Opinion of the Court of the Hague in 4 Widows v. Shell Companies Case number C / 09/540872 / HA ZA 17-1048

(Esther Kiobel, one of the Ogoni 9 Pix Credit HERE)

On 1 May 2019, the Court of the Hague (first instance) delivered its (very long) opinion in Case number C / 09/540872 / HA ZA 17-1048 (given by L. Alwin, B. Meijer and A. C. Bordes). The case was brought by four widows of the Ogoni 9 against the Shell companies, including ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC in London, United Kingdom, with offices in The Hague, and SHELL PETROLEUM N.V. in The Hague.  One of the four widows, Esther Kiobel had brought a suit against Shell in the United States. Filed in 2002, that lawsuit was dismissed in 2013 by the U.S. Supreme Court on the basis that US courts lacked jurisdiction in that case (case opinion here: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 569 U.S. 108 (2013)).

The Suit had been filed in 2017 (Ogoni 9 widow Esther Kiobel lands day in court against oil giant Shell). "Plaintiffs expressly do not base their claims against the parent companies on a breach of liability, the Anglo-Saxon legal entities piercing the corporate veil and crossing the corporate veil, shareholder liability or tort or negligence. Claimants claim that the basis of their claims against the parent companies is no different from that of SPDC [Shell's Nigerian operating company]" (Opinion ¶ 4.8). Instead the court grounded its analysis on a theory of joint or several tortfeasors tied togethjer by  identical facts.  "The core of the claimants' accusation is that SPNV, STTC and SPDC acted jointly in respect of the fundamental rights violations alleged by the claimants. The claims against the three defendants are based on the same facts, circumstances and legal grounds" (Opinion ¶ 4.26).

The Post includes the original decision (in Dutch) plus a rough English translation. Further commentary will follow. For now, and for English speakers, the Court's conclusion is especially interesting (rendered here in rough English):

VII. Conclusion

4,134. Claimants will be allowed to prove that:

(i) SPDC was involved in bribing the witnesses [U], [V], [II], [YY], [KK], [LL], [MM] and [NN] because [a.] [Y] by order of SPDC and / or a representative of SPDC attended the meeting (s) where these witnesses had to prepare / sign the statements prepared by others and / or [b.] SPDC has contributed financially to the payments to these witnesses and / or [c.] SPDC has promised these witnesses a job, and

(ii) the statements of witnesses bribed with the involvement of SPDC played a role in: [a.] the conviction of the spouses of claimants by the tribunal and / or [b.] the arrest and detention of spouses of claimants and / or [c.] the detention of claimants.

4,135. As has been considered above, part (ii) of the evidence assignment is only relevant if the involvement of SPDC as the meaning of (i) is established. Plaintiffs are admitted to the evidence of both parts of the evidence assignment for procedural economic reasons. Whether and to what extent this claim by claimants actually applies will be assessed after the evidence has been delivered.

4,136. The other accusations of claimants have no purpose. The other points of dispute about this - such as the question if and to what extent, and on what basis, the actions or omissions of the claimants on this point can be attributed to each of the defendants - need not be discussed. If and insofar as the documents to be provided in the incident give claimants cause to set new facts or otherwise give rise to a further position, claimants must proceed as quickly as possible.

4,137. The court holds any further decision in the main proceedings.

The Court then ordered the defendants to provide plaintiffs with copies of the relevant documents subject to a fine for delay in production.  

ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2019:4233

Instantie

Rechtbank Den Haag

Datum uitspraak

01-05-2019

Datum publicatie

01-05-2019

Zaaknummer

C/09/540872 / HA ZA 17-1048

Rechtsgebieden

Civiel recht

Bijzondere kenmerken

Bodemzaak
Eerste aanleg - meervoudig

Inhoudsindicatie

Zaak van vier weduwen van de ‘Ogoni 9’ tegen Shell-vennootschappen, die door eiseressen medeverantwoordelijk worden gehouden voor schendingen van grondrechten door het Nigeriaans regime. De echtgenoten van eiseressen zijn in november 1995 door een speciaal tribunaal ter dood veroordeeld en vervolgens ter uitvoering van het vonnis opgehangen.
Bevoegdheid rechtbank op grond artikel 8 lid 1 Brussel 1 bis-Vo en artikel 7 Rv. Exhibitie-incident. Verjaring naar Nigeriaans recht (FREP Rules 2009). Beoordeling ten gronde naar Nigeriaans recht (grondrechten uit Nigeriaanse grondwet en African Charter for Human Rights). Bewijsopdracht over gestelde betrokkenheid van SPDC bij omkoping getuigen en gebruik van verklaringen van deze getuigen in de zaken van de echtgenoten van eiseressen. De overige verwijten treffen geen doel.

Vindplaatsen

Rechtspraak.nl

Verrijkte uitspraak

Uitspraak

vonnis
RECHTBANK DEN HAAG

Team handel

zaaknummer / rolnummer: C/09/540872 / HA ZA 17-1048

Vonnis van 1 mei 2019

in de zaak van

1. [eiseres 1] te [woonplaats 1] ,
2. [eiseres 2] te [woonplaats 2] ,
3. [eiseres 3] te [woonplaats 3] ,
4. [eiseres 4] te [woonplaats 4] ,

eiseressen,
advocaat mr. Ch. Samkalden te Amsterdam,

tegen

1. ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC te Londen, Verenigd Koninkrijk, kantoorhoudend te Den Haag,
2. SHELL PETROLEUM N.V. te Den Haag,
3. THE SHELL TRANSPORT AND TRADING COMPANY LIMITED te Londen,
4. THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD te Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Federale Republiek Nigeria,

gedaagden,
advocaat mr. W.I. Wisman te Den Haag.

Eiseressen zullen gezamenlijk eiseressen worden genoemd en individueel respectievelijk [eiseres 1] , [eiseres 2] , [eiseres 3] en [eiseres 4] . Gedaagden zullen gezamenlijk gedaagden worden genoemd en individueel respectievelijk RDS, SPNV, STTC en SPDC.

1. De procedure

1.1. Het verloop van de procedure blijkt uit:
- de dagvaarding van 28 juni 2017 met producties 1 tot en met 269;
- de conclusie van antwoord met producties 1 tot en met 204;
- het vonnis waarbij een meervoudige comparitie van partijen is bepaald;
- de conclusie van eis in het exhibitie-incident met producties 1 tot en met 3;
- de akte houdende overlegging producties (205 en 206) van gedaagden;
- de conclusie van antwoord in het exhibitie-incident met één productie (207);
- de akte overlegging producties (270 t/m 291, en een addendum bij productie 34) van eiseressen;
- het proces-verbaal van de meervoudige comparitie van partijen van 12 februari 2019.
1.2. Het proces-verbaal is met instemming van partijen buiten hun aanwezigheid opgemaakt. Zij zijn in de gelegenheid gesteld om binnen twee weken na toezending van het proces-verbaal opmerkingen van feitelijke aard daarover te maken. Eiseressen hebben bij brief van 14 maart 2019 en gedaagden bij brief van 13 maart 2019 van deze gelegenheid gebruik gemaakt. Deze brieven maken deel uit van het procesdossier en het vonnis wordt gewezen met inachtneming van deze brieven, voor zover het correcties van feitelijke aard betreft.

2. De feiten
2.1. Eiseressen zijn de weduwen van vier van negen mannen, die ook wel bekend zijn als de Ogoni 9. Zij behoren tot de Ogoni, een bevolkingsgroep in Nigeria, die leeft in het in de provincie Rivers State gelegen Ogoniland. De Ogoni 9 zijn op 10 november 1995 in Nigeria opgehangen na door een speciaal tribunaal ter dood te zijn veroordeeld vanwege betrokkenheid bij de dood van vier traditionele Ogoni-leiders.

2.1.1 [eiseres 1] is de weduwe van dr. [A] ( [A] ) , die in januari 1994 was benoemd tot Honourable Commissioner van het ministerie van Handel, Industrie en Toerisme van de provincie Rivers State en die in die functie functioneerde als schakel tussen de Ogoni en de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten.
2.1.2 [eiseres 2] is de weduwe van [B] , die vanaf de oprichting een prominent lid was van MOSOP (zie hierna onder 2.13) en NYCOP (zie ook onder 2.13).
2.1.3 [eiseres 3] is de weduwe van [C] , die zich in 1993 had aangesloten bij NYCOP.
2.1.4 [eiseres 4] is de weduwe van [D] , die zich in 1993 had aangesloten bij MOSOP.

2.2. Shell Petroleum N.V. (SPNV) is de rechtsopvolger onder algemene titel van N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij (Royal Dutch). Royal Dutch en de rechtspersoon naar Engels recht The Shell Transport and Trading Company Limited (STTC) waren in de voor deze procedure relevante periode, 1990-1995 (hierna: “de relevante periode” of “1990-1995”), de moedermaatschappijen van de Shell-groep (Group Parent Companies). Royal Dutch en STTC – hierna ook tezamen ‘de moedermaatschappijen’ – werkten samen op grond van een in 1907 gesloten overeenkomst.

2.3. Royal Dutch en STTC hielden de aandelen in de houdstermaatschappijen van de Shell-groep (de Group Holding Companies), waartoe onder meer SPNV en de rechtspersoon naar Engels recht Shell Petroleum Company Ltd (SPCo) behoorden. De Group Holding Companies hielden de aandelen van de werkmaatschappijen binnen de Shell-groep, waaronder Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC), een rechtspersoon naar Nigeriaans recht.

2.4. SPDC is de voortzetting van Shell D’Arcy, dat in 1938 in Nigeria een vergunning verkreeg om naar olie te zoeken. In april 1956 werd de naam van dit bedrijf gewijzigd in Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited. In december 1979 is de naam van dit bedrijf opnieuw gewijzigd in haar huidige naam SPDC. SPCo hield in de relevante periode 99,9% van de aandelen in SPDC; SPNV hield in deze periode 0,1% van de aandelen in SPDC.

2.5. De rechtspersoon naar Engels recht Royal Dutch Shell plc (RDS) is sinds een herstructurering in 2005 de (enige) moedervennootschap van de Shell-groep. Deze herstructurering omvatte onder meer een fusie, waarbij Royal Dutch is opgegaan in SPNV. RDS is bovenaan de Shell-groep geplaatst en heeft geen verplichtingen van andere vennootschappen binnen de Shell-groep overgenomen.

2.6. Naast de Group Parent Companies, de Group Holding Companies en de werkmaatschappijen behoorden in de relevante periode tot de Shell-groep ook Service Companies, waaronder Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij B.V. (SIPM) en de rechtspersoon naar Engels recht Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (SIPC). Deze Service Companies voorzagen de Shell-groep van advies en expertise, bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van ingenieurswerk, geofysica, geologie, veiligheid en public affairs.

2.7. Tussen de Group Parent Companies bestond op organisatorisch niveau een overlegorgaan, aangeduid als de “Conference”. In de Conference kwamen de leden van de Raad van Commissarissen en de Directie van Royal Dutch en de Board of Directors van STTC bijeen. Daarnaast kende de Shell-groep het zogenoemde Comité van Directeuren (het CMD). Dit was een gemeenschappelijk, informeel college ingesteld door de Raden van Beheer van de Group Holding Companies. Ieder lid van het CMD was hetzij lid van de Directie van Royal Dutch, hetzij lid van de Board of Directors van STTC en lid van de Raden van Beheer van beide Group Holding Companies.

2.8. SPDC was en is thans nog operator in een in april 1973 opgerichte Nigeriaanse joint venture zonder rechtspersoonlijkheid die actief is in het opsporen, produceren en transporteren van aardolie en aardgas. De verhoudingen binnen de joint venture zijn in de loop der tijd gewijzigd. In de relevante periode had SPDC een belang van 30%. De rechtspersoon naar Nigeriaans recht Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) had een belang van 55%. Elf en Agip hadden een belang van 10% respectievelijk 5%. Binnen de joint venture waren in de relevante periode de taken als volgt verdeeld: de operator bereidde de werkprogramma’s en budgetten voor en de partners in de joint venture leverden op cash calls het kapitaal voor de werkzaamheden van de operator, die tevens verantwoordelijk was voor alle aspecten van oliewinning en -exploitatie van de joint venture. De joint venture had een Operating Committee (OPCOM), bestaande uit zes vertegenwoordigers van NNPC, vier vertegenwoordigers van SPDC, een vertegenwoordiger van Elf en een vertegenwoordiger van Agip. OPCOM was verantwoordelijk voor het algemene toezicht, de leiding en het bestuur van alles wat de joint venture betrof, waaronder het goedkeuren, aanpassen of verwerpen van voorgenomen besluiten over projecten en begrotingen.

2.9. De joint venture won onder meer olie in Ogoniland. Zij exploiteerde daar in ieder geval tot 1993 twaalf olievelden met 116 putten, vijf flow stations, verschillende manifolds en pijpleidingen.

2.10. SPDC had in 1990-1995 beveiligers in dienst, die geen vuurwapens mochten dragen. Daarnaast werden het personeel en de bezittingen van de joint venture beveiligd door reguliere politie (supernumerary police SPY, in de volksmond ook aangeduid als Shell police) en dog handlers. Deze politiefunctionarissen, die in dienst waren van de Nigeria Police Force, waren vaak langdurig verbonden aan bedrijven, die daar op grond van artikel 18, lid 4, van de Nigeriaanse Police Act een vergoeding voor betaalden aan de Nigeriaanse overheid. Ook betaalden deze bedrijven het salaris van deze politiefunctionarissen.
2.11. In 1985 is Major-General [E] door middel van een staatsgreep in Nigeria aan de macht gekomen. Hij is in augustus 1993 afgetreden. Na een interim regering onder [F] , is generaal [G] ( [G] ) in november 1993 aan de macht gekomen met een staatsgreep. Hij was staatshoofd van Nigeria tot zijn dood in 1998.

2.12. In oktober 1990 protesteerden bewoners van Umuechem, een dorp net buiten Ogoniland, tegen gebrekkige elektriciteits- en watervoorzieningen in Umuechem en het ontbreken van een redelijke vergoeding voor de onteigening en exploitatie van hun land. Nadat de divisional manager east van SPDC, [H] ( [H] ), op 29 oktober 1990 aan de Nigeriaanse Commissioner of Police had gevraagd om “security protection (preferably by Mobile Police Force)”, trad de Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) op 31 oktober 1990 op tegen de demonstranten in Umuechem. Daarbij vielen tientallen doden en vele gewonden. 495 huizen werden in brand gestoken.

2.13. In 1990 is de Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) opgericht door [I] ( [I] ). MOSOP protesteerde tegen de oliewinning in Ogoniland. Haar programma is neergelegd in de in 1991 opgestelde Ogoni Bill of Rights. MOSOP richtte zich op meer politieke autonomie van Ogoniland, een rechtvaardige vergoeding voor het gebruik van Ogoniland en de zich daarin bevindende grondstoffen en herstel van de schade die is ontstaan door olie-exploitatie. Later, in 1993, werden organisaties opgericht die fungeerden onder de paraplu van MOSOP. Eén daarvan was de jeugdbeweging National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP).

2.14. Op 20 en 21 juli 1992 demonstreerden Ogoni bij de Bonny Terminal, een door de joint venture in Ogoniland geëxploiteerde flow station. Het Nigeriaanse Rapid Intervention Force heeft toen ingegrepen. Daarbij is een dode gevallen en zijn twee anderen zwaargewond geraakt.

2.15. Op 30 november 1992 heeft MOSOP de oliemaatschappijen die op dat moment werkzaam waren in Ogoniland, waaronder SPDC, een demand notice gezonden met een verzoek om betaling binnen dertig dagen van USD 10 miljard en onderhandelingen over toekomstige oliewinning met afgevaardigden van de Ogoni. Zou hieraan niet worden tegemoetgekomen, dan ging de demand notice uit van een volledige stopzetting van alle activiteiten van deze oliemaatschappijen in Ogoniland en hun volledige terugtrekking uit Ogoniland.

2.16. Tijdens een rally op 4 januari 1993 heeft [I] een toespraak gehouden waarin hij Shell persona non grata verklaarde en opriep om te vechten voor de rechten van de Ogoni.

2.17. In januari 1993 heeft de joint venture zich teruggetrokken uit Ogoniland vanwege een toename van geweld, waaronder bedreigingen van haar staf en aanvallen op haar installaties. De joint venture zette wel de werkzaamheden voort aan de Trans Niger Pipeline (TMP), die op dat moment door Willbros West Africa (Willbros) door Ogoniland werd aangelegd. MOSOP en de lokale bevolking protesteerden tegen de aanleg van de TMP. Bij brief van 7 april 1993 aan Willbros protesteerden zij tegen de aanwezigheid van het leger in Ogoniland. Op 30 april 1993 vond een confrontatie plaats tussen het Nigeriaanse leger en Ogoni-demonstranten, waarop SPDC en Willbros op 3 mei 1993 besloten om de werkzaamheden aan de TMG op te schorten. Op 4 mei 1993 schreef [H] aan [J] , de gouverneur van Rivers State en oud-medewerker van Shell:
“I regret to inform you that work on the Bomu end of the line has been forced to stop because of some community intervention. (…) We humbly request the usual assistance of his Excellency to enable the project to proceed.”
Op 4 mei 1993 beëindigde een Nigeriaanse legereenheid de protesten bij de TMG. Daarbij vond één van de demonstranten de dood.

2.18. Op 15 mei 1993 en 8 juni 1993 vonden gesprekken plaats tussen [I] enerzijds en SPDC anderzijds, in de persoon van [H] en [K] , op dat moment de general business manager van SPDC ( [K] ). In deze gesprekken vroeg [I] SPDC de Ogoni-zaak te ondersteunen. In het door SPDC opgestelde verslag van het eerste gesprek staat dat [I] heeft gezegd:
“(…) that most of the issues were political and regretted that SPDC was being used as a scape goat. He claimed that his tactics were the only way to arouse public opinion (local and international) and attract Govt attention.”
In het verslag van het tweede gesprek staat over de uitlatingen van [I] :
“He was very apologetic for the “terrible things” he claimed to be doing to Shell particularly on the international scene. He felt that not all of that was deserved but he had no alternative instrument to use effectively for his campaign.”

2.19. In januari 1994 trad [L] ( [L] ) aan als directeur van SPDC. Hij stuurde wekelijks en soms vaker vertrouwelijke notities, Nigeria Updates genoemd, aan medewerkers van de Service Company SIPC te Londen, met een kopie aan de Service Company SIPM te Den Haag.

2.20. In een inter office memo van [M] , head of intelligence and surveillance East van SPDC ( [M] ) van 25 februari 1994 is vermeld dat [M] het team van [N] ( [N] ), commandant van de Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) een extra toelage heeft betaald namens SPDC:
“as a show of gratitude and motivation for a sustained favourable disposition towards SPDC in future assignments”

2.21. Op 21 april 1994 kondigde het Nigeriaanse regime het actieplan Operation Restore Order in Ogoniland aan. Deze operatie werd uitgevoerd door de RSISTF en werd geleid door haar commandant [N] .

2.22. Op 21 mei 1994 werden vier traditionele Ogoni-leiders, [O] , [P] , [Q] en [R] , gedood tijdens rellen die uitbraken bij een bijeenkomst in Giokoo, een dorp in Ogoniland. Deze bijeenkomst was bedoeld als ontvangst van twee “zonen van Gokana”, waaronder [A] .

2.23. Op 22 mei 1994 hield luitenant-kolonel [S] , de militaire gouverneur van Rivers State, een persconferentie waarin hij een deel van MOSOP verantwoordelijk hield voor het doden van de vier Ogoni-leiders en liet weten dat hij opdracht had gegeven om de voor de dood verantwoordelijken binnen MOSOP te arresteren.

2.24. In mei 1994 zijn onder meer [I] , [A] , [B] en [D] gearresteerd en gedetineerd. [C] is in oktober 1994 gearresteerd en gedetineerd.

2.25. Op 4 november 1994 is het Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal (het tribunaal) opgericht met, zoals later bleek, als taak de berechting van de personen verdacht van de moord op de Ogoni-leiders.
2.26. Op 28 januari 1995 is de eerste groep verdachten, waaronder [A] en [B] , voor het tribunaal in staat van beschuldiging gesteld. [I] behoorde ook tot deze groep verdachten. Begin februari 1995 begon het proces tegen de eerste groep verdachten.

2.27. Op 28 februari 1995 is een tweede groep verdachten, waaronder [C] en [D] , voor hetzelfde tribunaal als de eerste groep van verdachten in staat van beschuldiging gesteld. Eind maart 1995 begon het proces voor ditzelfde tribunaal tegen de tweede groep verdachten.

De twee processen voor het tribunaal – tegen de eerste en tweede groep verdachten – worden hierna ook tezamen aangeduid als ‘het proces’.

2.28. In februari 1995 is [eiseres 1] enige tijd gedetineerd geweest. [eiseres 2] is een dag vastgehouden toen zij haar gedetineerde echtgenoot bezocht. Later, op 11 november 1995, nadat haar echtgenoot ter dood was gebracht, is [eiseres 2] gearresteerd en ruim acht uur vastgehouden.

2.29. Er was in 1995 wereldwijd aandacht voor het tribunaal, dat (deels) werd bijgewoond en geobserveerd door verschillende waarnemers en vertegenwoordigers van non-gouvernementele organisaties. Deze waarnemers en organisaties hebben vraagtekens gezet bij de onafhankelijkheid van het tribunaal en de eerlijkheid van het proces. SPDC en de Shell-groep zijn van verschillende kanten opgeroepen om te interveniëren in het proces.

2.30. In een binnen de Shell-groep verspreide Q&A over de Nigeria Issue van 16 mei 1995 is als antwoord op de vraag waarom Shell niet intervenieerde, vermeld:
“As commercial organisations, Shell companies cannot, nor should not, interfere. Such legal matters are the concern of a country’s people and their government. Neither the government nor critics of Shell companies would tolerate interference in a country’s internal affairs by a business. Shell does wish Mr. [I] to be correctly treated and have access to proper legal and healthcare facilities.
(…)
We have openly expressed our concern about the situation in Nigeria. SPDC must operate within existing national law and endeavour to operate in a socially responsible manner. As a commercial organisation the company has no right to step outside its business interests and act as arbiter of Nigeria’s moral, social or political conduct. However, SPDC will speak up for the safety of its staff if they are put in danger.”

2.31. In juni 1995 is het rapport Nigeria Fundamental Rights Denied. Report of the Trial of [I] and Others van [T] verschenen. [T] had een deel van het proces tegen de eerste en tweede groep verdachten bijgewoond, als afgevaardigde van de Law Society of England and Wales en de Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales en met steun van ARTICLE 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, een human rights organisatie. In de samenvatting van de conclusies van zijn rapport heeft [T] onder meer geschreven:
“2.1 No sensible person could either doubt the seriousness of the Giokoo killings or challenge the right of the Nigerian authorities to investigate and try offences relating to them before an independent and impartial tribunal. However, I believe that the proceedings before the tribunal that has been specially appointed to try the case violate a number of the fundamental rights of the defendants which are guaranteed both by the Nigerian Constitution and by international human rights instruments to which Nigeria is a party.
(…)
2.4 The proceedings before the tribunal are in breach of fundamental rights in that:

(1) The tribunal is not independent of the government.(…)

(2) The tribunal has made some rulings favourable to the defence. (…) But, overall, it has behaved in a way which strongly suggests that it is biased in favour of the Federal Military Government and the prosecution. (…)
(...)
2.6 In assessing the overall fairness and legality of a trial one does not simple count up the rights denied and those upheld in order to make a purely numerical comparison. It is my view that the breaches of fundamental rights I have identified are so serious as to arouse grave concern that any trial before this tribunal will be fundamentally flawed and unfair.

2.7 I am also particularly concerned about two further aspects of the case. The first is the apparent influence of the Lt-Col [N] , an officer against whom grave allegations of human rights abuses have been made. In my view his insistence on arranging and attending defense conferences is bound to inhibit the preparation of the defense. His uninvited presence at my own meeting with prosecution counsel must give rise to fears that their independence has been compromised. There is also reason to suspect that he has private access to members of the tribunal.”

[T] heeft in zijn rapport zorgen geuit ten aanzien van het beschikbare bewijs en aandacht gevraagd voor een aantal punten, waaronder:
“The two principal witnesses against [I] have now sworn affidavits claiming that they were bribed to give false evidence.”

2.32. In juli 1995 is het rapport van Human Rights Watch, getiteld Nigeria. The Ogoni Crisis: A Case Study Of Military Repression In Southeastern Nigeria verschenen. Dit rapport is kritisch over de onafhankelijkheid van het tribunaal en de eerlijkheid van het proces voor het tribunaal. In dit rapport is onder meer opgenomen dat twee getuigen, [U] ( [U] ) en [V] ( [V] ), hebben verklaard dat zij zijn omgekocht en dat SPDC daarbij betrokken was, hetgeen zowel de aanklager als SPDC hebben ontkend.

2.33. Op 15 september 1995 is het rapport van Amnesty International verschenen, getiteld Nigeria. The Ogoni trials and detentions. Daarin staat onder meer:
“In the trials of [I] and others, the tribunal, appointed by Nigeria’s military government, is neither independent nor impartial. It has shown itself biased in favour of the prosecution at key stages, and the defence team, headed by Nigeria’s leading civil rights lawyers, has withdrawn from the trials in protest.

Amnesty International believes that at least three of the defendants – [I] , [W] and Dr [A] – are prisoners of conscience, imprisoned because of the non-violent expression of their political views, and is calling for immediate and unconditional release. (…)”
In dit rapport is betoogd dat de arrestaties en detentie van de verdachten is ingegeven door politieke motieven en dat het tribunaal niet onafhankelijk is van het Nigeriaanse militaire regime. Bij de beschrijving van het proces vermeldt dit rapport dat key prosecution witnesses zouden zijn omgekocht.

2.34. Op 30 en 31 oktober 1995 heeft het tribunaal het doodvonnis uitgesproken tegen negen verdachten. Deze Ogoni 9, waaronder de echtgenoten van eiseressen, werden veroordeeld tot death by hanging. De andere zes verdachten zijn vrijgesproken.

2.35. Naar aanleiding van het doodvonnis heeft Shell op 2 november 1995 het volgende persbericht uitgegeven:
“(…) Throughout the trial a number of respected organisations and campaigners raised questions over the fairness of the trial procedure. There are now demands that Shell should intervene, and use its perceived “influence” to have the judgement overturned.
This would be dangerous and wrong.
[I] and his co-defendants were accused of a criminal offence. A commercial organisation like Shell cannot and must never interfere with the legal process of any sovereign state. Those who call on us to do so might well be the first to criticise in any situation where that intervention did not suit their agenda. Any government, be it in Europe, North America or elsewhere, would not tolerate this type of interference by business. But what Shell has said, repeatedly and publicly, is that, while it does not agree with [I] ’s approach or opinions, it nevertheless recognises his right to hold and air his views, and that he is entitled to due legal process and medical support.(…)”

2.36. Op 8 november 1995 heeft [X] , de toenmalige voorzitter van het CMD, namens de Shell-groep in een brief aan [G] gevraagd om uit humanitaire overwegingen de executies niet uit te voeren.

2.37. Een persbericht van 8 november 1995 van SPDC houdt onder meer het volgende in:
“However, we believe that to interfere in the process, either political or legal, here in Nigeria would be wrong. A large multinational company such as Shell cannot and must not interfere with the affairs of any sovereign state. These principles, in which we strongly believe, are embedded in Shell’s Statement of General Business Principles. The very campaigners who are calling on us today to intervene may well be the first to criticise us in any other situation where intervention does not suit their agenda.”

2.38. Op 8 november 1995 heeft de Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), voorgezeten door [G] , de doodvonnissen bekrachtigd. De Ogoni 9 zijn op 10 november 1995 ter dood gebracht door ophanging.

2.39. Op 11 november 1995 hebben SPDC en Nigeria overeenstemming bereikt over het zogenoemde “NLNG-project”. Nigeria Liquid Natural Gas (NLNG) is een in mei 1989 opgerichte rechtspersoon met als doel de productie van liquified natural gas (LNG). Aandeelhouders in NLNG waren (en zijn) NNPC, Shell Gas B.V., Total LNG Nigeria Ltd en Eni S.p.A. De aandelen in Shell Gas BV werden gehouden door Royal Dutch. In 1995 vonden onderhandelingen plaats over onder meer de operationele activiteiten van NLNG, de inrichting van joint venture overeenkomsten en de financiering van de joint venture door de betrokken partijen. Enige tijd later, in december 1995 is de bereikte overeenstemming over het NLNG project wereldkundig gemaakt.

2.40. Op 12 november 1995 is Nigeria geschorst door de Commonwealth. Het Verenigd Koninkrijk en verschillende andere landen hebben hun ambassadeurs uit Nigeria teruggetrokken. De Wereldbank heeft zich teruggetrokken uit het NLNG-project vanwege de politieke situatie in Nigeria.

2.41. In een persbericht van de Shell-groep van 19 november 1995 is onder meer vermeld:
“First, did discreet diplomacy fail? Perhaps we should ask instead why the worldwide protests failed. Our experience suggests that quiet diplomacy offered the very best hope for [I] . Did the protesters understand the risk they were taking? Did the campaign become more important than the cause?”

2.42. Op 20 november 1995 heeft de Europese Unie de executies van de Ogoni 9 veroordeeld, met bevestiging van maatregelen tegen Nigeria uit 1993. Daarnaast heeft de Europese Unie een embargo op (handel in) wapens, munitie en militaire uitrusting ingevoerd en de ontwikkelingssamenwerking met Nigeria opgeschort.

2.43. Op 8 november 1996 zijn Royal Dutch en STTC door nabestaanden van de Ogoni 9, waaronder nabestaanden van [I] , in rechte betrokken in de Verenigde Staten (de Wiwa-procedure). In 2001 is ook [L] door deze nabestaanden in rechte betrokken en in 2003 SPDC. De zaken werden aangebracht onder de Amerikaanse Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) en de Torture Victim Protection Act en – voor wat betreft Royal Dutch en SPDC – onder de Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO). Na de discovery fase, heeft de District Court of Southern New York zich op 23 april 2009 bevoegd verklaard, waarna op 26 mei 2009 de inhoudelijke behandeling van de zaak is begonnen. Deze zaak is op 8 juni 2009 geëindigd met een schikking van USD 15,5 miljoen, waarmee onder andere een trustfonds is opgezet voor de Ogoni-bevolking.

2.44. Op 1 september 2002 heeft ook [eiseres 1] , mede namens haar overleden echtgenoot, samen met elf (nabestaanden van) Nigeriaanse Ogoni-activisten Royal Dutch en STTC gedagvaard in de Verenigde Staten (de Kiobel -procedure). In 2004 heeft zij ook SPDC gedagvaard. In 2013 heeft de Supreme Court de Amerikaanse rechter onbevoegd verklaard van het geschil kennis te nemen en geoordeeld dat een zaak alleen op grond van de ATCA aanhangig kan worden gemaakt in Amerika indien deze voldoende aanknoping heeft met de Amerikaanse rechtssfeer. Daar was naar het oordeel van de Supreme Court in de Kiobel -procedure geen sprake van.

De Wiwa-procedure en de Kiobel -procedure worden hierna tezamen aangeduid als ‘de Amerikaanse procedures’.

3. Het geschil

3.1. Eiseressen vorderen in de hoofdzaak bij uitvoerbaar bij voorraad verklaard vonnis:
I voor recht te verklaren dat gedaagden jegens eiseressen onrechtmatig hebben gehandeld en jegens hen hoofdelijk aansprakelijk zijn voor de schade die zij geleden hebben en nog zullen lijden als gevolg van de onrechtmatige gedragingen van gedaagden, welke schade is op te maken bij staat en te vereffenen volgens de wet, een en ander te vermeerderen met de wettelijke rente tot aan de dag der algehele voldoening
II gedaagden te gebieden binnen 21 dagen na vonnis een publieke verontschuldiging te doen uitspreken door de CEO van Royal Dutch Shell, althans de CEO van SPDC, voor de rol die Shell gespeeld heeft bij de gebeurtenissen die hebben geleid tot de dood van de echtgenoten van eiseressen, en de tekst van deze verklaring duidelijk zichtbaar op haar website te publiceren, op straffe van een dwangsom van € 20.000 per dag (of een ander door de rechtbank te bepalen bedrag) waarop niet aan dit gebod is voldaan;
III gedaagden hoofdelijk te veroordelen in de buitengerechtelijke kosten;

IV gedaagden hoofdelijk te veroordelen in de kosten van dit geding, inclusief de nakosten.

3.2. Eiseressen stellen dat gedaagden medeplichtig zijn aan de onrechtmatige arrestatie en detentie en de schending van de persoonlijke integriteit van hun echtgenoten en, in het geval van [eiseres 1] en [eiseres 2] , van henzelf. Verder verwijten zij gedaagden medeplichtigheid aan de schending van het recht op een eerlijk proces en het recht op leven van hun echtgenoten en van hun eigen recht op familieleven. Zij houden gedaagden – die zij tezamen in enkelvoud als Shell aanduiden – ieder voor zich verantwoordelijk voor medeplichtigheid aan deze grondrechtenschendingen door het Nigeriaanse regime, met wie Shell volgens eiseressen een bondgenootschap vormde, dat heeft geleid tot de dood van hun echtgenoten. Meer concreet stellen eiseressen dat Shell:

1. aan de basis stond van excessief gewelddadig optreden van het regime, omdat zij vanaf de jaren tachtig de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten bij herhaling heeft verzocht om in te grijpen als haar werkzaamheden werden verstoord door protesten van de lokale bevolking. Daarbij gaf zij meermaals de precieze locaties van de doorgaans vreedzame demonstraties door en stelde materiaal ter beschikking, vele doden en gewonden voor lief nemend;
2. Operation Restore Order in Ogoniland faciliteerde i) door aan te zetten tot (gewelddadig) ingrijpen tegen MOSOP en ii) doordat [N] mede in opdracht van Shell werkte;
3. met het Nigeriaanse regime als tandem opereerde, waarbij Shell i) het excessieve optreden van het Nigeriaanse regime faciliteerde, maar ook ii) zelf typische overheidstaken vervulde op het gebied van beveiliging en inlichtingenvergaring en iii) stromannen had op cruciale posities binnen het Nigeriaanse regime en vice versa;
4. vergaand betrokken was bij het proces, dat ertoe diende de gemeenschappelijke belangen van Shell en het regime veilig te stellen, aangezien i) haar advocaat [Y] (hierna: [Y] ) haar nauwkeurig op de hoogte hield en ii) met een watching brief de positie van de aanklager ondersteunde en iii) Shells protegé [N] een dominante rol speelde tijdens het proces;
5. bijdroeg aan de uitkomst van het proces door i) betrokkenheid bij omkoping van getuigen die belastende verklaringen moesten afleggen tegen de Ogoni 9 en ii) directe contacten met de rechters van het tribunaal;
6. heeft aangeboden om de uitkomst van het proces te beïnvloeden, maar daaraan de voorwaarde heeft verbonden dat MOSOP haar protest tegen Shell zou staken;
7. wetende hoe het proces zou aflopen en verkerend in een positie dat zij de executies kon verhinderen, haar commerciële belangen liet prevaleren boven het lot van de Ogoni 9, door i) op geen enkel moment afstand te nemen van de gang van zaken tijdens het proces, ii) het Nigeriaanse regime te blijven steunen en iii) niet (publiekelijk) te interveniëren, terwijl zij iv) tijdens het proces haar economische belangen veiligstelde door te onderhandelen over het NLNG-project, dat de samenwerking tussen het Nigeriaans regime en Shell voor vele jaren bestendigde.

3.3. In het incident vorderen eiseressen om bij incidenteel vonnis, uitvoerbaar bij voorraad, zoals ter comparitie gewijzigd:
I. gedaagden te bevelen om binnen 21 dagen na de datum van het in dezen te wijzen vonnis, aan eiseressen inzage te verschaffen in:
i. dat gedeelte van de door de plaintiffs aangemerkte intended trial exhibits dat door gedaagden geproduceerd is en als vertrouwelijk is aangemerkt in de Amerikaanse procedures en/of;
ii. de door de plaintiffs aangemerkte intended trial depositions die door gedaagden zijn geproduceerd en (ten dele) als vertrouwelijk zijn aangemerkt in de Amerikaanse procedures en/of;
iii. de documenten uit het privilege log (productie 198 dagvaarding en productie 3 in het incident, overzicht CDST-documenten) met de volgende nummers: 91 tot en met 94, 97 en 98, 100 tot en met 105, 125, 163, 165, 166 en 199 tot en met 206, althans die verslagen die de rechtbank toewijsbaar acht;
en gedaagden na inzage, afschrift of uittreksel te verstrekken van (het door
eiseressen gewenste gedeelte) van deze bescheiden, in fotokopie dan wel in een
gangbaar digitaal formaat of in enige andere vorm die uw rechtbank geraden
acht;
II. op straffe van een dwangsom van € 5.000,-- voor elke dag dat gedaagden na betekening van het vonnis in gebreke blijven aan de veroordeling te voldoen, met een maximum van € 50.000,--;
III. gedaagden hoofdelijk te veroordelen in de kosten van het incident, met de bepaling dat indien deze kosten niet betaald zijn binnen veertien dagen na de datum waarop het vonnis is gewezen, wettelijke rente daarover zal zijn verschuldigd.
3.4. Eiseressen stellen dat voor al deze documenten is voldaan aan de eisen van artikel 843a van het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Rv) voor afgifte daarvan.

