Thursday, October 11, 2018

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC): Release of 2018 Annual Report; Making a Case for 'Crimes Against Humanity' Against China, and Text of Proposed “Xinjiang Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2018”.


The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by the U.S. Congress in 2000 "with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress. The Commission consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior Administration officials appointed by the President." (CECC About). The CECC FAQs provide useful information about the CECC. See CECC Frequently Asked Questions. They have developed positions on a number of issues (e.g., here).

CECC tends to serve as an excellent barometer of the thinking of political and academic elites in the United States about issues touching on China and the official American line developed in connection with those issues. CECC becomes an even more important barometer of coherence and fracture in policy approaches as the discipline of activities between the political parties and the President and Legislature fractures in new and dynamic ways. As such it is an important source of information about the way official and academic sectors think about China. As one can imagine many of the positions of the CECC are critical of current Chinese policies and institutions (see, e.g., (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here).

This month the CECC has released its Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2018 (The Press Release HERE and following below). The 2018 Annual Report may be accessed HERE (pdf).

The CECC has also intensified its attention to a critical consideration of Chinese policies toward its autonomous regions, and its treatment of religion (in general) and religious minorities (specifically). CECC leaders coordinated the announcement of the release of the 2018 Report with three other actions that are particularly noteworthy:
1. The Chairs released a letter asking the FBI to report on how it addresses “unacceptable” intimidation and threats targeting Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan diaspora communities living in the United States (Letter to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray).

2. The Chairs released a letter to IOC President Thomas Bach urging him “to take steps to reassign” the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing (Letter to Thomas Bach, International Olympic Committee (IOC) President, on 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics).

3. The Chairs released the text of a Xinjiang Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2018 (the text of which follows below).
The material is rich with possibility. Ironically, some of the measures advocated would bring the United States much closer to adopting (and hardening) the mechanisms of the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights in both its 1st Pillar (State Duty) and 2nd Pillar (Corporate Responsibility) aspects. But of course it is meant to do more than that. It would align the work of the United States to that of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Special Rapporteurs even as the United States formally pulls out of the Human Rights Council. More importantly, it would further expand the use of the "targeted action mechanisms" represented by the Global Magnitsky Act (see here) now extended in a way that would make the United States the global protector of a neutrality based approach to human rights that reflects the evolving American jurisprudence of its Constitution's protection of the "Free Exercise" of religion and internationalizes those jurisprudential approaches, standards and principles.

One last point:While the human rights orientation of the CECC interventions would appear to run counter to Administration policies and preferences, it would be a mistake to think that there is policy dissonance in fact. In the past the CECC has tended to chart a course that was autonomous of the policies and objectives of Presidential Administrations. Yet now there appears to be a measure of coordination between CECC and the Trump Administration that one might not have noticed before. It may be necessary to read this intervention by the CECC as (in part) continuing the arc of the agenda that CECC has been forging autonomously for several years) but also that this arc has now been harassed int he service of the current efforts to strike a new grand bargain with China.    To that end, these interventions ought to be read against both Vice President Pence's speech at the Hudson Institute (Underlining the Obvious: Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China),  and President Trump's U.N. speech ("America First," "Belt and Road," "Mutually Advantageous Cooperation" and the Rise of the Global South: Preliminary Thoughts on Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (25 September 2018)). 

More importantly, the focus on Muslim majority populations in China may also provide an important opportunity for the Administration to refine its domestic position with respect to the jurisprudential structures within which religion will be privileged int he United States by holding up this policy-action mirror to China. It would likely be a mistake to see in the CECC only a focus outward.

The CECC Press Release, Letters to the FBI and the International Olympic Committee and the text of the Xinjiang Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2018 follow.


 PRESS RELEASE CECC:



Chairs announce new legislative initiative and release letter to FBI Director urging protection of U.S. citizens from intimidation and threats emanating from Chinese government

Media Contact:  202-226-3777

October 10, 2018

(WASHINGTON, DC)— U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and U.S. Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ), Chair and Cochair of the bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), today issued the Commission’s 2018 Annual Report and announced several new joint initiatives to protect U.S. citizens and residents from intimidation and address possible crimes against humanity occurring in China. 

