(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2015)
I have been posting about China's recent release of its draft Foreign NGO law (see, e.g.,
here and
here; and
here for my Commentary on the Draft). My point was that civil society, and especially civil society that operates in one state with funds provided by another, or that represent a local branch of a transnational civil society enterprise, could be helpful, and indeed instrumental, in moving local society forward, but only along the path that society has chosen for itself. When civil society moves from developing productive forces, or monitoring the effectiveness of governments to do as they have promised, then civil society runs the risk of response from governments that might be sensitive to foreign pressure for
political reform. Flora Sapio put is best in the Chinese context:
Foreign funded NGOs are talking to the Party-state, and the Party-state
is listening and responding to them. The message that comes to the
Party-state – rather than the whims of individual Party secretaries – is
what determines its response. If the message is seen as threatening,
the Party-state's response will be defensive, and we know how states
defend themselves by arresting or expelling those who are seen as posing
a threat to them, even though the threat may often be more imagined
than real. Voicing a trivial demand to install more public toilets by
referring to the political system of the US or the EU will likely result
in an angered response by the state, because the choice of such demands
and language carries definite implications. (
Flora Sapio on the Chinese Draft Foreign NGO Management Law (中华人民共和国境外非政府组织管理法(草案)(二次审议稿).
But the Chinese response to NGO activity is best viewed in a broader context, and as part of a larger global efforts by states to resist internationalization of politics and retain a greater control of their own internal development within the logic of the politician systems on which they are founded. Russia and Cambodia, for quite distinct reasons have also sought to manage their civil societies more to the liking of the political elites who run those states. The latest state to consider more extensive management of civil society is Kazakhstan, which seeks to deploy the administrative techniques of registration and funding to better align the behavior of civil society to the interests of the state apparatus.
This post considers the Kazakh NGO law, and the international response to it, int he context of the power balances that these efforts may represent--not just for alignments of power within states, but also for the consequences for the development of global systems of monitoring and disciplining transnational economic activity.