We are pleased to conclude our Symposium with a special treat for our readers: a double interview with two renowned scholars, Surya Deva and Claire Methven O’Brien, who are rather emblematic for different approaches and convictions regarding Business and Human Rights.
Opinions differ on how successful the OEIGWG treaty process
has been so far, both in terms of diplomatic negotiations as well as a
norm-development exercise. What do you think needs to happen now for the
process to be successful, and how could agency for the final outcome –
whatever form it may take – be achieved on the international level?
Claire: This is an excellent question, and the
answer is hardly straightforward or certain. Of course, it also depends
on what you think success looks like in this context.
For some, a treaty with relatively few adhering States, assumed to
come from the Global South, would be a success. Even if the actual
impact of such an instrument might not be extensive, on this view, it
could still embody a symbolic victory. The fact that more industrialised
States declined to participate would usefully spotlight what some
actors see as their hypocrisy on human rights issues – promoting human
rights in the public sphere but failing to accept their consequences
when it comes to extraterritorial ‘externalities’ of transnational
markets, production and investments. For those who take this view,
judgments against TNCs resulting from litigation taking point of
departure in the treaty, even if unenforced, for instance, might
nonetheless have a valuable function as moral judgements, offering
political capital in other settings.
I would not see this outcome as success, however, and I don’t share
its assumptions. Unquestionably, hypocrisies and contradictions abound
when it comes to human rights. Certainly, they should be challenged; on one view,
their dissonances actually present discursive space essential to
advancing progressive agendas. Relatedly, I believe universality remains
a critical aspiration in the realm of human rights. I do not therefore
think a UN human rights treaty-making initiative can self-consciously
aim from the outset to exclude many billions of people, across
industrialised and industrialising countries, from the ambit of its
protection, or deem this an acceptable end-point. On the contrary, a
human rights project must remain optimistic that all peoples, and their
respective governments, can share and define some common commitments, in
spite of differences of approach to their realisation. A project
without this inclusive and tolerant vision at its fundament is probably
another kind of project, rather than a human rights project, I think.
Also, North-South dynamics obviously retain importance in some
respects. But I think the analytical traction of North-South categories
is increasingly challenged, or at least their completeness. Certainly,
they do not exhaust relations of domination and exploitation in the
world, or the world economy. Capital is not territorially or even
materially bounded. Relationships of abuse, in the business and human
rights domain, flow in all directions: intra-North, intra-South,
South-North as well as North-South. Given this, it is crucial, I think,
that a treaty have the capacity to facilitate the widest possible
solidarities, and to identify patterns of abuse, whatever their
geographical configuration. Seeing only with a North-South lens, or even
a value chain lens, rather risks obscuring many problematic
aggregations of power and resources, and failures of accountability, so
that even egregious or colossal
denials of rights may be rendered invisible or beyond reach. I also
think that the subjectivities implicitly associated with a North-South
binary are essentialising and reductive. (This is also why, by the way, I
think the ‘unwilling or unable’ formulation generally applied to States
from the Global South, in terms of the ability to provide remediation
locally, is misplaced and patronising. Conversely, it may apply just as
well to States from the Global North, in relation to business-related
harms, though we rarely see this application practiced).
So, taking all this into account: I think a treaty, to be successful,
must enjoy wide, ideally, full, or as full as possible, participation
by States. Not at any expense, in terms of content. But surely, the
content will need to abstract from some of the specific requirements
foreseen in the OEIGWG drafts tabled to date, to accommodate a greater
plurality of national positions.
As is well known, I believe a framework-style BHR instrument, bridging in its primary text the concerns driving the OIEGWG drafts, and the principles and approach of the UN Framework and UNGPs,
but with scope to define sector-specific norms and subject-specific
rules on an ongoing basis, has potential in this regard, as well as in-principle merit from a range of legal and governance perspectives (see here, here and here).
I also think this approach has better prospects of promoting coherence
with wider climate-related and sustainability norms and objectives,
which must surely be a critical concern.
