Showing posts with label OECD. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OECD. Show all posts

Sunday, August 02, 2026

OECD Watch: Publication of Report--State of Remedy 2025; Analysing community and NGO-led National Contact Point complaints concluded in 2025

 


 

At the end of July 2026, OECD Watch  published its annual State of Remedy Report. This year it is entitled: State of Remedy 2025Analysing community and NGO-led National Contact Point complaints concluded in 2025. This is the way OECD Watch summarized its Report on its Website:

This year marks a dual milestone for responsible business conduct: the 50th anniversary of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, and the 25th anniversary of the National Contact Point (NCP) grievance mechanism. To help mark this occasion, and to highlight the importance of the NCP mechanism, OECD Watch has released its annual report analysing the community and NGO-led NCP complaints that were concluded last year.

The State of Remedy 2025 draws on OECD Watch’s complaint database and direct engagement with civil society complaints, to examine complaint outcomes from 2025, key numbers for complaints, remedy highlights, and remedy outcomes. The report offers an evidence-based account of how the NCP mechanism functions in practice to provide a state-backed, non-judicial pathway for affected individuals and communities to seek remedy.

Although many complaints have contributed to remedy and changed business practices, NCP performance is not equal across member states. More progress is needed to ensure effective remedy for the victims of corporate misconduct. What needs to change first and foremost, as emphasised in our report, is the voluntary nature of responsible business conduct standards. Companies are not driven to act responsibly through voluntary standards alone – instead binding government regulation is required to achieve true justice.

This report takes stock of what has been achieved, while simultaneously looking ahead to what needs to be done next, to attain and maintain an even higher standard of responsible business conduct. With this and previous reports, OECD Watch affirms its position in promoting binding government regulation to remediate as well as mitigate harms caused by corporate misconduct.

 

The "Key Numbers for 2025" follows below.

Thursday, October 02, 2025

A Transformative Moment for the European Model of Regulatory Governance With Application to AI?: On the EU Digital Omnibus; Simplification But No Pause

Pix credit here

 

 One might have been excused for believing that the European project of regulatory supervision, or of regulatory governance, was unstoppable (OECD (2022), Better Regulation Practices across the European Union 2022, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6e4b095d-en. ). In the economic sector, the approach was grounded in a framework in which the State would serve as a source of policy and objectives the realization of which would be delegated to enterprises in the form of compliance and reporting requirements.  Compliance would be the product of the work of large interlocking bureaucracies in constant communication--one lodged in and as the state apparatus, the other developed within the institutional apparatus of the complying enterprise. 

A key trend driving regulatory evolution is the growing demand for evidence-based compliance. As highlighted in recent discussions, EU regulations are increasingly requiring organizations to not only implement policies but also provide auditable, documented proof of compliance. This shift moves compliance beyond check-the-box exercises to defensible, data-driven processes that regulators can scrutinize. (here)

The result was an increasingly comprehensive and complex system of administrative supervision; one in which enterprises might, to some at least, appear to serve as the privatized organs of public administration of state policies and objectives. As a privatized public body their principal objective was to serve as an instrument of state policy, to be undertaken in the course of pursuing economic or commercial objectives.  The approach was comprehensive but especially notable in the business and human rights and sustainability areas through the European Green Deal. 

The push back was manifested in the form of Mario Draghi  

Mario Draghi – former European Central Bank President and one of Europe's great economic minds – was tasked by the European Commission to prepare a report of his personal vision on the future of European competitiveness. The report looks at the challenges faced by the industry and companies in the Single Market. It outlines how Europe will no longer be able to rely on many of the factors that have supported growth in the past and lays out a clear diagnosis and provides concrete recommendations to put Europe onto a different trajectory. (here)

The substance of the Draghi Report, supported in some measure by the European Commission resulted in the intensification of efforts to roll back, slow down, or reduce the net effects of projects of regulatory governance, now balanced by issues of efficiency and competitiveness.  

On 26 February 2025, the European Commission adopted a simplification package. It covers a number of legislative areas, including sustainable finance rules, carbon border adjustment mechanism and investment with the aim of simplifying EU rules, enhancing competitiveness and attracting investment. This initiative is part of the Commission’s commitment to reduce administrative burdens by 25% for all businesses and 35% for SMEs. In order to boost competitiveness and unleash growth, the EU needs to foster a favourable business environment and ensure that companies are not stifled by an excessive regulatory burden. This, in turn, will unlock investments and enable companies to embrace the transition to a sustainable economy in a more effective and pragmatic way, ultimately meeting our climate and other sustainability goals. The “Omnibus” package will reduce compliance complexities for all companies, while focusing the rules on the largest companies that have a bigger impact on the environment and climate. (here)

 Simplification has now come to the regulatory governance of A.I. The European Commission has distributed a Press Release Commission collects feedback to simplify rules on data, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence in the upcoming Digital Omnibus. 

The European Commission has opened a call for evidence to collect research and best practices on how to simplify its legislation in the upcoming Digital Omnibus, especially when it comes to data, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI).  This is fully in line with the Commission’s simplification agenda and efforts to create a more favourable business environment, by lightening administrative burdens and costs on companies. The initiative also supports the Commission’s target in the Competitiveness Compass to cut administrative burden by at least 25% for all companies and at least 35% for small and medium-sized enterprises.  * * * This call for evidence follows extensive stakeholder engagement that included public consultations on the Data Union Strategy, the Cybersecurity Act revision, and on the Apply AI Strategy. It is a first step in simplifying the EU’s digital rulebook and remains open until 14 October 2025.

 A Call for Evidence is a peculiarity of the EU lawmaking process.  It is described this way:

The Commission uses Call for evidence to define the scope of: (1) a politically sensitive and/or important new law or policy (2) an evaluation of an existing law or (3) policy a fitness check of a bundle of related existing laws and/or policies. A Call for evidence describes the problem to be tackled and objectives to be met, explains why EU action is needed, outlines policy options and describes the main features of the consultation strategy, including whether a public consultation with a questionnaire is needed.  The Call for evidence combines two steps that were previously sequential: the roadmap/inception impact assessment and the questionnaire (where relevant). (EU Commission, Planning and Proposing Law).

