Tuesday, October 31, 2023

"Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence" Text and Brief Reflections


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My Administration places the highest urgency on governing the development and use of AI safely and responsibly, and is therefore advancing a coordinated, Federal Government-wide approach to doing so. The rapid speed at which AI capabilities are advancing compels the United States to lead in this moment for the sake of our security, economy, and society. (Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence  §1)

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On 30 October 2023, President Biden along with Vice President Harris, held an event announcing the promulgation of an Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence Executive Order 14110; 88 FR 75191 (30 October 2023) ) which was discussed in a prior post ("Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris on the Administration’s Commitment to Advancing the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence").

The AI Executive Order is quite lengthy and follows below. One of the most striking elements of the Executive Order is in its form.  It is not written as a precise set of directions; rather it provides a complex, interlinked but general set of objectives directed to the administrative apparatus of the state. Those objectives, then, are left to the discretionary choices of that apparatus--subject to overarching rules and modalities of coordination and requests for legislative action constituting additional authority for administrative supervision--to flesh out and implement. But not just to flesh out and implement but also to administer. That administration, in turn, will be fueled by compliance measures.  In this case, compliance measures requires the governmentalization of targeted private actors (i.e., those in the business of creating and using AI and AI related systems, however these are defined)) onto whom the responsibility for implementation, reporting, and policing, will be delegated in the first instance. 

Perhaps the image above best sums up the conundrums that remain to be resolved: one has an image of a President hand signing a piece of paper the text of which, as a physical object, is to be transformed into action by a series of human organizations. That moment of symbolic signature is attended by other humans who preserve the moment for posterity--or attest to its reality--by recording the moment of signature on their mobile phones. It is not the event itself but the abstraction of the event and its imagery that becomes the reality propelling consequential action. Those images will then by uploaded into various platforms the effects of which (singular and cumulative) will be curated by a set of generative programs that are themselves the object of the Executive order and the regulations that will flow from them. And yet, that image is in a sense theater for humans. The text of the measures have been uploaded in word searchable data bases the protection against the corruption of which is automated and their use powered by systems that are also the subject of the Executive Order. Data that will drive the shaping of the regulations, the scope and breadth of delegation to regulatory subjects, and that will shape the exercise of administrative discretion in shaping the expectations of administrative supervision will all be generated by and with the assistance of big data and automated systems tat are themselves the objects of this effort. And it is the biases that will, in the aggregate, shape both the text of regulation the expectations of compliance, and the exercise of administrative supervision, that will both reflect and in its iterative reproduction likely also potentially corrupt these measures (discussed in its theoretical aspects here). The domestication of A.I., like that of dogs millennia ago, will likely be a partially successful project as log as canine sentience and cognition  (like that of generative intelligence) cannot be wholly subsumed within that of those seeking mastery. And yet maybe, just maybe, that is for the best. The canine that sometimes bites its human, and the human that can exploit their canine produces the sort of uncertainty that reminds each that neither is the other. 

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Monday, October 30, 2023

"Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris on the Administration’s Commitment to Advancing the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence"

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 AI is all around us.  Much of it is making our lives better. And AI is helping the National Weather Service predict weather events, helping Webb tech — the Webb — Webb Tel- — the Webb Telescope manage half a million miles of galaxies away — billions of light-years away. I found out when I was turning on my phone and saw that — I thought, “my God, what is this?  Science fiction.”  (Laughter.)  No, I’m serious.  You — didn’t you have the same thought when you saw it?  (Laughter.) AI is helping millions of commuters find the shortest route home as well.  (Laughter.)  But, you know, in some cases, AI is making life wor- — worse.  For example, using teenagers’ personal data to figure out what will keep them glued to their device, AI makes social media more addictive.  It’s causing what our Surgeon General calls a “profound risk of harm” to their mental health and well-being. Over the past years, Kamala and I have met with a range of experts, many of whom are here today — and I thank you for coming here today — on the risks and the incredible opportunities of AI. One thing is clear: To realize the promise of AI and avoid the risks, we need to govern this technology, not — and there’s no other way around it, in my view.  It must be governed.  (President Biden Remarks on AI Bill of Rights)
On 4 October 2023 the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released a proposed “
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Blueprint for an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Bill of Rights: Making Automated Systems Work for the American People
.” On 30 October 2022, the President and Vice Present announced the signing of an Executive Order that implements at least the spirit of that Blueprint. ("Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris on the Administration’s Commitment to Advancing the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence")

"First, the executive order is about AI safety and security." (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris). Based on the authority the President's advisors read into the Deference Production Act, the Executive Order will require substantial testing and administrative supervision of AI programs. "That means companies must tell the government about the large-scale AI systems they’re developing and share rigorous independent test results to prove they pose no national security or safety risk to the American people." (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris). These include protocols for chemical, biological, or nuclear risks testing and standards. The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, will be tasked with implementation and administration.

"Second, the order is about making sure AI systems can earn the American people’s trust and people’s trust around the world." (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris). The essence of the anti-deception provisions will direct the Department of Commerce to develop standards to watermark and clearly label AI-generated content. 

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"Third, this executive order is about protecting your fundamental rights to — like privacy.  . . With this executive order, my administration is going to help develop — develop leading-edge technology to make those protections as strong as possible."  (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris).The executive order will also develop protocols for protection against bias in AI programs.  The nature and extent of these standards is less clear but involves input from a range of individuals representing all sorts of identity groups. The teeth for this program will be enhanced authority for the Justice Department "and the federal Civil Rights offices will investigate and prosecute AI-related civil rights violations." (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris). One assumes that the elaboration of AI bias criminality will also be developed.

"A fourth thing this order does: It will ensure that emerging technology works for consumers and for workers." (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris). Programs will be developed to prevent worker exploitation by AI programs, especially with respect to wages.  In addition a comprehensive report on the potential impact of AI on the labor market has been commissioned. It is likely that the Labor Department will be tasked to "support workers in every industry by defining their rights and defending them — to a fair wage, to organize, and as these other — more technologies emerge." (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris).

