On 23 January 2026, the Department of War released its 2026 National Defense Strategy document, subtitled "Restoring Peace Through Strength for a New Golden Age of America." It is the public face of what is likely to be (hopefully anyway) a far more detailed elaboration of the Republic's fundamental political line with respect to military matters, one that embeds the core premises of the Republic's New Era principal objectives--moving forward along the American Path toward the realization of a new golden age by ensuring that the Republic realizes its strategy of peace through strength. .
Together with the National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025) (discussed here: America First as the Essence of National Security and the American Post-Colonial 'Howl': Reflections on the 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States (2025)) and the U.S. Department of State Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026) discussed here: Reflections on the Normative-Institutional Architecture of America First: U.S. State Department "Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2026-2030, the 2026 National Defense Strategy rounds out the elaboration of the America First basic political line of the Republic when it comes to the role and focus of the Republic's external relations with its (re) focus on the general contradiction of the Republic in its "new era of historical development" from the now foundational orienting lens of the protection and elaboration of a transactional ordering framework--the fundamental need of ensuring peace (the territorial space of a transactional universe projected outward and directed inward) for the appropriate forward movement along the path to the realization of the Republic's rebirth in its new golden age.
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| Pix credit here, 鼎Cauldrons (Ding), Eastern Zhou to Han dynasty (770-221 BCE) first two years of the Qin dynasty, but by that point ding were already established symbols of the power bestowed to rulers by the mandate of heaven. Only the emperor could use nine ding together in ritual offerings. Lords were allowed seven, and so on down to low-ranking officials who could only use one ding for offerings. The greater importance placed by Zhou emperors on food rather than wine further increased the importance of ding, which were already the preeminent bronze ritual vessel for food. Around the middle of the Zhou, a system was developed to use ding to identify noble classes. These objects became canvases for epigraphs which tell modern researchers a great deal about Zhou dynastic life. In many cases high ranking officials used ding to record special occasions by casting Chinese characters directly onto the bronze vessels. |
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| Pix credit here |
The cauldron of Zhou dynasty China served as the essential incarnation of the State, its organization, and the space into which productive forces were gathered symbolically and on the face of which the basic or fundamental political line as then understood could be etched, engraved, read, and undertaken . Modern society has done away with traditional means of ritual invocations of authority and with it the semiotic power of the imaginaries of the cauldron (鼎 Ding). The idea remains current, and in traditions like West African Ifa it serves as the core metaphor for understanding the way structures within which all of the human is ordered and contained (eg., Odu Òfúnmeji "everything is contained within the calabash" (Ninu igbá naa ni)). The images and signification of these ritual objects assume modern form in the documents that are meant to contain "everything"--in this case the State and the state of its societal relations. The concepts are particularly apt when describing the three documents-- National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025) , Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026), and the 2026 National Defense Strategy are the three essential legs of the cauldron of state, of the calabash, that together elaborates and signified the America First initiative, and from them, the conceptual structures that then bind together the core domestic policies of the American new era " (the great national renewal that will usher in a new golden age") and its external projection (peace through strength).
As analyzed by the US Naval Institute staff in its own consideration of the 2026 National Defense Strategy with reference to their own mission, the core normative elements of the 2026 NDS can be divided into three parts: (1) defend the U.S. homeland first; (2) Indio-Pacific peace through strength rather than confrontation and focused on access not territory; (3) burden sharing among the Republic's allies; and (4) align national defense with national reindustrialization (traditional industries) and innovative production (tech and AI based development) (2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute Staff (January 24, 2026 9:28 AM)). All of this is intimately tied to the America First superstructure and its national security narrative/normative overlay. They also interweave the core of domestic policy with its expression as national security on the one hand, and international relations on the other. These serve as the core 4 lines of effort that serve as the normative heart of the National Defense Strategy (2026 NDS, pp. 15-23).
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- Defend the U.S. Homeland. We will secure America’s borders and maritime approaches, and we will defend our nation’s skies through Golden Dome for America and a renewed focus on countering unmanned aerial threats. We will maintain a robust and modern nuclear deterrent capable of addressing the strategic threats to our country, raise and sustain formidable cyber defenses, and hunt and neutralize Islamic terrorists who have the ability and intent to strike our Homeland. At the same time, we will actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland. We will provide President Trump with credible military options to use against narco-terrorists wherever they may be. We will engage in good faith with our neighbors, from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests. This is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and America’s military stands ready to enforce it with speed, power, and precision, as the world saw in Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE.
- Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China, and he has shown that he is willing to engage President Xi Jinping directly to achieve those goals. But President Trump has also shown how important it is to negotiate from a position of strength—and he has tasked DoW accordingly. Consistent with the President’s approach, DoW will therefore seek and open a wider range of military-to-military communications with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a focus on supporting strategic stability with Beijing as well as deconfliction and de-escalation, more generally. But we will also be clear-eyed and realistic about the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup. Our goal in doing so is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them. Rather, our goal is simple: To prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies—in essence, to set the military conditions required to achieve the NSS goal of a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that allows all of us to enjoy a decent peace. To that end, as the NSS directs, we will erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain (FIC). We will also urge and enable key regional allies and partners to do more for our collective defense. In doing so, we will reinforce deterrence by denial so that all nations recognize that their interests are best served through peace and restraint. This is how we will establish a position of military strength from which President Trump can negotiate favorable terms for our nation. We will be strong but not unnecessarily confrontational. This is how we will help to turn President Trump’s vision for peace through strength into reality in the vital Indo-Pacific.
- Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. Ours is not a strategy of isolation. As the NSS directs, it is one of focused engagement abroad with a clear eye toward advancing the concrete, practical interests of Americans. Through this America First, commonsense lens, America’s alliances and partners have an essential role to play—but not as the dependencies of the last generation. Rather, as the Department rightly prioritizes Homeland defense and deterring China, other threats will persist, and our allies will be essential to dealing with all of them. Our allies will do so not as a favor to us, but out of their own interests. In the Indo-Pacific, where our allies share our desire for a free and open regional order, allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing China. In Europe and other theaters, allies will take the lead against threats that are less severe for us but more so for them, with critical but more limited support from the United States.In all cases, we will be honest but clear about the urgent need for them to do their part and that it is in their own interests to do so without delay. We will incentivize and enable them to step up. This requires a change in tone and style from the past, but that is necessary not only for Americans but also for our allies and partners. For too long, allies and partners have been content to let us subsidize their defense. Our political establishment reaped the credit while regular Americans paid the bill. With President Trump, a new approach is in effect. Already, President Trump has set a new global standard for defense spending at NATO’s Hague Summit—3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on core military spending and an additional 1.5% on security-related spending, for a total of 5% of GDP. We will advocate that our allies and partners meet this standard around the world, not just in Europe. As our allies do so, together with the United States, they will be able to field the forces required to deter or defeat potential adversaries in every key region of the world, even in the face of simultaneous aggression. This is how we will set conditions for lasting peace through strength around the world.
- Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. President Trump is leading a once-in-a century revival of American industry, re-shoring strategic industries to the United States and revitalizing the industries previous generations had shipped overseas. We will harness this historic initiative to rebuild our nation’s defense industry, which underpins our defense and that of our allies and partners. We must return to being the world’s premier arsenal, one that can produce not only for ourselves but also for our allies and partners at scale, rapidly, and at the highest levels of quality. To achieve this, we will reinvest in U.S. defense production, building out capacity; empowering innovators; adopting new advances in technology, like artificial intelligence (AI); and clearing away outdated policies, practices, regulations, and other obstacles to the type and scale of production that the Joint Force requires for the priorities before us. We will simultaneously leverage allied and partner production not just to meet our own requirements but also to incentivize them to increase defense spending and help them field additional forces as quickly as possible. In the process, we will not only ensure our own defense industrial advantage but also put our alliances on stronger footing so that they can do their part to maintain peace through strength on a strong, equitable, and enduring basis.