3.5. Gedaagden voeren gemotiveerd verweer in de hoofdzaak en in het incident. Zij hebben voorop gesteld dat zij zich bewust zijn van het tragische en schokkende karakter van de gebeurtenissen die hebben geleid tot de executie van de Ogoni 9. Gedaagden kunnen zich echter niet vinden in de wijze waarop eiseressen de rol van SPDC en de Shell-groep bij deze gebeurtenissen voorstellen en evenmin in de beschrijving van deze gebeurtenissen door eiseressen. Gedaagden betwisten de vorderingen op inhoudelijke gronden en voeren ook verweren die in de weg staan aan een inhoudelijke beoordeling, zoals het beroep op onbevoegdheid van de rechtbank en het beroep op verjaring.

3.6. De standpunten van partijen worden – voor zover van belang – hierna besproken.

4. De beoordeling

I. inleiding

4.1.

De rechtbank stelt voorop dat de dood van hun echtgenoten voor eiseressen een verdrietige en tragische gebeurtenis is, die hun leven heeft getekend. Eiseressen hebben tijdens de zitting geschetst hoe zij de gebeurtenissen destijds hebben ervaren en welke verdrietige en ingrijpende gevolgen de dood van hun echtgenoten voor hen heeft (gehad). Dit verdriet en het grote verlies van eiseressen staan niet ter discussie. Vaststaat ook dat hun leven ingrijpend is veranderd na de dood van hun echtgenoten en de daaraan voorafgaande arrestatie, detentie en procedure voor het tribunaal. De rechtbank is zich bewust van het schokkende en tragische karakter van de gebeurtenissen, dat ook door gedaagden is onderschreven.
In deze procedure dient de rechtbank de vraag te beantwoorden of gedaagden, zoals eiseressen stellen, in rechte medeverantwoordelijk kunnen worden gehouden voor de arrestatie, detentie en de (tenuitvoerlegging van) de veroordeling van hun echtgenoten.

4.2.Eiseressen stellen dat gedaagden als medeplichtigen aan schendingen van fundamentele grondrechten van hun echtgenoten en henzelf een rol hebben gespeeld bij de gebeurtenissen die hebben geleid tot de dood van hun echtgenoten. Volgens eiseressen vormden gedaagden daarbij een bondgenootschap met het Nigeriaanse regime. Eiseressen gaan uitvoerig in op aan de Nigeriaanse Staat toe te rekenen gedragingen van de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten, van het tribunaal dat de Ogoni 9 berecht heeft en van Nigeriaanse militairen en politie-eenheden. Met juistheid nemen zij daarbij tot uitgangspunt dat deze aan de Nigeriaanse Staat toe te rekenen gedragingen niet kunnen worden beoordeeld in deze procedure, waarin Nigeria geen partij is. Los daarvan geniet Nigeria volgens het ongeschreven Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht immuniteit voor deze als acte jurii imperii te kwalificeren gedragingen, wat betekent dat de Nigeriaanse Staat daarvoor alleen in Nigeria in rechte kan worden betrokken.

4.3.Partijen zijn het erover eens dat de vorderingen van eiseressen worden beheerst door Nigeriaans recht. Indien en voor zover nodig hebben zij daarmee een rechtskeuze gemaakt voor dat recht. Partijen hebben zich in de processtukken, door middel van legal opinions en door hen overgelegde Nigeriaanse jurisprudentie uitgelaten over de inhoud van het relevante Nigeriaanse recht dat in deze zaak moet worden toegepast. Daarnaast heeft de rechtbank eigen onderzoek daarnaar gedaan door literatuur en jurisprudentie te raadplegen.

4.4.Ter comparitie hebben eiseressen toegelicht dat zij met vordering I een verklaring wensen te verkrijgen die inhoudt dat gedaagden hebben gehandeld in strijd met de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten en dat gedaagden hoofdelijk aansprakelijk zijn voor de schade die eiseressen daardoor hebben geleden en nog zullen lijden. De rechtbank leest het petitum aldus.

4.5.Eiseressen beroepen zich op de schending van de navolgende fundamentele grondrechten van hun overleden echtgenoten en van hen zelf, neergelegd in de African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) en de Nigeriaanse Grondwet uit 1979 (NGW (1979)):

1. The right to life (artikel 4 ACHPR en artikel 30 NGW (1979),
2. The right to dignity of a person and the prohibition of torture and cruel or inhuman punishment and treatment (artikel 5 ACHPR en artikel 31 NGW (1979),
3. The right to personal liberty and the security of the person; the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention (artikel 6 ACHPR en artikel 32 NGW (1979),
4. The right to a fair trial (artikel 7 ACHPR en artikel 33 NGW (1979),
5. The right to family life (artikel 18 ACHPR en artikel 34 NGW (1979).

4.6.Eiseressen houden STTC, als toenmalige moedermaatschappij, aansprakelijk en SPNV als rechtsopvolger van Royal Dutch, de andere toenmalige moedermaatschappij. Zij houden de moedermaatschappijen en SPDC ieder voor zich aansprakelijk voor schendingen van de onder 4.5 genoemde grondrechten. Zij hebben RDS, die is opgericht nádat de verweten gebeurtenissen hebben plaatsgevonden, (zekerheidshalve) gedagvaard, voor het geval RDS aansprakelijk kan/moet worden gehouden voor handelen dat plaatsvond vóór de herstructurering van de Shell-groep.

4.7.De door eiseressen aan hun vorderingen ten grondslag gelegde verwijten (zie onder 3.2) zien vrijwel uitsluitend op gedragingen van SPDC dan wel aan SPDC toe te rekenen gedragingen van haar bestuur en werknemers. Eiseressen houden ook de moedermaatschappijen daarvoor aansprakelijk. Zij betogen daartoe dat SPDC en de moedermaatschappijen feitelijk als één handelden. SPDC deed volgens eiseressen niets zonder voorafgaand overleg of de impliciete toestemming van de moedermaatschappijen, die precies wisten welke rol SPDC speelde bij de gebeurtenissen in Ogoniland en zich ook daarmee bemoeiden. Zij betogen dat de Shell-groep bij de verweten gedragingen als één centraal aangestuurde organisatie optrad en daarbij de Ogoni-kwestie behandelde als een groepsaangelegenheid.

4.8.Eiseressen baseren hun vorderingen tegen de moedermaatschappijen uitdrukkelijk niet op doorbraak van aansprakelijkheid, de Angelsaksische rechtsfiguren piercing the corporate veil en crossing the corporate veil, aandeelhoudersaansprakelijkheid dan wel tort of negligence. Eiseressen stellen dat de grondslag van hun vorderingen tegen de moedermaatschappijen niet verschilt van die van SPDC. Zij verwijten SPDC en de moedermaatschappijen een gezamenlijk en gecoördineerd optreden bij de gebeurtenissen die tot de gestelde grondrechtenschendingen hebben geleid. Dat SPDC en de moedermaatschappijen in verschillende gradaties actief waren, doet volgens eiseressen aan de grondslag van die vorderingen niet af. Tijdens de comparitie van partijen hebben eiseressen de rechtbank gevraagd om de vorderingen te beoordelen aan de hand van de maatstaven van tort, voor het geval geoordeeld zou worden dat hun vorderingen niet rechtstreeks kunnen worden gebaseerd op de ingeroepen bepalingen uit het ACHPR en de NGW (1979).

4.9.

De rechtbank zal hierna eerst (onder II) nader ingaan op de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten en de wijze waarop in Nigeria kan worden opgekomen voor (dreigende) schending daarvan. Daarna zal zij (onder III) in de hoofdzaak en in het incident beoordelen of zij rechtsmacht heeft. Onder IV wordt het incident beoordeeld, gevolgd door het beroep op verjaring (onder V) en de beoordeling ten gronde (onder VI). Het vonnis is hierna als volgt ingedeeld:
II. de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten en de wijze waarop in Nigeria kan worden opgekomen tegen (dreigende) schending daarvan
III. rechtsmacht van de Nederlandse rechter
IV. het exhibitie-incident
IV.1 de intended trial exhibits en intended trial depositions (vordering i) en ii))
IV.2 de CDST-documenten (vordering iii))
IV.3 de minutes van de CMD-meeting van 7 november 1995
V. het beroep op verjaring van gedaagden
VI. bespreking van de verwijten ten gronde
VI.1 betrokkenheid bij en beïnvloeding van het proces voor het tribunaal
VI.1.a het houden van een watching brief, ondersteuning van de aanklager en informele contacten met de rechters van het tribunaal
VI.1.b omkoping getuigen
VI.1.b.i betrokkenheid van SPDC
VI.1.b.ii gebruik verklaringen bij de veroordelingen
VI.1.b.iii gebruik verklaringen bij de arrestatie en detentie
VI.1.c [N]
VI.2 aanbod tot beïnvloeding van het proces onder voorwaarde van staken protest MOSOP tegen SPDC
VI.3 niet interveniëren in het proces
VI.3.a volgen proces
VI.3.b stille diplomatie
VI.3.b.i contacten van [L] met Nigeriaanse functionarissen
VI.3.b.ii andere contacten met Nigeriaanse functionarissen
VI.3.b.iii de periode tussen de vonnissen en de executies
VI.3.b.iv toetsing
VII. slotsom

II. de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten en de wijze waarop in Nigeria kan worden opgekomen tegen (dreigende) schending daarvan

4.10.

De door eiseressen ingeroepen ACHPR is door Nigeria ondertekend en geratificeerd en vervolgens geïncorporeerd in Nigeriaanse wetgeving door middel van de African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983.1 Deze wet bestaat uit twee artikelen: de in artikel 2 neergelegde citeerbepaling en artikel 1, dat als volgt luidt:
“As from the commencement of this Act, the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which are set out in the Schedule to this Act shall, subject as thereunder provided, have force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers in Nigeria.”
The Schedule to this Act is de volledige ACHPR, die daarmee is geïncorporeerd in de Nigeriaanse rechtsorde. De Nigeriaanse Supreme Court overwoog daarover:
“Since the Charter has become part of our domestic laws, the enforcement of its provisions like all our other laws fall within the judicial powers of the courts as provided by the Constitution and all other laws relating thereto.”2

4.11.

De artikelen 31 t/m 34 van de NGW (1979), waarop eiseressen zich beroepen, zijn opgenomen in hoofdstuk IV van de NGW (1979). Het eveneens in hoofdstuk IV van de NGW (1979) opgenomen artikel 42 NGW (1979) bepaalt:
“(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcement or securing the enforcing within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter.”
Artikel 46 van Nigeriaanse Grondwet van 1999 (NGW (1999)) is gelijkluidend. Deze bepaling is eveneens opgenomen in hoofdstuk IV van die Grondwet, dat net als hoofdstuk IV van de NGW 1979 grondrechten bevat.

4.12.

De door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten hebben naar Nigeriaans recht horizontale werking.3 Deze jurisprudentie is als volgt samengevat door Akintin JSC in de zaak Abdulhamid v. Akar and another4:
“The position of the law is that where fundamental rights are invaded not by government agencies but by ordinary individuals, as in the instant case, such victims have rights against the individual perpetrators of the acts as they would have done against state actions. It follows therefor that in the absence of a clear and positive prohibition which precludes an individual to assert a violation or maintain a similar action in a court of law against another individual for his act that had occasioned wrong or damage to him or his property in the same way as an action he could maintain against the State for a similar infraction.”
Deze grondrechten kunnen ook tegenover bedrijven worden ingeroepen.

4.13.

Het derde lid van artikel 42 NGW (1979)/46 NGW (1999) geeft de Nigeriaanse Chief Justice (hierna de Chief Justice) de bevoegdheid
“(to) make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section.”

4.14.Met gebruikmaking van deze bevoegdheid heeft de Chief Justice in 1979 de Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules (de FREP-Rules 1979) vastgesteld. De FREP-Rules 1979 voorzien in een sui generis actie op grond van artikel 42 NGW (1979) voor (dreigende) schendingen van de in hoofdstuk IV van de NGW (1979) verankerde grondrechten.

4.15.

In 2009 heeft de Chief Justice nieuwe FREP-Rules vastgesteld (de FREP-Rules 2009), die op 1 december 2009 in werking zijn getreden. De FREP-Rules 2009 gelden ook voor redress in verband met (dreigende) schendingen van de ACPHR. Order II (1) van de FREP-Rules 2009 bepaalt:
“Any person who alleges that any of the Fundamental Rights provided for in the Constitution or African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act [onderstreping rechtbank] and to which he is entitled, has been, is being, or is likely to be infringed, may apply to the Court in the State where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur, for redress:”
Onder de FREP-Rules 1979 was al aangenomen dat op de grondrechten uit de ACPHR onder de daarin geregelde sui generis procedure een beroep kon worden gedaan.5

4.16.

Order XV Rule (1) en (2) van de FREP-Rules 2009 bepalen:
“(1) The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 are hereby abrogated.
(2) From the commencement of these Rules, pending Human Rights applications commenced under the 1979 Rules shall not be defeated in whole or in part, or suffer any judicial censure, or be struck out or prejudiced, or be adjourned or dismissed, for failure to comply with these Rules provided the applications are in substantial compliance with the Rules.”

4.17.

In de Explanatory Note bij de FREP-Rules 2009 staat dat deze de procedure regelen voor de sui generis actie voor (dreigende) schendingen van grondrechten:
“These Rules provide for the rules of procedure to be followed in the Court in applications for the enforcement or securing the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act.”
Voor niet in de FREP-Rules 2009 geregelde situaties gelden the Civil Procedure Rules of the Court for the time being in force (zie Order XV (4) FREP-Rules 2009).

4.18.

In de FREP-Rules 2009 is een aantal onder de FREP-Rules 1979 bestaande procedurele eisen en formaliteiten afgeschaft. De preambule bevat de opdracht aan de rechter om “constantly and conscientiously seek to give effect to the overriding objectives of these Rules.” De daaropvolgende overriding objectives strekken tot het geven van ruime toepassing aan bescherming van grondrechten en tot het extensief uitleggen ervan. Tot deze overriding objectives behoren onder meer:
“(a) The Constitution, especially Chapter IV, as well as the African Charter, shall be expansively and purposely interpreted and applied, with a view to advancing and realising the rights and freedoms contained in them and affording the protections intended by them.

(b) For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the applicant’s rights and freedoms, the Court shall respect municipal, regional and international bills of rights cited to it or brought to its attention or of which the Court is aware, whether these bills constitute instruments in
themselves or form parts of larger documents like constitutions. (…)
(c) For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the applicant’s rights and freedoms, the Court may make consequential orders as may be just and expedient.”

4.19.

Eén van de wijzigingen van de FREP-Rules 2009 ten opzichte van de FREP-Rules 1979 betreft de periode waarbinnen een vordering aanhangig moet worden gemaakt. Order I (3) van de FREP-Rules 1979 – waarop gedaagden hun hierna onder V. te bespreken beroep op verjaring baseren – bepaalt:
“Leave shall not be granted to apply for an order under these Rules unless the application is made within twelve months from the date of the happening of the event, matter, or act complained of, or such other period as may be prescribed by any enactment or, except where a period is so prescribed, the delay is accounted for to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge to whom the application for leave is made.”
Order III van FREP-Rules 2009 bepaalt:
“An application for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights shall not be affected by any limitation Statute whatsoever.”

4.20.Artikel 42 NGW (1979)/46 NGW (1999) draagt de titel Special jurisdiction of High Court. Dit artikel bepaalt dat de High Court van de staat waar de (dreigende) grondrechtenschending plaatsvindt original jurisdiction heeft om kennis te nemen van de grondwettelijke vordering tot redress. In de FREP-Rules 1979 is Court in Order 1(2) gedefinieerd als the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State. De FREP-Rules 2009 voegen daar in Order II(1) the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja aan toe. Gerechten zonder jurisdictie ten aanzien van een bepaalde vordering worden in Nigeria ipse facto niet bevoegd geacht om rechtens afdwingbare en bindende beslissingen te nemen ten aanzien van die vordering.6 Dat geldt ook ten aanzien van vorderingen die met toepassing van de FREP-Rules worden ingesteld. Als een onbevoegd gerecht toch een beslissing neemt op een dergelijke vordering, anders dan het verwijzen van de zaak naar het wel bevoegde gerecht, is de procedure nietig.7 De in artikel 42 NGW (1979)/artikel 46 NGW (1999) en in de FREP-Rules 1979/2009 aangewezen gerechten zijn dus in Nigeria exclusief bevoegd in de sui generis procedure waarvoor de FREP-Rules 1979/2009 gelden.

4.21.

Naar Nigeriaans recht is de sui generis procedure waarvoor de FREP-Rules 1979/2009 gelden geen exclusieve rechtsgang voor (dreigende) schendingen van grondrechten.8 Deze kunnen ook in andere procedures en op andere grondslagen aan de orde worden gesteld, bijvoorbeeld in het kader van een strafrechtelijke procedure of in een procedure over een vordering gebaseerd op tort of contract. Het Nigeriaanse Supreme Court heeft hierover overwogen:
“(…) the provision of Section 42 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution is only permissible and does not constitute a monopoly for those rights. The object of the Section is to prove a simple and effective judicial process for the enforcement of fundamental rights in order to avoid the cumbersome procedure and technicalities for their enforcement under the rules of the common law or other statutory provisions. The object has been achieved by the (FREP-Rules ((1979)). It must be emphasised that the Section does not exclude the application of the other means of their enforcement under the common law or statutes or rules of courts. (…) A person whose fundamental right is being or likely to be contravened may resort to any of these remedies for redress.”9

4.22.Een partij die een (dreigende) schending van de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten uit het ACPHR en de NGW aan de orde wil stellen in een gerechtelijke procedure in Nigeria, heeft dus de keuze om dat te doen i) hetzij met een vordering tot redress in de sui generis procedure waarvoor de FREP-Rules 1979/2009 gelden en ii) hetzij op een andere grondslag, in een andere procedure. Die andere grondslag zou voor een vordering van eiseressen tegen gedaagden – die zij buiten overeenkomst rechtstreeks aanspreken voor hun gedragingen – zijn gelegen in de privaatrechtelijke figuur tort. Eiseressen baseren hun vorderingen echter niet (in eerste instantie) op deze grondslag. In Nigeria zouden eiseressen hun vorderingen dus aanhangig moeten maken bij het exclusief bevoegde Federal High Court of de High Court in de sui generis procedure waarvoor de FREP-Rules gelden. Hierna onder III. zal de rechtbank beoordelen of en in hoeverre dit gevolgen heeft voor de rechtsmacht van de Nederlandse rechter.

III. rechtsmacht van de Nederlandse rechter

4.23.Niet ter discussie staat dat de Nederlandse rechter internationaal bevoegd is kennis te nemen van de vorderingen tegen de in Nederland gevestigde partijen RDS en SPNV. De rechtbank is internationaal bevoegd kennis te nemen van de vorderingen tegen de in Londen gevestigde STTC en de in Nigeria gevestigde SPDC indien is voldaan aan de eisen van artikel 8 lid 1 Brussel I bis-Vo10 respectievelijk artikel 7 Rv. STTC en SPDC betwisten dat aan deze eisen is voldaan en betogen hiertoe dat het handelen van elk van de gedaagden, zeker gelet op de naar Nigeriaans vennootschapsrecht geldende ‘separate entity doctrine’, van elkaar moet worden onderscheiden, terwijl voorts een gezamenlijke behandeling van de vorderingen volgens STTC en SPDC niet doelmatig is omdat de vorderingen tegen de ‘ankergedaagde’ SPNV bij voorbaat geen kans van slagen hebben.

4.24.Op grond van artikel 8 lid 1 Brussel I bis-Vo kan internationale bevoegdheid ten aanzien van de tegen STTC ingestelde vorderingen worden aangenomen indien sprake is van een zodanig nauwe band met de vorderingen tegen RDS en SPNV dat een goede rechtsbedeling vraagt om een gelijktijdige behandeling en berechting teneinde tegenstrijdige beslissingen te voorkomen. Deze vereisten dienen terughoudend te worden uitgelegd. Dit betekent onder meer dat het enkele feit dat zich divergerende uitspraken kunnen voordoen, onvoldoende is om te kunnen spreken van bedoelde nauwe band. Vereist is dat de divergentie zich kan voordoen in het kader van eenzelfde situatie, zowel feitelijk als rechtens, waarbij overigens niet vereist is dat de tegen de verschillende gedaagden ingestelde vorderingen dezelfde rechtsgrond hebben.11 Het onderzoek naar de bevoegdheid op grond van Brussel I bis-Vo dient niet te worden beperkt tot de stellingen van de eisende partij. De rechter moet daarbij acht slaan op alle hem ter beschikking staande gegevens over de werkelijk tussen partijen bestaande rechtsverhouding en, in voorkomend geval, op de stellingen van de verwerende partij. Wel geldt in dit verband de beperking dat indien de verwerende partij de stellingen van de eisende partij betwist, de rechter in het kader van de bepaling van zijn bevoegdheid geen gelegenheid behoeft te geven voor bewijslevering.12

4.25.Op grond van artikel 7 Rv kan rechtsmacht ten aanzien van SPDC worden aangenomen als tussen de vorderingen tegen de onderscheidene gedaagden een zodanige samenhang bestaat, dat redenen van doelmatigheid een gezamenlijke behandeling rechtvaardigen. Nu de Nederlandse wetgever bij de invoering en latere wijziging van de artikelen 1-14 Rv onder meer aansluiting heeft gezocht bij de voorlopers van de Brussel I bis-Vo,13 moet bij de uitleg van de commune bevoegdheidsregels voor internationale rechtsmacht in beginsel aansluiting worden gezocht bij de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie van de EU (HvJEU) over (de voorlopers van) Brussel I bis-Vo, tenzij aannemelijk is dat de Nederlandse wetgever heeft beoogd bij de inrichting van een commune regel af te wijken van de Unierechtelijke instrumenten of de uitleg daarvan door het HvJEU.14

4.26.De kern van het verwijt van eiseressen is dat SPNV, STTC en SPDC gezamenlijk hebben gehandeld bij de door eiseressen gestelde grondrechtenschendingen. De vorderingen tegen de drie gedaagden zijn gegrond op dezelfde feiten, omstandigheden en rechtsgronden. Daarmee zien de vorderingen tegen SPNV, STTC en SDPV feitelijk en rechtens op dezelfde situatie. Dat geldt in het bijzonder voor de vorderingen tegen de twee moedermaatschappijen SPNV en STTC, die zowel feitelijk als juridisch niet los kunnen worden gezien van de vorderingen tegen de werkmaatschappij SPDC. Voorts is de rechtbank met eiseressen van oordeel dat in geval van afzonderlijke berechting van deze samenhangende zaken het gevaar bestaat van tegenstrijdige beslissingen. Gezien deze zelfde situatie feitelijk en rechtens, moet het voor SPDC, STTC en SPNV voorzienbaar zijn geweest dat zij voor de rechter van het land van vestiging van een medegedaagde konden worden opgeroepen.

4.27.Het standpunt van gedaagden dat gezamenlijke behandeling van de vorderingen niet doelmatig is, omdat de vorderingen tegen de ‘ankergedaagde’ SPNV bij voorbaat kansloos zijn, is alleen relevant in de zaak tegen SPDC, waarin moet worden getoetst aan artikel 7 lid 1 Rv. Gedaagden baseren hun standpunt over de kans van slagen van de vorderingen tegen SPNV op de niet aan de vorderingen ten grondslag gelegde concernaansprakelijkheid. Gezien de feitelijke grondslag van de vorderingen, die bestaat uit de gestelde directe betrokkenheid van SPNV bij schendingen van de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten, die naar Nigeriaans recht directe en horizontale werking hebben en die ook tegenover bedrijven kunnen worden ingeroepen, kan niet op voorhand worden gezegd dat deze vorderingen evident kansloos zijn. Of en in hoeverre de verwijten tegen de ‘ankergedaagde’ SPNV opgaan, dient in de hoofdzaak te worden beoordeeld.

4.28.Het beroep van STTC en SPDC op de uitspraak van het Engelse Court of Appeal in de Ogale-zaak15, waarin de Engelse rechter zich jegens SPDC onbevoegd achtte, kan hen niet baten. De daarbij door de Engelse rechter toegepaste toets aan het Engelse recht is een andere dan de hier toepasselijke toets van artikel 8 lid 1 Brussel I bis-Vo en van artikel 7 Rv.

4.29.Zoals hiervoor onder 4.20 en 4.22 is overwogen, hadden eiseressen, als zij gedaagden in Nigeria in rechte zouden betrekken, hun vorderingen aanhangig moeten maken bij het exclusief bevoegde Federal High Court of de High Court in de sui generis procedure waarvoor de FREP-Rules gelden. De rechtbank ziet de onder 4.20 en 4.22 bedoelde exclusieve jurisdictie voor zo’n procedure van de Federal High Court of de High Court als een regel van relatieve bevoegdheid voor het instellen van zo’n vordering in Nigeria. Er is geen regel van geschreven of ongeschreven Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht, die noopt tot de conclusie dat deze Nigeriaanse regel van relatieve bevoegdheid eraan in de weg staat dat de Nederlandse rechter die – zoals hiervoor is vastgesteld – rechtsmacht heeft ten aanzien van alle gedaagden, kennisneemt van vorderingen gegrond op een rechtstreeks beroep op de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten. Eiseressen kunnen hun direct op de onder 4.5 genoemde grondrechten gebaseerde vorderingen, waarin zij redress vorderen in de vorm van publieke verontschuldigingen en een verklaring voor recht, dus ook instellen in deze procedure voor de Nederlandse rechter.

IV. het exhibitie-incident

4.30.De vorderingen in het incident zien op twee categorieën documenten uit de discovery in de Amerikaanse procedures: de intended trial exhibits en intended trial depositions (vordering i) en ii)) en de CDST-documenten (vordering iii)). Ter zitting hebben eiseressen hun vordering uitgebreid naar de ongeredigeerde versie van de minutes van de vergadering van het CMD van 7 november 1995, waarvan gedaagden een geredigeerde versie in het geding hebben gebracht.

4.31.Eiseressen stellen dat is voldaan aan de eisen van artikel 843a Rv, waarin (in lid 1) is bepaald dat hij die daarbij rechtmatig belang heeft, op zijn kosten inzage, afschrift of uittreksel kan vorderen van bepaalde bescheiden aangaande een rechtsbetrekking waarin hij of zijn rechtsvoorgangers partij zijn, van degene die deze bescheiden te zijner beschikking of onder zijn berusting heeft. Het voorgaande lijdt op grond van het vierde lid van artikel 843a Rv uitzondering indien daarvoor gewichtige redenen zijn, alsmede indien redelijkerwijs aangenomen kan worden dat een behoorlijke rechtsbedeling ook zonder verschaffing van de gevraagde gegevens is gewaarborgd. In dat geval is degene die de bescheiden te zijner beschikking of onder zijn berusting heeft, niet gehouden aan deze vordering te voldoen.

IV.1 de intended trial exhibits en intended trial depositions (vordering i) en ii))

4.32.Deze onderdelen van de vordering zien op de door de plaintiffs in de discovery in de Amerikaanse procedures als zodanig aangemerkte intended trial exhibits en intended trial depositions. Deze stukken zijn geproduceerd door de tot de Shell-groep behorende vennootschappen die partij waren in de Amerikaanse procedures en zijn door hen (deels) als vertrouwelijk aangemerkt. Deze stukken moesten op grond van de confidentiality agreement tussen de eisende partijen en de betreffende Shell vennootschappen binnen dertig dagen na het eindigen van deze procedures worden teruggestuurd of vernietigd.

4.33. [eiseres 1] stelt dat het niet te billijken is dat zij, nu ze haar juridische strijd in Nederland voortzet, geen toegang heeft tot een belangrijk deel van het bewijsmateriaal dat in de Verenigde Staten is verzameld in haar eigen zaak, waarin dezelfde feiten en juridische beginselen aan de orde waren. Eiseressen betogen dat gedaagden met hun weigering deze stukken te verstrekken, zichzelf in deze procedure een voorsprong proberen te verschaffen die indruist tegen de materiële waarheidsvinding die in rechte behoort plaats te vinden en het beginsel van equality of arms, dat is vervat in artikel 6 EVRM, waarvan artikel 843a Rv een uitwerking beoogt te zijn. Zij wensen de gevorderde stukken te gebruiken ter verdere onderbouwing van hun vorderingen in deze procedure en eventueel elders in te dienen vorderingen gebaseerd op hetzelfde feitencomplex.

4.34.

Artikel 843a lid 1 Rv eist dat de bescheiden waarvan inzage of afschrift wordt gevorderd, voldoende bepaald zijn. De gevorderde bescheiden behoeven niet individueel te worden omschreven. Aan deze eis is voldaan als er een redelijke grond is aan te nemen dat de gevorderde stukken bestaan en de vordering:
“betrekking (heeft) op een onderwerp dat nauwkeurig is afgebakend door omschrijving van het dossier en het noemen van de bij de stukken betrokken personen en instanties.” 16
Met deze invulling van de eis van voldoende bepaaldheid wordt bereikt dat de positie van degene die inzage vordert niet onredelijk wordt bemoeilijkt door van hem te verlangen dat hij alle bescheiden specificeert en individueel omschrijft. Tegelijkertijd wordt hiermee bereikt dat de positie van degene van wie inzage wordt gevorderd niet onredelijk wordt geschaad, aangezien wel sprake moet zijn van een voldoende nauwkeurige afbakening. Hoewel in de loop der jaren een ruimere invulling is gegeven aan de in artikel 843a Rv opgenomen eisen ‘bepaalde bescheiden’ en ‘rechtmatig belang’, geldt de bedoeling die de wetgever had met het in artikel 843a Rv opnemen van deze eisen – te weten het voorkomen van ‘fishing expeditions’ – onverkort.

4.35.De gevorderde intended trial exhibits zijn eerder onder de confidentiality agreement verstrekt in de Amerikaanse procedures. Zij bestaan dus en niet ter discussie staat dat gedaagden daar nog over (kunnen) beschikken. De gevorderde categorieën documenten de intended trial exhibits en intended trial depositions betreffen een grote hoeveelheid bescheiden van verschillende aard en inhoud uit de discovery uit de Amerikaanse procedures, die zich (in de zaak [eiseres 1] ) in een pril stadium bevond. Partijen hadden aangeduid wat zij relevant vonden, maar er was nog niet beslist welke documenten daadwerkelijk zouden worden toegelaten. Deze stukken hebben betrekking op een omvangrijk feitencomplex. Uit de toelichting van eiseressen volgt dat de eisende partijen in de Amerikaanse procedures de vorderingen in drie stappen aan de jury wilden voorleggen, te weten:

1. het Nigeriaanse regime was verantwoordelijk voor de extrajudicial execution, torture en battery,
2. SPDC was daarvoor medeverantwoordelijk (op grond van aiding and abbetting, conspiring, joint venture responsibility en responsibility for ratifying),
3. de moedermaatschappijen en [L] waren medeverantwoordelijk voor het handelen van SPDC (op grond van agency liability for SPDC, aiding and abetting SPDC, conspiring with SPDC).

Ook deze drie stappen beslaan ieder voor zich een veelheid van (sub)onderwerpen.
Gelet op dit een en ander zijn de gevorderde categorieën documenten de intended trial exhibits en intended trial depositions uit de discovery in de Amerikaanse procedures te ruim omschreven en voldoen zij niet aan de eis van ‘bepaalde bescheiden’. Nu dat het geval is, kan evenmin worden aangenomen dat is voldaan aan het vereiste van ‘rechtmatig belang’. Daar komt bij dat de vorderingen in deze procedure anders zijn ingestoken dan de vorderingen in de Amerikaanse procedure. De omstandigheid dat deze stukken in de Amerikaanse procedures mogelijk van belang waren, betekent dan ook niet automatisch dat eiseressen een rechtmatig belang hebben bij kennisname van de bescheiden in deze, anders ingestoken, procedure. Het in algemene zin mogelijk relevant of interessant zijn van een zeer grote hoeveelheid bescheiden, is tot slot onvoldoende om te voldoen aan de in artikel 843a lid 1 Rv gestelde eis van voldoende rechtmatig belang.

4.36.Nu ten aanzien van de intended trial exhibits en intended trial depositions niet is voldaan aan de in artikel 843a lid 1 Rv opgenomen eisen van rechtmatig belang en bepaalde bescheiden, dienen vordering i) en ii) te worden afgewezen. Aan bespreking van de overige geschilpunten, ten aanzien van de andere eisen van artikel lid 1 843a Rv en het bestaan van de in lid 4 van deze bepaling bedoelde gewichtige redenen komt de rechtbank dan ook niet toe.

IV.2 de CDST-documenten (vordering iii))

4.37.De onder iii) gevorderde CDST-documenten zijn de stukken met betrekking tot het tribunaal, die in het privilege log in de discovery in de Amerikaanse procedures zijn omschreven als Communications from counsel regarding proceedings before the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Tribunal. Dit zijn (i) de trial reports, de verslagen van de advocaten van het kantoor van [Y] , die door SPDC waren ingeschakeld om het proces voor het tribunaal te volgen (zie ook hierna onder VI.1.a), en (ii) stukken die binnen SPDC of breder binnen de Shell-groep verslag deden van de inhoud van de trial reports. Nadat gedaagden de trial reports in het geding hadden gebracht, hebben eiseressen hun vordering verminderd tot de onder 3.3 onder iii) aangeduide, niet overgelegde CDST-documenten uit categorie ii). Het geschil is beperkt tot deze, niet door gedaagden verstrekte documenten.

4.38.Het argument van gedaagden dat de CDST-documenten niet behoefden te worden overgelegd in de Amerikaanse procedures kan hen niet baten. Bepalend is of zij naar Nederlands recht op grond van artikel 843a Rv gehouden zijn tot het verstrekken van afschrift van deze bescheiden. Gedaagden betwisten dat eiseressen rechtmatig belang hebben bij het verkrijgen van afschrift van deze bescheiden, omdat het bronnenmateriaal voor de niet overgelegde interne verslagen – de trial reports – al is verstrekt.

4.39.Nu eiseressen gedaagden betrokkenheid verwijten bij en inmenging in het proces tegen hun echtgenoten, hebben zij rechtmatig belang bij het verkrijgen van afschrift van de interne documenten, waarin binnen SPDC of breder binnen de Shell-groep verslag wordt gedaan van de inhoud van de inmiddels overgelegde trial reports. Ook is voldaan aan de andere vereisten van het eerste lid van artikel 843a Rv: het gaat om voldoende bepaalde bescheiden, die zich onder gedaagden bevinden.

4.40.Gedaagden beroepen zich vervolgens op het vertrouwelijke karakter van de stukken, dat volgens gedaagden een gewichtige reden vormt om geen afschrift te verstrekken van de resterende CDST-stukken.

4.41.Voor een partij kan een gewichtige reden in de zin van artikel 843a lid 4 Rv bestaan bij handhaving van de vertrouwelijkheid van haar interne besluit- en gedachtevorming, waaronder begrepen de rol daarin van haar eventuele externe adviseurs. Of in een concreet geval een dergelijke ingeroepen gewichtige reden bestaat die tot afwijzing van de vordering of het verzoek moet leiden waar het die vertrouwelijke gegevens betreft, dient door de rechter met afweging van alle betrokken belangen, gemotiveerd te worden beslist. Het ligt op de weg van de partij die zich op het bestaan van die gewichtige reden beroept, te stellen en zo nodig aannemelijk te maken, met betrekking tot welke gegevens zij het bestaan van haar belang bij vertrouwelijkheid inroept en, zo nodig, waarin dat belang bestaat. Daarbij dient de opgave zo specifiek te zijn dat de rechter zich een oordeel kan vormen over de gerechtvaardigdheid van het beroep.17

4.42.Gedaagden stellen in algemene termen dat de resterende CDST-documenten bedrijfsvertrouwelijke informatie bevatten. Daarmee hebben zij niet voldaan aan het hiervoor omschreven vereiste van een concrete en specifieke opgave aan de hand waarvan de rechtbank zich een oordeel kan vormen over de gerechtvaardigdheid van het beroep op het bestaan van gewichtige redenen in de zin van artikel 843a lid 4 Rv.

