Showing posts with label BRICS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BRICS. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 19, 2026

Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (May 15, 2026)

 

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 It was reported in Al Jazeera that the BRICs meeting recently concluded  failed to issue a Jint Statement, producing instead only a Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (May 15, 2026).

The BRICS alliance of major developing economies has failed to issue a joint statement after their two-day meeting in India, amid internal divisions over the Iran war which is affecting several members. India hosted the foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi and currently chairs the alliance. BRICS brings together core members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as newer members Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia and the UAE. India said on Friday that “there were differing views among some members” regarding the conflict in the Middle East. (Al Jazeera)

One can parse through the Chair’s Statement  which is rich not just in what was stated but perhaps more importantly was remained unstated or written between the lines. The Chair’s Statement  is posted below without comment, but with the suggestion that it reflects the complexities  of a multi-polar world of hierarchically arranged power structures still searching for a se of ordering premises. 


 

Wednesday, February 18, 2026

CFP--"China, the United States, and the Future of the Global South: Competing Visions, Converging Interests": 6th International Conference on China and the United States in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia

 



I am delighted to share this call for paper for the 6th International Conference on China and the United States in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, for which I serve on the organizing committee. The theme for the 6th Conference is China, the United States, and the Future of the Global South: Competing Visions, Converging Interests. The Conference takes place May 14-15, 2026 at Turan University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

About the Conference

China, the United States, and the Future of the Global South: Competing Visions, Converging Interests

China’s expanding presence across Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia is reshaping the political, economic, and security landscapes of the twenty-first century. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested heavily in infrastructure, trade, and development partnerships that have redefined connectivity between Asia, Europe, and Africa. At the same time, the United States continues to play a decisive role in these same regions through its network of alliances, defense cooperation, development aid, and strategic competition with Beijing. While some analysts frame these developments as part of a “new Cold War,” others view them as opportunities for renewed dialogue, cooperation, and inclusive growth across the Global South.

This conference seeks to move beyond binary narratives of rivalry and dominance. Instead, it will explore the intersections, overlaps, and tensions between Chinese and American strategies and the ways in which regional actors exercise their own agency in navigating these global transformations. From the energy corridors of Central Asia to the maritime routes of the Indian Ocean, and from technological innovation in the Gulf to political realignments in Africa, these dynamics reveal a world increasingly defined by multipolar interdependence rather than simple polarization.

Participants will examine the strategic, economic, and normative dimensions of global engagement. Key themes include infrastructure and connectivity, digital and green transitions, regional security architectures, development financing, and soft power. The goal is not merely to assess competition but to highlight spaces of cooperation and mutual learning that can contribute to sustainable and equitable development across the Global South.

The conference aims to bring together a diverse community of scholars, policymakers, and graduate students from different world regions and disciplines — including international relations, political economy, sociology, area studies, and security studies. Through panels, roundtables, and keynote discussions, participants will engage in evidence-based dialogue on both global strategies and local realities. Particular attention will be given to how states and societies in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia interpret and respond to the evolving U.S.–China dynamic, crafting hybrid policies that reflect their own national priorities, identities, and developmental aspirations.

Rather than portraying the Global South as a passive arena of great-power competition, the conference emphasizes its active and strategic role in shaping the future of global order. Regional actors — from Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia and Indonesia — are increasingly defining new models of partnership that balance external ties with internal modernization. These emerging approaches challenge traditional hierarchies of global governance and call for rethinking development paradigms in light of local agency and regional innovation.

Ultimately, this event offers a platform for constructive, pluralistic, and forward-looking discussion on the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and the Global South. It encourages participants to envision a more inclusive global dialogue — one grounded in respect for diversity, sensitivity to context, and shared responsibility for peace and development. By bridging academic research with policy engagement, the conference aspires to generate fresh insights into how cooperation, competition, and co-evolution can coexist in an increasingly interconnected world.
More information follows below

 

Sunday, November 30, 2025

Xi Jinping (Full text: Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development) and 推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合(学习贯彻党的二十届四中全会精神)[Promoting the Deep Integration of Technological Innovation and Industrial Innovation (Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)]

 

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The 4th plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Committee has come and gone, producing a 15th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. The focus, as always, remains socialist modernization as it evolved through stages of Chinese historical development. 
The most important outcome of the Communist Party of China’s fourth plenum, held last month in Beijing, was the review and adoption of the “Recommendations of the CPC Central Committee on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development”. * * * The recommendations define major economic and social development objectives under the 15th five-year plan, encompassing seven areas: significant achievements in high-quality development; improvements in scientific and technological self-reliance; further deepening comprehensive reform; cultural and ethical progress across society; improvements in quality of life; new strides in environmental protection; and strengthening national security. (Cui Jianchun, "Opinion | 15th five-year plan charts a course for China’s modernisation" SCMP 17 November 2025)

The text of the English language version of the Full text: Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development may be accessed HERE

 The central elements of the 15th Five Year Plan and its intimate connection with advanced Socialist Modernization in the New Era and its objective to overcome the general contradiction of the times, was elaborated in a detailed commentary under the authorship of Xi Jinping (Full text: Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development). These are especially useful in summarizing the approach to the seven key areas specified in the 15th Five Year Plan.