What, then, is the nature of war in the Republic's "new era"? The 2026 NDS nicely summarizes it in their own words:
In doing so—as President Trump has so memorably emphasized—our purpose will not be aggression or perpetual war. Rather, our goal is peace. Peace is the highest good. But not a peace that sacrifices our people’s security, freedoms, and prosperity. Rather, a peace that Americans deserve—a noble and proud peace. Fortunately, this peace is compatible with the interests of our potential opponents, if they keep their demands reasonable and cabined. We do not demand their humiliation or submission. Rather, we demand only that they respect our reasonably conceived interests and those of our allies and partners who stand stoutly with us. If we all can acknowledge this, we can achieve a flexible and sustainable balance of power among us, and peace.
But we at the Department of War will be ready if our gracious offer is spurned. We know that wishing for a decent peace is not the same thing as bringing it about. Thus, if our potential opponents are unwise enough to reject our peaceful overtures and choose conflict instead, America’s armed forces will stand ready to fight and win the nation’s wars in ways that make sense for Americans. To ensure that is the case, this Strategy will ensure that we see things and the choices we need to make clearly. We will prioritize addressing the most consequential and grave threats to Americans’ interests. We will revamp our network of allies and partners to meet the threats we face. And we will be ready, always carrying the sharpest and most formidable sword but prepared to offer the olive branch. (2026 NDS, p. 24).
None of this makes sense except as a functionally differentiated piece of the larger puzzle that is America First, and that acquires its normative depth not from the Department of War--they themselves have reconstituted their apparatus as an instrument of peace through the perpetual threat of projections of force to neutralize threats to peace--from from the architecture of the America First. That architecture, in turn, blends the essential elements of "new era" domestic policy (re-industrialization in a guided markets driven environment) to augur in the renewal of the Republic that will be manifested in a golden age of the Republic's social relations (articulated in the form of its customs and traditions) repurposed for the contemporary age. It is shaped, in turn, with the cautions of national security (protection against domestic and external threat) of the 2025 NSS, and the structures for the outward projection of the Republic's domestic policy (transactions in economic, social, and cultural objects) that are in turn extensions of the manifestation of domestic fundamental objectives (DoS Agency Strategic Plan).
And thus the theory (whether one agrees with it or not I leave to the reader); and its calabash; its cauldron.
And with it an effort to repurpose violence projected outward (and inward) in the service of the State and against its enemies and unpatriotic elements. Within the cognitive cages of America First what emerges is their conviction that they will eliminate war --at least war as understood in 19th and 20th century terms, wars for territory, wars for elimination of other states, etc., ("No longer will we squander Americans’ will, resources, and even lives in foolish and grandiose adventures abroad." 2026 NDS, p. 24). The Republic, or rather its citizens will certainly bleed, and the national treasury will be used, extensively, to finance capability. What appears to be the idea, though, aligns with the fundamental transactional conceptual baseline of the Republic in its new era--that such blood and booty sacrifices will be undertaken strictly for quantitatively justifiable (or perhaps discursively positive)) domestic ends--either to protect the heartland (at the heartland's borders or within its essential near peripheries). What the documents struggle with, then, is an effort to abandon the old conceptual starting points for understanding and perhaps also for creating the legal-managerial structures for war, by reframing violence, as they mean to use it, as force projections in the service of peace (redefined as the absence of war, eg here or managed ceasefire), a condition of social relations understood, in turn, as the apex space (platform--eg it need not be physical but may be virtual as well) for social, cultural, economic, etc. transactions and with transactions value added ("this Strategy is defined by a realistic, practical approach to clearly understanding the threats Americans face and how realistically and pragmatically those threats can be addressed in
ways consistent with American interests." 2026 NDS p. 8).
For Europe (and NATO), the model is Israel ("Israel has long demonstrated that it is both willing and able to defend itself with critical but limited support from the United States. " 2026 NDS, p. 12). It generalized expression was elaborated in the NDS's discussion of "burden sharing. ("our allies and partners must
shoulder their fair share of the burden of our collective defense. This is the right thing for them to
do, especially after decades of the United States subsidizing their defense. But it is also vital from a strategic perspective—both for us and for them." 2026 NDS, pp. 13). The measure is a function of negative impact on the Republic's interests calculated from their perspective, and an interdiction of substitution effects of U.S. contributions to joint projects of defense (or transactions) (Ibid., pp. 13-14).
