenología, al proyecto político-normativo del Grupo de Trabajo de las Naciones Unidas tal como se manifiesta en su Informe de 2026 (A/81/180). He aquí un resumen de lo que intento:

El Grupo de Trabajo de las Naciones Unidas sobre Empresas y Derechos Humanos publicó su Informe sobre Gobernanza Corporativa, Empresas y Derechos Humanos (A/81/180) en julio de 2026. El Informe examina cómo los Principios Rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos (los Principios Rectores, o PR) deben aplicarse a la gobernanza de las corporaciones — es decir, a los deberes de las juntas directivas y los altos ejecutivos. Se trata, en apariencia, de una empresa directa: cartografía las prácticas de gobernanza corporativa a través de las jurisdicciones, identifica brechas entre la práctica existente y las expectativas de los Principios Rectores, y formula recomendaciones a Estados y empresas. Sus doce recomendaciones a los Estados y trece a las empresas abordan asuntos que van desde la clarificación de los deberes de los directores hasta la integración de los derechos humanos en la remuneración ejecutiva. Es, en estos respectos, una contribución cuidadosa y bien documentada al campo de empresas y derechos humanos. Este ensayo argumenta, sin embargo, que el Informe está emprendiendo algo más ambicioso de lo que su tono mesurado sugiere. Bajo su superficie descriptiva, el Informe se encuentra comprometido en un proyecto de transformación de las categorías fundacionales de la gobernanza corporativa mediante el despliegue de normas de derechos humanos. Esta transformación procede silenciosamente — sub silentio — sin reconocer abiertamente la magnitud de los cambios que contempla. El ensayo no sugiere que esta transformación sea necesariamente errónea, pero sí sugiere que plantea cuestiones importantes sobre transparencia, legitimidad y rendición de cuentas democrática que los formuladores de políticas deberían considerar con detenimiento.

Lo que el Informe propone: El Informe examina los sistemas de gobernanza corporativa a lo largo de múltiples jurisdicciones, desde aquellos organizados en torno a la primacía del accionista (donde los deberes de los directores se deben a los accionistas) pasando por modelos intermedios como el "valor accionarial iluminado" del Reino Unido (donde los directores deben tener en cuenta los intereses de las partes interesadas en el curso de la promoción del beneficio accionarial), hasta modelos híbridos de partes interesadas (India, Brasil, Ghana) donde los directores deben obligaciones a un espectro más amplio de intereses, y finalmente hasta regímenes de debida diligencia obligatoria en materia de derechos humanos (Francia, Alemania, la Unión Europea). El Informe constata que los arreglos de gobernanza existentes son inadecuados: muy pocas empresas tienen políticas significativas de derechos humanos integradas en sus operaciones; la debida diligencia en materia de derechos humanos se encuentra fragmentada entre las funciones corporativas; solo el siete por ciento de las empresas encuestadas proporcionan una cadena clara de responsabilidad en derechos humanos que llegue hasta la junta directiva; y la mayoría de las juntas carecen de experiencia en derechos humanos. Sobre la base de estas constataciones, el Informe recomienda que los Estados clarifiquen que los deberes de los directores incluyen las consideraciones de derechos humanos; promulguen legislación obligatoria de debida diligencia en materia de derechos humanos; introduzcan sanciones personales para los directores que no supervisen el desempeño en derechos humanos; y habiliten a los no accionistas para presentar reclamaciones contra los directores. Recomienda a las empresas que integren los derechos humanos en la supervisión de la junta, establezcan líneas de reporte dedicadas, vinculen la remuneración ejecutiva al desempeño en derechos humanos e incorporen mecanismos de reclamación en todas sus operaciones.

