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Latin America is as varied as its peoples. What they appear to share in common is adaptation to the substantial changes in the forms, cultures, and cognitive cages within which the United States seeks to deal with its Hispano-Lusitanian-Indigenous neighbors.
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| Senator Henry Clay |
The response to these changes in national leadership socio-political cultural "personality" by its neighbors has been one of the great sports of regional history. It also serves to unmask the cognitive cages, trip wires and rationalizing predilections of those sovereign enterprises that must deal both with foreign merchants, adventurers, investors and traders, while sending out their own to their own ends.
On the one hand, Mexican leaders, through their President Claudia Sheinbaum, have adapted to these personality changes through a well developed process of flexibility that both mimics the ruling American archetype of a time and then reflecting it back in ways that serve the Mexican national interest. ("Vamos a llegar a un acuerdo con el gobierno de EUA; no se negocia nunca la soberanía de nuestro país: Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum" [We will reach an agreement with the US government; our country's sovereignty is never negotiable: President Claudia Sheinbaum]; also here and here). The power imbalances between Mexico and the U.S. of course shape the nature of that interaction, but they do not make it either impossible or of some value to the Mexican Republic, itself a powerful regional actor within its own sphere of primary operation. And of course, Mexican elites have the capacity of transactional merchant cultures that in some ways equal or sometimes exceed that of the merchant types of their northern neighbor. The point, though is that Mexican political elites tend to be in the flow of their neighbor, and have learned to exploit it to the extent possible from time to time. In the age of the merchant, in the time of the triumph of the transaction, Mexico might become a saavy merchant and its transactions can be both defensive and offensive. In the latter respect one need only consider the way Mexico leverages both regional power and serves as a counterbalancing conduit for principal tiers competitors of its North American neighbor--for the moment particularly in its relations with China (here).
On the other hand, Brazil, that other Latin American power, has tended to adopt a quite different approach. That difference, grounded in wariness and built on a need to preserve its cognitive borders (physically manifested, of course, through the State and its legal-administrative apparatus) against what it views as interference by foreigners, especially disfavored or ideologically threatening foreigners. If Mexico can flexibly move between the cognitive sensibilities of the merchant and the official, Brazil appears less able or willing to do so. Probably less willing given its won development of a political culture around which the State apparatus has been built. In the current era, wariness of the United States--whether in its apparent in the cultures of the official or the merchant--runs deep, and to some extent is both ideological and personal in a way the dogmatics of which are more powerful than in either the United States or Mexico. One might start the current history of those dogmatics from the time that Brazil helped spearhead the demise of the U.S. based Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2008 (an irony, really, considering the enthusiasm, less than half a generation later, for the arrangements of the Chinese Belt & Toad Initiative). But that speaks to ideology as well as economic interest--and to an attachment of Brazil (though not necessarily its masses beyond the intellectuals and officials) for European and "South" sensibilities over that of the North Americans. Fair enough, of course, and one, at least among segments of its intelligentsia long cultivated by deep connections with Cuban political ideology and European intellectual currents.
The differences between Mexico and Brazil then tend to be quite showy, especially in moments of transition or crisis (both in the United States an in Brazil or Mexico). The showiest element, and the core triggering element of transactional discourse in both states touches on sovereignty. Like every other Latin American State, the issue of sovereignty, its discourse, and the way in which it is made meaningful in culture, politics, and economics, is central to the way in which States approach their relations with others. Sovereignty, in this sense acquires a profoundly semiotic and cognitive character. It is an object that incarnates the ideal of the State, but at the same time it is a way in which the State's ideal acquires significance, and through this signification (what does sovereignty mean in context and with respect to specific relations) it may be applied or interpreted expressed in the actions and policies of the State, as well as in the form of a conceptual framework within which it is possible to understand and abide by the "rules" and limits of actions that trigger taboo negative impacts on sovereignty. But the practice of sovereignty, that is, the way that sovereignty is articulated, and thus articulated manifested as a form of that articulation, is also a function of the history and national context in which it may be applied--even where the national feeling (the patriotic solidarity) among states may be viewed as equivalent. Mexican sovereignty, in this sense, is largely internalized. It is expressed within the self conception, and thus the action drivers, of its collective organs. Might it be possible to suggest that Brazilian sovereignty is more visible an an externalized force--projected outward through the expressions of an ideology of sovereign prerogative in law and discretionary actions leveraged outward bit applied to those invited in. Mexican sovereignty can thus be expressed in and as transactions in a way that would be difficult for their Brazilian counterparts, for which a more formal legal-administrative language of the culture of the official (rather than the merchant) predominates. No judgment here--either works--but it makes sense to acquire some sort of understanding of the language and cognitive frameworks within which relationships might be approached with either or both.
It is no surprise, then, that as President Sheinbaum negotiates, President Lula da Silva--ironically taking a page from the Executive playbook of President Trump, though within the cultural spaces of Brazilian approaches to these things--exercises administrative discretion within an apparatus of state. The result is inevitable--for Mexico the challenge of bargaining for a good deal; for Brazil, the start of a chess game of opposition and regulatory (as well as discursive) stances.