The 2018 Annual Report provides detailed analysis on human rights conditions and rule of law developments in China, and offers recommendations on ways to integrate these issues into U.S.-China relations. 

Among the major trends that the Report highlights are the unprecedented repression of ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); a dramatic increase in Communist Party Control over government, society, religion, and business; and the increasing use of technology and surveillance as a tool of repression.  The Report also highlights the elevated role of the United Front Work Department, a Party institution used to influence and neutralize possible challenges to its ideological and policy agenda, and the impact this has had on religious freedom and ethnic minority communities.

At the press conference releasing the report, the Chairs recognized members of the Uyghur diaspora community in attendance who had been personally and directly impacted by the current crackdown in the XUAR.

“The Commission’s 2018 report documents gross violations of human rights in ethnic  minority regions, religious freedom violations, harassment of rights defenders and lawyers, suppression of free speech, onerous restrictions on civil society and more—the markings of a fundamentally authoritarian state,” said Senator Rubio. “The crackdown in Xinjiang resulting in the internment of a million or more Uyghur and other Muslims may constitute crimes against humanity.  The Communist Party has dramatically increased its control over government, society and business and is ruthlessly employing technology to further its aims.  As American policymakers increasingly reexamine the misguided assumptions that have informed U.S.-China relations, we must be clear-eyed about the global implications of China’s domestic repression.”

“In the continued quest to retain power, the Chinese government and Communist Party has sought to coercively control civil society, ethnic identity, and religious belief and to decimate the ranks of human rights lawyers, pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong and labor rights advocates in China,” said Representative Smith. “Even by the Chinese Communist Party’s low standards, this year has been audaciously repressive. This report shines a light on the Chinese government’s failures to abide by universal standards; shines a light on the cases of tortured and abused political prisoners; shines a light on a million Uyghurs detained in Orwellian “political reeducation” camp and on China’s still coercive population control policies.  It should be required reading for anyone interested in reevaluating U.S.-China policy.”       
In conjunction with the 2018 Annual Report’s publication, the Chairs also announced new joint initiatives, including:   

Letter to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray: The Chairs released a letter asking the FBI to report on how it addresses “unacceptable” intimidation and threats targeting Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan diaspora communities living in the United States.

Letter to Thomas Bach, International Olympic Committee (IOC) President, on 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics: The Chairs released a letter to IOC President Thomas Bach urging him “to take steps to reassign” the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing given “credible reports of the mass, arbitrary internment of one million or more Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim ethnic minorities” and other gross violations of universally recognized rights, “which may constitute crimes against humanity.”       

Legislative Initiatives: The Chairs announced the introduction of the Xinjiang Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2018 (see attached) to focus U.S State Department resources on the mass internment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in China. During the 115th Congress, the Chairs and CECC Commissioners introduced a number of different measures related to human rights and the rule of law in China, highlighting bipartisan Congressional efforts to upgrade U.S. policy and diplomatic options regarding China. Among these measures are the Countering the Chinese Government and Communist Party’s Political Influence Operations Act (H.R. 6010/S. 3171, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess.); the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2017 (S. 417/H.R. 3856, 115th Cong., 1st Sess.); the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (S. 821/H.R.1872, 115th Cong., 1st Sess.); the Stop Higher Education Espionage and Theft Act (S. 2903, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess.) and the Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act (S. 2826/H.R. 6001, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess.).

Nomination of Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti for 2019 Nobel Peace Prize: The Chairs announced their intention to nominate Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti for the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Tohti, who is currently serving a life sentence on charges of “separatism,” founded the website Uyghur Online, which sought to promote dialogue, peace, and understanding between Han Chinese and Uyghurs.   

