New Essay Posted: "Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy For China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu Angang’s (胡鞍钢) Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese Constitutional State"

I have been considering the development of modern Chinese constitutionalism, and more specifically the unique structures of Chinese constitutionalism beyond the constitutional document and the related issue of its legitimacy within emerging norms of transnational constitutionalism (HERE, HERE, HERE, and HERE).

(MEDIA DEBUT: Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China meet the press after their election on November 15, 2012 (XIE HUANCHI), From  Collective Leadership, China's Way, Beijing Review, Sept. 2013)

As part of that consideration I have been posting the work of Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), a formidable and innovative constitutional law scholars (Table of Contents for the Series Available Here; and HERE) and Jiang Shigong (强世功), another of the most innovative constitutional law scholars in China today (HERE and HERE).  

Recently I have been considering the innovative work of another Chinese scholar,  Hu Angang (胡鞍钢), a Tsinghua University-affiliated economist who is regarded as a leading figure in what could be translated as ‘China National Exceptionalism Studies’ 国情研究. I had considered his political-economic theories before HERE. One of his most recent and innovative proposals focuses on the collective presidency model of Chinese governance. (Hu Angang, China's Collective Presidency (Berlin: Springer 2014) ISBN-13: 9783642552786).

Further to that engagement, I have just posted a new paper to the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) that considers Hu Angang's collective presidency model within the context of the theory of Chinese constitutionalism and the connection between that construction and global principles of constitutional democracy: "Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy For China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu Angang’s (胡鞍钢) Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese Constitutional State"   In the process I suggest the possibility of an alternative set of mechanisms for the expression of democracy--substituting for its exteriorization in elections, its interiorization in representative collective decision making. The abstract and essay introduction follows. The manuscript may be ACCESSED HERE.

      

Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy For China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu Angang’s (胡鞍钢) Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese Constitutional State

Larry Catá Backer[1]

ABSTRACT: In the West democratic constitutionalism is grounded on the premise that democracy occurs outside of the organs of state, through elections and discourse. Chinese constitutional theorists have begun to elaborate a distinct view—that democratic constitutionalism may also be grounded on the premise that democracy occurs within the organs of state and the political apparatus of the nation, through collective and representational decision making. Hu Angang has most recently expressed a theory of socialist democracy around the notion of a collective presidency. This essay considers Hu Angang’s theory and defense of the role of the CCP in China’s constitutional system, with particular focus on the evolution of the premises of collective action merged with democratic theory and applied to the operations of a party-state system. Its object is to theorize internal democratic structures of the CCP, and through them, of the government as a whole. Its focus is on the development of collective leadership. Part I first considers the theoretical underpinning of the theory of collective presidency—grounded in China’s history, context and its political ideology. The object is to better situate the history and utility of a collective presidency within the political structures and ideological premises of Chinese constitutionalism, and then to consider the connection between that construction and global principles of constitutional democracy. Part II then considers the arguments advanced for the efficiency and representation-reinforcing elements of the collective presidency—collective succession, collective labor division and cooperation, collective learning, collective research, and collective decision-making. Part III briefly considers the work that remains to be done as the CCP continues to scientifically develop the theory of democratic socialism and attends to the harder task, not of drawing theory form facts, but of living theory through practice. The essential insight of the Chinese move toward a distinct socialist democracy is not that that there can only be one best approach, but its opposite—that it is not which state is more democratic in accordance with a singular formula, but whether every state develops democratic structures effectively responsive to its own conditions. It is only in this context that comparison becomes useful.