4.43.Gedaagden dienen de in vordering iii) genoemde CDST-documenten dus te verstrekken aan eiseressen, binnen de gevorderde termijn van 21 dagen. De gevorderde dwangsom wordt als onvoldoende weersproken toegewezen. In de interne aard van de bescheiden ziet de rechtbank grond om op de voet van artikel 28 Rv de voorwaarde te verbinden dat eiseressen deze bescheiden alleen voor deze procedure mogen gebruiken. Het wordt eiseressen voorts verboden de bescheiden aan derden te verstrekken en om enige mededeling aan derden te doen omtrent de inhoud van deze stukken.

IV.3 de minutes van de meeting van 7 november 1995

4.44.Ter zitting hebben eiseressen tot slot hun incidentele eis (zo nodig) uitgebreid naar de niet geredigeerde minutes van de vergadering van het CMD van 7 november 1995, waarvan gedaagden een geredigeerde versie hebben overgelegd. De rechtbank begrijpt dat eiseressen ook afschrift wensen van de weggelaten passages, voor zover die betrekking hebben op het tribunaal en/of de Ogoni-kwestie.

4.45.Gedaagden hebben ter zitting uiteengezet dat de weggelaten passages gegevens bevatten die in de Amerikaanse procedures niet behoefden te worden overgelegd. Daarin is volgens gedaagden een gewichtige reden gelegen om niet het volledige stuk te verstrekken. Met deze algemene toelichting hebben gedaagden niet voldaan aan het hiervoor onder 4.41 omschreven vereiste van een concrete en specifieke opgave aan de hand waarvan de rechtbank zich een oordeel kan vormen over de gerechtvaardigdheid van het beroep op het bestaan van gewichtige redenen in de zin van artikel 843a lid 4 Rv. Gedaagden dienen een ongeredigeerde versie van de minutes van de CMD vergadering van 7 november 1995 te verstrekken, voor zover deze weggelaten passages zien op het tribunaal en/of de Ogoni-kwestie. De rechtbank verbindt hieraan dezelfde voorwaarden als aan verstrekking van de CDST-documenten (zie onder 4.43).

4.46.Nu partijen over en weer op punten in het ongelijk zijn gesteld in het incident, worden de proceskosten in het incident gecompenseerd.

V. het beroep op verjaring van gedaagden

4.47.Gedaagden beroepen zich op verjaring. Naar partijen met juistheid tot uitgangspunt nemen, wordt dit geschilpunt beheerst door Nigeriaans recht, het recht dat de vordering beheerst (zie artikel 10:14 BW).

4.48.Gedaagden baseren hun beroep op verjaring op Order I (3) van de FREP-Rules 1979, waaruit volgens hen volgt dat de vorderingen van eiseressen op 9 november 1996 zijn verjaard. Gedaagden betogen dat een uitzondering op de verjaringstermijn, zoals voorzien in de FREP-rules 1979, niet aan de orde is. Zij betogen verder dat, voor zover eiseressen hun vorderingen op tort baseren, de vorderingen zijn verjaard.

4.49.Eiseressen stelden zich aanvankelijk op het standpunt dat de verjaringsvraag wordt beheerst door Order III van FREP-Rules 2009. Eiseressen hebben dit standpunt tijdens de comparitie vervangen door het standpunt dat de FREP-Rules in het geheel niet van toepassing zijn op hun rechtstreeks op de NGW (1979) en het ACHPR gebaseerde vorderingen. Zij stellen dat hun vorderingen niet aan verjaring onderhevig zijn, omdat noch de NGW (1979), noch de ACHPR een regeling over verjaring bevatten.

4.50.Nu eiseressen gedaagden in Nederland in rechte hebben betrokken, wordt de procedure gevoerd aan de hand van de regels van het Nederlandse burgerlijk procesrecht. Daarmee is niet gezegd dat de FREP-Rules geheel geen betekenis kunnen hebben voor het door gedaagden gevoerde verjaringsverweer, zoals eiseressen betogen. Dat neemt namelijk niet weg dat eiseressen, nu zij hun vorderingen niet (in eerste instantie) op tort baseren, in Nigeria zouden zijn aangewezen op de sui generis procedure waarvoor de FREP-Rules gelden (zie onder 4.20 en 4.22). Als – zoals gedaagden voor ogen hebben – de FREP-Rules een als verjaringsregeling op te vatten voorschrift bevatten, is die bepaling uit de FREP-Rules daarmee wel relevant voor het in deze procedure gevoerde verweer van gedaagden dat de vorderingen van eiseressen verjaard zijn.

4.51.

Uit de door de rechtbank geraadpleegde literatuur en jurisprudentie over het door gedaagden ingeroepen Order I (3) van de FREP-Rules 1979 en over Order III van de FREP-Rules 2009 volgt dat de kwalificatie van de daarin neergelegde voorschriften – als al dan niet (zuiver) processuele voorwaarde – aan discussie onderhevig is (geweest) en dat de vraag is opgeworpen of de Chief Justice met de vaststelling van deze bepaling al dan niet buiten de reikwijdte van de aan hem gegeven bevoegdheid om processuele regels vast te stellen is getreden. Wat daarvan ook moge zijn, in de Nigeriaanse rechtspraak is aanvaard dat het recht om een vordering in te stellen in de sui generis procedure waarvoor de FREP-Rules gelden onder de FREP-Rules 1979 in tijd is beperkt. Zo is in de zaak N.D.I.C. v. O’Silvawax Intl. Ltd, waarin de vordering van 8 november 1996 zag op gebeurtenissen die hadden plaatsgevonden op 24 juli 1995 overwogen:
“A cause of action accrues on a date when a breach or any event would warrant a person who is adversely affected by the act of another to seek redress in court. A legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute. A cause of action will be statute barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the limitation Law or Act has elapsed. If the date on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law then the action is statute barred.
(…)
In this appeal, the time between the date the cause of action accrued and when the action was filed going by the writ, falls outside the limitation period allowed by the (FREP-Rules) [1979, toevoeging rechtbank] thereby making this action invalid and incompetent. Where the cause of action of the plaintiff is statute-barred, it affects the legal competence or jurisdiction of the court.”18

4.52.Daarmee wordt Order I rule (1) van de FREP-Rules 1979 – ongeacht de vraag of de FREP-Rules al dan niet (geheel) als een (zuiver) processuele regeling moeten worden gekwalificeerd – in de Nigeriaanse rechtspraak toegepast als een verjaringsregeling. In de rechtspraak wordt ook gesproken over een statute barred action. Het door gedaagden gevoerde verjaringsverweer noopt daarmee tot onderzoek van de vraag of de vorderingen van eiseressen in de Nigeriaanse rechtspraktijk, waarin nu de FREP-Rules 2009 van kracht zijn, op grond van Order I rule (1) van de FREP-Rules 1979 als te laat ingediend gelden.

4.53.

Na inwerkingtreding van de FREP-Rules 2009 is Order I rule (1) van de FREP-Rules 1979 nog toegepast in procedures waarin de vordering vóór inwerkingtreding van de FREP-Rules 2009 was ingediend. Dit is bijvoorbeeld gebeurd in de uitspraak van 6 maart 2015, Denca Services Ltd. v. Leo Oleka and sons, Nigeria Custom Services, waarin op 5 april 2007 een vordering was ingediend over gebeurtenissen die hadden plaatsgevonden op 8 april 2005.19 In de eveneens na 1 december 2009 gedane uitspraak in de zaak The Gov. of Borno State cs v. Alh. Ngabura Bukar Gadangari over een op 22 januari 2008 ingediende vordering met betrekking tot gebeurtenissen die hadden plaatsgevonden op 17 februari 2004 is overwogen:20
“(…) to enforce infringement of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of de Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 if not made within twelve months from the date of the happening of the event or act complained of will not confer jurisdiction on the lower court to entertain and grant relief to the aggrieved person.
(…)
Order 1 rule 3 (1) of the (FREP-Rules) 1979 is a limitation rule by which an application for leave to enforce the fundamental right of any person is to be commenced “within twelve months from the date of the happening of the event, matter, or act complained of…”(…)

Time is of the essence under limitation statutes or rules.”

4.54.Gedaagden zien in deze jurisprudentie de bevestiging van hun standpunt dat een eenmaal onder de FREP-Rules (1979) verjaarde vordering niet na inwerkingtreding van de FREP-Rules 2009 alsnog als tijdig ingediend kan gelden. Deze jurisprudentie heeft echter betrekking op vorderingen die waren ingediend vóór inwerkingtreding van de FREP-Rules 2009. In deze zaken zijn de onder de FREP-Rules 1979 ingediende vorderingen getoetst aan de termijn van Order I (3) FREP-Rules 1979.

4.55.

Op 9 maart 2018 heeft de Court of Appeal in the Akure Judicial Division, Holden at Akure in de zaak Fam-Lab Nigeria Limited & Anor v. Jahmarco Nigeria Limited & Anor21 uitspraak gedaan in een zaak over gebeurtenissen die vóór inwerkingtreding van de FREP-Rules 2009 hadden plaatsgevonden. Anders dan de vorderingen in de hiervoor besproken zaken, is de vordering in deze zaak ingediend ná inwerkingtreding van de FREP-Rules 2009. Onder Order I rule (1) van de FREP-Rules 1979 – die golden ten tijde van de gebeurtenissen waarop de vordering zag – is deze vordering (veel) te laat ingediend. In deze uitspraak heeft de Court of Appeal in the Akure Judicial Division echter overwogen dat de vordering moest worden getoetst aan de FREP Rules 2009:22
“To begin with, the 2009 FREPR, in Order XV Rule 1 thereof, repealed the 1979 FREPR. In other words, the former abrogated the life span of the latter. By the revocation, the 2009 FREPR put an end to the 1979 FREPR and same ceased to be in existence (…).23 In the eyes of the law, the 1979 FREPR "is regarded in the absence of any provision to the contrary, as having never existed, except as to matters or transaction past and closed...."24 In Olafisoye v. FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864) 580 at 636 Tobi, JSC, graphically weaved the dismal effect of repeal of legislation in these immaculate words: "A repealed law no more has legal life, as it does not exist any longer; it cannot be cited as if it still exists. If it must be cited at all, it must be cited as a repealed law, which has no life to influence an argument. A repealed law cannot be basis for any comparison with any existing law...
Nevertheless, the appellants will not reap from the above hallowed principle of law. The reasons are
not far-fetched. Firstly, the law applicable to jurisdiction of a Court is that in existence when the action is instituted and heard, not that in force when the cause of action ensued.25 It flows from this agelong rule, that the 2009 FREPR, which is now operational during the hearing of the appeal, is the applicable subsidiary enactment. Secondly, the 1979 FREPR, on which they anchored their case, falls within the wide domain of adjectival law. In the view of the law, procedural law "relates to practice and procedure, that is, rules according to which substantive law is administered" while "substantive law is concerned with the creation, definition, limitation of obligation".26 Both the 1979 and 2009 FREPR trace their paternity to Section 46 of the Constitution, as amended. They are procedural avenues usable to prosecute and effectuate fundamental rights of the citizens as ingrained in Section 33-44 of the Constitution, as amended.27 It is long established principle of law, that the procedural law in existence at the time a case is heard, whether at the trial or appellate level, applies to the determination of it. It is of no moment if the procedural law came into being/force before or after an appeal has been filed.28 The wisdom behind the rule of interpretation is that subsidiary legislations do not donate vested rights to the citizenry. Altogether, it is the operative 2009 FREPR, which has dethroned the 1979 FREPR that made provision for limitation of action, that is applicable to the appeal. Admirably, the limitation clause has been banished by the 2009 FREPR. This is a serious coup de grace on the appellants standpoint on the stubborn issue."

4.56.In de hiervoor besproken uitspraken, die allemaal zijn gedaan door Courts of Appeal in Nigeria, is steeds getoetst aan de FREP-Rules die golden op het moment van indiening van de vordering. De benadering in de onder 4.55 bedoelde uitspraak strookt voorts met de onder 4.18 aangehaalde overriding objectives van de FREP-Rules 2009, die ertoe strekken om een ruime toepassing te geven aan bescherming van grondrechten. De rechtbank ziet in deze Nigeriaanse jurisprudentie en de overriding objectives van de FREP-Rules 2009 reden om aansluiting te zoeken bij de benadering in de onder 4.55 bedoelde uitspraak. Zij zal de tijdigheid van het instellen van de vorderingen in deze procedure daarom toetsen aan de FREP-Rules 2009, die golden op het moment dat eiseressen gedaagden in rechte betrokken in deze procedure.

4.57.Gezien Order III van de FREP-Rules zijn de vorderingen op tijd ingediend. Het verjaringsverweer van gedaagden gaat dus niet op.

VI. bespreking van de verwijten ten gronde

4.58.Nu het verjaringsverweer niet opgaat, komt de rechtbank toe aan bespreking van de verwijten ten gronde. Het in het incident te geven bevel aan gedaagden om bescheiden aan eiseressen te verstrekken staat niet eraan in de weg dat de verwijten thans ten gronde worden beoordeeld. De rechtbank zal de verwijten van eiseressen inhoudelijk beoordelen op grond van de standpunten van partijen en de reeds overgelegde bewijsstukken. Indien en voor zover de in het incident te verstrekken stukken eiseressen aanleiding geven nieuwe feiten te stellen of anderszins aanleiding geven tot een nadere standpuntbepaling, moeten eiseressen daar zo snel mogelijk toe overgaan.

4.59.Eiseressen stellen dat gedaagden medeplichtig zijn aan de in hoofdstuk 4 van de dagvaarding beschreven schendingen van grondrechten van hun echtgenoten en henzelf door het Nigeriaanse regime. Hoofdstuk 4 van de dagvaarding is getiteld “het Ogoni 9- schijnproces” en ziet op de arrestatie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen, de oprichting van het Ogoni Disturbances Tribunal en de verdere gang van zaken tijdens het proces tot en met de executie van de aan de Ogoni 9 opgelegde doodvonnissen. Met deze verwijzing naar hoofdstuk 4 van de dagvaarding, stellen eiseressen de gestelde schendingen van de onder 4.5 genoemde grondrechten tijdens de detentie, berechting en executie van hun echtgenoten centraal als grondslag voor hun vorderingen. Hierop zien hun onder 3.2 sub 4. t/m 7. bedoelde verwijten.

4.60.De onder 3.2 sub 1. t/m 3. geformuleerde verwijten – die kort gezegd inhouden dat Shell door verzoeken om in te grijpen tegen protest van de lokale bevolking aan de basis stond van excessief gewelddadig optreden van het regime, Operation Restore Order in Ogoniland faciliteerde en met het Nigeriaanse regime als tandem opereerde – zien op de gebeurtenissen in Ogoniland in de periode van 1990 tot aan de arrestatie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen in 1994. Deze verwijten hebben niet concreet betrekking op eiseressen en hun echtgenoten. Zij maken veeleer deel uit van de door eiseressen geschetste voorgeschiedenis en de context van het proces en strekken ertoe te betogen dat SPDC en het Nigeriaanse regime wederzijds afhankelijk van elkaar waren en nauwe banden onderhielden. Het zijn geen verwijten die eiseressen en/of hun echtgenoten direct aangaan. In het door eiseressen ter zake van deze verwijten gestelde ziet de rechtbank dan ook geen concrete aanwijzingen van enig [rechtstreeks] verband tussen deze verwijten en de verweten schending van de grondrechten van de echtgenoten van eiseressen en eiseressen zelf tijdens de detentie, berechting en executie van hun echtgenoten. De rechtbank zal dan ook niet nader op deze verwijten ingaan.

4.61.De onder 3.2 sub 4 t/m 7 opgenomen verwijten hebben wel betrekking op de detentie, de berechting en de executie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen. Eiseressen maken gedaagden in het bijzonder de volgende verwijten, waarbij zij, net als bij de onder 3.2 sub 1. t/m 3. bedoelde verwijten, gedaagden tezamen als ‘Shell’ aanduiden:

1. Shell was betrokken bij het proces en heeft de uitkomst daarvan beïnvloed door:
2. het houden van een watching brief, ondersteuning van de aanklager en informele contacten met de rechters van het tribunaal;
3. het omkopen van getuigen,
4. de rol van [N] tijdens het proces.
5. Shell heeft aangeboden de uitkomst van het proces te beïnvloeden onder de voorwaarde dat MOSOP haar protest tegen Shell zou staken.
6. Shell heeft ten onrechte niet (publiekelijk) haar invloed aangewend om de Nigeriaanse overheid te bewegen tot een fair trial en tot clementie voor de Ogoni 9. Shell had dit kunnen en moeten doen door:
7. in haar contacten met de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten het belang van de naleving van de mensenrechten aan de orde te stellen,
8. voorwaarden te stellen aan een verdere samenwerking met de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten,
9. zich uit te spreken over het recht op protesteren van de Ogoni,
10. zich (publiekelijk) uit te spreken over de noodzaak van een fair trial en te verzoeken om clementie, en
11. desnoods te dreigen met terugtrekking uit Nigeria.

4.62.

De rechtbank zal hierna onder VI.1 t/m VI.3 deze verwijten beoordelen. Zij zal daarbij ook de voor deze verwijten relevante feiten nader vaststellen. Partijen gaan ervan uit dat de stelplicht en de bewijslast op eiseressen rusten. Over de bewijslast van een (dreigende) schending van fundamentele rechten heeft de Nigeriaanse Supreme Court in de zaak Okafor v. Lagos State Govt.29overwogen:
“The law remains that he who asserts must prove. So the appellant has the onus of proving by credible affidavit evidence that her fundamental rights were breached.”
Ook naar Nederlands procesrecht – voor zover toepasselijk op de bewijslastverdeling – rusten de stelplicht en de bewijslast op eiseressen.

VI.1 betrokkenheid bij en beïnvloeding van het proces

4.63.Dit verwijt bestaat uit het houden van een watching brief, ondersteuning van de aanklager en informele contacten met de rechters van het tribunaal (VI.1.a), het omkopen van getuigen (VI.1.b) en de rol van [N] tijdens het proces (VI.1.c).

VI.1.a het houden van een watching brief, ondersteuning van de aanklager en informele contacten met de rechters van het tribunaal

4.64.Eiseressen stellen dat de betrokkenheid van gedaagden bij het proces in de eerste plaats blijkt uit het feit dat SPDC een advocaat naar het proces stuurde, die haar nauwkeurig op de hoogte hield van het proces en die door middel van een zogenoemde watching brief de positie van de aanklager ondersteunde. Zij stellen dat de advocaat die een watching brief houdt in de regel nauw samenwerkt met de aanklager.

4.65.Vaststaat dat SPDC [Y] , die eerder voor haar had opgetreden, opdracht heeft gegeven om een watching brief voor haar te houden tijdens het proces. Volgens de toelichting van gedaagden was het voor SPDC – gezien de tumultueuze ontwikkelingen in Ogoniland, waar SPDC tal van installaties had – niet op voorhand duidelijk waarover het tribunaal zou gaan oordelen. Zij wilde uit de eerste hand vernemen hoe het proces verliep en of aan het adres van SPDC beschuldigingen werden geuit en zo ja, waarover. Gedaagden wijzen verder op de grote internationale belangstelling voor het proces en voeren aan dat het geen verwondering behoeft te wekken dat ook SPDC, die door [I] was betrokken in zijn campagne om de zaak van de Ogoni onder de aandacht te brengen, op de hoogte wilde blijven van het proces.

4.66.Een watching brief is een figuur van Nigeriaans gewoonterecht in strafzaken. Het inschakelen van een advocaat die als zodanig optreedt is een manier voor een derde partij die daarbij belang heeft om op de hoogte te blijven van de procedure teneinde zijn belangen zeker te stellen. De houder van de watching brief observeert de procedure voor zijn cliënt en kan – ter zekerheidsstelling van de belangen van zijn cliënt – met de aanklager samenwerken, door bijvoorbeeld informatie aan de aanklager te verschaffen. Dat laatste is echter geen regel. De houder van een watching brief kan samenwerken met de aanklager en/of deze ondersteunen, maar dat hoeft niet. Een watching brief kan ook louter ter observatie en terugrapportage worden benut.

4.67.Nu het houden van een watching brief op verschillende manieren kan worden vormgegeven, komt het aan op de vraag wat de opdracht was van SPDC aan (de advocaten van het kantoor van) [Y] en wat deze feitelijk voor SPDC heeft/hebben gedaan tijdens de zittingen van het tribunaal.

4.68.

De instructie van legal advisor van SPDC, [Z] , aan [Y] van 1 december 1994 luidt als volgt:
“As Shell has various interests in the Ogoni area which were adversely affected by the disturbances, we consider it necessary to brief a lawyer to follow up the proceedings in case Shell would be expected to testify before the panel.
We therefore request you to hold a watching brief on behalf of Shell during the proceedings.
We expect you to:

- attend the sittings of the panel on a regular basis
- report the outcome of the proceedings of each sitting to Shell
- in case Shell is required to testify before the panel, document and conduct the presentation of Shell’s case to the panel
- persue and obtain copy of the panel’s final report, recommendation or judgment for Shell’s records.

4.69.

Het transcript van de zitting van het tribunaal, 6 februari 1995, vermeldt dat [AA] , een kantoorgenoot van [Y] , aan het tribunaal kenbaar heeft gemaakt:
“My Lord, I am holding brief for Chief [Y] . My Lord, we have a watch brief for Shell Development Company of Nigeria.”
De aanklager verzette zich tegen het toelaten van de watching brief voor SPDC:
“My Lord, no staff of the Shell Development Company is involved in this case.
(…)
I do not think Shell Development Company is involved in this matter. My Lord should not take notice of his appearance.”
[AA] heeft vervolgens herhaald dat zijn positie is: “holding brief for Chief [Y] who has a watching brief on behalf of Shell Development Company” en heeft gevraagd: “I would like to be on record, Sir.”, waarop de voorzitter van het tribunaal heeft geantwoord: “I have already written that”.
Hieruit leidt de rechtbank af dat het tribunaal [Y] op de eerste zittingsdag heeft toegelaten als houdende een watching brief voor SPDC.

4.70.Gedaagden voeren aan dat SPDC op dat moment niet wist of het tribunaal een onderzoekstribunaal was of een tribunaal ter berechting. Volgens gedaagden verkeerde SPDC tot op de eerste zittingsdag in de veronderstelling dat het tribunaal onderzoek zou doen naar de onlusten in het algemeen in Ogoniland. Eiseressen vinden deze uitleg ongeloofwaardig. Wat SPDC al dan niet wist over het tribunaal kan echter onbesproken blijven nu vaststaat dat [Y] slechts één dag de formele positie van advocaat met een watching brief heeft vervuld tijdens het tribunaal.

4.71.

[Y] heeft namelijk bij brief van 8 februari 1995 aan SPDC laten weten dat het tribunaal gaat over de moord op de Ogoni leiders en:
“It is clear therefore that suspicions may be raised as to what interests SHELL has in the matter as to necessitate its representation by Counsel, albeit holding a Watching Brief.

We are already on record, but it is our humble view that we can clarify the situation to the Tribunal and to the public, to the effect that SHELL was under the impression that the work of the Tribunal was to inquire into the OGONI-LAND Disturbances, and not as revealed by the Information, to try the Accused Persons for the offences of MURDER. Thereafter, we would request to be allowed to maintain a passive presence at the Tribunal, like any other interested member of the public.”

4.72.

[Z] heeft hierop op 13 februari 1995 geantwoord dat SPDC instemt met dit voorstel en [Y] gevraagd om zijn positie zelf te verduidelijken op de volgende zittingsdag. Het transcript van de zitting van het tribunaal van 21 februari 1995 vermeldt dat [Y] , die toen zelf ter zitting aanwezig was, aan het tribunaal heeft laten weten:
“On the 6th February, 1995, we announced that we were representing the interest of Shell Development Company, holding a watching brief. Having obtained the records of the proceedings, we have observed that it is not a Tribunal of Inquiry but a trial for the offence of murder and we have advised our client in that light that there is no Shell employee accused, there is no Shell employee a victim or a witness (…) and so Sir, Shell Development Company is not particularly participating.”
Nadat de voorzitter van het tribunaal heeft gevraagd of [Y] zeker hiervan is, gezien de die dag door de verdediging geuite verdenking van omkoping van getuigen door SPDC (zie ook hierna onder VI.1.b), heeft [Y] geantwoord:
“Perhaps, when it is being investigated, our client will have an opportunity to defend themselves but that matter [de gestelde omkoping van getuigen door SPDC, toevoeging rechtbank] is not yet on trial.”

4.73.Advocaten van het kantoor van [Y] hebben vervolgens het proces bijgewoond en aan SPDC verslag uitgebracht van iedere zittingsdag in de inmiddels door gedaagden in het geding gebrachte trial reports. Volgens gedaagden hebben deze advocaten vanaf de tweede zittingsdag geen actieve rol meer vervuld in het proces, maar behield [Y] wel een watching brief voor het geval dat juridisch nodig zou zijn indien aantijgingen zouden worden geuit richting SPDC. [Y] heeft die rol feitelijk niet vervuld volgens gedaagden,

4.74.Er zijn geen concrete aanwijzingen dat de kantoorgenoten van [Y] die het proces hebben bijgewoond iets anders hebben gedaan dan – overeenkomstig de opdracht van SPDC – het proces observeren en terug rapporteren aan SPDC. Zij namen vanaf de tweede dag van het proces niet meer de formele positie in van advocaat met een watching brief. Zowel de oorspronkelijke opdracht als de na de eerste zittingsdag aangepaste opdracht van SPDC hield in dat het proces moest worden geobserveerd en informatie moest worden vergaard voor SPDC. De oorspronkelijke opdracht hield verder in dat een eventuele verschijning van SPDC voor het tribunaal moest worden voorbereid en ondersteund. Samenwerking met of ondersteuning van de aanklager maakte geen deel uit van de opdracht. De verslagen van de kantoorgenoten aan [Y] aan SPDC vermelden ook niets over enige samenwerking of contacten met de aanklager.

4.75.Eiseressen wijzen ter onderbouwing van de gestelde samenwerking met de aanklager verder op de schriftelijke verklaringen van de vrijgesproken verdachte [W]30 en van twee advocaten van andere verdachten, [BB]31 en [CC] .32 Daarin staat dat de advocaten van het kantoor van [Y] altijd op de eerste rij bij de aanklager zaten en informatie met hem uitwisselden tijdens de zittingen.

4.76.In de door gedaagden in het geding gebrachte schriftelijke verklaring van [Y]33 is toegelicht dat het tribunaal zitting hield in een gebouw/ruimte dat niet als rechtbank was ingericht. In de schriftelijke verklaring van [Y] staat verder dat hij, toen hij de zitting van 21 februari 1995 bijwoonde, op de voorste rij zat met de aanklager en met [DD] (de advocaat van [I] , [W] and [EE] ). Volgens de verklaring van [Y] zaten zij vooraan vanwege hun anciënniteit en de andere advocaten zaten achter hen.

4.77.

[T] schrijft echter:
“The tribunal sits in a large room in the House of Assembly in Port Harcourt. Its members sit at one end of the room with three soldiers behind them. (…) Facing the members of the tribunal is the dock; the prosecution sit to one side and the defence to the other.”34
Onduidelijk is daarmee of de advocaten van het kantoor van [Y] al dan niet naast de aanklager zaten. Ook dit kan echter onbesproken blijven. Gedaagden betwisten niet dat [Y] en zijn kantoorgenoten mogelijk tijdens de zittingen van het tribunaal met de aanklager hebben gesproken. Dat op zichzelf is echter geen reden om aan te nemen dat zij met hem hebben samengewerkt of hem hebben ondersteund. Ook overigens is er geen concreet aanknopingspunt om dit aan te nemen. Dit volgt ook niet uit de door eiseressen aangehaalde schriftelijke verklaringen, die alleen in algemene termen spreken over informatie uitwisselen. Uit het transcript van de zitting van 6 februari 1995 volgt verder dat de aanklager zich verzette tegen het toelaten van de watching brief van SPDC (zie onder 4.69). Dat is een contra-indicatie voor de door eiseressen gesuggereerde samenwerking door (de advocaten van het kantoor van) [Y] met de aanklager. De aanklager gaf immers daarmee te kennen dat hij vond dat SPDC geen rol had in het proces en dat hij kennelijk geen behoefte had aan ondersteuning door SPDC. Een verdere contra-indicatie is het ontbreken van enig aanknopingspunt voor de juistheid van deze stelling van eiseressen in de rapporten van de onafhankelijke organisaties en personen die het proces hebben geobserveerd, zoals [T] , Human Rights Watch en Amnesty International (zie onder 2.31, 2.32 en 2.33). Zij waren aanwezig bij (delen van) het proces en hebben de gang van zaken nauwlettend geobserveerd. Ook hebben zij destijds gesproken met vele betrokkenen. Hun rapporten bevatten kanttekeningen bij de onafhankelijkheid van het tribunaal en de eerlijkheid van het proces, bijvoorbeeld over de hierna te bespreken gestelde omkoping van getuigen en de rol van [N] (zie bijvoorbeeld [T] , onder 2.31). Het rapport van Human Rights Watch bevat een uiterst kritisch hoofdstuk over de rol van SPDC in Nigeria en de a-politieke koers van gedaagden (The Role and Responsibilities of Royal Dutch/Shell). Deze rapporten vermelden echter niets over samenwerking met of ondersteuning van de aanklager door (de advocaten van) SPDC. In deze rapporten zijn dan ook geen aanknopingspunten te vinden ter ondersteuning van de stelling dat SPDC heeft samengewerkt met de aanklager of deze heeft ondersteund of van informatie heeft voorzien.

4.78.Gezien het voorgaande stuit het verwijt dat gedaagden hebben getracht het proces te beïnvloeden door het houden van een watching brief en de aanklager te ondersteunen, af op het ontbreken van feitelijke grondslag. Aan bewijslevering in de vorm van het door eiseressen aangeboden horen van getuigen wordt dus niet toegekomen.

4.79.

Feitelijke grondslag ontbreekt ook voor de gestelde beïnvloeding door informele contacten met de rechters van het tribunaal in de vorm van het organiseren van een welkomstdiner en het ontvangen van de rechters in de senior staff club van SPDC. Eiseressen baseren deze informele contacten op de schriftelijke verklaring van de advocaat [CC] van 16 juni 2017, waarin staat:
“Even though Shell was formally an interested party in the proceedings, it organized a dinner for the judges of the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal (…).”
Volgens deze verklaring is ook een foto van dit diner in een krant gepubliceerd. Eiseressen verwijzen verder naar de verklaringen van de advocaten [BB] van 15 juni 2017 en [FF] van 2 mei 2017. Daarin staat dat de rechters van het tribunaal na een zittingsdag werden begeleid naar de residential area van SPDC op Aba Road, waar zij verbleven en verpoosden in de senior staff club van SPDC. In de schriftelijke verklaringen staat dat dit is gezien door mensen die door de advocaten waren ingehuurd om de rechters te volgen.

4.80.Gedaagden betwisten de gestelde informele contacten met klem. Zij voeren aan dat zij geen bewijs hebben gezien van het gestelde diner, dat volgens hen niet heeft plaatsgevonden. Zij wijzen erop dat de senior staff club van SPDC voor vele mensen toegankelijk was en dat ook [I] lid was van deze club. Het lidmaatschap was niet voorbehouden aan werknemers van SPDC. Verder wijzen gedaagden erop dat Nigeria een geruchtenmaatschappij is en dat het rond het proces gonsde van de niet onderbouwde geruchten. Gedaagden benadrukken tot slot dat het gaat om gebeurtenissen die lang geleden hebben plaatsgehad en vinden het opmerkelijk dat pas in 2017 voor het eerst verklaringen zijn afgelegd over de gestelde informele contacten.

4.81.Uit de onder 4.79 bedoelde schriftelijke verklaringen volgt dat de gestelde informele contacten van meet af aan bekend moeten zijn geweest, omdat daarvan verslag zou zijn gedaan in de krant en de advocaten via de door hen ingehuurde informanten daarvan op de hoogte waren. Het is opmerkelijk dat geen enkel aanknopingspunt voor deze informele contacten te vinden is in de rapportages van de waarnemers en onafhankelijke organisaties, die indertijd het proces volgden en met betrokkenen hebben gesproken en die kritisch waren over de onafhankelijkheid van het tribunaal. Verder is het krantenbericht waarop [CC] zich kennelijk baseert, niet achterhaald. Los daarvan is hetgeen over de informele contacten is gesteld – ook als zij hebben plaatsgevonden – onvoldoende grond om aan te nemen dat gedaagden daarmee de loop van het proces hebben beïnvloed. De rechtbank neemt hier mede in aanmerking de niet door eiseressen weersproken toelichting van gedaagden dat de senior staff club van SPDC voor vele mensen toegankelijk was en dat het lidmaatschap niet was voorbehouden aan werknemers van SPDC; ook [I] was lid van deze club. Voor verdere bewijslevering door het door eiseressen aangeboden horen van getuigen is dus geen plaats.

4.82.De slotsom luidt dat het verwijt over beïnvloeding van het proces door het houden van een watching brief, ondersteuning van de aanklager en informele contacten met de rechters van het tribunaal geen doel treft.

VI.1.b omkoping getuigen

4.83.Eiseressen stellen dat gedaagden de uitkomst van het proces hebben beïnvloed door getuigen om te kopen om belastende verklaringen af te leggen. Volgens eiseressen zijn valse verklaringen van deze omgekochte getuigen doorslaggevend geweest bij de veroordeling van de Ogoni 9 en hebben deze verklaringen een rol gespeeld bij de arrestatie en detentie van hun echtgenoten.

4.84.Voor het kunnen slagen van dit verwijt is in de eerste plaats vereist dat de door eiseressen gestelde betrokkenheid van SPDC bij omkoping van getuigen komt vast te staan. In de tweede plaats is vereist dat komt vast te staan dat de verklaringen van deze omgekochte getuigen een rol hebben gespeeld bij de veroordeling en/of de arrestatie en detentie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen.

VI1.b.i betrokkenheid van SDPC

4.85.Eiseressen baseren de gestelde betrokkenheid van SPDC bij omkoping van getuigen op de door hen in het geding gebrachte affidavit van [U] en de verklaring die [V] als getuige heeft afgelegd in de Kiobel -procedure.

4.86.Vaststaat dat [U] en [V] , die tegenover de politie belastende verklaringen hadden afgelegd tegen [I] en anderen, op 16 en 27 februari 1995 een aanvullende affidavit hebben afgelegd op het kantoor van één van de advocaten van de verdachten. Daarin verklaarden zij – samengevat – dat zij en een aantal andere getuigen, onder druk zijn gezet door de belangrijkste getuigen a charge, [GG] ( [GG] ) en [HH] ( [HH] ), om een valse belastende verklaring te ondertekenen tegen [I] , [W] en MOSOP-officials. [U] noemt als andere, eveneens omgekochte, getuigen: [II] ( [II] ), [JJ] ( [JJ] ), [KK] ( [KK] ), [LL] ( [LL] ), [MM] ( [MM] ) en [NN] ( [NN] ).

4.87.

In de affidavit van [U] , een muzikant, staat – voor zover hier van belang:
“I was afraid so I made a statement to them, but they refused my statement and ask me to copy a statement already made by them. Under duress I made the writing of their statements. (…) At this time I was promise that after the case in Court I will be given a house any place in the Country, a Contract from Shell and OMPADEC and some amount of money to buy my musical instrument. (…) On another date of meeting in [GG] ’s House, representative from Shell, OMPADEC, security agents, Govt officials and the [GG] , [R] and [P] ’s family were present and they all agreed. The family gave some money say that the money came from the Govt. and Shell. my case I was given N 30,000 from Shell and Govt.”

4.88.