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Monday signed the decree regulating the Trade Reciprocity Law, Chief of Staff Rui Costa confirmed in a statement from the Planalto Palace. The measure is to be published in a regular edition of the Federal Diário Oficial da União (Official Gazette - DOU). The new rule authorizes the Brazilian government to adopt trade measures against countries that impose unilateral barriers on Brazilian products in the global market. It could be used to respond to the 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States (US) as of August 1, as announced last week by US President Donald Trump. (HERE)
More specifically, the "Economic Reciprocity Law, approved by the Brazilian Congress in April and now formally implemented, allows the government to suspend trade concessions, investments and even intellectual property rights of countries that impose unilateral measures against Brazilian interests." (Here). To that end, President Lula da Silva promulgated DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025. The Decree establishes an Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures, of a deliberative and executive nature, under the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services. The Committee is authorized to consider adoption of provisional countermeasures referred to in Art. 6 of Law No. 15,122, of April 11, 2025; and to monitor negotiations to overcome unilaterally imposed measures detrimental to Brazil's international competitiveness. Chapter IV sets out the procedures for the adoption of provisional countermeasures and is worth a read.
Neither the Apil 2025 Law nor its implementaiton within the structures of a State organ vested with substantial (though interlinked) discretionary authority is unexpected, nor aberrational within the cultural cultures and approaches of Brazil's elites. It is just interesting to see how, in context, it may play out for the moment. Again, there is a measure of the personal, the cultural and the political that spices things up. President Trump favors the mortal enemy of President Lula da Silva, who suffered personally (as well as politically including his protege) at the hands of former President Jair Bolsonaro. And internet content oozing into (or from) Brazil on matters related to that feuding--including in its judicial forms--has irritated an influential sector of Brazilian leadership and raised old sensibilities anew. President Trump has also been a bit aggressive in response to the provocative (though not unexpected) discourse emerging from the BRICS summit of a few weeks ago.
Although the decree does not mention the U.S., its publication on Tuesday is widely seen as a response to the tariff escalation pushed by Trump, who framed the sanctions as a response to a Supreme Court case against former President Jair Bolsonaro, calling it a "witch hunt." On Monday, Brazil’s Office of the Prosecutor General recommended Bolsonaro’s conviction, along with seven others, for attempting a coup d’état. The new law applies in three scenarios: when a foreign country interferes in Brazil’s sovereign decisions, violates existing trade agreements or imposes environmental restrictions stricter than Brazil’s legislation. That includes, for instance, unilateral barriers on Brazilian commodity imports based on non-negotiated environmental standards. (Here).
One does not negotiate--one responds, formally and through the instrumentalities of State and law. ""Now the country has a legitimate and autonomous legal tool to respond more effectively to unfair trade practices,” he said. “Responses can be faster, more coordinated and based on objective criteria. That strengthens both the legal and political legitimacy of any retaliation, even before international bodies.”" .(Here quoting Igor Machado, a tax attorney at São Paulo-based firm Meirelles Costa Advogados). Early in the return of President Trump to Office, Welber Barral, a partner at the consultancy BMJ and Brazil’s foreign trade secretary from 2007 to 2011,explained the fundamental approach: "For trade policymakers in capitals everywhere, the issue is no longer whether to retaliate, but how to do so wisely. A poorly calibrated countermeasure risks harming domestic industries more than its intended target, while a well-crafted response can tilt the scales back toward negotiation." (here)
None of this is good or bad; it just is in the sense that it both reveals the nature and imperatives of cognitive cages and also the way that those cages make responses both inevitable and predictable. In the process it also serves as a reminder that cognition helps shape the way that people and collectives view, understand and respond to each other, that discourse sometimes provides a glimpse into the mindset that propels those relations, and that this knowledge can either be exploited or produces sometimes unfortunate though not unforeseen consequences. In this case, it is likely that the personal and the ideological shape U.S. Brazil relations in ways that are not transposable to the U.S. Mexican relationship. It is likely to endure until President Lula da Silva and Trump's time in office (and that of the leaders in their factions) disappear from the scene. But that is years in the future. And there is much to be learned from the Brazilian legal architecture in a world that is increasingly redefined by layered hub and spoke platforms of economic-political relations with the two apex powers at the top. All states eventually will have to make a space for themselves somewhere in this layered universe of functionally and politically differentiated global platforms. Brazil provides one approach; Mexico another, and both in the shadow of the structural frameworks developed by China and the United States.
And, of course, this is a U.S. Administration that is always eager to engage in leader play in the style of merchants negotiating transactions; President Lula da Silva, of course, will return the fvor, but in the style of the ideologiocally committed official thinking in terms of institutions and jurisdictional prerogatives seeking a positive stable state. The two styles are unlikely to align--and that may be the preference of both actors. And thus the American move:
Today, the Office of the United States Trade Representative initiated an investigation of Brazil under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The investigation will seek to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Brazil related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption interference; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.
“At President Trump’s direction, I am launching a Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s attacks on American social media companies as well as other unfair trading practices that harm American companies, workers, farmers, and technology innovators,” said Ambassador Greer. “USTR has detailed Brazil’s unfair trade practices that restrict the ability of U.S. exporters to access its market for decades in the annual National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report. After consulting with other government agencies, cleared advisers, and Congress, I have determined that Brazil’s tariff and non-tariff barriers merit a thorough investigation, and potentially, responsive action." (Office of the US TRade Representative)
The language is one of disadvantageous tariffs on the U.S. side. "Greer accused Brazil of disadvantaging American exports by offering lower tariffs to other trade partners. Investigators will look into alleged attempts by Brazil to penalise US companies involved in digital trade and services for not censoring political speech." (BBC)
The text of Lei nº 15.122 de 11 de abril de 2025 and of DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025 follow below in the original Portuguese and in a crude English translation. The Statement of the U.S. Trade Representative of 15 July, Brazil’s Unfair Trading Practices, also follows below.
