The U.S. Army War College, through its Strategic Studies Institute, publishes an annual estimate of the strategic security environment in which the U.S. finds itself. Ordinarily I don't bother passing these along--the usual crowd of those with a use for this ordinarily know when and how to get their copy. This, though, is an interesting year. Trajectories of actions and the ending point of contradictions and end points all point to the substantial possibility that all sorts of people and the institutions they control may, for a variety of reasons, believe that now may be the time to take action because, in their calculus--however wrongheaded--the risk reward ratios are at their apex, and in their favor. When multiple people/institutions believe this it is likely that perhaps up to half will get it very wrong. But these people/institutions tend to be risk controllers; the are not risk bearers. The polity is.
It is for that reason that the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute's 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment, published 24 July 2024 may be of particular interest to many who don't ordinarily have little interest in the security environment of which many may be oblivious as they go about their lives. As in past years, its primary objective is internal--it is "designed to guide the collective defense community to research and write about critical national security challenges." (Introduction).
Its description lays out the framework of analysis through the
lens of the role of the Army within the broader strategic objectives:
Description
The 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment sets the foundation for cutting-edge research to understand the ever-evolving security environment domestically and internationally. Competition with the People’s Republic of China continues to dominate the strategic narrative, with global implications for US national interests. The Russia-Ukraine War and the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, however, present immediate and political challenges that will undoubtedly influence US military efforts abroad. At the same time, the United States faces domestic challenges in navigating civil-military relations, and the Army is working diligently to overcome institutional hurdles. The United States published its first National Defense Industry Strategy in January 2024, focusing on resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence. Additionally, the Army released the 2024 white paper “Army Force Structure Transformation,” which lays the groundwork for creating new capabilities, initiates new recruitment modernization efforts, and justifies challenging personnel reductions across the force. Finally, the prevalence of competition in new and maturing arenas (such as space and the polar regions) may impact a delicate balance among the great powers. This balance, and the potential relative advantage the United States maintains over its adversaries, is further challenged by emerging technologies, many of which have yet to realize their impact on defense operations.
A mobile-friendly version of the Annual Estimate can be found here.
That, in turn, may reflect a service-specific application of relevant overall themes and thematic structures from the National Security Strategy (NDS) (October 2022) (on NSS, its legal basis, and prior iterations see here), and with it, its talk about "inflection points." (NSS, J. Biden, Intro, p. 1).
So, the United States will continue to defend democracy around the world, even as we continue to do the work at home to better live up to the idea of America enshrined in our founding documents. . . This is a 360-degree strategy grounded in the world as it is today, laying out the future we seek, and providing a roadmap for how we will achieve it. None of this will be easy or without setbacks. But I am more confident than ever that the United States has everything we need to win the competition for the 21st century. We emerge stronger from every crisis. There is nothing beyond our capacity. We can do this—for our future and for the world. (Ibid., p. 2).
The NDS showed that building enduring industrial advantages through a resilient defense
ecosystem is imperative, to include supporting our allies and partners with key capabilities to
strengthen integrated deterrence. * * * Achieving our priorities depends on the numerous stakeholders in national security and the defense industry – executive branch departments and agencies, government owned facilities, traditional defense contractors, non-traditional companies, and our global Allies and partners—to effectively collaborate in surmounting the complex known and unknown technical, manufacturing, and logistical challenges. (NDIS, ¶¶ 1.1.1; 1.1.2).
This ordering premise is picked up in important ways in the the 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment. "Modern war will increasingly demand the integration of civilian and military capabilities—from artificial intelligence (AI) to cyber operations to space to a re-invigoration of the defense industrial base." (2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment; p. 36). To these ends a robust system of interlocking public and private techno-bureaucracies will be necessary. These mirror those already being constructed to oversee the relationship between the deployment of productive forces and human rights based state management. (See here, here, here, and here).