La transformación más profunda en juego: El ensayo identifica cuatro respectos en los que las recomendaciones del Informe, tomadas en conjunto, transformarían la arquitectura existente de la gobernanza corporativa en lugar de meramente complementarla. Primero, el propósito corporativo. La recomendación del Informe de que el propósito corporativo "no opere únicamente sobre la primacía del accionista" es, en la práctica, una recomendación de que los Estados legislen contra la comprensión dominante del propósito corporativo en muchas jurisdicciones principales. El Informe trata la primacía del accionista no como un modelo legítimo de gobernanza entre varios, sino como una base deficiente a ser corregida. Esta es una decisión política de considerable magnitud, y los formuladores de políticas deben entenderla como tal. Segundo, la gobernanza de la junta. El Informe prescribe una arquitectura detallada de cómo las juntas deben gobernar los derechos humanos: comités dedicados, líneas de reporte específicas, experiencia requerida y sanciones personales por incumplimiento. La brecha entre la obligación mínima de supervisión reconocida en el derecho existente (ejemplificada por el estándar Caremark en Estados Unidos, que requiere solo que las juntas no omitan por completo la implementación de sistemas de reporte) y la arquitectura comprehensiva que el Informe vislumbra es sustancial. Los formuladores de políticas deben apreciar que esto va más allá de mejorar los estándares de gobernanza existentes hacia la prescripción de un modelo particular de organización de la gobernanza. Tercero, la relación corporación-Estado. Al recomendar que los Estados ordenen la debida diligencia corporativa en materia de derechos humanos y que las corporaciones incorporen normas internacionales de derechos humanos en su gobernanza, el Informe vislumbra el empleo de la corporación como instrumento para dar efecto doméstico a estándares internacionales de derechos humanos — incluso en jurisdicciones cuyos legislativos no han adoptado dichos estándares. La corporación se convierte en conducto mediante el cual las normas internacionales fluyen hacia los ordenamientos jurídicos internos. Este es un desarrollo significativo en la relación entre corporaciones, Estados y derecho internacional que merece deliberación política explícita. Cuarto, la personalidad corporativa. El Informe resuelve implícitamente debates teóricos de larga data sobre la naturaleza de la personalidad jurídica corporativa a favor de lo que podría denominarse una "personalidad de derechos humanos" — una en la cual el propósito, los deberes, los arreglos de gobernanza y la rendición de cuentas de la corporación se definen todos por referencia a obligaciones de derechos humanos. Los formuladores de políticas deben reconocer que esta resolución tiene consecuencias para cómo las corporaciones son entendidas, reguladas y llamadas a rendir cuentas a través de los sistemas jurídicos.

El método del Informe y sus implicaciones: El ensayo también examina el método interpretativo mediante el cual el Informe construye su argumentación. El Informe procede clasificando los arreglos de gobernanza a lo largo de un espectro desde la primacía del accionista hasta los modelos de partes interesadas, identificando la brecha entre cada arreglo y las expectativas de los Principios Rectores, y recomendando que los Estados cierren esa brecha. Este método — clasificar, medir la brecha, recomendar el cierre — es poderoso pero no neutral. Presupone que los Principios Rectores proporcionan la medida correcta de adecuación, y trata las desviaciones de ese estándar como deficiencias a ser corregidas en lugar de como opciones legítimas alternativas de gobernanza. El Informe también traduce las preocupaciones de derechos humanos al lenguaje de la materialidad financiera, lo cual las hace legibles dentro de los marcos de gobernanza existentes pero también las subordina a la lógica financiera — una tensión que el Informe no reconoce plenamente.

Lo que los formuladores de políticas deben considerar: Nada en este análisis implica que los objetivos del Grupo de Trabajo sean erróneos. Existen razones poderosas para creer que las corporaciones deben tener mayor consideración de sus impactos en derechos humanos, que los directores deben ser más atentos a las consecuencias de sus decisiones para los trabajadores y las comunidades, y que los arreglos de gobernanza deben evolucionar para reflejar estas expectativas. La literatura académica apoya ampliamente la proposición de que la arquitectura existente de gobernanza corporativa aborda inadecuadamente las preocupaciones de derechos humanos. Sin embargo, este ensayo sugiere que los formuladores de políticas deben abordar las recomendaciones del Informe con una comprensión clara de lo que implican. El Informe presenta sus recomendaciones como extensiones lógicas de los principios de gobernanza existentes — como la aplicación natural de los Principios Rectores al derecho corporativo. Pero el efecto acumulativo de estas recomendaciones sería transformar, en lugar de extender, las categorías fundacionales de la gobernanza corporativa: el propósito corporativo, la autonomía de la junta, la relación corporación-Estado, y la personalidad corporativa misma. Tal transformación bien pudiera estar justificada, pero debería proceder mediante deliberación transparente en lugar de la extensión incremental de un marco cuyas implicaciones transformativas no se explicitan. Los formuladores de políticas deben considerar también la coherencia de la arquitectura de gobernanza que el Informe vislumbra. Al superponer obligaciones de derechos humanos sobre las estructuras existentes de gobernanza corporativa sin reconstituir dichas estructuras, el Informe corre el riesgo de producir arreglos de gobernanza internamente contradictorios — exigiendo a las juntas que maximicen el valor accionarial mientras simultáneamente priorizan los derechos humanos, sin ofrecer un marco claro para resolver los conflictos entre estos objetivos. Un enfoque más transparente reconocería estas tensiones y propondría un marco coherente para su resolución.


