寻衅滋事 [Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble]: China Tightens Regulation of Celebrity Culture as it Reforms Education and Develops Insights From "Social Mentality" Studies

 

I have been looking at the ways in which states have increasingly sought to (again) attain a greater control of the management of the popular culture and the way in which the masses approach, understand, value, and embrace cultural knowledge.  China has proven to be an easy site for study primarily because its efforts have been both quite visible and unashamedly open. The West  is working in parallel, but as a more fractured  amalgam of ecologies of collectives, it is both more difficult to trace and much less stable.  Either way, the goal is an important one--the management of perceptions of customs and traditions, of the way that things are accepted as "natural."

In the case of China, I have focused on two related but distinct thrusts in the assertion of leadership by the vanguard (as the leading force of society--in the West there are many collectives vying for the authority of a "leading societal force"). The first focused on longitudinal efforts--the education of the young and the disciplining of the intelligentsia (here). The second focused on a sustained and quite objectives based development of fields of study on the management of what is called social mentality (here).  

For this post I focus on an increasingly important, and potentially challenging source of cultural power in China--celebrities and their fans. Liberal democratic collectives, of course, have long ago embedded and exploited celebrity culture (influencers, theatrical people, "personalities with followers, Tik Tok stars, talk media mouthpieces and the like). They have become large parts of the cultural landscape along with traditional actors--religious leaders, institutional big-wigs, public intellectuals, industrialists with substantial media presence, and political figures. To that extent, they have become potent but are deeply embedded in the culture machine and in this sense support rather than challenge the institutional structures which are designed to withstand constant movements of cultural orthodoxy (at least within normative limits).  Those normative limits, that is system tolerance of movement and deviation, has been increasingly tested since the 1960s, but the liberal democratic system has been stable enough to eventually absorb these movements.  That, in part, is grounded in the fundamental institutional structure that is made stronger by factional fracture (again within tolerable limits, the definition of which also tends to be a moving target). 

Leninist systems necessarily approach this source of cultural power from a different perspective.  With the leading social forces, its political vanguard, at the center, the systemic toleration of autonomous sources of societal production becomes much more problematic.  That problem increases as a function of its intersection with the objectives of the vanguard, it basic line, and its definition of the sphere of activity that are meant to be undertaken only under and through the guidance and leadership of the vanguard. These normative limits are also constantly tested, and its constitution are also dynamic. The relationship between the Communist Party and celebrity culture is a great example.  Once understood as innocuous enough (again within the limits of systemic toleration, which started quite broadly), celebrity culture has become more of a challenge as it grows in power and influence in ways that might rival that of its liberal democratic analogues. What is tolerable, or even cliche, in liberal democratic states, however, can easily be constituted a direct threat to the policies, objectives and (most dangerously) the authority of the vanguard.  

Pix Credit HERE

Celebrity culture was originally treated (mostly) as harmless and distracting--fashion, talent, discussion of roles (again within bounds that avoided politics or criticism of the vanguard). Celebrities  did not appear to threaten the political order and as long as they stayed out of politics and avoided scandal, they helped pass the time. Nonetheless, in this era when everything is political or cultural (that certainly has been the trajectory of thinking in liberal democratic systems as well) it would not be long before the consequences of celebrity--fans and influence, would draw attention. And the attention would become more suspicious as celebrities and their fans began to appear to be less compatible with their exploitation  in the service of vanguard goals. Individual lapses were easily identified and controlled, and celebrities wore golden collars--they could fairly easily be guided to avoid sensitivities.  But once celebrity culture spawned substantial and focal fan bases, things appear to have changed.  Fan bases from a Leninist perspective looks suspiciously like mass mobilization.  Mass mobilization for objectives consonant with vanguard objectives might be tolerated or exploited.  But where its autonomy collided with (changing and broadening) vanguard  policies and objectives (in this case the control of cultural movement and the training of the young), or when it becomes to collide with great public societal campaigns (the Socialist Core Values, the campaigns for trust and trustworthiness) things become more complicated.  

Of course Chinese social credit regimes might have been deployed to manage these autonomous collectives and exploit them (harness their influence potential) to align with vanguard objectives.  But this was not a path chosen by the vanguard decision making bureaucracy (perhaps a problem of capacity, perhaps a problem of inter-vanguard fighting, perhaps a normative decision based on a rejection of the use of data driven metrics based nudging strategies; it is not clear). Instead, as recently reported by Reuters, the vanguard appears to be choosing a more old fashioned path, one that is reactive rater than proactive, and one that is likely to produce additional challenges that the next generation of leaders will be forced to face because of the generational blinkers of the current collective assigned the task of domesticating celebrity culture.