"And, finally, we’re going to make sure America leads the world in innovation and attracts the top talent to stay at the cutting edge. . . . And we’ll continue to work closely with allies and partners, including the United Nations, the G7 — and the G7, which just set out the first-ever international code of conduct to safely guide AI development." (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris).

 The President understands that a chunk of this ambitious program lies largely beyond the constitutional limits of presidential authority. "Look, let me be clear: This executive order represents bold action, but we still need — we still need Congress to act.  We need Congress to act."  (Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris). While the President's focus was on the curation of markets for data (focusing in the public remarks on an easy target--the collection of data from children) it is clear that a substantial legislative effort will be required to develop the system of administrative supervision technical standards, and normative boundaries envisioned  in the remarks. 

The remaining challenges are substantial. I note two: (1) the ability to coordinate policy and rule making among these administrative departments (Defense, Commerce, Labor; Justice, Homeland Security) not known for their willingness to expend much energy on coordination, especially where jurisdictional boundaries may be in play; (2) the coordination (normative and administrative) with emerging regulatory systems coming out of the E.U.; (3) all of this regulation will take a substantial amount of time to draft and pass, and then to implement--by that time it is likely that AI technologies may well have obsoleted the efforts to manage AI.  

As for clues about the form of the regulatory project: it is likely that some clues about administrative and legislative pathways may be gleaned from the Blueprint for an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Bill of Rights. What is clear, though, is that in "the past year, perhaps the only thing that has advanced as quickly as artificial intelligence is worry about artificial intelligence." (The Who, Where, and How of Regulating AI).

The text of the Remarks by President Biden and Vice President Harris on the Administration’s Commitment to Advancing the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence follows below along with the White House's FACT SHEET on the Executive Order.


Sunday, October 29, 2023

中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法(修订草案) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Keeping State Secrets (Revised Draft)]


Pix Credit South China Morning Post


China’s top lawmakers have reviewed the first draft of a revised state secrets law that would reaffirm the ruling Communist Party’s control over information security and improve how state secrets are managed. State broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) reported on Tuesday that a first draft of the revised law on safeguarding state secrets was reviewed by lawmakers at a meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, the country’s top legislative body. . . according to a report on Friday by the state-run Xinhua news agency, the revised law would add new provisions to reaffirm the party’s control over all matters related to information security and, for the first time, stipulate government support for research and use of critical information security technologies.  (Chinese lawmakers review proposed changes to state secrets law amid national security push  (24 October 2023)).

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National security and the protection of the normative heartland of ideologically constructed systems seems to be the order of the day among the three great imperial centers emerging from out of the increasingly abandoned ideals of global convergence at the heart of the great experiment in globalization (so despised by self-referencing zealots of the political left and right in all three imperial centers and their bureaucratic cat's paws). Each has been working feverishly not merely to build borders within which the quintessential character of state sovereignty in core objects of state desire (data, industrial fields, cultural and social objects) may be articulated, preserved and developed; but in the process to seek to extend the suzereinity (overlorship of a kind) represented by those bordered constructions throughout their respective areas ofs dominance.  For the Europeans, that overlorship is nicely disguised as the "Brussels Effects" of its regulatory projections.  For the United States it is manifested in the power of the sanctions against objects that are incompatible with American values or interests. Both fuse the power of the state with that of the market to produce a self executing systems of administrative supervision in which the hard work of compliance is born by the subjects of those systems (enterprises for example).  These are built, in turn, on the premise of the fundamental value of markets of information as the means by which social progress or welfare augmentation may be realized. That realization may be internal to the market or may be managed through the emerging techniques of administrative supervision (compliance) through programs of curated disclosure. Information in this case is a positive social asset the power of which lies in its dispersal.

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China has taken a different path, one that more closely aligned to its construction of a Marxist-Leninist apparatus, which in the current stage of historical development of the state toward the establishment of a communist society, is manifested in the contemporary iteration of "socialist" legality the normative basis of which for the moment is identified as "New Era" theory. The manifestation of that approach is dominated not merely by the constitution of more empowered state and Party institutions that are meant to serve as centers of control guidance, leadership, and coordination (transposing political objectives into social, cultural, and economic practices) but also guided by the fundamental Leninist principle that all objects of value are state assets and all state assets must be protected against corruption or hijacking by the enemies of the nation as it seeks relentlessly to follow the socialist path to its end. Where information is power, and power can be made productive, state secrets become an important element in the management of state assets and the development of productive forces bent primarily toward the realization of overcoming the contemporary principal contradiction of dialectical development to move the nation further along on the path. Information in this case is a state asset the positive value of which is a function of its strict control.

Clearly the regulatory paths of these three post-global empires are, at a fundamental level, incompatible--though that between liberal democratic and Marxist Leninist systems much more so. External compatibilities of internally coherent systems tend to have little effect on the construction and maintenance of self-referencing systems. However, those incompatibilities become not merely problematic but a source of conflict in two principal contexts.  The first is where production chains cross the borders of imperial heartland. This is nicely exemplified in the EU-China case by the determination that data critical generated in China for compliance with European production chain related disclosures, may either not be generated or shared with respect to the Chinese operations of EU companies. Another example may be the interdiction of information about the operations of Chinese companies which may be essential for compliance with US sanctions directed against Chinese policy in, for example, Xinjiang. The second is where all three empires operate within the borders of sovereign territories of states that may be burdened with de facto dependence on any or all of them simultaneously. In that case there may be pressure (economic or otherwise) to conform  dependent state regulation to reflect compatibility with the laws of one or another suzerain. Or more likely it will produce regulatory fracturing of the vassal state effectively partitioning it not by territory but by the classification of economic activity. 