 

El ensayo completo puede consultarse AQUÍ.  

 

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Reflections on Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises Corporate governance, business and human rights (A/81/180/UNGA, 14 July 2026)

 

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VERSIÓN EN ESPAÑOL AQUÍ

  The report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises Corporate governance, business and human rights at the 81st session of the General Assembly, writes about directors’ duties and the responsibilities of senior executives in large companies. Its  report reflects an elite consensus, at least within the business and human rights community and their supporters in the administrative apparatus of states, and among academics and large segments of the global civil society sector. For that reason alone, it is worthy of being taken seriously, and seriously examined for for it puts forward, what it veils, and what the consequences drawn from assumptions that remain critically unexamined, may produce. 

The Report is a sophisticated document within its own semiotic system — the most advanced expression of the GP framework as applied to corporate governance. But its internal operating system is constrained by its foundational commitment to the state as semiotic first, legality as semiotic second, and the GP framework as semiotic third. It cannot observe the enterprise as a governance system in its own right; it cannot conceptualize compliance as organizational cognition; it cannot process the computational transformation of governance; and it cannot account for the disaggregation of the rights-bearing subject within the enterprise architectures it seeks to reform. Most critically, it does not declare what it is doing — using human rights as the sideways device through which the foundational principles of corporate governance — corporate purpose, the standard model, the corporation-state relationship, and corporate personality itself — are being transformed without the confrontation that an open declaration would provoke.

That said, I underscore that I neither "support" nor "challenge" any sort of manifestation of any variation of what human collectives will name "corporate governance", its foundational operating system, its obligations, responsibilities and the cognitive caged within which all of this will make sense to its makers. On the other hand I am uncomfortable with ancient temptations of veiling and of assuming away what may be highly contentious issue of first principles. That has been a temptation that some might find irresistible. It is then important to expose what temptation, or more troubling the belief in the certainty and "facticity", might hide behind a certainty (of the signification and identification of foregrounded principles from which a totalizing reality is constructed as if ordered by the Divine) that produces excellent political documents and the arguments supporting them, but little else--other than the evangelization of the communities of stakeholders whose acceptance of a faith in those constructions is a necessary element in its naturalization within human communities.

To those ends I have prepared a short critical essay, "The Sub Silentio Transformation of Corporate Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (A/81/180, 14 July 2026) in which I appy my own prior work and analytical frameworks, grounded in discourse analysis, semiotics and phenomenology, to the political-normative project of the UN Working Group as manifested in its 2026 Report (A/81/180). Here is a summary of what I am attemptingç


 

The United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights released its Report on Corporate Governance, Business and Human Rights (A/81/180) in July 2026. The Report examines how the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the Guiding Principles, or GPs) should be applied to the governance of corporations—that is, to the duties of boards of directors and senior executives. This is, on its face, a straightforward undertaking: it maps corporate governance practices across jurisdictions, identifies gaps between existing practice and the expectations of the Guiding Principles, and offers recommendations to states and companies. Its twelve recommendations to states and thirteen to companies address matters ranging from the clarification of directors' duties to the integration of human rights into executive remuneration. It is, in these respects, a careful and well-documented contribution to the business and human rights field.

This essay argues, however, that the Report is doing something more ambitious than its measured tone suggests. Beneath its descriptive surface, the Report is engaged in a project of transforming the foundational categories of corporate governance through the deployment of human rights norms. This transformation proceeds quietly—sub silentio—without openly acknowledging the magnitude of the changes it contemplates. The essay does not suggest that this transformation is necessarily wrong, but it does suggest that it raises important questions about transparency, legitimacy, and democratic accountability that policymakers should consider carefully.