But in the case of the AI Act, simplification does not appear to also suggest a pause in its enforcement.  As recently reported: 

According to Cynthia Kroet from Euronews, the European Commission has rejected calls to pause the AI Act’s implementation, with Commission official Yvo Volman confirming to EU lawmakers that no moratorium is being considered. Speaking to the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee, Volman emphasised that the focus remains on making the rules work practically. He also clarified that the upcoming digital simplification package, due in December, won’t involve a complete overhaul of the AI Act, addressing concerns about potential US pressure influencing changes. (The EU AI Act Newsletter #87: Digital Simplification Consultation Launches).

Of interest may be the  Draft Guidance article 73 AI Act - incident reporting (Download); Incident report for serious incidents under the AI Act (High-risk AI systems) (Download). "While the rules will only become applicable from August 2026, you can already download the draft guidance and reporting template below. Both these documents will help providers to prepare. The draft guidance clarifies definitions, offers practical examples, and explains how the new rules relate to other legal obligations. The EU’s approach also seeks alignment with international initiatives, such as the OECD’s AI Incidents Monitor and Common Reporting Framework." (here).

All of this suggests a conversation rather than a retreat. There is no going back to wherever it was that European governance had been in the 1970s, or 1980's, or thereafter in that short effervescent period that produced both a theory of regulatory governance (including its financial sector version as regulatory supervision, though the two align in fundamental respects). But going forward, the  calculus of regulatory governance will likely be encumbered (or blessed--depending on one's ideological starting point respecting the roles and responsibilities of states, markets, and the bodies corporate through which they are manifested), by an additional set of factors that, added to the calculus of regulatory governance, may reshape its outcomes and the expectations that drive those outcomes. It may be clearer now, and perhaps wiser, to indulge the foolishness of thinking that the European governance project will be abandoned--it will not. But perhaps it will be enriched by the incorporation of factors that had, until now, been marginalized from the analytics of European welfare, and in the process continue the development of European governance theory with strong foundations in liberal democracy and the autonomy of the individual within it.     

Saturday, June 21, 2025

Submission Drafts Posted: "The Current State and Future Trajectories of HRDD Laws: New Legal Norms on Human Rights Due Diligence" (Larry Catá Backer and Claire Methven O'Brien, eds; forthcoming)

 

Pix credit Larry Catá Backer Tabula se Saint Miquel (13th Century Catalonia)

 

I am delighted to announce that we are able to make available a number of submission drafts of the contributors to the book,  The Current State and Future Trajectories of HRDD Laws: New Legal Norms on Human Rights Due Diligence, that  Claire Methven O'Brien and I are editing ,for expected publication with Routledge at the end of 2025 or beginning of 2026 (assuming everything goes smoothly.

This volume brings together some of the most innovative and forward thinking academics, practitioners, and commentators, from universities, non-governmental organizations, business, and government. Their objective, collectively, was to contribute to a deeper understanding on the emerging law of due diligence. More specifically, contributors were asked to explore, from their own perspective on the ways in which due diligence as a legal concept touches on the human rights and sustainability elements of economic activities whether undertaken by public or private organizations. In each case, and from a variety of perspectives, each of the contributors explores the rich possibilities of due diligence within the business and human rights environment. Each explores the level and forms of attentiveness (diligence) as a function of the quantity and focus requires (the diligence that is due) in a variety of context that are defined both by the legal environment in which it is embedded and the normative principles that due diligence is meant to fulfill. The structuring is important—while one cannot ask due diligence to do more than it is capable—conceptually—one can certainly exercise a judgment about the way that one applies values and societal objectives within its somewhat capacious possibilities. With that fundamental understanding of structure, form, character, possibility, and limitation, no really useful understanding of, or effective application of due diligence is possible. (Backer & O'Brien, Chapter 1, Introduction).

Foe those interested we have posted material to the book website. All materials can be accessed through the Book Project Homepage which includes information about the overall project (Introduction to the Project) and its background (Project Genesis and Background). Information, including video links may be found about the introducory workshop held in 2023 here: Workshop-Conference: The current state and future trajectories of human rights due diligence laws: New Legal Norms on Human Rights Due Diligence(6 September 2023; virtual)

Information about the book may be accessed through the link: Book: The Current State and Future Trajectories of HRDD Laws: New Legal Norms on Human Rights Due Diligence. These include Contents and Chapter Abstracts; Selected Chapter Submission Drafts; and informaiton about our extraordinary group of Contributors.

Contributions include: 

 Chp 1: The Current State, and Future Trajectories, of Human Rights Due Diligence Laws —  Larry Catá Backer and Claire Methven O’Brien ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 2: Human Rights Due Diligence in the UNGPs – Larry Catá Backer ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 3: State Obligations and Corporate Responsibilities: The Notion of “Due Diligence” in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – Maria Monnheimer  ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 4: Lessons for Human Rights Due Diligence from Due Diligence in International Environmental Law – Sara Seck ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Ch.5:  The Growing Relationship Between Tort Law and Human Rights Due Diligence – Carola Glinski ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 6: Can the French Law of Vigilance Apply to the Extraterritorial Violations of Indigenous and Human Rights? – Cannelle Lavite and Jérémie Gilbert ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 7: Supply Chain Due Diligence Law in Germany – Birgitte Spiesshofer ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 8: Mandatory HRDD in the E.U. – Claire Methven O’Brien

Chp 9: US Measures to Give Legal Effect to Human Rights Due Diligence – Rachel Chambers and Eric R. Biel

Chp 10: Horizontal Legislation: Cascading Due Diligence Through Model Contract Clauses– Susan Maslow, Patrick Miller, and David Snyder ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 11: What are the Lessons from Sectoral Approaches to Human Rights Due Diligence – Justine Nolan and Shelley Marshall ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 12: Human Rights Due Diligence and Disclosure Regimes – Rachel Chambers and Anil Yilmaz Vastardis ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp 13: Human Rights Due Diligence and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct – Jernej Letnar Černič ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

Chp.14: The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (EU) and Its Impact on Barriers to Remedy in Transnational Litigation – Lucas Roorda

Ch.15 Epilogue: Legalising Human Rights Due Diligence from the Present  into an Uncertain Future — Larry Catá Backer and Claire Methven O’Brien ACCESS SUBMISSION DRAFT HERE

The Book Table of Contents (with Abstracts) and links to selected submission drafts follow below as well. Draft Frontmatter may be accessed HERE.

