On the Brink or a Blip in Dysfunctional Relations?--Cuba Prepares for Total War; President Trump and the "Venezuela Deal"; Executive Order "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba"

 

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 VERSIÓN EN ESPAÑOL AQUÍ

Cuba is now preparing for what its current leadership may believe to be an end game.  Of course it need not be; but the leadership has, as it has for a long time, been driven relentlessly by the inevitabilitties built into its way of looking at the world and from it constructing the alternatives which its values present top it. 

In a sense, the Cuban vanguard has been preparing for this day for a very long time. It is, perhaps one of the final markers of the 20th century's age of heroic (left and right) leader gods--leader gods that saw in the states and systems they built a very large funeral pyre on which their own hopes, dreams, and aspirations would be consumed. In this, perhaps, the 18th and 20th centuries represent the book ends of the political limiting concepts of the Enlightenment and its rationalizing cognitive cages.  The 18th century brought to its highest level of development the "enlightened despotism" in anbolute monarchy. The 20th century saw the rise of the enlightened despotic ideology incarnated in a vanguardist apparatus. Everywhere. . . from "l'etat c'est moi" to e pluribus unum or perhaps "unity in diversity" and its Leninist variations. 

Cuban authorities have already  taken public steps to put the Republic on a wartime footing, expecting a total war of the people. Discussed HERE: "Al imperio que nos amenaza le decimos: ¡Cuba somos millones!:" Discurso pronunciado por Miguel Mario Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de la República,

Now the United States has weighed in. On 29 January President Trump issued an executive order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba. That Executive Order was accompanied by a companion document: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba.

The Executive Order is quite interesting. It appears to provide Cuba with a Venezuelan solution that could, effectively, allow it to keep the substance of its governance system (at least for a little while). Consider the objective of the Executive Order as summarized in the Factsheet:  

• The Order imposes a new tariff system that allows the United States to impose additional tariffs on imports from any country that directly or indirectly provides oil to Cuba.
• The Order authorizes the Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce to take all necessary actions, including issuing rules and guidance, to implement the tariff system and related measures.
• The President may modify the Order if Cuba or affected countries take significant steps to address the threat or align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.

The first two objectives represent he standard issue tactics of the 2nd Trump Administration. It is the third objective that draws attention. The key is in the "deal"--if Cuba's government takes "significant steps to address the threat or align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives" then the Executive Order can be modified (likely along with other measures). The opening negotiating stance is roughed out in the Factsheet:  

The Cuban regime aligns itself with numerous hostile countries and malign actors, hosting their military and intelligence capabilities. For example, Cuba hosts Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility focused on stealing sensitive national security information from the United States.

Cuba provides safe haven for transnational terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and supports adversaries in the Western Hemisphere, undermining U.S. sanctions and regional stability.

The regime persecutes and tortures political opponents, denies free speech and press, profits corruptly from the Cuban people’s misery, and incites chaos by spreading communist ideology across the region.

The choke point, of course, is petroleum. The first phase eliminated Venezuelan supplies; the second the traditional handout by the Mexican government (Mexican president says her country has paused oil shipments to Cuba ("'Pemex makes decisions in the contractual relationship it has with Cuba,' Sheinbaum said in her morning news briefing. 'Suspending is a sovereign decision and is taken when necessary.'"). And Secretary Marco Rubio suggested the contours of the situation from the U.S. perspective:  US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stopped short of confirming whether the Trump administration would actively pursue regime change. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rubio when pressed on whether Washington would rule out a US-backed effort to remove Cuba’s current leadership noted that, indeed, that was an agenda set by Congress a generation ago. (Video: ‘Won’t rule out…': Marco Rubio stuns Dem Senator, rejects ‘no-regime-change’ pledge on Cuba)

Pix credit here 

 

Now. . . . let's make a deal!

Is a deal possible? Perhaps.  I suggested the contours of a deal space in my remarks delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy in October 2025: "Legal-Institutional Foundations for Reconstruction in a Post-Revolutionary Cuba: A Conceptual Exercise," Remarks prepared for delivery at the 2025 Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami, Florida, 25 October 2025. I left it this way: 

The project of transition ought to please no one; ought to be directed to the strategic benefit of no group; and ought to avoid the arrogance, so much on display by leaders of the past several generations, that they are best situated to declare what is right, good, and necessary, including the determination of the political economic model of sovereign peoples and the institutional-legal systems created for the fulfillment of its objectives.