And, indeed, these strategic documents begin to reveal just what lies on the other side of the inflection point to which President Biden pointed in the 2022 National Security Strategy, though it is unlikely that the process was organic and responsive rather than active and guided. In any case here the United States finds itself: in a world in which the premises of the "military-industrial complex" has given way, decisively, to one grounded in the necessity of both inter-penetration and solidity between military and industrial complexes. The question for the emerging age also changes, as do the challenges: how does one build a guiding framework of compliance and accountability that permits an effective engagement with the emerging forms and practices of combat/competition/conflict (or whatever other linguistic trope will be invented to describe whatever it is that is to be undertaken by naming it appropriately while preserving the values and practices for which these technologies, relationships, and undertakings are "activated"--that is a hard task, made more interesting within liberal democratic regimes precisely because, as the 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment reminds its readers (p. 21): "The hardening of ideological positions in the United States has led to deep political and cultural divides that the election will likely not heal, presenting a danger as significant as any external threat." Both remain a challenge:
“Today, senior military leaders struggle to articulate the ways in which the military can integrate AI, machine learning techniques, and other algorithms into war waging. As a result, senior military leaders depend upon actors in private industry to develop both strategies and solutions—yet private-industry actors are not steeped in professional ethics and norms as military officers are over the course of their careers. (Ibid, pp.36-37).
The Introduction follows below along with the Fact Sheet: National Defense Industrial Strategy, and a reminder of the deeper challenges for the new civilian military order reflected in the warnings of an age of historical development that is quickly receding into history--that portion of President Eisenhower's Address on the military-industrial complex.
The inflection point noted by President Biden in the 2022 NDS appears to have come and gone. One must deal with the new realities; and these are strikingly dissimilar from the foundations of the organization of national defense that were at the core of U.S. policy in the now rapidly receding so-called Post War Era. A significant challenge for the military in its role of protecting the American people from foreign threats (whether they are manifested within or beyond the territories and jurisdiction of the United States), then may be in the way in which it can (1) develop an appropriate conception of the normative framework, the institutional structural system, and the compliance-assessment-accountability structures of the emerging civilian-military interpenetrated techno-bureaucracies, increasingly assisted by technology (and eventually autonomously generative tech) (eg here on the Chinese normative basis HERE); (2) attempt to develop multi-level systems for objectives based quality control, international transparency, coordination, assessment, and accountability (eg HERE); (3) re-imagine accountability itself must be understood as a multi-vector project including the accountability of accountability measures (HERE; HERE) .
2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment
INTRODUCTION
The following analysis is the third iteration of a product that continues to adapt
to the changing security environment. The 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security
Environment is designed to guide the collective defense community to research and
write about critical national security challenges. To enable this research, it is organized
into four broad and enduring themes:
Theme 1 – Regional Challenges and Opportunities
Theme 2 – Domestic Challenges
Theme 3 – Institutional Challenges
Theme 4 – Challenges to the US Strategic Advantage
Instead of attempting to recreate and update assessments from last year, each section
examines how the environment is trending and highlights challenges likely to impact the
Department of Defense significantly in the near future.
Competition with the People’s Republic of China continues to dominate the strategic
narrative, with global implications for US national interests. The Russia-Ukraine War and
the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, however, present immediate and political
challenges that will undoubtedly influence US military efforts abroad.
At the same time, the United States faces domestic challenges in navigating
civil-military relations, and the Army is working diligently to overcome institutional hurdles.
The United States published its first National Defense Industry Strategy in January 2024,
focusing on resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic
deterrence. Additionally, the Army released the 2024 white paper “Army Force Structure
Transformation,” which lays the groundwork for creating new capabilities, initiates new
recruitment modernization efforts, and justifies challenging personnel reductions across
the force.
Finally, the prevalence of competition in new and maturing arenas (such as space and
the polar regions) may impact a delicate balance among the great powers. This balance,
and the potential relative advantage the United States maintains over its adversaries,
is further challenged by emerging technologies, many of which have yet to realize their
impact on defense operations.
The 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment will evolve to address the
fluid and complex world the Army faces. The US Army War College and the Strategic Studies
Institute stand ready to address these challenges by fostering research across the Army and the
broader defense community. This estimate serves as a starting point for this critical research
and is supplemented by a list of strategic issues that offers insight into the particularized
matters impacting defense organizations.
* * *
Fact Sheet: National Defense Industrial Strategy
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that the Department of Defense will prioritize
coordinated efforts with the full range of domestic and international partners in the defense
ecosystem to fortify the defense industrial base, our logistical systems, and relevant global
supply chains against subversion, compromise, and theft.