On the other hand, I think it is clear, and some contributions to this symposium (Roorda and Klaaren)
help further to clarify, that the OEIGWG texts and process are unlikely
to lead to that outcome. The critiques expressed in response to the
OEIGWG texts have been too widely dispersed amongst States, too
fundamental, and too consistent over time (reported here, here, here and here),
I think, to allow for their dismissal as technically mistaken, male
fides or purely instrumental to neo-imperialist dynamics, even if they
are no doubt coloured by power, self-interest and the desire to preserve sovereignties to some extent.
Consequently, for me, ‘success’ in the treaty process assumes opening
up the discussion, to encompass a wider range of perspectives and
proposals besides the latest OIEGWG draft. I have not yet seen any
convincing analysis to suggest this is not possible within the scope of
the resolution establishing the OEIGWG (UN HRC Resolution 26/9). Indeed, the US intervention
last year, as well as comments by the EU and others, suggests
otherwise. So, there is no need for a ‘tabula rasa’, or to expunge the
texts to which civil society and others have contributed so far.
A successful outcome is certainly attainable. Whether it will actually
materialise, however, will depend on whether the combination of
political leadership, diplomatic application, advocacy strategy and
scholarly engagement on which human rights progress always depends
eventuates. And that is a contingent matter that now rests in our
collective hands.
In this context, I think it is long overdue that States and other
relevant actors are pressed for more detail on what they would accept in
a treaty text. Declining to do engage on this terrain, I think, just
makes it easier for those that may rather not see any treaty at all to
prolong the current impasse. So, I would rather that States and others
that have voiced objections, or participated while reserving their
positions, or signalled a desire for alternative approaches, are now
challenged directly to articulate their positive vision for a BHR
treaty. A ‘no compromise’ stance, on the part of treaty proponents,
makes it easier, I think, for States to dismiss the entire process.
Again, this may be interesting if the objective is to reveal the whole
edifice of international human rights protection to be a dysfunctional
sham. But I think human rights advocacy presumes greater faith in our
collective ability to progress towards better norms and institutions
than is compatible with that approach.
Surya: The de jure agency for the proposed treaty
has been with States, in line with the predominantly State-centric
architecture of current international law. However, the Treaty Alliance comprising civil society organisations and BHR scholars
from all world regions have held a de facto agency. Considering the
significant resistance that the treaty process faced in its initial
phase from developed States and business organisations, it might not
have survived without active role of these non-State actors.
While accomplishing the ultimate goal of the current OEIGWG process
remains uncertain at this stage, it has already achieved certain
positive outcomes. This process has, for example, forced many developed
States – including the European Union (EU) – and BHR scholars to take
the treaty project seriously, rather than just focusing on the
implementation of the UNGPs through national actions plans (NAPs). It is not a coincidence that even some businesses and investors
in recent years have realised the value of creating a global level
playing field through binding rules at the regional and international
levels.
The chances of securing a BHR treaty should increase if the treaty
complements the UNGPs, States and other stakeholders are engaged in
between annual OEIGWG sessions to build consensus, expectations of civil
society organisations are managed, legitimate concerns of developing
States and businesses are addressed, and a balance is maintained between
specificity and flexibility.
The question as to what form a treaty in BHR should take has
been the subject of much discussion, fuelled again by the recently
expressed openness of the USA for a framework convention. In your
opinion, is a conventional treaty or a framework convention more
promising (see Klaaren), both in terms of content and of endorsement and compliance (see Grohmann) by States?
Surya: The question about the form of a BHR treaty
is perhaps not the right one to ask because it tries to put “the cart
before the horse”. The primary question should be: why is a BHR treaty
needed and what type of the treaty is most suitable to respond to this
need? The form question is subsidiary and should be answered in relation
to the primary question, rather than overshadowing the raison d’être
for such a treaty.
We should also take the so-called US openness with a pinch of salt.
The US has a chequered history concerning international treaty making
generally (see Van Ho).
Regarding the OEIGWG process specifically, the US has tried to derail
the process both in Geneva and New York. It is also very unlikely that
the US would ratify any BHR treaty that pushes the agenda on corporate
accountability. In short, the US government would need to provide some
tangible evidence of its good faith negotiation before being taken
seriously regarding its openness to “exploring alternative instruments, binding or nonbinding – such as a legally binding framework agreement”.