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

Coalition for Peace & Ethics: Input Statement for OHCHR UNGP Helpdesk Initiative


 

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights through its Business and Human Rights Section has initiated a major initiative--the establishment of a helpdesk mechanism on business and human rights. As part of that effort OHCHR is hosting an event 26 June 20204 in Geneva,  Establishing Effective Helpdesks on Business and Human Rights taking place on Wednesday, 26 June 2024 @ 14-15h in Geneva, Palais des Nations, Room XXII.The event will be held in hybrid format. If you cannot join in person, please feel free to connect via WebEx (Meeting number: 2743 583 3394; Password: PJsPnUBt472). Please note that during the Q&A portion of the event, priority will be given to participants in Room XXII.

The OHCHR is also accepting input related to the Helpdesk project even at this formative stage in its development.

On behalf of the Coalition for Peace & Ethics, I have submitted input for consideration in the development of this Helpdesk Initiative.  The Input, which consists of an analysis of the Helpdesk framework and a set of suggestions and recommendations for the concept's further development, follows below. From its conclusions:

The topic, and the effort, is important. The choices made in structuring this mechanism perhaps more so. This CPE analysis and input, including its suggestions and recommendations go toward the key elements of  that structuring—the delicate balancing between authority and (in)formality in structures and the even more delicate balance between interpretation and instrumentalization. The fundamental question that requires some discussion is this: will the OHCHR operating perhaps through this Helpdesks mechanism seek to develop a premise that it is the supreme authority or a significant and uniquely situated but not the only authority on the UNGP, its interpretation, and the manager of the premises through which judgments about application must be measured. CPE does not suggest that either position is fatally flawed, only that either requires a measure of transparency, consultation, and perhaps the legitimizing offices of law  unless the assertions and operations under any such mechanism is to remain informal.  The German model certainly points in that direction. The price one pays for informal narrative management, of course, is the effective and mandatory authority of interpretation and pronouncements, the legal effects of which may vary by State. The effort to move this to a virtual space, through the concept of platforms, is a good one though, as the CPE input suggests, one that in this formative stage of its development, presents critical challenges—and choices among objectives (policy, political, structural and the like). Lastly, it remains to be seen whether or to what extent the helpdesk mechanism can overcome the large challenge of effective access.  Aimed only at elite stakeholders the helpdesk mechanism will merely lard an already rich system of access. Aimed to those otherwise unable to access current may require some substantially creative thinking—with respect to which both virtual spaces and the conceptual framework of platforms can play a key role. Tied to that is the final normative element that ought to play a role in structuring—the role of data and data mining in the construction of the helpdesk system. The helpdesk system will generate a tremendous amount of data; much of it will be useful both for system quality control, but also to feed descriptive and predictive models. In a more advanced stage, that data can also serve as a baseline against which behavior changing policy measures may be adopted, adapted, and applied to the community of stakeholders.  None of this is necessarily bad, but all of it ought to be considered against emerging legal and normative standards about data and its uses to manage perception and conduct.  

The text of the CPE Helpdesk Input may also be accessed HERE. 

 

Pix Credit here

 

Friday, March 29, 2024

Brief Reflections on the 2024 U.S Government National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct


In 2016 the United States Government published its first National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct.  It was viewed positively by many.  But not by me.  My assessment was short and not entirely positive:

 The U.S.-NAP exhibits all of the weaknesses and missed opportunities that has marked the NAP process for many developed states: it focuses on outward conduct and pays little attention to the human rights effects of economic activity within the United States; it is grounded in the prerogatives of executive command; it provides little assessment of the legal and remedial framework of the United States and its relationship to managing business conduct; and most regrettably, so focused on the present it fails to present a coherent vision, grounded in law and policy, for moving forward. And yet there is a basis for moving forward revealed in the U.S.-NAP, one that might appeal to the incoming American administration--by focusing on disclosure, transparency and information sharing. The U.S.-NAP is at its most powerful and potentially useful not as a direct manifestation of state power through law, but by embracing methods of regulatory governance that enhance the use of market levers to manage preferred behaviors. (On the U.S. National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct--Business and Human Rights: Public Leadership and Private Governance (2016))

That assessment, in turn, reflected a substantial concern that the NAP process itself  provided States with the opportunity  to avoid confronting the deficiencies of their engagement with the State duty to protect by encouraging the crafting of aspirational pamphlets of encouragement for the extraterritorial application of international human rights law/norms which in important ways would have no internal effects (discussion over the course of years here, here, here, here, here

On June 16, 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced on behalf of the Biden-Harris Administration that the Department would soon begin updating and revitalizing the United States’ National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct (NAP RBC) for U.S. businesses operating and investing abroad (discussed here). At the time, Secretary of State Anthony Blink was quoted as saying: 

Businesses can provide crucial support for democratic principles, including respect for human and labor rights. They have the capacity to help shape society and the environment – raising local wages, improving working conditions, building trust with communities, and operating sustainably. As a result, businesses have a key role in addressing human rights abuses, including throughout their value chains. (here)

In 2024, after extensive consultations among selected stakeholders, the U.S. Government has issued its revised 2024 National Action Plan on Responsible Βusiness Conduct. Its Press Release framed that effort this way:

Businesses adhering to strong responsible business conduct (RBC) practices throughout their value chains can lift standards around the world and help level the playing field, including for U.S.-based businesses and workers. The U.S. government uses a range of tools to promote and incentivize RBC, including prohibitions against federal contractors and sub-contractors engaging in trafficking in persons or using forced labor or indentured child labor; technical assistance and programming to prevent child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking in global supply chains; preferential purchasing for contractors engaged in sustainable environmental practices; import and export controls; trade-related regulations; sanctions; and visa restrictions.

The Biden-Harris Administration’s release of the United States’ second National Action Plan (NAP) on Responsible Business Conduct reflects a whole-of-government commitment to strengthen RBC. Agencies across the U.S. government have pursued policies, initiatives, and programming focused on RBC to promote respect for human and labor rights, expand use of green energy, further a just transition, counter corruption, protect human rights defenders, advance gender equity and equality, and promote rights-respecting use of technology.

2024 United States Government National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct 
FACT SHEET: U.S Government’s National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct

And, indeed, much has changed since 2016--and particularly the principles and objectives driving U.S. efforts to develop some sort of policy chapeau over business conduct that the state can give the "responsible" imprimatur. The difference is quite notable when one compares the way each was framed at the time of their distribution. In the opening page of the 2016 US NAP, then Secretary of State John Kerry wrote:

 The United States is committed to promoting human rights and leading the global fight against corruption. . . U.S. companies are among the most sought-after partners across the globe because they take seriously their responsibility to follow the rule of law, uphold human and labor rights, and strengthen the communities in which they operate. . . We undertook this process to enhance coordination within our government, push for higher standards and a more level playing field globally, and strengthen public-private coordination to help U.S. companies attain their responsible conduct goals in a variety of environments around the world. (US NAP, p. 1)).

