(Pix Credit: Reuters, "Flag-waving 63-year-old gives Hong Kong protesters lesson in endurance" NY Post 3 July 2019 ("'I bought them in Shenzhen,” a smiling Wong, known affectionately as grandma, told Reuters of the flags, referring to the southern Chinese city across the border where she now lives. 'I had to ask secretly because they only showed the Chinese flag. So I asked them if they had the British flag and they take it out to show me. If you don’t ask, they don’t show.'"))
This is the second of two posts and includes the reflections of Larry
Catá Backer. The first post, the the Reflections of Flora Sapio, can be accessed here. Both posts also include Professor Zhang's essay, "The Capital of Protests" Who is Hong Kong? [郑永年：“抗议之都” 谁主香港？](Part 1 HERE; Part 2 HERE)), in the original
Chinese language version ( 原版中文版) along with a crude English translation that itself retains the ambiguities of the original text.
Now in its New Era of historical development, China has emerged as a great driving force for law and politics across a broad front of issues at the core of law, governance, politics and economics. The Coalition for Peace and Ethics has been following two remarkable trajectories in the development of theory and in its practice. The theoretical development centers around the re-construction of theories of imperialism devoid of its Western baggage of racism, occupation, and Western versions of cultural ethno-centrism. ( see, essays in CPE EmpireSeries).
Introduction to the posts
Now in its New Era of historical development, China has emerged as a great driving force for law and politics across a broad front of issues at the core of law, governance, politics and economics. The Coalition for Peace and Ethics has been following two remarkable trajectories in the development of theory and in its practice. The theoretical development centers around the re-construction of theories of imperialism devoid of its Western baggage of racism, occupation, and Western versions of cultural ethno-centrism. ( see, essays in CPE EmpireSeries).
The practical development centers on the construction and operation of a centerpiece of Chinese extra-national constitutional theory—the one country two systems principle (2019 Hong Kong Situation), and from there its extension to bilateral relations (contextually shaped) between China and its Belt and Road Initiative partners (Belt Road Initiative).
This developing theory and its practice implications are among the most interesting advances in political, economic and cultural relations since the construction of the contemporary global system under the leadership of the United States and its allies. It is especially interesting both for the way it signals a quite dynamic building of an organic political philosophy of Chinese Marxist-Leninism, and for the way this political philosophy is projected outward to drive re-conceptualization of law and politics on a global level.
These trajectories have now appeared to converge around the emerging situation in Hong Kong. CPE members have been observing the actions and reactions of the principal actors in that development since the start of the public phase of popular agitation and public response in June 2019 ). It is in that context that many have been following the shifting positions of governmental actors and other stakeholders in response to the social protests that have occurred in Hong Kong since June 20919.
Less noticed but perhaps ultimately more important, has been the high level discourse among elite intellectual circles with relations to the major actors in these processes of development. On occasion, these elite conversations among high status intellectuals are circulated. They provide sometimes brilliant insight into the forms and approaches that are likely to emerge in popular economic and political circles among the major actors. They are each worthy of careful reading in their own right, but are especially useful for a study of the emergence.
One of the more interesting conversations among the many is that between Albert Chen and Zheng Yongnian, a professor at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore. Professor Zheng has been at the forefront of intellectual movements and among the relevant academic community (e.g.,Brief Thoughts on Zheng Yongnian: Is Marxism Really Revived in China? [郑永年：马克思主义在中国真的复兴了吗？]). The interest, from the perspective of the CPE arises from the insight they each give to emerging positions on the key theoretical and practical developments of Chinese theories of imperialism in the New Era context in which Hong Kong has become a critical practical incubator—the site from which truth may be developed form facts.
CPE has already noted the elegant and quite sophisticated essays of Albert Chen (here, here, and here). With this post and the next, CPE members reflect on what may be considered a response to Professor Chen. That response, on Zheng Yongnian: "The Capital of Protests" Who is Hong Kong? [郑永年：“抗议之都” 谁主香港？] (Part 1 HERE; Part 2 HERE)) is also worthy of deep study both in its own right and for the way it reflects changing thinking about both Socialist New Era imperialist theory, and its global context (e.g., starting with Singapore). It originally appeared in the Hong Kong daily newspaper Lianhe Zaobao.
Reflections on Zheng Yongnian: "The Capital of Protests" Who is Hong Kong? [郑永年：“抗议之都” 谁主香港？] Part 2
Larry Catá Backer
CPE Working Group on Empire
鼎
(an ancient three legged bronze cauldron; the throne or leadership "core"; or more broadly the state apparatus)
Hong Kong is not the cauldron itself, or figuratively the throne (as itself a symbol of the authority given to the leadership "core" by the mandate of heaven), but rather an element of its content. But is an element of the cauldron that itself has upset the harmony that the cauldron represents--it has upset the order of things by its own fundamental disorder. To understand Hog Kong, then, within the stabilizing context of 鼎"ding" one must understand the root of its instability, it disorder. To do that, one must first unearth the reason why disorder is the fundamental order of Hong Kong--and one must do that from the perspective of the "core" and from the foundational principles of harmony and prosperity which is itself the evidence of good order.But that is not Hong Kong. Professor Zheng notes Hong Kong as the capital of protests, whose protests "have never been interrupted." This is not just disorder but the essence of disorder as a structural ordering pattern: "Such frequent social protests in a city are rare in world history." The result is a social shackling whose product is inevitable--violence. Social harmony, the cauldron again, provides thick walls that protect harmony, bring order and prosperity under the ordering responsibility of a "core;" direction directly by popular collectives produces the opposite, an inverted social order--social disruption, cultures of protests, a threat to prosperity that shackles society and normalizes violence. This is the cauldron overturned--a powerful discursive trope with a wealth of underlying meaning in history, culture, politics, etc.. That disorders produces the usual warnings that have been a constant theme of the pronouncement of central authorities, one that Professor Zheng underlines: "And it is not difficult to understand that any social protest, if the parties do not compromise, must end with violence. There are too many historical experiences to prove this inevitable result."