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These thoughts suggest the critical importance of legislative efforts within the imperial heartlands of the great empires.  A recent effort that merits attention has been the recent declaration by Chinese authorities to modify their state secrets law--中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法(修订草案)  [Law of the People's Republic of China on Keeping State Secrets (Revised Draft)]. This will have a profound effect not merely on the development of Chinese legalities (and by reference to that legality) on the as-applied character of normative development of Chinese Marxist-Leninism and its policy interface with administrative expectations.  New provisions include articles 3 (leadership of the Communist Party); 9 (state secrets education); 10 (state secrets funded research); 11 (incorporation of confidentiality work into the national economic and social development plan) ; 31 (random inspection and re-inspection system for security and confidentiality products and security technology and equipment); 35 (Data processing activities involving state secrets and their safety supervision); 53 (establish a confidentiality risk assessment mechanism); 54 (Confidentiality industry organizations self-discipline); 58 (corrective measures under administrative supervision); and 61 (non state secrets that are also subject to heightened protection). In addition there are a great many revisions. There appears to be a tightening of rules related to individuals dealing in secrets especially with respect to foreign travel. For foreign enterprises operating in China, the changes may affect not just their risk environment but also the likelihood of compliance incompatibilities.

 In reviewing both the State Secrets Law and its modifications, then, one ought to have in mind four quite distinct questions: (1) do the modifications appropriately align with the ruling ideology and its expression in contemporary policy or do they serve other (and thus erroneous or problematic) ends?; (2) how well does it align with other related policies and objectives, including the administrative apparatus designated for its operationalization? (3) to what extent do these provisions impact the interlinkages between China; the EU and the US especially in the economic, social, and cultural fields, with particular focus on incompatibilities for enterprises operating across those frontiers; and (4) to what extent may or must these provisions be exported or applied by and through Chinese instrumentalities in states either aligned with China or with respect to those fields of economic activities in which China has or seeks a dominant position in those states?

The modifications are set forth below along with the provisions of the State Secrets Law in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation. Statutory revisions are also included below.

Saturday, October 28, 2023

New On the European Chinese Law Research Hub Blogsite: (1) Jerome Cohen on China in International Law; (2) Navigating Stricter Data Privacy Rules for Cross-Border Data Transfers With China; and (3) the Silent Influence of Guiding Cases


The folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub (with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have posted  a marvelous set of discussions on a number of quote contemporary themese on Chinese law and policy.

Marianne von Bloomberg explains:

On the blog, we have the following for you:

The introduction of China's Guiding Case System has drawn much attention globally, especially so among common law scholars. However, 12 years later, the impact of guiding cases is hardly proven. Minhao Chen and colleagues applied a new method to measure the impact of the guiding cases and find: Even though barely explicitly cited, judgments reuse text uniquely traceable to them.

The picture [above] somewhat encapsulates the messy reality of cross-border data transfers. Seeking to regulate the chaos, the USA, the EU and China each adopt different approaches, as laid out by W. Gregory Voss and Emmanuel Pernot-Leplay.

Finally, Jerome Cohen, a first-generation scholar of PRC law, lays out some of his observations on China's development through the past decades. The interviewers Laura Formichella and Enrico Toti kindly shared the full conversation with us. 

One of the most interesting aspects of these studies suggests some of the interlinked issues of decision making that pose a challenge not merely in the specific context of Chinese Marxist-Leninist regulatory legality, but also pose an equally delicate challenge to the character and function of Liberal democratic legality. In both systems the issues converge: 

(1)  Convergence in dispute resolution centers on within the process of dispute resolution both between private parties, and in disputes involving the state and the discretionary decision making of its officials, to what extent and in what forms ought juridical decision making be automated, curated, or guided. For the moment for focus is on human centered and driven guidance mechanisms. But automated decision making, and perhaps first, automated quality control measures in assessing the value of judicial decision making under the shadow of human guidance (text )  appears to be just around the corner.  Its value lies in the way in which judicial decision making can be tested against iterative decision making assessed against the ideal represented by the guiding cases. In liberal democracy the same issues revolve not merely around precedent but also around judicial discretion in the face of normative shifts (social justice, for example, and sustainability) that produces a crisis of quality as well as of oversight through traditional means.

(2) Nothing paints a picture of the end of post 1945 ideals of converging globalization like the building of walls everywhere.  Walls have become a semiotic as well as a physical manifestation--especially with respect to abstractions like data and its flows. Normally data ought to flow with production--like the lymphatic system of a body of production maintained by the lubricant of data flowing constantly and in multiple directions. Yet the trend now appears to be favoring the fracturing of the body of global commerce and production. That, in part, is a defensive reaction to the growing idea that exposure to global production heightens the risk of normative  viruses that may corrupt or kill the body. How might one preserve the benefits of global production while systematically cutting off or regulating its lubricant.

(3) Historical flows are difficult objects. Its semiotics suggests that  the sense of a thing within time exists only in the moment of its capture, but that in that capturing one splits the object of history (now understood as outside of time) from the way n which one seeks to impose meaning on it from another time that is itself in flow. History, in that sense becomes a normative projection and though the facts on which it is built, though unchanging, the idea that those facts represent now assume the role and purpose of mirroring the present. It is in that sense that recollection becomes both useful and more so in understanding the present than in capturing the past.

I am cross posting the links to the essays below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE. And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.