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Presidência da República |
LEI Nº 15.122, DE 11 DE ABRIL DE 2025
| Regulamento |
Estabelece critérios para suspensão de concessões comerciais, de investimentos e de obrigações relativas a direitos de propriedade intelectual em resposta a medidas unilaterais adotadas por país ou bloco econômico que impactem negativamente a competitividade internacional brasileira; e dá outras providências. |
O PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA Faço saber que o Congresso Nacional decreta e eu sanciono a seguinte Lei:
Art. 1º Esta Lei estabelece critérios para a suspensão de concessões comerciais, de investimentos e de obrigações relativas a direitos de propriedade intelectual, pelo Poder Executivo e em coordenação com o setor privado, em resposta a ações, políticas ou práticas unilaterais de país ou bloco econômico que impactem negativamente a competitividade internacional brasileira.
Art. 2º Esta Lei aplica-se na hipótese de adoção, por país ou bloco econômico, de ações, políticas ou práticas que:
I – interfiram nas escolhas legítimas e soberanas do Brasil, procurando impedir ou obter a cessação, a modificação ou a adoção de ato específico ou de práticas no Brasil, por meio da aplicação ou da ameaça de aplicação unilateral de medidas comerciais, financeiras ou de investimentos;
II – violem ou sejam inconsistentes com as disposições de acordos comerciais ou, de outra forma, neguem, anulem ou prejudiquem benefícios ao Brasil sob qualquer acordo comercial;
III – configurem medidas unilaterais com base em requisitos ambientais que sejam mais onerosos do que os parâmetros, as normas e os padrões de proteção ambiental adotados pelo Brasil.
Parágrafo único. Para a caracterização do disposto no inciso III deste artigo, serão considerados:
I – as respectivas capacidades do país ou do bloco econômico, nos termos do Acordo de Paris, promulgado pelo Decreto nº 9.073, de 5 de junho de 2017;
II – os seguintes parâmetros, normas e padrões de proteção ambiental adotados pelo Brasil:
a) a Lei nº 12.651, de 25 de maio de 2012 (Código Florestal);
b) as metas estabelecidas na Lei nº 12.187, de 29 de dezembro de 2009, que institui a Política Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima;
c) as metas estabelecidas na Lei nº 6.938, de 31 de agosto de 1981, que dispõe sobre a Política Nacional do Meio Ambiente;
d) os compromissos nacionalmente determinados no âmbito do Acordo de Paris;
e) os atributos específicos do sistema produtivo brasileiro, tais como a elevada taxa de energia renovável nas matrizes elétrica e energética, ou particularidades e diferenciais ambientais brasileiros;
f) outros requisitos ambientais aplicáveis.
Art. 3º O Poder Executivo está autorizado a adotar contramedidas na forma de restrição às importações de bens e serviços ou medidas de suspensão de concessões comerciais, de investimento e de obrigações relativas a direitos de propriedade intelectual e medidas de suspensão de outras obrigações previstas em qualquer acordo comercial do País, nos termos desta Lei.
§ 1º As contramedidas previstas no caput podem incluir, de forma isolada ou cumulativamente:
I – a imposição de direito de natureza comercial incidente sobre importações de bens ou de serviços de país ou bloco econômico de que trata o art. 2º desta Lei;
II – a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações do País relativas a direitos de propriedade intelectual, nos termos dos arts. 2º a 8º da Lei nº 12.270, de 24 de junho de 2010;
III – outras medidas de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações do País previstas em quaisquer acordos comerciais de que o Brasil faça parte.
§ 2º As contramedidas previstas no caput deste artigo deverão ser, na medida do possível, proporcionais ao impacto econômico causado pelas ações, políticas ou práticas referidas no art. 2º.
§ 3º Sem prejuízo do disposto no § 2º, a adoção das contramedidas previstas no caput deste artigo deverá buscar minimizar o impacto sobre a atividade econômica e evitar ônus e custos administrativos desproporcionais.
Art. 4º Consultas diplomáticas serão realizadas com vistas a mitigar ou anular os efeitos das medidas e contramedidas de que trata esta Lei.
Art. 5º As etapas para a implementação do disposto nos arts. 2º e 3º serão estabelecidas em regulamento, que deverá prever, entre outras disposições:
I – a realização de consultas públicas para a manifestação das partes interessadas;
II – a determinação de prazos para análise do pleito específico;
III – a sugestão de contramedidas.
Parágrafo único. A contramedida de que trata o inciso II do § 1º do art. 3º deve ser utilizada em caráter excepcional, quando as demais contramedidas previstas nesta Lei forem consideradas inadequadas para reverter as ações, políticas ou práticas de que trata o art. 2º.
Art. 6º Em casos excepcionais, é o Poder Executivo autorizado a adotar contramedida provisória, válida ao longo da realização das etapas de que trata o art. 5º desta Lei.
Art. 7º O Poder Executivo estabelecerá mecanismos para monitorar periodicamente os efeitos das contramedidas adotadas com fundamento nesta Lei e a evolução das negociações diplomáticas com vistas a mitigar ou anular os efeitos das medidas e contramedidas de que trata esta Lei.
Art. 8º O Poder Executivo está autorizado a alterar ou suspender as contramedidas previstas no art. 3º, considerando o monitoramento e as negociações de que trata o art. 7º.
Art. 9º Não se aplica o disposto no § 1º do art. 10 da Lei nº 14.195, de 26 de agosto de 2021, na hipótese excepcional em que a proposta de edição ou de alteração de ato normativo preveja a imposição de licenças ou de autorizações como requisito para importações e decorra de decisão do Poder Executivo fundamentada nesta Lei.