Pix Credit HERE

China cracked down on what it described as a "chaotic" celebrity fan culture on Friday, barring platforms from publishing popularity lists and regulating the sale of fan merchandise after a series of controversies involving artists. The country's top internet watchdog said it would take action against the dissemination of "harmful information" in celebrity fan groups and close down discussion channels that spread celebrity scandals or "provoke trouble". Platforms will no longer be able to publish lists of popular celebrity individuals and fan groups must be regulated, the watchdog said. (Brenda Goh and David Stanway, "China cracks down on 'chaotic' celebrity fan culture after scandals," Reuters (27 August 2021))

Also on the chopping block was any sort of televised interactive activity that has the slightest alignment with the practices of liberal democratic states--for example voting to express collective sentiment . "

The internet regulator is also barring variety shows from charging fans to vote online for their favourite acts and has spoken out against enticing netizens to buy celebrity merchandise. Regulators need to "increase their sense of responsibility, mission and urgency to maintain online political and ideological security," the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) said in a statement. (Ibid.)

Pix Credit: HERE

But it is not just the voting.  There has been some misgiving about the way that such devices instill values that may corrupt.  More immediately it appears to also affect the ability of youth to function appropriately in the society being crafted for them by the vanguard. These clubs "have also been criticised for their influence over minors and for causing social disorder, as competing fan clubs have been seen trading verbal abuse online or spending large amounts of money to vote for their favourite stars on idol competition programmes." (Ibid,.). But it also represents a large industry in its own right--one substantially beyond the guidance of the vanguard: A "local newspaper The Paper projecting the country's "idol economy" could be worth 140 billion yuan ($21.59 billion) by 2022." Ibid. Still, it is the chaos of mass politics by other means to likely worries at least some within the vanguard senior leadership. Sports and entertainment for for millennia been the usual way in which mass political expression can be realized--sometimes with substantial political effect--when formal politics is subject to different rules. The Nika Riots in the Eastern Roman Empire provides an ancient template (here).

A conservative view of Leninism might view this later decision as necessary.  Voting and the imposition of collective decision making from the bottom might be understood as a challenge to the core Leninist principle of democratic centralism.  On the other hand, democratic centralism cannot be read in isolation in Chinese theory (again practice is an entirely different world form time to time in ways that poses additional challenges not considered here).  The Chinese mass line suggests the structures for encouraging, exploiting and managing popular sentiment in ways that make it easier and less risky for the exercise of democratic centralism by putting the conversations between guiding leadership and mass sentiment at the center of leadership working styles. 

Pix Credit HERE

Most interesting, of course, is the implicit rejection of the managerial approach of big data and social credit regimes (especially ironic in the context of internet based regulation and leadership guidance), and the reliance on very old school administrate  (and inefficient case by case) discretionary administration through the use of that old stand by--"provoking trouble." Not that there isn't a role for this catch all in a Leninist system (though the arbitrariness of its application especially when not used as a top down disciplinary tool, can be risky for the long term trajectories of authority). "Celebrities have also been directly criticised. On Tuesday, the China Federation of Literary and Art Workers Professional Ethics Committee held a forum in Beijing that issued a proposal advocating strict self-discipline for actors and other entertainers." ("China to crack down on 'chaotic' online fan culture; iQiyi halts 'idol competition' programmes," Straits Times (27 August 2021).

And yet it might have been worth considering whether the this approach aligned and creates synergies with the vanguard's efforts at managing culture and ideological training in the education system, and more importantly, whether it provides maximum benefits  within the insights provided by the emerging study of social mentality.  Suppression and resort to ancient techniques also ought to be considered in light of the trajectories suggested by emerging principles of New Era thinking. Here there is no question that celebrity culture represents an important target for regulation and now falls within the basic line of the Communist Party and its New Era objectives ("China has stringent rules on content ranging from video games to movies to music, and censors anything it believes violates core socialist values." "China cracks down on 'chaotic' celebrity fan culture). The ideological question, then, is whether is this an approach consistent with that ideology or now a distraction from its forward looking agendas. 