That is not to say that transition is to be avoided. All states are in a constant state of transition; one need only look closely at the United States, Cuba, and China since 2008 to see quite clearly the unavoidability of that trajectory.  The development of strong, authoritative and legitimate institutional-legal foundations in aid of transition is vital. In the case of Cuba that is meant to accompany not transitions that may sit of the margins of stable political economic models, but at its very center. That creates a more dynamic element in which such restructurings may be profound and profoundly transformative. At the same time, a lust for collapse and chaos ought not be satisfied, even by those who might be tempted to work toward those ends. In Cuba transition must start from the current situation. It might prune that which impedes and nurture that which moves state, government, and the satisfaction of popular need forward. That will require a change in the political economic model, a change that can be undertaken even within the broad umbrella of Marxist-Leninism. But the nomenklatura must be  reformed and its role refashioned, and the role of the informal market must become part of the operation of the political economy of a state in transition.

To those ends, the Cuban legal institutional system requires tweaking but not comprehensive reform; it requires capacity building in the context of administrative law (protect against abuse of discretion), in the law of economic collectives that exist beyond the state, and especially in the law of contract. Those changes require the develop of institutional capacity, one with respect to which may provide a basis for the re-education and repurposing of the nomenklatura.* * * 

 Lastly, and of critical importance is the issue of the insularity of Cuba. The construction of “Fortress Cuba” by the military and nomenklatura elements of power  has certainly served their short term interests. However, at some point Cuba will have to open up. That also requires the development of a host of institutions and legal regimes. The issue is complicated depending on how strong the desire to avoid instability may be.  It is likely that the safest route is a gradual opening up by expanding, in stages, the reach and operation of Special Economic Zines, like Mariel. Those can be used, as the Chinese did a generation ago, as the spaces where the apparatus can experiment with transition, develop institutions and legal regimes to suit the context, and then role them out to provinces and then nationally. At the same time, here institutional and legal development might profit more from the dual circulation model of the Chinese or its American version as part of the America First project, as a way of protecting the internal integrity of the state while preparing for better integration with the rest of the world.  In any case, given the size and diversity of experience of the diaspora community, a community the penetration of which into the national territory is inevitable, such a project of institution-law building, a project of the law of Special Economic Zones, may play a vital role in the short and medium term. * * *  

It is not for us to make the determination of details. That ought to be left to the people; but it does require a reconstitution of the PCC and its work style and objectives in ways that they may not be willing to take. If that is the case then a transition back to a military post-revolution government may be the best way forward. The bottom line, though, is simple: unless one is planning to absorb the Cuban Republic into a larger metropolitan State-empire, it is improbable to develop before the fact any detailed set of institutional legal structures that might be applied to Cuban transition. I leave that to utopians, politicians, and revolutionaries. (Legal-Institutional Foundations for Reconstruction in a Post-Revolutionary Cuba: A Conceptual Exercise)

The Cuban government's response was necessary and predictable (Cuba condena y denuncia nueva escalada del cerco económico de Estados Unidos; which follows below. Nonetheless, conditions have changed, and the pathways to stability beyond a governance of misery remain difficult (Cuba and the Constitution of a Stable State of Misery: Ideology, Economic Policy, and Popular Discipline). As much as it may pain the nomenklatura--so desperate to stop time and preserve those glorious moments of the 1970s and the transition from revolutionary to Communist government (Cuba’s Caribbean Marxism: Essays on Ideology, Government, Society, and Economy in the Post Fidel Castro Era; also here)--it may be time now to move forward either toward a socialist markets system or to reset back to January 1959 and consider a different way forward from a revolutionary government. In that respect Chinese notions of self-revolution and social revolution might be worth considering by the administrative and Party apparatus of state (Brief Reflections on 坚定不移把党的自我革命向纵深推进——习近平 [Xi Jinping, Resolutely Advance the Party's Self-Revolution to a Deeper Level]).  The essence of this change will require the rectification of the nomenklatura (hard but possible) and the incorporation of the mores and practices of the informal economy as the new basis for Cuban economic development, even with a socialist overlay.

The texts of the executive order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba. and the companion document: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba follow below, along with the Cuban government response--Cuba condena y denuncia nueva escalada del cerco económico de Estados Unidos.

 

Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba

The White House

January 29, 2026

CONFRONTING THE CUBAN REGIME: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order declaring a national emergency and establishing a process to impose tariffs on goods from countries that sell or otherwise provide oil to Cuba, protecting U.S. national security and foreign policy from the Cuban regime’s malign actions and policies.

• The Order imposes a new tariff system that allows the United States to impose additional tariffs on imports from any country that directly or indirectly provides oil to Cuba.
• The Order authorizes the Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce to take all necessary actions, including issuing rules and guidance, to implement the tariff system and related measures.
• The President may modify the Order if Cuba or affected countries take significant steps to address the threat or align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.

