Part 11 (Socialist Modernization and Class Struggle)--On a Constitutional Theory for China--From the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party to Political Theory

 

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer)

This Blog Essay site devotes every February to a series of integrated but short essays on a single theme. For 2015 this site introduces a new theme: On a Constitutional Theory for China--From the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party to Political Theory.

This Post includes Part 11, Socialist Modernization and Class Struggle. It considers Paragraph 9 of the General Program.

Table of Contents 


Part 11, Paragraph 9 of the General Program--Socialist Modernization and Class Struggle.

We have been reviewing the initial paragraphs of the CCP Constitution's General Program. The first two paragraphs of the General Program set out the outer framework of two critical aspects of Chinese constitutional theory. The five theories identified in paragraph 2 are the elaborated in paragraphs 3-7. Each, in turn, represents the “crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China” at each successive stage on the road toward communism. And the path itself makes clear that the process of successive crystallization is far from complete. Paragraph 3 elaborated on the place of classical Marxism-Leninism as the first stage of the path of socialism and serves as the foundation for Chinese political and constitutional theory. If the foundations of Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on European and received wisdom--the classical philosophy of Marxism-Leninism—the foundations of classical Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on Mai Zedong Thought.

Paragraph 4 considered Mao Zedong Thought as a necessary bridge between European theory and its transposition within the Chinese context, one that brings Marxism-Leninism forward from out of Europe into Asia, and places that forward evolution within the historical constraints of its time.It expressed the Leninist foundations of Chinese constitutional theory within notions of collective development and its role in establishing the socialist path toward which Mao Zedong Thought points, but which it does not in itself constitute. Paragraph 5 introduces the next stage in the development of Chinese constitutional and political Theory--Deng Xiaoping Theory. If Mao Zedong Thought provided a bridge from revolutionary to governing vanguard party, Deng Xiaoping theory provides the principles through which socialist modernization can be realized. Paragraph 6 introduces the succeeding layer of development of Chinese constitutional and political theory--the Important thought of Three Represents (Sange Daibiao). Paragraph 7 introduces the last of the current layers of theoretical development of Chinese political and constitutional theory--the scientific outlook on development. Paragraph 8 serves to sum up the initial paragraphs and as a bridge to the elaboration of the basic CCP line and working style in the paragraphs that follow. It is directed specifically to cadres and provides an easy conceptual framework within which  they can understand their role in socialist modernization.

With Paragraph 9 the General Program moves from theory to action infused by theory. It considers the first of the three fundamental tasks of the CCP derived from its theory, that is the first operational element of the CCP line: 

[9] China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come. This is a historical stage which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization in China which is backward economically and culturally. It will last for over a hundred years. In socialist construction the Party must proceed from China's specific conditions and take the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the present stage, the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of production. Owing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction. In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces. The Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role and different economic sectors developing side by side, as well as the system of distribution under which distribution according to work is dominant and a variety of modes of distribution coexist, encourage some areas and some people to become rich first, gradually eliminate poverty, achieve common prosperity, continuously meet the people's ever-growing material and cultural needs on the basis of the growth of production and social wealth and promote people's all-around development. Development is the Party's top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country. The general starting point and criterion for judging all the Party's work should be how it benefits development of the productive forces in China's socialist society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and improves the people's living standards. The Party must respect work, knowledge, talent and creation and ensure that development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits. The beginning of the new century marks China's entry into the new stage of development of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and accelerating socialist modernization. The Party must promote all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in accordance with the overall plan for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The strategic objectives of economic and social development at this new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the relatively comfortable life initially attained, bring China into a moderately prosperous society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the Party's centenary and bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China.
[9] 我国正处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段。这是在经济文化落后的中国建设社会主义现代化不可逾越的历史阶段，需要上百年的时间。我 国的社会主义建设，必须从我国的国情出发，走中国特色社会主义道路。在现阶段，我国社会的主要矛盾是人民日益增长的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛 盾。由于国内的因素和国际的影响，阶级斗争还在一定范围内长期存在，在某种条件下还有可能激化，但已经不是主要矛盾。我国社会主义建设的根本任务，是进一 步解放生产力，发展生产力，逐步实现社会主义现代化，并且为此而改革生产关系和上层建筑中不适应生产力发展的方面和环节。必须坚持和完善公有制为主体、多 种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度，坚持和完善按劳分配为主体、多种分配方式并存的分配制度，鼓励一部分地区和一部分人先富起来，逐步消灭贫穷，达到共 同富裕，在生产发展和社会财富增长的基础上不断满足人民日益增长的物质文化需要，促进人的全面发展。发展是我们党执政兴国的第一要务。各项工作都要把有利 于发展社会主义社会的生产力，有利于增强社会主义国家的综合国力，有利于提高人民的生活水平，作为总的出发点和检验标准，尊重劳动、尊重知识、尊重人才、 尊重创造，做到发展为了人民、发展依靠人民、发展成果由人民共享。跨入新世纪，我国进入全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化的新的发展阶段。必须按 照中国特色社会主义事业总体布局，全面推进经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设。在新世纪新阶段，经济和社会发展的战略目标是，巩固和发展已经初步达 到的小康水平，到建党一百年时，建成惠及十几亿人口的更高水平的小康社会；到建国一百年时，人均国内生产总值达到中等发达国家水平，基本实现现代化。   The