Both Chairs commend the capable and professional work of the CECC’s research staff in producing the Commission’s 17th Annual Report. The full report can be accessed on the CECC’s website

__________


A BILL
To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. Short title.
This Act may be cited as the “Xinjiang Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2018”.
SEC. 2. Statement of purpose.
The purpose of this Act is to direct United States resources to address gross violations of universally recognized human rights, including the mass internment of over 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim ethnic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats faced by United States citizens and legal permanent residents.
SEC. 3. Appropriate congressional committees.
In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 4. Findings.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a long history of repressing approximately 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni Muslims, particularly Uyghurs, in the nominally autonomous Xinjiang region. These actions are violations of international treaties and covenants to which the People's Republic of China is a party, including the United Nations Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(2) In recent decades, central and regional Chinese government policies have systematically discriminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial, among others.
(3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as a result of the central government’s severe repression is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government of the People’s Republic of China as evidence of “terrorism” and “separatism” and as an excuse for further disproportionate response.
(4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their latest “Strike Hard against Violent Extremism” campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, internationally linked threats of terrorism were used to justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human rights violations of, the ethnic minority communities of Xinjiang.
(5) Those policies included—
(A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across the region, ranging from the arbitrary collection of biodata, including DNA samples from children, without their knowledge or consent;
(B) the use of QR codes outside homes to gather information on how frequently individuals pray;
(C) facial and voice recognition software and “predictive policing” databases; and
(D) countless checkpoints across the region to control movement, all in a context with no enforceable privacy rights.
(6)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across the region.
(B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of government policy including “eradicating tumors” and “spray[ing] chemicals” on crops to kill the “weeds.”
(C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as muqam and meshrep, and due to elimination of the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in Xinjiang schools and universities.
(7) In 2017, credible reports found that family members of Uyghurs living outside of China had gone missing, that Chinese authorities were pressuring those outside the country to return, and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained in large numbers.
(8) There is ample credible evidence provided by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and think tanks substantiating the establishment by Chinese authorities of “political reeducation” camps, for which there is no legal basis.
(9) Chinese security forces have never been held accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014).
(10) Independent organizations conducted interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat Samarkan and Omir Bekali, along with others who had been detained in such facilities, who described forced political indoctrination, torture, uncertainty as to the length of detention, humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told by guards that the only way to secure release was to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip (2018), Abdulnehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin (2017), Sawut Raxman (2017), Tursungul (2015), Memet Ibrahim (2015), and Perhat Mollahun (2013) died while in the custody of the Chinese authorities without proper investigation of the circumstances.
(11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now obtained permanent residence or citizenship in other countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment from Chinese officials.
(12) Under pressure from the Government of the People's Republic of China, countries have forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the non-refoulement principle and their well-founded fear of persecution. States returning Uyghurs include Egypt (2017), the United Arab Emirates (2017), Malaysia (2011, 2013),Thailand (2011, 2015); Laos (2010); Burma (2010); Cambodia (2009); Vietnam (2014); Kazakhstan (1999, 2001, 2003, 2006); Uzbekistan (2007), Tajikistan (2011), Pakistan (2003, 2009, 2011), Nepal (2002), India (2016). A group of 11 Uyghurs currently remain in immigration detention in Malaysia.
(13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their family members in Xinjiang have endured in response to their work exposing abusive policies across the region.
(14) Several United States-based companies are conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with unclear due diligence as to how their business operations may create or contribute to human rights violations.
(15) The Government of the People’s Republic of China is increasingly investing in the “Belt and Road Initiative” across Xinjiang and throughout Central Asia, extending its influence through organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization without regard to the political, cultural, or linguistic rights of ethnic minorities.
(16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, and individual members of the executive branch and Congress have all expressed growing concern regarding the pervasive human rights abuses across Xinjiang and the “political reeducation” camps.
(17) In August 2018, the United Nations Committee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged the Government of the People’s Republic of China over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment of mass arbitrary detention camps.
(18) In September 2018, newly appointed United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as High Commissioner the “deeply disturbing allegations of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-education camps across Xinjiang”.
(19) Between August and September 2018, Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by either flatly denying them or insisting that the facilities are “vocational training centers”.
(20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington Post wrote, “At stake is not just the welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the technologies of the 21st century will be employed to smother human freedom.”
(21) Experts have described the Xinjiang region as “a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid” and the repression in the Xinjiang region as a “slow motion Tiananmen”.
SEC. 5. Sense of Congress.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the President should condemn abuses against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting damage of China’s current policies, and immediately close the “political reeducation” camps, lift all restrictions on internationally guaranteed human rights across the region, and allow for reestablishment of contact between those inside and outside China;
(2) the United States Government should develop a strategy to support the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, including the “political reeducation” camps;