______

Where does democracy happen? How is it legitimately expressed? What is its principal marker in the construction of democratic political institutions? The West has developed an elaborate theory of democratic constitutionalism grounded on the premise that democracy occurs outside of the organs of state, through elections and discourse. Recently Chinese constitutional theorists have begun to elaborate a distinct view—that democratic constitutionalism may also be grounded on the premise that democracy occurs within the organs of state and the political apparatus of the nation, through collective and representational decision making. The narrative of democracy and the parameters of legitimate constitutionalism, once wholly the construct of ancient Western notions of the character of society, politics and the state, may now be witness to the emergence of a counter narrative that is emerging, slowly and incompletely for the moment, in the forms of Chinese socialist democracy.[3]



One of the most important aspects of campaigns to win the hearts and minds of target populations is the ability to control the master narrative, the script that is used when we tell stories or understand what is going on around us.[4] Despite its political origins, the concept has become important to both business practices and academic understanding of the context in which people understand what is going on around them. Scholars, government officials, and increasingly the business community have come to understand the importance of narrative in framing the way social and political practices are understood. The Harwood Institute has suggested a useful approach to narrative: "Our adherence to a master narrative dictates how we frame stories, whom we interview, the questions we ask and ultimately the work we produce, which typically reinforces our belief in the master narrative."[5] Once an institution or institutional actors can assert substantial control over the master narrative, they can easily manage populations to their point of view.



The importance of a master narrative is particularly acute in the context of constitutionalism and constitutional legitimacy of states.[6] Within the constitutional master narrative that has arisen especially after 1945 the ideal of popular democracy became central to the concept of a legitimate constitutional state.[7] Legitimacy was central to the master narrative of constitutional states because illegitimacy empowered internal resistance and external intervention.[8] Indeed, the rhetoric of legitimacy is powerful enough to be invoked in 2014 in the context of the Russian partitioning of Ukraine and its interventions in large parts of Ukrainian territory.[9] It has a Chinese dimension as well.[10]



Within the conventional mater narrative of constitutional democracy, elections are assumed to serve as the bedrock manifestation of the operationalization of democratic principles in a constitutional state grounded in popular sovereignty. Elections are understood as the periodic performance of popular sovereignty, the objective of which is to structure a process in which the mass of a state’s citizens may choose individual representatives to the legislative and executive branches of a government. One of the great scholars of constitutionalism in the West, Louis Henkin, succinctly expressed this idea:



In this age of mass democracy, elections are the essence of democratic constitutionalism. Elections, like some purifying elixir, cleanses all (political) sin of states that indulge the practice. An act of sovereign will by which the people of a state convey their political power to agents who act on their behalf, elections conform the appropriate relationship between state apparatus and the sovereign masses. Elections have proven crucial for legitimating states, and their governments. There is a strong connection between democracy and elections. One is impossible without the other. Together they implement notions of popular sovereign in the construction and operation of government.[11]



This elections-based basic premise of constitutionalist legitimacy has been criticized.[12] Yet while it might have lost its function of direct accountability for representative government, it retains legitimating power under constitutionalism principles a social act and an act of social discipline, as a means of managing popular violence, as a measure of governmental legitimacy and as a ritual of affirmation of the mass democracy grundnorm as the basis of political organization, as a method of popular organization to support or undermine the state apparatus, and as an affirmation of belonging.[13] Beyond that, elections in Western liberal constitutional states appear to require a set of mechanisms for ensuring that the masses vote effectively. To that end, civil society has been said to critically support a vigorous democracy.[14]



But can democracy take other forms? If the central problem of the expression of democracy—popular elections—ignores the effectiveness of democratic function within modern governments, and indeed, remains exterior to it, then might an alternative path to democratic expression also serve to legitimate the democratic constitutionalism of a state? These are questions that are central to the constitutional discourse of states, like China, that have developed a strong constitutional discourse but which are organized on Party-State principles.[15] Recently Chinese scholars have begun arguing with greater force that traditional notions of democratic constitutionalism do not describe the entirety of possibilities of the means by which a state may be organized along constitutional and democratic lines, and that states like China are developing an alternative to that of Western models.[16]