COUNTERING CUBA’S MALIGN INFLUENCE: The President is addressing the depredations of the communist Cuban regime by taking decisive action to hold the Cuban regime accountable for its support of hostile actors, terrorism, and regional instability that endanger American security and foreign policy.

• The Cuban regime aligns itself with numerous hostile countries and malign actors, hosting their military and intelligence capabilities. For example, Cuba hosts Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility focused on stealing sensitive national security information from the United States.
• Cuba provides safe haven for transnational terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and supports adversaries in the Western Hemisphere, undermining U.S. sanctions and regional stability.
• The regime persecutes and tortures political opponents, denies free speech and press, profits corruptly from the Cuban people’s misery, and incites chaos by spreading communist ideology across the region.
• These actions constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy, requiring immediate response to protect American citizens and interests.

PUTTING AMERICA FIRST: President Trump has consistently confronted regimes that threaten U.S. security and interests, delivering where others have failed to hold adversaries accountable.

• President Trump is continuing efforts from his first term to stand with the Cuban people and hold the regime accountable.
  • In his first term, President Trump implemented a robust policy toward Cuba, reversing the Obama Administration’s one-sided deal that eased restrictions without securing meaningful reforms for the Cuban people.
• In June 2025, President Trump implemented partial travel restrictions on nationals from Cuba due to its role as a state sponsor of terrorism, its failure to cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States, its historical refusal to accept back its removable nationals, and its high visa overstay rate.
• In June 2025, President Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) to strengthen the policy of the United States toward Cuba.
• This is not the first time President Trump has taken a tough stance against hostile regimes—in just the past few months, he has ordered strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and authorized operations to remove Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro from power, making clear that dictators and state sponsors of terrorism will be held to account.

ADDRESSING THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA

Executive Orders

January 29, 2026

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I hereby determine and order:

Section 1.  National Emergency.  As President of the United States, I have an imperative duty to protect the national security and foreign policy of this country.  I find that the policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

The Government of Cuba has taken extraordinary actions that harm and threaten the United States.  The regime aligns itself with — and provides support for — numerous hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors adverse to the United States, including the Government of the Russian Federation (Russia), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Government of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah.  For example, Cuba blatantly hosts dangerous adversaries of the United States, inviting them to base sophisticated military and intelligence capabilities in Cuba that directly threaten the national security of the United States.  Cuba hosts Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility, which tries to steal sensitive national security information of the United States.  Cuba continues to build deep intelligence and defense cooperation with the PRC.  Cuba welcomes transnational terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, creating a safe environment for these malign groups so that these transnational terrorist groups can build economic, cultural, and security ties throughout the region and attempt to destabilize the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.  Cuba has long provided defense, intelligence, and security assistance to adversaries in the Western Hemisphere, attempting to thwart United States and international sanctions designed to enforce the stability of the region, uphold the rule of law, and safeguard the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  Cuba continues to try to thwart United States efforts to address threats to the United States posed by hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors, including in the Western Hemisphere. 

Further, contrary to the interests and foreign policy of the United States, the Cuban communist regime supports terrorism and destabilizes the region through migration and violence.  The communist regime persecutes and tortures its political opponents; denies the Cuban people free speech and press; corruptly profits from their misery; and commits other human-rights violations.  For example, families of political prisoners face retaliation for peacefully protesting the improper confinement of their loved ones.  Cuban authorities harass worshippers, block free association by civil society organizations, prohibit free press, and deny the ability to speak freely, including on the internet.  The Cuban regime continues to spread its communist ideas, policies, and practices around the Western Hemisphere, threatening the foreign policy of the United States.  

The United States has zero tolerance for the depredations of the communist Cuban regime.  The United States will act to protect the foreign policy, national security, and national interests of the United States, including by holding the Cuban regime accountable for its malign actions and relationships, while also remaining committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspirations for a free and democratic society.

I find that the policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba directly threaten the safety, national security, and foreign policy of the United States.  The policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba are designed to harm the United States and support hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors that seek to destroy the United States.  The policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba are also repugnant to the moral and political values of democratic and free societies and conflict with the foreign policy of the United States to encourage peaceful change in Cuba and to promote democracy, the principle of free expression and press, the rule of law, and respect for human rights throughout the world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that the situation with respect to Cuba constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency with respect to that threat. 