That value added and value threatening framework is nicely captured in the 2026NDS approach to China, not as such, but as a threat to the ability of the Republic to do business when and as it likes: "The American people’s security, freedom, and prosperity are therefore directly linked to our ability to trade and engage from a position of strength in the Indo-Pacific. Were China—or anyone else, for that matter—to dominate this broad and crucial region, it would be able to effectively veto Americans’ access to the world’s economic center of gravity, with enduring implications for our nation’s economic prospects, including our ability to reindustrialize." (2026 NDS, p. 10). Russia, on the other hand, is a second order threat and potential a first order platform for the realization of transactional value added. It is a threat to the extent it threatens the value added of old alliances along NATO's Eastern flank. But it is a secondary threat in the sense that the expectation now arises that the Republic will no longer finance the containment of Russian first order threats, even against its dearest allies (2026 NDS p. 10-11). There will be room to bargain, certainly--markets for defense and alliance are in essence no different than markets for "widgets", but it is clear that violence projections against second order threats will have to be made worthwhile. A repudiation of the post 1945 order as it had come to evolve itself after 1989; most likely. Yet in the minds of the architects of this approach it represents not a repudiation but a classic rectification. That then explains the approach to Iran as well--one that recharacterizes the Iranian leadership as a much more potent variant on the Venezuelan model--operating to thwart the Republic's interests and heading both a state and a criminal apparatus which makes it fair game for force projections in defense of the Republic's win-win transactions platforms (2026 NDS, p. 11-12). And so on.
That, at any rate, is one way one might read these documents, and with it, the way in which their authors understand and apply America First in its domestic, international, defense, security and institutional policy manifestations--all now as a unified whole that is both self-referencing (a series of looping conceptual constructs) and interconnected with the greater public and private organizational frameworks of the Republic. And all of this requires a substantial rectification both the policies of the Republic and of the thinking and conduct (the working style) of its own cadres and patriots as well as those of its allies (if they wish to remain so). That, in the discursive style of Herodotus, was the essence of President Trump's remarks at Davos, coded,, in a style infuriating or easily dismissed by his enemies (who in vanguardist terms would be understood and thus flushed out as unpatriotic or reactionary forces). Whether or not this is a good idea, whether it is attainable, or whether it will survive the current administration (the last point appears to be generally accepted if one takes the Canadian Prime Minister's speech ar Davos seriously), I leave for another day and others more invested in projecting their own value universes in the public domain (politics).
The Introduction to the 2026 NDS follows below
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .. 1
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT .... 7
Homeland and Hemisphere ......8
People’s Republic of China (PRC)...... 9
Russia ...... 10
Iran .... 11
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ... 12
The Simultaneity Problem and Implications for Allied Burden-Sharing .... 13
STRATEGIC APPROACH ...... 15
Line of Effort 1: Defend the U.S. Homeland ..... 16
Line of Effort 2: Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation ..... 18
Line of Effort 3: Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners...... 18
Line of Effort 4: Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base .. 21
CONCLUSION .... 23
NTRODUCTION
President Trump in his first term and since reentering office in January 2025 has rebuilt the
American military to be the world’s absolute best—its most formidable fighting force. But it is
essential to emphasize how much of an achievement this has been.
The fact is that President Trump took office in January 2025 to one of the most dangerous
security environments in our nation’s history. At home, America’s borders were overrun, narco-
terrorists and other enemies grew more powerful throughout the Western Hemisphere, and U.S.
access to key terrain like the Panama Canal and Greenland was increasingly in doubt. Meanwhile
in Europe, where President Trump had previously led North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies to begin taking their defenses seriously, the last administration effectively
encouraged them to free-ride, leaving the Alliance unable to deter or respond effectively to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the Middle East, Israel showed that it was able and willing to
defend itself after the barbaric attacks of October 7th—in short, that it is a model ally. Yet rather
than empower Israel, the last administration tied its hands. All the while, China and its military
grew more powerful in the Indo-Pacific region, the world’s largest and most dynamic market
area, with significant implications for Americans’ own security, freedom, and prosperity.
None of this was foreordained. America emerged from the Cold War as the world’s most
powerful nation by a wide margin. We were secure in our hemisphere, with a military that was
focused on warfighting and far superior to anyone else’s, engaged allies, and powerful industry.