In 2024, the Introduction to the 2024 US NAP took a slightly different tone: 

To mark the 10th anniversary of the UNGPs on June 16, 2021, Secretary Antony Blinken announced the USG’s intent to revitalize and update the NAP. While this NAP addresses the full range of RBC issues for U.S. businesses operating and investing abroad, it focuses principally on the business responsibility to respect human rights, including through effective due diligence in a rapidly changing risk environment. . . Under the Biden Administration, agencies across the USG have pursued policies, initiatives, and programming to promote respect for human and labor rights, expand the use of green energy, further a just transition, counter corruption, protect human rights defenders (HRDs), advance gender equity and
equality, and promote rights-respecting technology. (2024 US NAP p. 3, 4)

One moves here from collaboration and incentive to compliance based regimes overseen by a blended techno-bureaucracy of public and private functionaries constituted to align economic productivity with public policy, and public policy around human rights (consider a European perspective here)--but only in their outbound activities (longer discussion here). The alignment of the spheres of politics, law, and economic activity--subsumed within the overarching principles of international human rights--requires a refocus of the enterprise of business and human rights as a legal-policy matter from the State duty to protect human rights to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  That is, that in the context of business and human rights, States are far better equipped to transpose public regulatory structures onto private activity than they are, for the moment at least, to actually bind themselves and their domestic legal orders to the very international human rights regime they are more than eager to foist down supply chains beyond the borders of the State.  

Fair enough.

But one is still very much within the sphere's of incentive systems and incentives based compliance regimes. There is still a great distance between this approach and those privileging legalization or direct state direction (these find more fertile ground in Europe and in Marxist-Leninist states). Here one encounters a re-affirmation of the fundamental approach and sensibilities (which themselves have been evolving since the 1970s) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the group that tends to include many "home" states in goal economic production networks.  That makes a lot of sense, especially given the strength (still) of markets driven development and the protection of the autonomy of natural and legal persons  in what is still understood as a private sphere of activity (a close look at the Business Roundtable  (re)statement on corporate purpose makes that clear enough). That does not suggest laissez faire in the style of Milton Friedman--it does suggest that public policy creates guard rails and expectations but does not drive micro-decision making. That is, public policy does not drive economic production (its character and choices); rather public policy creates the "playing field" within those choices can be made in conformity to collective expectations, duties, and obligations (some of which are written into law especially in the guise of compliance measures and "hardened" private law; see also here).

The fundamental operative structure of the UNGP State duty to protect was grounded on the premise of international legality embedded within the principles of the state system.  And that, in turn, is still, more or less, grounded n the nation of the contractual nature of international law, and the aspirational nature of international norms.  True enough, the transformation of international law from contract to constituting instrument (that is from treaties memorializing norms and a duty to transpose them into domestic legal orders to treaties that constitute an institutional apparatus onto which certain authority is delegated; the classic version of which might be José Alvarez's International Organizations as Law Makers (OUP, 2006)  proceeds apace.  And the trajectory and implications of that transformation are substantially irresistible at this point--absent crisis. Still, State's remain protective of their authority (undisturbed in the UNGP) that (with the customary exceptional cases) to embrace or reject what may be proffered for their consideration either in the form of treaty obligation or the product of treaty bodies. 

The United States, like the People's Republic of China, are no exceptions to this sensibility, and in a sense siblings in their shared view of the prerogatives of (powerful) states within the state system and its institutional apparatus. 

And thus, it ought not surprise that the emphasis on a quasi-legalization, or exhortation toward that goal (even in hybrid form), of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, based on international law, and applied only beyond the territorial borders of the home state becomes the centerpiece of State strategies for compliance with its duty to protect human rights. The irony is inescapable, as is the resulting transformation of the State duty from one that might have been centered on the alignment of a State's domestic legal order with its international human rights duty, to one  grounded in exteriorization of the State duty beyond its territories and governmentalization of economic actors as agents for implementation of extraterritorial human rights regimes. 

To that end an apparatus is necessary; in this case a Federal Advisory Committee on Responsible Business Conduct, that might serve as a platform in which public and private consumers of responsible business conduct (RBC) might "come to market." (2024 US NAP, p. 11). But the driving force is still exteriorization of rights based  compliance, however broadly it is dressed up in the COED-inspired language of RBC. It also requires the cultivation, long resisted in the US, of a greater openness toward non-judicial state based remedies created (through the OECD National Contact Point organs),

The OECD’s work on RBC is delivered through the OECD Centre for Responsible Business Conduct. The RBC Centre, which is part of the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, works with governments, business, workers and civil society to promote the implementation of the OECD Guidelines. The RBC Centre provides the Secretariat to the Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct, composed of representatives of all governments adhering to the Guidelines. The Working Party’s mandate includes supporting governments in designing policies for responsible business conduct, developing guidance to business of how to implement due diligence and promoting its implementation, and strengthening access to remedy through National Contact Points for RBC. (HERE)

The OECD principles and mechanisms also come with their own guiding apparatus--the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct established in 2012 and serving as a sort of capacity building and guidance mechanism around RBC. Lastly, the 2024 US NAP approach is one that permits the strategic aligning of favored elements of international human rights law/norms that align with current USG policy priorities with US procurement policies, and the USG's increasingly important sanctions mechanisms (now converging with human rights priorities).  This aligns with the explanation of RBG offered in the 2024 US NAP--"based on the growing evidence that businesses can perform well while doing good and that governments should create and facilitate the conditions for this to take place." (2024 US NAP, p. 3, n. 1).

At the center of RBC, and operationalization mechanisms are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, "an international legal instrument, adopted by all OECD members and open for adherence to interested non-OECD members. To date, around 50 countries have adhered to the Guidelines or are in the process of adhering. These countries represent some of the largest markets in the world and a large majority of global trade and investment activity" (HERE).  This multi-lateral apparatus has been acquiring  some quasi-jurisprudential and regulatory heft over the last twenty or so years (see my early discussion in “Rights And Accountability In Development (Raid) V Das Air (21
July 2008) And Global Witness V Afrimex (28 August 2008); Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations,” (2009) 10(1) Melbourne Journal Of International Law 258-307). Thus a necessary element of exteriorization involves alignments with supra-national blocs of like minded states--in this case the OECD-- through which their values can be crammed down supply chains (the US variation of what is sometimes referred to as the European "Brussels Effect"). And, like the Norwegian Pension Fund Global, that institutional apparatus is meant to privilege national priorities in international spaces  (2024 US NAP pp. 15-39; the operational guts of the 2024 US NAP) (e.g. here). 