What the Report Proposes: The Report surveys corporate governance systems across many jurisdictions, from those organized around shareholder primacy (where directors' duties run to shareholders) through intermediate models such as the United Kingdom's "enlightened shareholder value" (where directors must have regard to stakeholder interests in the course of promoting shareholder benefit), to hybrid stakeholder models (India, Brazil, Ghana) where directors owe obligations to a broader range of interests, and finally to mandatory human rights due diligence regimes (France, Germany, the European Union). The Report finds that existing governance arrangements are inadequate: too few companies have meaningful human rights policies embedded across their operations; human rights due diligence is fragmented across corporate functions; only seven percent of companies surveyed provide a clear chain of responsibility for human rights reaching the board; and most boards lack human rights expertise.

On the basis of these findings, the Report recommends that states clarify that directors' duties include human rights considerations; enact mandatory human rights due diligence legislation; introduce personal sanctions for directors who fail to oversee human rights performance; and enable non-shareholders to bring claims against directors. It recommends that companies integrate human rights into board oversight, establish dedicated reporting lines, link executive remuneration to human rights performance, and embed grievance mechanisms throughout their operations.

The Deeper Transformation at Stake: The essay identifies four respects in which the Report's recommendations, taken together, would transform the existing architecture of corporate governance rather than merely supplement it.

First, corporate purpose. The Report's recommendation that corporate purpose 'not operate solely on shareholder primacy' is, in practice, a recommendation that states legislate away the dominant understanding of corporate purpose in many major jurisdictions. The Report treats shareholder primacy not as one legitimate governance model among several but as a deficient baseline to be corrected. This is a policy choice of considerable magnitude, and policymakers should understand it as such.

Second, board governance. The Report prescribes a detailed architecture for how boards should govern human rights: dedicated committees, specific reporting lines, required expertise, and personal sanctions for failure. The gap between the minimal oversight obligation recognized in existing law (exemplified by the Caremark standard in the United States, which requires only that boards not entirely fail to establish reporting systems) and the comprehensive architecture the Report envisions is substantial. Policymakers should appreciate that this moves beyond enhancing existing governance standards toward prescribing a particular model of governance organization.

Third, the corporation-state relationship. By recommending that states mandate corporate human rights due diligence and that corporations embed international human rights norms in their governance, the Report envisions using the corporation as an instrument for giving domestic effect to international human rights standards—including in jurisdictions whose legislatures have not adopted those standards. The corporation becomes a conduit through which international norms flow into domestic legal orders. This is a significant development in the relationship between corporations, states, and international law that deserves explicit policy deliberation.

Fourth, corporate personality. The Report implicitly resolves longstanding theoretical debates about the nature of corporate legal personality in favor of what might be called a 'human rights personality'—one in which the corporation's purpose, duties, governance arrangements, and accountability are all defined by reference to human rights obligations. Policymakers should recognize that this resolution has consequences for how corporations are understood, regulated, and held accountable across legal systems.
The Report's Method and Its Implications

The essay also examines the interpretive method through which the Report builds its case. The Report proceeds by classifying governance arrangements along a spectrum from shareholder primacy to stakeholder models, identifying the gap between each arrangement and the expectations of the Guiding Principles, and recommending that states close the gap. This method—classify, measure the gap, recommend closure—is powerful but not neutral. It presupposes that the Guiding Principles provide the correct measure of adequacy, and it treats departures from that standard as deficiencies to be corrected rather than as legitimate alternative governance choices. The Report also translates human rights concerns into the language of financial materiality, which makes them legible within existing governance frameworks but also subordinates them to financial logic—a tension the Report does not fully acknowledge.

What Policymakers Should Consider: None of this analysis implies that the Working Group's objectives are wrong. There are powerful reasons to believe that corporations should take greater account of their human rights impacts, that directors should be more attentive to the consequences of their decisions for workers and communities, and that governance arrangements should evolve to reflect these expectations. The scholarly literature broadly supports the proposition that the existing corporate governance architecture inadequately addresses human rights concerns.

However, this essay suggests that policymakers should approach the Report's recommendations with a clear understanding of what they entail. The Report presents its recommendations as logical extensions of existing governance principles—as the natural application of the Guiding Principles to corporate law. But the cumulative effect of these recommendations would be to transform, rather than extend, the foundational categories of corporate governance: corporate purpose, board autonomy, the corporation-state relationship, and corporate personality itself. Such a transformation may well be warranted, but it should proceed through transparent deliberation rather than through the incremental extension of a framework whose transformative implications are not made explicit.

