I am delighted to share this quite interesting interview with David Lampton, the Author of Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War.
David M. Lampton is Professor Emeritus and former Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Sr. Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute. Dr. Lampton was formerly President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and he is the author of many books including his most recently published Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War. Below, you will find the transcript from the U.S.-China Perception Monitor’s interview with Dr. Lampton about his new book. Dr. Lampton also shared three personal anecdotes about his experiences in U.S.-China relations that we have published separately here.
编者按：大卫·M·兰普顿（David M. Lampton）是约翰霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院 (SAIS) 的名誉教授、前海曼教授兼SAIS中国和中国研究主任，外交政策研究所 (Foreign Policy Institute)的高级研究员。兰普顿博士还曾担任美中关系全国委员会主席，出版著作无数，是一个权威的“中国通”学者。他最近出版的新书《经历美中关系：从冷战到冷战》（Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War) 从近六十年的亲身经历出发，讲述了中美关系作为两个社会而非仅仅两个国家之间的故事。本书先已经在亚马逊以及各大网络平台上架。以下是中美印象编辑们对兰普顿博士关于他的新书采访的编译。采访中，兰普顿博士还分享了三个关于他在美中关系中经历的轶事，我们已经在这里单独发表。
The interview in English and Chinese are reported below. The original posting may be accessed HERE: English; Chinese.
An Interview with David M. Lampton: Living U.S.-China Relations
The defining and unique characteristic of this volume is that it tells the story of U.S.-China ties as the relationship between two societies, not just two states. This account has nuance, avoids black-and-white caricature, and is empathetic.
Why did I write this book? To understand myself. To understand China to a greater degree. And, to enhance Sino-American cooperation and mutual understanding. My experience is that people write books for more than one reason. For me there were three: personal, field-related history and methodology, and then policy.
At the personal level: This book was my principal “COVID pandemic period project.” During that long period of isolation, this project, along with my family, were my companions. Also, even had there been no pandemic, China was itself becoming less accessible to scholars such as myself who relied on extensive field research. This project enabled me to use a lifetime of data that I already had accumulated.
A more deeply personal reason is that we’re all so busy leading our lives during middle age that we often are not particularly self-conscious about how we got to any given moment. One day, you sort of wake up and say, “Well, how is it that I ended up studying China in the first case? Why did I study it the way I did?” Finally, my father and my grandfather had left our respective extended families their autobiographies. I had found that their life stories grounded me, and I wanted to do no less for my children and grandchildren.
The academic reasons for this project were several. Serendipitously, during my career I had unusual access to players in U.S.-China relations in both countries, players at five levels: multi-lateral international, central government-to-central government, locality-to-locality, civil society-to-civil society, and individual-to-individual. One should consider all those levels, because all of them have shaped the way our two societies have interacted over the last 50 years–indeed way before that.
I’m an inveterate note taker. For most of my career I did not take and save notes principally to create an historical record, but rather because I listen more carefully to what people are saying when I’m writing it down. So, with the passage of time I accumulated an extensive data set recording interactions extending back to the early 1970s. Fifty years later I wanted to share what I felt these materials suggested–that U.S.-China relations needs to be understood as a society-to-society relationship. The bulk of those stenographic records are in the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow New York.
Scholars employ many different sources and research approaches. Some predominantly use big data and quantitative approaches. Others are grounded more exclusively in the documentary record. As for me, I’ve always learned more by getting out in the field and talking to people. And, as you do so, you don’t start by having too many preconceptions about why subjects are behaving the way they are, at least initially. I use quantitative information when it’s available and, of course, documents are critical too—both are checks on what you are being told and inform you as to questions to ask informants.
Then, there are policy reasons I wrote this book. A principal purpose was to address head-on what I believe to be a distorted narrative about the more than four-decade period of Sino-American comprehensive engagement across eight U.S. administrations and several Chinese regimes. Concisely, a dominant current critique is that naïve U.S. elites (academic, business, and policy) confused their hopes for democracy and a globally responsible China with the actual prospects for those desirable ends and, in the process, unwisely traded away American interests, competitive position, values, and national security. In short, the U.S. bolstered the principal strategic threat that it is said to face today. This book is a fact-based challenge to that simplistic, indeed dangerous narrative.
Engagement was not a strategy. Engagement was not a plan. Engagement was a happening between our two societies. Both our societies for about 40 years saw their interests as predominantly compatible and complementary. Many corners of U.S. society saw their interests and/or values served by positive interaction with China. Many in the American religious community, for example, were supportive of productive relations with China. In the case of Christians and Evangelicals, it was bringing souls to the Lord and doing good works. Universities saw their interests, educational missions, research aspirations, and their values served by ever-growing numbers of Chinese students who, over time, paid growing amounts of tuition. American farmers saw their incomes grow and the nutritional status of Chinese citizens improved enormously. So, I argue that engagement was propelled by powerful interests at all levels of both societies for a long time and those engaged in the interaction thought they not only were doing well, but also good.
Inevitably, along the way, there were growing numbers of people and groups in both societies who came to perceive themselves as either absolute or relative losers in the relationship as it grew and changed and globalization took root. Over time those losers in the U.S.-China relationship accumulated power and influence in both societies. The longer the engagement policy continued, the losers stacked up, and the emergent coalition finally gained political traction and became, in both of our societies, more skeptical of the other–policy gradually bent toward their suspicions and concerns.
This is a cyclical phenomenon. Now and in the future, the costs of growing conflict will mount and, at some point, a new coalition will come to dominate in each society, pushing for improving ties once again. Of course, we don’t know how long this cycle will last or what the intervening damage will be. But one thing is for sure: if the conflict continues to deepen, which seems likely, there will be more and more losers on both sides, and they will begin to search for a new, better, more productive, and more mutually beneficial relationship. And, when this happens the human resources created during the preceding upswing in relations will provide the human resources to reconnect.
Because this is a two-part interview, and in this first part we emphasize strategic and state-to-state issues, would you flag some of the other dimensions of Living U.S.-China Relations? [Ed., See also three personal anecdotes Dr. Lampton provided in the course of this interview, which you can find here].
Important parts of this book deal with what it took to build the academic field of contemporary China studies, and the parallel task of constructing the galaxy of NGOs that have linked academic and public affairs. I spend considerable time describing interactions with some of the individuals who played significant roles in shaping public, private, and academic institutions and their interactions with the PRC. Coming out of the McCarthy era of the 1950s, it took a cross-generational effort to reconstitute and build anew the human and organizational infrastructure capable of seizing the opportunities that Presidents Nixon and Carter provided when their times came in the 1970s and 1980s. What comes through in this volume is the importance of teachers, and other individuals who conveyed animating ideas, built organizations, and sought to improve public life and motivate their students.