I agree with one of the underpinning rationales behind the proposal
for a framework convention: the difficulty in building a consensus among
significant number of States around too many substantive provisions
with precise details in one BHR treaty (see Roorda and O’Brien).
Hence, instead of aiming for a catch-all treaty, an incremental
approach may be more practicable. What is needed is a middle path
between “an empty shell” and “an overly prescriptive” treaty. This
middle path could be achieved through a series of treaties by following
either the conventional treaty or the framework convention approach.
The devil is in the details, rather than in the label of the form. A
framework convention can contain detailed and reasonably specific
substantive provisions, including on the obligations of State parties.
The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
is a case in point. On the other hand, even a conventional treaty could
have an in-built process to negotiate future substantive elements. In
fact, Article 15(5) of the Third Revised Draft
already provides for this possibility: “The States Parties shall meet
regularly in a Conference of States Parties in order to consider any
matter with regard to the implementation of the (Legally Binding
Instrument), including any further development needed towards fulfilling
its purposes.” Article 17(1) further notes that this treaty “may be
supplemented by one or more protocols”. Therefore, we should not frame
the discussion about the form of the proposed BHR treaty in a binary
way.
Claire: I have partly answered this question
already, in my answer to your first question. However, I also think that
the question as posed overstates the differences between ‘conventional’
and framework treaties (a point that Nils Grohmann’s contribution here
illustrates well). The form of a legal instrument is clearly not
without any significance. Neither do I doubt the value, intrinsically or
instrumentally, of ‘binding’ legal norms. But there is a wealth of
scholarship addressing international (and regional) treaties, compliance,
implementation and the roles of institutions that has illuminated that
form and content of legal norms is not all, in explaining outcomes. The
‘hard vs soft law’ binary can be very misleading. Existing human rights treaties may have more in common with framework instruments than ‘conventional’ treaties addressing narrow or technical matters. Barbara Koremenos has done some important work in this area, and we have a piece in pipeline that will look at BHR treaty design specifically.
The discussion on the treaty form has led to great tension,
one might even say polarisation. Some commentators have argued that a
framework convention would undermine the development of an appropriate
human rights standard (see van Ho),
while others have considered this treaty design option to be more
viable than the detailed provisions envisaged in the current OEIGWG
draft (see Roorda).
Taking another perspective, it has been criticized that a shift to a
framework convention would render futile the efforts of stakeholders
such as civil society actors (see do Amaral Vieira)
invested into several negotiation rounds. In your opinion, how could
these tensions be resolved? Would it be an option to combine the two
approaches, for example by simultaneously negotiating and adopting both,
a framework convention with ambitious principles and institutional
mechanisms and a more detailed protocol with provisions from the current
OEIGWG draft?
Claire: I think it is very natural that there are
different, and opposing, views on what content and model of BHR treaty
should be pursued, and on the best political and diplomatic approaches
to securing a treaty, as this symposium illustrates. And certainly, yes,
I think it would be possible to advance a draft framework convention
text in tandem with one or more draft protocols, or model laws, or sets
of formal guidance on various topics that are addressed by the existing
OEIGWG text, and I have suggested this approach for some time.
Surya: Polarisation is not unique to the BHR field.
In any case, some resistance, and consequent polarisation, is inevitable
in the BHR field because any project seeking to hold powerful business
actors accountable for human rights abuses is likely to disrupt powers
enjoyed by vested interests. Seen in the context, the current BHR treaty
process has unmasked the “wide but thin” – rather than a “thick” –
consensus around the UNGPs and contributed to positive and
action-triggering tensions from the perspective of rights holders.
The OEIGWG process emerged as a response to the perceived softness of
the UNGPs. However, over the years this process has rightly evolved
from an “either or” to a “complementary” approach. The proposed BHR
treaty should take the UNGPs as a “starting point” and not the “end
point” (as I have explained
in detail elsewhere). In fact, after almost five decades of discussion
about binding international obligations of (multinational) corporations,
adopting a BHR treaty with merely an “agreement to agree” or an
agreement only on broad general principles will be a regressive step. We
should not, once again, deceive the affected rights holders by handing
them a hollow victory (see do Amaral Vieira).
