The release of the much anticipated book by Bob Woodward about the administration of the presidency of Donald Trump, Fear: Trump in the White House (Simon & Schuster (September 11, 2018)) was met with substantial emotion from all quarters of the political spectrum. Mr. Woodward
paints a harrowing portrait of the Trump presidency, based on in-depth interviews with administration officials and other principals. Woodward writes that his book is drawn from hundreds of hours of interviews with firsthand participants and witnesses that were conducted on “deep background,” meaning the information could be used but he would not reveal who provided it. His account is also drawn from meeting notes, personal diaries and government documents. ( Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, "Bob Woodward’s new book reveals a ‘nervous breakdown’ of Trump’s presidency," The Washington Post (4 Sept. 2018))
It is no doubt a marvelous work of its kind. It is also likely to keep global elites quite busy as they ponder ways to draw maximum utility from the materials in the service of whatever agenda moves them. And yet Fear may yet serve a useful purpose beyond the utility of the gossip about the aristocracy that that book serves up in generous portions. That utility goes to illustrating the structures of power within enclosed and self reflexive structures that sometimes mark powerful states. I have written about this from the perspective of the architecture that such states leave behind:
There is a certain trans-cultural element to architecture of a certain kind. There is certainly what appears to be a universal approach to an architecture to power. That architecture should serve as a lesson to those who tend to like to wield it. In a different age the architecture of power was expressed in the palace complex. For all their contextual quirks, the Forbidden City, the Topkapi Palace and Versailles all express the same complex set of symbols and gestures. And each reveals the same fatal weakness. (Forbidden Cities 2008)
Americans appear to have been intent on building their own palace complex within the White House. If so, and it is possible Mr. Woodward might agree, then the object, of course, translated into the language of American political culture, is to make the case for the illegitimacy of the office of the United States because, if one believes the gossip, then the President is no longer actually exercising his office. Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, writing for the Washington Post puts it this way: "Woodward describes “an administrative coup d’etat” and a “nervous
breakdown” of the executive branch, with senior aides conspiring to
pluck official papers from the president’s desk so he couldn’t see or
sign them." ( Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, "Bob Woodward’s new book reveals a ‘nervous breakdown’ of Trump’s presidency," The Washington Post (4 Sept. 2018)). More importantly, it may serve as an important tool in shaping mass
opinion on the eave of elections in the United States that may shift the
balance of power among some of the aggressively antagonistic leadership
factions in the United States.The effect may be useful to those who have no love for the current administration-- to provide the performance that the population can then vote on the way people submit their votes during one of the many television talent or reality TV dramas. And, indeed, one might see Fear as a political version of "The Voice" or more likely "Survivor".
This post considers the other side of "Fear"--the fear that the state of the internal workings of the U.S: administration is reflected in the state of the workings of American foreign policy. That is it considers the way that the "Fear" administration has developed a new architecture for U.S. engagement in a world, whose leaders read Mr. Woodward's Fear, with the same eager anticipation as many Americans. It is organized in the context of a conversation I recently had with a foreign colleague. It draws no conclusions about either, but it does suggest a dissonance between analysis and passion in this age increasingly marked by "Fear" at every turn.
___________
1-Nowadays we are
witnessing great gaps and differences among G7 member states while SCO member
states are moving forward more convergence. Some believe that the orders and
the regimes created after World War II are declining and because of this reason
the US is not going to pay the costs of regimes like NATO, WTO and different
free trade treaties like NAFTA,… What do you think of this? Why the US is not
ready to pay the costs of the regimes and orders as before?
It is true enough that the current crop of influential
intellectuals and their political clients in our largest states, and their
colleagues elsewhere, have undertaken a great campaign to instill in the masses
(and perhaps to convince themselves) that, indeed, the events of the last
decade must evidence a “decline of the West and rise of the rest.” But consider
whether the events of the last decade are capable of interpretation in a
different light. I have written about
this before (e.g., Picture
and Communique: Agit Prop at the G7 (10 June 2018) (“The idea, I
suppose, was that unity über alles, über alles in der Welt (an ironic
allusion to the Deutschlandlied) was now the touchstone of successful
trade and international relations”)) and consider it further here.