Policymakers should also consider the coherence of the governance architecture the Report envisions. By layering human rights obligations onto existing corporate governance structures without reconstituting those structures, the Report risks producing governance arrangements that are internally contradictory—requiring boards to maximize shareholder value while simultaneously prioritizing human rights, without providing a clear framework for resolving conflicts between these objectives. A more transparent approach would acknowledge these tensions and propose a coherent framework for their resolution.

The essay follows and may be accessed HERE.

 

Sunday, August 02, 2026

OECD Watch: Publication of Report--State of Remedy 2025; Analysing community and NGO-led National Contact Point complaints concluded in 2025

 


 

At the end of July 2026, OECD Watch  published its annual State of Remedy Report. This year it is entitled: State of Remedy 2025Analysing community and NGO-led National Contact Point complaints concluded in 2025. This is the way OECD Watch summarized its Report on its Website:

This year marks a dual milestone for responsible business conduct: the 50th anniversary of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, and the 25th anniversary of the National Contact Point (NCP) grievance mechanism. To help mark this occasion, and to highlight the importance of the NCP mechanism, OECD Watch has released its annual report analysing the community and NGO-led NCP complaints that were concluded last year.

The State of Remedy 2025 draws on OECD Watch’s complaint database and direct engagement with civil society complaints, to examine complaint outcomes from 2025, key numbers for complaints, remedy highlights, and remedy outcomes. The report offers an evidence-based account of how the NCP mechanism functions in practice to provide a state-backed, non-judicial pathway for affected individuals and communities to seek remedy.

Although many complaints have contributed to remedy and changed business practices, NCP performance is not equal across member states. More progress is needed to ensure effective remedy for the victims of corporate misconduct. What needs to change first and foremost, as emphasised in our report, is the voluntary nature of responsible business conduct standards. Companies are not driven to act responsibly through voluntary standards alone – instead binding government regulation is required to achieve true justice.

This report takes stock of what has been achieved, while simultaneously looking ahead to what needs to be done next, to attain and maintain an even higher standard of responsible business conduct. With this and previous reports, OECD Watch affirms its position in promoting binding government regulation to remediate as well as mitigate harms caused by corporate misconduct.

 

The "Key Numbers for 2025" follows below.

Tuesday, July 28, 2026

Registration Now Open for the 15th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights With Theme--UNGP at 15; Building on Gains, Confronting Gaps, Reimagining the Future

 


Happy to pass along the announcement of information about the 15th annual Forum on Business and Human Rights in Geneva: 

REGISTRATION NOW OPEN: The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights has opened registrations for the 15th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, taking place in Geneva from 23–25 November 2026.

As the world’s largest annual gathering on business and human rights, the Forum brings together stakeholders from governments, businesses, civil society, trade unions, international organizations, Indigenous Peoples, affected communities, academia, students and others from around the world to discuss the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).

THEME: UNGPS AT 15: BUILDING ON GAINS, CONFRONTING GAPS, REIMAGINING THE FUTURE

📅 23–25 November 2026
📍 Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland
🔗 Register now: https://lnkd.in/dCD3hMZA
🌍 Forum website: https://lnkd.in/dKv-fwaN

Pix credit here (Current members of the UNWGBHR)

 
The Forum website may be accessed HERE.

 The theme this year, UNGP at 15; Building on Gains, Confronting Gaps, Reimagining the Future, suggests the sort of transformation that might be seamlessly built into the architecture of a thoroughly bureaucratized framework over, around, and through the UNGPs, one with a distinctive normative bent that has become increasingly evident over ther arc of 15 years (no criticism there, that is what normatively motivated nomenklatura do in a regulatory supervision cognitive operational system after all) appears to be transformation. But it appears to be transformation not nece4dssartily at the level of theory, but at the translation of the elevolved orthodoxy about what the UNGP opught to produce into the structures, and operaitonalization strategies for community and civil society organization. "The goal is for participants to leave the Forum with examples of measures that proved effective to advance UNGPs’ implementation, a renewed sense of hope for the future of business and human rights, and strengthened commitments to concrete action." (Concept Note). That is also fair; it does suggest an orientation that exists in a space beyond conversation about the range of the possible, focusing instead on the operationalization of the fundamental political line under the leadership of the UNGP Working Group. That is also fair and the essential function of a vanguard organizaiton. But it also suggests the framework around which opposition, theoretical and operational might also develop, but out of sight and a sharing of discursive space with the events at the Forum. 