First, the important position of the 15th Five-Year Plan period. Socialist modernization can only be realized through a historical process of gradual and ongoing development. It requires the unremitting hard work of one generation after another. * * *

Second, economic and social development objectives for the 15th Five-Year Plan period. Setting development objectives in a well-conceived way is crucial to the formulation and implementation of five-year plans. In the draft document, we have defined the main objectives for economic and social development according to the basic positioning of the 15th Five-Year Plan period and the specific requirements for this stage.  An important benchmark for basically achieving socialist modernization by 2035 is that China’s per capita GDP will
be on a par with that of a mid-level developed country by that time. * * *

Third, promoting high-quality development. Following the approach of the 14th Five-Year Plan, this draft document also defines the promotion of high-quality development as the main focus in economic and social development in the 15th Five-Year Plan period. It sets the requirements of continuing to pursue economic development as our central task, fully and faithfully applying the new development philosophy on all fronts, promoting higher-quality economic growth while achieving an appropriate increase in economic output, and driving sustained, sound economic development and all-around social progress. * * *

Fourth, strengthening the domestic economy and promoting unimpeded domestic and international economic flows. As the international landscape becomes increasingly challenging and complex, we must move faster to create a new development pattern and keep a firm hold on the initiative in development. At present and for some time to come, we must work to strengthen the domestic economy and boost domestic economic flows, so as to leverage the stability of the domestic economy as a hedge against uncertainties in the international economy. * * *

Fifth, making solid progress toward realizing common prosperity for all. Chinese modernization is the modernization of common prosperity for all. Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, we have remained true to our original aspiration and approached problems from the perspective of the people’s interests. This has seen us advancing coordinated regional development, adopting strong measures to ensure and improve the people’s wellbeing, securing victory in the fight against poverty, and building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.  * * *

Sixth, ensuring both development and security. Security is a prerequisite for development while development provides a guarantee for security. Over the next five years, China will see a notable rise in uncertainties and unforeseen factors, which will make the task of ensuring both development and security much harder. With a view to modernizing China’s national security system and capacity, the document recommends steps for improving the national security system, building up national security capacity in key sectors, enhancing public safety governance, and improving the social governance system. * * *

Seventh, upholding the overall leadership of the Party. We must uphold and strengthen the Party’s overall leadership, as it is the fundamental guarantee for advancing Chinese modernization. With a view to improving the Party’s ability to lead China’s economic and social development endeavors, the document emphasizes the need to uphold and strengthen the Party Central Committee’s centralized, unified leadership, refine the mechanisms through which the Party Central Committee’s major decisions and plans are carried out. (Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan).

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There are no surprises, just elaboration of the 3rd Plenum development and refinement of the focus of economic and social development from the 14th Five Year Plan. First, the emphasis on bending economic and social development to the current general contradiction  might be expected, but it may be worth considering the extent to which the details of the 15th Five Year Plan actually moves the nation forward along that path. This is especially interesting as a function of what appears to be a fairly routine elaboration of welfare state objectives as common to Portugal as it is now to China. One might wonder if that is, indeed, the better expression of movement beyond the general contradiction and forward along the Socialist Path. Second, the emphasis on development and security continues to firm up the alignment in policy development between the United States and China. Even the details, such as they are, resonate, especially the last bit (the details of which are well beyond any form of public disclosure): "speed up the development of advanced combat capabilities, modernize military governance, and consolidate and improve integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities. Third, the reminder of the Party's leadership is at once both a standard element of these documents and a reminder of the driving source and political center of Chinese governance. The administrative apparatus operationalizes, the Party leads, subject to its duties to the People and solidarity with the core ideology of the political-economic model. That might resonate well with the continuing evolution of the managerial models of American corporate law and practice.  Fourth, and likely the most foundational important--the fundamental duty of the State and of the leadership of the Party is to advance socialist modernization through the sages of Chinese development, directing an accelerated movement of people and productive forces through the stages of development necessary to move forward along a Socialist Path. 

Still, all of this, especially its evolutionary character and its relationship to current challenges (different from those at the time of the 14 Five Year Plan) require popular explanation. And thus 推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合(学习贯彻党的二十届四中全会精神)[Promoting the Deep Integration of Technological Innovation and Industrial Innovation (Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)], the work of Yin Hejun (阴和俊), Minister of Science and Technology and its Communist Party secretary (see also his interview on this topic here: 锚定科技强国目标 以科技现代化有力支撑中国式现代化——访科技部党组书记、部长阴和俊 [Anchoring the goal of building a strong nation in science and technology and providing powerful support for China's modernization through scientific and technological modernization—An interview with Yin Hejun, Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Minister of Science and Technology]). 

The explanation is well worth reading. Yin's has a quite specific focus: "promoting the deep integration of technological innovation and industrial innovation" [“推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合”]. In that respect there is an alignment between the 4th Plenum's focus in this respect and President Trump's Genesis Mission (The American Leninist-Brain Trust Republic: Text of President Trump's Executive Order, "Launching the Genesis Mission," and the Press Release "President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery"). 

Pix credit here (Concentrate the major force in developing heavy industry)
科技创新主要包括基础研究、应用研究、技术开发和成果转化等活动,取得新的科学发现,提出新的科学原理,发明新的技术方法工艺,得到新的验证示范。产业创新通过技术应用、管理改革、模式创新,开发新产品,开拓新市场,创造新需求,推动产业变革和经济发展。[Technological innovation mainly includes basic research, applied research, technology development, and achievement transformation activities, resulting in new scientific discoveries, proposing new scientific principles, inventing new technologies, methods, and processes, and obtaining new verification and demonstrations. Industrial innovation, through technological application, management reform, and model innovation, develops new products, explores new markets, creates new demands, and drives industrial transformation and economic development. ] (推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合)

Both are essential for promoting high quality development at the heart of the 3rd Plenum's refocusing of socialist modernization. "”新质生产力具有高科技、高效能、高质量特征,是创新起主导作用,摆脱传统经济增长方式、生产力发展路径的先进生产力质态。" ["New-type productivity is characterized by high technology, high efficiency, and high quality. It is an advanced form of productivity in which innovation plays a leading role and breaks away from the traditional economic growth mode and productivity development path."] (Ibid.). Like the Americans, Yon notes:

  Artificial intelligence, as a strategic technology leading a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, is rapidly and widely permeating all sectors and aspects of the economy and society, comprehensively empowering all industries, driving the iterative upgrading of technological systems, and reshaping scientific research paradigms, industrial forms, and economic patterns. [人工智能作为引领新一轮科技革命和产业变革的战略性技术,正在迅速广泛渗透经济社会各领域各方面,全面赋能千行百业,牵引技术体系迭代升级,重塑科研范式、产业形态和经济格局] (Ibid.)