In the volume I underscore the fact that the analytic frameworks one uses to try to understand China and our own behavior shape the kinds of information we seek and the conclusions to which we come. Another feature of the book is that it highlights the interaction among individuals, demonstrating that not only are Americans motivated by a variety of interests and values, but so too are Chinese, citizens and leaders alike. The fact that earlier in life I had spent time as a fire-fighter at Stanford University and subsequently was a medical specialist in the U.S. Army greatly shaped my own work.
Considerable time is expended looking at the ins and outs of managing actual U.S.-China non-government projects such as developing a land use plan for the Ussuri River Valley (straddling the Sino-Russia border) and another project involving a group going to Tibet, writing a report on economic and social development, human rights, and other challenges there, concluding the project with a meeting with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, briefing him on the trip itself and future steps that might be taken.
Finally, many readers will find of interest encounters with a great number of Chinese, American, and other leaders at many levels, including: Queen Elizabeth, members of Congress such as Nancy Pelosi, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, with each vignette adding texture and substance to the accounts of why things evolved as they did.
The subtitle of your book strongly implies that the U.S. is in the midst of a “Second Cold War” with China. Why do you choose to employ this terminology, which remains debatable among scholars?
I chose the subtitle I did because I entered the China field as the first Cold War was in its most intense period in the 1960s and 1970s and, ironically, I am at the twilight of that career with Sino-American conflict mounting and, once again, China and Russia are in one corner and America and “like-minded countries” increasingly in another. Some people question this terminology, disputing whether or not the current situation has quite reached the stage of a new Cold War. They point to the many economic interdependencies and cultural contacts we now have with the PRC that did not exist in the first Cold War.
Well, of course, there are differences between the first Cold War and what I’m characterizing as the emerging second. A dramatic illustration of the difference is found in economic relations. In the case of the Soviet Union and the U.S., there was virtually no trade, economic, or financial relationships in the First Cold War. Today, probably the biggest instrument in Beijing’s toolbox of power is its economic strength, which provides leverage in its dealings with the outside world. So clearly, the economic dimension involves more interdependence and the PRC possesses more influence. There also are bigger economic problems by virtue of China’s economic role: issues of equity in trade, theft of intellectual property, etc. The economy cuts both ways. But on balance, it’s certainly a different dimension than existed in the first Cold War.
Second, on culture. The interaction with China on the cultural, student, and scientific exchange fronts dwarf anything that existed in the first Cold War. The Soviet Union in its entire 70-plus-year history never sent as many students and scholars to America as China sent to the United States in the mid-1980s in any single year. President Jimmy Carter made a fundamental strategic decision that we were not going to limit student exchange with China, as we had done with the Soviet Union. As long as the federal government wasn’t paying for Chinese students, as many as could come to the U.S. were welcome. By 2020, we had about 375,000 Chinese students here at any one time. We even had PRC students in K-12.
Differences in the two periods aside, let me explain why I find the similarities compelling. First, the U.S. and China are now in an arms race. Both sides are growing their military budgets with each side principally concerned about the other. Last year, each of us boosted our military spending by 7 or 8%–that’s fast growth for a government budget. That direction is clear, and it has been clear for a number of years.
Our strategic competition with the Soviet Union was particularly focused on fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, notably in the heart of Europe. The arms race now with China is more complicated than it was with the Soviet Union because now we have cyber tools that can disable civilian and government systems essential to life and civilization—power and water, medical records, financial records, etc. Also, artificial intelligence. We’re both developing weapons that could be autonomous, and that raises questions about human agency in war fighting. We’re in a space race with China, both in terms of the moon and Mars, with norms concerning militarization and international ownership in space becoming blurred, indeed abandoned.
Then, there’s the Taiwan Strait and the South China and East China Sea issues, giving rise to intensifying naval competition today. In the first Cold War, the Taiwan Strait itself was a boiling pot giving rise to crises in 1954 and 1958. Another aspect of the second Cold War is alliance behavior. In the first Cold War, it was essentially the “free world” and our alliances with NATO, Japan, the ROC, and Republic of Korea (ROK). We competed to build alliances, get friends, and encourage them to spend and mobilize so that our burdens would be less than would otherwise the case. This is the exact same thing that is happening now. In addition, now we have AUKUS, the Quad, and Japan and the ROK now cooperating to a greater extent. China is moving closer to Russia, which gets you back to the first Cold War directly. And Beijing is aligning itself more closely to the DPRK (North Korea) and Iran.
Also similar to the first Cold War, both sides have trouble judging one another’s actual strength, feeding each side’s “worst case analyses”. You have people who say in the public debate in the United States that “China’s not as strong as you think given all its economic problems. Look at their demographic problems. Look at the problems Beijing has with social security and healthcare financing. Look at unemployment among young people. China’s not as strong as it appears. We can push.” Another set of arguments in the United States is that China is stronger than you think and Washington needs to arm itself fast. That is the dominant view in our security apparatus. All this analytic dichotomy finds reflection in China as well, with many PRC analysts seeing the U.S. as fundamentally weak and distracted, what Mao called a “paper tiger.” Others in the PRC argue that a principal danger is that Beijing will underestimate American power. In short, we have many of the same analytic problems judging how strong each of us is in comparison to the other as we had in the first Cold War.
After the first Cold War, in the fullness of time when we really had the information, it turned out in many respects that the Soviet Union wasn’t as strong as we thought. But, like the first Cold War, today’s analytic uncertainty drives dangerous competition forward. Also important, a state’s power in one setting, say the Taiwan Strait, can be greater than in another setting, say dealing with Europe. We could underestimate China’s strength, and will in the Taiwan Strait, and overestimate it elsewhere. For me, the cautionary tale has always been the Korean War. Washington thought that a poor, weak, new PRC wouldn’t dare take on the nuclear-armed United States, winner of World War II. Mao Zedong did take Washington on and fight it to a standstill!
On balance, I’m not arguing that the two Cold Wars are identical. But, I think it is what we Americans would call “whistling past the graveyard” to deny the direction in which our relations are moving and the important similarities with the first Cold War. I’m not arguing identical, I’m arguing frighteningly similar dynamics in important respects. But, you cannot say all that in the book title, so you just simplify and go with it.
Why in your book did you characterize the U.S.-China relationship during the period of engagement as moving from “elite-centric to an increasingly society-to-society, globalized relationship”? How did you argue against the current critique that U.S. elites naively fostered its most substantial competitor?