De affidavit van [V] bevindt zich niet bij de gedingstukken. Eiseressen hebben wel zijn verklaring in de Kiobel -procedure in het geding gebracht. Daarin heeft [V] verklaard over een bijeenkomst in het government house in Rivers State, waar ook de getuigen [II] , [KK] , [LL] , [NN] , [JJ] en [U] aanwezig waren. [V] heeft onder meer verklaard:
“(...) this was like a table like this, we sit down like this and he said first of all he came in when we all came in, I said the first time you came in here, you introduce yourself to me, I introduce myself to you, so he stand up and said, this is governor of river state, this is commissioner police, this is representative of Shell, and this is Umbadek chairman, and many other peoples like that? I don’t know most of their names again.
Q. Where did this meeting that you’re referring to take place?
A. It was government house.
Q. In the city?
A. Rivers state, the capital.
Q. Approximately when did this meeting take place?
A. Within June, July, 1994.
(...)
Q. You refer to someone as a Shell representative. Do you know the name of this person?
A. He said this is OC [Y] , Shell’s lawyer, that’s what he said.
Q. Had you ever seen mr. [Y] before?
A. No. That was the first time I saw him.
Q. Was there anyone else at the meeting that you understood to be representing what you refer to as Shell in any way?
A. He was the only person over there.
[V] heeft vervolgens verklaard dat de getuigen een verklaring op papier moesten zetten. Ze mochten niet weg en zijn een paar dagen gebleven. Op een gegeven moment werden “prepared statements” gebracht. [V] heeft daarover verklaard:
“Then this is the very time when they bring the statement, prepared statement, that is the time they brought money for us.
(...)
Q. I’m just asking if you recall were there any other people there? Was there anyone, for example, from – that you believed to be from SPDC?
A. That’s what I want to explain to you. Yeah. I have somebody who was there. This is a time he came in, he came in with money. Sign this statement that we involve [I] and the rest and they give you the money and [II] , he was very, very intelligent and he asked [GG] , where is this money from? He said, this money come from Shell, government of Nigeria. This is why the chairman, the lawyer representative is here.
Q. Who told you to sign the statement?
A. [GG] .”

4.89.Uit hun verwijzing naar de affidavit van [U] en de verklaring van [V] , zoals door eiseressen nader toegelicht tijdens de comparitie van partijen, volgt dat eiseressen stellen dat SPDC betrokken was bij omkoping van de getuigen [U] , [V] , [II] , [JJ] , [KK] , [LL] , [MM] en [NN] doordat (a) [Y] in opdracht van SPDC en/of een vertegenwoordiger van SPDC aanwezig was/waren bij de bijeenkomst(en) waarbij de getuigen voorbereide verklaringen moesten opstellen/tekenen, (b) financieel heeft bijgedragen aan betaling van deze getuigen en/of (c) hun een baan bij SPDC in het vooruitzicht heeft gesteld.

4.90.Gedaagden betwisten de gestelde betrokkenheid van SPDC bij omkoping van getuigen met klem. Zij verwijzen naar de schriftelijke verklaring van 19 februari 2018 van [Y] , waarin deze iedere betrokkenheid bij de gestelde omkoping van getuigen ontkent. Zij wijzen voorts erop dat [Y] er heel anders uitziet dan de beschrijving die [V] van hem heeft gegeven in zijn verklaring in de Kiobel -procedure. Gelet daarop is de verklaring van [V] volgens gedaagden niet betrouwbaar.

4.91.

De gestelde omkoping van getuigen wordt genoemd in de rapporten van [T] en Human Rights Watch (zie onder 2.31 en 2.32). Destijds bestond reeds de verdenking van betrokkenheid daarbij van SPDC. In het rapport van Human Rights Watch staat bijvoorbeeld dat deze beschuldigingen van omkoping destijds zowel door de aanklager als door SPDC zijn ontkend.35 Deze verdenking is ook besproken tijdens het proces, toen de voorzitter in verband daarmee aan [Y] vroeg of deze zeker wist dat hij niet langer een watching brief voor SPDC wenste te houden (zie onder 4.69). Het transcript van de zitting van 21 februari 1995 vermeldt verder dat [DD] , de advocaat van [I] , [W] en [EE] , de affidavits van [U] en [V] aan de orde heeft gesteld en heeft verzocht of deze affidavits, die ook in de krant The Masses waren afgedrukt, in het geding mochten worden gebracht. De voorzitter van het tribunaal heeft daarover opgemerkt:
“This case is not going to be tried on affidavit; the case is going to be based on evidence before the Tribunal. Even the statements given by the accused persons, they still have to give oral evidence. It is not going to be judged on Affidavits.”
Het verzoek om de aanvullende verklaringen in te brengen is als prematuur afgewezen:
“The trial will soon be on and the accused persons will have the opportunity to challenge the veracity of his evidence and render any document they may wish. This observation as far as the Tribunal is concerned is premature.”
De affidavits zijn volgens het transcript van deze zitting 27 februari 1995 opnieuw aan de orde gesteld door de advocaat van [A] , [OO] . Deze heeft in het kader van het verzoek om bail voor zijn cliënt, aandacht gevraagd voor de affidavit van [U] . Hij las de weergave daarvan uit de krant voor en betoogde ter onderbouwing van zijn verzoek om bail voor [eiseres 1] :
“In summary, I submit that prima facie, the quality of the evidence is poor. (…) The affidavit of [U] is a very serious issue which must not be taken lightly by this Tribunal.”

VI.1.b.ii gebruik verklaringen bij de veroordelingen

4.92.Uit de opmerking van de voorzitter van het tribunaal (zie onder 4.91) en uit de Evidence Act 1990 leidt de rechtbank af dat de belastende schriftelijke verklaringen van getuigen en de affidavits van [U] en [V] in beginsel niet kunnen bijdragen aan het bewijs in het proces. Om te kunnen bijdragen aan het bewijs, is vereist dat getuigen in persoon worden gehoord voor het tribunaal. [U] en [V] zijn niet als getuige gehoord voor het tribunaal; volgens de niet door gedaagden weersproken toelichting van eiseressen was dat omdat zij waren ondergedoken uit angst voor repercussies. Aangenomen moet daarom worden dat hun belastende verklaringen geen rol hebben gespeeld in de veroordelingen van de echtgenoten van eiseressen.

4.93.Uit de aan SPDC door (de kantoorgenoten van) [Y] uitgebrachte trial reports volgt dat op 16 mei 1995 [GG] als getuige is ondervraagd door het tribunaal. Tijdens de cross-examination heeft hij ontkend dat Shell, de Rivers State regering en hijzelf N 30,000.00 aan [V] hebben betaald. Uit deze trial reports volgt voorts dat de door [U] en [V] als omgekochte getuigen genoemde [II] , [JJ] en [NN] voor het tribunaal als prosecution witnesses zijn gehoord. Onduidelijk is echter wat zij hebben verklaard en of en in hoeverre hun verklaringen hebben bijgedragen aan de veroordelingen van de echtgenoten van eiseressen.

VI.1.b.iii gebruik verklaringen bij de arrestatie en detentie

4.94.

Uit de onder 4.91 geciteerde verklaring van de advocaat van [A] leidt de rechtbank af dat de schriftelijke verklaringen van de door [U] en [V] genoemde omgekochte getuigen wellicht een rol hebben gespeeld bij de arrestatie en detentie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen. De affidavit van [U] wordt immers opgebracht in verband met een verzoek om bail. [T] heeft in zijn rapport een analyse gemaakt van het beschikbare bewijs. Hij heeft geschreven (onder 1.19):
“On the last day of my visit (29 March), the prosecution served on the defence a bundle of the statements of the witnesses on whom they rely. I have analyzed these statements in great detail (see Part E and Appendix 9).”

4.95.

In Appendix 9 van zijn rapport, waarnaar eiseressen ook verwijzen ter onderbouwing van hun stellingen over (het gebruik van) verklaringen van de gesteld omgekochte getuigen, heeft [T] de verklaringen van de getuigen in het proces opgesomd. [T] heeft geschreven dat deze bijlage bij zijn rapport:
“is my attempt at a detailed and neutral analysis of the disclosed statements of all eyewitnesses, that is, the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution who claim to have seen part of the events of 21 May 1994.”
Daarbij heeft hij wel het volgende voorbehoud gemaakt:
“I must stress that they are concerns rather than conclusions since they are based on a reading of papers rather than on a hearing of the live evidence.”

4.96.

Volgens de samenvatting in Appendix 9 bij het rapport van [T] heeft [U] , in de verklaring waarvan hij in zijn affidavit stelt dat deze onder dwang is afgegeven, verklaard dat hij, toen hij op weg was naar de markt in Kobaga, een witte auto zag aankomen, die werd tegengehouden door een beveiligingsbeambte, die de bestuurder van de auto vroeg om rechtsomkeert te maken. In Appendix 9 van het rapport van [T] staat dat deze verklaring van [U] verder inhoudt:
“I saw so many people gathered round the place. There was a big argument that I came to know the man inside the white car who was arguing with the uniformed men was [I] . I also saw Mr. [W] inside his own car near [I] ’s car. After much argument when they were about to go back, I heard mr [I] said in Ogoni language “GBO BEDERE EBADI GIOKO EBAGE DONE KPEGE NI EBA LEELA GBO BE KO BAA SIMEE AALII SI - GIOKO A KOLA NU EALEEMAI ONAA NII - VA” meaning in English that it is those vultures who are at Gioko sharing money that send the uniform men to arrest me. He told the crowd who gathered around there that they should go to Gioko and deal with the Vultures. The whole crowd moved toward Gioko.”

4.97.

Appendix 9 bij het rapport van [T] bevat geen samenvatting van verklaringen van [V] of [II] . Wel staan daarin samenvattingen van verklaringen van andere door [U] en [V] genoemde getuigen die zouden zijn omgekocht, te weten [PP] (wellicht [KK] ), [NN] , [JJ] , [LL] en [MM] . Deze houden het volgende in:
- [PP] heeft verklaard dat hij hoorde dat [I] sprak over vultures,
- [NN] heeft verklaard dat [eiseres 2] de aanvallers leidde die [Q] dood knuppelden en dat hij de aanvallers uiteindelijk beval te stoppen,
- [JJ] heeft verklaard dat [eiseres 2] tijdens de bijeenkomst op 21 mei 1994 zei: “let us kill them”,
- [LL] heeft [D] genoemd als iemand die hij herkende onder de mensen die de VW kever duwden in het door [T] genoemde “Volkswagen Beetle Incident”. [T] heeft hierover vermeld:
“ In the car he saw the naked body of a fat man. 2 other corpses were being carried on an “improvised stretcher”. Of these 2 one was the body of [R].”36

4.98.Op grond van de vaststaande feiten en de in het geding gebrachte bewijsstukken, kan geen eindoordeel worden geveld over dit verwijt. Eiseressen zullen worden toegelaten tot het bewijs van hun door gedaagden gemotiveerd betwiste stellingen over betrokkenheid van SPDC bij omkoping van getuigen en het gebruik van verklaringen van deze getuigen bij de veroordelingen en/of de arrestatie en detentie van hun echtgenoten. Dat laatste zal per echtgenoot moeten komen vast te staan. Eiseressen zullen worden toegelaten te bewijzen dat:
( i) SPDC betrokken was bij omkoping van de getuigen [U] , [V] , [II] , [JJ] , [KK] , [LL] , [MM] en [NN] , doordat

a. [Y] in opdracht van SPDC en/of een vertegenwoordiger van SPDC aanwezig was/waren bij de bijeenkomst(en) waarbij deze getuigen de door anderen voorbereide verklaringen moesten opstellen/ondertekenen en/of
b. SPDC financieel heeft bijgedragen aan de betalingen aan deze getuigen en/of
c. SPDC deze getuigen een baan in het vooruitzicht heeft gesteld, en

( ii) de verklaringen van de met betrokkenheid van SPDC omgekochte getuigen een rol hebben gespeeld bij:

a. de veroordeling van de echtgenoten van eiseressen door het tribunaal en/of
b. de arrestatie en detentie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen en/of
c. de detentie van eiseressen.
Deel (ii) van de bewijsopdracht is alleen relevant voor het geval de betrokkenheid van SPDC als bedoel onder (i) komt vast te staan. Eiseressen worden om proceseconomische redenen toegelaten tot het bewijs van beide onderdelen van de bewijsopdracht. Of en in hoeverre dit verwijt van eiseressen daadwerkelijk opgaat, zal na de bewijslevering worden bezien.

VI.1.c [N]

4.99.Eiseressen wijzen op de, onder meer door [T] bekritiseerde, rol die [N] , de commandant van de Rivers State Internal Security Task Force heeft gespeeld tijdens het proces (zie onder 2.31). Naast de door [T] gesignaleerde gedragingen, stellen eiseressen dat [N] verantwoordelijk was voor de martelingen en vernederende behandelingen die de gevangenen gedurende het proces moesten ondergaan, voor de mishandeling en aanranding van [eiseres 1] en voor het in beslag nemen van bewijsmateriaal tegen de verdachten. Eiseressen duiden [N] aan als “Shell protegé” en gaan uitvoerig in op de volgens hen bestaande nauwe banden tussen SPDC en [N] in de periode voorafgaand aan het proces, onder meer bij de door [N] geleide Operation Restore Order. Verder wijzen eiseressen op betalingen door SPDC aan [N] , die volgens eiseressen ook tijdens het proces zouden hebben plaatsgehad.

4.100. Met gedaagden is de rechtbank van oordeel dat dit verwijt geen doel treft. Er is geen grond om de gedragingen van [N] tijdens het proces op enige wijze aan SPDC en/of de andere gedaagden toe te rekenen of om enige betrokkenheid van gedaagden daarbij aan te nemen. Die gevolgtrekking kan niet worden gestoeld op de vaststaande feiten en volgt ook niet uit de stellingen van eiseressen. De rechtbank licht dit als volgt toe.

4.101. Eiseressen kennen groot gewicht toe aan de onder 2.20 bedoelde inter office memo van [M] van SPDC van 25 februari 1994 en aan het gegeven dat [N] Operation Restore Order Ogoniland heeft geleid en publiekelijk zou hebben verkondigd dat hij handelde in opdracht van Shell. Gedaagden betwisten dat laatste gemotiveerd en lichten toe dat de in de memo bedoelde betalingen ‘field allowances’ betroffen die de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten in rekening brachten bij SPDC voor verleende assistentie ter bescherming tegen het aanhoudend en steeds extremer wordend geweld waarmee SPDC zich geconfronteerd zag voor zij haar activiteiten in Ogoniland staakte.

4.102. Onder verwijzing naar schriftelijke verklaringen, onder meer een verklaring van [QQ] , in de Kiobel -procedure, stellen eiseressen dat SPDC [N] ook tijdens het proces heeft betaald. [QQ] heeft verklaard dat hij drie keer getuige is geweest van het overhandigen van geld door SPDC aan [N] , waarvan twee keer door [RR] . Deze verklaringen – waarvan gedaagden overigens gemotiveerd betwisten dat zij juist en betrouwbaar zijn – zien echter alle op vermeende betalingen in verband met de Operation Restore Order Ogoniland.

4.103. De rechtbank merkt op dat onduidelijk is wat de grondslag is voor betaling van de field allowances aan [N] die worden genoemd in de interoffice memo. De rechtbank laat dat voor wat het is, aangezien geen enkel verband is gesteld of gebleken tussen deze betalingen en de rol die [N] vervulde tijdens het proces. Ook uit de door eiseressen overgelegde verklaringen blijkt niet van enige betaling van SPDC aan [N] gedurende of in verband met het proces. Uit hetgeen eiseressen naar voren brengen over de contacten tussen SPDC en [N] in de jaren voor het proces kan alleen worden afgeleid dat [N] betrokken is geweest bij optreden van de Nigeriaanse overheid rond de installaties van de joint venture in Ogoniland en dat SPDC betalingen aan hem heeft verricht in de vorm van field allowances. Ook als [N] zichzelf zag als protegé van SPDC/de Shell-groep, betekent dat niet dat gedaagden op enigerlei wijze betrokken waren bij [N] ’s optreden tijdens het proces. Om die conclusie te kunnen trekken, moet sprake zijn van concrete feiten en omstandigheden waaruit volgt dat gedaagden via [N] hebben getracht het proces te beïnvloeden of anderszins betrokken waren bij [N] ’s optreden tijdens het proces. Dergelijke concrete feiten en omstandigheden zijn niet gesteld of anderszins gebleken.

VI.2 aanbod tot beïnvloeding proces onder voorwaarde dat MOSOP haar protest tegen SPDC zou staken

4.104. Vaststaat dat [L] begin 1995 heeft gesproken met de broer van [I] , [SS] . Eiseressen stellen dat [L] toen aan [SS] heeft aangeboden om het proces te beïnvloeden, onder de voorwaarde dat MOSOP haar protesten tegen SPDC zou staken.

4.105. In de Nigeria Update van 6 april 1995 heeft [L] verslag gedaan van een gesprek dat hij die dag had met de Britse ambassadeur, [TT] , die hij in het verslag heeft aangeduid als BHC [de afkorting voor de British High Commissioner]. Dit verslag vermeldt dat [TT] heeft gesproken met [SS] en de boodschap heeft overgebracht dat [SS] met [L] wil spreken. [L] schrijft:
“I told the BHC that I might be prepared to meet him [ [SS] , toevoeging rechtbank] on an informal basis to see what he had to say, and the BHC suggested that he introduce me to him during the Queen’s Birthday celebrations at his house later this month.

I also made the point that, so long as the MOSOP leadership keep the claim for compensation against us we would find it impossible to deal with them formally. I also said that I will not become involved in [I] ’s trial in any way.

There is still a strong belief amongst these people that we Shell have the power to get [G] to let [I] off! Would that we had such power, we certainly would not have had the cash calls problems if we had!”

4.106. Op 20 april 1995 heeft [L] bij de Britse ambassadeur gesproken met [SS] en [UU] , één van de advocaten van [I] . De Nigeria Update van 24 april 1995 vermeldt hierover:
“We discussed the matter of opening a dialogue between Shell and the Ogoni people. I made the point in many ways that I felt that I could not be expected to open up Shell to a dialogue when we had learned from experience to distrust the methods employed by [I] against us. His use of the media to propagate what we felt were lies or distortions of the truth to a gullible world made us very wary indeed. I told him that they would have to modify their stance before we could contemplate a useful dialogue.

I also said that we were not about to start discussions as long as we had a claim for reparations for environmental pollution and back royalties and taxes of 10 billion hanging over our heads, figures that were quite preposterous.

(…)

MOSOP’S Whishes of Shell

I asked what exactly MOSOP wanted of Shell. OSW said that they wanted us to help to get the release of KSW and the removal of the army from Ogoniland.

I went over all the arguments against us doing either of the two things.

(…)
Dialogue?

The matter of a continued dialogue was raised again at the end. I said that I was happy to keep the door open to dialogue and I gave my contact numbers. However, I also said that I would not be able to talk about anything substantive as long as I was given reason to distrust MOSOP and its motives in wanting the dialogue. I said it was up to them to show there was a genuine change of approach before there would be much point in continued dialogue.”

4.107. [SS] heeft bij brief van 13 mei 1995 opdracht gekregen van zijn broer om het voorstel van [L] niet te accepteren. In de brief heeft [I] twee scenario’s geschetst om met [L] te bespreken, te weten:

( I) “We remain in jail. A. The cause grows. Junior’s recent visit to the US was a smasher. He met Al Gore, Ethel Kennedy (…) Along with the Goldman Foundation, Shell could be facing an expensive call for the boycott of its products. (…). B. Within Nigeria, the other oil-producing area’s who have been working to see if MOSOP’s non-violent stand will draw Shell out of its cocoon, decide that force is what Shell wants. There will be trouble on the oilfields, losing Shell a lot of its investment. Military force will not secure them peace on the oilfields. (…)
In the end, all this would be extremely expensive for Shell particularly if as is being mooted, we sue them in the U.S. Punitive damages could be imposed on them. Our sponsors are thinking in that direction. Is this what Shell wants?
OR THIS?,
( II) Shell uses its considerable clout to (i) CREATE an Ogoni State. We will have something to show to the Ogoni people & assuage their anger.
(ii) Shell gets the Tribunal stopped or the Fed Attorney General to enter a “nolle prosequi” using the fact of my ill-health and inability to go on with the trial. Shell’s stock in Ogoni rises. The human rights and writers lobbies which have stood solidly behind us abroad are disarmed. Shell gets a breathing space.”

4.108. [SS] heeft deze brief op 13 mei 1995 met [L] besproken, die in een Note for File hiervan verslag heeft gedaan:
- It was reiterated that his demand for Shell to become involved with political and legal matters of Nigeria was wrong and Shell would not do it, i.e. no royalties/taxes, no reparations, no interventions with the tribunal process.
- (…) In any case, it was important for Shell’s image and integrity, long term, to adhere to its business principles as we have stated in this case.
- We were keen to address the issues of Community Development and the Environment as soon as possible even ahead of resuming operations, provided the situation on the ground was peaceful (…) We were prepared to sit down and discuss these two areas of mutual interest and get advice/input from MOSOP. However, first and foremost we needed to satisfy ourselves that we can trust MOSOP. (…)
- (…) We would not have the confidence to sit down with MOSOP to consider areas of mutual interest unless these false claims and attacks were stopped. Such cessation would be seen as a display of MOSOP’s willingness to sincerely explore common grounds with Shell in a trustworthy manner. (…)

The meeting was summarised to O-W from our viewpoint that the discussion has not moved forward since it started. We reiterated that we would be prepared to discuss areas of mutual interests only, namely, Community Development and Environment, but only if the basis for trust was established. The minimum we would expect as indication of display of trust on MOSOP’s part would be the cessation of deliberate and false accusations against Shell, and not urging Shell to become involved in Nigerian politics against its business principles. Finally, we added that until there was a change in MOSOP’s attitude and approach, we saw was no basis for continuing the dialogue for the meantime, even though the door was not shut.”

4.109. In een interoffice memorandum aan [VV] , destijds Area Coordinator bi SIPC van 22 augustus 1995 heeft [L] hierover geschreven:
“I offered [SS] the possibility that we would be prepared to put in some humanitarian aid (medical?) in exchange for the undertaking by his brother to soften their official stance on two key issues for us: 1. the outrageous claims (…) against Shell for royalties and reparations, and 2. the claim that we had funded the military in their clean up operations, to “clear the way” for our return.
(…)
I am not sure that we want to be moving towards unilateral aid: we need something in return from the MOSOP elected representatives. (…) Don’t forget that the government see MOSOP as terrorists and our dealing with them could be misconstrued.”

4.110. Uit de onder 4.105 tot en met 4.109 bedoelde verslagen en brief van [I] volgt dat [L] in de gesprekken met [SS] onderscheid heeft gemaakt tussen twee verschillende onderwerpen: 1) de reactie van SPDC op het verzoek om te interveniëren in het proces en 2) een dialoog met een eventuele bijdrage van SPDC aan projecten in het kader van Community Development and the Environment. Deze verslagen vermelden ten aanzien van het eerste onderwerp dat [L] tijdens de gesprekken met [SS] steeds duidelijk heeft gemaakt dat SPDC niet zal overgaan tot de door [SS] gevraagde interventie in het proces. Zie bijvoorbeeld de opmerking in het onder 4.108 bedoelde verslag: “(…) his demand for Shell to become involved with political and legal matters of Nigeria was wrong and Shell would not do it (…) no interventions in the tribunal process.” Dit sluit aan bij de opmerking van [L] tegen de Britse ambassadeur voordat hij met [SS] sprak, dat SPDC op geen enkele manier betrokken wilde raken bij het proces van [I] (zie 4.105). Uit de verslagen volgt dat alleen is gesproken over eventuele humanitaire (medische) hulp aan [I] “to soften their stance on two key issues for us” (zie 4.109). De vraag om te interveniëren in het proces is steeds ongeclausuleerd negatief beantwoord, met de uitleg dat SPDC zich niet mengt in dit soort kwesties, omdat dit tegen de business principles ingaat. Wel heeft [L] voorwaarden gesteld aan het tweede onderwerp van gesprek, een dialoog met een eventuele bijdrage van SPDC aan projecten in het kader van Community Development and the Environment. Dit zijn de voorwaarden waarop eiseressen doelen. Deze voorwaarden zien echter uitsluitend op het tweede onderwerp. Eén van deze voorwaarden was overigens “not urging Shell becoming involved in Nigerian politics against its business principles” (zie 4.108). Dat bevestigt dat [L] tijdens de gesprekken duidelijk heeft gemaakt dat SPDC onder geen enkele voorwaarde zou interveniëren in het proces.

4.111. In hun schriftelijke verklaringen koppelen [SS] en [UU] daarentegen de door [L] gestelde voorwaarden aan de afwijzing van het verzoek om te interveniëren in het proces. De rechtbank is van oordeel dat deze verklaringen geen afbreuk kunnen doen aan de hiervoor onder 4.110 getrokken conclusies. De rechtbank neemt daartoe in aanmerking dat de hiervoor weergegeven door SPDC opgestelde verslagen in de regel op de dag van het gesprek of kort daarna zijn opgesteld. Eiseressen aanvaarden deze verslagen van [L] op alle andere punten als juist. De schriftelijke verklaringen van [SS] en [UU] zijn daarentegen jaren na dato afgelegd en geven de herinnering weer van wat destijds is besproken. Zonder nadere toelichting – die ontbreekt – ziet de rechtbank geen grond om op basis van deze schriftelijke verklaringen aan te nemen dat de verslagen van [L] geen juiste weergave van de gesprekken vormen. Daarmee is geen ruimte voor de door eiseressen aangeboden nadere bewijslevering op dit punt.

4.112. De rechtbank concludeert dat er geen grond is voor het verwijt dat gedaagden hebben aangeboden om het proces te beïnvloeden onder de voorwaarde dat MOSOP haar protesten tegen Shell zou staken.

VI.3 niet interveniëren in het proces

4.113. Eiseressen verwijten gedaagden dat zij niet (publiekelijk) hun invloed hebben aangewend om de Nigeriaanse overheid te bewegen tot een fair trial en tot clementie voor de Ogoni 9. Gedaagden hadden dit volgens eiseressen kunnen en moeten doen door:

1. in contacten met de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten het belang van de naleving van de mensenrechten aan de orde te stellen,
2. voorwaarden te stellen aan een verdere samenwerking met de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten,
3. zich uit te spreken over het recht op protesteren van de Ogoni,
4. zich (publiekelijk) uit te spreken over de noodzaak van een fair trial en te verzoeken om clementie,
5. desnoods te dreigen met terugtrekking uit Nigeria.

4.114. Vaststaat dat gedaagden gedurende het proces en voor de tenuitvoerlegging van de vonnissen verzoeken van (rechts)personen en organisaties ontvingen om zich in het proces te mengen (zie onder 2.29). Gedaagden voeren aan dat zij de overtuiging hadden en hebben dat een commerciële partij zich niet behoort te mengen in een interne juridische aangelegenheid van een soevereine staat. Zij hebben dit in hun Business Principles vastgelegde uitgangspunt destijds ook consequent uitgedragen, aldus gedaagden, die verder toelichten dat zij (a) het proces volgden en (b) stille diplomatie hebben aangewend.

VI.3.a volgen proces

4.115. Zoals hiervoor aan de orde is geweest, volgde SPDC het proces via de advocaten van het kantoor van [Y] . Zij ontving verslagen van de zittingen. Vanaf de Nigeria Update van 30 mei 1994 die vermeldt dat [I] het weekend daarvoor is opgepakt en vastgezet op verdenking van de moord op vier Ogoni leiders, is [L] in de Nigeria Updates regelmatig ingegaan op de actuele stand van het proces en op ontwikkelingen in verband daarmee. Ook heeft [L] in de Nigeria Updates verslag gedaan van hetgeen over het proces aan de orde is gekomen in de gesprekken die hij voerde met de Nederlandse en Britse ambassadeurs. Hij hoorde bijvoorbeeld van de Britse ambassadeur dat een Britse rechter een deel van het proces heeft bijgewoond op verzoek van de Britse regering om te bezien of het proces eerlijk verliep en hij heeft in de Nigeria Update van 4 juni 1995 vermeld:
“The Judge apparently concluded that it was flawed (some technical points apparently.”
Eerder, op 6 april 1995, had hij in de Nigeria Update genoteerd:
“The BHC believes that although the charges should not stick the government will make sure that he is found guilty. He would then be sentenced to death, and reprieved after giving in to pressure from outside, but be incarcerated for a very long time.

The feeling is that this trial by Tribunal will go the way of all others of the kind in the past here: nobody had ever been found innocent. Hence those around [I] are using all methods to try and influence this.”

4.116. [L] zond zijn berichten aan de Nederlandse en Britse Service Companies, SIPC te Londen en (in kopie) SIPM te Den Haag (zie onder 2.19). Tijdens een vergadering in februari 1993 in Londen, waarbij vertegenwoordigers van de Service Companies en SPDC aanwezig waren, is gesproken over [I] en MOSOP, die in de notulen werden aangeduid als een risico voor de internationale reputatie van de Shell-groep, waarvoor urgent attention werd gevraagd. De notulen vermelden dat is afgesproken dat:
“SPDC and SIPC PA (Public Affairs) departments to keep each other more closely informed to ensure that movements of key players, what they say and to whom is more effectively monitored to avoid unpleasant surprises and adversely affect the reputation of the Group as a whole.”
Kort nadat het proces in februari 1995 was begonnen, is in maart 1995 de Nigeria Issue Contact Group opgericht binnen de Shell-groep, om de ontwikkelingen in Nigeria te volgen en daarop te kunnen reageren.

4.117. Niet ter discussie staat dat de moedermaatschappijen op de hoogte waren van het proces en de wereldwijde aandacht daarvoor. Gedaagden, waaronder de moedermaatschappijen, waren op de hoogte van de kritiek op de onafhankelijkheid van het tribunaal en de eerlijkheid van het proces, die onder meer is geuit in de rapporten van [T] , Human Rights Watch en Amnesty International. Vaststaat dat gedaagden – juist ook de moedermaatschappijen – door verschillende non-gouvernementele organisaties zijn opgeroepen te interveniëren in het proces.

VI.3.b Stille diplomatie

4.118. Gedaagden hebben toegelicht dat zij hebben gekozen voor de weg van de stille diplomatie. Wat de Shell-groep heeft gedaan, kan worden verdeeld in drie onderdelen, te weten de contacten die [L] tijdens het proces heeft gehad met Nigeriaanse functionarissen (VI.3.b.i), andere contacten van (functionarissen van) entiteiten binnen de Shell-groep over het proces (VI.3.b.ii) en de gebeurtenissen in de periode tussen het vonnis en de executie daarvan (VI.3.b.iii). De rechtbank gaat daarbij uit van de inhoud van de Nigeria Updates en andere verslagen van [L] en van besprekingen binnen de Shell-groep, waarop zowel eiseressen als gedaagden hun feitelijke standpunten baseren. Ook betrekt de rechtbank in het navolgende de getuigenverklaringen uit de Kiobel -procedure van [L] , [X] en [WW] , die in de relevante periode Group Managing Director was, waarop partijen zich allebei beroepen.

VI.3.b.i contacten tussen [L] en Nigeriaanse functionarissen

4.119. Op 22 juli 1995 heeft [L] gesproken met [G] . Daags daarvoor had hij de Britse ambassadeur gesproken over de aankomende ontmoeting met [G] . Hij hoorde op dat moment van de Britse ambassadeur dat de tweede groep advocaten in het tribunaal was gestopt omdat zij vonden dat zij hun taak niet behoorlijk konden vervullen omdat het proces werd bepaald door de Nigeriaanse militairen. [L] heeft daarover genoteerd:
“He seemed to be quite sure that KSW [ [I] , toevoeging rechtbank] will be convicted, perhaps to the death penalty, to be commuted later on to life imprisonment. I told him that this would be a very unpleasant outcome for Shell, as the international outrage would certainly involve us. The time between conviction and commutation of the sentence would also be critical to us. There is also the link to the coup plotters: if some of them are shot, then the outside world will, probably justifiably, conclude that KSW may also be executed, and therefore renewed internationalisation of the KSW/Ogoni issue could be triggered off even before that verdict is announced.”

4.120. Ter voorbereiding op het gesprek met [G] sprak [L] op 21 juli 1995 ook met [F] , de tweede man in Nigeria, die hem vertelde:
“The HoS [Head of State, [G] , toevoeging rechtbank] is very touchy on the matter of foreign criticism, and on the Ogoni issue. He suggested that we should not raise either issue although it may still come up.”
Uit de Nigeria Update van 23 juli 1995 volgt dat [L] dit advies heeft opgevolgd en tegenover [G] niet zelf is begonnen over de Ogoni-kwestie en/of het proces. Met hun opmerking daarover gaan eiseressen ten onrechte eraan voorbij dat dit op uitdrukkelijk advies van [F] is gebeurd. Tijdens dit gesprek heeft [G] de Ogoni-kwestie aan de orde gesteld. [L] schreef hierover:
“After I had finished with my part (which lasted about 1 ½ hours) he said he had something he wanted to raise with me. The Ogoni issue!

- [G] ’s irritation with Shell’s public statements
He suddenly became very strident on the subject, complaining that the biggest company in Nigeria, who had the best knowledge of the activities on the ground in the Ogoni area, had in his eyes failed to adequately portray the real facts of the case to the outside world.(…)
He put me on the spot, and I was finding it particularly hard to get through to him that it was not up to us to defend the government’s role. After a long discussion, during which he again became quite heated, he said that he accepted that Shell could not refer to the government’s performance in its public statements.

- Shell’s efforts to tread between mines
I told him of our efforts to get the public to understand our position (referring to the Ogoni briefing paper). When I mentioned this, he again became quite incensed, saying that he had read this document and that he found this also to woolly and not sufficient clear on what the real facts were. (…)

- Shell’s non-political stance
At this point I tried to defuse the situation by going over the non-political stance that we had taken, mentioning that our job was to try and do our best to help the government to develop its oil and gas reserves as efficiently as possible, and that we could not take sides with the government on such a sensitive issue. I must say that after explaining this he calmed down a bit, but I was left with the distinct impression that he was not really happy nevertheless.
(…)

I told him of the pressures we as Shell were under on the Ogoni issue internationally and that we had to tread extremely carefully in order to try and minimise the potential (or actual) damage such an issue could cause worldwide business. (…)I told him that we were very conscious of the government’s irritation with the public villification it was getting on the Ogoni Issue but that we also were being tied into the matter in ways which we also felt were quite wrong.
(…)
I conclude from what he [ [G] ] said that he had no sympathy for [I] whatsoever, and we must therefore prepare ourselves for a conviction in this trial with all the difficulties that portends for us.
(…)
He wants us to support him, but I think he now understands better that we have some very clear limits to what we can do publicly, or in private for that matter.”
4.121. De rechtbank leidt hieruit af dat [G] wenste dat SPDC/de Shell-groep de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten zou steunen in de Ogoni-kwestie en dat [L] in reactie hierop heeft gewezen op de niet-politieke koers van SPDC/de Shell-groep. Niet blijkt dat [L] zich tijdens dit gesprek met [G] heeft uitgesproken over het recht van de verdachten op een eerlijk proces. [L] heeft tijdens de Kiobel -procedure verklaard dat hij dit in andere gesprekken met Nigeriaanse functionarissen wel heeft gedaan. Ten aanzien van de vraag of gedaagden zich gedurende het proces (publiekelijk) hebben uitgesproken over het recht van de verdachten op een eerlijk proces heeft [L] in de Kiobel -procedure als volgt verklaard:
Q. “Shell Nigeria did say that he [ [I] , toevoeging rechtbank] is entitled to due legal process?” Do you see that?
A. Correct.
Q. Is that referring to statements you made?
A. Yes. As I testified earlier, that’s what I’m referring to.
Q. And it’s your recollection that you made these statements prior to Mr [I] ’s conviction?
A. I believe many times and publicly and privately.
(…)
Q. Did you convey to any officials of the Nigerian government that there was a perception internationally that the trial did not meet the standards of due legal process?
A. I spent all my time leading through that process, trying to get people to understand we wanted proper legal process and there was a concern being reported in the press that this was not occurring. Hence the reason I was making the statements.”
Op grond van deze verklaring stelt de rechtbank vast dat [L] in gesprekken met Nigeriaanse functionarissen het recht op een eerlijk proces van de Ogoni 9 aan de orde heeft gesteld. Over de keuze voor de weg van stille diplomatie heeft [L] in de Amerikaanse Kiobel-procedure als volgt verklaard:
Q. (…) do you see the sentence: “Our experience suggests that quiet diplomacy afforded the very best hope for [I] ”?
(…)
A. I worked in many countries where there’s a central government with a lot of control, and my experience has been in the past in other countries like Malaysia or the Middle east and so on that to get action on sensitive issues it is better to do it with quiet diplomacy than to make it a public domain issue, where people become very polarised and very quickly. In the Western World people tend to be more public with these things. In the developing things success generally requires a degree of quiet diplomacy rather than public debate.”