The 2024 US NAP, on balance represents a step toward an evolution of US engagement with the issues of business and human rights in economic activity, as it intersects with critical developments in tastes and expectations for governance, their modalities, and the balance between individual autonomy to drive choices and public policy that shapes them (overseen by techno-bureaucracies seeded within the apparatus of public and private institutions).  It provides a strong statement of an approach that is quite distinct from that of the Europeans and that of Marxist-Leninist States (for a comparison of first principles driving structures that might be applied to business and human rights see here, here, and here).

The bottom line: The 2024 US NAP shows promise and is exceptionally useful as a memorial of current US policy under the current political administration. First the positives:

1. The strong alignment with the structures and sensibilities of the OECD--including its normative formulations (the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises), and its "soft" remedial mechanisms (through the National Contact Points). But more important than that is the convergence with the underlying first principles of OECD approaches to governance--markets driven, state regulatory, soft law  frameworks, and incentives based nudging that reflects a dialectic between public policy and private expectation (consider eg here, and here). 

2. The deepening of U.S. policy commitment from traditional corporate social responsibility sensibilities to RBC--understood to embrace both human rights and sustainability, as well as "good governance" issues (eg here, and here; in this case built around the concept of corruption).  Yet lost in the shift is the relationship between the normative values of RBC and the modalities of its realization.  In particular, the now generations long marginalization of philanthropy is to be lamented both in its own right and as an important expression of RBC in some cultures. 

3.The detailed and comprehensive mapping of the role of the State and its administrative organs in facilitating RBC (that is in constructing the structural elements and guidance through which RBC can be identified, measured, assessed, and guided as context changes).

4. The transparent development of prioritization in governmental nudging efforts in furtherance of policy objectives. 

5.The 2024 US NAP approach falls plausibly within a certain way of interpreting the spirit of the UNGP as well as its approach to state obligation to facilitate the 2nd pillar corporate responsibility to respect human rights.

And then the negatives: 

1. The characterization of the RBC project--and its due diligence methodologies--as something to be projected out from the US, rather than applied  both within the (home) state and elsewhere. The dangers are well known. The first touches on the construction of dual law/compliance/norm/expectation systems--one to be applied to the home state activities of enterprises and the other applicable elsewhere.  The second is the continuing treatment of international law as something alien though useful to home state. The third is that it tends to cabin RBC and its human rights elements within the foreign policy  and US external relations circles, further inhibiting the naturalization of its principles within the US  domestic order (legal and otherwise).
2. The 2024 US NAP leaves unresolved the core issues exposed by both the OECD Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: is economic activity an instrument for the realization of public policy objectives (macro and micro) or is public policy an instrument for the realization of economic activity reflective of social expectations?  Within this issue are comfortably lodged the usual questions that most people like to avoid (because consensus among elites, for example, is very difficult to come by at this moment): the morality of profit and the further morality of profit distribution to holders of interest in capital; the morality of leaving to autonomous choice (not directed by or for the benefit of the State)choices in economic activity; the valuation of inputs and outputs of production; ad the like. On the other hand, the lack of resolution may be understood as a positive--at least within the context of the US political-economic model.

3. The 2024 US NAP is grounded on capacity building.  That raises three potential issues of implementation: First, much of the structures of internal capacity have already been developed or are in the process of development to some extent.  But capacity dissemination in the US administrative apparatus is thin--at best, and in this case effectively confined to the US foreign relations apparatus. Second, it is not clear how effectively knowledge and norm capacity can be imparted into the objects of all this effort. The traditional approaches, now well practiced, for example, by IFIs, have had mixed results. Third, it is not clear that, beyond funding the crafting of the 2024 US NAP the state is willing to appropriate sufficient funds to effectively implement the NAP. This challenge is heightened given the timing of the announcement of the 2024 US NAP: at the start of what is likely to be a particularly brutal US Presidential election cycle.  The temptation to view the drafting as the object, rather than its implementation, may be great, even if inadvertent circumstances may produce that result.

4. The human rights prioritization appears to cut both ways.  On the positive side it tends to simplify implementation. And it makes the "public policy case" for governmental investment of resources in the project (the way that the business case for RBC considers the benefit of enterprise investment in human rights). At the same time it might raise the concern that is never far from the core of the civil society critique: that human rights are indivisible etc.  Yet, the pragmatic turn here would institutionalize a tolerance in the State for a regime of picking and choosing priority human rights. That would align, interestingly enough, with the way that enterprises prioritize  among the Sustainability Development Goals to align with their business or enterprise objectives. 

The text of the 2024 US NAP and the published "Fact Sheet" (summary) follow below.

Sunday, August 20, 2023

The Battle Over the Soul of Global Tax Reform Picks Up Again in (Sort of) Earnest

 

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At the end of the day, it is always about money.  Or, as people who are in the capital consuming fields like to refer to it (both euphemistically and to detach money from icky markets) resources. And more importantly for states, it is about tax income from shares of participation in trans-national global production that is not based on market measures chopped up among states, but on an "equitable" distribution of the value added (no one liker to speak about profit any more, though they are more thna happy to engorge their wealth directly or indirectly with or through it). 

They have a point, in part, and they have gone off the  rails in part (though that rail busting is quite strategic).  At the same time the recent efforts reflect the persistence of contradiction built into the increasingly unhappy relationships between the premises of the state system (based on horizontal equality, internal control, etc.) and those of an idealized international law. The former speaks to the supremacy of the state and state organs, except as and when states contract among themselves to do or not do certain things or to choose to add to their orthodox normative structures of belief or disbelief. The later speaks to a vanguard of international bureaucrats and their technocratic nomenklatura. They would harden the implicit theory of vertical power arrangements, from small and scattered to a single power. Like the early Roman emperors they would no doubt continue to nod in the direction of the old system, but effectively they would displace the state with the international apparatus. In a sense they would transform the state from a center of power to a pass-through compliance apparatus for the of policy and rules developed and imposed from the top. As a consequence states would either veer toward one of two models: (1) they would begin to assume the role of enterprises in current systems of human rights, sustainability ad the like. That is states would tend to be the nexus point of public-private hybridity; (2) states would effectively be reduced, except for colorful performances and the responsibility to deploy a police force, into an administrative organ of international organizations.  Clearly neither pf these polar points is likely.  But even small movements along a trajectory can have potent and sometimes unanticipated effect. 