The 21st century has seen the rise of a number of constitutionalist schools within China and with them the genesis of a healthy debate about the character of Chinese constitutionalism as an exercise in constitutional legitimacy and its relationship to global principles of legitimate constitutionalism.[17] Together these schools have been debating the contours of what is emerging as Chinese socialist democracy—a rule of law constitutionalism centered on the division of authority between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government that is meant to be representative and democratic but under premises of the nature of both of those terms quite distinct from those embraced in the West.[18] This internal debate remains relatively opaque to foreigners, who tend to view any effort to deviate from Western premises of constitutionalism as a rejection of constitutionalism itself, a position around which some Chinese intellectuals disagree.[19]



One of the central issues debated among the distinct schools of Chinese constitutionalists, in the construction of a constitutionally legitimate socialist constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics,[20] is the character and role of the CCP within the Chinese constitutional system.[21] This issue is important because of the role of the CCP within Chinese politics and its place within the Chinese constitutional system.[22] Beyond whether to not the CCP falls inside ort outside the 1982 State Constitution,[23] the issue of the exercise of democratic (that is representative and institutional non-arbitrary) governance is a foundational one. In effect, Chinese theorists are suggesting that the constitutional principle of democracy is manifested not merely through the exercise of popular elections for a rotating slate of representatives who exercise substantial authority and are accountable only through the election cycle, but also and perhaps more importantly through the development of democratic practices within the representative institutions of politics (the CCP) and the state (the government).[24] This different focus becomes the lynchpin through which socialist democracy is developed.[25]



One of the most interesting variations of this approach within Chinese constitutional discourse is the notion of collectivity in the decision-making structures of Party and state in China. Hu Angang[26] has most recently expressed this theory of democratic governance through collective action, and specially a theory of socialist democracy around a collective presidency.[27] He is part of a line of theorists who are developing a theory of democracy that looks beyond the exercise of elections to the exercise of power within state and political entities. Hu suggests that if the ideal of a constitutionalist state is the exercise of democracy through representative and accountable governance institutions, then it is possible to implement that ideal both by focusing on popular elections (traditional view) or on increasing responsive democracy within governmental and political institutions (Chinese socialist democracy).[28] In both cases, the core democratic principle of legitimate constitutionalism is exercised. In one case (Western democracies) democracy is operationalized through the exercise of the franchise to elect leaders and in the other (Chinese) democracy may be embedded in the exercise of democratic and representative principles within the institutions of state and as a critical part of the operation of the democratic functions of the party in power in one-party (or vanguard party) constitutional states. Either way, systems are instituted that enhance rule of law governance grounded in principles that reflect the political community as a whole in whose collective interests the representatives act. Yet Hu understands that “in almost 200 countries around the world, the personal presidential system is known, but the notion of a collective presidential system is not. This innovative practice by China is poorly understood, and it is not one that foreigners agree with.”[29]



Hu Angang has sought to introduce Western thinkers to the emerging theories of constitutionalism and economic policy,[30] and especially notions of collective democracy at the heart of the move toward socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics.[31] Here democratic principles run from people to CPC and them outward toward the state apparatus and the people. It is democratic theory reconstituted as the mass line.[32] This essay considers Hu Angang’s theory and defense of the role of the CCP in China’s constitutional system, with particular focus on the evolution of the premises of collective action merged with democratic theory and applied to the operations of a party-state system. Its object is to theorize internal democratic structures of the CCP, and through them, of the government as a whole. Its focus is on the development of collective leadership at the very top of the political and state organs of China, and especially on the operation of what he identifies as a collective president.[33] These efforts are in line with the CCP’s efforts to treat the ideological foundations of the Chinese state as a living force that benefits from development in ways that remain true to its fundamental principles but which are suited to the context in which they are applied. To a large extent, these provide an important additional element of progress in the scientific development of Chinese constitutionalism along a long road with origins in Leninist principles in Chinese Marxist thought and emerging as a rule of law based set of principles of socialist democracy. The question for both Chinese and Western elites is whether these describe a distinct constitutionalist road. A consideration of these important ideas is the subject of this review essay.