To deal with the national emergency declared in this order, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to establish a tariff system, as described below.  Under this system, an additional ad valorem duty may be imposed on imports of goods that are products of a foreign country that directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba.  In my judgment, the tariff system, as described below, is necessary and appropriate to address the national emergency declared in this order.

Sec. 2.  Imposition of Tariffs.  (a)  Beginning on the effective date of this order, an additional ad valorem rate of duty may be imposed on goods imported into the United States that are products of any other country that directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba, in accordance with subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(b)(i)  The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State and any senior official the Secretary of Commerce deems appropriate, shall determine whether, after the effective date of this order, a foreign country directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba.  After the Secretary of Commerce finds that a foreign country directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba, the Secretary of Commerce shall inform the Secretary of State of his finding, including any information relevant to that finding. 

(ii)  The Secretary of Commerce may issue rules, regulations, and guidance necessary or appropriate to implement this order.  The Secretary of Commerce may also make any other determinations or take any other actions necessary or appropriate to implement this order.

(c)(i)  After the Secretary of Commerce makes an affirmative finding pursuant to subsection (b)(i) of this section and informs the Secretary of State of his finding, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade Representative, shall determine whether and to what extent an additional ad valorem rate of duty should be imposed on goods that are products of the foreign country found to directly or indirectly sell or otherwise provide any oil to Cuba.

(ii)   If the Secretary of State determines that an additional ad valorem rate of duty should be imposed on goods that are products of the country found to directly or indirectly sell or otherwise provide any oil to Cuba, the Secretary of State shall inform me of his recommendation, and the Secretary of Commerce shall inform me of his finding related to that recommendation.  I will then consider the recommendation and finding, among other relevant things, in determining whether and to what extent to impose an additional ad valorem rate of duty on goods that are products of the country in question.

(iii)  The Secretary of State may issue rules, regulations, and guidance necessary or appropriate to implement this order.  The Secretary of State may also make any other determinations or take any other actions necessary or appropriate to implement this order.

Sec. 3.  Modification Authority.  (a)  To ensure that the national emergency declared in this order is dealt with, I may modify this order, including in light of additional information, recommendations from senior officials, or changed circumstances.

(b)  Should a foreign country retaliate against the United States in response to this order or any action taken pursuant to this order, I may modify this order or actions taken pursuant to this order to ensure the efficacy of this order and the actions taken pursuant to this order to deal with the national emergency declared in this order. 

(c)  Should the Government of Cuba or another foreign country affected by this order take significant steps to address the national emergency declared in this order and align sufficiently with the United States on national security and foreign policy matters, I may modify this order. 

Sec. 4.  Monitoring and Recommendations.  (a)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with any senior official the Secretary of State deems appropriate, shall monitor the circumstances involving the national emergency declared in this order.  The Secretary of State shall inform me of any circumstance that, in his opinion, might indicate the need for further Presidential action to deal with the national emergency declared in this order.

(b)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, and any other senior official the Secretary of State deems appropriate, shall recommend to me additional action, if necessary, if the actions in this order or taken pursuant to this order are not effective in dealing with the national emergency declared in this order.

(c)  The Secretary of Commerce shall monitor whether a foreign country directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba.  The Secretary of Commerce shall continue such monitoring after a foreign country has been found to do so.

Sec. 5.  Delegation.  Consistent with applicable law, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are directed and authorized to take all actions necessary to implement and effectuate this order — including through temporary suspension or amendment of regulations or through notices in the Federal Register and by adopting rules, regulations, or guidance — and to employ all powers granted to the President, including by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement this order.  The head of each executive department and agency (agency) is authorized to and shall take all appropriate measures within the agency’s authority to implement this order.  The head of each agency may, consistent with applicable law, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, redelegate the authority to take such appropriate measures within the agency.

Sec. 6.  Reporting Directives.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with any senior official he deems appropriate, is hereby authorized and directed to submit recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in, and authorities exercised by, this order, consistent with section 401 of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7.  Definitions.  For the purposes of this order:

(a)  The term “oil” means crude oil or petroleum products.

(b)  The term “indirectly” includes selling to or otherwise providing oil to Cuba through intermediaries or third countries, with knowledge that such oil may be provided to Cuba, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.

(c)  The term “Cuba” means the territory of Cuba and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Cuba claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government of Cuba exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements.

(d)  The term “Government of Cuba” includes the Government of Cuba, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Cuba.

Sec. 8.  Effective Date.  This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on January 30, 2026.

Sec. 9.  Interaction With Other Presidential Actions.  Any provision of previous proclamations and Executive Orders that is inconsistent with the actions directed in this order is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency. 