Art. 10. É facultado ao Poder Executivo adotar alíquota distinta da que trata o § 4º do art. 2º da Lei nº 10.168, de 29 de dezembro de 2000, em razão de decisão fundamentada nesta Lei.
Art. 11. A alíquota de que trata o § 2º do art. 33 da Medida Provisória nº 2.228-1, de 6 de setembro de 2001, poderá ser alterada em razão de decisão do Poder Executivo fundamentada nesta Lei.
Art. 12. Esta Lei entra em vigor na data de sua publicação.
Brasília, 11 de abril de 2025; 204º da Independência e 137º da República.
LUIZ
INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA
Fernando Haddad
Geraldo José Rodrigues Alckmin Filho
Maria Laura da Rocha
Este texto não substitui o publicado no DOU de 14.4.2025.
Presidency of the RepublicChief of Staff
Special Secretariat for Legal Affairs
ACT No. 15,122, OF APRIL 11, 2025
Regulation
Establishes criteria for the suspension of commercial concessions, investments, and obligations related to intellectual property rights in response to unilateral measures adopted by a country or economic bloc that negatively impact Brazil's international competitiveness; and provides other measures.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC I hereby make it known that the National Congress decrees and I hereby sanction the following Law:
Art. 1. This Law establishes criteria for the suspension of commercial concessions, investments, and obligations related to intellectual property rights, by the Executive Branch and in coordination with the private sector, in response to unilateral actions, policies, or practices of a country or economic bloc that negatively impact Brazil's international competitiveness.
Art. 2. This Law applies in the event of the adoption, by a country or economic bloc, of actions, policies, or practices that:
I – interfere with Brazil's legitimate and sovereign choices, seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification, or adoption of specific acts or practices in Brazil, through the application or threat of unilateral application of trade, financial, or investment measures;
II – violate or are inconsistent with the provisions of trade agreements or otherwise deny, nullify, or impair benefits to Brazil under any trade agreement;
III – constitute unilateral measures based on environmental requirements that are more onerous than the parameters, norms, and standards of environmental protection adopted by Brazil.
Sole Paragraph. To characterize the provisions of item III of this article, the following shall be considered:
I – the respective capacities of the country or economic bloc, under the terms of the Paris Agreement, enacted by Decree No. 9,073 of June 5, 2017;
II – the following environmental protection parameters, norms, and standards adopted by Brazil:
a) Law No. 12,651 of May 25, 2012 (Forest Code);
b) the goals established in Law No. 12,187 of December 29, 2009, which establishes the National Policy on Climate Change;
c) the goals established in Law No. 6,938 of August 31, 1981, which establishes the National Environmental Policy;
d) nationally determined commitments under the Paris Agreement;
e) the specific attributes of the Brazilian production system, such as the high rate of renewable energy in the electricity and energy matrices, or Brazilian environmental characteristics and differentials;
f) other applicable environmental requirements.
Art. 3. The Executive Branch is authorized to adopt countermeasures in the form of restrictions on the import of goods and services or measures suspending commercial concessions, investment concessions, and obligations related to intellectual property rights, as well as measures suspending other obligations provided for in any Brazilian trade agreement, pursuant to this Law.
§ 1. The countermeasures provided for in the caput may include, individually or cumulatively:
I – the imposition of a commercial duty on imports of goods or services from a country or economic bloc referred to in Art. 2 of this Law;
II – the suspension of concessions or other obligations of the country related to intellectual property rights, pursuant to Articles 2 to 8 of Law No. 12,270 of June 24, 2010;
III – other measures suspending concessions or other obligations of the country provided for in any trade agreements to which Brazil is a party.
§ 2. The countermeasures provided for in the caput of this article shall be, to the extent possible, proportional to the economic impact caused by the actions, policies, or practices referred to in Article 2.
§ 3. Without prejudice to the provisions of § 2, the adoption of the countermeasures provided for in the caput of this article shall seek to minimize the impact on economic activity and avoid disproportionate administrative burdens and costs.
Article 4. Diplomatic consultations shall be held with a view to mitigating or nullifying the effects of the measures and countermeasures set forth in this Law.
Article 5. The steps for implementing the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 shall be established in regulations, which shall provide, among other provisions:
I – the holding of public consultations for the expression of interested parties;
II – the determination of deadlines for the analysis of the specific request;
III – the suggestion of countermeasures.
Sole paragraph. The countermeasure referred to in item II of § 1 of art. 3 must be used exceptionally, when the other countermeasures provided for in this Law are considered inadequate to reverse the actions, policies, or practices referred to in art. 2.
Art. 6. In exceptional cases, the Executive Branch is authorized to adopt a provisional countermeasure, valid throughout the implementation of the steps referred to in art. 5 of this Law.
Art. 7. The Executive Branch shall establish mechanisms to periodically monitor the effects of the countermeasures adopted under this Law and the progress of diplomatic negotiations with a view to mitigating or nullifying the effects of the measures and countermeasures set forth in this Law.
8. The Executive Branch is authorized to amend or suspend the countermeasures provided for in Article 3, taking into account the monitoring and negotiations set forth in Article 7.
9. The provisions of Article 10, § 1, of Law No. 14,195 of August 26, 2021, do not apply in the exceptional case where the proposed enactment or amendment of a regulatory act provides for the imposition of licenses or authorizations as a requirement for imports and is the result of a decision of the Executive Branch based on this Law.