Part I first considers the theoretical underpinning of Hu’s theory of collective presidency—grounded in China’s history, context and its political ideology. The object is to better situate the history and utility of a collective presidency within the political structures and ideological premises of Chinese constitutionalism, and then to consider the connection between that construction and global principles of constitutional democracy. While the West focuses on the external elements of democracy, Hu focuses on its internal elements. Both focus on the collective elements of social action, traditional Western democracies emphasize the mechanics and integrity of elections as the marker of democratic legitimacy; socialist democracy of the type Hu engages emphasizes the mechanics and integrity of the collective government as the marker of democratic legitimacy. The fundamentally distinct political premises of political organization that distinguish Western liberal democracies from Chinese socialist democracy best explain the difference. There is no question that the two systems are incompatible, and that each values quite distinct aspects of governance. But their objectives are similar—to institutionalize rule of law governance systems that avoid arbitrariness and that are constrained by the normative political frameworks from which they draw their values. Hu’s theory represents an interesting and scientific development that transforms the original Marxist and Leninist structures of the early Chinese state, in its revolutionary period, into rule of law structures that advance the socialist and democratic values of a Communist Party in power. But it is also one that suggests the theoretical and implementation work that remains to be done.



Part II then considers the arguments advanced for the efficiency and representation-reinforcing[34] elements of the collective presidency—collective succession, collective labor division and cooperation, collective learning, collective research, and collective decision-making. The specific focus is on the adoption of this model by the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. The implications, however, are far broader and suggest a general approach to governance where the implementation of socialist democracy focuses inward. In this way, Hu offers an alternative way to think about the focus of the representation reinforcing elements of democratic organization. He starts by situating the development of a theory and mechanics of collective presidency in the history of China and the CCP. He then considers each of the elements of collective presidency in detail—drawing from a study of each it character, the elements that contribute to its efficiency and its expression of the CCP line and contribution to the building of socialist democracy.



Part III briefly considers the work that remains to be done as the CCP continues to scientifically develop the theory of democratic socialism and attends to the harder task, not of drawing theory form facts, but of living theory through practice. This is both inherent in the CCP’s scientific development line and the truth from facts elements of the mass line as a fundamental element of the democratic character of the Chinese constitutional system. It analyses current approaches to the refinement of the collective presidency mechanisms and the deepening of the ideal of collective decision making within the premises of the organization and substantive principles of the Chinese constitutional state. Whether you agree or not with the emerging theoretical approaches to democratic and constitutional theory being developed in China now, this emerging approach will be important, and potentially influential, and thus worth studying. It is as important to avoid losing sight of the essential insights of this development in efforts to compare the Chinese and other (especially U.S.) approaches. Except to measure functional equivalence, comparison is distracting and suggests, incorrectly, that there can only be one best approach. The essential insight of the Chinese move toward a distinct socialist democracy is the opposite—that it is not which state is more democratic, but whether every state develops democratic structures effectively responsive to its own conditions.

NOTES:

[1] Larry Catá Backer (白 轲) W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University. The author may be contacted at lcb911@gmail.com.


[2] John Hart Ely is well known for his representation reinforcing theory of U.S. constitutional law. The insight, though, is transcultural—that a constitution embodies principles that make the ideal of representative democracy possible. For Ely, a student of the American constitutional system, those representation-reinforcing principles served to structure representative democracy the framework of which was protected by an independent judiciary. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980); David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 Stanford Law Review 761 (2004). In China, on the other hand, it may be argued, the representation-reinforcement system that makes representative democracy possible is structured around the CCP and its internal mechanics.


[3] The power of ideological narratives within China are well known. See, Woei Lien Chong, China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).


[4] Jean-Francois Lyotard, The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press 1984).


[5] What is a Master Narrative, Covering Communities.org, The Harwood Institute for Public Innovation 2007. Available http://www.coveringcommunities.org/PDFs/MasterNarrativeNEW.pdf.


[6] See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113(3) Penn State Law Review 671-732 (2009).


[7] Louis Henkin famously expressed this notion. See Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, in Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives 30 (Michel Rosenfeld, ed., Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994) (constitutionalism based on popular sovereignty, and a government bounded by rule of law and installed through the application of democratic principles, that is of political democracy and representative government. Id., 40-42).