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Today this contradiction and its trajectories is much on display in the context of the quite difficult issues  around developing a tax framework for multi-state economic activity (OECD ‘disappointed’ over ‘surprising’ UN global tax report:The U.N. chief pushed for a bigger say in the international tax agenda and said the group of wealthy countries had ignored the needs of developing nations). That at least is conceivable. still inconceivable is the possibility of  doing the same for civil society and foundations. 

On the one side one encounters the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This is the umbrella organization of the wealthiest states, and to some extent, the states whose ancestors cobbled together a vision of globalization squandered by their progeny (perhaps for lack of will. more likely for lack of vision). The OECD represents the most advanced forces of the state and of a globalized market economy (chopped up into states) as the royal road to prosperity.The issues of equitabpe tax  revenue sharing are technical and, again driven my markets. Equalization may require subsidy but no real attack on markets. 

On the other end one encounters the free wheeling organs of the UN based international community and its technocratic, ideological, and self-described visionary claque. They continue (for as long as the OECD has been peddling its vision) to put forward the possibility of dismantling markets and what they call the hegemony of leading states. Much of this represents a refinement and updating of ideological oppositions first taken by the post-colonial and developing states in the 1960s-1980s (but who reads yesterday's paper anymore). Well, I have, and that puts things in perspective--for both sides (Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized Economic Regimes). To some extent, they had a point--no one is going to go in on profitability activity unless it is worth their time--unless they are compelled. Of course it is one thing to approach the issue from the insider and quite another to use this (as it has been used for half a century) as a club to beat markets out of global systems. One ought to have no objection to these politics.  But at the same time one ought to be warty where the flank attacks on core principles and narratives of global human social relations are actually up for debate, then that ought to be undertaken transparently. 

In the meantime the squabbling commences its next round. The reporting follows below. And while they are at it, an open conversation about the definitions of tax dodging (always a relational and policy issue), tax rates (usually an issue of definition transnational markets and production processed in a dynamic area), and the end of the practice of pretending that the hurling of statistics (without definition) is meaningful in any way except as a political and narrative projectile

Tuesday, January 31, 2023

New Discussion Draft Posted: "Chinese State-Owned Companies and Investment in Latin America and Europe"

 

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I take this opportunity to let people know that I have posted a new discussion draft, "Chinese State-Owned Companies and Investment in Latin America and Europe." The abstract describes its objetives:

The Chinese state owned enterprise (CSOE) presents an anomaly in the operation of the well-ordered construction of a self-referencing and closed system of liberal democratic internationalism, especially as that system touches on business responsibilities under national and international human rights and environmental law and markets driven norms. The anomaly is sourced in the increasingly distinct and autonomous framework principles within which it is possible to develop conduct based systems respectful of both human and environmental rights which is emerging as between liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist systems. This essay considers the forms and manifestations of these disjunctions where CSOEs are used as vehicles for the projection of Chinese economic activity beyond its borders. The essay first situates the CSOE within the political ideology of its home state. The CSOE cannot be understood except as a specific expression of that ideology suited to the times and the context in which it operated. The essay then examines the outward projection of the CSOE national model. To that end the essay focuses on the formal structures for CSOE surveillance by state organs that operationalize the guiding ideology through which they are conceived and operated. This provides the basis for a deeper consideration of the way that the projection of CSOEs abroad is structured within a conceptual cage of policy objectives: specifically the Belt & Road Initiative and emerging conceptions of socialist human rights, including environmental rights and obligations, as these are manifested when CSOEs operate abroad. The focus is on the development of conceptions of risk in that context guiding decisions about the conduct of economic activity. The essay concludes with a suggestion of the greater rift between Marxist-Leninist and liberal democratic approaches—the differences in embracing risk models grounded in prevent-mitigate-remedy strategies.
The analysis centers political ideology and its formal expression through law, regulation, guidance, and operational supervision (theory does matter in this context, perhaps a lot). Nonetheless, at its core, the study is about risk--its ideology and the way it is expressed through governance expectations and principles. One speaks here about legal risk (to align the discussion with the 1st Pillar of the UN Guiding Principles), but also of business risk (aligning the markets driven, private law structures of the UNGP 2nd Pillar).

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More importantly, the sort of risk that one encounters here, in comparing the liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist models of human rights and sustainability, is intimately tied to the principle of "prevent-mitigate-remedy, and its administrative-compliance overlay.  In a sense, when one speaks to human rights and sustainability, and especially climate change, one is using the  qualitative language of rights to speak to the quantitative probabilities of risk of harm, and more importantly risk of irremediable harm. The function of those principles, then, framed through the prevent-mitigate-remedy principle is to provide a formula for valuing those risks, and for placing them within a hierarchy of risk tolerance. Increasingly in liberal democratic regimes, risk tolerance for strategies that do not privilege prevention (and then mitigation and last remedy) are reduced, or in some cases, risk aversion is implicitly or explicitly the result of the application of the "principles" analysis.  That is fair enough and represents the culmination of conversation about value choices.  Nonetheless, Marxist-Leninist systems approach risk, and risk tolerance in a different way.  That difference is in part a function of differences in the conceptualization of both human rights and sustainability as a function of development and collective prosperity. But it is also in part a reflection, effectively, of what might be preferences for mitigation-remediation (or otherwise exit if the costs of prevention exceed the anticipated vale of an activity), at least indifference as between the strategies as a function of expected value. That poses some challenges for any project that seeks global consensus on  what had once been the unchallenged valuations and framework of liberal democracy.   

The Abstract, Introduction and Conclusion follow. The text of the draft may be accessed HERE. Engagement always welcome as this moves from draft tp more finished versions. 

 

Saturday, January 28, 2023

The Conundrums of Current Iterations of ESG in Market Economies--Utah et al v. Walsh: Challenging the Biden Administration's Rulemaking Incorporating of Certain ESG Factors in Pension Investment Decisions

 

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ESG, has been driven by the private sector and intensely debated in the context of privately ordered responsible business conduct standards, and formed part of a rich debates among market actors and public international organizations about the role and nature of so-called non-financial siclosure in genmeral, and sustainability and climate related factors in decision making. The idea has been that consideration of these factors could substantially change the way that businesses approach value maximizing deciswions by giving value to these non-financial factors.   