Article 10. The Executive Branch is authorized to adopt a tax rate different from that set forth in Article 10, § 4. 2 of Law No. 10,168 of December 29, 2000, based on a decision based on this Law.
Art. 11. The tax rate referred to in § 2 of art. 33 of Provisional Measure No. 2,228-1 of September 6, 2001, may be changed based on a decision of the Executive Branch based on this Law.
Art. 12. This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication.
Brasília, April 11, 2025; the 204th anniversary of Independence and the 137th anniversary of the Republic.
LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA
Fernando Haddad
Geraldo José Rodrigues Alckmin Filho
Maria Laura da Rocha
This text does not replace that published in the Official Gazette of April 14, 2025.
Presidência da República
Casa Civil
Secretaria Especial para Assuntos Jurídicos
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Regulamenta a Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, que estabelece critérios para suspensão de concessões comerciais, de investimentos e de obrigações relativas a direitos de propriedade intelectual em resposta a medidas unilaterais adotadas por país ou bloco econômico que impactem negativamente a competitividade internacional brasileira. |
O PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA, no uso da atribuição que lhe confere o art. 84, caput, inciso IV, da Constituição, e tendo em vista o disposto na Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025,
DECRETA:
CAPÍTULO I
DISPOSIÇÕES PRELIMINARES
Art. 1º Este Decreto regulamenta a Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, que estabelece critérios para suspensão de concessões comerciais, de investimentos e de obrigações relativas a direitos de propriedade intelectual em resposta a medidas unilaterais adotadas por país ou bloco econômico que impactem negativamente a competitividade internacional brasileira.
CAPÍTULO II
DO COMITÊ INTERMINISTERIAL DE NEGOCIAÇÃO E CONTRAMEDIDAS ECONÔMICAS E COMERCIAIS
Art. 2º Fica instituído o Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais, de natureza deliberativa e executiva, vinculado ao Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços, com competência para:
I - deliberar sobre a possibilidade de adoção das contramedidas provisórias de que trata o art. 6º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025; e
II - acompanhar as negociações para a superação das medidas unilateralmente impostas em detrimento da competividade internacional brasileira.
Art. 3º O Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais será composto pelos seguintes membros:
I - Ministro de Estado do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços, que o presidirá;
II - Ministro de Estado da Casa Civil da Presidência da República;
III - Ministro de Estado da Fazenda; e
IV - Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores.
§ 1º Em suas ausências e seus impedimentos, os Ministros de Estado de que trata o caput poderão ser representados no Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais por seus substitutos legais.
§ 2º A Secretaria-Executiva do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais será exercida pela Secretaria-Executiva do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços.
§ 3º O quórum de reunião e de aprovação do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais é de maioria simples.
§ 4º Na hipótese de empate, além do voto ordinário, o Presidente do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais terá o voto de qualidade.
§ 5º Poderão ser convidados para participar das reuniões do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais outros Ministros de Estado, conforme a pertinência temática das matérias em exame.
CAPÍTULO III
DOS LEGITIMADOS PARA A PROPOSIÇÃO DA ADOÇÃO DAS CONTRAMEDIDAS
Art. 4º São legitimados para a proposição do pleito de adoção das contramedidas de que trata a Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025:
I - os membros do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais; e
II - os membros do Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Câmara de Comércio Exterior – Camex.
CAPÍTULO IV
DO RITO DAS CONTRAMEDIDAS PROVISÓRIAS
Art. 5º O pleito a ser proposto ao Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais deverá conter justificativa preliminar quanto à excepcionalidade para adoção de contramedidas provisórias com fundamento nos art. 2º e art. 6º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 abril de 2025.
Art. 6º A Secretaria-Executiva do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais compartilhará o pleito recebido com:
I - o Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços, para:
a) avaliação dos efeitos comerciais e setoriais das medidas unilaterais sobre a competitividade dos setores produtivos nacionais; e
b) proposição, quando cabível, de contramedidas provisórias a serem adotadas;
II - o Ministério das Relações Exteriores, para:
a) análise dos efeitos das medidas unilaterais sobre as relações diplomáticas, bem como a violação de eventuais compromissos internacionais firmados com a República Federativa do Brasil; e
b) proposição, quando cabível, de contramedidas provisórias a serem adotadas;
III - o Ministério da Fazenda, para:
a) avaliação dos efeitos econômicos das medidas unilaterais sobre a competitividade dos setores produtivos nacionais; e
b) proposição, quando cabível, de contramedidas provisórias a serem adotadas.
Parágrafo único. A Secretaria-Executiva do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais poderá ouvir representantes do setor privado e outros órgãos da administração pública federal com competências relativas à matéria.
Art. 7º Concluído o procedimento de que trata o art. 6º, a Secretaria-Executiva do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais submeterá à deliberação de seus membros proposição de adoção das contramedidas provisórias de que trata o art. 6º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025.
Art. 8º Aprovada a contramedida, por meio de resolução, o Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais adotará as medidas necessárias à sua implementação.
§ 1º Na hipótese de adoção de contramedidas provisórias previstas no caput, será iniciada a tramitação ordinária do processo de deliberação sobre as contramedidas definitivas com fundamento na proposição do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais, dispensadas as etapas previstas nos art. 9º a art. 11.
§ 2º O Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais poderá determinar a adoção, a alteração ou a suspensão das contramedidas provisórias a qualquer tempo.
