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| Pix credit here (Secretary of State Marco Rubio) |
For too long, these issues have festered due to a misguided U.S. foreign policy that never recalibrated from the fleeting triumphalism of the fall of the Iron Curtain. * * * How do we practice America First foreign policy? To start, we must be clear, concrete, and limited in the delineation of our core national interests. The United States is blessed with tremendous assets—physical, financial, military, geographical, and otherwise—but our resources are hardly infinite and the problems we face are many. We cannot hope to solve every issue, or to prevent every global tragedy. Success requires clear-eyed prioritization of the key interests in our diplomatic agenda.
Every political society manifests its core "political line" in some way or another. In European Marxist Leninist systems it was encased in and as the Генеральная линия партии (eneral'naya liniya partii; the general line of the Soviet Communist Party and those of its satellites and dominions); and in Chinese Leninist systems it is referenced as the "basic or fundamental line"(党的基本路线). In liberal democratic states, and more specifically in the United States, the fundamental political line of an elected government as a specific expression of the ruling group within which their politics is located (e.g., the elected representatives of a political party supported by a a larger group of elite operatives and supporters in the leading structures of governance--academia, think tanks, the larger enterprises and civil society organizations, and their associated organs of media) is spread among a number of institutions and documents. These include official state documents (1) speeches like a State of the Union Address, (2) government platforms, budget proposal premises and legislative agendas), (3) official documents and platforms of the elected political party, (4) documents produced by elements of the state administrative apparatus that both describe and apply what they extract as functionally relevant aspects of the fundamental ruling political line, and (5) actions/explanations from the Executive authority (in the United States for example "Executive Orders"). That reality creates a political-normative framework in which the political line can be well understood in its most general terms (through liberal democratic sloganeering, for example) while leaving enough room for substantial operational variation to suit the more granular needs of time, space, and place.
This tension between the articulation of a general or fundamental political line, and the absence of enough of a set of details to provide a basis for assessment, has been particularly evident since 2016 in the birth, evolution and operation of America First. It has had its most valuable use as a slogan that justifies and projects any number if specific policy initiatives, and especially the choices made in advancing "America First "objectives" without the need to justify either as a function of the ruling ideology itself and its fundamental or basic line, and more importantly without providing a more solid basis in values and objectives against which specific actions may be assessed. This is nothing new to American politics, of course. That has been the great strength and also sometimes a weakness, of what is usually labelled "American political pragmatism" either as a compliment or as a criticism (for a recent expression from outside the political elite here). And it has generally been viewed as a virtue among the chattering forces of the American elites (and in that way transmitted as general purpose knowledge for the masses) until it became inconvenient in the face of what appears to many to be the great fundamental transformations that became visible after 2016, a transformation that threatened the position, status, and power of those who had invested lifetimes in what now appeared to be receding into history or at least plausibly threatened to be so "receded."
These issues have been particularly acute respecting America First, at least from the time of the destruction of old order America with the abandonment of the Trans Pacific Partnership framework for world convergence and the emergence of what, at the time, I called "let's make a deal politics"). It is a term that appears to have been of greatest use as slogan. "From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first." (President Trump, Executive Order 20 January 2025, "America First Policy Directive to the Secretary of State"). It has also served well as a shield either to cover action contemplated or transformation of relationships that from the America First ideological lens appear to require adjustment.
What has been clear enough is that, whatever it is, America First was meant primarily and initially as a negative. It was meant to negative the dominant American fundamental political line as it was formed and projected from about 1990 to about 2016. What was meant to be negatived was that era's World-and-Cold-War-global triumphalism through a process of strategic transformation to a well managed global hegemon jealously advancing the interests of it own ideological empire. That, in turn, appeared to be the outward shell of a more fundamental transformation from a focus on systems and governance--from the grounding of national relations in and through the lens of an institutionalist/technocrat to that of a merchant, that is to one grounded in transactional relations meant to maximize the value of relations for the parties, each according to their own values (for a comparison and consequence of these different perspectives, see, e.g., here).