Over the past few years, massive asset managers and financial institutions have increasingly focused on prioritizing ESG factors when making key investment decisions. They have particularly set their sights on investing in companies based on those companies' efforts to combat climate change and curb their carbon footprints.Companies like BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard, which collectively manage trillions of dollars in assets, have taken lead roles in the ESG movement. (25 states hit Biden admin with lawsuit over climate action targeting Americans' retirement savings)

The problem, however, has always been the reluctance to embed these within financial disclosure regimes and to preserve their role as qualitative risk factors. The move to metrics has produced additional challenges.

Regarding ESG metrics, there is a strong argument that the quality and reliability of ESG metrics need to improve. The role of ESG metrics as a proxy of sustainability performance is highly prominent in empirical studies in the SRI performance theme. However, there are two main measurement problems with ESG metrics: lack of transparency and lack of consistency or convergence. (A Systematic Literature Review of Socially Reposnible Investing (SRI) and Environmental Social Givernnace (ESG), p- 25).

On the other hand, for the World Bank Groups Internaitonal Finance Corporation, "ESG Standards comprise the Performance Standards, which define clients' responsibilities for managing their environmental and social risks, and the Corporate Governance Methodology, which sets out an approach to evaluate and improve the corporate governance of clients." (IFC, Environmental, Social, and Governance).

The goal oriented policy objectives of ESG have also been underscored by the OECD, one that seeks to recionceive the traditional focus on value maximization grounded in traditional financial analysis to  a more generalized set of public objectives toward which economic actoivity can contribute, on e in which the markers of financial value are made more a function of public good objectives. 

While noteworthy progress has been made, considerable challenges hinder the efficient mobilisation of capital to support ESG and climate-related objectives. Greater comparability of climate transition methodologies, as well as transparency and interpretability of climate finance and ESG metrics are urgently needed. In response to the rapid growth of market practices with respect to ESG investing to assess and manage climate transition risks in financial markets, the OECD Committee on Financial Markets (CMF) has developed a substantive body of work that provides analysis on challenges with respect to current market practices, and proposes policy considerations to improve them (OECD, Policy guidance on market practices to strengthen ESG investing and finance a climate transition. p. 7)

ESG initiatives have been tied to the UN Sustainability Development Goals and its 2030 Agenda. It has also become a focus of shareholder actions within enterprises, and regulatory programs in the US federal government.

ESG breakthroughs last year included a surge in shareholder proposals meant to pressure corporations to do better on climate, diversity and similar topics. Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission unveiled a slew of guidance and rule proposals to improve disclosures and add clarity to ESG investing, including the agency’s controversial proposal for climate risk disclosure. (Investors defend ESG ‘materiality’ in expectation of more attacks).

More recently it has become lumped together with a host of what opponents call an ideological push to transform society in all sorts of ways--and that has in turn produced an increasingly vocal and organized resistance. It has now also become a focus of politics, one with increasing importance. "EU rules require large companies and listed companies to publish regular reports on the social and environmental risks they face, and on how their activities impact people and the environment."  (EU Corporate sustainability reporting (disclosure touches on environmental matters; social and employee aspects; respect for human rights; anti-corruption and bribery issues; diversity on board of directors)). 

The emergence of ESG narratives and methodologies has generated reaction--not only in the economic but in the political sphere as well. ESG has been increasingly treated as an ideological movement the object of which is the erosion  of a key element of core objectives in the economic sector. That assault is undertaken through sideways strategies, ESG included, that seeks to transform purpose by changing the focus of fiduciary duty (and director discretion in decision making), and by adding categories of risk into decision-making analytics. Even if the traditional core purpose of economic activity, to maximize the value of the economic value of collective activity, is retained, its meaning and the factors that must be considered can substantially change the environment in which decisions are made and analytics are fashioned. The core concept of value maximization, remains highly relevant. It was nicely summarized, even in an environment friendly to ESG analytics, in instruments such as the Santiago Principles (Principle 19: "The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds."). And in this form the concept of value maximization serves political ends in transnational spaces. It underlines the strong connection between purpose, concepts of maximization, and the protections of markets as the driving force of economic activity (around which states serve to protect their own interests through regulation and the protection of a level playing field in which they shed their political advantage when they enter the market (and the market distinguishes between between public (political) and private (economic) activity on the basis of some sort of value maximization theory based on financial, rather than social, governance or other criteria. 

Yet ESG is still in search of a disciplinary maturity. Issues of consensus, scalability, quantification, and comparability remain unresolved.  The marketplace for ESG modalities is vigorous. Its anchoring in qualitative analytics and risk analysis produces a temptation for speculation that can be used to advance strategic agendas. No one has been particularly shy about trumpeting these background objectives.  Yet risk based analysis produces it own problems. The issue emerges from the essential political ideology of risk in economic activity.  The thrust of much public policy over the last century has been both to unearth, but also to constrain risk and risk taking.  Prevent-mitigate-and remedy strategies, for example, suggest a preference for risk aversion.  The state and its instrumentalities tend to be risk averse--the essence of the ideology of compliance based governmentality.  However, the ideology of risk taking in markets based economies had, at least in its inception, been grounded on notions of facilitating, and in some respects (eg asset partitioning) encouraging risk. Risk taking is an essential feature of the value of capital and labor pooling to achieve value growth.  The state, then, in a markets privileging environment is caught on the horns of potentially incompatible objectives: the convergence of economic and administrative collectives around notions of compliance and state duty; or the promotion of risk taking in economic ventures to create prosperity and enhance the production of value that can then be tapped for all kinds of purposes.  Conundrum follows--yet most participants in the chattering about this remain blissfully oblivious to the analytics of that conundrum.

It ought to surprise few people, then, that in this anarchic and dynamic environment, the concept of value maximization, its meaning, and its relevance remains hotly contested, sometimes as part of the debate about corporate purpose (see Brief Thoughts on Martin Lipton: "ESG, Stakeholder Governance, and the Duty of the Corporation" (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance). That aligns with the continued robustness of the core principles of globalization based on idea of a level playing field in which states have a duty to enhance value in the macro community, while economic enterprises have a micro obligation of value enhancement (mindful of business, legal, and financial risk) toward its community of investors or in some instances for the enhancement of its value as a going concern (discussed here).  The investment industry has tried to push back, "pressing the importance of environmental, social and governance considerations in U.S. financial markets ahead of an expected pushback from Republican Party aligned officials as they take control of the House. Firms and funds with acute interest in ESG are adamant that issues such as climate change and human capital management are financially material, albeit non-traditional, issues. The fight against ESG may even add to the growing body of evidence that such factors are critical to investors, according to some." (Investors defend ESG ‘materiality’ in expectation of more attacks).