CAPÍTULO V
DO RITO DAS CONTRAMEDIDAS ORDINÁRIAS
Art. 9º O pleito de adoção das contramedidas de que tratam os art. 3º, art. 9º, art. 10 e art. 11 da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, deverá ser encaminhado, por escrito, à Secretaria-Executiva da Camex, com:
I - indicação das medidas unilaterais adotadas por outro país ou bloco econômico que impactem negativamente a competitividade internacional brasileira e seu enquadramento nas hipóteses previstas no art. 2º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025;
II - designação dos setores econômicos afetados na República Federativa do Brasil; e
III - estimativa do impacto econômico causado pelas ações, políticas ou práticas referidas no inciso I.
Art. 10. A Secretaria-Executiva da Camex compartilhará o pleito com os membros do Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex, e poderá ouvir outros órgãos da administração pública federal com competências relativas à matéria.
Art. 11. Compete à Secretaria-Executiva da Camex elaborar, em coordenação com os membros do Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex e com os demais órgãos da administração pública federal com competências relativas à matéria objeto do pleito, no prazo de até trinta dias, prorrogável por igual período, o relatório sobre o enquadramento nas hipóteses previstas no art. 2º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, e encaminhá-lo para deliberação do Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex.
Parágrafo único. O Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex deliberará, no prazo de até trinta dias, prorrogável por igual período, sobre o enquadramento do pleito nas hipóteses previstas no art. 2º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, e a consequente possibilidade de adoção das contramedidas.
Art. 12. Na hipótese de determinação positiva sobre o enquadramento do pleito nas hipóteses previstas no art. 2º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, poderá ser instituído grupo de trabalho coordenado pela Camex e integrado por representantes de todos os seus membros para elaboração de proposição das contramedidas aplicáveis.
§ 1º Poderão ser convidados para participar das reuniões do grupo de trabalho de que trata o caput representantes:
I - dos orgãos da administração pública federal com competências relativas à matéria; e
II - do setor privado.
§ 2º O grupo de trabalho apresentará proposição de contramedidas para deliberação do Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex e posterior envio ao Conselho Estratégico da Camex.
Art. 13. Proposta preliminar de adoção de contramedidas será submetida pelo Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex à consulta pública, pelo prazo de até trinta dias, com o objetivo de obter manifestações de partes interessadas e de parceiros comerciais potencialmente afetados.
Parágrafo único. Poderão ser realizadas consultas públicas adicionais a critério do Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex.
Art. 14. Encerrada a consulta pública ou concluídas as atividades do grupo de trabalho de que trata o art. 12, a Secretaria-Executiva da Camex submeterá a proposição de contramedida à deliberação do Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex.
Art. 15. Compete ao Conselho Estratégico da Camex deliberar pela adoção das contramedidas de que tratam os art. 3º, art. 9º, art. 10 e art. 11 da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, no prazo de sessenta dias, prorrogável por igual período, contado da data de seu encaminhamento pelo Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex.
Parágrafo único. A adoção das contramedidas de que trata o caput poderá ser adiada pelo Conselho Estratégico da Camex, a depender da evolução das negociações diplomáticas de que trata o art. 4º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025.
CAPÍTULO VI
DAS CONSULTAS DIPLOMÁTICAS E DO MONITORAMENTO DOS EFEITOS DAS CONTRAMEDIDAS
Art. 16. A partir do compartilhamento do pleito pela Secretaria-Executiva da Camex ou, na hipótese de contramedida provisória, pela Secretaria-Executiva do Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores notificará o parceiro comercial afetado em cada fase do processo, especialmente na adoção de contramedidas, e iniciará as consultas diplomáticas de que trata o art. 4º da Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025.
Art. 17. O Ministério das Relações Exteriores realizará consultas diplomáticas, em coordenação com o Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços, ouvidos, quando cabível, os demais órgãos integrantes da Camex com competências relativas à matéria, com vistas a mitigar ou anular os efeitos das medidas adotadas pelo parceiro comercial e das contramedidas em vigor.
Art. 18. O Ministério das Relações Exteriores apresentará ao Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex, periodicamente, relatório sobre a evolução das negociações diplomáticas.
Art. 19. A Secretaria-Executiva da Camex solicitará, periodicamente, aos órgãos competentes relatórios do monitoramento dos efeitos das contramedidas adotadas com fundamento na Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, e os submeterá ao Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex.
Art. 20. O Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex poderá submeter ao Conselho Estratégico da Camex proposição de alteração ou suspensão das contramedidas definitivas a qualquer tempo.
Parágrafo único. O Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex poderá instituir grupo de trabalho para a elaboração de proposição de alteração ou suspensão de contramedida em vigor.
CAPÍTULO VII
DISPOSIÇÕES FINAIS
Art. 21. O Conselho Estratégico da Camex, o Comitê-Executivo de Gestão da Camex e o Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais poderão editar normas complementares ao disposto neste Decreto, no âmbito de suas competências.
Art. 22. Este Decreto entra em vigor na data de sua publicação.
Brasília, 14 de julho de 2025; 204º da Independência e 137º da República.
LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA
Geraldo José Rodrigues Alckmin Filho
Maria Laura da Rocha
Este texto não substitui o publicado no DOU de 15.7.2025.
Presidency of the Republic
Chief of Staff
Special Secretariat for Legal Affairs
DECREE No. 12,551, OF JULY 14, 2025
Regulates Law No. 15,122, of April 11, 2025, which establishes criteria for the suspension of commercial concessions, investments, and obligations related to intellectual property rights in response to unilateral measures adopted by a country or economic bloc that negatively impact Brazil's international competitiveness.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by art. 84, caput, section IV, of the Constitution, and in view of the provisions of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025,
DECREES:
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Art. 1 This Decree regulates Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, which establishes criteria for the suspension of commercial concessions, investments, and obligations related to intellectual property rights in response to unilateral measures adopted by a country or economic bloc that negatively impact Brazil's international competitiveness.