Our societies are very complicated. The nature of the engagement period was that Mao Zedong (at the end of his life), Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and eight parallel administrations in the United States mobilized various elements of our societies to pursue their interests in one another. At the very start of the rapprochement in the early 1970s, and with normalization at the end of that decade, the decisive action of a few leaders (Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, Zhou Enlai, Carter, and Brzezinski), elites, started the ball rolling down the hill. But soon many other sectors and levels of both societies saw how their interests could be positively affected by joining the process, and shaping it. The relationship rapidly broadened from Ping-Pong, gymnastics, basketball teams, orchestras, and wushu (martial arts) groups, to multinational corporations, localities, mass tourism, and policy dialogues in all manner of domains. The organization I later headed, the National Committee on US-China Relations, brought the Ping-Pong team to the United States in 1972. The entire initiative was importantly financed by the U.S. government, but it also relied heavily on a huge volunteer effort from varied segments of society to organize a nationwide tour for the team, and many large-scale activities thereafter. The very beginnings of this effort saw the U.S. government initially hesitant to take the lead improving relations with China. Our Committee had conversations with President Johnson around 1966-67, encouraging him to move towards China, but he was unable to do so due to the Vietnam War and electoral considerations.
And so, the book recounts how even in the 1960s, groups — importantly the National Committee — mobilized society, including philanthropies such as the Rockefeller, Ford, and Luce foundations. We mobilized domestic groups to encourage the government to change its policy. Eventually, under Nixon, Kissinger, and later President Carter, the government responded, but much of the activity was shrouded in secrecy and elite negotiations. Elites in both societies realized that the Soviet Union was a bigger problem for each of us than we needed to be for each other. This was an elite initiative that once taken opened the flood gates to society-to-society interaction on an ever-increasing scale. At first, we moved towards each other to apply more strategic pressure on the Soviet Union, but soon the rationale for engagement spread across all domains of human interaction.
Almost immediately the business community began to recognize China’s potential and China, initially under Deng Xiaoping, was convinced that the PRC’s economic success would depend on access to knowledge, technology, and the markets of the West, opportunities to which the United States held the keys. Additionally, of importance for President Carter, was the nineteenth and twentieth century role of religious missionaries in China. One of the first things President Carter asked Deng was to permit the printing of Bibles and the reintroduction of missionaries into China. Deng agreed to the first request but not the second. Illustrative of this spiritual motivation, the president of Notre Dame University, Father Theodore Hesburgh, on the National Committee Board of Directors, believed that it was a Christian obligation to improve relations with 25% of the world’s population.
In the second half of the 1970s and throughout much of the 1980s, I was in the State of Ohio where the governor was concerned about the decline of heavy industry in the state. Despite being a conservative Republican and a staunch anti-communist, Governor James A. Rhodes was in favor of growing economic relations with China because he hoped it would revitalize the manufacturing industry in Ohio. His support stemmed from economic concerns. Thus, what I am trying to convey in my book is that the engagement process wasn’t animated simply by Nixon and Mao. Rather its dynamism reflected the fundamental interest groups within both of our societies that wanted to push it along.
However, over subsequent decades, gradually more individuals and groups in both societies came to perceive themselves as relative losers in the process of engagement and globalization, and they began to exert increasing pressure on their respective leaders to adopt a tougher stance with respect to the other side. This process progressively undermined engagement and productive relations. This is the main line of my argument.
Another major aspect of this is that I believe currently we are almost sleepwalking into higher levels of conflict between the United States and China. Armed conflict is not to be excluded. One reason for this is because, in our discourse in both countries — and China is just as guilty of this as are we — we both fail to recognize the significant gains both sides made in U.S.-China relations under globalization. By failing to acknowledge the massive gains of the past, we inadvertently make the seeming costs of current and future friction less than they actually are, and will be.
Living U.S.-China Relations devotes a lot of time to discussing dimensions of gain. Let me highlight a couple. The World Bank recently assessed that about 800 million people in China moved above the international absolute poverty line of $1.90 per day per capita in the last forty-plus years — 800 million is approximately two-plus times the population of the United States. China accounted for 80% of the reduction in world poverty. Now, if you want to talk about human rights, you better start with that fact. Not to ignore all the other problems, all the other injustices, but, you have to start with the fact that two-plus times the population of the United States was lifted out of absolute poverty. That’s a pretty fundamental fact. Then some Americans say, “Well, that’s fine for China, but the United States was a big loser here.” Not so, and I’ll just highlight an economic statistic. If you look at per capita GDP in the two countries over time, at the end of engagement, American per capita GDP was further ahead of China than when reform started. However, there is a problem in the U.S., and that is we didn’t equally (or equitably) distribute the gains of globalization across our society, thereby leaving many people and groups out of the relative gains. So, there are many people who associate globalization with rising inequality, unfairness, and defective rules of the game and failure to even observe what rules there are. That perspective also exists widely in China. Not everybody benefited from globalization in China, and many are not very happy. Even if they did benefit, they might not have benefited as much as someone else, leading to what the Chinese call “red eye disease” — envy. So, it’s all very complicated. But broadly speaking, economically and in terms of human rights defined as economic welfare, both countries, as an aggregate, are infinitely better off than they were at the dawn of engagement. If you just consider the life opportunities of people in both our societies, the winners dwarf the losers.
You might ask, “Okay, what are some of the other benefits that we can identify?” Well, first of all, for the last 40 years, there hasn’t been any major war in this region. The two biggest wars of the first Cold War, as far as the U.S. was concerned, were Korea and Vietnam. Korea was a direct war between America and the PRC. Moreover, most Americans don’t realize how directly involved China was in the Vietnam War. That’s a whole story I delve into.
So, I’m not suggesting that globalization was great for everybody all the time. I’m not denying there were losers, because there were, in both societies. However, we need to appreciate the gains that were made. Without recognizing that, we won’t realize the true costs of conflict now and in the future. It’s not an attempt to gloss over problems. It’s an attempt to provide a balanced perspective. And I believe over time, we will come to see things from a more balanced viewpoint. I just want to minimize the damage imposed before we reach that hopeful day.
Since 2010, the relationship between the U.S. and China has been more competitive than cooperative. In the book you write that “the ascribed goal of each country is unacceptable to the other.” Can you explain your point further? Do you think this stair-step action-reaction cycle can be broken?
Remember, what led Mao, Nixon, Carter, and Deng Xiaoping towards each other was, most importantly, a confluence of recognition that the Cold War strategy of China and America fighting each other was weakening them in the face of their primary strategic problem–the Soviet Union. Defining moving toward each other as in our respective strategic interests opened the floodgates to all other interest groups broadening and pushing the productive process along a wide front.
Well, what’s happening now is that the convergence of strategic interests is no longer evident or bringing us together. Now, by way of contrast, the divergence of strategic interests is pulling us apart. My basic proposition is that if you have a security problem, that problem outweighs economic and cultural considerations–when you’re concerned about your security, you tend to prioritize that over potential damage to your economic or cultural relationships and interests. So, what strikes me as the core of the current problem is that we have each identified the other as our core strategic problem. Some of Living U.S.-China Relations examines the core strategic statements and documents of each of our countries. For instance, if you look at the United States, we have a national security strategy that came out in 2022, along with a nuclear posture review that same year. Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a speech in May of 2022 on relations with China, which is the most comprehensive statement on the PRC Washington has made under President Biden.