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The result of all of this, thanks in large part to the staff and expertise of the U.S. State Department under the leadership of Secretary Marco Rubio, is system, wrapped in institution, and manifested in a set of categorical objectives that themselves expose by their systematic organization, the underlying premises that produce their organizaiton and their goals, and that, a their most fundamental also permit a glimpse at the reality ordering lens from which all of this is spun out in ways that, in accordance with their terms, premises, and assumptions, "make sense."
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Together the various parts of this plan can be used advantageously to begin to understand the core elements of the outward facing American basic or fundamental political line during the time of the leadership of the Trump Administration. It can be understood in as comprising seven elements: (1) narrative linking external and internal political models; (2) sovereignty as the animating or grund-norm of the political model; (3) The inner concentric circle of external relations; (4) the west of the US--Asia and points west; (4) the American "east", and civilizational parents; (5) the sovereignty of technology; and (8) the triumph of the transactional in inter-governmental relations.
The U.S. Department of State Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026) is worth reading carefully by both friends of the Trump Administration and those who mean either to preserve the old order (or whatever parts of might might be salvaged and repurposed) and those with opposition on their minds. It is closely linked to the National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025) (discussed here: America First as the Essence of National Security and the American Post-Colonial 'Howl': Reflections on the 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States (2025)) with which it ought to be read together.
Whatever one's stance, there is value in making an effort to understand the document and the ideas, agendas, and action plans they represent. An initial effort in that direction is the object of the brief reflections that follow.
1. Every system needs a narrative. The narrative is set out in Secretary Rubio's Foreword, which is actually not a foreword but the elaboration, in orderly form, of the core premises that together constitute at least one version if America First, and from out if which it is possible both to discern a system and from it to build an apparatus through which system goals can be articulated and realized. It starts from the usual starting point at this point of the 2nd Trump Presidency: the President Washington invoking premise of "peace through strength" and what to some might sound like an American version of the Chinese New Era principle of national rejuvenation, in its American version is expressed as "domestic renewal . . . . [which] will usher in a new era of American greatness." (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
An objective of "domestic renewal" which will "usher in a new era of American greatness" must be measured against something. That something is presented as the consequence of the long term elaboration of an American fundamental political line that did more harm than good to the body of the Republic, indeed, a political line that produced the sort of instability and chaos within which it was both impossible to govern or to engage in transactional relations:
systematic infringements on our sovereignty; the return of multi-faceted great power competition unlike any we have seen since the end of the Cold War; rampant abuse and exploitation in the global trading system; a post-war global order increasingly plagued with anti-Western ideology and weaponized against us; the erosion of our borders and an epidemic of unchecked global mass migration; and global chaos, instability, and armed conflict of a scale not seen in decades. (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
Perhaps the Republic could have navigated within transnational instability and chaos. Things became more difficult and dangerous, as this narrative elaborates, when these trajectories were projected inward and deeply embedded in American mass politics and socio-economic relations in ways that causes social and economic weakness. "We have been growing increasingly dependent on foreign supply chains. We have become increasingly ashamed of our own culture, identity, and values. And, in many quarters, there is a creeping fatalism about the future of American power and prosperity." (Ibid), This was a set of conditions that might even be thought more advanced within the traditional allies of the Republic with which, at one point at least, there was a unity of values as well as interests. And the "big bang" of all of this was the arrogant triumphalism that infected the Republic's leading groups--its vanguard elements as vanguardism was deployed in the Republic from the time of Woodrow Wilson at least (discussed here)--from the time of the disintegration of the Soviet empire. That line produced an "agenda committed to multilateralism, globalization, and to remaking—often by force—disparate parts of the world in the image of Western democracies." (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
These choices and that post-Soviet American political line put the Republic "on a path towards civilizational and geopolitical suicide." (Ibid.). It is important to note the twin elements of the suicide formula of the American post Soviet line--it was both political and societal-cultural. It was rooted in a foreign policy that "consistently elevated the interests of the “global community” and the “rules-based order” above the national interests of the United States and our people." (Ibid.). The Republic's suicide,then, was a draught of globalism laced with a multilateral rules based order that required for its ultimate triumph the obliteration of the United States (and China etc.) as something apart from and autonomous of the global community into which it would sink, except perhaps for things that might matter less--cuisine, language, folkways that were not otherwise offense to the emerging global aggregate.