CHAPTER II
ON THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ECONOMIC AND TRADE COUNTERMEASURES
Art. 2. The Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures, of a deliberative and executive nature, is hereby established, under the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services, with the authority to:
I - deliberate on the possibility of adopting the provisional countermeasures referred to in Art. 6 of Law No. 15,122, of April 11, 2025; and
II - monitor negotiations to overcome unilaterally imposed measures detrimental to Brazil's international competitiveness.
Art. 3. The Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures shall be composed of the following members:
I - Minister of State for Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services, who shall preside;
II - Minister of State for the Chief of Staff of the Presidency of the Republic;
III - Minister of Finance; and
IV - Minister of Foreign Affairs.
§ 1. In their absence or impediment, the Ministers of State referred to in the caput may be represented on the Interministerial Committee for Negotiations and Economic and Trade Countermeasures by their legal substitutes.
§ 2. The Executive Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for Negotiations and Economic and Trade Countermeasures shall be held by the Executive Secretariat of the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services.
§ 3. The quorum for meetings and approval of the Interministerial Committee for Negotiations and Economic and Trade Countermeasures shall be a simple majority.
§ 4. In the event of a tie, in addition to the ordinary vote, the President of the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiations and Countermeasures shall have the casting vote.
§ 5. Other Ministers of State may be invited to participate in meetings of the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiations and Countermeasures, depending on the thematic relevance of the matters under review.
CHAPTER III
PERSONS ENTITLED TO PROPOSE THE ADOPTION OF COUNTERMEASURES
Art. 4. The following are entitled to propose the adoption of the countermeasures referred to in Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025:
I - the members of the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiations and Countermeasures; and
II - the members of the Executive Management Committee of the Foreign Trade Chamber (Camex).
CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL COUNTERMEASURES
Art. 5. The request to be submitted to the Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures must contain a preliminary justification regarding the exceptionality of the adoption of provisional countermeasures based on Articles 2 and 6 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025.
Art. 6. The Executive Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures will share the received request with:
I - the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services, for:
a) evaluation of the commercial and sectoral effects of unilateral measures on the competitiveness of national production sectors; and
b) propose, when applicable, provisional countermeasures to be adopted;
II - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to:
a) analyze the effects of unilateral measures on diplomatic relations, as well as the violation of any international commitments signed with the Federative Republic of Brazil; and
b) propose, when applicable, provisional countermeasures to be adopted;
III - the Ministry of Finance, to:
a) evaluate the economic effects of unilateral measures on the competitiveness of national production sectors; and
b) propose, when applicable, provisional countermeasures to be adopted.
Sole paragraph. The Executive Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiations and Countermeasures may consult with representatives of the private sector and other bodies. of the federal public administration with powers related to the matter.
Art. 7. Once the procedure set forth in Art. 6 has been completed, the Executive Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiations and Countermeasures shall submit to its members for deliberation a proposal for the adoption of the provisional countermeasures set forth in Art. 6 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025.
Art. 8. Once the countermeasure is approved by resolution, the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiations and Countermeasures shall adopt the measures necessary for its implementation.
§ 1. In the event of the adoption of provisional countermeasures provided for in the caput, the ordinary deliberation process on the definitive countermeasures will begin based on the proposal of the Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures, waiving the steps provided for in Articles 9 to 11.
§ 2. The Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures may determine the adoption, modification, or suspension of provisional countermeasures at any time.
CHAPTER V
ON THE PROCEDURE FOR ORDINARY COUNTERMEASURES
Art. 9. The request for the adoption of the countermeasures referred to in Articles 3, 9, 10, and 11 shall be subject to review. 11 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, must be submitted in writing to the Camex Executive Secretariat, along with:
I - indication of the unilateral measures adopted by another country or economic bloc that negatively impact Brazil's international competitiveness and their classification under the circumstances set forth in Article 2 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025;
II - designation of the affected economic sectors in the Federative Republic of Brazil; and
III - estimate of the economic impact caused by the actions, policies, or practices referred to in item I.
Art. 10. The Camex Executive Secretariat will share the request with the members of the Camex Executive Management Committee and may consult with other federal government agencies with jurisdiction over the matter.
Art. 11. The Camex Executive Secretariat, in coordination with the members of the Camex Executive Management Committee and other federal government agencies with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the request, shall prepare, within a period of up to thirty days, extendable for an equal period, a report on the classification of the cases provided for in Article 2 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, and submit it for deliberation to the Camex Executive Management Committee.
Sole paragraph. The Camex Executive Management Committee shall deliberate, within a period of up to thirty days, extendable for an equal period, on the classification of the request under the cases provided for in Article 2 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, and the consequent possibility of adopting countermeasures.
Art. 12. In the event of a positive determination regarding the classification of the claim under the circumstances provided for in Art. 2 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, a working group coordinated by Camex and composed of representatives of all its members may be established to prepare proposals for applicable countermeasures.
§ 1. Representatives may be invited to participate in the working group meetings referred to in the caput:
I - Federal public administration agencies with jurisdiction over the matter; and
II - The private sector.
§ 2. The working group will present proposed countermeasures for deliberation by the Camex Executive Management Committee and subsequent submission to the Camex Strategic Council.