In any case, this policy thrust might best be understood as deeply embedded in what appears to be a large scale multi-objective policy that might well have been long in the planning and now executed seriatim along its various front.  The Reuters reporting follows below.  More reporting here, here, and here. For sympathetic reporting in Chinese see eg HERE (每个人都能感受到，一场深刻的变革正在进行！ [Everyone can feel that a profound change is underway!]). Describing the chaos in the entertainment industry it then connected the actions against the entertainment industry with other actions against big data and credit enterprises this way:

金融领域、文化领域到政治领域都在发生一场深刻的变革，或者也可以说是一场深刻的革命。这是一次从资本集团向人民群众的回归，这是一次以资本为中心向以人民为中心的变革。因此，这是一场政治变革，人民正在重新成为这场变革的主体，所有阻挡这场以人民为中心变革的都将被抛弃。这场深刻的变革也是一次回归，向着中国共产党的初心回归，向着以人民为中心回归，向着社会主义本质回归。[A profound change is taking place in the financial field, the cultural field, and the political field, or it can be said to be a profound revolution. This is a return from the capital group to the masses of the people, and this is a transformation from capital-centered to people-centered. Therefore, this is a political change, the people are becoming the main body of this change again, and all those who block this people-centered change will be discarded. This profound change is also a return, a return to the original intention of the Chinese Communist Party, a return to the people-centered nature, and a return to the essence of socialism.]. 

August 27, 20217:34 PM EDTLast Updated 2 days ago

China cracks down on 'chaotic' celebrity fan culture after scandals

By Brenda Goh and David Stanway

Singer-actor Kris Wu is seen on the cover of a fashion magazine at a newsstand in Beijing, China July 20, 2021. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang

SHANGHAI, Aug 27 (Reuters) - China cracked down on what it described as a "chaotic" celebrity fan culture on Friday, barring platforms from publishing popularity lists and regulating the sale of fan merchandise after a series of controversies involving artists.

The country's top internet watchdog said it would take action against the dissemination of "harmful information" in celebrity fan groups and close down discussion channels that spread celebrity scandals or "provoke trouble".

Platforms will no longer be able to publish lists of popular celebrity individuals and fan groups must be regulated, the watchdog said.

The internet regulator is also barring variety shows from charging fans to vote online for their favourite acts and has spoken out against enticing netizens to buy celebrity merchandise.

Regulators need to "increase their sense of responsibility, mission and urgency to maintain online political and ideological security," the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) said in a statement.

China has stringent rules on content ranging from video games to movies to music, and censors anything it believes violates core socialist values. The crackdown on celebrity fan culture also comes amid a wider regulatory campaign against the country's Internet giants. read more

CELEBRITY MISBEHAVIOUR

Online celebrity fan clubs have become a widespread phenomenon in China with local newspaper The Paper projecting the country's "idol economy" could be worth 140 billion yuan ($21.59 billion) by 2022.

But they have also been criticised for their influence over minors and for causing social disorder, as competing fan clubs have been seen trading verbal abuse online or spending large amounts of money to vote for their favourite stars on idol competition programmes.

When Canadian-Chinese pop star Kris Wu was detained by Beijing police last month on suspicion of sexual assault, his fan groups come to his defence on social media. Most of these fan accounts, along with Wu's online accounts, were later shut down. read more

China's Netflix equivalent, iQiyi, also drew fire earlier this year after fans of one of its talent shows were filmed wasting milk in their bid to qualify to vote. On Thursday iQiyi said it would no longer broadcast idol competition shows. read more

Chinese authorities have also been targeting domestic celebrities after a number of controversies.

In January, actor Zheng Shuang became engulfed in a surrogacy controversy and she was later probed by tax authorities. On Friday, Shanghai tax authorities said they had decided to fine her 299 million yuan for tax evasion.

Separately, Chinese video platforms on Friday took down films starred or directed by Zhao Wei, one of China's biggest stars, citing "relevant laws and regulations" which prompted widespread online speculation over the reason. Her name was also removed from online casting lists.

Chinese celebrities have been subjected to such treatment in the past when they have fallen foul of the authorities or public sentiment. Zhao's management agency, Pulin Saisi, told Reuters it had no knowledge of the situation.

Reporting by David Stanway and Brenda Goh; Aditional reporting by Sophie Yu; Editing by Gerry Doyle, Ana Nicolaci da Costa and Tomasz Janowski