The original sin of globalism is that it denied American exceptionalism and deluded us into becoming ashamed of our history, strength, and prosperity. . . At our core, we are a proud people—proud of our country, our might, and our culture. A truly American foreign policy ought to reflect this indominable spirit. (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 3).
That is the narrative vision. It was a vision that, like its Chinese counterpart (and one speaks here to the formulation of the basic or fundamental political lines of hegemonic powers that are in no hurry to cede authority or their sense of their place in the world) required a thing against which it could define both danger and possibility. In the case of the Americans (and to some extent the Chinese post 1949), the danger was national obliteration either as a historical reality from out of which a national rejuvenation was necessary or a pathway forward to obliteration fro which a national renewal was a necessary antidote. The cure for that would be quite different in each state--but cure there must be to their respective national-civilizational maladies. For the Republic,
"Correcting course demands a rapid return to a pragmatic diplomacy committed to advancing the national interests of the United States and our people. In other words, it requires a foreign policy that puts America First." (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, p. 1).
And there it is.
America First has a story; it has a lens; and it has the capacity for self-referencing structuring through systems grounded in a set of core premises from out of which a collective normative structure can be built, its objectives specified and the policies and other tools necessary for its realization marshaled. Cultural and political integrity must be protected--the autonomous body of the Republic must be preserved. Here one comes to a hegemonic version of the post-colonial ideal, now transposed onto the fundamental self-understanding of the hegemon itself. Collective life and its cognitive frameworks provides irony that keeps on giving. Perhaps that, at its most basic, is the human condition.
And so Secretary Rubio then makes the obvious more so for those who have not yet gotten the point: First, that the renewing political line is focused on action rather than theoretical elaboration; that its basis is on the elaboration of the the core dual objects that every State must protect: (1) its political sovereignty; and (2) its cultural/societal sovereignty. Left unsaid, of course, is the further duty of a State to constantly consider the meaning nature and expression of those dual sovereignties across time. But that is a second order consideration. First things first--one must get one's sovereignty houses in order. And here again a conflation of America First as a transactional global strategy in protection of the Republic's sovereignty with the Republic's National Security Strategy for 2025, one that aligns foreign policy with internal objectives built around the protection of the State against challenges, internal and external--that is the essence of and the purpose for the State.
How do we practice America First foreign policy? To start, we must be clear, concrete, and limited in the delineation of our core national interests. . . We cannot hope to solve every issue, or to prevent every global tragedy. Success requires clear-eyed prioritization of the key interests in our diplomatic agenda. . . Moreover, no significant structure can stand without a robust foundation; a safe, secure, and prosperous United States is a prerequisite for a powerful global presence. Domestic renewal begins by reasserting American sovereignty—over our territory, our people and commercial enterprises, and our state.(Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, pp. 1-2).From these consequential principles (that is from principles that follow from the core premises--preserve and realize political and cultural/societal sovereignty) it is possible to sketch out the initial policy and structural actions/agendas necessary to fulfill the America First basic line: (1) territorial integrity (migration; bandit gangs and "narco-terrorist criminal organizations" and their strongholds markets for suppressed goods and services and within dissident communities); (2) economic autonomy and solidity (independence, perhaps of the sort that was the ideal of the post-colonial States through the 1970s, it is not clear); (3) technological independence and supremacy. All of this is wrapped up in Goal 1 of America First (Ibid., pp. 4-7).