To these ends, connectivity is the key: " 强调要搭建平台、健全体制机制,让创新链和产业链无缝对接。[It was emphasized that platforms should be built and systems and mechanisms improved to ensure seamless integration between the innovation chain and the industrial chain.] (Ibid.). Also critical is the deep integration of governmental leadership within systems of innovation of productive forces. "Adhere to the combination of an effective market and a proactive government. Innovation requires both market mechanisms and proactive government planning and policy guidance. The combined efforts of both are essential to effectively stimulate innovation and creativity across society." [坚持有效市场和有为政府相结合。创新既需要市场机制推动,也需要政府超前谋划和政策引导,二者共同发力,有效激发全社会创新创造活力。] (Ibid.). 

Underlying all of this is innovative autonomy and self-sufficiency. This represents a key element in the rupture between the Era of Reform and Opening Up and the New Era of historical development.  The object is to both to avoid tech dependency and to promote dependency on Chinese tech by others--the American model. Yin noted five areas of priority in that respect:

(I) Strengthen Original Innovation and Key Core Technology Breakthroughs to Enhance Technological Support and Leadership. We must adhere to the principles of facing the forefront of global science and technology, the main battlefield of the economy, major national needs, and the health of the people, highlighting national strategic needs, and deploying and implementing a number of major national science and technology tasks. We must adopt extraordinary measures to achieve decisive breakthroughs in key core technologies in key areas such as integrated circuits, industrial machine tools, high-end instruments, basic software, advanced materials, and biomanufacturing across the entire value chain.  [(一)加强原始创新和关键核心技术攻关,提升科技支撑引领能力。坚持面向世界科技前沿、面向经济主战场、面向国家重大需求、面向人民生命健康,突出国家战略需求,部署实施一批国家重大科技任务。采取超常规举措,全链条推动集成电路、工业母机、高端仪器、基础软件、先进材料、生物制造等重点领域关键核心技术攻关取得决定性突破。]  * * *

(II) Promote the aggregation of innovation resources to enterprises and strengthen the leading role of enterprises in scientific and technological innovation. Strengthen the integration of industry, academia, and research led by enterprises, support enterprises in leading the formation of innovation consortia, undertake more national key scientific and technological tasks, and promote integrated innovation across the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain. [(二)推动创新资源向企业集聚,强化企业科技创新主体地位。加强企业主导的产学研融合,支持企业牵头组建创新联合体,更多承担国家科技攻关任务,促进产业链上下游融通创新。] * * *

(III) Improve the transformation mechanism and accelerate the efficient transformation and application of major scientific and technological achievements. We will allow scientific and technological personnel greater autonomy in the distribution of benefits from the transformation of scientific and technological achievements, establish a separate management system for job-related scientific and technological achievements assets, and deepen the reform of empowering job-related scientific and technological achievements. [(三)完善转化机制,加快重大科技成果高效转化应用。允许科技人员在科技成果转化收益分配上有更大自主权,建立职务科技成果资产单列管理制度,深化职务科技成果赋权改革。] * * *

(IV) Strengthen policy guarantees and create a favorable ecosystem for deep integration. Strengthen intellectual property protection, enhance the rule of law, ethics, integrity, and security in science and technology, and improve policies on market access, regulation, and fair competition.. . Deepen international scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation, establish a high-tech talent immigration system, and attract and cultivate outstanding global talent. [四)强化政策保障,营造深度融合的良好生态。加强知识产权保护,强化科技法治、科技伦理、科研诚信、科技安全建设,完善市场准入、监管、公平竞争等政策。. . 深化国际科技交流合作,建立高技术人才移民制度,引育世界优秀人才。] * * *

(V) Improve the regional innovation system and explore new models of deep integration tailored to local conditions. Strengthen central-local coordination in strategic planning, policies, major tasks, research capabilities, and resource platforms for science and technology innovation. [(五)健全区域创新体系,因地制宜探索深度融合新模式。加强科技创新战略规划、政策措施、重大任务、科研力量、资源平台等央地协同。]

Again, the suggestion of greater alignment between the U.S. and Chinese approaches, and the greater distance between both and European approaches becomes clearer. 

Pix credit here (Hold high the Great Red Banner of the "Angang Constitution" to set off the High Tide of grasping Revolution and Promoting Production).


The text of (1) Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ; (2) Xi Jinping (Full text: Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development) (Official translation); (3)  推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合(学习贯彻党的二十届四中全会精神)[Promoting the Deep Integration of Technological Innovation and Industrial Innovation (Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)]  (Chinese with English translation) follow below.