李克强同志逝世 [Comrade Li Keqiang passed away]


Pix Credit here (Li (R2) at PKU Law)



新华社北京10月27日电  中国共产党第十七届、十八届、十九届中央政治局常委,国务院原总理李克强同志,近日在上海休息,2023年10月26日因突发心脏病,经全力抢救无效,于10月27日0时10分在上海逝世,享年68岁。(讣告后发)

 Comrade Li Keqiang passed away

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, October 27. Comrade Li Keqiang, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 17th, 18th and 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and former Prime Minister of the State Council, was resting in Shanghai recently. He suffered a sudden heart attack on October 26, 2023. After all-out efforts to rescue him failed, he died in Shanghai at 0:10 on October 27 at the age of 68. (obituary will be posted later)


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I F poysonous mineralls, and if that tree, 
Whose fruit threw death on else immortall us, 
If lecherous goats, if serpents envious 
Cannot be damn'd; Alas; why should I bee?
Why should intent or reason, borne in mee,
Make sinnes, else equall, in mee more heinous?
And mercy being easie, and glorious
To God; in his sterne wrath, why threatens hee?
But who am I, that dare dispute with thee
O God? Oh! of thine onely worthy blood,
And my teares, make a heavenly Lethean flood,
And drowne in it my sinnes blacke memorie;
That thou remember them, some claime as debt,
I thinke it mercy, if thou wilt forget.

John Donne, Holy Sonnets IX (1633)


Thursday, October 26, 2023

Current Hostory: November 2023 Special Issue "Human-Nonhuman Relations"



 I have been thinking about the consequences of the rise of non carbon based intelligence--some of which may be approaching, not just consciousness but sentience. The effect on the core obsessions of philosophy since the Enlightenment will be profound (see, e.g., my thinking here--Discussion Draft Posted for Comment: "Non-Carbon Based Autonomous (A.I. and Predictive) Intelligence and the Human Condition--An Encounter with Jan M. Broekman, Knowledge in Change: The Semiotics of Cognition and Conversation (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023)").

These consequences have also been explored from a variety of angles in the November 2023 special issue of Current History, the century-old international affairs journal https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/issue/122/847. Entitled “Human–Nonhuman Relations” the articles ask and seek to interrogate a number of profoundly fascinating questions. 

The issue contents follow below; access online here.

Wednesday, October 25, 2023

中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [Patriotism Education Law of the People's Republic of China]


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Patriotic education has been at the center of Chinese education policy for some time.  

Since the 1980s, and especially since the Tian'anmen Massacre and the fall of the Soviet Union, China’s leaders have been promoting "patriotic education". The CCP faced a crisis of legitimacy, and Party elites were well aware of this. In 1989, the party leadership attributed the student demonstrations to failures in steeping the younger generations in revolutionary history. The CCP initiated the Patriotic Education Campaign to reorient the party’s ideological position. (Socialist Patriotic Education Campaign (1990))

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That is in line with similar issues in other places (“Order, Discipline and Exigency” : Cuba's VIth Party Congress, the Lineamientos (Guidelines) and Structural Change In Education, Sport and Culture?). It played a key role in the Chinese analysis of what went wrong in Hong Kong during the 2019-2020 crisis (Larry Catá Backer, Hong Kong Between One Country and Two Systems (2021), chapter 7)). It certainly has been near the center of vanguard policy and a key element of Chinese New Era theory (e.g.,Focusing on Civic Education in China--The CCP's Ideological Work Comes to the Universities: 关于进一步加强和改进新形势下高校宣传思想工作的意见 (2015); 習思想滲各級教材 小學重「政治啟蒙」 革命傳統、國安、勞動教育 9課題「融入」大中小學 [Xi's thought is embedded in teaching materials at all levels; primary schools to emphasize "political enlightenment," revolutionary traditions, national security, labor education, and a 9 topics curriculum are "integrated" into universities, middle schools and primary schools] (2021); 习近平用青春的智慧和汗水打拼出一个更加美好的中国 [Xi Jinping, Use the wisdom and sweat of youth to work hard to create a better China] Through the Lens of 毛泽东青年运动的方向 (4 May 1939) [Mao Zedong, On the Orientaiton of the Youth Movement)] (2022)). And it extends not just to students but to CPC cadres as well (《中国共产党党员教育管理工作条例》"Regulations on the Education and Management of Party Members of the Communist Party of China" (2019)).  The central elements of a patriotic education are specified with some particularity:

It is in this context that one can consider the finalization of the law of patriotic education: 中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [Patriotism Education Law of the People's Republic of China]. The text of the final version follows below in the original Chinese along with a crude English translation. 

The positive elements of a patriotic education are specified with some particularity:

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Article 6 The main contents of patriotic education are: (1) Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of "Three Represents", Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; (2) The history of the Communist Party of China, the history of New China, the history of reform and opening up, the history of socialist development, and the history of the development of the Chinese nation; (3) The socialist system with Chinese characteristics, the major achievements, historical experience and vivid practice of the Communist Party of China leading the people in united struggle; (4) China’s excellent traditional culture, revolutionary culture, and advanced socialist culture; (5) National symbols and signs such as the national flag, national anthem, and national emblem; (6) The magnificent rivers and mountains and historical and cultural heritage of the motherland; (7) Constitution and laws, awareness and concepts of national unity and ethnic unity, national security and national defense, etc.; (8) The deeds of heroes, martyrs and advanced model figures and the national spirit and spirit of the times they embody; (9) Other content rich in patriotic spirit. 第六条 爱国主义教育的主要内容是: (一)马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观、习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想; (二)中国共产党史、新中国史、改革开放史、社会主义发展史、中华民族发展史; (三)中国特色社会主义制度,中国共产党带领人民团结奋斗的重大成就、历史经验和生动实践;(四)中华优秀传统文化、革命文化、社会主义先进文化; (五)国旗、国歌、国徽等国家象征和标志; (六)祖国的壮美河山和历史文化遗产;  (七)宪法和法律,国家统一和民族团结、国家安全和国防等方面的意识和观念;  (八)英雄烈士和先进模范人物的事迹及体现的民族精神、时代精神;  (九)其他富有爱国主义精神的内容。

 And so are the the contours of anti-patriotism, which is subject to legal discipline:

Article 37: Any citizen or organization should carry forward the spirit of patriotism, consciously safeguard national security, honor and interests, and shall not engage in the following behaviors: (1) Insulting the national flag, national anthem, and national emblem or other behavior that damages the dignity of the national flag, national anthem, and national emblem; (2) Distort, vilify, blaspheme, or deny the deeds and spirit of heroes and martyrs; (3) Promote, beautify, and deny aggressive wars, acts of aggression, and massacres; (4) Occupying, destroying, or defacing patriotic education facilities; (5) Other behaviors prohibited by laws and administrative regulations. 第三十七条 任何公民和组织都应当弘扬爱国主义精神,自觉维护国家安全、荣誉和利益,不得有下列行为: (一)侮辱国旗、国歌、国徽或者其他有损国旗、国歌、国徽尊严的行为;(二)歪曲、丑化、亵渎、否定英雄烈士事迹和精神;  (三)宣扬、美化、否认侵略战争、侵略行为和屠杀惨案;(四)侵占、破坏、污损爱国主义教育设施;(五)法律、行政法规禁止的其他行为。

One cannot understand the nature and character of the one without reference to the other. 