These three foundational agendas then generate their own derivative agendas which, when aggregated, will constitute the ecology of action/objective that is America First in this first era of its operation. These include a strong market oriented Western Hemisphere (the near periphery of the Republic) elaborated in Goal 2 (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, pp. 2, 7-9). It also includes a general principle of promoting "shared prosperity with these friendly states" (Ibid., p. 2) and "competition with China or other geopolitical adversaries" (Ibid.), from one perspective bringing memories of Chinese people's democratic dictatorship but in a transactional universe in which there is trade for friends and competition for adversaries. It is here that the transactional lens is at its most visible: "Once more, commerce will play a critical role in forging alliances and partnerships. American enterprise is the root of our global power and our domestic prosperity." (Ibid., p. 3).
Commerce has a public dimension. "[W]e will embrace the President’s dealmaking ethos and forge new ventures, compacts, and trade agreements that will bring about fair and mutually beneficial trade and economic partnerships with our friends and allies" (Ibid., p. 3). Just as it can guide the Republic back to prosperity if well managed, so can it serve as a foundation for a sound public policy projected outward:
Doing this will require that we shrewdly allocate resources to the most pressing challenges. . . Prudence and prioritization are essential to ensuring a quiet resolve that deters, rather than invites, foreign aggression. To this end, we will also empower strong and self-sufficient allies, ensuring that our friends are able to contribute their fair share towards collective security and welfare. . allowing the United States to prioritize strategic imperatives. Our allies will also play key roles helping us push back against anti-Americanism in international organizations, protect free and open sea lanes and commercial corridors, and prevent foreign powers from dominating key regional resources and domains. (Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030, pp. 2-3)
All of this, of course, is based on an assumption, the continuing relevance of which is the essence if America First: that "the United States is still the indispensable nation" (Ibid., p. 3). That is the challenge of America First. And the challenge is to be undertaken in the transactional spirit of pragmatism. That "means deal making in the shadow of first principles. And that translate into the transactional matrix of America First: "rejecting the arrogant paternalism of thinking we can or should change the customs or politics of foreign nations where there is not a direct benefit to doing so. It means dealing in the art of the possible and not wishing away constraints—whether they be natural,geographical, geopolitical, economic, or social. " (Ibid.).
That is the challenge now better elaborated to the large enterprise of the Republic's post 1945 vision for a global order by those who now seek to move, in the current era of the Republic's historical development, to a vision that is, in many respects impossibly incompatible with that which came before. Whatever happens, and however successful this is, it is unlikely that it will be possible to turn the clock back before 2016. And in that lies the greatest challenge both to the proponents and opponents of the America First era of the Republic (cf., 'White House National -Security Strategy Reflects Vance's Thinking).
The details follow. These represent the current expression of system manifestation of its global objectives, crafted to maximize value under current circumstances and likely to change as cintext changes. And that detailing takes up the bulk of the Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030. Most of them are further elaborated in the National Security Strategy for 2025, discussed America
First as the Essence of National Security and the American
Post-Colonial 'Howl': Reflections on the 2025 National Security Strategy
of the United States (2025)The difference is that this is a pragmatic document that seeks, in its own way, to reveal more precisely the scope, form, and prioritization of national public goals projected outward in furtherance of national goals and aspirations. And in that respect, as well, it takes on the character of the core initiative of its fraternal hegemon evidenced in the framework of China's Silk Roads structures; the difference is on the way in which the structures and operations of the international order is to be used. For Chinese institutionalists these are valuable productive forces; for the United States these are impediments to systems if transactional production. (Xi proposes Global Governance Initiative at largest-ever SCO summit). See China’s
Three Global Initiatives: China’s Solutions to Addressing Global
Challenges——Speech by Chinese Ambassador to PNG Yang Xiaoguang at
the“China’s Global Initiative and China-PNG Cooperation” Symposium (13 March 2025).
2. The semiotics of sovereignty.
Objective 1.1: Secure America’s borders and the American people’s right to decide who to admit and on what terms.
Objective 1.2: Ensure all Americans can exercise their rights free from foreign interference.
Objective 1.3: Engage in international organizations only when it advances America’s national interests.
3. The ordering of the near periphery (or building a wall around the apex sovereign).
Objective 2.1: Counter and reverse our
competitors’ influence in the Western
Hemisphere.