Paragraph 9 is long and complex. It bears the scars of criticism and self criticism that marked the maturation of the CCP, its theory and working style, from its pre revolutionary and revolutionary periods through the emergence of the current stage of CCP development of its vanguard role. But it is a paragraph that is itself ripe for analysis in the face of changing historical conditions and may no longer reflect entirely the "facts" from which its "truth" is derived. I begin with a short description of the paragraph contents and then draw insights from that reading, insights that will connect  the statements of ¶ 9 back to foundation theory and forward to the elaboration of the CCP line under current historical conditions in China and the world.

The paragraph is structured as a long historical-theoretical-policy-justificatory narrative designed to move from "facts" to "truth" in two respects--the first justifying the current iteration of theoretical approaches to the CCP's political work, and the second justifying the current development of the CCP line within the context of theoretical imperatives (socialist modernization, reunification, and engagement).

The first three sentences set the historical context.  It emphasizes the location of China's development as still situated in its formative stage, thus underlining the dynamic element in both theory and the shaping of the CCP line ("China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come"). It also infers significant insights from that historical positioning.  The first is that historical development must run in accordance with its own logic and cannot be managed instrumentally, even by a Leninist vanguard ("This is a historical stage which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization in China"). The second is that the determination of position is relational, and gauged against the historical situation in advanced developed states, and now principally the United States (China "is backward economically and culturally").  The third is that the process will require patience and assessment must be realistically grounded on the pace of forward movement, which is expected to be slow (at least by human reckoning) ("It will last for over a hundred years").

The next two sentences then direct the insights of history and position to the justification of the CCP line ("In socialist construction the Party must proceed from China's specific conditions and take the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics"). But the imperative of socialist modernization keyed to current historical conditions conditions produce contradiction, that is it produces a disjunction between the CCP's obligation to the people in the short run and its obligations to society in the long run ("At the present stage, the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of production").

The next sentences then confront the contradiction between socialist modernization in this early stage of development and the obligations of the CCP to the people within socialist principles that eschew exploitation of labor that mimics capitalist systems.  First, it admits that the current movement toward socialist modernization exacerbates class struggle.  Indeed, it asserts that both socialist modernization and the open up policy necessarily produces enhanced class tensions in the early stages of development.  But precisely because this contradiction is inevitable but transitory that it is also no longer a central contradiction that must be centered within the theory or the CCP line.  And because the contradiction producing class struggle is embedded in the processes of socialist modernization, rather than produced by the historical process of conflict between capitalist and socialist systems (because, in other words, it is embedded within socialism) it cannot be approached the way the CCP approached class conflict during the revolutionary period, a historical stage now confined to history ("Owing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction").

More importantly they confront the quite specific movement from a focus on class struggle--in theory and action--to one grounded in socialist modernization. But the movement away from class struggle is not meant to be a repudiation of class struggle but a redirection.  That redirection shifts focus from relational issues of class to contextualized issues of production.  It changes the direction of the CCP's attention from the consequences of production to production itself. It is in this sense that, to some extent, it is possible to understand the insight of developing productive forces as the more robust way of engaging in class struggle by directing the leadership focus to those aspects of economic life from out of which class struggle arises ("In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces").

Developing societal productive forces, then, is the key to socialist modernization. Or developing productive forces might be more usefully understood as the source from out of which socialist modernization is activated. That is the subject of the next several sentences. That consequential insight then drives theory and the formation of the CCP line ("In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces").  That this is the key requires one to recall the fundamental purpose and the basis of legitimacy of a Leninist vanguard party--to serve as the advanced elements of societal forces that direct the state, nation and people towards the construction of a communist society.,  But that communist society is not attainable in a poor nation only a few generations removed from a feudal societal and political structure.  What is needed--the marker of the stages of historical development which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization--is wealth.  It is to the production of wealth that the productive forces must be developed.  But that development is not meant to produce bourgeois wealth, that is personal wealth amassed and protected to a selective class (including the political class of privileged members of the CCP itself (a severe breach of the representation obligation at the core of CCP duty)).  Instead is is meant to produce societal wealth sufficient to make it possible to move from one historical stage to another, one closer to the possibility of establishing a communist economic, social and political order. It is to that end that the CCP retains its legitimacy--and from out of which its fundamental mandate is set.  And it is on the road toward that accumulation of wealth that the contradictions of socialist class struggle may appear ("The Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role and different economic sectors developing side by side, as well as the system of distribution under which distribution according to work is dominant and a variety of modes of distribution coexist, encourage some areas and some people to become rich first, gradually eliminate poverty, achieve common prosperity, continuously meet the people's ever-growing material and cultural needs on the basis of the growth of production and social wealth and promote people's all-around development").  