Tuesday, July 08, 2025

17th BRICS Summit: Remarks of President Putin

 

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The 17th BRICS Summit is concluding.  It was, unlike past years, undertaken at a time when the transactional relations with the U.S. has been both heightened and sharpened. Where BRICS once occupied unchallenged the field of resistance to a dominant discourse and structure of globalization, it must now compete with the United States for its share of adherents to competing models of transformation.  That produces an odd situation where the only large and powerful block that still adheres in fact to the old forms of convergence globalization, are the Europeans. That might leave one wondering: if everyone is selling change then is (1) there anything against which change is directed, or (2) as suggested with the opening address of President Lula at 17 BRICS, is the discourse a veil of change behind which only actors change and the forms of privileging advantage are, like furniture, rearranged. 

It is in this context that the Remarks of Russian Federation President Putin might be better read and understood,  Its essence is this--regionalized globalization models all built around interlinked hub and spoke systems of managed control, at the borders of which are States. 

We all see that the world is experiencing tectonic shifts. The unipolar system of international relations that once served the interests of the so-called golden billion, is losing its relevance, replaced by a more just multi-polar world. Global economic patterns are changing faster. Everything indicates that the liberal globalisation model is becoming obsolete while the centre of business activity is gravitating towards developing markets, launching a powerful growth wave, including in the BRICS countries. To maximise the emerging prospects, it is important to intensify cooperation within the group, primarily in technology, effective resource development, logistics, insurance, trade and finance.

The U.S. offers a merchant's view of this new order. The Chinese offer it from the conceptual cages of the official; that is reflected in BRICS, as well as in the official pronouncements of its leading officials.

Lurking beneath these, of course, are the warriors and the farmer/peasants on whose backs all of this is made possible. President Putin's remarks follow below in the official transcription provided by the Russian government.  

 

Tuesday, June 24, 2025

CfP (Convocatoria) for Dossier No. 38--Iuris Dictio Journal: Acceso a la Justicia y Equidad: Nuevas Perspectivas Jurídicas e Interdisciplinarias para la Inclusión de Personas en Situación de Vulnerabilidad [Access to Justice and Equality: New Legal and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Inclusion of People in Vulnerable Situations]

 



I am delighted to pass along this CfP (Convocatoria) for Dossier No. 38--Iuris Dictio Journal: Acceso a la Justicia y Equidad: Nuevas Perspectivas Jurídicas e Interdisciplinarias para la Inclusión de Personas en Situación de Vulnerabilidad. In English here: Access to Justice and Equality: New Legal and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Inclusion of People in Vulnerable Situations.
The Iuris Dictio Journal invites researchers and specialists in Law, Human Rights, Legal Sociology, Social Work, Psychology, Political Science and related areas to submit their articles for consideration as part of Dossier No. 38 of the review, which will be published in June 2026 and will address access to justice and equality from new legal and interdisciplinary perspectives focused on the inclusion of people in vulnerable situations. In the last few years, systems of justice in Latin America, particularly in Ecuador, have shown with growing clarity their structural weaknesses in assuring true, equal, indiscriminate access to all people, especially those who belong to historically excluded groups or who are in vulnerable conditions. While changes focused on strengthening human rights and the democratization of justice have been promoted, these advancements still coexist with socioeconomic, cultural and territorial barriers that further exclusion and inequality in the actual practice of law. For example, in rural areas of Ecuador, the limited presence of legal institutions and the scarcity of public defenders create obstacles to the effective practice of legal access. * * * In the face of this scenario, it is fundamental to promote a critical and interdisciplinary view that articulates a legal analysis with input from sociology, anthropology, psychology, social work, education and public health, among other fields. The idea is to explore paths that rethink the access to justice from an intersectional perspective that recognizes the diversity of experiences and contexts, and which advances towards a truly inclusive model of justice that is participatory and centered on human dignity.
La revista Iuris Dictio invita a investigadores y especialistas en Derecho, Derechos Humanos, Sociología Jurídica, Trabajo Social, Psicología, Ciencia Política y áreas afines a enviar sus artículos para ser considerados como parte del Dossier Nº 38 de la revista, que será publicado en junio de 2026 y que versará sobre el acceso a la justicia y la equidad desde nuevas perspectivas jurídicas e interdisciplinarias orientadas a la inclusión de personas en situación de vulnerabilidad. En los últimos años, los sistemas de justicia en América Latina, y de forma particular en Ecuador, han mostrado con creciente nitidez sus debilidades estructurales para asegurar un acceso real, equitativo y sin discriminación a todas las personas, especialmente a quienes pertenecen a grupos históricamente excluidos o en condiciones de vulnerabilidad. Si bien se han promovido cambios orientadas a fortalecer los derechos humanos y la democratización de la justicia, estos avances aún conviven con barreras socioeconómicas, culturales y territoriales que profundizan la exclusión y la desigualdad en el ejercicio real de los derechos. Por ejemplo, en zonas rurales del Ecuador, la limitada presencia de instituciones judiciales y la escasez de defensores públicos obstaculizan el ejercicio efectivo de acceder a la justicia. * * * Frente a este escenario, resulta fundamental promover una mirada crítica e interdisciplinaria que articule el análisis jurídico con aportes desde la sociología, la antropología, la psicología, el trabajo social, la educación y la salud pública, entre otros campos. Se trata de explorar caminos que permitan repensar el acceso a la justicia desde una perspectiva interseccional, que reconozca la diversidad de experiencias y contextos, y que permita avanzar hacia un modelo de justicia realmente inclusivo, participativo y centrado en la dignidad humana.

Articles may be written in English or Spanish and must be submitted by 15 December 2025. 

The full CfP (English and Spanish) follows below.