[8] Thus consider the implications of determinations of democratic legitimacy as a foundation for respect of territorial integrity:

A defiant Russian President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday that masked gunmen are fueling anarchy in Ukraine. He decried what he called an illegitimate government that illegally seized power in a coup with U.S. backing, arguing that his country has a right to use military force.

U.S. President Barack Obama and his country's top diplomat said Ukraine's new government is democratically responding to the people's will. They warned of invading forces and a desperate Russia breaking international law.

Catherine E. Shoichet, Putin vs. Obama: Facing off over facts in Ukraine, CNN World, March 5, 2014. Available http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/04/world/europe/putin-obama-ukraine-facts/.


[9] See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism, supra note --.


[10] Woei Lien Chong, China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002);


[11] Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part XIX: Electoral Legitimacy in Honduras and Afghanistan, Law at the End of the Day, Nov. 29, 2009. Available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/demo-racy-part-xix-electoral-legitimacy.html.


[12] Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part XXVI: Democratic Accountability--From Voter to Managed Mob, Law at the End of the Day June 4, 2012. Available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/democracy-part-xxvi-democratic.html (“The rise of highly efficient administrative apparatus in states, and tightly networked clusters of functionally differentiated non-governmental actors with power to affect individual and group behavior may require a more direct confrontation with the question: has public participation in democratic governance is becoming largely symbolic”).


[13] Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part XXVII--The Utility of Voting in the Shadow of the Administrative State, Law at the End of the Day, July 27, 2012. Available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/demcracy-part-xxvii-utility-of-voting.html.


[14] For a critical view of this notion, see, Ann Hudock, NGOs And Civil Society: Democracy By Proxy (Polity press, 1999); Anne Hawthorne, Middle Eastern Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Papers No. 44 (March 2004), available http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CarnegiePaper44.pdf.


[15] Discussed in Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in China, 36(1) Modern China 12-46 (2010); See also, Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30(1) Boston University International Law Journal 331-408 (2012).


[16] See, e.g., Zhiwei Tong, A Comment on the Rise and Fall of the of the Supreme People’s Court’s Reply to Qi Yuling’s Case, 43(3) Suffolk Law Review (2010(; Frank Fang, Taking the China Model Seriously: One-Party Constitutionalism and Economic Development, in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and Perspectives 209 (Frank Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, ed.,s Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2012); Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in China, 36(1) Modern China 12-46 (2010); Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 533, 557 (2007)


[17] Tong Zhiwei, for example, has identified three schools of constitutional thought—ant constitutionalists, socialist constitutionalists and universal constitutionalists. The first reject western notions o constitutionalism and seek to develop an autonomous structure for constitutional debates. The second recognizes the vanguard role of the Chinese Communist Party and its political ideology but seeks to conform that political framework to larger constitutional principles applied in the Chinese context. The last posits that Chinese constitutionalism must eventually adopt the form of western constitutional democracies. Zhiwei Tong, Two Issues on Constitutional Government in China, paper presented at the conference, China-Constitution-Politics, Penn State University, April 9, 2014. I have also posited a school of political constitutionalism that recognizes the special role of the Chinese Communist Party as the organizer of the Chinese polity and the expression of its political mandate through a binding constitution.


[18] Jiang Shigong, Chinese-Style Constitutionalism: On Backer’s Chinese Party-State Constitutionalism, 40 Modern China (2014).


[19] Hu Angang notes, for example, “China has adopted a collective central leadership system, which cannot be understood by foreigners; they think of it as a one-party, undemocratic, or autocratic system.” Hu Angang, Collective Presidency in China (Beijing: Tsinghua Institute for Contemporary Chinese Studies, 2013).


[20] See Hu Jingtao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all, Report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Oct. 15, 2007). Available http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm.


[21] See e.g., Zhiwei Tong, Part XXIX—Zhiwei Tong (童之伟) Series: Five Theoretical Issues Should Be Addressed to Restart Political Reforms, Law at the End of the Day, Nov. 1, 2013. Available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/part-xxxzhiwei-tong-series-five.html. Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16(1) Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 29-102 (2006).