First, appearance and reality are two very different
things. Leaders use optics for a variety
of purposes. This has been true not just
in the modern era but from ancient times. Everything from architecture to the
ceremonies of power have been crafted through the ages to deliver a
message. Usually that message is meant
to reinforce hierarchy, authority and legitimacy. People appear comforted by these performances
and so they have remained popular for thousands of years, adjusting to the
times and ideological context in which they must be performed. Indeed, the responsibility to produce that
comfort in the masses, the sense of order, coherence, control, and competence,
has been a central element of leadership irrespective of the nature of the
state or the character of the community. The appearance of a necessary public
unity may, and usually does, mask private difference. Most people understand
that, but prefer the appearance of unity as a show of good order. It is perhaps for that reason that much is
made of the disorder of the G7 and the relations between the United States and
its partners. It may, however, be useful to remember that the strategic value
of unity is centered on appearance, and not substance. That is, the appearance of unity is meant to
be projected outward onto the observer, rather than to reinforce the self-reflexive
understanding of the institution attempting to appear united. The appearance of unity is a commodity meant
to be distributed and used to purchase influence and induce behaviors among
those onto whom it is made available. It is for that reason that, like a
narcotic, it ought to be ingested with great caution and only to alleviate
greater harm.
Second, it is sometimes strategically useful to play against
expectation. Given the strong cultural
affinity toward leader unity, and ceremonies of power and authority, there may
be strategic value in behaving in ways that surprise and challenge. There is
substantial risk as well. If one assumes
that the objective of the current strategy is to put a spotlight on and change
past behaviors, then the course of conduct undertaken by Mr. Trump might be
risky, but can certainly meet that objective better than to resort to the
easily dismissed conventions of “polite society” in state to state relations. This is not to say that traditional good
manners in state to state relations have gone out of style in the Trump
Administration. Quite the reverse—it is
the strategic use of “bad” behavior that tends to appear to be used to
strategic advantage. Here the objective is to break bad habits and to shake up
what might have, in the opinion of some, be viewed as the ossified patterns of
relations between the United States and its allies in the face of “new era”
threats and behaviors. It is possible
that some in the current administration might take the position that it makes
no sense to encourage European behaviors respecting Russia, for example, based
on the over-use of gesture (especially for example with respect to the
so-called annexation of Crimea) without substance, while effectively creating
strong trade arrangements with Russia. On the other hand, U.S: policy toward
European engagement with China (in some sense even more intricate) has been
noticeably off the public radar.
Third, the appearance of unity does not invariably suggest
forward movement while the appearance of disarray does not invariably suggest
lack of positive movement. Formal expressions of unity make for great optics—of
the sort brilliantly captured, for example, by Soviet Poster Art form the first
half of the 20th century.
(Radio: Iz voli
Millionov sozdadim edinuiu voliu (Radio: From the Will of Millions we will
create a single will)1925 Leningrad; FIU Wolfensohn Museum Miami Beach, FL)
But it can hide disagreements as
well as project unity. Indeed, except
for any importance attached to its making and its utility in discerning hints
about underlying disunity or the relative positions of participants in these
exercises in optics, unity provides very little substance. It is obvious that an
SCO that includes China, India and Pakistan, is an organization in which deep
unity is unlikely. There one encounters
an organization with substantial efforts at surface accord and unity within
deep division. Might it be possible to
see in the NATO and G/7 meetings of 2018, surface division within deep unity. What
is most certain, though, is that old public behavior patterns have changed, and
those changes must have meaning. Beyond
that is speculation.
Fourth, it is becoming understood and, perhaps grudgingly, accepted that the post Second World War Order is
disappearing. The extent and success of
this passing perhaps may be gauged by the intensity of internal U.S. (and
European) opposition generated by those sectors of the intelligentsia, the
public and non-governmental sectors and among business elites, who were the
guardians, and beneficiaries of that passing world order. That is not to
suggest that this order, in its time, was neither brilliant nor useful. Indeed,
history will look back on that ordering as a golden age moment that came
exceptionally close to fundamentally changing the human community for a long
time. But it did not. And it could not for a number of reasons.