Sec. 10.  Severability.  If any provision of this order or the application of any provision of this order to any individual or circumstance is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other individuals or circumstances shall not be affected.  If the action in this order or any action taken pursuant to this order is held invalid, the other actions imposed to deal with the national emergencies declared with respect to the Government of Cuba shall not be affected and shall remain in effect.

Sec. 11.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of State.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    January 29, 2026.

Cuba condena y denuncia nueva escalada del cerco económico de Estados Unidos

Declaración del Gobierno Revolucionario

Autor: Granma | internet@granma.cu

30 de enero de 2026 20:01:48

Foto: Ricardo López Hevia

El Gobierno Revolucionario condena en los términos más enérgicos la nueva escalada del gobierno de los Estados Unidos contra Cuba, en su empeño por imponer un cerco absoluto a los suministros de combustible a nuestro país.

La orden ejecutiva del Presidente estadounidense, anunciada el 29 de enero de 2026, declara una supuesta emergencia nacional, en virtud de la cual su gobierno podrá imponer aranceles comerciales a las importaciones de productos provenientes de países que suministren petróleo a Cuba.

Para justificar una acción tan extrema, se esgrime en el texto de la referida orden una lista extensa de mentiras y acusaciones difamatorias contra Cuba. Destaca entre ellas la absurda aseveración de que Cuba constituye una "amenaza inusual y extraordinaria" para la seguridad nacional de los Estados Unidos. El propio Presidente y su gobierno están conscientes de que nadie o muy pocos pueden creer argumentos tan mendaces, pero no les importa. Así es su desprecio por la verdad, la opinión pública y la ética gubernamental cuando se trata de avalar su agresión contra Cuba.

Con esta decisión, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos, a través del chantaje, la amenaza y la coerción directa a terceros países, intenta imponer componentes adicionales de presión a las acciones de asfixia económica que desde el primer mandato de Trump fueron dispuestas para impedir la entrada de combustibles a nuestro país. Consolida una forma peligrosa de conducir la política exterior de los Estados Unidos por vía de la fuerza y de ejercer sus ambiciones para garantizar su hegemonismo imperialista. Conforme a lo anunciado, ese país se adjudica el derecho de dictar a Estados soberanos con qué naciones pueden comerciar y a cuáles pueden exportar sus productos nacionales.

La orden ejecutiva del Presidente de los Estados Unidos constituye, por tanto, una violación flagrante del Derecho Internacional y atenta, además, contra la Proclama de América Latina y el Caribe como Zona de Paz. Ratifica que es el gobierno de ese país el que atenta contra la seguridad, la estabilidad y la paz de la región y del mundo.

El gobierno de los Estados Unidos llega a este punto tras haber fracasado durante 67 años en rendir y destruir un proceso político y revolucionario genuino y legítimo, de plena soberanía, justicia social y fomento de la paz y la solidaridad con el resto del mundo.

Está ampliamente documentada la disposición histórica de Cuba a sostener con el gobierno de los Estados Unidos un diálogo serio, responsable, basado en el Derecho Internacional, en la igualdad soberana, en el respeto mutuo, en el beneficio recíproco, sin injerencia en los asuntos internos y con absoluto respeto a la independencia y a la soberanía de los Estados.

Como todo el mundo conoce, incluyendo el propio gobierno estadounidense, Cuba no constituye amenaza alguna para los Estados Unidos, sus intereses nacionales o el bienestar de los ciudadanos de ese país que, además, siempre han sido tratados con respeto y hospitalidad cuando su gobierno les ha permitido visitar la isla. Cuba no amenaza o agrede a país alguno. No es objeto de sanciones por parte de la comunidad internacional. Es un país de paz, solidario y cooperativo, dispuesto a ayudar y contribuir con otros Estados.

Es también el país de un pueblo aguerrido y combatiente. Se confunde el imperialismo cuando confía en que con la presión económica y el empeño en provocar sufrimiento a millones de personas, se va a doblegar su determinación de defender la soberanía nacional y de impedir que Cuba caiga, una vez más, bajo el dominio estadounidense.

Tiene ante sí la comunidad internacional el reto ineludible de definir si un crimen de esta naturaleza podrá ser el signo de lo que está por venir o si prevalecerán la cordura, la solidaridad y el rechazo a la agresión, la impunidad y el abuso.

Enfrentaremos la nueva arremetida con firmeza, ecuanimidad y seguridad de que la razón está absolutamente de nuestra parte. La decisión es una:

¡Patria o Muerte, Venceremos!

La Habana, 30 de enero de 2026