All of the current strategic documents have some version of the following thought: “China is the principal threat to American values and interests.” Well, you can interpret that to mean China is the major long-term threat to the United States. That’s how to decode that sentence. Now, we can debate whether that statement is true or not, and under what circumstances it could be made less true. But, that’s the definition that we’ve put out there.
It’s not all the U.S.’s fault; just because I mentioned the U.S. first doesn’t mean I think we’re always the principal problem. I think China is a major mover in this direction too. You can see the most recent statement in March of 2023 by President Xi Jinping at the National People’s Congress and related meetings. He talks about the comprehensive suppression and containment policy of the United States to keep China down and he has made it clear that, along with Putin, he wishes to weaken the role of America in the post-World War II international system. I’m sure that if Americans actually saw Beijing’s unexpurgated strategic plans their blood would run cold.
So, it seems to me that the security apparatus in both our countries has defined each other as the principal problem in terms of national security and each side has adopted a national security strategy that is unacceptable to the other. Consequently, each side begins to think about how it could complicate the economic and security life of the other. How can we each gain more friends in the international system than the other? How can we get our friends to spend more money on defense? Elite circles in Beijing begin to consider how Beijing can take advantage of problems in the Middle East, or bolster Moscow as it destabilizes Europe, thereby diverting Washington’s attention from the PRC. That’s what is happening.
So, once again, you can see this Cold War idea resurfacing. I think this is the core issue. Our two leaders (and groups at all levels in both societies) need to sit down and ask themselves and one another, questions: “Should we be in this position? Is it inevitable? Are we, should we be, each other’s principal security problem?” There are lots of candidates to be problems at the top of our respective agendas: Climate change and global pandemics, for example. If we’re at each other’s throats, how are we going to deal with those challenges? Secondly, let’s address the issue head-on. Is China our principal threat? Well, it seems to me that right now you could argue that Russia, in the heart of Europe, is a bigger, more intractable threat, if Beijing and Washington can manage the Taiwan issue.
In the past, the U.S. and China cooperated greatly on global health challenges, SARS and Ebola among them. Now, we’re not cooperating very well at all in the international health domain, which is extremely shortsighted. In the COVID-19 pandemic, both of us mishandled it to a substantial degree, with PRC lack of transparency a key problem. So, that’s what I’m really trying to say. Until we both get the security relationship straightened out and see each other in balanced perspective, we will be unable to control competition and foster cooperation in most other realms. The U.S. elections of 2024, and Xi Jinping’s own personal and regime insecurity at home, present particular challenges in this regard.
How do you think average American and Chinese people are affected, and will be affected, by the fluctuations in the U.S.-China relationship in 2024? In other words, what might an average American or Chinese citizen take away from reading your book?
Certainly, this year (2024) is going to represent very big challenges to the management of this relationship. We can all look to the positive fact that our two presidents, Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, gathered in San Francisco in November of last year, 2023. We were hopeful that this meeting would put what the U.S. Administration calls “guardrails” on the relationship. Prior to the summit we knew it might not improve the relationship much, but we wanted to make sure it didn’t continue to get worse. I applaud the effort of our presidents to get together. I’m glad they expressed the desire to move things forward. However, I would say that post-summit reality is moving in other, more worrisome directions; we are accumulating problems.
Just since the San Francisco summit, we now have the Middle East as a significant new problem in U.S.-China relations. Washington has backed Israel and its retaliation against Hamas, qualms in Washington aside. In the process, at this time, tens of thousands of civilians in Gaza are being killed. It’s a horrendous human rights problem no matter how you look at it. China has aligned itself more with both Iran and the Palestinians. Beijing and Washington should be cooperating to bring the carnage to an end, but that is not occurring as far as I can see.
Russia is another area of contention that seems to be growing as a friction point in Sino-America ties. Russia was a problem in U.S.-China relations before the invasion of Ukraine, but I would say that’s gotten worse. Right now, Ukraine is not doing as well after its floundering counter-offensive in 2023 as it did in the first year-plus of the war. Washington and its allies are less certain that Ukraine will win or what victory might mean. Therefore, we’ve become increasingly sensitive to China’s support of Russia. And Russia is challenging U.S. and allied security on an increasingly broad front, including space-based weapons. Moreover, with each passing day, a possible Ukrainian loss or and/or loss of American will to support Ukraine, is seen as emboldening Beijing to be more assertive and testing America’s will to continue playing a global role. There is increasing worry about the Taiwan Strait as the likely test of resolve in a distracted and overstretched America.
Other developments raise the temperature in Washington as well—the internal direction of Chinese politics toward increasing tension is important among them. Hong Kong people are coming under more constraint from the National Security Law there. Mainland China’s pressure on Taiwan grows by the day, measured by the number of ships and airplanes in the vicinity of the island, and by the mainland managing to reduce the last few nations recognizing the ROC.
In short, while Biden and Xi made some progress in getting together, any good will and progress is getting leeched away rapidly on other fronts. The two presidents wanting to stabilize things is commendable, but I don’t think the strategic situation calls for optimism.
Then, you add to all that the recent elections in Taiwan. The people of Taiwan elected as their leader Lai Ching-te, a person who historically has associated himself with calls for independence. Even though he has made statements trying to reassure mainland China, the mainland is not reassured. The United States has weakened its One China Policy. Many people in China think Washington has a “One Taiwan, One China Policy”. That’s been, in the Chinese mind, reinforced by some of the statements by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense who has talked about Taiwan as the linchpin of Asian security, implicitly raising the issue of whether or not Washington would countenance any kind of reunification, irrespective of whether peacefully achieved or not.
In short, the U.S. thinks China is not being helpful on the strategic problems we find crucially important. China thinks that we are reneging on our practices and promises concerning the One China Policy and Taiwan.
All this raises the question: What to do about it? I can see the dangers in the direction in which America and China are headed much more clearly than how we can peacefully exit from the current cul de sac. I do suggest in the book some guidelines as we move into the future.
The tenure of the current leader of China might be last a long time, and the U.S. is in a complicated, polarized domestic situation. Leaders in both societies seem more dedicated to mobilizing anger with each other than in educating their citizens as to the costs and tragedies that lie at the end of the current path. What strikes one is how similar the policies of Trump and Biden are toward China. There seems to be a consensus in the United States behind a policy that, along with China’s behavior in the world and domestically, make it unlikely that things will improve any time soon.
In the years ahead, our first task is to avoid war. Secondly, we have to begin to take steps in strategic areas that reassure each other. Living with China demonstrates how this was done the first time, ending on the note that, eventually, we both will return to elements of the comprehensive engagement playbook.