Tuesday, October 24, 2023

"Modern Times"--The Rise of State Managed Enterprises and the Role of the National Procuratorate in Market Economies like the United States


Pix Credit Charlie Chaplin, "Modern Times"

If you’ve been paying attention to the policies we’ve implemented over the past two years, you’ve probably noticed that I talk a lot about empowering general counsels and compliance officers – to make the case in the board room and the c-suite for investments in compliance – and to make the case that investing in strong compliance programs is good for business. As compliance officers, you are on the front line of protecting your company and its shareholders, and in today’s world, more and more frequently that means protecting national security. Corporate enforcement is in an era of expansion and innovation. (Lisa O. Monaco, "Policy Designed to Encourage Disclosure of Misconduct and Hold Individual Wrongdoers Accountable; Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics’ 22nd Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute", 4 October 2023)

Pix Credit--"The Office (1999)
One of the most interesting development among those fixated on the enterprise of law has been the way that the formal structures of law making have been dissolving under the acid drip that is shift from law-command institutions (the classical operating mode of the state) to institutional systems grounded in the exercise of administrative discretion conferred on officials by law. Law, in effect, at least its classical expression, has retreated, and in its place one finds the administrator, the official, the individual (or soon the automated generative and sentient AI program) applying, enforcing, or embellishing the  structure or system making "command" of law. In the process, the direct interface between the individual who bears the burden of law (the objects of compliance) and those who impose it (traditionally legislatures and the judiciary) has also changed. The administrator--and increasingly the prosecutor--now stand between the individual and classical law. And the modalities of law do not reach the individual burdened with the responsibility for compliance. Rather, and increasingly, law's command--elaborated through the structures of regulatory governance (and effectuated through the exercise of administrative discretion)--is increasingly delegated to the individuals and entities  whose compliance are their object (e.g., here).  As a result--public legalities now wear two faces.  On the one hand, they are charged with overseeing compliance by the objects of regulation; on the other they oversee that compliance both by exercising discretion in enforcement, and by elaborating the conditions under which that discretion is to be exercised.  

This trend has been especially important in the context of business and human rights.  And it has been even more important in the evolution of the power of informal public regulation within administrative bureaucracies under the guide of informative letters and other communications that explain (or constrain?; that is not clear and certainly the prevention of abuse of discretion is even less clear) the conditions under which administrative officials (and especially prosecutors-enforcers) will exercise their discretionary authority to apply the law.  In the process, of course, those conditions begin to function like law, though, for purposes of formal law making, they do not have either the dignity or authority of traditional law-regulation. But who needs authority or dignity where one speaks to matters of compliance? 

The move toward extra-legal regulation has found a particularly warm welcome--where else (?)--but with lawyers in the Department of Justice and their prosecutorial wings.  Without a wink of irony and clothed with a strategic reading of their customs, traditions, and self conception, the Department of Justice has over the last generation slowly begun to build a sophisticated codex of regulation in the form of self guidance on the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion.  The effect is not meant as much for internal self discipline and guidance. Rather these guidelines are meant to be projected out to the class of people and institutional organs against which they might assert the authority of the state. 

The temptations to move toward this shift of authority from the rule of law to the law of the exercise of discretion is especially irresistible where the prosecutorial organs of state power seek to protect against corruption or to further the governmentalization of enterprises through the institution of internal law systems (in the American parlance--compliance and monitoring programs designed to prevent, mitigate and avoid unlawful behaviors).  It is a trajectory that is as important in the "soft law" area of corporate social responsibility where one might substitute non-governmental organizations, or public international organizations for the organs of state prosecutorial power. (The New Legislation: Prosecutorial Discretion Guidelines and Corporate Compliance)
Pix Credit: Vogons
The movement toward even tighter regulation (at the micro level) by the U.S. Department of Justice only accelerates as Congress increasingly mirrors the chaos of national political society in the current era of American historical development. No need even for administrative regulation when the matter touches on the characteristics that mark procedural compliance or that further a particular view of what or how it is exactly that a regulatory object (individual or entity) ought to comply. And in the process the underlying normative ether of the original legislation necessarily changes character. Though it manifests differently in Marxist-Leninist and liberal democratic legal orders, the effect (on the ground) is felt in the same way. We will all become, in the language of Douglas Adam's famous book, Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy--Vogons.
None of this suggests judgment. None of this is sinister. It follows inevitably from the changing character of the state, and of the managerial expectations of public bodies. The incentive in compliance environments is to increasingly narrow private choice (and risk calculus) substituting for it the public policy choices of the state expressed through the administration of objectives-based regulation by its officials.  This is manifested in contemporary governance in the process of devolution of policy implementation and the transformation of law from its classical forms to its compliance-oriented manifestations--one heavily intertwining what once was thought best to keep separate--(a) public and private spheres, and (b) separation of powers (executive-legislative-judicial) and functions. Compliance regimes, with their delegation and basis in an administrative supervision ethos (here) makes this shift in legality inevitable, and likely necessary. Indeed, none of the great markers of traditional legality is possible in a compliance culture premised in state management of decision making as a function of policy objectives and undertaken through the process expectations of state supervisory personnel with authority to discipline non-compliance. 
The problem it raises is not focused on efficiency or necessity. Rather the problem focuses on the increasing gap between the 18th century political philosophies on which contemporary liberal democratic orders are founded, authenticated, and are presumed to operate, and the realities of emerging (and studiously un-expressed) political philosophies of compliance-based legal orders in which the old divides between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninist states appear to disappear. At some point along this trajectory enterprises in both systems will begin to resemble each other as state managed assets. In liberal democracies, that movement will follow the path of govermentalization of governance  increasingly aligned with public policy to be effectuated through the activities of the enterprise.