Rather, the treaty process should be used to test the seriousness of
commitment made by States and businesses to implement the UNGPs and
address various regulatory gaps that soft standards would never be able
to fill.
Regardless of its form, a BHR treaty is unlikely to solve all
issues in business and human rights area from the outset, or perhaps at
all. In your opinion, what are the main obstacles to aligning business
activities with human rights and sustainable development? What criteria
do should be used to evaluate the success of a UN human rights treaty?
Claire: This is a complex and multi-dimensional
problem. But you are right, in one sense the BHR problematique is that
of how to drive human society and economic activity, globally and at
subordinate levels, towards more equitable, emancipating and
environmentally sustainable forms. This encompasses aspects of
alignment, but also of course reform and reconstitution of basic
concepts and norms of trade, investment, finance, economics as well as
the corporation itself. We see many legal and policy efforts today, as
well as initiatives in the market domain, apparently devoted to such
goals. It does not yet seem clear, though, whether they will in
aggregate be adequate to discipline the negative tendencies of today’s
predominating systems of production and exchange, in time to avoid
irreversible planetary damage.
I think my greatest concern currently, in terms of obstacles to
avoiding that outcome, probably relates to finance and financialisation.
Here is a shadowy continent dedicated to goals of accumulation and
profit extraction that are generally inimical to social and
environmental sustainability, and equality, combined with technical
complexity, speed and a de-territorialised form that puts it largely
beyond the reach of effective democratic control and human rights
accountability, even if its impacts for human rights are profound and
all-pervasive.
So, this is another reason why I favour a broad rather than a
narrow-spectrum BHR treaty: I think an instrument that insists on, but
gets ensnared in, hard-to-resolve issues of civil procedure risks
leaving us critically exposed in other areas.
Surya: Despite all the rhetoric, rights and rights
holders have not been central to the development and implementation of
BHR standards so far. Nor do these standards generally respond to ground
realities in the Global South. Even the UNGPs perform poorly on these
criteria (Deva 2013; Meyersfeld 2017). Although rooted in the International Bill of Rights, Pillar II of the UNGPs turns “rights” into mere “social expectations” (an issue that I have addressed
elsewhere). Moreover, as the viability of human rights due diligence
was tested mostly in relation to the practice of multinational
corporations (Ruggie, Just Business, pp. 152-53),
the content of Pillar II pays inadequate attention to informal economy
actors or unique regulatory challenges faced by States from the Global
South. Non-centrality of rights and rights holders is thus a main
obstacle in making a meaningful progress on the ground.
The problem of starting with a weak foundation is compounded by the corporate capture of States (see do Amaral Vieira)
as well as lack of political will on the part of States to address
corporate impunity for human rights abuses. For example, States such as
China, India and Russia, which had voted in support of the resolution
establishing the OEIGWG (resolution 26/9),
have done little to strengthen the current treaty process. On the other
hand, the EU’s engagement with the BHR treaty process, despite securing
a major concession about the scope of the treaty covering all business
enterprises (see the 2019
and subsequent drafts), has been lukewarm at best. Moreover, the EU has
exposed itself to attacks for adopting double standards, because the
European Commission’s Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence
applies only to big corporations. In this context, the current treaty
process should also be used to build the necessary political will bottom
up, because “political and economic constraints can be overcome” to
boost up States’ commitment (Kirkebø and Langford 2018, p. 182).
The fractured agendas of BHR, the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), the right to development and climate change pose another major
challenge (see Jägers 2021).
Moreover, it is unclear that many States are learning lessons from the
COVID-19 pandemic and reorienting their laws and policies to weed out
inherently exploitative or unsustainable business models. A fundamental
shift is also needed in “the existing economic model” as well as in corporate laws and international investment law to create pathways for an inclusive and sustainable development.
In short, there are many obstacles in ensuring that businesses act in
line with international human rights standards. A BHR treaty, while
needed, cannot overcome all these obstacles, especially those which are
systemic or structural in nature. Yet, any treaty should keep rights and
rights holders central. It should try to fill “black spots” of the
UNGPs, address asymmetries between rights and obligations of
corporations, encourage collective action on the part of States and
strengthen access to remedy for corporate human rights abuses.
No comments:
Post a Comment