Tuesday, June 10, 2025

Summary Report of Wang Yi's Intervention in the Sixth China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting [王毅 中国—中亚外长举行第六次会晤]

 

Pix Credit Here




On 26 April 2025, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted a Press Release in the usual language translations (English, French, Spanish and Russian) and thus signal an intention to make what followed generally available to mass audiences) its summary report of the Sixth China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting. It was held 26 April 2025 in Almaty. The text of that reporting follows below in their English and Chinese versions.

I returned to this now to underscore the framework that Foreign Minister 王毅 [Wang Yi] outlined, not necessarily for its application to China's relations with Central Asia but more generally as a marker of the framework around which Chinese outbound relations are built. Though the tone will change based on the status of a State and the context of interaction--the United States and Croatia will be treated different--the framework remains the same. These are built around the five principles of outbound relations that serve as the basis for virtually everything China builds abroad--from its silk roads initiatives (including BRI), to its approach to reshaping the structures and practices of international institutions.  

These are likely to hep frame the way in which U.S. bilateral relations are being framed (see, e.g., Trump Says Trade Deal With China ‘Is Done,’ but Offers Few Details; see also here). And these are likely to become more prominent as the US retreats from the Geneva and New York based international institutional complexes to pursue its own aggregating bilateral transactional pathways. 


"First, firmly uphold good faith and foster harmony. China and Central Asian countries should fully leverage the strategic guiding role of head-of-state diplomacy, make sound preparations for the second China-Central Asia Summit, and take the implementation of the common understandings reached between the heads of state as the fundamental principle." [一是坚持讲信修睦。充分发挥元首外交的战略引领作用,筹备好第二届中国—中亚峰会,以落实元首共识为根本遵循].

The important element here is the reminder that all relations with China must start at the top and then trickle down. This is not just a matter of tone at the top; rather it is a reminder that all relations with foreigners are regulated (1) between states and (2) proceed only from agreement at the highest levels of the State apparatus. The American version of disaggregated, transactional, penetrative, and markets driven  arrangements facilitated by States, a hallmark of U.S. approaches in Asia since the 1850s (and more generally in its free trade arrangements), is implicitly rejected. In its place is the ordering premise that all relations are set by political leaders who act as the supreme gatekeepers both to entry into the territories of a State and also who determine that nature and terms of that "opening up."  The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux  


"Second, stick to mutually beneficial cooperation. China and Central Asian countries should formulate and implement more facilitation measures to further increase the scale of trade and investment." [二是坚持互利合作。制定实施更多便利化举措,进一步提升贸易和投资规模。]

Development remains the core ordering principle of opening up. The negotiation around inter-penetrative development is then ordered through China's win-win principle. 
It is being reconstructed within hub and spoke state to state constructs being attempted to be built on the foundations of globalization through Belt & Road and America First Initiatives. It s attempted to be reconstructed in more modest ways by South.South integration efforts. But is all marked by what the South-South community pioneered in ALBA and the Chinese refined as win-win relations--transactional, and uneven in the sense that the value of transactional relations is not measured by a single standard but is a function of the value that each participant apples to the transaction (and their aggregation) as a function of their national needs and national circumstances. (The New Order for the Ages? "Trump's Tariffs," Fractured Territories and the Discursive (Re)Ordering of the Global)
But this top down principle of mutual cooperation is itself a function of the national security interests of all parties to negotiation (Great Wall and Silk Roads: 新时代的中国国家安全 (2025年5月)[China's National Security in the New Era (May 2025)]--State Council [国务院] White Paper [白皮书]).


Third, adhere to institutional development. China and Central Asian countries should strengthen coordination, accelerate the development of the mechanism's pillars, and better leverage the role of the ministerial cooperation mechanism in the 12 key areas. [三是坚持机制建设。加强统筹协调,加快机制“四梁八柱”建设,更好发挥12个重点领域部级合作机制作用。]

If agreement is a function of political decisions made by the core of the political leadership of the State, and if it is grounded in a transactionally contextual objective of win-win development that is national security compatible, then its elaboration becomes the object of the national techno-bureaucracies led, as would be proper in a hierarchically arranged  system of people and institutions, by the ministers of the States whose leaders have agreed. Again, the notion  embodies the conceptual universe of the official (士) and rejects the orienting framework of the merchant (商). While the leaders develop the framework, in fidelity to their political-economic model and their rationalizing perspectives, the technocracy of suitably able officials are charged with its management--a management overseen, coordinated, and directed by the techno-bureaucracies. What is underscored, especially by its absence, is the notion of markets, and markets driven behaviors, as anything but an instrument of higher order politics. What is underscored are pyramids of authority driven from the top rather than as an expression of the aggregated manifestations of actions at the bottom.
Fourth, adhere to fairness and justice. China and Central Asian countries should jointly remember history and commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. [四是坚持公平正义。共同铭记历史,纪念世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年和联合国成立80周年。]

What gives order and purpose to pyramids of authority, what drives its mechanisms, and produces the contextually based value structures essential for development driven win-win relations are a collective memory of history as an expression and vindication of normative principle. In this case that is embedded in the collective memorialization of the formative event--named (and in naming given value and shaping meaning) as the World Anti-Fascist War. Values of fairness and justice, then, are understood as a function of events that themselves embody the forms and results by which value is to be measured. History is linear and driven by its own logic toward its own apotheosis in and as progress, which can be judges by others ("Standing on the right side of history and human progress" [站在历史正确一边]). And again, like markets, the international institutions and the system that they express must be understood as instruments for the realization of this progress which is read into a history which is relentless in its (forward) march. The implication, of course, is that these vanguard States must address in a meaningful way those States which impede or oppose that march.
Fifth, be firm in friendship for generations. China and Central Asian countries should uphold the values of equality, mutual learning, dialogue and inclusiveness among civilizations, enhance mutual understanding, and ensure that the torch of friendship is passed down through generations.[五是坚持世代友好。秉持平等、互鉴、对话、包容的文明观,增进相互理解,让世代友好薪火相传]