The latest step in that direction is nicely described, in language suitable for an audience of elite members of the liberal democratic apparatus, by Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco in announcing a new "Safe Harbor Policy for Voluntary Self-Disclosures Made in Connection with Mergers and Acquisitions." The text of the remarks follows below.


Sunday, October 22, 2023

习近平谈妇女工作:发挥妇女在社会生活和家庭生活中的独特作用 [Xi Jinping talks about women's work: giving full play to women's unique role in social life and family life]


 我们强调促进男女平等发挥妇女在各个方面的积极作用,都是对的,要坚定不移。 同时,我们也要注重发挥妇女在社会生活和家庭生活中的独特作用,发挥妇女在弘扬中华民族家庭美德、树立良好家风方面的独特作用。-2013年10月31日,习近平在同全国妇联新一届领导班子成员集体谈话时的讲话 We emphasize the promotion of gender equality and the active role of women in all aspects, which is right and must be unswerving. At the same time, we must also pay attention to the unique role of women in social life and family life, and give full play to the unique role of women in promoting the family virtues of the Chinese nation and establishing good family traditions. -On October 31, 2013, Xi Jinping’s speech during a collective conversation with members of the new leadership team of the All-China Women’s Federation]

The issue of women's rights in China has taken an interesting turn  in China.  On the one hand, equality in the workplace remains a goal  At the same time that equality is now contextualized by the notion of women's traditional role in society (Bringing Family Values Back into the Gender Equality Laws: 中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法 [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests]). 

Now leading print organs in China has produced a set of graphics enhanced insights on the issues: 习近平谈妇女工作:发挥妇女在社会生活和家庭生活中的独特作用 [Xi Jinping talks about women's work: giving full play to women's unique role in social life and family life]. These are made up of portions of text drawn from remarks delivered by Xi Jinping between 2013 and 2020. 

妇女事业始终是党和人民事业的重要组成部分。党的十八大以来,以习近平同志为核心的党中央从党和国家事业发展全局出发,高度重视和积极推进妇女工作。习近平总书记围绕妇女事业和妇联工作发表的一系列重要论述,是指导各级妇联组织进一步做好新时代妇女工作的行动指南。人民网•中国共产党新闻网 带您学习习近平总书记关于妇女和妇联工作的一系列重要论述,本篇聚焦“发挥妇女在社会生活和家庭生活中的独特作用”。[Women's cause has always been an important part of the cause of the Party and the people. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core has attached great importance to and actively promoted women's work based on the overall development of the party and the country's cause. A series of important expositions issued by General Secretary Xi Jinping around women's causes and the work of women's federations are action guides for women's federations at all levels to further improve women's work in the new era. People's Daily • China Communist Party News Network will take you to study a series of important expositions by General Secretary Xi Jinping on the work of women and women's federations. This article focuses on "playing the unique role of women in social life and family life."]

The essence of the insights--especially as they align the policy of the Communist Party and its oversight of family based social relations is this: equality is contextually framed and that tradition plays a role in defining context in all aspects of social life.

 要引导妇女带动家庭成员,发扬尊老爱幼、男女平等、夫妻和睦、勤俭持家、邻里团结等中华民族传统美德,抵制歪风邪气,弘扬清风正气,以好的家风支撑起好的社会风气。—2018年11月2日,习近平在同全国妇联新一届领导班子成员集体谈话时的讲话 [It is necessary to guide women to lead family members to carry forward the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation such as respecting the elderly and caring for the young, equality between men and women, harmony between husband and wife, diligence and thrift in housekeeping, and unity among neighbors. They should resist unhealthy tendencies, promote clean and healthy trends, and support good social atmosphere with good family traditions. —On November 2, 2018, Xi Jinping’s speech during a collective conversation with members of the new leadership team of the All-China Women’s Federation]

This approach to gender equality aligns quite closely with the emergence, at roughly the same time, of  a new element to New Era Theory: 习近平文化思想 [Xi Jinping's cultural thought]. See here, here, here, here, and here.

The text graphics are worth some substantial consideration.  From a comparative perspective, its fundamental orienting premise may not be aligned with those emerging in developed liberal democracies. That, in turn, will have a substantial effect both (1) on the application and development of international soft and hard law, as well as (2) the consequences of compliance with extraterritorial national business and human rights schemes, like that being developed in Europe and sanctions based regimes in the U.S. It also suggests the evolving contours of Socialist Human Rights in the area of gender.

The text graphics follow below in the original Chinese and crude English translation.

Das Narrenschiff (Ship of Fools): Upcoming 9th Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Workng Group to Produce that Bricolage to be Asssembled as an International legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises


Saint Grobian, the Patron Saint of what is vulgar and coarse in Sebastian Brant's 1494 classic satire, Das Narrenschiff (The Ship of Fools continues to guide the voyage of the  damned through the weaknesses and vices of our times.

That voyage continues very much in evidence in the 9 year voyage of that ship charged with the concoction of an "international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises."

On 26 June 2014, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 26/9, in which it decided "to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, whose mandate shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises."

Since, the open-ended intergovernmental working group (OEIGWG) has had eight sessions (see history of the process below). Between the eighth and ninth sessions, numerous activities took place that were taken into consideration during the development of an updated draft legally binding instrument (version in track changes) (see intersessional activities below). This instrument will serve as the basis for State-led direct substantive intergovernmental negotiations during the working group’s ninth session.