Some of these reasons were sourced in the internal contradictions of the fundamental
premises of that ordering. Some of them
were the product of the failures of individuals, and communities, at critical
moments, to do more than give lip service to the responsibilities imposed under
that order. And, of course, some of them
were grounded in the strength of the tendencies toward barbarity against which
this post World War II order was created. In the end, though, human mortality
did more to undermine that old order than any external force. As new generations arose, commitments and
understandings, interest and prejudices changed, and those were reflected not just
in culture but in geo-politics as well. What
that suggests, of course, is that in this period between great epochs, there
will be both instability and change. And
some of these may be both painful and quite dangerous. Saplings sometimes are
nurtured from and grow on the decaying trunks of its parents.
Fifth, change can suggest a positive transformation as well
as an inevitable decline. The problem with change is that, at the time of
occurrence, it is difficult to determine the direction of that change. For the enemies of the United States, or at
least for those communities whose interests are at the moment adverse to that
of the United States, change is most usefully characterized as evidence of
decline. For American elites whose interests are averse to that of the current
President, change is understood as evidence of temporary decline that can be
corrected were the masses to vote in the right way. Disagreement, here, can be
used to advance local political agendas.
For the Party in power, such disagreement may indicate strength in
forging a new path forward. But none of this is helpful except for the sort of
short term political analysis many of us are trained to believe is the only
thing that matters. For the longer term, my sense is that the changes one is
witnessing is not of decline but of transformation. The old multilateral order is going way to a
new multilateral order. The power of the
great states are changing in character and application, but they may not
necessarily be declining or increasing. It is too soon to tell. What is clear is that overplaying one’s hand
in this dynamic period can have consequences—that is appearing to be evident in
the context of the so-called trade wars behind the veil of which the global
economic order is changing.
Sixth, the problem of cost sharing in Western alliances is
an old one; Presidents Bush and Obama complained as well (e.g., here). But it goes back almost to the beginning of
the alliance (see, e.g., ). This was not
a Republican Party exercise. In 1963, President Kennedy spoke to the issue of
European free riding, not just with respect to NATO but with respect to other
multilateral efforts on which European prosperity after 1945 was dependent.
One effort we must make, the
President continued, is to seek to prevent European states from taking actions
which make our balance of payments problem worse. For example, we maintain
large forces in Germany. We must firmly oppose West Germany if it increases its
agricultural production to our detriment. We have not yet reached the point of
wheat against troops but we cannot continue to pay for the military protection
of Europe while the NATO states are not paying their fair share and living off
the “fat of the land.” We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time
for us to look out for ourselves, knowing full well that the Europeans will not
do anything for us simply because we have in the past helped them. (Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and
Canada; 168. Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council
Meeting (Washington, January 22, 1963)).
Beyond what appears to be President Kennedy’s early and
informal expression of what President Trump has fashioned as the “America
First” Policy, these sentiments and the underlying issues, suggest more a
continuity than a break with the past respecting the management of American
alliances. However, the issue of NATO cost sharing has been one marked by a
singular unwillingness to revisit cost sharing except exceptionally (a1998 GAOP
Report is instructive, see GAO/NSIAD-98-172 NATO,
though written in the context of enlargement. The exigencies of U.S. Middle
Eastern wars appeared to have shaped the focus over the last two decades (see, NATO Common Funds Burdensharing:
Background and Current Issues (2012) p. 8 drawing ion the 1998
GAO Report) by emphasizing capabilities and commitment contributions for cash
contributions). There has been some
effort to draw a parallel between the world of the 1970s and that of 2018 in
that respect, suggesting that the geo-political situation may push NATO partner
contributions higher out of threats fear and because the Europeans have the funds
(see, e.g., What
NATO’s burden-sharing history teaches us).
The problem here, perhaps, has been one of tactics rather than of objectives. Prior Presidents have been much more
discrete, and polite, in using their power to influence changes. Mr. Trump has
applied a much more direct and brutal style—one that permits little room for
face saving and the operations of the routine “behind the curtain” politics of
Europe. Mr. Kennedy complained to his staff; Mr. Trump complains to European
leaders. That stings; and it brings the appearance of retaliation.
Seventh, the tiff
over burden sharing, then, suggests the outward character of the inward
transformation of the alliance over which the United States has played a
leading role. The United States is not ready to pay the costs of the regimes
and orders as before perhaps because it no longer needs to, or because it no
longer feels that it is fair to be taxed for the burden of supporting allies
with diminishing returns, or because the U.S. seeks something else form
them. And indeed, it would be useful, in
this context, to consider the (mis)alignments between U.S.-European ideologies
of economic policies, and military relationships. In the end, however, absent extraordinary
shocks in Europe or the U.S., the alliance will remain sound. Fundamental interests are too closely
aligned; familial connections are too strong; cultural structures are too close
to suggest a permanent rupture at this stage.