But rather than husband and cultivate these hard-earned advantages, our nation’s post–Cold War
leadership and foreign policy establishment squandered them.
Rather than protect and advance
Americans’ interests, they opened
our borders, forgot the wisdom of
the Monroe Doctrine, ceded
influence in our hemisphere, and
outsourced America’s industry,
including the defense industrial
base (DIB) upon which our forces
rely. They sent America’s brave
sons and daughters to fight war
after rudderless war to topple
regimes and nation-build halfway
around the world, in doing so
eroding our military’s readiness and
delaying modernization. They
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth meets with World War II veterans in Normandy,
France, on the 81st Anniversary of D-Day. These American heroes exemplify
the warrior ethos at the heart of the U.S. military.
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condemned our warfighters, criticizing and neglecting the warrior ethos that was once cultivated
and heralded by our forerunners—and that made this American military the envy of the world.
They allowed, even enabled, our cunning adversaries to grow more powerful, even as they
encouraged our allies to behave as dependents rather than partners, weakening our alliances and
leaving us more vulnerable. And so we found ourselves, in January 2025, facing not only a world
with individual regions at war or descending toward it but also increased risk of America itself
being drawn into simultaneous major wars across theaters—a third world war, as President
Trump himself warned.
That is all changing now. Under President Trump’s leadership, consistent with his vision and
direction as laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Department of War (DoW) is
laser-focused on restoring peace through strength. As detailed in the NSS, the President’s
approach is one of a flexible, practical realism that looks at the world in a clear-eyed way, which
is essential for serving Americans’ interests.
This has clear implications for the Department of War. Above all, it means prioritizing the
missions that matter most for Americans’ security, freedom, and prosperity. This means
concentrating the Department’s efforts to:
► Defend the U.S. Homeland. We will secure America’s borders and maritime approaches,
and we will defend our nation’s skies through Golden Dome for America and a renewed
focus on countering unmanned aerial threats. We will maintain a robust and modern nuclear
deterrent capable of addressing the strategic threats to our country, raise and sustain
formidable cyber defenses, and hunt and neutralize Islamic terrorists who have the ability and
intent to strike our Homeland. At the same time, we will actively and fearlessly defend
America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and
commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and
Greenland. We will provide President Trump with credible military options to use against
narco-terrorists wherever they may be. We will engage in good faith with our neighbors,
from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they
respect and do their part to defend our shared interests. And where they do not, we will stand
ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests. This is the
Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and America’s military stands ready to enforce it
with speed, power, and precision, as the world saw in Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE.
► Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. President Trump
seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China, and he has shown that he
is willing to engage President Xi Jinping directly to achieve those goals. But President Trump
has also shown how important it is to negotiate from a position of strength—and he has
tasked DoW accordingly. Consistent with the President’s approach, DoW will therefore seek
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and open a wider range of military-to-military communications with the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) with a focus on supporting strategic stability with Beijing as well as
deconfliction and de-escalation, more generally. But we will also be clear-eyed and realistic
about the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup. Our goal in doing so
is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them. Rather, our goal is simple:
To prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies—in
essence, to set the military conditions required to achieve the NSS goal of a balance of power
in the Indo-Pacific that allows all of us to enjoy a decent peace. To that end, as the NSS
directs, we will erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain (FIC). We will also
urge and enable key regional allies and partners to do more for our collective defense. In
doing so, we will reinforce deterrence by denial so that all nations recognize that their
interests are best served through peace and restraint. This is how we will establish a position
of military strength from which President Trump can negotiate favorable terms for our
nation. We will be strong but not unnecessarily confrontational. This is how we will help to
turn President Trump’s vision for peace through strength into reality in the vital Indo-Pacific.
► Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. Ours is not a strategy of isolation.
As the NSS directs, it is one of focused engagement abroad with a clear eye toward
advancing the concrete, practical interests of Americans. Through this America First,
commonsense lens, America’s alliances and partners have an essential role to play—but not
as the dependencies of the last generation. Rather, as the Department rightly prioritizes
Homeland defense and deterring China, other threats will persist, and our allies will be
essential to dealing with all of them. Our allies will do so not as a favor to us, but out of their
own interests. In the Indo-Pacific, where our allies share our desire for a free and open
regional order, allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing
China. In Europe and other theaters, allies will take the lead against threats that are less
severe for us but more so for them, with critical but more limited support from the United
States.