Objective 2.2: Strengthen strategic
partnerships in the Western Hemisphere.
Objective 2.3: Suppress narco-terrorist
gangs and cartels.
4. Protecting the Western flank of the Republic's sovereignty.
Objective 3.1: Strengthen the Indo-
Pacific economic system to support U.S.
reindustrialization and reinforce ties
with allies.
Objective 3.2: Deter aggression and
establish favorable military balance
across the region.
5. The Eastern flank; nostalgia and impatience.
Objective 4.1: Transfer primary
responsibility for conventional European
defense to allies and expand our joint
Defense Industrial Base.
Objective 4.2: Rebalance U.S. trade
with European allies and decrease their
economic dependencies on adversarial
powers.
Objective 4.3: Defend civilizational
values and reassert national sovereignty.
6. Technology and the new sovereignty.
Objective 5.1: Reindustrialize the
United States.
Objective 5.2: Stop foreign actors’
abuse of the global trading system.
Objective 5.3: Drive the United States’s
strategic leverage by increasing U.S.
exports and investment.
Objective 5.4: Strengthen U.S.
technological edge and industry
dominance.
7. The triumph of the transactional in and as inter-governmental relations.
Objective 6.1: Leverage assistance as a
tool of statecraft.
Objective 6.2: Promote and provide
trade, not aid.
Secretary Rubio's Foreword follows below.
1
I am pleased to submit the Department of State’s
Agency Strategic Plan (ASP) for Fiscal Years
2026-2030. These four years come at a defining
period for the United States and our place in the
world. With President Trump’s agenda of domestic
renewal and peace through strength, we will usher
in a new era of American greatness.
President Trump inherited from his predecessor a
dangerous world full of unprecedented challenges
facing this nation: systematic infringements on our
sovereignty; the return of multi-faceted great power
competition unlike any we have seen since the end
of the Cold War; rampant abuse and exploitation in
the global trading system; a post-war global order
increasingly plagued with anti-Western ideology
and weaponized against us; the erosion of our
borders and an epidemic of unchecked global mass
migration; and global chaos, instability, and armed
conflict of a scale not seen in decades.
Tackling these problems requires a dynamic
and vigorous America. Yet, after years of weak
leadership, we are beset by social division.
We have been suffering from a declining
manufacturing and industrial base. We have been
growing increasingly dependent on foreign supply
chains. We have become increasingly ashamed
of our own culture, identity, and values. And, in
many quarters, there is a creeping fatalism about
the future of American power and prosperity.
Moreover, we call upon a set of core allies with the
same ailments, and which have grown increasingly
weak and incapable of protecting themselves—
much less willing to shoulder their fair share of
responding to collective challenges.
For too long, these issues have festered due to
a misguided U.S. foreign policy that never re-
calibrated from the fleeting triumphalism of the fall
of the Iron Curtain. For some thirty-five years, the
bipartisan consensus of that moment has guided a
diplomatic agenda committed to multilateralism,
globalization, and to remaking—often by
force—disparate parts of the world in the image
of Western democracies. That foreign policy
consistently elevated the interests of the “global
community” and the “rules-based order” above
the national interests of the United States and our
people. In an earlier era, such an approach may
have merely been self-defeating; facing today’s
challenges, it risks putting America on a path
towards civilizational and geopolitical suicide.
Correcting course demands a rapid return to a
pragmatic diplomacy committed to advancing
the national interests of the United States and our
people. In other words, it requires a foreign policy
that puts America First.
How do we practice America First foreign policy?
To start, we must be clear, concrete, and limited in
the delineation of our core national interests. The
United States is blessed with tremendous assets—
physical, financial, military, geographical, and
otherwise—but our resources are hardly infinite and
the problems we face are many. We cannot hope
to solve every issue, or to prevent every global
tragedy. Success requires clear-eyed prioritization
of the key interests in our diplomatic agenda.
President Trump has been clear that America’s
national interests start at home and that our
government’s first duty is to protect America and
Americans. Moreover, no significant structure can
stand without a robust foundation; a safe, secure,
and prosperous United States is a prerequisite for a
powerful global presence.