Art. 13. The Camex Executive Management Committee will submit a preliminary proposal for the adoption of countermeasures for public consultation for up to thirty days, with the aim of obtaining feedback from potentially affected stakeholders and business partners.
Sole paragraph. Additional public consultations may be held at the discretion of the Camex Executive Management Committee.
Art. 14. Once the public consultation is concluded or the activities of the working group referred to in Art. 12 are completed, the Camex Executive Secretariat will submit the proposed countermeasure to the Camex Executive Management Committee for consideration.
Art. 15. The Camex Strategic Council shall be responsible for deciding on the adoption of the countermeasures referred to in Art. 3, Art. 9, Art. 10, and Art. 11 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, within sixty days, extendable for the same period, from the date of its submission by the Camex Executive Management Committee.
Sole paragraph. The adoption of the countermeasures referred to in the caput may be postponed by the Camex Strategic Council, depending on the progress of the diplomatic negotiations referred to in Article 4 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025.
CHAPTER VI
DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS AND MONITORING OF THE EFFECTS OF COUNTERMEASURES
Article 16. Upon sharing the request with the Camex Executive Secretariat or, in the case of a provisional countermeasure, with the Executive Secretariat following the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiations and Countermeasures, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will notify the affected trading partner at each stage of the process, especially regarding the adoption of countermeasures, and will initiate diplomatic consultations as provided for in Article 4 of Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025.
Article 17. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will conduct diplomatic consultations, in coordination with the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services, and, when applicable, consult other Camex member bodies with relevant jurisdiction, with a view to mitigating or nullifying the effects of the measures adopted by the trading partner and the countermeasures in force.
Article 18. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will periodically submit a report on the progress of diplomatic negotiations to the Camex Executive Management Committee.
Art. 19. The Camex Executive Secretariat shall periodically request from the competent bodies reports on the monitoring of the effects of countermeasures adopted pursuant to Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, and shall submit them to the Camex Executive Management Committee.
Art. 20. The Camex Executive Management Committee may submit to the Camex Strategic Council a proposal to amend or suspend definitive countermeasures at any time.
Sole paragraph. The Camex Executive Management Committee may establish a working group to prepare a proposal to amend or suspend an existing countermeasure.
CHAPTER VII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Art. 21. The Camex Strategic Council, the Camex Management Executive Committee, and the Interministerial Committee for Economic and Trade Negotiation and Countermeasures may issue regulations supplementing the provisions of this Decree, within the scope of their powers.
Art. 22. This Decree shall come into force on the date of its publication.
Brasília, July 14, 2025; 204th anniversary of Independence and 137th anniversary of the Republic.
LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA
Geraldo José Rodrigues Alckmin Filho
Maria Laura da Rocha
This text does not replace that published in the Official Gazette of July 15, 2025.
July 15, 2025
WASHINGTON — Today, the Office of the United States Trade Representative initiated an investigation of Brazil under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The investigation will seek to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Brazil related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption interference; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.
“At President Trump’s direction, I am launching a Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s attacks on American social media companies as well as other unfair trading practices that harm American companies, workers, farmers, and technology innovators,” said Ambassador Greer. “USTR has detailed Brazil’s unfair trade practices that restrict the ability of U.S. exporters to access its market for decades in the annual National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report. After consulting with other government agencies, cleared advisers, and Congress, I have determined that Brazil’s tariff and non-tariff barriers merit a thorough investigation, and potentially, responsive action."
Background
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, (Trade Act) is designed to address unfair foreign practices affecting U.S. commerce. Section 301 may be used to respond to unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Under Section 302(b) of the Trade Act, the Trade Representative may self-initiate an investigation under Section 301.
A Section 301(b) investigation examines whether the acts, policies, or practices are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Considering the specific direction of the President, and the advice of the inter-agency Section 301 Committee, the United States Trade Representative has initiated an investigation. The U.S. Trade Representative must seek consultations with the foreign government whose acts, policies, or practices are under investigation. USTR has requested consultations with Brazil in connection with the investigation. USTR will hold a hearing in connection with this investigation on September 3, 2025. To be assured of consideration, interested persons should submit written comments, requests to appear at the hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by August 18, 2025. USTR will hold a hearing in connection with this investigation on September 3, 2025.
As set out in the Federal Register notice, the investigation relates to a number of trading practices, including:
- Digital trade and electronic payment services: Brazil may undermine the competitiveness of U.S. companies engaged in these sectors, for example, by retaliating against them for failing to censor political speech or restricting their ability to provide services in the country;
- Unfair, preferential tariffs: Brazil accords lower, preferential tariff rates to the exports of certain globally competitive trade partners, thereby disadvantaging U.S. exports;
- Anti-corruption enforcement: Brazil’s failure to enforce anti-corruption and transparency measures raises concerns in relation to norms relating to fighting bribery and corruption;
- Intellectual property protection: Brazil apparently denies adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, harming American workers whose livelihoods are tied to America’s innovation- and creativity-driven sectors;
- Ethanol: Brazil has walked away from its willingness to provide virtually duty-free treatment for U.S. ethanol and instead now applies a substantially higher tariff on U.S. ethanol exports; and
- Illegal deforestation: Brazil appears to be failing to effectively enforce laws and regulations designed to stop illegal deforestation, thereby undermining the competitiveness of U.S. producers of timber and agricultural products.
A copy of the Federal Register Notice is available here.
A docket for comments regarding the investigation will be available here.
A docket for requests to appear at the public hearing to be held in connection with this investigation will be available here.
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