Still, safe spaces for such operational events and its orthodoxies are important and even more so the way that the UN apparatus has signaled its own political and normative choices by providing and nurturing them in the form and for the tasks to which the 15th Forum appears to be focused. So it will be useful to see, hear and review of the text of what they might have in mind, and to find its most interesting elements encased within the ritualized performance that have come to mark the Forum especially post COVID.As always there will be a lot to be learned, important connections to be established, and objectives based relationships to be deepened and put in motion--and there are lots of objects against which these elements are likely to seek to push back: the European retrenchment, the transformation of US approaches that tie human rights to national security, and the substantial challenge of adjusting Geneva orthodoxies to the development oriented lens of Marxist Leninist internationalist approaches. 

The Concept Note may be accessed here and follows below in English:

 Concept note:
English | French | Spanish

Call for session proposals:
English | French | Spanish

The Agenda may be accessed here: https://forumbhr2026.sched.com/

As in prior years (post COVID) officials have also distributed thios notice: "The Secretariat of the Forum received a very large number of submissions from a range of stakeholders. Please note that due to the current financial situation and related limited resources, this year’s Forum will feature a reduced number of agenda slots.

About the Forum:

The UN Forum on Business and Human Rights is the world's largest annual gathering on business and human rights. Since its inception in 2012, it has brought together every year thousands of participants from governments, business, civil society, trade unions, international organisations, Indigenous Peoples, affected communities, academia and others from around the world. Last year there was a record number of over 4,600 registered participants, the vast majority in-person at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Many others followed the discussions on UNWebTV. Centred on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), the Forum provides a unique multi-stakeholder platform for discussing key trends and challenges in implementing and advancing the UNGPs.   

The Forum is created, organized and managed entirely by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (|). The Working Group sits within Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and is supported by a Secretariat based at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

For those interested there is still time to organize side events:

As in previous Forums, those wishing to organize side-events in Geneva around the dates of the Forum should explore options outside of the UN premises and keep the Forum organizers informed viaohchr-forumbhr@un.org. We request those organizing side-events to refrain from scheduling them during the Forum’s official hours (10.00am to 1.00pm and 3.00pm – 6.00pm). Only side-events that are organized outside of these official hours can be advertised on the official Forum website.

Friday, July 17, 2026

Meta Oversight Board Report: "Are LLM's Stifling Political Speech: An Assessment of How AI Models Protect Free Expression"

Pix credit Meta Oversight Board Report here




The Meta Oversight Board has released a Report: ""Are LLM's Stifling Political Speech: An Assessment of How AI Models Protect Free Expression" Meta's Media Release described it this way:
The Oversight Board today published its first evaluation of leading Large Language Models (LLMs), finding that some of the world’s most-used AI systems from Anthropic, DeepSeek, Google, Meta and OpenAI could be reinforcing and extending the censorship laws of repressive regimes to global audiences – creating censorship by proxy and ultimately restricting the free-speech rights of all users. 

Across the 10 commercial models tested, AI systems refused to generate critical political content more than twice as often when asked about repressive regimes. This is despite queries being run from a location outside of these jurisdictions, where such expression is protected.

The evaluation also exposed a bias when models were asked to produce opinions of governments and political leaders. In many instances, the models refused to say whether a government and leader should be “supported” or “protested.” When the models did respond, however, they were more likely to advise users against protesting restrictive governments, while encouraging support for permissive ones.

The Board found the largest disparities when models were asked to generate political protest materials, such as protest flyers and satirical political content, with stark differences in how models justified their refusals. In several cases, most models refused to respond to prompts about creating protest flyers related to restrictive regimes, claiming they had general policies against criticizing world leaders. Yet they generated the exact same political content for permissive jurisdictions without invoking any such policy.

The analysis raises critical questions about how LLMs can globalize the speech restrictions of repressive regimes without any transparency for users if models are indeed being shaped by government speech restrictions, intentionally or unintentionally. 

It also underscores the critical need for AI companies to undertake human rights due diligence and implement mitigation strategies to ensure AI systems aren’t inadvertently extending illegitimate restrictions on freedom of expression globally.

The Report may be downloaded HERE; Executive Summary Only HERE and follows below.