VI.3.2 andere contacten met Nigeriaanse functionarissen

4.122. Op 16 maart 1995 hebben functionarissen van andere Shell-entiteiten, waaronder [XX] , head of Public Affairs van de Shell-groep, (hierna: [XX] ) in Londen over het proces gesproken met de Nigeriaanse ambassadeur. De Nigeriaanse ambassadeur merkte over [I] op: “there is every chance he will be found guilty” en sprak over de ‘misinformatie’ over het proces van onder meer [YY] van The Body Shop. Volgens het verslag van deze ontmoeting:
“He [ de Nigeriaanse ambassadeur, toevoeging rechtbank] then called on Shell to put head together with the Mission to effectively debunk all the false allegations peddled against Nigeria and Shell over Ogoni and [I] .

4. In his reaction Mr. [XX] said that Shell was aware of the vicious campaign embarked upon by The Body Shop and other groups to discredit Shell and Nigeria. He informed HC that Shell has been inundated with hundreds of letters of protest and abuse regarding their operations in Nigeria. He noted that, apart from the Body Shop, Green Peace, Action Earth, Church groups, Amnesty International as well as Shell Shareholders have all been involved in the campaign. They complain about the environment and human rights issue. Some of the complaints were that Shell should prevail on the Nigerian government to release [I] .”

4.123. Net als tijdens het onder 4.120 bedoelde gesprek dat [L] met [G] voerde, is hier van Nigeriaanse kant aangedrongen op het samen optrekken, waarbij [XX] heeft gewezen op de internationale kritiek op het proces en de klacht dat Shell geen druk uitoefende op de Nigeriaanse autoriteiten om [I] vrij te laten. Tijdens dit gesprek is afgesproken dat één van de rapporten van de onafhankelijke organisaties over het proces aan de Nigeriaanse ambassadeur zou worden verstrekt. Daarmee is tijdens en naar aanleiding van dit gesprek gewezen op de kritiek op het proces. Verder is niet ingegaan op het aandringen van Nigeriaanse kant om samen op te trekken in deze kwestie.

VI.3.3. de periode tussen de veroordelingen en de executies

4.124. Nadat het tribunaal op 30 en 31 oktober 1995 de Ogoni 9 tot death by hanging heeft veroordeeld, is tijdens de vergadering van het CMD van 31 oktober en 1 november 1995 besloten dat [L] contact zou zoeken met [G] om de zorgen van de Shell-groep uit te spreken over de tenuitvoerlegging van de vonnissen. [ZZ] – de toenmalige Regional Coordinator for Latin America and Africa bij SPIM – zou hetzelfde doen bij de Nigerian High Commissioner in Londen. [X] heeft hierover in de Kiobel -procedure het volgende verklaard:
“Q. Was the possibility of Mr [I] being executed discussed at any meetings of the Committee of Managing Directors?
A. yes, it was.
(…)
A. I do remember that we discussed in the Committee of Managing Directors whether the chairman should write a letter to ask for clemency. I think we discussed that twice, and the second time we decided that I would do so, yes.
(…)
Q What do you recall being discussed at the committee about that subject?
A. What we discussed at that particular meeting was whether we should, as a group, send a letter to the head of state and ask for clemency. As is recorded here, it was decided against, most definitely on the basis of advice from [L] , who—and I don’t specifically recall—may have said, “Don’t do that at this stage. Let me try and get to the head of state and talk to him.” In cases like this, as I explained earlier on, we would always, always follow the advice of the man on the spot because he is in the best position to judge whether sending a letter would be counter-productive or not and, at least at this stage, his advice must have been “don’t do it.”
Q. Do you have a recollection of Mr [L] making that advice?
A. Not a specific one, but I can well imagine that it went that way because that would be totally in line with our policy.
Q. What policy is that?
A. The policy is not to interfere from a distance in the affairs of an operating company.
(…)
A. I remember that the chief executive for a long time advised not to do that because he felt that a direct contact with the head of state would be more appropriate and effective.
Q. It says here, “It was agreed that Mr [L] should seek access to the head of state to explain Shell’s concerns”.
(…)
A. I do remember that we felt that it was necessary to do something, and here we decided to give [L] a chance to talk to the head of state.”

4.125. De keuze voor [L] is door [WW] als volgt toegelicht:
“[L] had become a respected and trusted figure in Nigeria and, notwithstanding the criticism that he attracted to himself by raising this subject with [G] —and you saw his note about how the President got very agitated when he did bring it up on that one occasion— [L] , having been born in Nigeria and feeling passionate about Nigeria—you know [L] , I’m sure—was quite the best individual to express these views to the Nigerian authorities; whether the president himself, [F] or anyone else of great seniority in Nigeria.”

4.126. In de Nigeria Update van 2 november 1995 heeft [L] geschreven over een ontmoeting op 1 november 1995 met [F] . Deze Update vermeldt onder meer dat de reden voor dit bezoek was dat [L] [G] wilde bezoeken:
“The visit to the Head of State [ [G] , toevoeging rechtbank] would have the objective of trying to obtain his support for clemency and the commutation of the recent sentence of death on [I] for his part in the murder of 4 Ogoni elders in May 1994.(…)

[F] agreed to request the HoS [Head of State] for an audience for him and I on the 17th or the 18th November, after his (S’s) return from a visit to South Africa.

[F] advised very strongly against Shell sending any letter to the Head of State asking for clemency for KSW. He felt that it would be taken very badly and that it may seriously jeopardise the objective.

He did not believe that [G] would carry out the sentence, nor did he expect any sudden moves: rather, he expected that a final decision on the matter may well be made much later in the year, possibly in December. He felt that having given clemency to the military in the recent coup plotters saga he would not be able to do any differently with a civilian.

I emphasised that Shell would be obliged to defend itself against criticism from many quarters, both locally and internationally, over the next weeks and that we could not take the government’s corner. He [ [F] ] accepted this as a matter of fact. He did however remind me of the HoS’s demand that Shell be more (publicly) supportive, and he said that HoS felt that the government were doing what they could to help Shell!
(…)
S told me that [G] seemed to have valued our last talk very highly and he felt that he would welcome a fairly frequent dialogue of this kind. (…) This bodes well if true.”
Het beoogde gesprek tussen [L] en [G] heeft echter niet plaatsgevonden. [L] heeft in de Kiobel -procedure verklaard dat hij zowel voor als na het opleggen van de doodstraf heeft geprobeerd om een afspraak te maken met [G] , maar dat dat niet is gelukt.

4.127. Tijdens de vergadering van het CMD van 7 november 1995 is besloten om uit naam van de Shell-groep een verzoek om clemency op humanitaire gronden aan [G] te sturen. [X] heeft hierover in de Kiobel -procedure het volgende verklaard:
“Q. At this meeting of the Committee of Managing Directors was it decided that you should send a personal letter to President [G] ?
A. Yes, it was, yes.
Q. Can you recount for me, as best you can, how that decision came about?
A. I don’t have a detailed recollection, but I think what made us decide to do that was that [L] had not been able to talk to the head of state directly. He tried. At the previous meeting I remember we took his advice that he would seek an appointment with the head of state, so we decided not to send a letter. Now that that discussion had not taken place, we felt that we had to do something. The discussion was “Why are we doing that, if we do it at all?” I do recall that I said, “We do that on humanitarian grounds”—I could well have added to that, that I am absolutely against the death penalty—“and now that it looks as if this is moving in that direction in the case, we have to indeed make it known to the head of state that we are against that.”
Q. Did Mr [L] change his recommendation as to whether or not a direct request for clemency should be made?
A. That I don’t recall, but I think it is much more likely to think that, after we learned that he had been unable to see the head of state, we felt that we had to do something.
(…)
Q. There is reference to this letter being a personal letter. Is that correct? This is a personal letter?
A. It is personal in a way that it is from person to person, yes. But I think it’s quite clear in what capacity it is written. It doesn’t say writing to the head of state from his private address. It clearly states Mr [X] writing to the head of state in his capacity as chairman of the Committee of Managing Directors of the Royal Dutch Shell group of companies.
Q. The address that’s located on the bottom of this letter?
A. That is the address of Royal Dutch.
(…)
A.(…) Because this had become, at this particular time, an issue which was not just an SPDC issue, but was an issue for the group as a whole. The group was attacked everywhere almost, and we felt that, as a group, we had to show that we, indeed, were of the opinion that, whatever the conclusion of the legal process was in Nigeria, that it’s not something for us to interfere with; that we would be against the death sentence.”
Vervolgens is op 8 november 1995 namens de gehele Shell-groep het onder 2.36 bedoelde verzoek om clemency gedaan voor de negen personen die ter dood waren veroordeeld door het Ogoni-tribunaal. Dit verzoek is aan de Nigerian High Commissioner overhandigd, met het verzoek dit door te sturen aan [G] .

VI.3.4 toetsing

4.128. Uit het voorgaande volgt dat gedaagden uitdrukkelijk de keuze hebben gemaakt om, gelet op hun Business Principles, niet te interveniëren in politieke en juridische kwesties van het land waarin zij opereerden en zich niet publiekelijk uit te spreken over het proces, maar de weg van de stille diplomatie te volgen. Zij hebben ook daarnaar gehandeld. In de gesprekken met Nigeriaanse functionarissen werden zij geconfronteerd met een wens samen op te trekken, waaraan niet is voldaan. Verder heeft [L] zich tijdens het proces in algemene zin uitgesproken over het recht op en het belang van een eerlijk proces voor de Ogoni 9. In ieder geval in de periode tussen de veroordeling en de executies werd het proces en het lot van de Ogoni 9 gezien als een kwestie die de Shell-groep als geheel raakte en niet (langer) als een lokale kwestie waarmee (alleen) SPDC van doen had. Ook toen is bewust ervoor gekozen om niet publiekelijk een verzoek om clemency te doen. Gekozen is voor de weg van de stille diplomatie, uiteindelijk uitmondend in de brief van 8 november 1995 namens de Shell-groep aan [G] .

4.129. Het verwijt van eiseressen aangaande het niet of onvoldoende interveniëren in het proces, kan alleen slagen als gedaagden, door het proces te volgen en te kiezen voor stille diplomatie en geen andere actie te ondernemen, de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten van hun echtgenoten en/of van henzelf hebben geschonden. De stellingen van eiseressen impliceren dat gedaagden op grond van de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten gehouden waren meer te doen dan zij hebben gedaan. De rechtbank heeft echter geen aanknopingspunten gevonden voor de juistheid van dat standpunt, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van precedenten of breed gedragen opvattingen van Nigeriaanse rechtsgeleerden. Dergelijke aanknopingspunten zijn ook niet door partijen aangedragen in hun uitlatingen over de inhoud en toepassing van de door eiseressen ingeroepen grondrechten. De conclusie van de rechtbank luidt daarmee dat gedaagden deze grondrechten niet hebben geschonden door het proces te volgen en te kiezen voor stille diplomatie.

4.130. De rechtbank neemt bij dit oordeel mede in aanmerking de onder 4.121 weergegeven ervaringen van [L] die pleitten voor stille diplomatie, de onder 4.120 bedoelde waarschuwingen van verschillende kanten om omzichtig te werk te gaan bij het aan de orde stellen van kwesties bij [G] – die niet was gediend van kritiek en juist vond dat SPDC de Nigeriaanse overheid te weinig steunde – en het uitdrukkelijke advies van [F] om geen publiekelijk verzoek om clemency te doen, waarbij [F] bovendien de verwachting had uitgesproken dat er niet op korte termijn uitvoering aan het doodvonnis zou worden gegeven. Ook ging [F] ervan uit dat het doodvonnis, net zoals bij de militaire coupplegers was gebeurd, zou worden omgezet in een gevangenisstraf (zie 4.126). Desalniettemin is na de veroordelingen een serieuze en dringende poging tot beïnvloeding van het lot van de Ogoni 9 gedaan, met de beslissing van het CMD om [L] in Nigeria contact te laten zoeken met [G] en de afspraak dat [ZZ] de Nigeriaanse ambassadeur in Londen zou benaderen. Verder is met het uiteindelijk gedane clemency verzoek namens de hele Shell-groep, ondertekend door de voorzitter van het CMD, aan [G] duidelijk gemaakt dat dit een serieus en dringend verzoek betrof.

4.131. Daar komt bij dat er geen aanknopingspunten zijn om aan te nemen dat het proces anders zou zijn verlopen, en de echtgenoten van eiseressen niet zouden zijn veroordeeld en geëxecuteerd, als gedaagden anders hadden gehandeld dan zij hebben gedaan. Zoals gedaagden hebben aangevoerd, is het zeer de vraag of zij de invloed hadden op [G] die eiseressen hun toedichten en die destijds ook werd verondersteld, bijvoorbeeld door [I] (zie zijn brief van 13 mei 1995, onder 4.107) en degenen die gedaagden opriepen om (publiekelijk) stelling te nemen in verband met het proces en de veroordeling van de Ogoni 9. Uit de verslagen van de gesprekken van [L] met [G] volgt immers, dat [G] niet was gediend van kritiek, en juist vond dat SPDC de Nigeriaanse overheid te weinig steunde. Die verslagen vermelden ook de cash call problematiek; dat is de niet door eiseressen weersproken voortdurende inspanningen die SPDC moest betrachten om de Nigeriaanse regering te bewegen om te voldoen aan de cash calls die in het kader van de joint venture werden gedaan. [L] vat dit een en ander samen in zijn Nigeria Update van 6 april 1995:
“There is still a strong belief amongst these people that we Shell have the power to get [G] to let [I] off! Would that we had such power, we certainly would not have had the cash calls problems if we had!” (zie 4.105).

4.132. Eiseressen stellen – zonder nadere toelichting – dat gedaagden hadden moeten dreigen om de onder 2.39 bedoelde NLNG-deal, waarover met de Nigeriaanse overheid onderhandeld werd tijdens het proces, niet door te laten gaan of daaraan voorwaarden te verbinden. Mede tegen de achtergrond van hetgeen onder 4.131 is overwogen over de invloed die gedaagden daadwerkelijk hadden/konden uitoefenen, kan deze blote stelling geen doel treffen. Dat geldt ook voor de stelling van eiseressen dat gedaagden desnoods hadden moeten dreigen zich terug te trekken uit Nigeria. Hoewel het gegeven dat SPDC
– om andere redenen – in 1995 de oliewinning in Ogoniland heeft gestaakt, het betoog van gedaagden over de praktische onuitvoerbaarheid van het dreigement tot terugtrekking relativeert, kan deze enkele, niet nader toegelichte stelling eiseressen niet baten, reeds omdat niet aangenomen kan worden dat dit dreigement effect zou sorteren. Ook hier is het de vraag of eiseressen gedaagden niet meer invloed toedichten dan zij hadden op [G] , die niet was gediend van kritiek en juist vond dat SPDC de Nigeriaanse overheid te weinig steunde.

4.133. Voor zover gedaagden op grond van het toepasselijke Nigeriaanse recht al gehouden waren tot enige interventie, hebben zij genoeg gedaan door het proces te volgen en te kiezen voor stille diplomatie. De rechtbank zegt hiermee niet in algemene zin dat een onderneming in gevallen als deze stille diplomatie moet aanwenden. De rechtbank oordeelt dat gedaagden niet gehouden waren om meer te doen, zoals eiseressen betogen. Het verwijt dat gedaagden niet (publiekelijk) hun invloed hebben aangewend om de Nigeriaanse overheid te bewegen tot een fair trial en tot clementie voor de Ogoni 9 gaat dus niet op.

VII. slotsom

4.134. Eiseressen zullen worden toegelaten te bewijzen dat:

( i) SPDC betrokken was bij omkoping van de getuigen [U] , [V] , [II] , [JJ] , [KK] , [LL] , [MM] en [NN] , doordat

a. [Y] in opdracht van SPDC en/of een vertegenwoordiger van SPDC aanwezig was/waren bij de bijeenkomst(en) waarbij deze getuigen de door anderen voorbereide verklaringen moesten opstellen/ondertekenen en/of
b. SPDC financieel heeft bijgedragen aan de betalingen aan deze getuigen en/of
c. SPDC deze getuigen een baan in het vooruitzicht heeft gesteld, en

( ii) de verklaringen van de met betrokkenheid van SPDC omgekochte getuigen een rol hebben gespeeld bij:

a. de veroordeling van de echtgenoten van eiseressen door het tribunaal en/of
b. de arrestatie en detentie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen en/of
c. de detentie van eiseressen.
4.135. Zoals hiervoor is overwogen, is deel (ii) van de bewijsopdracht alleen relevant voor het geval de betrokkenheid van SPDC als bedoel onder (i) komt vast te staan. Eiseressen worden om proceseconomische redenen toegelaten tot het bewijs van beide onderdelen van de bewijsopdracht. Of en in hoeverre dit verwijt van eiseressen daadwerkelijk opgaat, zal na de bewijslevering worden bezien.

4.136. De andere verwijten van eiseressen treffen geen doel. De overige geschilpunten daarover – zoals de vraag of en zo ja in hoeverre, en op welke grondslag, het door eiseressen op dit punt gestelde handelen of nalaten te handelen is toe te rekenen aan ieder van de gedaagden – behoeven geen bespreking. Indien en voor zover de in het incident te verstrekken stukken eiseressen aanleiding geven nieuwe feiten te stellen of anderszins aanleiding geven tot een nadere standpuntbepaling, moeten eiseressen daar zo snel mogelijk toe overgaan.

4.137. De rechtbank houdt iedere verdere beslissing in de hoofdzaak aan.

5. De beslissing

De rechtbank:

in het incident

5.1.

beveelt gedaagden uiterlijk 21 dagen na de datum van dit vonnis afschrift aan eiseressen te verstrekken van:
- de documenten uit het privilege log (productie 198 dagvaarding en productie 3, overzicht CDST-documenten) met de volgende nummers: 91 tot en met 94, 97 en 98, 100 tot en met 105, 125, 163, 165,166 en 199 tot en met 206;
- de niet geredigeerde minutes van het CMD van 7 november 1995, voor zover deze weggelaten passages zien op het tribunaal en/of de Ogoni-kwestie;

5.2.verbindt aan de onder 5.1 bedoelde veroordeling een dwangsom van € 5.000,-- voor elke dag dat gedaagden na betekening van het vonnis in gebreke blijven aan deze veroordeling te voldoen, met een maximum van € 50.000,--;

5.3.verbiedt eiseressen aan derden mededelingen te doen over (de inhoud van) de onder

5.1bedoelde bescheiden, met de bepaling dat zij deze bescheiden alleen in deze procedure mogen gebruiken en dat zij deze bescheiden niet aan derden mogen verstrekken;

5.4.wijst het meer of anders gevorderde af;

5.5.compenseert de proceskosten in het incident in de zin dat partijen hun eigen kosten dragen;

in de hoofdzaak

5.6.

laat eiseressen toe te bewijzen dat:
(i) SPDC betrokken was bij omkoping van de getuigen [U] , [V] , [II] , [JJ] , [KK] , [LL] , [MM] en [NN] , doordat
a. [Y] in opdracht van SPDC en/of een vertegenwoordiger van SPDC aanwezig was/waren bij de bijeenkomst(en) waarbij deze getuigen de door anderen voorbereide verklaringen moesten opstellen/ondertekenen en/of
b. SPDC financieel heeft bijgedragen aan de betalingen aan deze getuigen en/of
c. SPDC deze getuigen een baan in het vooruitzicht heeft gesteld, en
(ii) de verklaringen van de met betrokkenheid van SPDC omgekochte getuigen een rol hebben gespeeld bij:
a. de veroordeling van de echtgenoten van eiseressen door het tribunaal en/of
b. de arrestatie en detentie van de echtgenoten van eiseressen en/of
c. de detentie van eiseressen;

5.7.bepaalt dat eiseressen, indien zij getuigen willen laten horen, de getuigen en de verhinderdagen van de partijen en hun advocaten op 5 juni 2019 in de maanden september 2019 tot en met december 2019 moeten opgeven, waarna dag en uur van het getuigenverhoor zullen worden bepaald,

5.8.bepaalt dat dit getuigenverhoor zal plaatsvinden op de terechtzitting van de daartoe tot rechter-commissaris benoemde mr. L. Alwin in het paleis van justitie te Den Haag aan Prins Clauslaan 20,

5.9.houdt iedere verdere beslissing aan.

Dit vonnis is gewezen door mr. L. Alwin, mr. B. Meijer en mr. A.C. Bordes en in het openbaar uitgesproken op 1 mei 2019.

1 Chapter A10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 en Chapter A9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004
2 Verg. Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt 366) 1
3 Verg. Onwo v. Oko & Ors (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 584 en Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1
4 (2006) 5 SCNJ 43
5 Verg. Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt 366) 1
6 Verg. Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962)2 SCNLR 341
7 Verg. Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962)2 SCNLR 341
8 Verg. Ina and 4 Ors v. Ukoi (2003) FWLR (Pt. 143) 382
9 Verg. Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt 366) 1
10 Verordening (EU) nr. 1215/2012 van het Europese Parlement en de Raad van 12 december 2012 betreffende de rechterlijke bevoegdheid, de erkenning en de tenuitvoerlegging van beslissingen in burgerlijke en handelszaken (herschikking) (PbEU 2012, L 351/1)
11 Verg. HvJEU 21 mei 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335 (Cartel Damage Claims/Akzo Nobel), punt 17 t/m 20 en ook HvJEG 13 juli 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:458 (Roche/Primus); HvJEG 11 oktober 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:595 (Freeport); HvJEU 12 juli 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:445 (Solvay)
12 Verg. HvJEU 28 januari 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:37 (Kolassa/Barclays Bank), punt 58-65, en HvJEU 16 juni 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:449 (Universal Music/Schilling), punt 42-46
13 Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, nr. 3, p. 1
14 Verg. HR 29 maart 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:443
15 Lungowe and Ors v. Vedanta resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc (2017) EWCA Civ 1528, (2017)
16 HR 26 oktober 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW9244, (X/Theodoor Gilissen Bankiers NV.)
17 Verg. HR 26 oktober 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1985
18 (2006) 7 NWLR 588
19 Court of Appeal (Lagos Division), Denca Services Ltd. v. Leo Oleka and sons, Nigeria Custom Services (2015) 3 CLRN 33
20 Court of Appeal (Jos Division), The Gov. of Borno State cs v. Alh. Ngabura Bukar Gadangari, (2016) NWLR 396
21 (2018) LPELR-44730 (CA);
22 de meeste verwijzingen naar jurisprudentie zijn voor de leesbaarheid in hierna volgende voetnoten zijn opgenomen (cursief)
23 see Adesanoye v. Adewole (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 242.
24 see Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) NWLR (Pt. 1048) at 509 per Muhammed, JSC; Leadways Ass. Co. Ltd. v. J.U.C. Ltd. (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 439) Abubakar v. B.O.L.A.P. Ltd. (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 319/(2007) 147 LRCN 109
25see Ada v. NYSC (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 639; Utih v. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 60; Olutola v. Unilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416; SPDCN Ltd. v. Anaro (supra).
26see Atolagbe v. Awuni (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 522) 536 at 575, per Onu, JSC; Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig) Ltd. (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 189.
27see Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Lafia Local Govt. v. Gov., Nasarawa State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 94
28see Rossek v. ACB Ltd. (1993) 218 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382/(1993) 10 SCNJ 20; Owata v. Anyigor (1993) 2 SCNJ 1/(1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 276) 380; Aremo II v. Adekanye (supra);Nwora v. Nwabueze (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1271) 467; Iwunze v. FRN (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1404) 580.
29 (2017) 4 NWLR 404
30 Verklaring d.d. 2 mei 2017
31 Verklaring d.d. 15 juni 2017
32 Verklaring d.d. 16 juni 2017
33 Verklaring d.d. 19 februari 2018
34 [T] , p 33, randnummer 11.5
35 Zie p. 28 van het rapport van Human Rights Watch, met verwijzing (in noot 119) naar een interview van Human Rights Watch met [AAA] , de aanklager, op 23 februari 1995 en een brief d.d. 6 maart 1995 van [BBB] , SPDC Acting Managing Director aan de hoofdredacteur van de krant The Masses, [CCC] . Opmerking rechtbank: deze stukken maken geen deel uit van de processtukken.
36 [T] , p. 66

__________

 Instance
    Court of The Hague
Date of decision
    01-05-2019
Date of publication
    01-05-2019
Case number
    C / 09/540872 / HA ZA 17-1048
Jurisdictions
    Civil rights
Special characteristics
    Bottom case
    First instance - multiple
Content indication

    Case of four widows of the "Ogoni 9" against Shell companies, who are held jointly responsible by claimants for violations of fundamental rights by the Nigerian regime. The spouses of the plaintiffs were sentenced to death in November 1995 by a special tribunal and subsequently hanged in execution of the judgment.

    Jurisdiction of the court on the basis of Article 8, paragraph 1, Brussels 1 bis and Article 7, Code of Civil Procedure. Exhibition incident. Limitation period under Nigerian law (FREP Rules 2009). Substantive assessment under Nigerian law (fundamental rights from Nigerian constitution and African Charter for Human Rights). Evidence regarding the alleged involvement of SPDC in bribery witnesses and the use of statements made by these witnesses in the cases of the spouses of the claimants. The other accusations have no purpose.
Locations
    Rechtspraak.nl

    Enriched pronunciation

Statement

verdict

COURT THE HAGUE

Team trade

case number / roll number: C / 09/540872 / HA ZA 17-1048

Judgment of 1 May 2019

in the case of

1. [plaintiff 1] in [domicile 1],

2. [claimant 2] in [domicile 2],

3. [plaintiff 3] in [domicile 3],

4. [plaintiff 4] in [domicile 4],

claimants,

lawyer mr. Ch. Samkalden in Amsterdam,

against

1. ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC in London, United Kingdom, with offices in The Hague,

2. SHELL PETROLEUM N.V. in The Hague,

3. THE SHELL TRANSPORT AND TRADING COMPANY LIMITED in London,

4. THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD at Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Federal Republic of Nigeria,

defendants,

lawyer mr. W.I. Wisman in The Hague.

Claimants will be collectively referred to as claimants and individually respectively [claimant 1], [claimant 2], [claimant 3] and [claimant 4]. Defendants will be collectively referred to as defendants and individually respectively RDS, SPNV, STTC and SPDC.

1. The procedure

1.1. The course of the procedure appears from:

- the summons of 28 June 2017 with productions 1 to 269;

- the conclusion of answer with productions 1 to 204;

- the judgment in which a multiple comparison of parties is determined;

- the conclusion of claim in the exhibition incident with productions 1 to 3;

- the deed for the production of productions (205 and 206) by defendants;

- the conclusion in the exhibition incident with one production (207);

- the deed for the production of productions (270 to 291, and an addendum to production 34) of claimants;

- the minutes of the multiple competition of parties of 12 February 2019.

1.2. The official report was drawn up outside their presence with the consent of the parties. They were given the opportunity to submit factual comments within two weeks of sending the official report. Plaintiffs took this opportunity by letter of 14 March 2019 and defendants by letter of 13 March 2019. These letters form part of the case file and the judgment is given with due observance of these letters, as far as corrections are of a factual nature.

2. The facts

2.1. Plaintiffs are the widows of four out of nine men, also known as the Ogoni 9. They belong to the Ogoni, a population group in Nigeria, that lives in Ogoniland in the state of Rivers State. The Ogoni 9 were hanged in Nigeria on November 10, 1995 after being sentenced to death by a special tribunal for involvement in the deaths of four traditional Ogoni leaders.

2.1.1 [plaintiff 1] is the widow of Dr. [A] ([A]), who was named Honorable Commissioner of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism of the Rivers State Province in January 1994 and who holds that position functioned as a link between the Ogoni and the Nigerian authorities.

2.1.2 [plaintiff 2] is the widow of [B], who was a prominent member of MOSOP (see below under 2.13) and NYCOP (see also under 2.13) from the start.

2.1.3 [plaintiff 3] is the widow of [C], who had joined NYCOP in 1993.

2.1.4 [plaintiff 4] is the widow of [D], who had joined MOSOP in 1993.

2.2. Shell Petroleum N.V. (SPNV) is the legal successor under the general title of N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij (Royal Dutch). Royal Dutch and the legal person incorporated under English law The Shell Transport and Trading Company Limited (STTC) were, during the period relevant for this procedure, 1990-1995 (hereinafter: "the relevant period" or "1990-1995"), the parent companies of the Shell Group (Group Parent Companies). Royal Dutch and STTC - hereafter also "the parent companies" together - worked together on the basis of an agreement concluded in 1907.

2.3. Royal Dutch and STTC held the shares in the holding companies of the Shell group (the Group Holding Companies), which included SPNV and the legal person under English law Shell Petroleum Company Ltd (SPCo). The Group Holding Companies held the shares of the operating companies within the Shell group, including Shell Petroleum Development Company or Nigeria Ltd (SPDC), a legal person under Nigerian law.

2.4. SPDC is the continuation of Shell D'Arcy, which obtained a license to search for oil in Nigeria in 1938. In April 1956 the name of this company was changed to Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company or Nigeria Limited. In December 1979 the name of this company was changed again to its current name SPDC. SPCo held 99.9% of the shares in SPDC during the relevant period; SPNV held 0.1% of the shares in SPDC during this period.

2.5. The legal person under English law Royal Dutch Shell plc (RDS) has been the (sole) parent company of the Shell group since a restructuring in 2005. This restructuring included a merger, whereby Royal Dutch was merged with SPNV. RDS is placed at the top of the Shell group and has not taken over any obligations from other companies within the Shell group.

2.6. In addition to the Group Parent Companies, the Group Holding Companies and the operating companies, the Shell group also included Service Companies, including Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij B.V. (SIPM) and the legal person under English law Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (SIPC). These Service Companies provided the Shell group with advice and expertise, for example in the field of engineering, geophysics, geology, safety and public affairs.

2.7. There was a consultative body between the Group Parent Companies at organizational level, referred to as the "Conference". The members of the Supervisory Board and the Executive Board of Royal Dutch and the Board of Directors of STTC met in the Conference. In addition, the Shell group knew the so-called Committee of Directors (the CMD). This was a common, informal college established by the Management Boards of the Group Holding Companies. Each member of the CMD was either a member of the Executive Board of Royal Dutch or a member of the Board of Directors of STTC and a member of the Boards of Directors of both Group Holding Companies.

2.8. SPDC was and still is an operator in a Nigerian joint venture without legal personality, which was established in April 1973 and is active in the exploration, production and transport of petroleum and natural gas. The relationships within the joint venture have changed over time. SPDC had a 30% interest in the relevant period. The legal person under Nigerian law Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) had an interest of 55%. Elf and Agip had a 10% and 5% interest respectively. Within the joint venture, the tasks were divided as follows during the relevant period: the operator prepared the work programs and budgets and the partners in the joint venture provided the capital for the work of the operator on cash calls, which was also responsible for all aspects of oil extraction and exploitation of the joint venture. The joint venture had an Operating Committee (OPCOM), consisting of six representatives from NNPC, four representatives from SPDC, a representative from Elf and a representative from Agip. OPCOM was responsible for the overall supervision, management and management of everything related to the joint venture, including the approval, adjustment or rejection of proposed decisions on projects and budgets.

2.9. The joint venture won oil in Ogoniland, among others. At least until 1993, it operated 12 oil fields with 116 wells, five flow stations, different manifolds and pipelines.

2.10. SPDC employed in 1990-1995 security guards who were not allowed to carry firearms. In addition, the personnel and assets of the joint venture were protected by regular police (supernumerary police SPY, also popularly referred to as Shell police) and dog handlers. These police officers, who were employed by the Nigeria Police Force, were often associated with companies for a long time, who paid compensation to the Nigerian government under Article 18 (4) of the Nigerian Police Act. These companies also paid the salaries of these police officers.

2.11. In 1985, Major General [E] came to power through a coup d'état in Nigeria. He resigned in August 1993. After an interim government under [F], General [G] ([G]) came to power in November 1993 with a coup. He was the head of state of Nigeria until his death in 1998.2.12. In October 1990, residents of Umuechem, a village just outside Ogoniland, protested against inadequate electricity and water supplies in Umuechem and the lack of reasonable compensation for the expropriation and exploitation of their land. After the divisional manager east of SPDC, [H] ([H]), had asked the Nigerian Commissioner of Police for "security protection (preferably by Mobile Police Force)" on 29 October 1990, the Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) on October 31, 1990 against the protesters in Umuechem. In addition, dozens of people were killed and many injured. 495 houses were set on fire.

2.13. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was founded in 1990 by [I] ([I]). MOSOP protested against oil extraction in Ogoniland. Its program is set out in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, drawn up in 1991. MOSOP focused on more political autonomy for Ogoniland, fair compensation for the use of Ogoniland and the resources contained therein and repair of the damage caused by oil exploitation. Later, in 1993, organizations were established that functioned under the umbrella of MOSOP. One of them was the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP).

2.14. On 20 and 21 July 1992, Ogoni demonstrated at the Bonny Terminal, a flow station operated by the joint venture in Ogoniland. The Nigerian Rapid Intervention Force then intervened. One person died and two others were seriously injured.

2.15. On November 30, 1992, MOSOP sent a demand notice to oil companies operating at that time in Ogoniland, including SPDC, requesting payment of USD 10 billion within 30 days and negotiations on future oil extraction with Ogoni representatives. If this were not met, the demand notice was based on a complete cessation of all activities of these oil companies in Ogoniland and their complete withdrawal from Ogoniland.

2.16. During a rally on January 4, 1993, [I] delivered a speech in which he declared Shell persona non grata and called to fight for the rights of the Ogoni.

2.17. In January 1993, the joint venture withdrew from Ogoniland due to an increase in violence, including threats to its staff and attacks on its facilities. The joint venture did, however, continue the work on the Trans Niger Pipeline (TMP), which was laid at that time by Willbros West Africa (Willbros) by Ogoniland. MOSOP and the local population protested against the construction of the TMP. By letter of 7 April 1993 to Willbros, they protested against the presence of the army in Ogoniland. A confrontation between the Nigerian army and Ogoni protesters took place on 30 April 1993, after which SPDC and Willbros decided on 3 May 1993 to suspend work on the TMG. On May 4, 1993, [H] wrote to [J], the Governor of Rivers State and former Shell employee:

“I regret to inform you that work on the Bomu end of the line has been forced to stop because of some community intervention. (…) We humbly request the usual assistance or his Excellency to enable the project to proceed. ”

On 4 May 1993, a Nigerian army unit ended the protests at the TMG. One of the protesters was killed.

 2.18. On 15 May 1993 and 8 June 1993, discussions took place between [I] on the one hand and SPDC on the other, in the person of [H] and [K], at that time the general business manager of SPDC ([K]). In these discussions, [I] asked SPDC to support the Ogoni case. The SPDC report of the first interview states that [I] said:

“(…) That was most of the issues political and regretted that SPDC was being used as a scape goat. He claimed that his tactics were the only way to public opinion (local and international) and attract Govt attention. ”

The report of the second interview states about the statements of [I]:

"He was very apologetic for the" terrible things "he claimed to be doing to Shell particularly on the international scene. He felt that not all of that was deserved but he had no alternative instrument to use effectively for his campaign. ”

2.19. In January 1994, [L] ([L]) took over as director of SPDC. He sent weekly and sometimes more often confidential notes, called Nigeria Updates, to employees of the Service Company SIPC in London, with a copy to the Service Company SIPM in The Hague.

2.20. In an inter-office memo of [M], head of intelligence and surveillance East of SPDC ([M]) of 25 February 1994, it is stated that [M] the team of [N] ([N]), commander of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) has paid an additional allowance on behalf of SPDC:

“As a show of gratitude and motivation for a sustained favorite disposition towards SPDC in future assignments”

2.21. On April 21, 1994, the Nigerian regime announced the Operation Restore Order action plan in Ogoniland. This operation was performed by the RSISTF and was led by its commander [N].

2.22. On May 21, 1994, four traditional Ogoni leaders, [O], [P], [Q] and [R], were killed in riots that broke out at a meeting in Giokoo, a village in Ogoniland. This meeting was intended to receive two "sons of Gokana," including [A].

2.23. On May 22, 1994, Lieutenant Colonel [S], the military governor of Rivers State, held a press conference in which he held part of MOSOP responsible for killing the four Ogoni leaders and announced that he had ordered the to arrest those responsible for death within MOSOP.

2.24. In May 1994, among others, [I], [A], [B] and [D] were arrested and detained. [C] was arrested and detained in October 1994.