专访兰普顿：美中接触战略何以被诟病？如何避免新冷战演变成热战？
编者按：大卫·M·兰普顿（David M. Lampton）是约翰霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院 (SAIS) 的名誉教授、前海曼教授兼SAIS中国和中国研究主任，外交政策研究所 (Foreign Policy Institute)的高级研究员。兰普顿博士还曾担任美中关系全国委员会主席，出版著作无数，是一个权威的“中国通”学者。他最近出版的新书《经历美中关系：从冷战到冷战》（Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War) 从近六十年的亲身经历出发，讲述了中美关系作为两个社会而非仅仅两个国家之间的故事。本书先已经在亚马逊以及各大网络平台上架。以下是中美印象编辑们对兰普顿博士关于他的新书采访的编译。采访中，兰普顿博士还分享了三个关于他在美中关系中经历的轶事，我们已经在这里单独发表。
这本书与您过往的研究类专著不同，因为它包含了许多个人故事和反思。是什么激发了您写这本书的灵感？通过人际关系的视角研究中美关系有什么好处？
这本书的独特之处在于，它把中美关系描绘成两个社会之间的联系，而不仅仅是两个国家之间的关系。这种叙述方式细腻、避免了简单的黑白对立，展现了同理心。
我为什么要写这本书？一是为了更好地了解自己，二是为了更深入地了解中国，三是为了促进中美合作和相互理解。我的经验是，人们写书往往不止一个原因。对我来说，有三个原因：个人原因、与研究领域相关的历史和方法论，以及政策。
在个人层面上：这本书是我在新冠疫情时期的主要项目。在那漫长的隔离期间，这个项目和我的家人一起成为我的伴侣。此外，即使没有疫情，对于像我这样依赖大量实地研究的学者来说，中国本身也变得越来越难以接近。这个项目使我能够利用我已经积累的一生的各种资料。
一个更深层次的个人原因是，人过中年，我们都忙于生活，往往不会刻意思考自己是如何走到当前这一刻的。有一天，你可能会突然想到， “我最初是怎么开始研究中国的？为什么我会用这种方式研究它?” 最后，我的父亲和祖父为我们的大家庭留下了他们的自传。我发现他们的人生故事给了我根基，所以我也希望为我的孩子和孙子们做同样的事情。
影响这本书的学术原因有几个。在我的职业生涯中，我很偶然地获得了比常人更多的同中美两国关系参与者接触的机会。他们分布在五个层面：多边国际机构、两国的中央政府、地方政府、民间社会，以及个人对个人。我们在谈论中美关系时应该考虑所有这些层面，因为它们都塑造了我们两个社会在过去50年中的互动方式。
我还有记笔记的习惯。在我的职业生涯的大部分时间里，我并不是主要为了创建历史记录而记录和保存笔记，而是因为当我写下来时，我会更仔细地听人们说的话。因此，随着时间的推移，我积累了一份自1970年代初期开始的中美交流记录。50年后，我想与大家分享我认为这些资料所暗示的内容——中美关系需要被理解为一个社会对社会的关系。这些速记记录的大部分现在都在纽约睡谷的洛克菲勒档案中心。
学者们采用许多不同的资源和研究方法。有些人主要使用大数据和定量方法，而我一直是通过走出去和与人交谈了解情况。在这个过程中，至少一开始，我不会对研究对象有太多的先入为主的想法。在可用的情况下，我会使用定量信息，当然，文件也很关键——它们既是对你所听到的内容的检验，也能告诉你该问哪些问题。
此外，我写这本书还有政策方面的原因。一个主要目的是正面回应我所认为的对中美四十多年来跨越八届美国政府和几代中国领导人的全面接触 (Engagement) 的歪曲叙述。当前占主导地位的批评是，天真的美国精英（学术界、商界和政策界）将他们对民主和一个对全球负责任的中国的希望与实现这些理想目标的实际前景混为一谈，并在此过程中不明智地将美国的利益、竞争地位、价值观和国家安全拱手相让。简而言之，美国自己加强了它今天所面临的主要战略威胁。本书以事实为基础，对这种简单化、甚至危险的说法提出了质疑。
接触不是一种策略，也不是一个计划。接触是我们两个社会之间发生的事情。大约40年来，我们的两个社会都认为他们的利益总体来说是兼容和互补的。美国社会的许多层面认为，与中国的积极互动有助于他们的利益或价值观。例如，许多美国宗教团体支持与中国建立良好的关系。对基督徒和福音派来说，这是为了引领灵魂归主和行善事。大学看到，越来越多的中国学生为他们的利益、教育使命、研究愿望和价值观服务，随着时间的推移，这些学生支付的学费也越来越多。此外，美国农民的收入增加了，中国公民的营养状况也得到了极大改善。因此，我认为接触是由两个社会各个层面的强大利益长时间推动的结果，而且参与互动的人认为他们不仅做得好，而且做得对。
不可避免的是，随着关系的发展和变化以及全球化的深入，两个社会中越来越多的人和群体开始认为自己是绝对或相对的输家。随着时间的推移，这些在中美关系中的输家在两个社会中积累了权力和影响。接触政策持续的时间越长，输家就堆积得越多，而新出现的联盟最终获得了政治影响力。两国的政策逐渐向他们的猜忌和担忧倾斜，社会也对对方变得更加怀疑。这是一种周期性现象。现在和将来，冲突加剧的代价会越来越高，到某个时候，新的联盟会在两个社会中重新占据主导地位，再次推动改善关系。当然，我们不知道这种循环会持续多久，也不知道其间会造成什么损害。但有一点是肯定的：如果冲突继续加深（这似乎很有可能），双方的失败者会越来越多，他们会开始寻找一种新的、更好的、更有成效的、更互利的关系。而当这种情况发生时，在之前中美关系上升期所创造的人力资源将为重新建立起的联系提供帮助。
因为这是一次分为两部分的采访，在这第一部分中我们强调战略和国家间的问题，您能否介绍一下这本书的其他维度？
这本书的重要部分涉及了构建当代中国研究学术领域所需的努力，以及构建将学术界和公共事务联系起来的非政府组织网络的任务。我花了相当多的时间描述了一些在塑造公共、私人和学术机构及其与中国的互动中发挥重要作用的个人。从1950年代的麦卡锡时代走出来，重建和建立新的人力和组织基础设施，以抓住尼克松和卡特总统在1970年代和1980年代提供的机会，需要跨代的努力。这部分突出了教师和其他传达想法、建立组织、寻求改善公共生活和激励学生的个人的重要性。