It follows that developing productive forces must be the "Party's top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country." But that is only the beginning of the analysis for shaping the CCP's approach to developing productive forces in the service of socialist modernization. The next several sentences then frame the CCP's role in its leadership role for this task. Paragraph 9 offers an assessment formula for determining both the forward movement of developing productive forces and for judging the success of the CCP's leadership in that respect, one that looks to value added ("The general starting point and criterion for judging all the Party's work should be how it benefits development of the productive forces in China's socialist society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and improves the people's living standards"). But this leaves the issue that animated the earlier part of the paragraph--the contradiction of a socialist class struggle. This internal class struggle musty also be ameliorated as the CCP leads the state toward socialist modernization. That leadership requires sensitivity to class based prejudice, to the substitution of material wealth for societal talent and ability to contribute. This produces a heavy burden on the CCP, especially for cadres at the provincial and local levels, that remains very much a work in progress ("The Party must respect work, knowledge, talent and creation and ensure that development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits").

That discussion of the current state of the progress of socialist modernization, and its intersection with (and redirection of ) class struggle, provides the basis for the CCP leadership line moving forward. It is to that which the last sentences of paragraph 9 are directed. First the notion of the historical stages in which China finds itself is recast in the wake of the end of the 20th century ("The beginning of the new century marks China's entry into the new stage of development of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and accelerating socialist modernization"). This modifies, perhaps in some substantial respect, the idea of the first sentences of the paragraph--indeed, ¶ 9 can be seen structured like a short time line, starting with class struggle and the genesis of socialist modernization, through the efforts to begin to understand and direct the development of productive forces, to the institutionalization of that development, its assessment, and its transformative absorption of 20th century class struggle political lines. But the 21st century, a new stage of historical development can be seen, and with it a new stage in the leadership responsibilities of the CCP in the direction of the development of productive forces ("The Party must promote all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in accordance with the overall plan for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics"). For the CCP, the early 21st century and this new stage of historical development is one of consolidation and protection of the economic advances that had been produced in prior generations. It is the objective of the CCP to spread wealth among all Chinese people to a level appropriate to its level of development, with the understanding that this level development will remain uneven for a long time to come ("The strategic objectives of economic and social development at this new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the relatively comfortable life initially attained, bring China into a moderately prosperous society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the Party's centenary and bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China").

There are several general themes that emerge from this reading of ¶ 9.

The first focuses on the class struggle element of Chinese constitutional and political theory. In a way that parallels the development of theory from out of European Marxism.Leninism, through Mao Zedong Thought to Deng Xiaoping Theory, Sange Daibiao and the scientific outlook on development, class struggle has evolved from the central organizing principle of the CCP line, to an aspect of the larger project of socialist mobilization, one through which class struggle itself can be overcome. That overcoming will occur through the development of productive forces and the accumulation of wealth. This change in focus from the objects of production to production itself--from class difference to socialist production has tremendous effects on the substantive approaches to CCP's line and the style of its leadership.

The second focuses on production and productive forces shifts the focus of theory as well, from one grounded on those societal structures that must be changed to the cultivation of the forces of change. European socialism has tended to be backwards looking--constantly fighting the class demons from a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary period. But that ritualized warfare against the past does little to move society forward. It deploys the productive forces of the vanguard party on a fruitless battle against the past, with the ironic result of making progress impossible. (see, e.g., here). And ultimately, it causes the vanguard party to eat its own children. Refocusing on production and productive forces opens the possibility that the political work of the vanguard party may be effectuated through the instrumental generation of wealth than through the management of individuals.

The third focuses on the style of planning necessary to advance the development of productive forces. Socialist modernization, the development of productive forces, is a concept quite distinct from European Marxist notions of central planning. The CCP's role is to lead; it is not to displace productive forces. The focus away from class struggle makes it possible, as well, to focus away from central planning and to structure and oversee "all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress."

The fourth focuses on accountability. Theory that permits a vanguard party to hide behind principle and remain aloof from accounting for its decisions and positions will breach a fundamental principle of Chinese constitutional and political theory.  The criticism and self criticism of CCP cadres extends to the CCP itself in its institutional role.  Theorizing accountability within the context of socialist modernization serves to discipline the CCP within its cage of principles and policy.  It provides the basis for legitimate collective analysis and legitimate collective decision making within the changing context of Chinese development.  In the absence of this accountability--robust and accurate--the CCP will be unable to fulfill its fundamental obligation as a vanguard party.

The last focuses on the concept of consolidation. Consolidation ought to have sounded somewhat out of step with the rest of the paragraph, one that speaks to development, advancement, forward motion, etc. Yet in the face of an operational style that is dynamically forward moving, the CCP speaks to consolidation as well. the reason may be fairly straightforward, and toes the end of the paragraph with its beginning. Consolidation is a leveling operation. It is a moment to pause and ensure that all att in step with development and that productive forces are being advanced in ways that are consonant with the overall objectives of the CCP. It provides an opportunity to reduce the class effects of socialist modernization by ensuring more even distribution of wealth as the nation moves toward its ultimate objective. 

It is to the role of the CCP within this complex that we turn next.