2.25. The Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal was set up on November 4, 1994 with the task, as it turned out, of the trial of the persons suspected of the murder of the Ogoni leaders.

2.26. On January 28, 1995, the first group of suspects, including [A] and [B], were charged with before the tribunal. [I] also belonged to this group of suspects. At the beginning of February 1995 the trial against the first group of suspects started.

2.27. On February 28, 1995, a second group of suspects, including [C] and [D], were indicted before the same tribunal as the first group of suspects. The trial for the same tribunal against the second group of suspects began at the end of March 1995.

The two trials before the tribunal - against the first and second groups of suspects - are hereinafter jointly referred to as "the trial."

2.28. [Plaintiff 1] was detained for some time in February 1995. [Plaintiff 2] was held for one day when she visited her detained husband. Later, on November 11, 1995, after her husband was put to death, [plaintiff 2] was arrested and detained for more than eight hours.

2.29. In 1995 there was worldwide attention for the tribunal, which was (partly) attended and observed by various observers and representatives of non-governmental organizations. These observers and organizations have questioned the independence of the tribunal and the fairness of the trial. SPDC and the Shell group have been called on from different sides to intervene in the process.

2.30. A Q&A on the Nigeria Issue of 16 May 1995, distributed within the Shell group, states as an answer to the question why Shell did not intervene:

“As commercial organizations, Shell companies cannot, nor should not, interfere. Such legal matters are the concern of a country's people and their government. Neither the government nor critics of Shell companies would tolerate interference in a country's internal affairs by a business. Shell does wish Mr. [I] to be treated correctly and have access to proper legal and healthcare facilities.

(...)

We have openly expressed our concern about the situation in Nigeria. SPDC must operate within existing national law and endeavor to operate in a socially responsible manner. As a commercial organization the company has no right to step outside its business interests and act as arbitrator or Nigeria's moral, social or political conduct. However, SPDC will speak up for the safety of its staff if they are put in danger. "

2.31. The Nigeria Fundamental Rights Denied report was published in June 1995. Report of the Trial of [I] and Others by [T]. [T] had attended part of the trial against the first and second group of suspects, representing the Law Society of England and Wales and the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales and with support from ARTICLE 19, the International Center Against Censorship , a human rights organization. In the summary of the conclusions of his report, [T] wrote, inter alia:

“2.1 No sensible person could either doubt the seriousness of the Giokoo killings or challenge the right of the Nigerian authorities to investigate and try offenses related to them before an independent and impartial tribunal. However, I believe that the proceedings before the tribunal that has been specially appointed to try the case.

(...)

2.4 The proceedings before the tribunal are in breach of fundamental rights in that:

(1) The tribunal is not independent of the government. (…)

(2) The tribunal has made some rulings favored to the defense. (…) But, overall, it has behavior in a way which strongly suggests that it is biased in favor of the Federal Military Government and the prosecution. (...)

(...)

2.6 In assessing the overall fairness and legality of a trial one does not simply count up the rights denied and those upheld in order to make a purely numerical comparison. It is my view that the breaches of fundamental rights I have identified are so serious as to arouse grave concern that any trial before this tribunal will be fundamentally flawed and unfair.

2.7 I am also particularly concerned about two further aspects of the case. The first is the apparent influence of the Lt-Col [an] officer against whom grave allegations of human rights abuses have been made. In my view his insistence on arranging and attending defense conferences is bound to inhibit the preparation of the defense. His uninvited presence at my own meeting with prosecution counsel must give rise to fears that their independence has been compromised. There is also reason to suspect that he has private access to members of the tribunal. ”

In his report, [T] expressed concern about the available evidence and called for attention to a number of points, including:

"The two principal witnesses against [I] have now sworn affidavits claiming that they were committed to give false evidence."

2.32. In July 1995, the report of Human Rights Watch, entitled Nigeria. The Ogoni Crisis: A Case Study Of Military Repression Released In Southeastern Nigeria. This report is critical of the independence of the tribunal and the fairness of the trial before the tribunal. This report includes the statement that two witnesses, [U] ([U]) and [V] ([V]), stated that they were bribed and that SPDC was involved, which denied both the prosecutor and SPDC .

2.33. Amnesty International's report, entitled Nigeria, was published on 15 September 1995. The Ogoni trials and detentions. It states among other things:

“In the trials of [I] and others, the tribunal, appointed by Nigeria's military government, is neither independent nor impartial. It has shown itself biased in favor of the prosecution at key internships, and the defense team, headed by Nigeria's leading civil rights lawyers, has protested withdrawn with the trials.

Amnesty International believes that at least three of the defendants - [I], [W] and Dr [A] - are prisoners of conscience, imprisoned because of the non-violent expression of their political views, and is calling for immediate and unconditional release . (...) "

This report argues that the arrests and detention of the suspects are motivated by political motives and that the tribunal is not independent of the Nigerian military regime. When describing the process, this report states that key prosecution witnesses would have been bribed.

2.34. On 30 and 31 October 1995, the tribunal handed down the death sentence against nine suspects. These Ogoni 9, including the spouses of claimants, were sentenced to death by hanging. The other six suspects have been acquitted.

2.35. Following the death sentence, Shell issued the following press release on November 2, 1995:

“(…) Throughout the trial a number of respected organizations and campaigners raised questions about the fairness of the trial procedure. There are now demands that Shell should intervene, and use its perceived influence to overturn the judgment.

This would be dangerous and wrong.

[I] and his co-defendants were accused of a criminal offense. A commercial organization like Shell cannot and must never interfere with the legal process or any sovereign state. Those who call on us to do so may well be the first to criticize in any situation where that intervention did not suit their agenda. Any government, be it in Europe, North America or elsewhere, would not tolerate this type of interference by business. But what Shell has said, repeatedly and publicly, is that, while it does not agree with [I] 's approach or opinions, it nevertheless recognizes his right to hold and air his views, and he is entitled to due legal process medical support. (…) ”

2.36. On November 8, 1995, the then chairman of the CMD, on behalf of the Shell group, [X] asked in a letter to [G] not to carry out the executions for humanitarian reasons.

2.37. A press release of 8 November 1995 from SPDC includes the following:

“However, we believe that interfere in the process, whether political or legal, here in Nigeria would be wrong. A large multinational company such as Shell cannot and must not interfere with the affairs of any sovereign state. These principles, in which we strongly believe, are embedded in Shell’s Statement of General Business Principles. The very campaigners who are calling on us today to intervene may well be the first to criticize us in any other situation where intervention does not suit their agenda. ”

2.38. On November 8, 1995, the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), chaired by [G], ratified the death sentences. The Ogoni 9 were put to death on 10 November 1995 by hanging.

 2.39. Op 11 november 1995 hebben SPDC en Nigeria overeenstemming bereikt over het zogenoemde “NLNG-project”. Nigeria Liquid Natural Gas (NLNG) is een in mei 1989 opgerichte rechtspersoon met als doel de productie van liquified natural gas (LNG). Aandeelhouders in NLNG waren (en zijn) NNPC, Shell Gas B.V., Total LNG Nigeria Ltd en Eni S.p.A. De aandelen in Shell Gas BV werden gehouden door Royal Dutch. In 1995 vonden onderhandelingen plaats over onder meer de operationele activiteiten van NLNG, de inrichting van joint venture overeenkomsten en de financiering van de joint venture door de betrokken partijen. Enige tijd later, in december 1995 is de bereikte overeenstemming over het NLNG project wereldkundig gemaakt.

2.40. Op 12 november 1995 is Nigeria geschorst door de Commonwealth. Het Verenigd Koninkrijk en verschillende andere landen hebben hun ambassadeurs uit Nigeria teruggetrokken. De Wereldbank heeft zich teruggetrokken uit het NLNG-project vanwege de politieke situatie in Nigeria.

2.41. In een persbericht van de Shell-groep van 19 november 1995 is onder meer vermeld:

“First, did discreet diplomacy fail? Perhaps we should ask instead why the worldwide protests failed. Our experience suggests that quiet diplomacy offered the very best hope for [I] . Did the protesters understand the risk they were taking? Did the campaign become more important than the cause?”

2.42. Op 20 november 1995 heeft de Europese Unie de executies van de Ogoni 9 veroordeeld, met bevestiging van maatregelen tegen Nigeria uit 1993. Daarnaast heeft de Europese Unie een embargo op (handel in) wapens, munitie en militaire uitrusting ingevoerd en de ontwikkelingssamenwerking met Nigeria opgeschort.

2.43. Op 8 november 1996 zijn Royal Dutch en STTC door nabestaanden van de Ogoni 9, waaronder nabestaanden van [I] , in rechte betrokken in de Verenigde Staten (de Wiwa-procedure). In 2001 is ook [L] door deze nabestaanden in rechte betrokken en in 2003 SPDC. De zaken werden aangebracht onder de Amerikaanse Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) en de Torture Victim Protection Act en – voor wat betreft Royal Dutch en SPDC – onder de Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO). Na de discovery fase, heeft de District Court of Southern New York zich op 23 april 2009 bevoegd verklaard, waarna op 26 mei 2009 de inhoudelijke behandeling van de zaak is begonnen. Deze zaak is op 8 juni 2009 geëindigd met een schikking van USD 15,5 miljoen, waarmee onder andere een trustfonds is opgezet voor de Ogoni-bevolking.

2.44. Op 1 september 2002 heeft ook [eiseres 1] , mede namens haar overleden echtgenoot, samen met elf (nabestaanden van) Nigeriaanse Ogoni-activisten Royal Dutch en STTC gedagvaard in de Verenigde Staten (de Kiobel -procedure). In 2004 heeft zij ook SPDC gedagvaard. In 2013 heeft de Supreme Court de Amerikaanse rechter onbevoegd verklaard van het geschil kennis te nemen en geoordeeld dat een zaak alleen op grond van de ATCA aanhangig kan worden gemaakt in Amerika indien deze voldoende aanknoping heeft met de Amerikaanse rechtssfeer. Daar was naar het oordeel van de Supreme Court in de Kiobel -procedure geen sprake van.

De Wiwa-procedure en de Kiobel -procedure worden hierna tezamen aangeduid als ‘de Amerikaanse procedures’.

 3. The dispute

3.1. Plaintiffs claim in the main action with judgment declared enforceable by stock:

I, declare that defendants have acted unlawfully towards plaintiffs and are jointly and severally liable towards them for the damage they have suffered and will continue to suffer as a result of the unlawful conduct of defendants, which damage can be established by state and settled according to the law, all this plus the statutory interest until the day of full payment

II, order defendants to have a public apology issued by the CEO of Royal Dutch Shell, or at least the CEO of SPDC, within 21 days of the verdict for the role that Shell played in the events that led to the death of the plaintiffs' spouses , and to publish the text of this statement clearly visible on its website, on pain of a penalty of € 20,000 per day (or another amount to be determined by the court) on which this order has not been met;

III, order the defendants jointly and severally to pay the extrajudicial costs;

IV, Order the defendants to be jointly and severally liable for the costs of these proceedings, including the subsequent costs.

3.2. Claimants claim that defendants are complicit in the unlawful arrest and detention and violation of the personal integrity of their spouses and, in the case of [claimant 1] and [claimant 2], themselves. They also accuse the defendants of being complicit in the violation of the right to a fair trial and the right to life of their spouses and of their own right to family life. They hold defendants - which they jointly designate as Shell - each responsible for complicity in these fundamental rights violations by the Nigerian regime, with whom, according to claimants, Shell formed an alliance that led to the death of their spouses. More specifically, claimants claim that Shell:

    1. was the cause of excessive violent action by the regime, since it has repeatedly asked the Nigerian authorities to intervene in the 1980s if its activities were disrupted by protests from the local population. In doing so she repeatedly passed on the precise locations of the generally peaceful demonstrations and made material available, accepting many dead and wounded;

    2. Operation Restore Order in Ogoniland facilitated i) by inciting (violent) intervention against MOSOP and ii) because [N] also worked on behalf of Shell;

    3. operating as a tandem with the Nigerian regime, whereby Shell i) facilitated the excessive action of the Nigerian regime, but also ii) performed typical governmental tasks in the field of security and intelligence gathering and iii) held men in crucial positions within the Nigerian regime and vice versa;

    4. was deeply involved in the process, which served to safeguard the common interests of Shell and the regime, since i) her lawyer [Y] (hereinafter: [Y]) kept her accurately informed and ii) with a watching letter supported the position of the prosecutor and iii) Shell's protégé [N] played a dominant role during the trial;

   5.  contributed to the outcome of the trial by i) involvement in bribery of witnesses who had to make incriminating statements against Ogoni 9 and ii) direct contacts with the judges of the tribunal;

    6. has offered to influence the outcome of the trial, but has attached the condition that MOSOP should stop its protest against Shell;

    7. knowing how the trial would end and being in a position that it could prevent executions, let its commercial interests prevail over the fate of the Ogoni 9, by i) never distancing itself from the course of events during the trial, ii) to continue to support the Nigerian regime and iii) not to intervene (publicly), while (iv) safeguarding its economic interests during the process by negotiating the NLNG project, which has continued cooperation between the Nigerian regime and Shell for many years perpetuated.

 3.3. In the incident, claimants claim by incidental judgment, enforceable in stock, as amended by comparison:

I. to order the defendants to allow claimants access to the claimants within 21 days of the date of the judgment to be given in this regard:

i. that part of the intended trial exhibits designated by the plaintiffs that has been produced by defendants and has been classified as confidential in the American procedures and / or;

ii. the intended trial depositions designated by the plaintiffs that have been produced by the defendants and that are (in part) classified as confidential in the American procedures and / or;

iii. the documents from the privilege log (production 198 summons and production 3 in the incident, overview of CDST documents) with the following numbers: 91 to 94, 97 and 98, 100 to 105, 125, 163, 165, 166 and 199 to 206, at least those reports that the court deems assignable;

and provide defendants after inspection, copy or extract of (the by claimants desired portion) of these documents, in photocopy or in one common digital format or in any other form that your court guessed eight;

II. on pain of a penalty of € 5,000 for each day that defendants fail to comply with the sentence after service of the judgment, with a maximum of € 50,000;

III. order the defendants to be jointly and severally liable for the costs of the incident, with the stipulation that if these costs are not paid within fourteen days after the date on which the judgment was given, statutory interest will be payable on it.

3.4. Claimants state that the requirements of Article 843a of the Code of Civil Procedure (Rv) have been met for all these documents for their issue.

3.5. The defendants put forward a substantiated defense in the main proceedings and in the incident. They have stated first and foremost that they are aware of the tragic and shocking nature of the events that led to the execution of the Ogoni 9. However, defendants cannot agree with the way in which plaintiffs play the role of SPDC and the Shell group in these events or in the description of these events by claimants. The defendants dispute the claims on substantive grounds and also put up defenses that stand in the way of a substantive assessment, such as the appeal to the court for lack of jurisdiction and the claim to prescription.

3.6. The views of the parties are - as far as relevant - discussed below.

4. The assessment

I. introduction

4.1.The court stated first and foremost that the death of their spouses for plaintiffs is a sad and tragic event that marked their lives. During the hearing, plaintiffs outlined how they experienced the events at the time and what sad and drastic consequences the death of their spouses has (had) for them. This sadness and the great loss of claimants are not up for discussion. It is also certain that their lives have changed radically after the death of their spouses and the prior arrest, detention and proceedings before the tribunal. The court is aware of the shocking and tragic nature of the events, which is also endorsed by defendants.

In these proceedings, the court must answer the question of whether defendants, as plaintiffs claim, can be held legally co-responsible for the arrest, detention and (execution of) the sentencing of their spouses.

4.2.Plaintiffs argue that defendants as accomplices to violations of fundamental rights of their spouses and themselves have played a role in the events that led to the death of their spouses. According to claimants, defendants formed an alliance with the Nigerian regime. Plaintiffs elaborate on the behavior of the Nigerian authorities, of the tribunal that has tried the Ogoni 9 and of Nigerian soldiers and police units that are attributable to the Nigerian State. In doing so, they take the premise that these behaviors attributable to the Nigerian State cannot be assessed in these proceedings, in which Nigeria is not a party. Regardless of this, according to the unwritten Dutch private international law, Nigeria enjoys immunity for these acts that can be qualified as acte jurii imperii, which means that the Nigerian State can only be legally involved in this in Nigeria.

4.3.The parties agree that the claims of claimants are governed by Nigerian law. If and to the extent necessary, they have thereby made a choice of law for that right. The parties expressed themselves in the procedural documents, by means of legal opinions and Nigerian case law submitted by them, about the content of the relevant Nigerian law that must be applied in this case. In addition, the court has conducted its own investigation into this by consulting literature and case law.

4.4.For comparison, claimants have explained that claim I wishes to obtain a statement that defendants have acted contrary to the fundamental rights invoked by claimants and that defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damage that claimants have suffered and will suffer as a result. The court thus reads the petitum.

4.5.Plaintiffs invoke the violation of the following fundamental fundamental rights of their deceased spouses and of themselves, laid down in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and the Nigerian Constitution of 1979 (NGW (1979)):

The right to life (article 4 ACHPR and article 30 NGW (1979),

The right to dignity of a person and the prohibition of torture and cruel or inhuman punishment and treatment (Article 5 ACHPR and Article 31 NGW (1979),

The right to personal freedom and the security of the person; the prohibition of arbitrary judgment and detention (Article 6 of the ACHPR and Article 32 of the NGW (1979)),

The right to a fair trial (Article 7 of the ACHPR and Article 33 of the NGW (1979),

The right to family life (Article 18 ACHPR and Article 34 NGW (1979).

4.6.Plaintiffs hold STTC, as the parent company at that time, liable and SPNV as the legal successor of Royal Dutch, the other parent company at the time. They each hold the parent companies and SPDC liable for violations of the fundamental rights mentioned under 4.5. For the sake of certainty, they have summoned RDS, which was set up after the alleged events occurred, to be held in case RDS can / should be held liable for actions that took place before the restructuring of the Shell group.

4.7.The accusations on which claims are based on their claims (see under 3.2) almost exclusively refer to the behavior of SPDC or the behavior of its management and employees attributable to SPDC. Plaintiffs also hold the parent companies liable for this. They argue that SPDC and the parent companies were in fact acting as one. According to the claimants, SPDC did nothing without prior consultation or the implicit consent of the parent companies, which knew exactly what role SPDC played in the events in Ogoniland and also interfered with it. They argue that the Shell group acted as one centrally controlled organization in the conduct complained of, thereby treating the Ogoni issue as a group matter.

4.8.Plaintiffs expressly do not base their claims against the parent companies on a breach of liability, the Anglo-Saxon legal entities piercing the corporate veil and crossing the corporate veil, shareholder liability or tort or negligence. Claimants claim that the basis of their claims against the parent companies is no different from that of SPDC. They criticize SPDC and the parent companies for joint and coordinated action in the events that led to the alleged violations of fundamental rights. The fact that SPDC and the parent companies were active in various degrees does not affect the basis of those claims, according to claimants. During the comparative proceedings of the parties, plaintiffs asked the court to assess the claims against the standards of tort, should it be judged that their claims could not be based directly on the invoked provisions of the ACHPR and NGW (1979) ).

4.9.The court will first (below II) elaborate on the fundamental rights invoked by claimants and the manner in which they can stand up in Nigeria for (imminent) violation thereof. After that, she will assess (under III) in the main proceedings and in the incident whether she has jurisdiction. The incident is assessed under IV, followed by the claim for limitation (under V) and the substantive assessment (under VI). The judgment is classified as follows:

II. the fundamental rights invoked by plaintiffs and the manner in which Nigeria's (imminent) violation thereof can be challenged

III. jurisdiction of the Dutch court

IV. the exhibition incident

IV.1 the intended trial exhibits and intended trial depositions (claim i) and ii))

IV.2 the CDST documents (claim iii))

IV.3 the minutes of the CMD meeting of 7 November 1995

V. the claim on the prescription of defendants

VI. discussion of the accusations on the merits

VI.1 involvement in and influence of the trial before the tribunal

VI.1.a holding a watching letter, supporting the prosecutor and informal contacts with the judges of the tribunal

VI.1.b bribery witnesses

VI.1.b.i involvement of SPDC

VI.1.b.ii use statements in the convictions

VI.1.b.iii use statements during arrest and detention

VI.1.c [N]

VI.2 offer to influence the process on condition that MOSOP cease protest against SPDC

VI.3 do not intervene in the process

VI.3.a follow process

VI.3.b silent diplomacy

VI.3.b.i contacts of [L] with Nigerian officials

VI.3.b.ii other contacts with Nigerian officials

VI.3.b.iii the period between judgments and executions

VI.3.b.iv assessment

VII. Conclusion

II. the fundamental rights invoked by plaintiffs and the manner in which Nigeria's (imminent) violation thereof can be challenged

4.10.The ACHPR invoked by claimants was signed and ratified by Nigeria and subsequently incorporated into Nigerian law through the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983.1. Article 1, which reads as follows:

“As from the convention of this Act, the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which are set out in the Schedule to this Act shall, subject as thereunder provided, have force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers in Nigeria. "

The Schedule to this Act is the full ACHPR, which is thereby incorporated into the Nigerian legal order. The Nigerian Supreme Court considered:

"Since the Charter has become part of our domestic laws, the enforcement of its provisions like all our other laws fall within the judicial powers of the courts as provided by the Constitution and all other laws related thereto." 2

 4.11 Articles 31 to 34 of the NGW (1979), on which claimants rely, are included in Chapter IV of the NGW (1979). Article 42 of the NGW (1979), also included in Chapter IV of the NGW (1979), provides:

“(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is or is likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcement or securing the enforcement within that State or any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter. ”

Article 46 of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (NGW (1999)) is the same. This provision is also included in Chapter IV of the Constitution, which, like Chapter IV of the NGW 1979, contains fundamental rights.

4.12.The fundamental rights invoked by plaintiffs have horizontal effect under Nigerian law.3 This case law is summarized as follows by Akintin JSC in the Abdulhamid v. Akar and another case4:

“The position of the law is that where fundamental rights are invaded not by government agencies but by ordinary individuals, as in the instant case, such victims have rights against individual perpetrators or the acts as they would have done against state actions. It follows therefor that in the absence of a clear and positive prohibition which precludes an individual to assert a violation or maintain a similar action in a court of law against another individual for his act that had occasioned wrong or damage to him or his property in the same way as an action he could maintain against the State for a similar infraction. ”
These fundamental rights can also be invoked against companies.


4.13.The third paragraph of article 42 NGW (1979) / 46 NGW (1999) gives the Nigerian Chief Justice (hereafter the Chief Justice) the authority

"(To) make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section."

4.14.Using this power, the Chief Justice established the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules (the FREP Rules 1979) in 1979. The FREP Rules 1979 provide for a sui generis action on the basis of Article 42 NGW (1979) for (imminent) violations of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the NGW (1979).

4.15.In 2009, the Chief Justice adopted new FREP Rules (the FREP Rules 2009), which entered into force on 1 December 2009. The FREP Rules 2009 also apply to redress in connection with (imminent) violations of the ACPHR. Order II (1) of the FREP Rules 2009 provides:

“Any person who alleges that any of the Fundamental Rights provided for in the Constitution or African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act [underline court] and to which he is entitled, has been, is being, or is likely to be infringed, may apply to the Court in the State where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur, for redress: "

Under the 1979 FREP Rules, it was already assumed that fundamental rights from the ACPHR could be invoked under the sui generis procedure regulated therein.5

4.16.Order XV Rule (1) and (2) of the FREP Rules 2009 provide:

"(1) The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 are hereby abrogated.

(2) From the commencement of these Rules, pending Human Rights applications commenced under the 1979 Rules shall not be defeated in whole or in part, or suffer any judicial censure, or be forbidden out of prejudiced, be adjourned or dismissed, for failure to comply with these rules provided the applications are in substantial compliance with the rules. ”

4.17.The Explanatory Note to the FREP Rules 2009 states that they govern the procedure for the sui generis action for (imminent) violations of fundamental rights:

“These Rules provide for the rules of procedure followed in the Court in applications for the enforcement or securing the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act. "

For situations not regulated in the FREP Rules 2009, the Civil Procedure Rules or the Court for the time being in force apply (see Order XV (4) FREP Rules 2009).

4.18.In the FREP Rules 2009, a number of procedural requirements and formalities existing under the FREP Rules 1979 have been abolished. The preamble contains the instruction to the court to "constantly and conscientiously seek to give effect to the overriding objectives of these Rules." The subsequent overriding objectives are intended to give wide application to protection of fundamental rights and to extensively explain them. These overriding objectives include:

“(A) The Constitution, especially Chapter IV, as well as the African Charter, shall be expansively and purposely interpreted and applied, with a view to advancing and realizing the rights and freedoms contained in them and affording the protections intended by them.

(b) For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the applicant's rights and freedoms, the Court shall respect municipal, regional and international bills of rights cited to it or brought to its attention or of which the Court is aware, whether these bills adopt instruments

themselves or form parts or larger documents like constitutions. (...)

(c) For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the applicant's rights and freedoms, the Court may make consistent orders as may be just and expedient. "

4.19. One of the changes to the FREP Rules 2009 compared to the FREP Rules 1979 concerns the period within which a claim must be filed. Order I (3) of the FREP-Rules 1979 - on which the defendants base their appeal to be discussed below under V. prescription - provides:

“Leave shall not be granted to apply for an order under these Rules unless the application is made within twelve months of the date of the event, matter, or act complained or, or such other period as may be prescribed by any enactment or, except where a period is so prescribed, the delay is accounted for to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge to whom the application for leave is made. "

Order III of FREP Rules 2009 provides:

"An application for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights shall not be affected by any limitation Statute whatsoever."

4.20.Article 42 NGW (1979) / 46 NGW (1999) has the title Special jurisdiction of High Court. This article stipulates that the High Court of the state where the (imminent) violation of fundamental rights takes place has original jurisdiction to hear the constitutional claim for redress. In the FREP Rules 1979, Court in Order 1 (2) is defined as the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State. The FREP Rules 2009 add in Order II (1) the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Courts without jurisdiction in respect of a specific claim are not considered competent in Nigeria to take legally enforceable and binding decisions with regard to that claim.6 This also applies to claims that are filed in application of the FREP Rules. If an unauthorized court nevertheless decides on such a claim, other than referring the case to the competent court, the proceedings are null and void. In Nigeria, FREP-Rules 1979/2009 have exclusive jurisdiction in the sui generis procedure to which the FREP-Rules 1979/2009 apply.

4.21.Under Nigerian law, the sui generis procedure to which the FREP Rules 1979/2009 apply is not an exclusive remedy for (imminent) violations of fundamental rights.8 These can also be raised in other proceedings and on other bases, for example in the context of in criminal proceedings or in proceedings based on a tort or contract claim. The Nigerian Supreme Court has considered this:

“(…) The provision of Section 42 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution is only permissible and does not constitute a monopoly for those rights. The object of the Section is to prove a simple and effective judicial process for the enforcement of fundamental rights in order to avoid the cumbersome procedure and technicalities for their enforcement under the rules of the common law or other statutory provisions. The object has been achieved by (FREP-Rules ((1979)) .It must be emphasized that the Section does not exclude the application of the other means of their enforcement under the common law or statutes or rules of courts. (…) A person whose fundamental right is being or likely to be a contravened resort to any of these remedies for redress. ”9

4.22. A party wishing to raise a (threatened) violation of the fundamental rights of the ACPHR and the NGW invoked by plaintiffs in legal proceedings in Nigeria therefore has the choice to do so i) either with a claim for redress in the sui generis procedure to which the FREP Rules 1979/2009 apply and ii) either on a different basis, in a different procedure. The other basis for a claim of plaintiffs against defendants - which they directly approach for their conduct outside of contract - lies in the private-law figure. However, claimants do not base their claims (in the first instance) on this basis. In Nigeria, claimants should therefore bring their claims before the exclusively competent Federal High Court or the High Court in the sui generis proceedings to which the FREP Rules apply. Below under III. the court will assess whether and to what extent this has consequences for the jurisdiction of the Dutch court.

III. jurisdiction of the Dutch court

4.23.It is not disputed that the Dutch court has international jurisdiction to hear the claims against the parties RDS and SPNV established in the Netherlands. The court has international jurisdiction to hear the claims against the London-based STTC and the SPDC based in Nigeria if the requirements of Article 8, paragraph 1, Brussels Ia-Vo10 and Article 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure are met. STTC and SPDC dispute that these requirements are met and argue that the actions of each of the defendants, certainly in view of the 'separate entity doctrine' applicable under Nigerian company law, must be distinguished from each other, while furthermore a joint treatment of the claims according to STTC and SPDC is not efficient because the claims against the 'anchor-challenged' SPNV have no chance of success in advance.

4.24.Pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 1, Brussels Ia-Vo, international jurisdiction can be assumed with regard to the claims against STTC if there is such a close link with the claims against RDS and SPNV that proper administration of justice requires simultaneous treatment and trial in order to prevent conflicting decisions. These requirements must be interpreted with caution. This means, among other things, that the mere fact that divergent judgments may arise is insufficient to be able to speak of the close connection referred to. It is required that the divergence can occur in the context of the same situation, both in fact and in law, although it is not required that the claims brought against the various defendants have the same legal basis.11 The examination of jurisdiction under Brussels Ia- Vo should not be limited to the claims of the claimant. The court must thereby take into account all information available to it about the legal relationship that actually exists between the parties and, where appropriate, the defendant's arguments. In this context, however, the restriction applies that if the defendant disputes the claims of the claimant, the court need not give an opportunity to provide evidence in the context of determining its jurisdiction.12

4.25.Pursuant to Article 7 DCCP, jurisdiction over SPDC can be assumed if there is such a connection between the claims against the various defendants that reasons of efficiency justify a joint treatment. Now that the Dutch legislator has sought, among other things, to align with the predecessors of the Brussels Ia-Vo when introducing and subsequently amending Articles 1-14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 13 the interpretation of the common rules of jurisdiction for international jurisdiction must in principle be sought. to the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on (the precursors of) Brussels Ia-Vo, unless it is plausible that the Dutch legislator intended to deviate from EU law instruments in the establishment of a common rule or the interpretation thereof by the CJEU.14

4.26  The core of the claimants' accusation is that SPNV, STTC and SPDC acted jointly in respect of the fundamental rights violations alleged by the claimants. The claims against the three defendants are based on the same facts, circumstances and legal grounds. This means that the claims against SPNV, STTC and SDPV are factually and legally related to the same situation. This applies in particular to the claims against the two parent companies SPNV and STTC, which cannot be viewed separately from the claims against the operating company SPDC, both in fact and legally. Furthermore, the court with plaintiffs is of the opinion that in the event of separate judgment of these related cases there is a risk of conflicting decisions. Given this same factual and legal situation, it must have been foreseeable for SPDC, STTC and SPNV that they could be sued in the country of residence of a co-defendant.

4.27.The position of the defendants that joint handling of the claims is not effective, because the claims against the "anchor defendant" SPNV have no chance in advance, is only relevant in the case against SPDC, in which it must be assessed against Article 7 paragraph 1 DCCP. The defendants base their position on the likelihood of the claims against SPNV being successful on the group liability not based on the claims. Given the factual basis of the claims, which consists of the alleged direct involvement of SPNV in violations of the fundamental rights invoked by claimants, which have direct and horizontal effect under Nigerian law and which can also be invoked against companies, it cannot be said in advance that these claims are clearly hopeless. Whether and to what extent the accusations go against the "anchor-challenged" SPNV must be assessed in the main proceedings.
 
4.28.The appeal of STTC and SPDC to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in the Ogale case15, in which the English court found itself unauthorized against SPDC, cannot benefit them. The test applied to the English law by the English court is a different test from Article 8 paragraph 1 of Brussels Ia-Vo and from Article 7 CCP.
 
4.29.As previously considered under 4.20 and 4.22, if plaintiffs were to bring legal proceedings against defendants in Nigeria, they would have had to bring their claims before the exclusively competent Federal High Court or the High Court in the sui generis proceedings to which the FREP Rules apply. The court sees the exclusive jurisdiction referred to in 4.20 and 4.22 for such proceedings by the Federal High Court or the High Court as a rule of relative jurisdiction to institute such a claim in Nigeria. There is no rule of written or unwritten Dutch private international law that leads to the conclusion that this Nigerian rule of relative jurisdiction precludes the Dutch judge who - as stated above - has jurisdiction over all the defendants of claims based on a direct appeal to the fundamental rights invoked by claimants. Plaintiffs can therefore bring their claims directly based on the fundamental rights referred to under 4.5, in which they demand redress in the form of public apologies and a declaration of justice, in these proceedings before the Dutch court.
 
IV. The discovery Demand

The claims in the incident relate to two categories of documents from the discovery in the American procedures: the intended trial exhibits and intended trial depositions (claim i) and ii)) and the CDST documents (claim iii)). At the hearing, plaintiffs extended their claim to the unedited version of the minutes of the meeting of the CMD of 7 November 1995, of which the defendants brought an edited version into question.

4.31.Claimants state that the requirements of Article 843a of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure have been met, in which it is stipulated (in paragraph 1) that he who has a legitimate interest can demand inspection, copy or extract of certain documents concerning a legal relationship in which he or his legal predecessors party of the person who has these documents at his disposal or under his resignation. The foregoing suffers on the grounds of the fourth paragraph of Article 843a DCCP if there are compelling reasons for this, and if it can reasonably be assumed that a proper administration of justice is also guaranteed without providing the requested information. In that case, the person who has the documents at his disposal or under his resignation is not obliged to comply with this claim.

IV.1 the intended trial exhibits and intended trial depositions (claim i) and ii))

4.32.These parts of the claim relate to the intended trial exhibits and intended trial depositions designated as such by the plaintiffs in the discovery in the American procedures. These documents were produced by the companies belonging to the Shell group that were parties to the American proceedings and were (partly) designated by them as confidential. Pursuant to the confidentiality agreement between the claimants and the relevant Shell companies, these documents had to be returned or destroyed within thirty days after the end of these proceedings.

4.33.  [plaintiff 1] states that it is not fair that, as she continues her legal battle in the Netherlands, she does not have access to a significant part of the evidence gathered in the United States in her own case, in which the same facts and legal principles. Plaintiffs argue that defendants, with their refusal to provide these documents, try to give themselves a head start in these proceedings that goes against the material finding of truth that should be made in law and the principle of equality of arms, which is contained in Article 6 ECHR, of which Article 843a DCCP aims to be an elaboration. They wish to use the requested documents to further substantiate their claims in this procedure and any claims to be filed elsewhere based on the same set of facts.

4.34. Article 843a, paragraph 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that the documents for which inspection or copy is demanded are sufficiently determined. The required documents do not have to be described individually. This requirement is met if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the requested documents exist and the claim:

"Relates to a subject that is carefully defined by describing the file and naming the persons and authorities involved in the documents." 16

With this interpretation of the requirement of sufficient determination it is achieved that the position of the person requesting inspection is not unreasonably hampered by requiring him to specify all documents and describe them individually. At the same time, this ensures that the position of the person from whom access is sought is not unreasonably harmed, since there must be a sufficiently precise delimitation. Although, over the years, a broader interpretation has been given to the requirements of "certain documents" and "legitimate interest" contained in Article 843a of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, the intention of the legislator to include these requirements in Article 843a of the Dutch Civil Code applies - namely the prevention of 'fishing expeditions' - in full.

4.35. The intended intended trial exhibits were previously provided in the US procedures under the confidentiality agreement. They therefore exist and it is not disputed that the defendants still have access to that. The advanced categories of documents, the intended trial exhibits and intended trial depositions relate to a large amount of documents of different nature and content from the American proceedings' discovery, which was (in the [plaintiff 1] case) at an early stage. The parties had indicated what they considered relevant, but it had not yet been decided which documents would actually be admitted. These documents relate to an extensive complex of facts. It follows from the plaintiffs' explanation that the plaintiffs in the American proceedings wanted to submit the claims to the jury in three steps, namely:

the Nigerian regime was responsible for extrajudicial execution, torture and battery,

SPDC was jointly responsible for this (on the basis of aiding and abbetting, conspiring, joint venture responsibility and responsibility for ratifying),

the parent companies and [L] were jointly responsible for the actions of SPDC (on the basis of agency liability for SPDC, aiding and abetting SPDC, conspiring with SPDC).

These three steps also cover a multitude of (sub) topics.

In view of this, the required categories of documents, the intended trial exhibits and intended trial depositions from the discovery in the American procedures are too broadly defined and do not meet the requirement of "certain documents". Now that that is the case, it cannot be assumed that the "legitimate interest" requirement has been met. In addition, the claims in this proceeding are different than the claims in the American proceedings. The fact that these documents were possibly of importance in the American proceedings does not therefore automatically mean that plaintiffs have a legitimate interest in taking cognizance of the documents in this, otherwise inserted, procedure. Finally, the fact that a very large quantity of documents may be relevant or interesting in a general sense is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of sufficient legitimate interest set out in Article 843a (1) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.