 What is developed at the top, and its theory, perspective, and way of understanding the world, right/wrong, values and the like must be inculcated among the masses in the sense of teaching an attitude, idea, or habit by persistent instruction. The form of that inculcation, of course, is generated from the core of leadership, and then elaborated through its techno-bureaucracies.  But it is manifested in people to people encounters, capacity building and the more intimate integration of intellectual habits and manners to develop mass solidarity within sovereignties. The Americans pioneered this after the 1950s, but have lost their way.  The Chinese, it appears are both good students and quite capable to transforming the forms to suit their own objectives. At some point it might return, as well, to America First.  But not today.

 


 

Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Trade Complementarity and Latin American Regionalism -- Transcript of Press Conference Claudia Sheinbaum at the Presidential Palace, Mexico City 13 May 2025

 

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A quite interesting Press Conference on the reform of health care in Mexico.  It is useful as much for its content as it is for the nature of the dialogue and interaction between the Mexican administration and the press.  

Th entire transcript (in Spanish) is worth a read and follows below and may be accessed HERE. Nonetheless, there is a short colloquy that might be of particular interest, especially as Mexico and Brazil, like Saudi Arabia, attempts to pivot onto positions of authority at a level just beneath and alongside (to some extent) those of the two great hegemons:


Mi segunda pregunta, en el marco de la 4ª Reunión Ministerial, precisamente, del Foro China-CELAC, en donde participa México, el canciller Juan Ramón de la Fuente, ¿cuál ha sido el posicionamiento de México en este Foro?

¿Y su opinión, también, sobre las declaraciones que hizo el presidente Lula de que buscaría mayor integración?


PRESIDENTA DE MÉXICO, CLAUDIA SHEINBAUM PARDO: Es una relación que se tiene desde hace tiempo, no es nueva.

CELAC es una organización de todos los países de América Latina y el Caribe.

Y ya se habían hecho conferencias que tenían que ver con la relación de CELAC con China, también se ha hecho con Estados Unidos. Y en este caso, esta reunión estaba programada desde hace tiempo para hacerse en China, en algunos casos fueron los jefes de Estado, en nuestro caso nos representó, o nos bien representó Juan Ramón de la Fuente, el canciller.

Y va a salir una declaración muy general de la buena relación que tiene que ver con China y con otras regiones del mundo. Y ya, está ya pronto de regreso para que él les pueda platicar con mayor detalle.

PREGUNTA: Gracias. Y aprovechando su gentileza, la última pregunta…
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PRESIDENTA DE MÉXICO, CLAUDIA SHEINBAUM PARDO: Y estuvo aquí —perdón— estuvo aquí el secretario de Hacienda de Brasil, como un primer encuentro entre Brasil y México.

Va a venir después el secretario de Comercio de Brasil. Y la idea es que podamos avanzar en la cooperación Brasil-México para varios temas, algunos comerciales de complementariedad. La idea es, ahí donde nos complementa Brasil y ahí donde México complementa a Brasil, poder tener estos acuerdos comerciales, junto con los empresarios de allá y los empresarios de México; y de otros temas: educación, ciencia y tecnología, medicina, por ejemplo.

Uno de los grandes temas que se ha platicado es que la Cofepris y la Agencia de Regulación Sanitaria de —no es sanitaria, ¿verdad?, de medicamentos, ¿o si es sanitaria?— de Brasil puedan tener, así como tenemos con la FDA, que es de Estados Unidos, que lo que aprueba FDA se aprueba de inmediato aquí, que también lo podamos tener con Brasil.

Brasil tiene una industria farmacéutica muy importante; entonces, temas como esos, nos van a ayudar. Entonces, estamos avanzando en ese trabajo.

My second question, in the context of the 4th Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum, in which Mexico and Foreign Minister Juan Ramón de la Fuente are participating, what has been Mexico's position in this Forum?

And your opinion, also, on the statements made by President Lula that he would seek greater integration?


PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, CLAUDIA SHEINBAUM PARDO: It's a relationship that has existed for some time; it's not new.

CELAC is an organization of all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

And conferences related to CELAC's relationship with China had already been held, and they have also been held with the United States. And in this case, this meeting had been scheduled for some time to be held in China. In some cases, it was the heads of state who attended. In our case, we were represented, or we were well represented, by Juan Ramón de la Fuente, the Foreign Minister.

And a very general statement will be issued regarding the good relationship with China and other regions of the world. And now, he'll be back soon so he can talk to you in more detail.

QUESTION: Thank you. And taking advantage of your kindness, the last question...

PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, CLAUDIA SHEINBAUM PARDO: And the Brazilian Secretary of Finance was here—sorry—the Brazilian Secretary of Commerce was here, as a first meeting between Brazil and Mexico.

The Brazilian Secretary of Commerce will be here later. And the idea is that we can advance Brazil-Mexico cooperation on various issues, some of them complementary trade issues. The idea is, where Brazil complements us and where Mexico complements Brazil, to be able to have these trade agreements, together with businesspeople there and businesspeople from Mexico; and on other issues: education, science and technology, medicine, for example.

One of the major topics discussed is that Cofepris and the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency—not a health agency, right? But a drug agency, or is it a health agency?—could have the same status with Brazil, just as we do with the FDA, which is from the United States, where everything approved by the FDA is immediately approved here.