But the avoidance of rupture does not mean that there will not be a
breech. And if European power is seen to decline further in relation to that of
other blocks, the space within which Europe may negotiate terms may shrink. That will not happen in the
long term, but I suspect there are people in many capitals that are even now plotting
the trajectories of power.
2-While the US
president Donald Trump attended the NATO and G7 summits with an aggressive
approach toward Washington’s allies, he is trying to improve relation with
North Korea and Russia with a reconciling approach. Why?
This makes
perfect sense in a way; to deal with one’s opponents requires a different
approach than to engage with one’s allies. As mentioned above, the United
States has form time to time taken quite aggressive stances when it seeks to
discipline its allies. The difference
with the past is that this time the aggression is public. That may be a
function of changes in mass democratic politics or the adoption of new
strategies. Or it may suggest a
negotiating style more in keeping with the preferences of those who now lead.
One would have to ask them; or their biographers. While the United States may
aggressively seek to change the working styles of relationships with allies, it
requires only the attainment of objectives with respect to its opponents. One
might be able to read that approach into the 2017 U.S. National Security
Strategy (From
Global to Fortress America; Thoughts on "National Security Strategy of the
United States" (4 Dec 2017)).
I would expect more of this sort of behavior in the future as the great powers
begin to sort their alliances and develop objectives with respect to their
opponents for mutual benefit and to minimize risk. Conflict will come with failures of alignment
of objectives and the interpretation of risk.
To that extent communication will become increasingly important; but
more than communication, a common basis
for calculation will have to be developed.
Perhaps that will be possible as states shift from individual
discretionary policy decisions, to AI aided decisions. Rumors have already begun circulating of
Chinese foreign ministry experiments in this area; that the rumors have been
permitted to go public suggests that the project may already be in an advanced stage
(e.g., generally “Next
Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” (新一代人工智能发展规划;
specifically “China
Is Using Artificial Intelligence to Help Make Diplomatic Decisions”).
3-The international
community is experiencing a new era in which while the US is retreating from
the old orders and regimes, China is trying to impose its own orders and
regimes by reviewing ancient Silk Road project. To what extent the developments
in the Middle East especially in Syria are affected by international systems
structure which is changing?
The Syrian situation has proven to be an interesting
space. In some ways it is symbolic of
the growing political division of Islam, again, and of its political
manifestation between its Ottoman,
Persian, and Arabic parts. In part it
suggests a continuation, interrupted by a
century, in the relationships between the Russian empire and the dar
al-Islam. Lastly, it reminds us of the role of the Middle East in trade and
energy. Syria has appeared to be of significant value both to renewed Ottoman
ambitions (in religious and political terms) and to the Russian
Federation. For the moment Russian
influence is deeply felt, and its ability to coordinate the militaries of
normally quite antagonistic forces is remarkable. But these things seldom last in
a region whose divisions seem to mark its most permanent characteristic. The U.S. remains an important player, though
in a changing way, and the Chinese appear to be acquiring more influence. Yet
it is useful to note the differences in the working styles of each of these major
actors. The Chinese working style might
be best compared to its Tong dynasty policy of protecting trade to China
through a system of well protected roadways.
The image of the Silk Road is thus powerful not just for its imagery but
also for its sense of the shape of the policy behind it. That policy, in turn,
is given concrete shape in the architecture of Chinese projections abroad. The most emblematic, in the Middle East at
least, is the style fo fortress being built by the Chinese in Djibouti (e.g., “Satellite
imagery offers clues to China’s intentions in Djibouti”). At the same time, the U.S. has been tilting
toward the Arab bloc. That produces
warmer relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and makes it more likely that
Turkey and Iran will align with Russia.
Syria, again, suggests the outlines of that pattern. In that sense,
then, one might look to the Middle East to see the glimmerings of the way in
which the new global order—with “Silk Roads” leading to Washington; Beijing;
and Moscow—might manifest itself in political and economic relations. But as road, rather than empires, these alignments
will mask much activity across alignments. And these alignments will produce distinct
kinds of relationships. The Chinese,
Russians, Americans and Europeans are cultivating now increasingly distinct
styles at their core, even as they begin to converge at their edges. Most telling in this respect is the creation
of the Japanese-American version of the Chinese led Asian infrastructure
initiative (e.g., “Australia,
Japan Join U.S. Infrastructure Push in Asia”).