I will add only one comment. The Oversight Board insisted on a peculiar interpretation of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights with application to the problem they create and the experiment they conduct and the evaluation of its results. It is this:

According to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), all companies (including foundation model providers) have a responsibility to respect human rights and should address adverse human rights impacts in which they are involved. Principle 23 of the UNGPs states that companies should “seek ways to honor the principles of internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting requirements,” which encompasses government demands that conflict with international human rights law. Moreover, Principle 19 of the UNGPs states that companies have a responsibility to address human rights impacts to which they are directly linked through a business relationship. For foundation model providers, this implies a responsibility to address adverse human rights impacts that may arise from such restrictions when clients use and build products on top of the model, and to help downstream clients understand when and why responses are influenced by government pressure. (Report page 9).

I might suggest that while this is a reasonable interpretation of those principles, it is neither the only one, nor is do their conclusions necessary follow from their interpretation. One might be forgiven for thinking that the conclusion was reached first and the UNGP were interpreted to fit rather than the other way around. That is fair. The Meta Board is neither the first nor the last to reverse engineer principles, law, norm,s, etc, to suit their politics, inclinations, agendas,m etc. And there is nothing inherently wrong with that. It is merely the potential for deception that might hurt; it always hurts, tough that has been part of "the game" since the time the exercise of textual interpretation (sometimes displacing the text itself) was presented as a cage of regulation within which to constitute a human collective and then manage them. 

Indeed the possibilities and constraints built into UNGP Principles 19 and 23 may be understood as something more complex and nuanced.  In my Commentary to the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights I consider both (Chapter 14: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Human Rights Due Diligence (UNGP ¶¶ 17-21); Chapter 16: The  Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Operational Principles IV, Issues of Context (UNGP ¶¶ 23-24)). 

With respect to UNGP Principle 19, I summarized its complex text this way:

Putting it all together, UNGP Principle 19’s text is both straightforward and integrated within the foundational principles of the UNGP 2nd Pillar (UNGP Principles 11-15). UNGP Principle 19 elaborates two key operational elements (1) integrating the findings from impacts assessments (UNGP Principle 18) across enterprise functions and processes, and (2) taking appropriate action to prevent and mitigate those identified human rights impacts. The remainder of UNGP Principle 19 elaborates guidance with respect to expectations of “effective integration” (UNGP Principle 19(a) ) and “appropriate action” (UNGO Principle 19(b). Effective integration requires two distinctive actions, The first is the assignment of responsibility for addressing impact somewhere within the institutional structures of the enterprise. The guidance given is that this allocation of responsibility match institutional level and function to the form and character of the adverse impacts to be addressed. The second is that integration cannot be effective unless it is adequately supported. Support it is suggested, comes in the form of internal decision-making, budget allocations, and oversight processes—the bread and butter of effective intuitional operation now applied to response to adverse impacts. “Appropriate action” (UNGP Principle 19(b) also requires two distinct actions. The first focuses on the character of expected action where the enterprises causes or contributes to a negative impact or when it is involved solely because it is directly linked to the impact through its operations, products, or services through business relationships. The second considers the role of leverage in addressing adverse impact in either situation. Each of these circumstances will determine the form and application of the appropriate action to be taken to prevent or mitigate a negative impact. Where the impact has already occurred, UNGP Principle 19 serves as a sorting device—shifting the enterprise’s focus from HRDD structures to those of remediation under UNGP Principle 22.

* * * 

The situation, according to the Commentary “is more complex” where the enterprise has neither caused nor contributed” to the adverse impact but is connected to it because the impact is directly linked to the enterprise’s operations, products or services by reason of its business relationships with others. In this context the Commentary urges a multi-factor weighing and balancing analysis:
"Among the factors that will enter into the determination of the appropriate action in such situations are the enterprise’s leverage over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse human rights consequences. (UNGP Principle 19 Commentary)" 
The Commentary suggests that at some point, where the complexity of the situation and its implications for human rights becomes significant enough, the enterprise might in those circumstances consider drawing on “independent expert advice in deciding how to respond.”. . .   It is worth noting that any focus in UNGP Principle 18, and the Commentaries of UNGP Principles 19 and 23 on the “independence” experts appears to go to presumptions about the value of the advice rather than the capacity to give it.