4.36.Now that the intended trial exhibits and intended trial depositions have not met the requirements of legitimate interest and certain documents included in Article 843a, paragraph 1 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, claims i) and ii) must be rejected. The court is therefore not entitled to discuss the other points of dispute, with regard to the other requirements of article 1, 1 843a DCCP and the existence of the serious reasons referred to in paragraph 4 of this provision.

IV.2 the CDST documents (claim iii))

4.37 The CDST documents demanded under iii) are the documents relating to the tribunal, which are described in the privilege log in the discovery in the American procedures as Communications from counsel regarding proceedings before the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Tribunal. These are (i) the trial reports, the reports of the lawyers at the office of [Y], who were engaged by SPDC to follow the trial before the tribunal (see also below under VI.1.a), and (ii ) documents that reported on the content of the trial reports within SPDC or more widely within the Shell group. After the defendants had brought the trial reports into question, the claimants reduced their claim to the non-submitted CDST documents from category ii) indicated under 3.3 under iii). The dispute is limited to these documents not provided by the defendants.

4.38.The defendants' argument that the CDST documents did not have to be submitted in the American procedures cannot help them. The decisive factor is whether, under Dutch law, they are required by virtue of Article 843a of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure to provide copies of these documents. The defendants dispute that plaintiffs have a legitimate interest in obtaining a copy of these documents, because the source material for the non-submitted internal reports - the trial reports - has already been provided.

4.39.As plaintiffs accuse defendants of involvement and interference in the process against their spouses, they have a legitimate interest in obtaining a copy of the internal documents, which report on the content of the trial that has now been submitted within SPDC or more widely within the Shell group reports. The other requirements of the first paragraph of Article 843a of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure have also been met: these are sufficiently certain documents that are found among defendants.

4.40.The defendants then invoke the confidential nature of the documents, which, according to the defendants, is a serious reason not to provide a copy of the remaining CDST documents.

4.41.A party may have a serious reason within the meaning of Article 843a, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure in maintaining the confidentiality of its internal decision-making and ideas, including the role therein of its possible external advisors. Whether in a specific case there is such a compelling reason invoked that should lead to the rejection of the claim or the request with regard to that confidential information, must be decided by the judge, taking into account all the interests involved. It is up to the party who relies on the existence of that compelling reason to state and, if necessary, to make plausible, with regard to which information it invokes the existence of its interest in confidentiality and, if necessary, in which that interest exists. In addition, the statement must be so specific that the court can form an opinion on the justification of the appeal.17

4.42.Defendants state in general terms that the remaining CDST documents contain business confidential information. As a result, they have not met the requirement described above of a concrete and specific statement on the basis of which the District Court can form an opinion on the justification of relying on the existence of serious reasons within the meaning of Article 843a, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

4.43.The defendants must therefore provide the CDST documents referred to in claim iii) to claimants, within the claimed period of 21 days. The demanded penalty payment is awarded as insufficiently contradicted. In the internal nature of the documents, the court sees reason to make a condition on the basis of Article 28 DCCP that claimants may only use these documents for this procedure. Claimants are furthermore prohibited from providing the documents to third parties and from making any communication to third parties regarding the content of these documents.

IV.3 the minutes of the meeting of 7 November 1995

4.44.  At the hearing, the claimants finally extended their incidental claim (if necessary) to the non-edited minutes of the meeting of the CMD of 7 November 1995, of which the defendants submitted an edited version. The court understands that plaintiffs also want a copy of the omitted passages, insofar as they relate to the tribunal and / or the Ogoni case.

4.45.The defendants explained at the hearing that the omitted passages contained information that did not have to be submitted in the American proceedings. According to the defendants, there is a serious reason for not providing the complete document. With this general explanation the defendants have not met the requirement described above under 4.41 of a specific and specific statement on the basis of which the court can form an opinion on the justification of the appeal to the existence of serious reasons within the meaning of Article 843a paragraph 4 Rv. Defendants must provide an unedited version of the minutes of the CMD meeting of 7 November 1995, insofar as these omitted passages relate to the tribunal and / or the Ogoni issue. The court applies the same conditions to this as to provide the CDST documents (see under 4.43).

4.46.Now that the parties have been unsuccessful for some points in the incident, the costs of the proceedings in the incident are compensated.
V. the claim on the prescription of defendants

4.47.Defendants invoke prescription. In accordance with the parties' accuracy, the dispute is governed by Nigerian law, the law governing the claim (see Article 10:14 of the Dutch Civil Code).

4.48.The defendants base their claim on the limitation period on Order I (3) of the FREP Rules 1979, from which, according to them, the claimants' claims are time-barred on 9 November 1996. The defendants argue that an exception to the limitation period, as provided for in the FREP rules 1979, does not apply. They further argue that, to the extent that claimants base their claims on tort, the claims are barred.

4.49.Plaintiffs initially took the position that the limitation question is governed by Order III of FREP-Rules 2009. Plaintiffs replaced this position during the competition by the position that the FREP-Rules do not apply to them directly at the NGW (1979) and the ACHPR-based claims. They claim that their claims are not time-barred because neither the NGW (1979) nor the ACHPR contain any rules on time-barring.

4.50.Now that plaintiffs have sued defendants in the Netherlands, the proceedings are conducted on the basis of the rules of Dutch civil procedure. This does not mean that the FREP Rules cannot have any meaning whatsoever for the defendants' defense, as the claimants argue. That does not alter the fact that claimants, since they do not base their claims (initially) on tort, in Nigeria would have to rely on the sui generis procedure to which the FREP Rules apply (see under 4.20 and 4.22). If - as the defendants have in mind - the FREP Rules contain a rule to be construed as a limitation period, that provision from the FREP Rules is therefore relevant to the defendant's defense in this proceedings that the claims of the claimants are time-barred.

4.51.From the literature and case law consulted by the court on the Order I (3) of the FREP-Rules 1979 invoked by defendants and on Order III of the FREP-Rules 2009, it follows that the qualification of the rules laid down therein - whether or not ( purely procedural condition - has been or has been the subject of discussion and that the question has been raised as to whether or not the Chief Justice, with the adoption of this provision, has departed from the scope of the authority given to him to determine procedural rules. Whatever the case may be, Nigerian case law has accepted that the right to bring a claim in the sui generis proceedings to which the FREP Rules apply under the 1979 FREP Rules is limited in time. In the case of N.D.I.C. v. O’Silvawax Intl. Ltd, in which the claim of 8 November 1996 related to events that took place on 24 July 1995, considered:

“A cause of action accrues on a date when a breach or any event would warrant a person who is adversely affected by the act or another to seek redress in court. A legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute. A cause of action will be statute barred if legal proceedings cannot be commended in respect of the same because the period laid down by the limitation Law or Act has elapsed. If the date is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law then the action is statute barred.

(...)

In this appeal, the time between the date of the cause of action accrued and when the action was filed going by the writer, falls outside the limitation period allowed by the (FREP-Rules) [1979, addition court] make making this action invalid and incompetent. Where the cause of action or the plaintiff is statute-barred, it affects the legal competence or jurisdiction of the court. ”18

4.52.This means that Order I rule (1) of the FREP Rules 1979 - regardless of whether or not the FREP Rules should be (wholly) qualified as a (purely) procedural regulation - is applied in Nigerian case law as a limitation period. The case law also refers to a statute barred action. The defendants 'defense defense claims that the defendants' claims in Nigerian legal practice, in which the FREP-Rules 2009 are now in force, should be examined under the Order I rule (1) of the FREP-Rules 1979 as late filed.

4.53.After the entry into force of the FREP-Rules 2009, Order I rule (1) of the FREP-Rules 1979 was still applied in proceedings in which the claim was submitted before the entry into force of the FREP-Rules 2009. This happened, for example, in the judgment of 6 March 2015, Denca Services Ltd. v. Leo Oleka and sons, Nigeria Custom Services, in which a claim was filed on April 5, 2007 about events that took place on April 8, 2005.19 In the judgment in The Gov case, also made after December 1, 2009. or Borno State et al. v. Alh. Ngabura Bukar Gadangari on a claim filed on January 22, 2008 regarding events that occurred on February 17, 2004 has been considered: 20

"(...) to enforce infringement of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 jurisdiction on the lower court to entertain and grant relief to the aggrieved person.

(...)

Order 1 rule 3 (1) of the (FREP-Rules) 1979 is a limitation rule by which an application for leave to enforce the fundamental right of any person is commenced “within twelve months of the date of the happening of the event , matter, or act complained of ... ”(…)

Time is the essence of limitation statutes or rules. ”

4.54.Defendants see in this case law the confirmation of their position that a claim that has lapsed under the FREP Rules (1979) cannot still be considered to have been submitted in time after the FREP Rules 2009 came into effect. However, this case law relates to claims that were submitted prior to the entry into force of the FREP-Rules 2009. In these cases, the claims submitted under the FREP-Rules 1979 were tested against the term of Order I (3) FREP-Rules 1979.

 4.55.On March 9, 2018, the Court of Appeal in the Akure Judicial Division, Holden at Akure in the Fam-Lab Nigeria Limited & Anor v. Jahmarco Nigeria Limited & Anor21 case in a case concerning events occurring before the FREP Rules entered into force 2009 had taken place. Unlike the claims in the aforementioned cases, the claim in this case was filed after the FREP Rules 2009 came into effect. Under Order I rule (1) of the FREP Rules 1979 - which applied at the time of the events to which the claim - this claim was submitted (much) too late. In this judgment, however, the Court of Appeal in the Akure Judicial Division considered that the claim should be assessed against the FREP Rules 2009: 22

“To begin with, the 2009 FREPR, in Order XV Rule 1, repealed the 1979 FREPR. In other words, the former abrogated the life span or the latter. By the revocation, the 2009 FREPR puts an end to the 1979 FREPR and the same ceased to be in existence (…) .23 In the eyes of the law, the 1979 FREPR "is considered in the absence of any provision to the contrary, as having never existed, except for matters or transaction past and closed .... "24 In Olafisoye v. FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864) 580 at 636 Tobi, JSC, graphically weaved the dismal effect or repeal of legislation in these immaculate words: "A repealed law no more has legal life, if it does not exist any longer; it cannot be cited if it still exists. If it must be cited at all, it must be cited as a repealed law, which has no life to influence an argument A repealed law cannot be the basis for any comparison with any existing law ...

Nevertheless, the appellants will not react from the above hallowed principle of law. The reasons are not far-fetched. Firstly, the law applicable to jurisdiction of a Court is that in existence when the action is instituted and heard, not that in force when the cause of action ensued.25 It flows from this agelong rule, that is the 2009 FREPR, which is now operational during the hearing of the appeal, is the applicable subsidiary enactment. Secondly, the 1979 FREPR, on which they anchored their case, falls within the wide domain of adjectival law. In the view of the law, procedural law "relates to practice and procedure, that is, rules according to which substantive law is administered" while "substantive law is concerned with creation, definition, limitation of obligation. 2009 FREPR trace their paternity to Section 46 of the Constitution, as amended. They are procedural avenues usable for prosecute and effective fundamental rights of the citizens as ingrained in Section 33-44 of the Constitution, as amended.27 It is long established principle of law, that procedural law in existence is heard at the time a case is heard , whether at the trial or appellate level, applies to the determination of it. It is the moment when the procedural law came into being / force before or after an appeal has been filed.28 The wisdom behind the rule of interpretation is that subsidiary legislations do not donate vested rights to the citizenry. Altogether, it is the operative 2009 FREPR, which has dethroned the 1979 FREPR that made provision for limitation of action, that is applicable to the appeal. Admirably, the limitation clause has been banished by the 2009 FREPR. This is a serious coup de grace on the appellant's standpoint on the stubborn issue. "

4.56.The aforementioned judgments, all made by Courts of Appeal in Nigeria, have always been tested against the FREP Rules that applied at the time the claim was filed. The approach in the judgment referred to in 4.55 is also consistent with the overriding objectives of the FREP Rules 2009 cited in 4.18, which aim to give a broad application to the protection of fundamental rights. The court sees this Nigerian case law and the overriding objectives of the 2009 FREP Rules as a reason to seek alignment with the approach in the judgment referred to in 4.55. It will therefore assess the timeliness of bringing the claims in these proceedings against the FREP Rules 2009, which applied at the time that plaintiffs were the defendants legally involved in these proceedings.

4.57.Given Order III of the FREP Rules, the claims were submitted on time. The defendants' defense of defense is therefore not valid.

VI. discussion of the accusations on the merits

4.58 Now that the limitation defense does not apply, the court is ready to discuss the accusations on the merits. The order to be given in the incident to defendants to provide documents to plaintiffs does not prevent the accusations from being judged on the merits. The court will substantively assess plaintiffs' accusations based on the views of the parties and the evidence already submitted. If and insofar as the documents to be provided in the incident give claimants cause to set new facts or otherwise give rise to a further position, claimants must proceed as quickly as possible.

4.59.Plaintiffs argue that defendants are complicit in the violations of fundamental rights of their spouses and themselves by the Nigerian regime described in chapter 4 of the summons. Chapter 4 of the writ of summons is entitled "the Ogoni 9 sham trial" and deals with the arrest of the plaintiffs' spouses, the establishment of the Ogoni Disturbances Tribunal and the further course of the proceedings up to and including the execution of the Ogoni 9 death sentences imposed. With this reference to Chapter 4 of the subpoena, plaintiffs put the alleged violations of the fundamental rights mentioned under 4.5 during the detention, trial and execution of their spouses at the center of their claims. Their reproaches referred to under 3.2, subsections 4. through 7. See this.

4.60.The accusations formulated under 3.2 under 1. to 3. - in short, that Shell's requests to intervene against the protest of the local population were at the basis of excessive violent action by the regime, facilitated Operation Restore Order in Ogoniland and operated with the Nigerian regime as a tandem - referring to the events in Ogoniland in the period from 1990 until the arrest of spouses of claimants in 1994. These accusations do not relate specifically to claimants and their spouses. Rather, they are part of the prehistoric history and context of the process outlined by claimants, and aim to argue that SPDC and the Nigerian regime were interdependent and maintained close ties. They are not reproaches directly against plaintiffs and / or their spouses. Consequently, the court does not see any concrete indications of any [direct] connection between these accusations and the alleged violation of the fundamental rights of the spouses of claimants and claimants themselves during the detention, trial and execution of their husbands. The court will therefore not elaborate on these accusations.

4.61.The accusations included under 3.2 sub 4 to 7 do relate to the detention, trial and execution of the claimants' spouses. Plaintiffs in particular make defendants the following accusations, whereby, just as with the accusations referred to under 3.2 under 1. t / m 3, they together defend defendants as "Shell":

1. Shell was involved in the process and influenced the outcome by:

2. holding a watching letter, supporting the prosecutor and informal contacts with the judges of the tribunal;

3. bribing witnesses,

4. the role of [N] during the process.

5. Shell has offered to influence the outcome of the trial on the condition that MOSOP cease its protest against Shell.

6. Shell has wrongly not (publicly) used its influence to get the Nigerian government to a fair trial and to leniency for the Ogoni 9. Shell could and should have done this by:

7. to address the importance of respect for human rights in its contacts with the Nigerian authorities,

8. conditions for further cooperation with the Nigerian authorities,

9. to speak out about the Ogoni's right to protest,

10. to speak out (publicly) about the need for a fair trial and to request leniency, and

11. threaten to withdraw from Nigeria if necessary.

4.62.The court will then assess these accusations under VI.1 to VI.3. It will also further establish the facts relevant to these accusations. Parties assume that claimants and the burden of proof lie with claimants. Regarding the burden of proof of an (imminent) violation of fundamental rights, the Nigerian Supreme Court in Okafor v. Lagos State Govt.29 considered:

“The law remains that he who must prove asserts. So the appellant has the onus of proving by credible affidavit evidence that the fundamental rights were breached. ”

Claiming and the burden of proof also fall on claimants under Dutch procedural law - insofar as applicable to the burden of proof distribution.

VI.1 involvement in and influence on the process

4.63.This reproach consists of holding a watching letter, supporting the prosecutor and informal contacts with the judges of the tribunal (VI.1.a), bribing witnesses (VI.1.b) and the role of [N] during the process (VI.1.c).

VI.1.a holding a watching letter, supporting the prosecutor and informal contacts with the judges of the tribunal

4.64.Plaintiffs argue that the involvement of defendants in the trial is primarily evident from the fact that SPDC sent a lawyer to the trial, who kept her accurately informed of the trial and who, by means of a so-called watching letter, prosecutor supported. They state that the lawyer who keeps a watching letter usually works closely with the prosecutor.

4.65.It is common ground that SPDC [Y], who had previously acted for her, ordered a watching letter for her during the trial. According to the defendants' explanation, it was not clear to SPDC - in view of the tumultuous developments in Ogoniland, where SPDC had numerous installations - about what the tribunal would judge. It wanted to know first-hand how the process went and whether any accusations were made against SPDC and, if so, about what. The defendants further point to the great international interest in the process and argue that it is not surprising that SPDC, which was involved by [I] in its campaign to bring the Ogoni case to the attention, is also informed wanted to stay the process.

4.66.A watching letter is a figure of Nigerian customary law in criminal cases. Calling in a lawyer acting as such is a way for a third party who has an interest in being informed of the proceedings in order to safeguard his interests. The holder of the watching letter observes the procedure for his client and can - in order to safeguard the interests of his client - cooperate with the prosecutor, for example by providing information to the prosecutor. However, the latter is not a rule. The holder of a watching letter can cooperate with and / or support the prosecutor, but that is not necessary. A watching letter can also be used purely for observation and back reporting.

4.67.Now that a watching letter can be organized in different ways, it is important to know what the assignment was for SPDC to (the lawyers of the office of) [Y] and what it actually did for SPDC during the sessions of the tribunal.

4.68.The instruction of legal advisor of SPDC, [Z], to [Y] of December 1, 1994 reads as follows:

“As Shell has various interests in the Ogoni area which were adversely affected by the disturbances, we consider it necessary to a lawyer to follow up the proceedings in case Shell would be expected to testify before the panel.

We therefore request you to hold a watching letter on behalf of Shell during the proceedings.

We expect you to:

- attend the sessions or the panel on a regular basis

- report the outcome of the proceedings of each sitting to Shell

- in the case Shell is required to testify before the panel, document and conduct the presentation or Shell’s case to the panel

- Persue and obtain copy of the panel's final report, recommendation or judgment for Shell's records.

 4.69.The transcript of the session of the tribunal, 6 February 1995, states that [AA], a colleague of [Y], made known to the tribunal:

“My Lord, I am holding letter for Chief [Y]. My Lord, we have a watch letter for the Shell Development Company of Nigeria. "
The prosecutor objected to allowing the watching letter for SPDC:

“My Lord, no staff or the Shell Development Company is involved in this case.

(...)

I do not think Shell Development Company is involved in this matter. My Lord should not take notice of his appearance. "

[AA] then reiterated that his position is: "holding letter for Chief [Y] who has a watching letter on behalf of Shell Development Company" and asked: "I would like to be on record, Sir." The president of the tribunal replied: "I have already written that".

The court concludes from this that the tribunal [Y] admitted on the first session as holding a watching letter for SPDC.

4.70.Defendants argue that at that time SPDC did not know whether the tribunal was an investigative tribunal or a trial tribunal. According to the defendants, SPDC was under the assumption that the tribunal would investigate the general riots in Ogoniland until the first session. Claimants find this explanation unbelievable. What SPDC knew or did not know about the tribunal can, however, remain undisputed now that it has been established that [Y] only fulfilled the formal position of a lawyer with a watching letter for one day during the tribunal.

4.71. Indeed, [Y] informed SPDC by letter of 8 February 1995 that the tribunal is about the murder of Ogoni leaders and:

“It is clear therefore that suspicions may be raised as to what interests SHELL has in the matter as to necessity its representation by Counsel, albeit holding a Watching Brief.

We are already on record, but it is our humble view that we can clarify the situation to the Tribunal and to the public, to the effect that SHELL was under the impression that the work of the Tribunal was to inquire into the OGONI-LAND Disturbances , and not as revealed by the Information, to try the Accused Persons for the offenses of MURDER. Thereafter, we would like to be allowed to maintain a passive presence at the Tribunal, like any other interested member of the public. ”

4.72. [Z] replied on 13 February 1995 that SPDC agreed to this proposal and asked [Y] to clarify its position itself on the following session. The transcript of the session of the tribunal of 21 February 1995 states that [Y], who was then present at the session, informed the tribunal:

“On the 6th February, 1995, we announced that we were representing the interest of Shell Development Company, holding a watching letter. Having obtained the records of the proceedings, we have observed that it is not a Tribunal of Inquiry but a trial for the offense of murder and we have advised our client in that light that there is no Shell employee accused, there is no Shell employee a victim or a witness (…) and so Sir, Shell Development Company is not particularly participating. ”

After the president of the tribunal asked if [Y] was sure of this, given the suspicion voiced by SPDC on that day's defense (see also below under VI.1.b), [Y] replied:

"Perhaps, when it is being investigated, our client will have an opportunity to defend themselves but that matter [the alleged bribery of witnesses by SPDC, addition court] is not yet on trial."

4.73.Lawyers at the office of [Y] then attended the trial and reported to SPDC on each session in the trial reports now brought by defendants. According to the defendants, these lawyers no longer played an active role in the trial from the second session, but retained [Y] a watching letter in case it would be legally necessary if allegations were made to SPDC. [Y] did not actually fulfill that role according to the defendants,

4.74.There are no concrete indications that the [Y] office colleagues who attended the process have done something other than - in accordance with the instructions of SPDC - observing the process and reporting back to SPDC. From the second day of the trial, they no longer took the formal position of a lawyer with a watching letter. Both the original assignment and the SPDC assignment adjusted after the first session meant that the process had to be observed and information gathered for SPDC. The original assignment also meant that a possible appearance of SPDC before the tribunal had to be prepared and supported. Collaboration with or support from the prosecutor was not part of the assignment. The reports from the office mates to [Y] to SPDC also mention nothing about any cooperation or contacts with the prosecutor.

4.75.In order to substantiate the alleged cooperation with the prosecutor, plaintiffs also refer to the written statements of the acquitted suspect [W] 30 and of two lawyers of other suspects, [BB] 31 and [CC] .32 It states that the lawyers of the office van [Y] always sat in the front row with the prosecutor and exchanged information with him during the sessions.

4.76.The written statement of [Y] 33 put forward by the defendants explains that the tribunal was sitting in a building / room that was not designed as a court. The written statement by [Y] further states that when he attended the session of February 21, 1995, he was in the front row with the prosecutor and with [DD] ([I], [W] and [EE's lawyer ]). According to the statement by [Y], they sat in front because of their seniority and the other lawyers sat behind them. 

4.77. However, [T] writes:

“The tribunal sits in a large room at the House of Assembly in Port Harcourt. Its members sit at one end of the room with three soldiers behind them. (...) Facing the members of the tribunal is the dock; the prosecution sit to one side and the defense to the other. "34

It is therefore unclear whether or not the attorneys at [Y] 's office sat next to the prosecutor. However, this too can remain undiscussed. The defendants do not dispute that [Y] and his office colleagues may have spoken to the prosecutor during the tribunal's sessions. That in itself, however, is no reason to assume that they have cooperated with or supported him. Moreover, there is no concrete starting point for assuming this. Nor does this follow from the written statements cited by the claimants, which only speak about the exchange of information in general terms. It also follows from the transcript of the session of 6 February 1995 that the prosecutor opposed the admission of the SPDC watching letter (see under 4.69). This is a contraindication to the cooperation suggested by claimants by (the lawyers of) Y's office with the prosecutor. After all, the prosecutor indicated that he felt that SPDC had no role in the process and that he apparently did not need SPDC support. A further contraindication is the lack of any clue to the accuracy of this claim of the claimants in the reports of the independent organizations and persons who have observed the process, such as [T], Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (see under 2.31, 2.32 and 2.33). They were present at (parts of) the process and closely monitored the course of events. They also spoke with many stakeholders at the time. Their reports contain reservations about the independence of the tribunal and the fairness of the trial, for example about the bribe to be discussed below and the role of [N] (see for example [T], under 2.31). The Human Rights Watch report contains a highly critical chapter on the role of SPDC in Nigeria and the non-political course of defendants (The Role and Responsibilities of Royal Dutch / Shell). However, these reports do not mention anything about cooperation with or support of the prosecutor by (the lawyers of) SPDC. In these reports, therefore, there are no clues to support the statement that SPDC has cooperated with or supported the prosecutor or provided it with information.

4.78.In view of the foregoing, the accusation that defendants have attempted to influence the process by holding a watching letter and supporting the prosecutor comes up against the lack of factual basis. Proof of evidence in the form of hearing witnesses offered by claimants is therefore not delivered.

4.79.There is also no actual basis for the alleged influence through informal contacts with the judges of the tribunal in the form of organizing a welcome dinner and receiving the judges in the senior staff club of SPDC. Plaintiffs base these informal contacts on the written statement of the lawyer [CC] of 16 June 2017, which states:

"Even though Shell was formally an interested party in the proceedings, it organized a dinner for the judges or the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal (...)."

According to this statement, a photo of this dinner has also been published in a newspaper. Plaintiffs also refer to the statements of lawyers [BB] of 15 June 2017 and [FF] of 2 May 2017. It states that the judges of the tribunal were escorted after a session to the residential area of ​​SPDC on Aba Road, where they stayed and pampered in the SPDC senior staff club. The written statements state that this was seen by people who were hired by the lawyers to follow the judges.

4.80.Defendants strongly dispute the informal contacts made. They argue that they have not seen any evidence of the alleged dinner, which, according to them, did not take place. They point out that SPDC's senior staff club was accessible to many people and that [I] was also a member of this club. Membership was not reserved for SPDC employees. The defendants also point out that Nigeria is a rumor company and that the process was buzzing with unsubstantiated rumors. Finally, the defendants emphasize that these are events that took place a long time ago and find it remarkable that it was not until 2017 that statements were made for the first time about informal contacts.

4.81.It follows from the written declarations referred to in 4.79 that the informal contacts made must have been known from the outset, since this would have been reported in the newspaper and the lawyers were aware of this through the informants hired by them. It is noteworthy that no point of reference for these informal contacts can be found in the reports of the observers and independent organizations, who at the time followed the process and spoke with those involved and who were critical of the independence of the tribunal. Furthermore, the newspaper report on which [CC] apparently relies is not outdated. Apart from that, what has been said about the informal contacts - even if they have taken place - is insufficient reason to assume that defendants have thereby influenced the course of the process. The court also takes into account the defendant's statement, not contradicted by claimants, that the senior staff club of SPDC was accessible to many people and that membership was not reserved for employees of SPDC; [I] was also a member of this club. There is therefore no room for further evidence by hearing witnesses offered by claimants.

4.82.The conclusion is that the accusation about influencing the trial by holding a watching letter, supporting the prosecutor and informal contacts with the judges of the tribunal is of no use.

VI.1.b bribery witnesses

4.83.Claimants claim that defendants have influenced the outcome of the trial by bribing witnesses to make incriminating statements. According to claimants, false statements by these bribed witnesses have been decisive in the sentencing of the Ogoni 9 and these statements played a role in the arrest and detention of their spouses.

4.84.The success of this accusation requires in the first place that the claim of SPDC in bribery of witnesses stated by claimants be established. Secondly, it is required that it is established that the statements of these bribed witnesses played a role in the sentencing and / or arrest and detention of the plaintiffs' spouses.

VI1.b.i involvement of SDPC

4.85.Plaintiffs base the alleged involvement of SPDC in the bribery of witnesses on the [U] affidavit that they have challenged and the statement that [V] made as a witness in the Kiobel proceedings.

4.86.It is common ground that [U] and [V], who had made incriminating statements against [I] and others to the police, made an additional affidavit on 16 and 27 February 1995 at the office of one of the lawyers of the suspects. In it they stated - in summary - that they and a number of other witnesses have been pressured by the principal witnesses a charge, [GG] ([GG]) and [HH] ([HH]), to sign a false incriminating statement against [I], [W] and MOSOP officials. [U] mentions as other, also bribed, witnesses: [II] ([II]), [YY] ([YY]), [KK] ([KK]), [LL] ([LL]), [MM ] ([MM]) and [NN] ([NN]).

4.87.In the affidavit of [U], a musician, it says - as far as relevant here:

“I was afraid so I made a statement to them, but they refused my statement and ask me to copy a statement already made by them. Under duress I made the writing of their statements. (…) At this time I was promising that after the case in Court I will be given a house any place in the Country, a Contract from Shell and OMPADEC and some amount of money to buy my musical instrument. (…) On another date or meeting at [GG] House, representative from Shell, OMPADEC, security agents, Govt officials and the [GG], [R] and [P ]'s family were present and they all agreed. The family gave some money say that the money came from the Govt. and Shell. my case I was given N 30,000 from Shell and Govt. "

4.88.The affidavit of [V] is not among the case documents. Plaintiffs did challenge his statement in the Kiobel procedure. In it, [V] stated about a meeting at the government house in Rivers State, where witnesses [II], [KK], [LL], [NN], [JJ] and [U] were also present. [V] has stated, among other things:

“(...) this was like a table like this, we sit down like this and he said first or all he came in when we all came in, I said the first time you came in here, you introduce yourself to me, I introduce myself to you, so he stand up and said, this is governor or river state, this is police commissioner, this is Shell representative, and this is Umbadek chairman, and many other people like that? I don't know most of their names again.

Q. Where did this meeting refer you to take place?

A. It was a government house.

Q. In the city?

A. Rivers state, the capital.

Q. Approximately when did this meeting take place?

A. Within June, July, 1994.

(...)

Q. You refer to someone as a Shell representative. Do you know the name of this person?

A. He said this is OC [Y], Shell’s lawyer, that's what he said.

Q. Did you ever see Mr. [Y] before?

A. No. That was the first time I saw him.

Q. Was there anyone else at the meeting that you understood to represent what you refer to as Shell in any way?

A. He was the only person over there.

[V] subsequently stated that the witnesses had to put a statement on paper. They were not allowed to leave and stayed for a few days. "Prepared statements" were made at some point. [V] stated that:

“Then this is the very time when they bring the statement, prepared statement, that is the time they brought money for us.

(...)

Q. Am I just asking if you recall were there any other people there? Was there anyone, for example, from - that you believed to be from SPDC?

A. That's what I want to explain to you. Yeah. I have somebody who was there. This is a time he came in, he came in with money. Sign this statement that we involve [I] and the rest and they give you the money and [II], he was very, very intelligent and asked [GG], where is this money from? He said, this money comes from Shell, government of Nigeria. This is why the chairman, the lawyer representative is here.

Q. Who told you to sign the statement?

A. [GG]. "

4.89.From their reference to the affidavit of [U] and the statement of [V], as further clarified by claimants at the parties' party, it follows that claimants claim that SPDC was involved in the bribery of witnesses [U], [V], [II], [YY], [KK], [LL], [MM] and [NN] because (a) [Y] was / were present at the meeting on behalf of SPDC and / or a representative of SPDC (and ) where witnesses had to prepare / sign prepared statements, (b) contributed financially to payment of these witnesses and / or (c) offered them a job with SPDC.

4.90.Defendants strongly dispute the alleged involvement of SPDC in the bribery of witnesses. They refer to the written statement of February 19, 2018 by [Y], in which he denies any involvement in the alleged bribery of witnesses. They further point out that [Y] looks very different from the description that [V] gave of him in his statement in the Kiobel procedure. In view of this, according to the defendants, the [V] statement is not reliable.

4.91.The alleged bribery of witnesses is mentioned in the reports of [T] and Human Rights Watch (see under 2.31 and 2.32). At that time, SPDC was already suspected of being involved. For example, the Human Rights Watch report states that these charges of bribery were denied by both the prosecutor and SPDC at the time.35 This suspicion was also discussed during the trial, when the chairman asked [Y] in connection with this whether he was certain that he no longer wanted to keep a watching letter for SPDC (see under 4.69). The transcript of the session of February 21, 1995 further states that [DD], the lawyer of [I], [W] and [EE], has raised the affidavits of [U] and [V] and has asked whether these affidavits, which were also printed in the newspaper The Masses, were allowed to be called into question. The President of the Tribunal commented on this:

“This case is not going to be tried on affidavit; the case is going to be based on evidence before the Tribunal. Even the statements given by the accused persons, they still have oral evidence. It's not going to be judged on Affidavits. "

The request to submit the additional statements has been rejected as premature:

“The trial will soon be on and the accused persons will have the opportunity to challenge the veracity of his evidence and render any document they may wish. This observation as far as the Tribunal is concerned is premature. "

According to the transcript of this session, 27 February 1995, the affidavits were again raised by the lawyer of [A], [OO]. In the context of the request for bail for his client, the latter requested attention for [U] 's affidavit. He read the reproduction thereof from the newspaper and argued in support of his request for bail for [plaintiff 1]:

“In summary, I submit that prima facie, the quality of the evidence is poor. (...) The affidavit or [U] is a very serious issue which should not be taken lightly by this Tribunal. ”

VI.1.b.ii use statements in the convictions

4.92.From the remark of the chairman of the tribunal (see under 4.91) and from the Evidence Act 1990, the court concludes that the incriminating written statements of witnesses and the affidavits of [U] and [V] cannot in principle contribute to the evidence in the process. To be able to contribute to the evidence, witnesses must be heard in person before the tribunal. [U] and [V] were not heard as witnesses before the tribunal; according to plaintiffs' explanation, not contradicted by the defendants, it was because they had gone into hiding for fear of repercussions. It must therefore be assumed that their incriminating statements did not play a role in the convictions of spouses of claimants.

4.93.It appears from the trial reports issued to SPDC by (the colleagues of) [Y] that on 16 May 1995 [GG] was questioned as a witness by the tribunal. During the cross-examination, he denied that Shell, the Rivers State government, and himself have paid N 30,000.00 to [V]. It also follows from these trial reports that the [II], [JJ] and [NN] mentioned by [U] and [V] as bribe witnesses were heard before the tribunal as prosecution witnesses. However, it is unclear what they have stated and whether and to what extent their statements have contributed to the convictions of the spouses of the claimants.

VI.1.b.iii use statements during arrest and detention

4.94.From the statement of [A] 's lawyer quoted under 4.91, the court concludes that the written statements of the bribe witnesses mentioned by [U] and [V] may have played a role in the arrest and detention of the plaintiffs' spouses. After all, the affidavit of [U] is raised in connection with a request for bail. [T] made an analysis of the available evidence in his report. He has written (under 1.19):

“On the last day of my visit (March 29), the prosecution served on the defense a bundle of the statements of the witnesses on whom they rely. I have analyzed these statements in great detail (see Part E and Appendix 9). "

4.95.In Appendix 9 of his report, to which plaintiffs also refer to substantiate their claims about (the use of) statements made by the bribed witnesses, [T] listed the statements made by the witnesses in the process. [T] has written that this appendix to his report:

"Is my attempt at a detailed and neutral analysis of the disclosed statements of all eye fitnesses, that is, the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution who claim to have seen part of the events of 21 May 1994."

He did, however, make the following reservation:

"I must stress that they are concerned rather than conclusions since they are based on a reading or papers rather than on a hearing of the live evidence."