In all cases, we will be honest but clear about the urgent need for them to do their part and
that it is in their own interests to do so without delay. We will incentivize and enable them to
step up. This requires a change in tone and style from the past, but that is necessary not only
for Americans but also for our allies and partners. For too long, allies and partners have been
content to let us subsidize their defense. Our political establishment reaped the credit while
regular Americans paid the bill. With President Trump, a new approach is in effect. Already,
President Trump has set a new global standard for defense spending at NATO’s Hague
Summit—3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on core military spending and an additional
1.5% on security-related spending, for a total of 5% of GDP. We will advocate that our allies
and partners meet this standard around the world, not just in Europe. As our allies do so,
together with the United States, they will be able to field the forces required to deter or defeat
potential adversaries in every key region of the world, even in the face of simultaneous
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aggression. This is how we will set conditions for lasting peace through strength around the
world.
► Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. President Trump is leading a once-in-a-
century revival of American industry, re-shoring strategic industries to the United States and
revitalizing the industries previous generations had shipped overseas. We will harness this
historic initiative to rebuild our nation’s defense industry, which underpins our defense and
that of our allies and partners. We must return to being the world’s premier arsenal, one that
can produce not only for ourselves but also for our allies and partners at scale, rapidly, and at
the highest levels of quality. To achieve this, we will reinvest in U.S. defense production,
building out capacity; empowering innovators; adopting new advances in technology, like
artificial intelligence (AI); and clearing away outdated policies, practices, regulations, and
other obstacles to the type and scale of production that the Joint Force requires for the
priorities before us. We will simultaneously leverage allied and partner production not just to
meet our own requirements but also to incentivize them to increase defense spending and
help them field additional forces as quickly as possible. In the process, we will not only
ensure our own defense industrial advantage but also put our alliances on stronger footing so
that they can do their part to maintain peace through strength on a strong, equitable, and
enduring basis.
With the Department laser-focused on these priorities, we
will ensure that the Joint Force is ready to deter and, if
called upon, to prevail by achieving the nation’s objectives
against the most dangerous threats to Americans’ interests.
At the same time, this Strategy will enable the Joint Force
to provide President Trump with the operational flexibility
and agility required for other objectives, especially the
ability to launch decisive operations against targets
anywhere—including directly from the U.S. Homeland, as
America’s servicemembers so memorably demonstrated in
Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER. By ensuring that the
Joint Force is second to none, we will ensure the greatest
optionality for the President to employ America’s armed
forces.
The core logic of this Strategy, consistent with President
Trump’s historic and needed shift, is to put Americans’
interests first in a concrete and practical way. This requires
being clear-eyed about the threats that we face, as well as the resources available to both us and
our allies to confront them. It requires prioritizing what matters most for Americans and where
President Donald J. Trump salutes during the
Pentagon’s 9/11 Observance Ceremony on
September 11, 2025.
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the gravest and most consequential threats to their interests lie. It requires being honest and clear
with our allies and partners that they simply must do more rapidly, not as a favor to Americans
but for their own interests. This will entail a sharp shift—in approach, focus, and tone. But that is
what is needed to shift away from the legacy course headed for disaster and toward making
America great again. It is also the one that will set the conditions for lasting peace not only at
home but abroad—in other words, a better outcome not only for Americans but also for our allies
and partners. Out with utopian idealism; in with hardnosed realism. That is the mission we at
DoW must embrace—boldly, actively, and without hesitation.
President Trump is leading our nation into a new golden age. As he does, he speaks often about
restoring peace. But he is equally clear that we can only do so from a position of strength—
including, fundamentally, military strength. Only the Department of War can provide that power
to ensure that the nation’s interests are defended, and we will unapologetically do so. We will be
our nation’s sword and its shield, always ready to be wielded decisively at the President’s
direction, in service of his vision for lasting peace through strength. This National Defense
Strategy (NDS) shows how.
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