本书中，我强调了一个事实，即用来理解中国和我们自己行为的分析框架塑造了我们寻求的信息类型和我们得出的结论。本书的另一个特点是它强调了个人之间的互动。不仅美国人是出于各种利益和价值观的驱动，中国人，无论是普通公民还是领导人，也是如此。我早年在斯坦福大学担任消防员，随后在美国陆军担任卫生员的经历，极大地塑造了我的工作。
书中还花了大量时间探讨管理实际的中美非政府项目的细节，例如为乌苏里江谷（横跨中俄边界）制定土地利用计划，以及一个前往西藏、撰写经济和社会发展、人权和其他挑战的报告的项目。
最后，许多读者可能会对我与众多中、美及其他国家的领导人在多个层面上的相遇感兴趣，包括：伊丽莎白女王、国会议员如南希·佩洛西、前纽约市市长鲁迪·朱利安尼，等等。每个小插曲都为事情的演变方式增添了内容和实质。
您的书的副标题暗示美国正处于与中国的“第二次冷战”中。为什么您选择使用这个在学术界仍有争议的术语？
我选择这个副标题是因为我在上世纪60、70年代第一次冷战最激烈的时期进入了研究中国的领域，而在我的职业生涯的黄昏时期，中美冲突加剧，再次出现了中国和俄罗斯在一方，美国和“志同道合的国家”在另一方的局面。有些人质疑这个”冷战”这个术语，争论当前形势是否真的达到了新冷战的阶段。他们指出，我们现在与中国在经济上相互依存，文化联系更是千丝万缕，这些在第一次冷战中并不存在。
当然，第一次冷战和我所描述的第二次冷战之间有差异。一个明显的区别体现在经济关系上。对苏联和美国来说，他们在第一次冷战期间几乎没有贸易、经济或金融关系。如今，北京手中最大的权力工具可能就是其经济实力，这为其与外界的交往提供了杠杆。因此，从经济层面来讲，相互依存的现实为使得中国拥有更大的影响力。中国在国际经济中的作用还带来了更大的问题， 比如公平贸易、知识产权保护等问题。经济方面有利有弊，但总的来说，这显然是一个与第一次冷战不同的维度。
其次，从文化方面来看，美国与中国在文化、学生和科学交流方面的互动远远超过了第一次冷战期间的任何情况。苏联在其整个70多年的历史中从未像中国在1980年代中期的任何一年那样向美国派遣过如此多的学生和学者。吉米·卡特总统做出了一个根本性的战略决定，即我们不会像对待苏联那样限制与中国的学生交流。只要联邦政府不为中国学生支付学费，美国就欢迎尽可能多的学生来美国。到2020年，有大约有37.5万中国学生在美国，甚至在K-12中也能见到他们的身影。
撇开两个时期的差异不谈，让我解释一下为什么我觉得两个”冷战”相似之处令人吃惊。首先，美国和中国现在正处于军备竞赛之中。为了对付对方，双方都在增加军事预算。去年，两国的军事开支都增加了7%或8%——这对于政府预算来说是快速增长。这一方向是明确的，而且多年来一直如此。在第一次冷战中，美国与苏联的战略竞争主要在发展核武器和防止核战争，尤其是在欧洲中心。而现在美国与中国的军备竞赛要比当年的美苏竞赛更为复杂，因为现在我们有了可以使民用和政府系统瘫痪的网络工具，它们将影响到对日常生活至关重要的一切——电力和水、医疗记录、财务记录等等。
除此之外，还有人工智能。中美双方都在开发可具有自主性的武器，这就对人类在战争中的作用提出了质疑。我们还在与中国进行太空竞赛，涉及月球和火星，关于太空军事化和太空空间站所有权的规范正在变得模糊，甚至被抛弃。其次，台湾海峡以及南海和东海问题导致当今海军竞争的加剧。在第一次冷战中，台湾海峡本身就是一个热点，它导致了1954年和1958年两次台海危机。
第二次冷战的另一个方面是联盟行为。在第一次冷战中，基本上是“自由世界”和美国与北约、日本、台湾当局和大韩民国的联盟。我们竞相建立联盟，争取朋友，并鼓励他们增加国防经费和动员，以便我们的负担比其他情况下要少。这正是现在也在发生的事情。此外，现在我们有了AUKUS、四方安全对话和同日本与韩国更紧密的合作。而中国正在向俄罗斯靠拢（这直接回到了第一次冷战），也更加紧密地与北朝鲜和伊朗建立各种联系。
同样类似于第一次冷战，双方都难以判断对方的实际实力。这促生了双方的“最坏情况分析”。在美国的公共辩论中，有人会说“鉴于中国所有的经济问题，中国并没有你想象的那么强大。看看他们的人口问题。看看北京在社保和医保方面的问题。看看年轻人的失业问题。中国并没有表面上那么强大。我们无需担忧。”而另一方论点是中国比你想象的更强大，华盛顿需要迅速武装。这是美国安全机构的主导观点。所有这些分析上的二分法在中国也有所反映：许多中国的分析人士认为美国从根本上是软弱和自顾不暇的，正如毛泽东所说的“纸老虎”；其他人则认为，北京低估美国实力是一个巨大的危险。简而言之，我们在判断彼此的实力与对方相比有多强时，与第一次冷战时一样，有许多相同的分析弊病。
第一次冷战结束后，当我们真正掌握了充分的信息时，很多方面都证明苏联并没有我们想象的那么强大。但是，与第一次冷战一样，今天的分析不确定性也推动着危险的竞争向前发展。同样重要的是，一个国家在某种情况下（比如台湾海峡）的实力可能比在另一种情况下（比如与欧洲打交道）更强。我们可能会低估中国旨在解决台海问题的实力和意志，而高估它在其他领域的实力和意志。对我来说，朝鲜战争一直是一个警示故事。美方认为，一个贫穷、弱小的新中国不敢与美国，一个拥有核武器的二战胜利者对抗。但中国确实与华盛顿打了一场硬仗。
总的来说，我并不是说这两次冷战是完全相同的。但是，我认为如果否认我们两国关系的发展方向与第一次冷战的重要相似之处，那就是美国人所说的 “对墓地吹口哨” (whistling past the graveyard)。我并不是在争辩说两次冷战完全相同，而是想说在一些重要方面的发展有着令人恐惧的相同之处。但是，我不可能在书名中把所有这些都说出来，所以我只能简化并且接受它。
在您的书中，您将中美关系在接触期间的特征描述为从“精英中心主义逐渐向社会对社会的、全球化的关系发展”(“elite-centric to an increasingly society-to-society, globalized relationship”)。您是如何反驳当前美国精英们天真地培养了自己最重要的竞争对手这一观点的？