The ninth session of the OEIGWG will take place from 23 to 27 October 2023 in Room XX, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

 Details and documents can be found here; If you would like to watch any of the sessions, you can access the live streaming here. The programme is available here (and below) The sessions will also be recorded should you miss any of the sessions. 

Pix Credit here



Friday, October 20, 2023

Full Transcript: President Biden’s Speech to the Nation on Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine Wars, Delivered 19 October 2023


Pix Credit: New York Times

"Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common. They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy — completely annihilate it. Hamas’ stated purpose for existing is the destruction of the state of Israel and the murder of Jewish people. Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people. Hamas uses Palestinian civilians as human shields, and innocent Palestinian families are suffering greatly because of them."

"Meanwhile, Putin denies Ukraine has, or ever had, real statehood. He claims the Soviet Union created Ukraine. And just two weeks ago, he told the world that if the United States and our allies withdraw — and if the United States withdraws, our allies will as well — military support for Ukraine would have, quote, a week left to live." (Joe Biden, Transcript of Remarks Delivered to the Nation 19, October 2023)

Whatever one may be moved to think about its content, one is always grateful for moments of clarity, moments that have been spaced by longer and longer periods of fog since the end of the 20th century. After a quick trip to Israel--one upstaged by the performances (some of it quite cruel) of conflict and spiced with the expected performances of each head of political communities as supporting characters drawn from some sad provincial company of players in a troop of commedia dell'arte reprising their now over-worn roles as buffo characters in a tragedy in which they are complicit--President Biden returned home to deliver remarks to the nation, the transcript of which has been distributed by the New York Times as  Full Transcript: Biden’s Speech on Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine Wars.

The transcript of the remarks follow in full below. The remarks speak for themselves. I add the briefest of preliminary comments:

1. The greatest tragedy of the American imperium has been its relentless efforts to profit from the fruits of empire (and enjoy its privileges) while shirking, to a greater and greater extent, the responsibilities of post-global, post-modern empire. Here, of the course, one speaks of an empire of ideas translated into systems that create a coherent worldview and operationalized in a way that provides the possibilities of global solidarity built around the protection of the autonomy of the individual, and a great space in which the character of that ideal as applied in each era of human development may be debated.  "American leadership is what holds the world together. American alliances are what keep us, America, safe. American values are what make us a partner that other nations want to work with. To put all that at risk if we walk away from Ukraine, if we turn our backs on Israel, it’s just not worth it." (Biden Remarks, supra).

2. The alignment of the conflicts in Israel and Ukraine is quite important as policy and as as reality-shaping narrative within that context. In both cases, now, one speaks to the discourse of extinguishing aggression. The extinguishing element is itself evidenced by the techniques of aggression. and its ends. ("Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common. They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy — completely annihilate it." Biden Remarks, supra).

3. The connection between these trajectories of obliteration at the peripheries of the American empire of ideals and its threat to the heartland of those ideals also has significant consequences. It suggests that there is no difference, in effect, between trajectories of obliteration at the periphery and in the heartland.  It is not for nothing, for example, that great civilizations sometimes move their capital from the center to the peripheries of their domains (eg a North Capital (北京)). "You know, history has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction. They keep going. And the cost and the threats to America and the world keep rising." (Biden Remarks, supra).

4. And that leaves the challenge for a great empire, like that of the United States (as well as the other great emerging empires who must confront their own inner demons and concede a space for inter-imperial solidarity): "In moments like these, we have to remind — we have to remember who we are. We are the United States of America. The United States of America. And there is nothing, nothing beyond our capacity, if we do it together." (Biden Remarks, supra).  But what sort of memory do Americans wish to craft for themselves now? That is the challenge not just for the U.S., but for those who lurk behind and to some extent strategically use these peripheral subaltern conflicts in a way that is ultimately horribly self-destructive.

Thursday, October 19, 2023

The Wheel of Time (Re)Turns the Imaginaries of the Ideogram that is "Development": Thoughts on Surya Deva, "Reinvigorating the right to development: A vision for the future"-- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to development*


Pix Credit here

“The Wheel of Time turns, and Ages come and pass, leaving memories that become legend. Legend fades to myth, and even myth is long forgotten when the Age that gave it birth comes again.”
Robert Jordan

 Thus it is with the right to development.  Straight out of the narrative of the Wheel of Time, the infinitely long fantasy adventure novel series by Robert Jordan and completed by Branden Sanderson (now reduced to a multi-season television series), the right to development as a conception of or in international legality (soft or hard) has left memories, which became legends, which faded to its own mythos, and then, once forgotten has reappeared.  That reappearance assumes three forms--each, like the great protagonists of the Wheel of Time series, represents a different cluster of beliefs  and practices, that is a different way of looking at the world. These different imaginaries each reflect the time, space, and place where they arose. They are, in that sense, distinct collective interpretations of "development" as an ideogram--in semiotics a signified object--redolent with meanings that, like the wheel of time, turn on the forward movement of human dialectics (of the synthesis of meaning from the clash of a ruling meaning, its challenging meaning. The Wheel is fueled by this dialectic. The ideogram /development) never changes--that is both the word and the object. But its signification, that is the way it is identified, described, understood, and exploited by communities is always changing. "Shape clay into a vessel; It is the space within that makes it useful." (Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching (Gia Fu Feng & Jane English (trans)) ¶ 11).

And thus the concept (object)--development--is both solidified as a sign (given significance), and its interpretation within communities is in constant flux within the rough parameters of consensus on its significs. In the current era (since 1945) development has been applied to the imaginaries of three distinct communities, and from there projected onto the world. (that projection serving as the lubricant for global dialectics on development). Each understands develop in conceptually different ways. Though they overlap, they cannot occupy the same space.  And each seeks to displace the others and assume the central element of our world's wheel of time.  