Domestic renewal begins by reasserting American
sovereignty—over our territory, our people and
commercial enterprises, and our state. Under
President Trump, illegal border crossings have
reached historic lows. We will continue to
control our borders, ensuring that only lawful and
vetted people reach our shores, and expeditiously
remigrate all those who do not belong. Just as
importantly, the United States must reclaim our
economic independence: rebuilding our industrial
and manufacturing capacities, building durable
supply chains, reestablishing American energy
dominance, championing our businesses, and
investing in homegrown innovation to ensure U.S.
leadership in the technologies of tomorrow.
A robust foundation depends also upon a strong,
safe and market-oriented Western Hemisphere.
A focus on peace and security in our hemisphere
ought not be confused with isolationism or a
withdrawal from the rest of the world. Rather,
it reflects the common-sense recognition that
America cannot effectively project power around
the world if it is not prosperous and safe at home.
After decades of failed U.S. policymakers
prioritizing faraway conflicts, our region has
become marred by a handful of weak states
overtaken by narco-terrorist criminal organizations,
disorder, and the malign influence of geopolitical
adversaries. Cartels exploit these failed states
to ship poison across our borders, while foreign
powers leverage them to project military might
mere miles from our shores.
No longer. Under President Trump, the United
States will reassert control of our hemisphere,
stamping out foreign military power, organized
crime, and terrorists. The projection of foreign
power in the Western Hemisphere will once
again be treated as a hostile act towards the
United States. In its place, we will cultivate a
network of strong, stable, and growth-oriented
allies. Together, we will eradicate disorder, drug
trafficking, and mass migration in our hemisphere.
We will also promote shared prosperity with these
friendly states—expanding fair trade, private
sector investment, and targeted foreign assistance,
and near-shoring key supply chains.
Similar principles will guide American global
engagement farther from our shores. Above all,
the United States will pursue a posture of peace
through strength—maintaining both the might to
beat back any adversary, but also the restraint to
only use force when necessary. Under President
Trump, the United States has already used our
strength to become the preeminent facilitator of
global peace in the most intractable global conflicts,
from Israel and Gaza to Armenia to Cambodia. Our
peace and strength are self-reinforcing in a virtuous
cycle: a peaceful world is one in which America
can be strong and prosperous, while a strong and
prosperous America will, in turn, promote more
peace and global prosperity.
Nor will the United States shy away from
competition with China or other geopolitical
adversaries. While we do not seek unnecessary
conflict, we will zealously guard our interests—
political, security, economic, and otherwise—
against encroachment by China, Russia, Iran and
other geopolitical rivals. Doing this will require
that we shrewdly allocate resources to the most
pressing challenges. We ought not forget the
damage and distraction done by allowing the
United States to become mired in never-ending
conflicts far from our borders and detached from
our core interests. Prudence and prioritization are
essential to ensuring a quiet resolve that deters,
rather than invites, foreign aggression.
To this end, we will also empower strong and self-
sufficient allies, ensuring that our friends are able
to contribute their fair share towards collective
security and welfare. As the President’s Abraham
Accords in the Near East have demonstrated, self-
sufficient allies, united with and led by America
through economic and technological partnerships,
will be capable of more independently addressing
regional challenges, allowing the United States to
prioritize strategic imperatives. Our allies will also
play key roles helping us push back against anti-
Americanism in international organizations, protect
free and open sea lanes and commercial corridors,
and prevent foreign powers from dominating key
regional resources and domains.
Once more, commerce will play a critical role
in forging alliances and partnerships. American
enterprise is the root of our global power and
our domestic prosperity. President Trump has
made clear that the United States will no longer
tolerate being fleeced in the global trading
system, the pilfering of our intellectual property,
nor exploitation of our workers. Instead, we
will embrace the President’s dealmaking ethos
and forge new ventures, compacts, and trade
agreements that will bring about fair and mutually
beneficial trade and economic partnerships with
our friends and allies. Through a reinvigorated
focus on commercial diplomacy, we will protect
American businesses, workers, and economic
interests across the world.