我们的社会非常复杂。毛泽东（在他生命的最后阶段）、邓小平、江泽民、胡锦涛以及美国的八个总统动员了各种各样的社会要素来追求彼此的利益。两国在70年代初期开始改善关系，并在那个十年结束时实现了关系的正常化，少数领导人（尼克松、基辛格、毛泽东、周恩来、卡特和布热津斯基）即精英们的决定性行动，对中美的接触起到了决定性的作用。但很快，两国社会的许多其他部门和领域意识到，加入这一过程并对其加以塑造可以积极地影响他们的利益。中美关系迅速从乒乓球、体操队、篮球队、管弦乐队和武术团体等领域扩展到跨国公司、地方政府、大规模旅游以及各种领域的政策对话。我后来领导的组织，美中关系全国委员会，于1972年将（中国）乒乓球队带到美国。整个举措在很大程度上是由美国政府提供资金支持，但也依赖于社会各个领域的大量志愿者的努力，这才成功组织了中国乒乓球队在美国全国的巡回表演，以及之后的许多大型活动。美国政府最初在带领改善与中国关系方面犹豫不决。我们的委员会在1966-67年左右与约翰逊总统进行了对话，鼓励他向中国靠拢，但由于越战和选举考虑，他无法这样做。
因此，这本书讲述了即使在60年代，美中关系全国委员会，也包括洛克菲勒、福特和卢斯基金会等非政府机构在内的许多团体鼓励政府改变政策。最终，在尼克松、基辛格和后来的卡特总统的领导下，政府做出了回应，但很多活动都局限于在秘密和精英谈判之中。两国的精英意识到，与中美彼此之间相比，苏联对我们每个人来说都是一个更大的问题。起初，我们相互接近是为了对苏联施加更多的战略压力，但很快，接触的理由扩展到人类互动的各个领域。
几乎立刻，商界开始认识到中国的潜力，而中国，最初在邓小平的领导下，深信其经济成功将取决于对西方知识、技术和市场的引进，而这些资源正是美国所掌握的。此外，对卡特总统来说，19世纪和20世纪宗教传教士在中国的角色也很重要。卡特总统向邓小平提出的第一要求就是允许印刷圣经并允许（美国）传教士再去中国。邓小平同意了第一个请求，但没有同意第二个。作为这种精神动机的例证，圣母大学校长西奥多·赫斯伯格神父，作为美中关系全国委员会的理事会成员，认为改善与世界上25%的人口的关系是基督徒的义务。
在19世纪70年代的下半叶和80年代的大部分时间里，我住在俄亥俄州。时任州长詹姆斯·A·罗兹担心该州重工业衰落。尽管他是一个保守派的共和党人和坚定的反共分子，但他仍然支持与中国发展经济关系，因为他希望这将重振俄亥俄州的制造业。他的支持源于经济上的关切。因此，我在书中试图传达的是，接触的过程并不仅仅是由尼克松和毛泽东推动的。相反，接触政策的活力反映了我们两个社会内部的基本利益集团希望推动这一进程。
然而，在随后的几十年里，两个社会中越来越多的个人和团体开始认为自己在接触和全球化过程中相对处于不利地位，他们开始向各自的领导人施加越来越大的压力，要求他们对对方采取更强硬的立场。这一过程逐渐破坏了接触和积极的关系。这是我的主要论点。
另一个主要方面是，我认为目前我们几乎是在梦游般地走向中美之间更严重的冲突。武装冲突并非不可能。其中一个原因是，我们都未能认识到全球化背景下中美双方取得的重大成就。没有正确认识到过去的巨大收获，我们也就在无意中低估了当前和未来摩擦的成本。
这本书用了很多篇幅讨论两国在接触中的收益。让我来举几个例子。世界银行最近评估称，在过去40多年中，中国约有8亿人脱离了绝对贫困线，即人均收入每天1.90美元以下的贫困线——8亿人约为美国人口的两倍以上。中国贡献了了全球减贫总数的80%。如果你想谈论人权，你最好从这个事实开始。我并不是要忽视其他所有问题，但你必须从两倍的美国人口被从绝对贫困中解救出来这一事实开始。这是一个非常基本的事实。有些美国人说：“这对中国来说是好事，但美国一无所得。” 事实并非如此，我只想强调一个经济上的具体问题。如果你看一下两国随时间变化的人均GDP，接触政策终结时，美国的人均GDP对比中国的领先程度甚至远甚于中国的改革刚开始时对中国的领先。然而，美国存在一个问题，那就是我们并没有平等（或公平地）将全球化的收益分配给我们社会的各个阶层，从而使许多人和团体在相对收益中被排除在外。因此，有许多人将全球化与不断增加的不平等、不公平以及游戏规则的缺陷联系在一起。这种观点在中国也普遍存在。并不是每个人都从全球化中受益，很多人并不开心。即使他们受益了，他们的收益可能不如其他人多，这导致了眼红和嫉妒。所以，一切都非常复杂。但总体而言，在经济上和以经济福利定义的人权方面，作为一个整体，两国都比接触之初要好得多。如果你仅考虑我们两个社会中人们生活中的机遇，赢家远远超过输家。
你可能会问：“那还有其他的好处吗？”当然有。在过去40年里，这个地区没有发生过任何重大战争。在第一次冷战中，就美国而言，最大的两场战争是朝鲜战争和越南战争。朝鲜战争是美国和中华人民共和国之间的直接战争。此外，大多数美国人并没有意识到中国直接参与了越南战争。我在书中深入探讨了这一点。
因此，我并不是在暗示全球化一直对所有人都是件好事。我并不否认在两个社会中都有输家。然而，我们需要充分认识到取得的收益。如果不承认这一点，我们就不会意识到可能为冲突所付出的真正代价。这并不是试图掩盖问题。这是试图提供一个平衡的观点。我相信随着时间的推移，我们会从更加平衡的角度来看待两国关系。我只是希望在我们达到那个充满希望的日子之前尽量减少所带来的损害。
自2010年以来，中美关系更多的是竞争而不是合作。在您的书中，您写道“每个国家追求的目标对另一个国家来说都是不可接受的”(“the ascribed goal of each country is unacceptable to the other” ）。您能进一步解释一下您的观点吗？您认为您书中提到的这种阶梯式的行动-反应循环（stair-step action-reaction cycle）能够被打破吗？
请记住，毛泽东、尼克松、卡特和邓小平彼此走到一起的原因，他们认识到中美两国的相互对抗不利于他们应对彼此的主要战略对手—苏联。中美互相走近符合各自的战略利益，也打开了所有其他利益集团加大投入、推动两国广泛接触的闸门。