4-Some theoreticians
including John Mearsheimer believe that one of the most important elements of
president Trump’s foreign policy is to move toward offshore balancing and
reduction of troops and increasing of animosity with Iran. Do you agree with
this? Will the US decrease the number of its troops in Middle East? If we
accept that the mentioned elements be the base for Trump’s foreign policy, how
will Washington confront with Iran’s regional influence?
I have some sympathy for the offshore balancing strategy,
and its focus on regrouping forces. As a matter of strategy it has
strengths. At the same time, there are
risks. No state with which the U.S:
cultivates relationships wishes to find itself drawn outside the line of
principal protection. And, with respect
to Latin America, the political consequences, again, could prove quite
distracting. Indeed, the United States
has been lucky to date that given its relative inattention to Latin America, that
the Chinese and Russia and have not exploited the situation to their
benefit. But that may be changing,
especially as the Chinese travel all over Latin America embedding themselves in
the local economy in ways that will work toward their benefit. Still, even with
a policy of neglect, the cost of Russian and Chinese deep penetration may not
be worth the price, all things being equal. On the other hand, map drawing of
this sort always tends to have risks—as the Spanish and Portuguese discovered
after the 1490s, when having divided the New World with the blessing of the
Pope in the Treaty of Tordesillas, discovered that none Catholic England and
Catholic France were all to happy to make itself at home in North America. More
importantly, U.S. strategic interests worth fighting for have a tendency to
change, and sometimes change quickly.
Line drawing runs the risk of a rigidity that may impede good analysis
and better response to the protection of U.S: interests. On the other hand, the basic point, that the
United States ought not to consider itself the automatic first responder for every situation that is the least bit
disquieting, is sound. But in a way that sort of strategy had been more or less
discernable in Africa, where the U.S. usually was able to rely on the old
colonial powers (especially France) for responses to instability and crisis
within its old empire.
That leaves the issue of Iran. First, it is not clear that one can consider
Iran without also considering Turkey.
These are two rising regional powers which are quickly adjusting to new
circumstances in ways that might change expected behaviors, objectives and
strategies. Second, Russian interests, like U.S. interests, are served in the
long term by stability. Of course,
instability for the purpose of installing or preserving regimes friendly to the
superior power, will be tolerated. As a
consequence, it would be difficult to predict Iranian and Turkish policy
objectives without considering Russia.
Lastly, even if the United States appears to retreat, it is unclear
whether that means its interests will not be indirectly protected. The test of that change in strategy, perhaps,
may be in gestation in the Yemeni conflict. In this sense, one might not speak
to Syria without also considering Yemen.
5-Reacting to
President Trump’s remarks calling EU as the US foe, Donald Tusk, president of
the European Council asked Trump and Putin not to disturb world order. Do you
think that Trump and Putin are going to create a new world order? If your answer
is yes, how will the new polarization be in the new order?
Donald Tusk’s heart was in the right place, certainly, when
he offered that plea. And to some extent, the world order, in general terms,
will survive roughly in the form in which the post WWII Allies created it. But
by the time Mr. Tusk offered that plea, the world order he hoped to preserve
was already going. Perhaps a century
from now historians will debate whether the transformation began with the political
turmoil of the World Trade Center attacks, or perhaps in the aftermath of the
global recession of 2007-2008. But
change has come, both to the economic and to the political order. Discourse is moving in important circles from
one that focuses on multilateralism within which states are subordinate, to
regional trading blocs and the national characterization of international
consensus. The new world order might be built around aggregating bilateralism
structured around powerful states and enterprises. The tensions between political regionalism and
economic globalism framed through supra national production chains will likely
occupy policymakers for some time as they try to deliver regimes of stability
and economic development with national
characteristics. For many, these changes
may be imperceptible—certainly that is true when measured by the small
transactions that mark everyday life within ordinary families. Goods continue
to circulate freely, so does capital, and even for the most part
investments. Yet, the four previous
questions already nicely suggest the trajectory of the changes to the global
order, the risks inherent in those changes, and the worries that those changes
bring.
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