Brazil has a very important pharmaceutical industry; so issues like these will help us. So, we're making progress on that work.

 There was a lot there in a very small space. The 4th Ministerial Meeting of CELAC-China was quite an event--especially for President Lula who has been making the rounds of hegemons and hegemon wannabes in his perambulations anywhere but North America (and with good reason perhaps). President Sheinbaum's description of it was amusingly understated. It was meant to drive home a larger point--that both Mexico and Brazil have some maneuvering space between the hegemons.  And in the space that they believe they have carved out, they might be free(er) to pursue their own national and regional interests. Yet President Sheinbaum also understands that even in the best of circumstances that is not entirely true--in order to create that space, both hegemons must be convinced that it is in their interests to permit it, or to permit it without exacting too great a cost on those who believe it is in their interests to have it.  But good enough. The principle of hegemonic equivalence serves President Sheinbaum well; President Lula has already crossed a number of lines, some of them years old; but he serves well as a conduit in and through China. There is no pretense there, just waiting until one understands the character of his successor; but in the meantime he is busy, like President Trump, creating a legacy the he believes may bind the nation long after he has ascended to a better (different) place. 

Nonetheless, President Sheinbaum has more delectable fish to fry; and fry them she will--something that her American counterparts continue stubbornly to ignore, or if not to ignore, to dismiss. With President Lula doing the front work for the China connection ("President Xi Jinping vowed on Tuesday to boost China's footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean with a new $9 billion credit line and fresh infrastructure investment, although Brazil warned the region not to become overly reliant on foreign funding." Reuters); President Sheinbaum can handle the Americans (on the cultivation of that narrative here).  Divide and create the Latin American space  in which it might be possible to avoid at least a little, the effects of Belt & Road and America First from a position of dependence without alternative options. And then together they can fashion their own mini hegemony--in the form of Latin American regionalism managed by the Mexican and Brazilian State apparatus and directed by their economic forces. Equally interesting is the basis of regionalism--functional differentiation and complementarity. That appears to be the win-win framework the resident Sheinbaum has embraced; President Lula, however, may have something else in mind.  In either case the danger is the same as it has always been--avoiding becoming the latifundia of a greater power.


Tuesday, February 18, 2025

Nzambi and the Conceptual Flesh of a Departed Spirit Now Controlled by Powerful Sorcerers--Text of the UN General Assembly Resolution (19 December 2024) "Towards a New International Economic Order"

 

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It is satisfactory, however, that the no less important philosophy of Pythagoras and Empedocles, and the Plantonists, take the contrary view, and declare the soul to be immortal; affirming, moreover, in a way which most nearly approaches (to our own doctrine), that the soul actually returns into bodies, although not the same bodies, and not even those of human beings invariably: thus Euphorbus is supposed to have passed into Phythagoras, and Homer into a peacock. They firmly pronounced the soul's renewal to be in a body, (deeming it) more tolerable to change the quality (of the corporeal state) than to deny it wholly: they at least knocked at the door of truth, although they entered not. Thus the world, with all its errors, does not ignore the resurrection of the dead. (Tertulian, On the Resurrection of the Flesh).

Humans constantly prove the value of Fidel Castro+s insight that ideas cannot be killed.  They live on, whether in the flesh, or in the flesh or another, or through some other mechanism that perpetuates the conceptual in the flesh of something else. So it is with the now ancient New International Economic Order--a concept that once played significantly in the devolution of the post-colonial, anti-imperialist, and European Marxist-Leninist camp, but that after the mid-1970s, appeared to drown in its own contradictions, and the contradictory agendas of all of its adherents in a world about to go mad about markets and development.

Resurrection in part propels notions about the importance of a body postmortem.  It also suggests, in some cultures, particularly those from Africa transformed through the horrors of the experience of slavery, that the care of the body is not merely one of preservation but also of control and animation during the time that the spirit and body are apart or before the spirit  is able to depart to one+s ancestors.

African scholars who deign to seriously discuss such topic as the zombie, say the word comes from the Kongo word for "soul", nzambi. When slaves were brought to Haiti and the Vodou religion grew amidst old African traditions and the harsh conditions of slavery, the idea of the zonbi was born. It is estimated that 80-90% of Haitians "serve the spirits" or practice Vodou. In Vodou, all people die in two ways--naturally (sickness, gods' will) and unnaturally (murder, before their time); those who die unnaturally linger at their grave, unable to rejoin ancestors until the gods approve. Souls are vulnerable at this time: their will may be snatched up by a powerful sorcerer (boko) and locked in a bottle which the boko uses to control their un-dead but un-living body. Other times he lets their body rest but uses just the soul. (Haiti & the Truth About Zombies)
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These are the principal thoughts that come to mind as a read through the re-animated New International Economic Order--"Towards a New International Economic Order" UNGA A/RES/79/215 (23 December 2024). One might be excused for wondering whether this effort at re-animation is Tertulian or more likely the manifestation of boko magic on the body of an old idea, the spirit of which has departed from its body. a body of text re-animated by powerful contemporary boko long after its spirit has departed and is seeking to go join its ancestors. But it cannot--for the contemporary sorcerers within the community of nations have managed to capture the soul of the dead New International Economic Order, and seek to use it to re-animate its ancient flesh(text) in the service of the sorcerer's interest. In the process the soul of the boko  drives the flesh of the text of the body (NIEC) which now appears to be itself but is actually another. The essence of deceit and of usurpation runs deep; deeper still the effort to appear to embody the spirit and flesh of a time now long gone and withered.