4.96.According to the summary in Appendix 9 to the [T] report, [U], in the statement he states in his affidavit that it was forcibly issued, stated that when he was on his way to the Kobaga market, he saw a white car coming, which was stopped by a security officer, who asked the driver of the car to turn around. Appendix 9 of the [T] report states that this statement by [U] further includes:

“I saw so many people gathered round the place. There was a big argument that I came to know the man inside the white car who was arguing with the uniformed one was [I]. I also saw Mr. [W] inside his own car near [I ]’s car. After much argument when they were about to go back, I heard Mr. [I] said in Ogoni language “GBO BETER EBADI GIOKO EBAGE DONE KPEGE NI EBA LEELA meaning in English that it is those vultures who are at Gioko sharing money that send the uniform to arrest me. He told the crowd who gathered around there that they should go to Gioko and deal with the Vultures. The whole crowd moved toward Gioko. "

4.97.Appendix 9 to the [T] report does not contain a summary of statements by [V] or [II]. It does, however, contain summaries of statements from other witnesses mentioned by [U] and [V] that would have been bribed, namely [PP] (possibly [KK]), [NN], [YY], [LL] and [MM] . These include the following:

- [PP] stated that he heard that [I] was talking about vultures,

- [NN] has stated that [claimant 2] led the attackers who clubbed [Q] to death and that he finally ordered the attackers to stop,

- [JJ] stated that [plaintiff 2] said at the meeting on 21 May 1994: "let us kill them",

- [LL] mentioned [D] as someone he recognized among the people who pushed the VW beetle in the "Volkswagen Beetle Incident" mentioned by [T]. [T] stated about this:

“In the car he saw the naked body of a fat man. 2 other corpses were being carried on an improvised stretcher. Or this 2 one was the body or [R]. "36 

4.98 On the basis of the established facts and the supporting documents at issue, no final assessment can be made on this accusation. Plaintiffs will be admitted to the evidence of their defendants' substantiated arguments about the involvement of SPDC in the bribery of witnesses and the use of statements made by these witnesses in the convictions and / or arrest and detention of their spouses. The latter will have to be established for each spouse. Claimants will be allowed to prove that:

(i) SPDC was involved in bribing the witnesses [U], [V], [II], [YY], [KK], [LL], [MM] and [NN] because

a. [Y] by order of SPDC and / or a representative of SPDC attended the meeting (s) where these witnesses had to prepare / sign the statements prepared by others and / or

b. SPDC has contributed financially to the payments to these witnesses and / or

c. SPDC has promised these witnesses a job, and

(ii) the statements of witnesses bribed with the involvement of SPDC played a role in:

the conviction of the spouses of claimants by the tribunal and / or

b. the arrest and detention of spouses of claimants and / or

c. the detention of claimants.

Part (ii) of the evidence engagement is only relevant if the involvement of SPDC as the meaning under (i) is established. Plaintiffs are admitted to the evidence of both parts of the evidence assignment for procedural economic reasons. Whether and to what extent this claim by claimants actually applies will be assessed after the evidence has been delivered.

VI.1.c [N]

4.99.Plaintiffs point to the role, among others criticized by [T], that [N], the commander of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force played during the trial (see under 2.31). In addition to the behavior identified by [T], claimants claim that [N] was responsible for the torture and degrading treatment that prisoners had to undergo during the trial, for the assault and assault of [claimant 1] and for seizing evidence against the suspects. Plaintiffs designate [N] as "Shell protégé" and elaborate in detail on the, according to them, existing close ties between SPDC and [N] in the period prior to the trial, including the Operation Restore Order led by [N]. Furthermore, claimants point to payments by SPDC to [N], which according to claimants also took place during the trial.

4,100. With defendants, the court is of the opinion that this accusation has no purpose. There is no reason to attribute the behavior of [N] during the process in any way to SPDC and / or the other defendants or to assume any involvement of defendants in this. That conclusion cannot be based on the established facts and does not follow from the claims of claimants. The court explains this as follows.

4,101. Plaintiffs attach great importance to the inter-office memo of [M] of SPDC of 25 February 1994 referred to under 2.20 and to the fact that [N] Operation Restore Order led Ogoniland and would have publicly announced that it acted on behalf of Shell. The defendants dispute the latter's reasons and explain that the payments referred to in the memo concerned 'field allowances' that the Nigerian authorities charged SPDC for assistance provided to protect against the persistent and increasingly extreme violence that SPDC faced before it activities in Ogoniland.

4,102. With reference to written statements, including a statement by [QQ], in the Kiobel procedure, claimants claim that SPDC [N] also paid during the trial. [QQ] has stated that he has witnessed three times the handing over of money by SPDC to [N], of which twice by [RR]. However, these statements - of which the defendants incidentally argue that they are correct and reliable - all relate to alleged payments in connection with the Operation Restore Order Ogoniland.

4,103. The court notes that it is unclear what the basis is for paying the field allowances to [N] mentioned in the interoffice memo. The court leaves that for what it is, since no link has been established or proved between these payments and the role that [N] played during the trial. Also the statements submitted by claimants do not show any payment from SPDC to [N] during or in connection with the process. From what claimants put forward about the contacts between SPDC and [N] in the years prior to the trial, it can only be deduced that [N] was involved in the Nigerian government's action around the facilities of the joint venture in Ogoniland and that SPDC has made payments to him in the form of field allowances. Even if [N] saw itself as a protégé of SPDC / the Shell group, that does not mean that defendants were involved in any way in [N ]'s actions during the trial. In order to be able to draw that conclusion, there must be specific facts and circumstances from which it follows that defendants tried to influence the process through [N] or were otherwise involved in [N ]'s actions during the process. Such specific facts and circumstances have not been stated or have otherwise appeared.

VI.2 offer to influence the process on condition that MOSOP cease its protest against SPDC

4,104. It is established that [L] spoke at the beginning of 1995 with the brother of [I], [SS]. Plaintiffs claim that [L] then offered to [SS] to influence the process, on condition that MOSOP cease its protests against SPDC.

4,105. In the Nigeria Update of April 6, 1995, [L] reported on a conversation he had that day with the British ambassador, [TT], whom he referred to in the report as BHC [the abbreviation for the British High Commissioner]. This report states that [TT] has spoken with [SS] and has conveyed the message that [SS] wants to speak with [L]. [L] writes:

“I told the BHC that I might be prepared to meet him [[SS], addition court] on an informal basis to see what he had to say, and the BHC suggested that he introduce me to him during the Queen's Birthday celebrations at his house later this month.

I also made the point that, so long as the MOSOP leadership keep the claim for compensation against us we would find it impossible to deal with them formally. I also said that I will not be involved in [I ]’s trial in any way.

There is still a strong belief among these people that we have the power to get [G] to let [I] off! Would that we had such power, we certainly would not have had the cash calls problems if we had! ”

4,106. On April 20, 1995, [L] spoke to the British ambassador with [SS] and [UU], one of [I] 's lawyers. The Nigeria Update of April 24, 1995 states:

“We discussed the matter of opening a dialogue between Shell and the Ogoni people. I made the point in many ways that I felt that I could not be expected to open up Shell to a dialogue when we had learned from experience to distrust the methods employed by [I] against us. His use of the media to propagate what we felt or distortions of the truth to a gullible world made us very wary indeed. I told him they would have to modify their stance before we could contemplate a useful dialogue.

I also said that we were not about to start discussions as long as we had a claim for environmental pollution and back royalties and taxes or 10 billion hanging over our heads, figures that were quite preposterous.

(...)

MOSOPs Whishes or Shell

I asked what exactly MOSOP wanted or Shell. OSW said they wanted us to help get the release of KSW and the removal of the army from Ogoniland.

I get used to all the arguments against us doing either of the two things.

(...)

Dialogue?

The matter of a continued dialogue was raised again at the end. I said that I was happy to keep the door open to dialogue and I gave my contact numbers. However, I also said that I would not be able to talk about anything substantive as long as I was given reason to distrust MOSOP and its motives in wanting the dialogue. I said it was up to them to show there was a genuine change of approach before there would be much more point in continued dialogue. ”

4,107. By letter of 13 May 1995, [SS] was instructed by his brother not to accept [L] 's proposal. In the letter, [I] outlined two scenarios to discuss with [L], namely:

(I) “We remain in jail. A. The cause grows. Junior's recent visit to the US was a smasher. Hey with Al Gore, Ethel Kennedy (…) Along with the Goldman Foundation, Shell could face an expensive call for the boycott of its products. (...). B. Within Nigeria, the other oil-producing areas who have been working to see if MOSOPs non-violent stand will draw Shell out of its cocoon, decide that force is what Shell wants. There will be trouble on the oilfields, losing Shell a lot or its investment. Military force will not secure peace on the oilfields. (...)
In the end, all this would be extremely expensive for Shell particularly if is being mooted, we sue them in the U.S. Punitive damages could be imposed on them. Our sponsors are thinking in that direction. Is this what Shell wants?

OR THIS ?,

(II) Shell uses its considerable clout to (i) CREATE an Ogoni State. We will have something to show to the Ogoni people & ass their anger.
(ii) Shell gets the Tribunal stopped or the Fed Attorney General to enter a “nolle prosequi” using the fact of my ill-health and inability to go on the trial. Shell’s stock in Ogoni rises. The human rights and writers lobbies which have stood solidly behind us abroad are disarmed. Shell gets a breathing space." 

4,108. [SS] discussed this letter with [L] on 13 May 1995, which reported on it in a Note for File:

- It was reiterated that his demand for Shell to become involved with political and legal matters or Nigeria was wrong and Shell would not do it, i.e. no royalties / taxes, no reparations, no interventions with the tribunal process.

- (…) In any case, it was important for Shell's image and integrity, long term, to adhere to its business principles as we have stated in this case.

- We were prepared to address the issues of Community Development and the Environment as soon as possible even ahead of resuming operations, provided the situation on the ground was peaceful (…) We were prepared to sit down and discuss these two areas of mutual interest and get advice / input from MOSOP. However, first and foremost we needed to satisfy ourselves that we can trust MOSOP. (...)

- (…) We would not have the confidence to sit down with MOSOP to consider areas of mutual interest unless these false claims and attacks were stopped. Such cessation would be seen as a display or MOSOPs willingness to sincerely explore common grounds with Shell in a trustworthy manner. (...)

The meeting was summarised to O-W from our viewpoint that the discussion has not moved forward since it started. We reiterated that we would be prepared to discuss areas of mutual interest only, namely, Community Development and Environment, but only if the basis for trust was established. The minimum we would expect as an indication or display or trust on MOSOP's part would be the cessation of deliberate and false accusations against Shell, and not urgent Shell to become involved in Nigerian politics against its business principles. Finally, we added that until there was a change in MOSOP's attitude and approach, we saw no basis for continuing the dialogue for the meantime, even though the door was not shut. ”

4,109. In an interoffice memorandum to [VV], then Area Coordinator at SIPC of August 22, 1995, [L] wrote about this:

“I offered [SS] the possibility that we would be prepared to put in some humanitarian aid in exchange for the undertaking by his brother to soften their official stance on two key issues for us: 1. the outrageous claims (… ) against Shell for royalties and reparations, and 2. the claim that we had funded the military in their clean up operations, to "clear the way" for our return.

(...)

I am not sure that we want to move towards unilateral aid: we need something in return from the MOSOP elected representatives. (...) Don't forget that the government see MOSOP as terrorists and our dealing with them could be misconstrued. ”

4,110. From the reports referred to in 4.105 to 4.109 and letter from [I] it follows that in the conversations with [SS] [L] distinguished between two different topics: 1) SPDC's response to the request to intervene process and 2) a dialogue with a possible contribution from SPDC to projects in the context of Community Development and the Environment. With regard to the first subject, these reports state that during the discussions with [SS], [L] always made it clear that SPDC will not proceed with the intervention requested by [SS] in the process. See for example the comment in the report referred to under 4.108: “(…) his demand for Shell to become involved with political and legal matters of Nigeria was wrong and Shell would not do it (…) no interventions in the tribunal process.” This closes to [L] 's remark to the British ambassador before speaking to [SS] that SPDC did not want to be involved in any way in the [I] process (see 4.105). It follows from the reports that only humanitarian (medical) assistance to [I] was discussed to "soften their stance on two key issues for us" (see 4,109). The question to intervene in the process has always been answered in a negative way, unconditionally, with the explanation that SPDC does not interfere with these types of issues, because this goes against the business principles. However, [L] has set conditions for the second topic of conversation, a dialogue with a possible contribution from SPDC to projects in the context of Community Development and the Environment. These are the conditions that claimants refer to. However, these conditions only apply to the second topic. One of these conditions was "not urging Shell becoming involved in Nigerian politics against its business principles" (see 4,108). This confirms that during the talks [L] made it clear that SPDC would not intervene in the process under any circumstances.



4.11. By contrast, in their written statements, [SS] and [UU] link the conditions set by [L] to the rejection of the request to intervene in the proceedings. The court is of the opinion that these statements cannot prejudice the conclusions drawn above under 4.110. To this end, the court takes into account that the reports prepared by SPDC for this purpose are generally drawn up on the day of the interview or shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs accept these reports from [L] on all other points as correct. The written statements of [SS] and [UU], on the other hand, were made years later and reflect the memory of what was discussed at the time. Without further explanation - which is lacking - the court sees no reason to assume, on the basis of these written statements, that the [L] reports do not accurately reflect the conversations. There is therefore no room for the further evidence provided by claimants on this point.

4,112. The court concludes that there is no justification for the accusations that defendants have offered to influence the trial on the condition that MOSOP cease its protests against Shell.

VI.3 do not intervene in the process

4,113. Plaintiffs accuse defendants that they have not (publicly) used their influence to persuade the Nigerian government to conduct a fair trial and leniency for the Ogoni 9. According to the plaintiffs, defendants could and should have done this by:

to address the importance of respecting human rights in contacts with the Nigerian authorities,

conditions for further cooperation with the Nigerian authorities,

to speak out about the Ogoni's right to protest,

to speak out (publicly) about the need for a fair trial and to request leniency,

threaten to withdraw from Nigeria if necessary.

4,114. It is established that defendants received requests from (legal) persons and organizations during the trial and for the execution of the judgments to get involved in the trial (see under 2.29). Defendants argue that they were and are convinced that a commercial party should not interfere in an internal legal matter of a sovereign state. They also consistently propagated this principle laid down in their Business Principles, said defendants, who further explained that they (a) followed the process and (b) used silent diplomacy.

VI.3. follow process

 4,115. As discussed above, SPDC followed the process through the lawyers at the [Y] office. She received reports of the sessions. From the Nigeria Update of 30 May 1994, which states that [I] was arrested and detained the previous weekend on suspicion of the murder of four Ogoni leaders, [L] in the Nigeria Updates regularly commented on the current state of the trial and on related developments. In the Nigeria Updates, [L] also reported on what was discussed about the process in the conversations he had with the Dutch and British ambassadors. For example, he heard from the British ambassador that a British judge attended part of the trial at the request of the UK government to see if the trial was fair and he stated in the Nigeria Update of June 4, 1995:

"The Judge apparently concluded that it was flawed (some technical points apparently."
Earlier, on April 6, 1995, he had noted in the Nigeria Update:

“The BHC believes that although the charges should not stick, the government will make sure that it is found guilty. He would then be sentenced to death, and reprieved after giving in to pressure from outside, but be incarcerated for a very long time.

The feeling is that this trial by Tribunal will go the way of all others or the child in the past here: nobody ever found innocent. Hence those around [I] are using all methods to try and influence this. ”

4,116. [L] sent his messages to the Dutch and British Service Companies, SIPC in London and (in copy) SIPM in The Hague (see under 2.19). At a meeting in February 1993 in London, attended by representatives of the Service Companies and SPDC, discussions were held on [I] and MOSOP, which were identified in the minutes as a risk to the international reputation of the Shell group, for which it was urgent attention was asked. The minutes state that it has been agreed that:

“SPDC and SIPC PA (Public Affairs) departments to keep each other more closely informed to ensure that movements of key players, what they say and to whom is more effectively monitored to avoid unpleasant surprises and adversely affect the reputation of the Group as a whole . "

Shortly after the process started in February 1995, the Nigeria Issue Contact Group was established within the Shell group in March 1995 to follow developments in Nigeria and to be able to respond to them.

4,117. It is not disputed that the parent companies were aware of the process and the worldwide attention to it. Defendants, including the parent companies, were aware of the criticism of the independence of the tribunal and the fairness of the trial, expressed among other things in the reports of [T], Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. It is common ground that defendants - especially the parent companies - were called on by various non-governmental organizations to intervene in the process.

VI.3.b Silent diplomacy

4,118. Defendants have explained that they have chosen the path of silent diplomacy. What the Shell group has done can be divided into three parts, namely the contacts that [L] had during the trial with Nigerian officials (VI.3.bi), other contacts of (officers of) entities within the Shell -group on the trial (VI.3.b.ii) and the events in the period between the judgment and its execution (VI.3.b.iii). The court thereby bases itself on the content of the Nigeria Updates and other reports from [L] and on discussions within the Shell group, on which both claimants and defendants base their actual views. In the following, the court also takes the witness statements from the Kiobel proceedings of [L], [X] and [WW], which was Group Managing Director during the relevant period, on which the parties both rely.

VI.3.b.i contacts between [L] and Nigerian officials

4,119. On July 22, 1995, [L] spoke with [G]. The day before he had spoken to the British ambassador about the upcoming meeting with [G]. At that time he heard from the British ambassador that the second group of lawyers had been put in the tribunal because they felt that they could not perform their duties properly because the trial was determined by the Nigerian military. [L] noted about this:

“He seemed to be quite sure that KSW [[I], addition court] will be convicted, perhaps to the death penalty, to be commuted later on to life imprisonment. I told him that this would be a very unpleasant outcome for Shell, as the international outrage would certainly involve us. The time between conviction and commutation or the sentence would also be critical to us. There is also the link to the coup plotters: if some of them are shot, then the outside world will, probably justifiably, conclude that KSW may also be executed, and therefore renewed internationalization of the KSW / Ogoni issue could be triggered off even before that verdict is announced.”.

4,120. In preparation for the conversation with [G], [L] also spoke with [F], the second man in Nigeria, on 21 July 1995, who told him:

“The HoS [Head of State, [G], addition court] is very touchy on the matter of foreign criticism, and on the Ogoni issue. It suggested that we should not raise either issue although it may still come up. "

From the Nigeria Update of July 23, 1995, it follows that [L] has followed this advice and has not begun itself against [G] about the Ogoni issue and / or the process. The claimants wrongly ignore the fact that this was done on the express advice of [F]. During this interview, [G] raised the Ogoni issue. [L] wrote about this:

“After I finished with my part (which lasted about 1 ½ hours) he said he had something he wanted to raise with me. The Ogoni issue!

- [G ]’s irritation with Shell's public statements

He suddenly became very strident on the subject, complaining that the biggest company in Nigeria, who had the best knowledge of the activities on the ground in the Ogoni area, had in his eyes failed to adequately portray the real facts of the case to the outside world. (…)

He put me on the spot, and I was finding it particularly hard to get through to him that it was not up to us to defend the government's role. After a long discussion, during which he again became quite heated, he said that he accepted that Shell could not refer to the government's performance in its public statements.

- Shell’s efforts to tread between mines

I told him of our efforts to get the public to understand our position (referring to the Ogoni briefing paper). When I mentioned this, he again became quite incensed, saying that he had read this document and that he found this also to be woolly and not sufficiently clear on what the real facts were. (...)

- Shell’s non-political stance

At this point I tried to defuse the situation by going over the non-political stance that we had tasks, mentioning that our job was to try and do our best to help the government to develop its oil and gas reserves as efficiently as possible, and that we could not take sides with the government on such a sensitive issue. I must say that after explaining this he calmed down a bit, but I was left with the distinct impression that he was not really happy nevertheless.

(...)

I told him of the pressures we as Shell were under on the Ogoni issue internationally and that we had to tread extremely carefully in order to try and minimize the potential (or actual) damage such an issue could cause worldwide business. (…) I told him that we were very conscious of the government's irritation with the public villification it was getting on the Ogoni issue but that we were also being tied into the matter in ways which we also felt were quite wrong.

(...)

I concluded from what he [[G]] said that he had no sympathy for [whatsoever], and we must therefore prepare ourselves for a conviction in this trial with all the difficulties that portends for us.

(...)

He wants us to support him, but I think he now understands better that we have some very clear limits to what we can do publicly, or in private for that matter. ”

4,121. The court concludes from this that [G] wanted SPDC / the Shell group to support the Nigerian authorities in the Ogoni issue and that [L] in response pointed to the non-political course of SPDC / the Shell group . It does not appear that during this conversation with [G] [L] spoke about the suspects' right to a fair trial. [L] stated during the Kiobel procedure that he did so in other discussions with Nigerian officials. Regarding whether defendants (publicly) expressed their views on the right of the suspects to a fair trial during the trial, [L] stated in the Kiobel proceedings as follows:

Q. "Shell Nigeria did say that he [[I], addition court] is entitled to due process?" Do you see that?

A. Correct.

Q. Is that referring to statements you made?

A. Yes. As I testified earlier, that's what I'm referring to.

Q. And it's your recollection that you made these statements prior to Mr [I ]’s conviction?

A. I believe many times and publicly and privately.

(...)

Q. Did you transfer to any officials of the Nigerian government that there was an international perception that the trial did not meet the standards or due legal process?

A. I spent all my time leading through that process, trying to get people to understand we wanted proper legal process and there was a concern being reported in the press that this was not occurring. Hence the reason I was making the statements. "

On the basis of this statement, the court finds that [L] has raised the right to a fair trial of the Ogoni 9 in discussions with Nigerian officials. Regarding the choice of silent diplomacy in the American Kiobel procedure, [L] stated as follows:

Q. (…) do you see the sentence: “Our experience suggests that quiet diplomacy afforded is the very best hope for [I]”?

(...)

A. I worked in many countries where there is a central government with a lot of control, and my experience has been in the past in other countries like Malaysia or the Middle East and so on to get action on sensitive issues it is better to do it with quiet diplomacy than to make it a public domain issue, where people become very polarized and very quickly. In the Western World people tend to be more public with these things. In the developing things success generally requires a degree of quiet diplomacy rather than public debate. ”

VI.3.2 other contacts with Nigerian officials

4,122. On 16 March 1995, officials from other Shell entities, including [XX], Head of Public Affairs of the Shell group, (hereinafter: [XX]) discussed the trial with the Nigerian ambassador in London. The Nigerian ambassador commented on [I]: "there is every chance he will be found guilty" and spoke about the "misinformation" about the process of, among others, [YY] of The Body Shop. According to the report of this meeting:

“Hey [the Nigerian ambassador, addition court] then called Shell to put head together with the Mission to effectively debunk all the false allegations peddled against Nigeria and Shell about Ogoni and [I].

4. In his reaction Mr. [XX] said that Shell was aware of the vicious campaign embarked upon by Shell and Nigeria. He informed HC that Shell has been inundated with hundreds of letters of protest and abuse regarding their operations in Nigeria. He noted that, apart from the Body Shop, Green Peace, Action Earth, Church groups, Amnesty International as well as Shell Shareholders have all been involved in the campaign. They complain about the environment and human rights issue. Some of the complaints were that Shell should prevail on the Nigerian government to release [I]. "

4,123. Just like during the conversation referred to in section 4.120 that [L] had with [G], Nigerian people insisted on working together, with [XX] pointing to international criticism of the trial and the complaint that Shell was not exerting pressure on the Nigerian authorities to release [I]. During this meeting it was agreed that one of the reports from the independent organizations on the trial would be provided to the Nigerian ambassador. This raised the criticism of the process during and following this conversation. Furthermore, the Nigerian side was not urged to work together on this issue.


VI.3.3. the period between convictions and executions

4,124. After the Tribunal sentenced Ogoni 9 to death by hanging on 30 and 31 October 1995, it was decided at the CMD meeting of 31 October and 1 November 1995 that [L] would contact [G] to To speak to the Shell Group on the enforcement of judgments. [ZZ] - the then Regional Coordinator for Latin America and Africa at SPIM - would do the same at the Nigerian High Commissioner in London. [X] stated the following about this in the Kiobel procedure:

"Q. Was the possibility of Mr [I] being discussed at any meetings of the Committee of Managing Directors?

A. yes, it was.

(...)

A. I do remember that we discussed in the Committee of Managing Directors or the chairman should write a letter to ask for clemency. I think we discussed that twice, and the second time we decided that I would do so, yes.

(...)

Q What do you recall being discussed at the committee about that subject?

A. What we discussed at that particular meeting was whether we should, as a group, send a letter to the head of state and ask for clemency. As has been recorded here, it was decided against, most definitely on the basis of advice from [L], who — and I don't specifically recall — may have said, “Don't do that at this stage. Let me try and get to the head of state and talk to him. ” whether sending a letter would be counter-productive or not, at least at this stage, his advice must have been “don't do it.”

Q. Do you have a recollection of Mr [L] making that advice?

A. Not a specific one, but I can well imagine that you got used to it because that would be totally in line with our policy.

Q. What policy is that?

A. The policy is not to interfere from a distance in the affairs of an operating company.

(...)

A. I remember the chief executive for a long time advised not to do that because he felt that a direct contact with the head of state would be more appropriate and effective.

Q. It says here, "It was agreed that Mr. [L] should seek access to the head of state to explain Shell’s concerns."

(...)

A. I remember that we felt that it was necessary to do something, and here we decided to give [L] a chance to talk to the head of state. "

4,125. The choice of [L] is explained by [WW] as follows:

“[L] had become a respected and trusted figure in Nigeria and, notwithstanding the criticism that he attracted to himself by raising this subject with [G] —and you saw his note about how the President got very agitated when he did bring it up on that one occasion— [L], having been born in Nigeria and feeling passionate about Nigeria — you know [L], I'm sure — was quite the best individual to express these views to the Nigerian authorities; whether the president himself, [F] or anyone else or great seniority in Nigeria. "

4,126. In the Nigeria Update of November 2, 1995, [L] wrote about a meeting on November 1, 1995 with [F]. Among other things, this Update states that the reason for this visit was that [L] [G] wanted to visit:

“The visit to the Head of State [[G], addition court] would have the objective or trying to obtain his support for clemency and the commutation of the recent sentence of death on [I] for his part in the murder of 4 Ogoni elsewhere in May 1994. (…)

[F] agreed to request the HoS [Head of State] for an audience for him and I on the 17th or the 18th November, after his (S's) return from a visit to South Africa.

[F] advised very strongly against Shell sending any letter to the Head of State asking for clemency for KSW. He felt that it would be very badly and that it may seriously jeopardize the objective.

He did not believe that [G] would carry out the sentence, nor did he expect any sudden moves: rather, he expected that a final decision on the matter may well be made much later in the year, possibly in December. He felt that having given clemency to the military in the recent coup plotters saga he would not be able to do any differently with a civilian.

I emphasized that Shell would be obliged to defend itself against criticism from many quarters, both locally and internationally, over the following weeks and that we could not take the government's corner. He [[F]] accepted this as a matter of fact. He did however remind me of the HoS's demand that Shell be more (publicly) supportive, and he said that HoS felt that the government were doing what they could help Shell!

(...)

Said me that [G] seemed to have valued our last talk very highly and he felt that he would welcome a fairly frequent dialogue of this kind. (...) This bodes well if true. "

However, the intended conversation between [L] and [G] did not take place. [L] stated in the Kiobel proceedings that he tried to make an appointment with [G] both before and after the death penalty was imposed, but that he did not succeed.

4,127. At the meeting of the CMD on 7 November 1995 it was decided to send a request for humanitarian clemency to [G] on behalf of the Shell group. [X] stated the following about this in the Kiobel procedure:

"Q. At this meeting of the Committee of Managing Directors was it decided that you should send a personal letter to President [G]?

A. Yes, it was, yes.

Q. Can you recount for me, as best you can, how did that decision come about?

A. I don't have a detailed recollection, but I think what made us decide to do that was that [L] hadn't been able to talk to the head of state directly. He tried. At the previous meeting I remember his advice that he would seek an appointment with the head of state, so we decided not to send a letter. Now that that discussion did not have place tasks, we felt that we had to do something. The discussion was “Why are we doing that, if we do it at all?” I do recall that I said, “We do that on humanitarian grounds” —I could well have added to that, that I am absolutely against the death penalty - "and now that it looks like if this is moving in that direction in the case, we have indeed made it known to the head or state that we are against that."

Q. Did Mr [L] change his recommendation as to whether or not a direct request for clemency should be made?

A. That I don't recall, but I think it is much more likely to think that, after we learned that he had been unable to see the head of state, we felt that we had to do something.

(...)

Q. There is reference to this letter being a personal letter. Is that correct? This is a personal letter?

A. It is personal in a way that it is from person to person, yes. But I think it's quite clear in what capacity it is written. It doesn't say writing to the head of state from his private address. It clearly states Mr [X] writing to the head of state in his capacity as chairman of the Committee of Managing Directors of the Royal Dutch Shell group of companies.

Q. The address that's located at the bottom of this letter?

A. That's the address of Royal Dutch.

(...)

A.(…) Because this had become, at this particular time, an issue which was not just an SPDC issue, but was an issue for the group as a whole. The group was attacked everywhere almost, and we felt that, as a group, we had to show that we, indeed, were of the opinion that, whatever the conclusion of the legal process was in Nigeria, that it’s not something for us to interfere with; that we would be against the death sentence.”

Subsequently, on 8 November 1995, on behalf of the entire Shell group, the request for clemency referred to under 2.36 was made for the nine persons sentenced to death by the Ogoni Tribunal. This request has been handed over to the Nigerian High Commissioner with a request to forward it to [G].


VI.3.4 assessment

4,128. It follows from the above that defendants have explicitly made the choice, in view of their Business Principles, not to intervene in the political and legal issues of the country in which they were operating and not to speak publicly about the trial, but the path of silent to follow diplomacy. They also acted accordingly. In the conversations with Nigerian officials, they were confronted with a desire to work together, which was not met. Furthermore, during the trial, [L] spoke in general about the right to and importance of a fair trial for the Ogoni 9. At least in the period between the conviction and the executions, the trial and fate of the Ogoni 9 became seen as an issue that affected the Shell group as a whole and not (any longer) as a local issue that (only) SPDC had to deal with. Even then, a conscious decision was made not to make a public request for clemency. The path of silent diplomacy was chosen, eventually resulting in the letter of 8 November 1995 on behalf of the Shell group to [G].

4,129. The accusations of claimants for not or insufficiently intervening in the process can only succeed as defendants, by following the process and opting for silent diplomacy and not taking other action, the fundamental rights of their spouses invoked by claimants and / or of have violated themselves. The assertions of claimants imply that the defendants were obliged to do more than they did on the basis of the fundamental rights invoked by claimants. However, the court has found no clues for the correctness of that position, for example in the form of precedents or widely accepted views of Nigerian legal scholars. Such clues were also not put forward by the parties in their statements about the content and application of the fundamental rights invoked by claimants. The court's conclusion is that defendants have not violated these fundamental rights by following the process and opting for silent diplomacy.

4,130. In this judgment, the Court also takes into account the experiences of [L] that advocated silent diplomacy, mentioned under 4.121, the warnings from different sides referred to in 4.120 to be cautious when addressing issues at [G] - who was not served with criticism and thought that SPDC did not sufficiently support the Nigerian government - and the explicit advice of [F] not to make a public request for clemency, with [F] also expressing the expectation execution of the death sentence. [F] also assumed that the death sentence, just as had happened with the military coup armies, would be converted into a prison sentence (see 4.126). Nevertheless, after the convictions, a serious and urgent attempt to influence the fate of the Ogoni 9 was made, with the CMD's decision to allow [L] to contact Nigeria in [G] and to agree that [ZZ] the Nigerian ambassador to London. Furthermore, with the final clemency request made on behalf of the entire Shell group, signed by the chairman of the CMD, it was made clear to [G] that this was a serious and urgent request.

4,131. In addition, there are no clues to assume that the trial would have been different, and plaintiffs' spouses would not have been convicted and executed if defendants had acted differently than they did. As defendants have argued, it is highly questionable whether they had an influence on [G] that plaintiffs attribute to them and that was also supposed at the time, for example by [I] (see his letter of 13 May 1995, under 4.107) and those who called on the defendants to take a (public) stand concerning the trial and the conviction of the Ogoni 9. After all, it follows from the reports of the conversations of [L] with [G] that [G] was not served with criticism, and on the contrary, SPDC did not support the Nigerian government enough. These reports also mention the cash call issue; that is the continuous efforts that SPDC had to make to persuade the Nigerian government to meet the cash calls made in the context of the joint venture, not contradicted by claimants. [L] summarizes this in his Nigeria Update of April 6, 1995:

“There is still a strong belief among these people that we have the power to get [G] to let [I] off! Would that we had such power, we certainly would not have had the cash calls problems if we had! ”(See 4.105).

4,132. Plaintiffs argue - without further explanation - that defendants should have threatened not to proceed with the NLNG deal referred to under 2.39, which was negotiated with the Nigerian government during the trial, or to attach conditions to it. Partly against the background of what was considered under 4,131 about the influence that the defendants actually had / were able to exert, this bare proposition cannot be effective. The same applies to the claimants' claim that the defendants should have threatened to withdraw from Nigeria if necessary. Although it's given that SPDC

- for other reasons - the oil extraction in Ogoniland ceased in 1995, puts the defendants 'argument about the practicability of the withdrawal threat in perspective, does not benefit some of the claimants' explanation, which is not explained in detail, because it cannot be assumed that this threat would have an effect. Here too, the question is whether plaintiffs do not attribute defendants more influence than they had on [G], who was not served by criticism and found that SPDC did not support the Nigerian government too little.

4,133. To the extent that defendants were already required to intervene under applicable Nigerian law, they have done enough by following the trial and opting for silent diplomacy. The court does not say in a general sense that a company must use silent diplomacy in cases such as this. The court ruled that defendants were not obliged to do more, as claimants argue. The accusation that defendants have not (publicly) used their influence to persuade the Nigerian government to conduct a fair trial and that leniency for the Ogoni 9 is therefore not valid.

 

VII. Conclusion

4,134. Claimants will be allowed to prove that:

(i) SPDC was involved in bribing the witnesses [U], [V], [II], [YY], [KK], [LL], [MM] and [NN] because [a.] [Y] by order of SPDC and / or a representative of SPDC attended the meeting (s) where these witnesses had to prepare / sign the statements prepared by others and / or [b.] SPDC has contributed financially to the payments to these witnesses and / or [c.] SPDC has promised these witnesses a job, and

(ii) the statements of witnesses bribed with the involvement of SPDC played a role in: [a.] the conviction of the spouses of claimants by the tribunal and / or [b.] the arrest and detention of spouses of claimants and / or [c.] the detention of claimants.

4,135. As has been considered above, part (ii) of the evidence assignment is only relevant if the involvement of SPDC as the meaning of (i) is established. Plaintiffs are admitted to the evidence of both parts of the evidence assignment for procedural economic reasons. Whether and to what extent this claim by claimants actually applies will be assessed after the evidence has been delivered.


4,136. The other accusations of claimants have no purpose. The other points of dispute about this - such as the question if and to what extent, and on what basis, the actions or omissions of the claimants on this point can be attributed to each of the defendants - need not be discussed. If and insofar as the documents to be provided in the incident give claimants cause to set new facts or otherwise give rise to a further position, claimants must proceed as quickly as possible.

4,137. The court holds any further decision in the main proceedings.

 

5. The decision

The court:

in the incident
 

5.1.orders defendants to provide claimants with a copy of: a. 21 days after the date of this judgment at the latest:

- the documents from the privilege log (production 198 summons and production 3, overview of CDST documents) with the following numbers: 91 up to and including 94, 97 and 98, 100 up to and including 105, 125, 163, 165,166 and 199 up to and including with 206;

- the unedited minutes of the CMD of 7 November 1995, insofar as these omitted passages relate to the tribunal and / or the Ogoni issue;

 

5.2.commits to the sentence referred to in 5.1 a penalty of € 5,000 for each day that defendants fail to comply with this sentence after service of the judgment, with a maximum of € 50,000;
 

5.3.Prohibits claimants from disclosing to third parties about (the content of) the subject
 

5.1the documents referred to, with the proviso that they may only use these documents in this procedure and that they may not provide these documents to third parties;
 

5.4.rejects the more or otherwise advanced;
 

5.5.compensates for litigation costs in the incident in the sense that the parties bear their own costs;

in the main case
 

5.6.allow claimants to prove that:

(i) SPDC was involved in bribing the witnesses [U], [V], [II], [YY], [KK], [LL], [MM] and [NN] because

a. [Y] by order of SPDC and / or a representative of SPDC attended the meeting (s) where these witnesses had to prepare / sign the statements prepared by others and / or

b. SPDC has contributed financially to the payments to these witnesses and / or

c. SPDC has promised these witnesses a job, and

(ii) the statements of witnesses bribed with the involvement of SPDC played a role in:

the conviction of the spouses of claimants by the tribunal and / or

b. the arrest and detention of spouses of claimants and / or

c. the detention of claimants;

 

5.7.stipulates that, if they wish to have witnesses heard, the witnesses and the days of absence from the parties and their lawyers must state on 5 June 2019 in the months September 2019 to December 2019, after which the date and time of the witness hearing will be determined,
 

5.8.determines that this hearing of witnesses will take place at the hearing of Mr L. Alwin, LL.M., who has been appointed for this purpose in the palace of justice in The Hague at Prins Clauslaan 20,
 

5.9.keeps every further decision.

This judgment was given by L. Alwin, B. Meijer and A. C. Bordes, and was pronounced in public on 1 May 2019.