The National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) offers a strategic vision to coordinate and
prioritize actions to build a modernized defense industrial ecosystem that is fully aligned with
the NDS. It also calls for sustained collaboration and cooperation between the entire U.S.
government, private industry, and our Allies and partners abroad.
The NDIS lays out four long-term strategic priorities to serve as guiding beacons for industrial
action and resource prioritization in support of the development of this modernized defense
industrial ecosystem.
1) Resilient supply chains that can securely produce the products, services, and technologies
needed now and in the future at speed, scale, and cost.
a) To address this priority, the DoD will incentivize industry to improve resilience by
investing in extra capacity; manage inventory and stockpile planning to decrease near
term risk; continue and expand support for domestic production; drive investment in the
organic industrial base and production accelerators; diversify the supplier base and invest
in new production methods; leverage data analytics to improve sub-tier visibility to
identify and minimize strategic supply chain risks and to manage disruptions proactively;
engage allies and partners to expand global defense production and increase supply chain
resilience; and improve the Foreign Military Sales process.
b) The risks of not achieving resilient supply chains include supply and materiel shortfalls;
diminished surge capacity; supply chain vulnerability; and falling behind pacing
challenges identified in the NDS.
2) Workforce readiness will provide for a sufficiently skilled, and staffed workforce that is
diverse and representative of America.
a) To address this priority, DoD will work to prepare the workforce for future technological
innovation; continue targeting critical skill sets in science, technology, engineering, and
math; increase access to apprenticeship and internship programs; and reduce
stigmatization of industrial careers while expanding recruitment of non-traditional
communities.
b) Insufficient workforce readiness could lead to the inability to successfully onshore
critical manufacturing; the inability to compete globally; reduced productivity throughout
the full supply chain; and limited innovation.
2
3) Flexible acquisition will lead to the development of strategies that strive for dynamic
capabilities while balancing efficiency, maintainability, customization and standardization in
defense platforms and support systems. Flexible acquisition strategies would result in
reduced development times, reduced costs, and increased scalability.
a) To address this priority, DoD will work to broaden platform standards and
interoperability; strengthen requirements to curb “scope creep;” prioritize off-the-shelf
acquisition where applicable and reasonable; increase DoD access to intellectual property
and data rights to enhance acquisition and sustainment; consider greater use and policy
reform of contracting strategies; continue to support acquisition reform; and update
industrial mobilization authorities and planning to ensure preparedness.
b) Flexible acquisition planning will allow the DoD to work with a broader set of industry
partners and balance the tension between the need for customization and adopting, where
appropriate, industry standards. While some level of customization is necessary to meet
specific mission requirements and stay ahead of potential adversaries, there are risks
associated with excessive customization that hinder the development of a modern
industrial ecosystem. Thus, COTS approaches versus customized systems must be
balanced to meet warfighter requirements at speed and scale. Failure to balance these
risks strategically can significantly hinder the delivery of critical capabilities. Other risks
of failure include limited scale; high costs and lengthy development times; technology
obsolescence; diminished industrial base resilience; sustainment and logistics challenges;
reduced operational effectiveness; and increased technological risk.
4) Economic deterrence will promote fair and effective market mechanisms that support a
resilient defense industrial ecosystem among the U.S. and close international allies and
partners and economic security and integrated deterrence. As a result of effective economic
deterrence, fear of materially reduced access to U.S. markets, technologies, and innovations
will sow doubt in the mind of potential aggressors.
a) To address this priority, DoD will work to strengthen economic security agreements;
enable international interoperability standards through active participation in standards-
setting bodies; fortify alliances to share science and technology; strengthen enforcement
against adversarial ownership and against cyberattacks; and strengthen prohibited sources
policies to protect the DIB from adversarial intrusion.
b) Failing to deter adversarial entities could generate critical economic, supply chain, and
infrastructure vulnerabilities; increased costs and reduced defense budgets; a weakened
industrial ecosystem; intellectual property theft and adversarial capital IP control;
degraded technological edge, innovation, and quality; and eventually lead to the loss of
trust and reputation with international partners.
* * *
President Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell Address
* * *A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.
Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peace time, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United State corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even spiritual-is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.
Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.
In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been over shadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.
The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.
It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system-ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.
******
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