The text of the UNGP Resolution on the New International economic Order follows below. The untangling of the treads of the old body from the agency  of its re-animators I leave for personal reflection. What is unavoidable is the sense that this old corpse was resurrected as a means of providing a body that once moved the Global South (before there was a Global South and its discourse) as an instrument for the achievement of the aims of the boko who now control that re-animation. A body, then, appeared to be needed to give more coherence to the assemblage of actions, hopes, dreams, narratives, directives, and actions undertaken  over the course of this century but which lacked a body through which it could be rationalized and made manifested, in the flesh. 

¶2 Notes that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development and the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change carry forward many of the ideas and recommendations of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order; 

The effort is not unique and follows a pattern of resurrection after a long period of diminution toward irrelevance, except in the propaganda offices of certain states and within the normative aspirations of certain elements of civil societyt.  I have suggested, for example, the way that those who have been driving the forms and norms of the current effort to draft a legally binding international instrument for business and human rights have also sought to animate their text with the spirit of the NIEC (see here). Still, here on witnesses an effort at a more comprehensive resurrection into the body of the aspirations of a certain group of boko in the post-global. That alone is worth a careful study.

Will this incantation be enough? We will see. The text of the Resolution follows.

Sunday, October 27, 2024

Multilateral Socialist Modernization and Chinese Style Development in Three Global Initiatives to Build A Community With Shared Future for Mankind: 习近平在中非合作论坛北京峰会开幕式上的主旨讲话(全文) Full text: Keynote address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit

 

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I have been writing about what may be the beginning of a substantial rift between the trajectories of the evolution of the concept of development under the leadership of the United Nations apparatus in Geneva and emerging as Chinese Multilateral Socialist Modernization (here, here, here, here, here, here). 

A recent address by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China continues the trajectories of development of the concept of development with Chinese characteristics, and its alignment with the arc of evolution of the notion of development  beyond China. In an Address delivered at the opening of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)on 5 September 2024, the General Secretary suggested some of the core premises on which an internationalized of Socialist Modernization might be used as a framework for the construction of deep multilateral relations between China and the Global South. This, in turn, is meant to serve as an element in the fulfillment of Chinese objectives to put at the center of global discourse its notion of a community with a shared future built around the values of Chinese style modernization.

The text of the address follows below in its original Chinese and in the English translation prepared by Chinese authorities. A globalized approach to development, to global Socialist modernization, is built around five core discursive tropes:

1. Socialist Modernization is centered on national interest and national realities. Development is a state task and the essence of sovereign prerogative.

2. Socialist modernization is built around the concept of mutually beneficial cooperation (here, here; on its relation to Africa here).

3. Socialist modernization centers its objectives on the masses. "The ultimate goal of modernization is the free and full development of human beings." [实现人的自由全面发展是现代化的最终目标。]

3. Socialist Modernization is a comprehensive notion  that includes the development of culture and cultural connection as well as economic and economic connection; the Chinese framework has been elaborated in a  Global Civilization Initiative (considered here; and here).

4. Socialist Modernization focuses on issues of environment--that includes not just "green growth engines" [“绿色增长引擎”] but also energy accessibility.

5.  Socialist Modernization is grounded in an architecture of stability and security; a set of objectives which have been aggregated into the Chinese Global Security Initiative (eg here).

Put differently, Socialist Modernization pulls together three critical strands--economic development, security development, and cultural (or civilization) development--which together help build a community with a shared future for mankind, the keystone concept around which Chinese multilateralism is grounded. This, in turn, was nicely summarized in a recent essay in Red Flag Journal 《红旗文稿》: 三大全球倡议助力人类命运共同体构建 [Three global initiatives help build a community with a shared future for mankind] authored by Chou Zejing [丑则静] 28 March 2024, which follows below as well in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation (for a discussion outside of China see eg here)..

 

 

Saturday, September 14, 2024

"BRICS can discipline strategic interventions in intl. organs": Text of my Interview with Payman Yazdani for Mehr News Agency

 

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I was delighted to have been able to  "sit" for a short interview with Payman Yazdani for the Mehr News Agency.  The topic was BRICS and the potential for its emerging role in whatever emerges as the contemporary world order. This is the way that Payman Yazdani framed the conversation:

BRICS is an intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. Originally identified to highlight investment opportunities, the grouping evolved into an actual geopolitical bloc, with their governments meeting annually at formal summits and coordinating multilateral policies since 2009. Bilateral relations among BRICS are conducted mainly based on non-interference, equality, and mutual benefit.

The founding countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China held the first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, with South Africa joining the bloc a year later. Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates joined the organisation on 1 January 2024. Saudi Arabia is yet to officially join, but participates in the organisation's activities as an invited nation. Recently, Turkey one of the big economies in the world has reportedly submitted its request to join the bloc.

To know more about the bloc and the role that it can play in the future of the world orders, we reached out to Larry Cata Backer Professor of Law and International Affairs at Penn State University, USA. He is also a member of the American Law Institute and the European Corporate Governance Institute. (Payman Yazdani, Interview)

The discussion was framed around three key questions, each of which served as a doorway to a perhaps more profound

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NATO member, Turkey has recently applied for BRICS membership. Earlier some other big economies like Saudi Arabia and UAE had joined the BRICS. Why is the desire to join the bloc increasing among world countries, especially among Asian and African countries?

How did the US and its European allies' policy in using the dollar and global banking system as a political weapon against their rivals motivate the world countries to look for alternatives like BRICS?

How do you see the future of BRICS in the long term? Can we expect a new order?

The text of the interview may be accessed from the Mehr News Agency website HERE.  It also follows below in English. Please check with the website for translations into Farsi and other languages.  Visit the BRICS webpage HERE.