(3) the Secretary of State should consider the establishment of a new position within the Department of State, the United States Special Coordinator for Xinjiang, who will coordinate diplomatic, political, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, counterterrorism, and security resources within the United States Government to respond to the gross violations of universally recognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region, including by addressing the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, the deployment of technologically advanced surveillance and police detection methods, and the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism claims used to justify the policies of the Government of the People's Republic of China in Xinjiang Province;
(4) if the objectives of the Special Coordinator position described in paragraph (3) are accomplished, the Secretary of State may terminate the position, but must inform the appropriate congressional committees 45 days before the termination;
(5) the Secretary must consult with the chairman and ranking minority members of the appropriate congressional committees prior to the designation of the Special Coordinator;
(6) the Secretary of State should consider the applicability of existing authorities, including the Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 114–328), to impose targeted sanctions on members of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state security apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere;
(7) the Secretary of State should fully implement the provisions of the Frank Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and consider strategically employing sanctions and other tools under the International Religious Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures required as part of the “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) designation for the Government of the People's Republic of China that directly address particularly severe violations of religious freedom;
(8) the Secretary of Commerce should review and consider the prohibition on the sale or provision of any United States-made goods or services to any state agent in Xinjiang, and add the Xinjiang branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang Office of the United Front Work Department, among others, to the “entities” list;
(9) the Secretary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to establish a voluntary database to which United States citizens or permanent family members of the Uyghur diaspora can provide details about missing family members, with a view towards pressing for accountability, and take appropriate measures to expedite the asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic Muslim minorities;
(10) United States companies and individuals selling goods or services or otherwise operating in Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public or financial filings, to publicly assert that their commercial activities are not contributing to human rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China;
(11) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appropriate United States law enforcement entities should track and take steps to hold accountable officials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate United States citizens and legal permanent residents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Americans, Chinese-Americans, and Chinese nationals legally studying or working in the United States;
(12) the Secretary of State should work with traditional United States allies and partners to take similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted sanctions and visa restrictions; and
(13) the work of Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur language service should be commended for providing a detailed and accurate account of current events facing Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China despite efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to intimidate their reporting through threats and detention of family members living in China.
SEC. 6. National security report.
(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a classified and unclassified report to assess regional security threats posed by the crackdown across Xinjiang and the frequency with which Central and Southeast Asian governments are forcibly returning Turkic Muslim refugees and asylum seekers.
(b) Annex.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include an annex with a list of all Chinese companies involved in the construction or operation of the “political education” camps, or the provision or operation of surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang.
SEC. 7. Report on stopping intimidation of citizens and residents of the United States.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees that outline efforts to provide information to and protect United States citizens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the United States who have experienced harassment as described under section 5(9).
SEC. 8. Report on public diplomacy.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—
(1) describes the current status and reach of United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers to the free flow of news and information to these communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical and fiscal requirements necessary to increase broadcasting and other media to these communities globally;
(2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on human rights issues in the People's Republic of China; and
(3) in consultation with the Global Engagement Center at the Department of State, describes and assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Government of the People's Republic of China or other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts to downplay gross violations of universally recognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region.
SEC. 9. Annual report.
(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, after consulting relevant civil society organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available on the website of Department of State an interagency report that includes—
(1) an assessment of the number of individuals detained in political “reeducation camps” and conditions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang region, including whether detainees endure torture, forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment;
(2) a description, as possible, of the methods used by People's Republic of China authorities to “reeducate” Uyghur detainees as well as the People's Republic of China agencies in charge of reeducation;
(3) an assessment of the number of individuals being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial detention centers and prisons;
(4) an assessment of the level of access People's Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats, journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang region;
(5) an assessment of the repressive surveillance, detection, and control methods used by People's Republic of China authorities in the Xinjiang region, and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership positions and are responsible for “high-tech” policing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts targeting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region; and
(6) a description of United States diplomatic efforts to address the gross violations of universally recognized rights in the Xinjiang region, including in multilateral institutions and through bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China, the nations of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and other countries.
(b) Termination.—The Secretary of State may terminate the report required under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that the gross violations of universally recognized human rights and mass detention of Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim ethnic minorities has ended in the Xinjiang region.






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