目前，两国的战略利益不再趋于一致，也不再能将我们捆绑在一起。相比之下，战略利益的分歧正使两国渐行渐远。现在的基本情况是，如果你有一个安全问题，那么这个问题会超过对经济和文化关系的考量。因此，对我而言，我认为当前问题的核心是，我们各自将对方视为自己的核心战略问题。这本书中的一部分审视了我们两国有关各自核心战略的声明和文件。例如，美国有一份2022年发布的国家安全战略，以及同年发布的核态势评估。国务卿安东尼·布林肯于2022年5月发表了一篇关于与中国关系的演讲，这是拜登总统任内华盛顿对中华人民共和国做出的最全面的声明。
美国所有的战略文件都涉及一点：“中国是对美国价值观和利益的主要威胁。”你可以把这解读为中国是美国主要的长期威胁。我们可以辩论这个陈述是否正确，以及在什么情况下它可以变得不那么正确。但是，这就是我们对中国提出的定义。
这不全是美国的错。我首先提到了美国，并不意味着我认为我们总是问题的主要方面。我认为中国在这方面也是一个重要的推动者。你可以看到最近的一份文件，即2023年3月中国领导人在“两会”期间的讲话。他提到美国全面打压和遏制中国的政策，试图阻止中国的崛起，并明确表示，他将于与普京一起削弱美国在二战后国际体系中的作用。我相信，如果美国人真正看到北京未经删节的战略计划，他们也会胆战心惊。
因此，我觉得我们两国的安全机构已经把对方定义为国家安全的主要问题，而且双方都采取了对于另一方来说不可接受的国家安全战略。因此，双方都开始考虑在经济和安全领域削弱对方，都开始考虑如何在国际体系中拉拢更多的朋友，以及如何让我们的朋友在国防上投入更多的预算？北京的精英圈开始考虑如何利用中东的问题，或者支持莫斯科破坏欧洲的稳定，从而转移华盛顿对中华人民共和国的注意力。这就是正在发生的事情。
因此，从中美的对抗之中，你可以再次看到这种冷战思维的重现。我认为这是核心问题。我们两国的领导人（以及两国各个层面的团体）需要坐下来互相询问自己和对方一些问题：“我们应该处在这种境地吗？这是不可避免的吗？我们应该成为彼此的主要安全问题吗？”我们各自的桌面上摆着许多亟待处理的问题：例如气候变化和全球流行病。如果我们之间关系紧张，我们如何应对这些挑战？其次，让我们直面这个问题：中国是我们的主要威胁吗？我认为现在可以说，如果北京和华盛顿能够解决台湾问题，那么在欧洲腹地的俄罗斯是一个更大、更棘手的威胁。
过去，美国和中国在全球卫生问题上进行了大量合作，其中包括SARS和埃博拉疫情。现在，在国际卫生领域，我们的合作不太顺利，这是极其短视的。在COVID-19大流行期间，我们双方在很大程度上都处理不当，但中国缺乏透明度是一个关键问题。所以，我真正想说的是，除非我们两国都能够搞清楚安全关系并以平衡的视角看待彼此，否则我们将无法管理竞争并在大多数其他领域促进合作。2024年的美国选举以及中国国内的不稳定因素无疑是实现这一目标的阻碍。
您认为2024年中美关系的波动将如何影响美国和中国的大众？他们从阅读您的书中能得到什么启示？
今年（2024年）将为管控中美关系构成一个非常大的挑战。从积极的方面来看，两位总统，习近平和拜登，去年11月在旧金山会晤。我们希望这次会晤能够为这一关系设立所谓的“护栏”。在峰会之前，我们知道这可能不会太多地改善关系，但我们希望确保它不会继续恶化。我赞扬总统们努力会面的行动，也乐见他们表达了推动事情向前发展的愿望。然而，我想说的是，峰会后的现实正在朝着其他更令人担忧的方向发展；中国和美国正在积累问题。
自旧金山峰会以来，中东已成为中美关系中一个重要的新问题。华盛顿支持以色列及其对哈马斯的报复行动。在此过程中，加沙地带已经有数万平民被杀害。无论如何看，这都是一个可怕的人权问题。中国更多地与伊朗和巴勒斯坦站在一起。北京和华盛顿应该合作结束这场屠杀，但据我所见，这并没有发生。
俄罗斯是另一个似乎正在成为中美关系摩擦点的问题领域。在乌克兰入侵之前，俄罗斯就是中美关系中的一个问题，但我认为这个问题目前已经变得更糟。目前，乌克兰在2023年的反攻行动失败后，后续表现不如战争的第一年。美国和其盟友对于乌克兰是否能够赢得胜利，或者胜利究竟意味着什么已经变得不太确定。因此，美国对于中国对俄罗斯的支持变得越发敏感。而且，俄罗斯正在越来越多的领域挑战美国及其盟友的安全，比如在太空武器方面。此外，随着时间的推移，乌克兰可能的失败或美国对支持乌克兰的意愿的减弱，都会被视为对中国的一种鼓励，让中方更加自信地挑战美国，试探美国是否愿意继续发挥全球领导者的意愿。对于自顾不暇且过度扩张的美国来说，台湾海峡日益成为对其决心的考验。
其他一些事态的发展也让华盛顿感到不安，比如香港的政治氛围趋于紧张，而且大陆对台湾的压力与日俱增，具体表现为在台湾附近的舰船和飞机数量增加。同时，大陆也正在积极切断台湾与其最后几个“邦交国”的联系。虽然拜登和习近平主席在合作方面取得了一些进展，但任何善意和进展都会在其他方面被迅速蚕食。两位总统希望稳定局势的想法值得称赞，但我认为战略形势不容乐观。除此之外，还有台湾最近的选举。台湾人民选出了赖清德，一个一直与要求独立的呼声联系在一起的候选人，作为他们的领导人。尽管他已经发表了试图安抚大陆的声明，但大陆并不放心。美国已经削弱了其“一个中国”的政策。中国的许多人认为华盛顿有一个“一个台湾，一个中国”政策。在中国人的心目中，这一点被美国助理国防部长的一些声明所强化，他谈到台湾是亚洲安全的关键，含蓄地提出了华盛顿是否会支持任何形式的统一（无论是否和平实现）的问题。简而言之，美国认为中国在美方认为至关重要的战略问题上没有提供帮助。中国认为美国在一个中国政策和台湾问题上违背了原先的做法和承诺。
所有这些都引出了一个问题：该怎么办？相比如何和平地摆脱当前的困境，我能更清楚地看到中美两国前进方向中的危险。我确实在书中提出了一些指导原则，作为我们未来的参考。 中国当前领导人的任期可能还会持续，而美国正处于一个复杂的、两极分化的国内局势。两个社会的领导人似乎更专注于激发彼此的愤怒，而不是教育他们的公民了解当前穷途末路的代价和悲剧。令人震惊的是，特朗普和拜登的对华政策何其相似。美国国内似乎对这一政策达成了共识，再加上中国在国际和国内的行为，情况不可能很快得到改善。
在未来的几年里，我们的首要任务是避免战争。其次，我们必须开始在战略领域采取让彼此放心的措施。这本书展示了中美第一次是如何做到这一点的，并最后指出，我们双方最终都将回归到全面接触战略的要素上来。
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