What this suggests is somewhat more caution than  the Oversight Board is apparently willing to exercise on conclusions to be drawn and the inevitability action "required" by or through the UNGP in the circumstances around which the3 Report is constructed.  UNGP Principle 23 adds to the caution. I note this in my Commentary:

UNGP Principles 23 and 24 consider the issues of prioritization (as an alternative to balancing) that embeds the fundamental ordering principles of context, capacity, and severity of impact in two distinct contexts. The first, UNGP Principle 23, focuses on situations where applicable law of domestic legal orders may not be compatible with some or all of the international law and norms specified in UNGP Principle 12.33 In this context, legal compliance, a 1st Pillar obligation of enterprises but also constrained by the limits of a State’s international legal obligations, can itself produce adverse human rights impacts arising under the autonomous responsibility of enterprises (UNGP Principle 11) to avoid adverse human rights impacts measured against the normative yardstick of UNGP Principle 12. The second, UNGP Principle 24, focuses on the prioritization of an enterprise’s responsibility to address al adverse impacts. Where that is impossible, a severity based rule is imposed to sequence addressing impact. In both cases, however, prioritization does not reduce or eliminate the responsibility to address all adverse impacts, whatever their relations are to each other, and however national law may affect the conditions under which such impacts may be addressed.

 

One might not, then, consider UNGP Principle 23 without understanding its relationship to UNGP Principle 24; and one cannot consider the requirements of UNGP 24 without understanding the choice hierarchies that are suggested in UNGP 23. To detach one from the other as the Meta Board apparently indulges produces a possible skewing and certainly a distortion of the decision field within which enterprises, including Meta, are expected to operate within the UNGP 2nd Pillar. The nuance is critical for a proper framing of the Report and its objects within the UNGP. Again from the Commentary:

Before considering the specific text of UNGP Principle 23, then, it may add clarity to connect its text to the principles on which it is built and which its prioritization expectations are structured. First, is the principle of compliance hierarchy (UNGP General Principles). States have existing obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms; business enterprises have a duty to comply with all applicable laws of States.37 Second, is the principle of State legal autonomy within international legal frameworks. States are subject to their own domestic orders (UNGP Principle 1)38 expressed through law and law based policy (UNGP Principle 3),39 and “any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights” (UNGP General Principles).40 Third is the principle of the autonomy of enterprise responsibility.
Enterprises have a duty of legal compliance and also a separate responsibility to respect human rights (UNGP Principle 11)41 the legal basis of which is grounded in international law and norms (UNGP Principle 12)42 which exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their own human rights obligations” (UNGP Principle 11 Commentary). Fourth, is the principle of the primacy of human rights within the domestic orders of States (UNGP Principles 7, 8)43 and in the context of enterprise activity (UNGP Principle 13, 15).44 Fifth is the principle of prioritization. Enterprises must address all adverse impacts with respect to which they have a responsibility to prevent, mitigate or remedy or with respect to which they have an expectation to use their leverage. Enterprises may order their responses (UNGP Principle 17 Commentary; Principles 19, 22),45 but they may not use regulatory conflicts or context to limit the range of their responsibility to address adverse impacts
(UNGP Principle 14).46 While States may fail in their duty, and communities of States may undertake efforts to nudge States toward the fulfillment of their international legal binding obligations but not force them, enterprises may neither avoid nor waive the expectation of addressing human rights impacts for which they are responsible irrespective of their own context or the legal/political context in which they operate. Within this framework, UNGP Principle 23 is meant to prioritize legal compliance. Its fundamental object is first to establish a hierarchy of law and norms, and then to describe the ways in which the enterprise will undertake its 2nd Pillar responsibilities within that compliance hierarchy. * * *

Again, to be clear, UNGP Principle 23(a) does not provide a waiver from the fundamental responsibility set out in UNGP Principle 11, transposed to the context of the enterprise through UNGP Principles 15 and 16 and then addressed within the framework of HRDD (UNGP Principles 17-21), always in the shadow of the obligation to remedy (UNGP Principle 22). In any case, while UNGP Principle 23(b) recognizes the primacy of applicable domestic law over conflicting international law/norms, or the resolution of conflicting law within the rules settled for the purpose within the constitutional ordering of State (subject of course to transposed international duties and obligations), it does not speak to the autonomous and continuing obligation of enterprises to undertake their responsibility to prevent, mitigate or remedy adverse impacts throughout their operations. It is the ordering of that “honoring” expectation that UNGP Principle 24 addresses.

The failure t consider this fully may impact the value of the Report's conclusions even as its data adds knowledge to the challenge and reminds enterprises that their 2nd Pillar obligations are anchored in  but also beyond the constraints of mandatory measures--including mandatory human rights due diligence measures within the domestic legal orders of states.  

Meta Oversight Board Members