This is an ambitious mandate. To seize it, we must
above all reclaim American pride. As President
Trump has said, for all the challenges we face,
the United States is still the indispensable nation.
The United States has led nearly every economic,
social, technological, and political evolution of
the last century and we must never forget it. The
original sin of globalism is that it denied American
exceptionalism and deluded us into becoming
ashamed of our history, strength, and prosperity.
The United States must never be made to
apologize for our power, our wealth, our victories,
or our Western values. At our core, we are a proud
people—proud of our country, our might, and our
culture. A truly American foreign policy ought to
reflect this indominable spirit.
Our confidence, however, must remain tempered
by pragmatism. At his core, President Trump
is a deal-maker and, like any great deal-maker,
his agenda is defined by realism. Success in
diplomacy means meeting countries on their
own terms, and respecting differences in culture,
history, and governance. It means rejecting the
arrogant paternalism of thinking we can or should
change the customs or politics of foreign nations
where there is not a direct benefit to doing so. It
means dealing in the art of the possible and not
wishing away constraints—whether they be natural,
geographical, geopolitical, economic, or social.
The Department of State’s diplomatic engagement
is at the center of this vision. America First is not a
retreat from diplomacy—but rather a recommitment
to its truest form. For centuries, diplomacy has
been defined by sober, pragmatic dialogue and
guided by the axiom that rational global actors
will act for the benefit of their people and their
states. Although forgotten for too long, the art
and prudence of traditional interests-oriented
diplomacy has been in the bones of the Department
of State since 1789. By reclaiming its promise,
together we can put America First and usher in the
next era of American peace and prosperity.
tAble oF contentS
Foreword by Secretary Rubio ............................................................................................................... 1
Goal 1: U.S. National Sovereignty ........................................................................................................ 4
Objective 1.1: Secure America’s borders and the American people’s right to decide who to admit
and on what terms. ........................................................................................................ 4
Objective 1.2: Ensure all Americans can exercise their rights free from foreign interference. ............ 5
Objective 1.3: Engage in international organizations only when it advances America’s national
interests. ........................................................................................................................ 5
Goal 2: The Western Hemisphere and Establishment of the Donroe Doctrine ................................ 7
Objective 2.1: Counter and reverse our competitors’ influence in the Western Hemisphere. .............. 7
Objective 2.2: Strengthen strategic partnerships in the Western Hemisphere. ..................................... 8
Objective 2.3: Suppress narco-terrorist gangs and cartels. ................................................................... 8
Goal 3: Peace and Stability in the Indo-Pacific Region ...................................................................... 9
Objective 3.1: Strengthen the Indo-Pacific economic system to support U.S. reindustrialization
and reinforce ties with allies. ........................................................................................ 9
Objective 3.2: Deter aggression and establish favorable military balance across the region. ............ 10
Goal 4: Rebuild the Civilizational Alliance with European States .................................................. 11
Objective 4.1: Transfer primary responsibility for conventional European defense to allies and
expand our joint Defense Industrial Base. .................................................................. 12
Objective 4.2: Rebalance U.S. trade with European allies and decrease their economic
dependencies on adversarial powers. .......................................................................... 12
Objective 4.3: Defend civilizational values and reassert national sovereignty. .................................. 13
Goal 5: U.S. Economic and Technological Dominance ..................................................................... 14
Objective 5.1: Reindustrialize the United States. ............................................................................... 14
Objective 5.2: Stop foreign actors’ abuse of the global trading system. ............................................. 15
Objective 5.3: Drive the United States’s strategic leverage by increasing U.S. exports and
investment. .................................................................................................................. 15
Objective 5.4: Strengthen U.S. technological edge and industry dominance. .................................... 16
Goal 6: Targeted Foreign Assistance that Puts American Interests First ....................................... 18
Objective 6.1: Leverage assistance as a tool of statecraft. .................................................................. 18
Objective 6.2: Promote and provide trade, not aid. ............................................................................ 19
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