It has also taken a turn toward law. In late 2022sit was reported that some influential senators threatened to use their oversight powers to consider the implications under US antitrust laws, of the development of ESG reporting and decision making modalities (Senate Republicans warn U.S. law firms over ESG advice). 

The senators cited a "collusive effort to restrict the supply of coal, oil, and gas, which is driving up energy costs across the globe and empowering America’s adversaries abroad." They said Congress would refer anticompetitive actions made in the name of ESG to federal antitrust authorities and told the firms they have a duty to inform clients of such regulatory risks. (Ibud.).

More recently 25 State Attorney's General have recently filed a lawsuit challenging a Biden Administration effort to incorporate ESG in Pension fund investment decision making. The Press Release issued by the Attorney General of Virginia nicely summarizes the action and its rationale:

Attorney General Jason Miyares filed a lawsuit alongside 24 other state attorneys general challenging a Department of Labor rule which would affect the retirement accounts of millions of people. The rule would allow 401(k) managers to direct their clients’ money to ESG (Environmental Social Governance) investments and runs contrary to existing rules and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 

The new rule, “Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,” will take effect on January 30, 2023. Two-thirds of the U.S. population’s retirement savings accounts would be affected, totaling $12 trillion in assets. Strict laws placed in ERISA are intended to protect retirement savings from unnecessary risk. 

“The Biden Administration continues to use other people’s money to achieve its political goals. Virginia families have worked hard to build their retirement accounts. The federal government should be protecting that money, not putting it at risk to support the progressive ESG agenda. But this new rule—created by an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy without input from Congress or the American people—puts progressive politics above Virginians’ financial wellbeing and security. It is another unilateral and illegal power grab by the Biden Administration,” said Attorney General Miyares.  

From the complaint: “[T]he 2022 Investment Duties Rule makes changes that authorize fiduciaries to consider and promote “nonpecuniary benefits” when making investment decisions. ... Contrary to Congress’s clear intent, these changes make it easier for fiduciaries to act with mixed motives. They also make it harder for beneficiaries to police such conduct.” 

The complaint may be accessed here and below.

 

Tuesday, January 24, 2023

Instruments in the Marketplace of Liberal Democratic Multilateralism: Brief Thoughts on Stewart Patrick, "Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism"

 

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 The narrative, carefully cultivated in the United States and even more carefully cultivated by on set of factions of the leading forces of American collective society, is that the period between 2016-2020 was some sort of aberration and that the correction gloriously brought forth by the voting choices of a bare majority of those participating in the 2020 American presidential election, has set to rights the otherwise well tended course of American engagement in the world.  

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It is, if nothing else, comforting. And to the extent that there was a correction from the crude boorishness of communication during those years (expressed in brutalist style text and policy) to the more refined Neo-classical style of post -1945 American discursive and policy engagement, the forms of discourse and policy have again assumed an outward appearance more in keeping with the expected forms of politesse among stakeholders in the international community. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether the forms of engagement continue to mask an affirmation of precisely many of those products of that brutalism and many of the fundamental re-orienting frameworks that were so boorishly rolled out  after 2016. And, indeed, the even more interesting question is one of continuity--that the manufacturing of the narrative of aberration and break between 2016 and 2020, and the return to Neo-classicism  actually serves to mask a strategic set of continuity choices of trajectories of choices with respect to which the political climate before 2016 made substantially harder to advance.

The Biden Administration National Security Strategy (October 2022) made this later point somewhat clearer:

Our goal is clear—we want a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order. We seek an order that is free in that it allows people to enjoy their basic, universal rights and freedoms. It is open in that it provides all nations that sign up to these principles an opportunity to participate in, and have a role in shaping, the rules. It is prosperous in that it empowers all nations to continually raise the standard of living for their citizens. And secure, in that it is free from aggression, coercion and intimidation.
Achieving this goal requires three lines of effort. We will: 1) invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; 2) build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and 3) modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland. (NSS, supra, pp. 9-10).
The President made this quite clear in the introduction to NSS:

The 2022 National Security Strategy outlines how my Administration will seize this decisive decade to advance America’s vital interests, position the United States to outmaneuver our geopolitical competitors, tackle shared challenges, and set our world firmly on a path toward a brighter and more hopeful tomorrow. . . Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been. We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.

To a large extent, then, one might be forgiven if the thought creeps in unbidden that the current iteration of the American foreign policy vision appears to be to preserve and augment the effective goals of America First but without its impolite and offensive discursive rabble rousing. In its place is a language and practice better conforming to international practices of discursive politesse.  That state of things would, at the very least, have the salutary effect of aligning the discourse and intentions of the United States and of China, each incarnating quite distinct visions of and for the world for each each has reserved for itself the position of apex vanguard leadership. At the same time, however, it becomes discursively critical to take the opportunity of personnel and discursive shifts to suggest that the change in discourse also has produced a change in objective. Moreover, it leaves open the question of the constitution of the amalgamation of willing states assuming various relationships with the leading forces of American functionaries and others with the authority operationalization of discourse and policy.   

This all becomes clearer as one considers the quite interesting contribution that that important mission, Stewart Patrick, "Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism," published 23 January 2023 through the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The core purpose of the contribution is to think through modalities of multilateralism and their risk-reward profiles. The four that serve as the basis of analysis reflect what is put forward as the core consensus strategic approaches around which American leaders and their allies now strategize and with which they now argue among themselves. 

 

("Four Contending Approaches to Multilateralism," supra)

True to the times, the essay situates its contribution within the four corners of the new American foreign policy discursive orthodoxy. "The era of U.S. president Donald Trump exposed the shortcomings of a unilateralist and hypernationalist approach to the pursuit of U.S. global objectives. . . Biden has turned the page on Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, but the debate over alternative approaches to intergovernmental cooperation has just begun." (Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism," supra). Patrick aligns the analysis, quite rightly, to the necessity of bending strategy to the realization of the NSS core objectives of American leadership over a rules based multilateral order.

The essay may be accessed HERE. The essay is an important one and well worth reading and thinking through. Brief reflections follow below.