[22] “China experimented in the past with various political systems, including multi-party democracy, but it did not work, President Xi Jinping said during a visit to Europe, warning that copying foreign political or development models could be catastrophic. China's constitution enshrines the Communist Party's long-term "leading" role in government, though it allows the existence of various other political parties under what is calls a "multi-party cooperation system". But all are subservient to the Communist Party.” Xi Jinping says multi-party system didn't work for China, Reuters, April 2, 2014. Available http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/02/china-politics-xi-jinping-idINDEEA3101U20140402.


[23] Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982 as amended. Available


[24] “We will expand intra-Party democracy to develop people's democracy and increase intra-Party harmony to promote social harmony. We need to respect the principal position of Party members, guarantee their democratic rights, increase transparency in Party affairs and create favorable conditions for democratic discussions within the Party.” Hu Jingtao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all, Report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Oct. 15, 2007) ¶ XII. Available http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm.


[25] See, e.g., Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Building of Political Democracy in China (Beijing, New Star Publishers, Oct. 2005). Available http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/democracy.html.


[26]胡鞍钢　”is a Tsinghua University-affiliated economist who is regarded as a leading figure in what could be translated as ‘China National Exceptionalism Studies’ 国情研究. . . . A fierce defender of China’s political institutions, Hu argues that China’s current political model deserves more credit than reformists who urge speedier democratisation often allow.” The China Story. Available http://www.thechinastory.org/key-intellectual/hu-angang-%E8%83%A1%E9%9E%8D%E9%92%A2/.


[27] Hu Angang, Collective Presidency in China (Beijing: Tsinghua Institute for Contemporary Chinese Studies, 2013))


[28] “The CPC aims at future expansion, and it intends to create political trust and confidence as it builds and develops China.” Hu Angang, Collective Presidency in China, supra., 129.


[29] Hu Angang, Collective Presidency in China, supra note --, at 177.


[30] Hu Angang, China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2011) [hereafter “Hu 2020”].


[31] Larry Catá Backer, Review Essay: Hu Angang (胡鞍鋼), China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower, Consortium for Peace & Ethics Working Paper No. 2013-2 (2013). Available http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2223279 (Hu suggests here the contours of a seamless merger of domestic and internal policies grounded in China’s substantive political norms, now harmonized with global internationalism).


[32] Ibid., The Chinese Communist Party has itself instituted a well publicized “Mass Line Campaign”. See CPC Launches Mass Line Campaign, Available http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/207797/index.html. “In June, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, stressed that the mass line, or furthering ties with the people is the lifeline of the Party and the fundamental route of work. The upcoming education campaign, including cracking down on undesirable work styles, will bring a closer tie between the Party and the people, the editorial says. Undesirable work styles, such as formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and extravagance, are like an invisible wall that cuts off the Party from the people, depriving the CPC of people foundation, it says.” People's Daily editorial stresses stronger ties with masses, News of the Communist Party of China, July 1, 2013. Available http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206974/8305468.html. Hu Angang discusses the application fo the mass line in the context of the collective presidency, at Hu Angang, supra, 111-112.


[33] “The major purpose of this book is to examine this development of the collective presidency. It aims to explore the operations of this mechanism, analyze the methods of government by collective presidency, and identify the rationale, innovation, and international competitiveness of this system.” Hu Angang, supra., 128-129.


[34] John Hart Ely is well known for his representation reinforcing theory of U.S. constitutional law. The insight, though, is transcultural—that a constitution embodies principles that make the ideal of representative democracy possible. For Ely, a student of the American constitutional system, those representation-reinforcing principles served to structure representative democracy the framework of which was protected by an independent judiciary. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980); David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 Stanford Law Review 761 (2004). In China, on the other hand, it may be argued, the representation-reinforcement system that makes representative democracy possible is structured around the CCP and its internal mechanics.