Pix Credit: The Trivium
The first is that of the liberal democratic order  brought to its current state of expression in the bodies of developed states and expressed through the magisterium that is the OECD. Development here is understood as the inevitable product of aggregated private activities by autonomous individual actors whose autonomy and risk taking (an equality of opportunity) is the principal role of the state.  This had been the age of the liberal democratic markets driven order and its conception of development since the start of the 20th century and embedded in the law of globalization under the leadership of the United States.  

The second is that of Marxist-Leninist orders brought to its current state of expression  in the bodies of Asian Marxist Leninist states and expressed now through the magisterium that is the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) with China at ts core. Development here is understood as the inevitable expression of collective enterprise organized by and under the guidance and leadership of the leading forces of society organized as a Leninist collective and charged with the responsibility of exercising political power to move the national collective closer to the time when a communist society can be established. Development of the nation's productive forces is an essential element of that responsibility. 

The last is that of post-colonial and post-imperial national orders brought to its current state of expression in the bodies of states liberated from the formal domination of other states  a lifetime ago (measured by the life span of a human) and expressed through the magisterium of that is the constant state of oppression against which all national existence is gauged. For some, these are orders stuck in a moment in time and still unable to leave that moment of liberation in which they appear to be stuck. Development here is understood as a pathway that moves away from the structures, patterns, and sensibilities of oppression in which their national identities were forged, but spiced with the fundamental premise that such a pathway is inevitably blocked by the other two orders, though in very different ways.

For an instant in time, the Wheel appeared to turn in favor of the post-colonial, post-imperial orders. Allied with Marxist-Leninist orders, they sought to write their triumph in the text of the New International Economic Order (1974), and a slew of international instruments that would wrest not just control from, but also to discredit  the normative basis for, the liberal democratic order. That order, from that perspective, is understood in the pejorative--as a neoliberal (colonial) order.   But then, so is the Marxist-Leninist order with its core in China, for being either a capitalist fellow traveler (through its markets Marxism), or a front for Leninist imperialism. 

Pix credit here
That was the 1970s.  The Wheel of Time has turned--back again. That, at any rate, is the sense one might be forgiven for having after reading the quite interesting Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to development, Surya Deva, Reinvigorating the right to development: A vision for the future (A/HRC/54/27; 4 August 2023).  The new future "calls for a new economic order" (Ibid., ¶4). That new economic order is said to offer a language of resistance to the current economic order (of liberal democracy) the core effect of which  is to "systematically disempower developing countries from realizing the human rights of their people." (Ibid., ¶ 22; also ¶ 35). One is immediately thrust back to the 1970s and the early 1980s--to the normative workshop of Fidel Castro (Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized Economic Regimes). Indeed, " [t]he right to development is also emerging as a cornerstone of the calls for a new economic order." (Surya Deva, Reinvigorating the right to development: A vision for the future; ¶ 26). The current economic order,, then, is branded, in the fashion of a certain segment of the global intelligentsia as neocolonial (ibid., ¶ 36), the essence of Neo-liberalism (Ibid., ¶¶ 50-52). 

But the Wheel of time has turned.  And while the adversary remains the same: the liberal democratic economic order--the discursive tropes of the counter-hegemonic hegemony have changed.  Now they speak the language of sustainability, compliance, and impacts. "It is becoming increasingly clear that the current economic order and business models are not fit for the purpose of achieving inclusive, equitable and sustainable development. A fundamental shift is needed." (Ibid., ¶82). They remains suspicious of unguided autonomous decision making and directionless markets as the 1974 version, but the appeal is to a broader audience, and the invocation is to  the promise of state based quality control measures in the form of increasingly complex webs of administrative discretion. 

There are many root causes behind the non-realization of the right to development. Lack of meaningful participation of people in decision-making processes, capacity deficits related to finance and technology, various inequalities, the current neocolonial and neoliberal economic order and irresponsible business models are just some. (Ibid., ¶ 79).

But a bit of the old language remains.  "It is becoming increasingly clear that the current economic order and business models are not fit for the purpose of achieving inclusive, equitable and sustainable development. A fundamental shift is needed. (Ibid., ¶11) This nicely echos the 1974 language: "Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State." (NIEO ¶ 4(e)).

And, of course, the underlying premise remains the same.  China--and Marxist-Leninist orders are also missing--an odd state of affairs for a normative order that is methodically insinuating itself in the heart of what is assumed, without more, to be the heart of postcolonial and post.imperial orders. A pity.

Pix Credit here
The greatest and most significant achievement during the last decades has been the independence from colonial and alien domination of a large number of peoples and nations which has enabled them to become members of the community of free peoples. Technological progress has also been made in all spheres of economic activities in the last three decades, thus providing a solid potential for improving the well-being of all peoples. However, the remaining vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, apartheid and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the developing countries and all the peoples involved. The benefits of technological progress are not shared equitably by all members of the international community. The developing countries, which constitute 70 per cent of the world's population, account for only 30 per cent of the world's income. It has proved impossible to achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the existing international economic order. The gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to widen in a system which was established at a time when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent States and which perpetuates inequality. (NIEO ¶ 1).

The Wheel has turned indeed; what was dead has been reanimated; an old spirit long thought quite dead has been reborn. The semiotics of development are in some respects even more profoundly powerful than its details. It is the semiotics of Elysium and of revolution, the apotheosis of which tends to end the narrative (and thus doom the future--the case of Cuba is emblematic).

All of this makes  Reinvigorating the right to development: A vision for the future a fascinating read as well as a harbinger of the battles that will be fought--again pitting forces which view each other as incarnations of evil and themselves as good. Beyond that, the Report suggests the ways in which both human rights and sustainability are likely to break out of their conceptual cages to assume a more comprehensive impact as legal foundational text. The transformation of sustainability and human rights from object to structural element in law and regulation--for example as they insinuate themselves into the structures of development, will likely have a profoundly transformative effect on the epistemology of law. 

The text of  Reinvigorating the right to development: A vision for the future follows below.