Professor Zheng, then, brings us from the narrative positioning of the situation in Hing Kong to his own role in its elaboration--to investigate its causes and suggest a way to bring Hong Kong back to order and Harmony. To do that the intellectual must probe deeply into the contradictions that have produced disharmony, identify the "sickness" that is embedded in that disorder, and excise it. The process, as Professor Zheng will show, is made infinitely easier where the "sickness" is equated with the foreign (the way that viruses and bacterial are foreign to the human body), and thus identified, can be opposed to bring the body back to health. In Professor Zheng's words: "To put it bluntly, there is only one fundamental problem in Hong Kong, that is: Who is Hong Kong?
To that end, Professor Zheng constructs a set of fundamental oppositions, one that mirrors the position of the emerging position of the central authorities. One is constructed as endogenous (and benign)--China and its elaboration of a system of sovereignty over territory to which the authority to rule has been delegated. He notes, for example, "China enjoys less and less actual sovereignty, manifested in a limited area of diplomacy, and enjoys only "honorary sovereignty" in most areas. Even the garrison has only symbolic meaning." And, indeed, the maintenance of One Country Two Systems has been costly to China to the advantage of those profiting from disorder in Hong Kong. Professor Zheng writes: "The actual situation is that in order to maintain "one country, two systems", the mainland has delivered a large number of benefits to Hong Kong in order to maintain its prosperity, at least economically.
The other is constructed as exogenous--the colonialist imperialism of the United Kingdom (principally though the shadow of the United States can be discerned at the edges). Here in the face of China's critical role in economic stands the unmoving wall that is the colonial legacy of the United Kingdom in the form of a legal architecture that itself ensures disorder. He concludes: "As far as governance is concerned, the most substantive legal system is not within China's sovereignty."
Thus framed in the comfortable style of an oppositional binary, Professor Zheng is able to take the blunter discourse of the Black Hand [黑手](see CPE's discussion here and here) and elaborate a quite sophisticated theoretics of rule with substantial implications for the construction of an imperial order built around (like the rings of Beijing) an ever widening circle of relationship between sovereignty and rule that extends outward from the center to the farthest peripheral regions. But to do that Professor Zheng must put Hong Kong in perspective and in order.
These fundamental oppositions--of harmony and chaos, of leadership core and popular chaos, of social peace and violence--is then elaborated through the lens of four distinct lenses to themes. These themes include (1) the authority of the Hong Kong Chief Executive (the absence of a leadership core); (2) the persistence of foreign forces (the black hand as a structural element); (3) the contrast to Singapore (the model imperial partner); and (4) the fundamental contradiction of disorder and social harmony (the impossibility of social harmony in the face of an embedded foreign element)). Let us consider each in turn.
The Hong Kong Chief Executive:
Professor Zheng here subtly raises a point well made by Jiang Shigong and other Chinese scholars--that the transposition of forms of governance also transposes with it the underlying ideology from which that form of governance derived (see, Larry Catá Backer, "Between the Judge and the Law: Judicial Independence and Authority With Chinese Characteristics," Connecticut Journal of International Law 33(1):1-41
(2017)). In this case Professor Zheng pointedly directs attention of the Western structural element in the organization of the Hong Kong government: separation of powers and an autonomous judiciary singled out for special mention. These together strip the leadership core of its authority. And the singular lack of that authority contributes to disharmony--to a leaderless collective that then in seeking to govern becomes ungovernable. But for Zheng it does much more than that--it suggests the heart of his first theme about the structural embedding of instability and disharmony on Hong Kong--that de-colonization has never, in fact, been successful, and that as a consequence of the constraints placed on China by the 1997 agreement (and the one country two systems principle, Hong Kong remains effectively a dependency of the United Kingdom. "The entire judicial system is still almost in the hands of the 'Hong Kong British authorities' who are 'reclusive'. Even the administrative system, except for the chief executive, is still receiving the 'whole' from the British Hong Kong authorities."
With one bold brush stroke, Professor Zheng is able to transform a sector of the indigenous population and in the process to blot them out form the Chinese polity. There are marvelous echoes of a similar effort to recast, and thus dismiss, sectors of the Chinese population in the early period of Mao Zedong's leadership, though perhaps to different ends.
You are dictatorial." My dear sirs, what you say is correct. That is just what we are. All the experiences of the Chinese people, accumulated in the course of successive decades, tell us to carry out a people's democratic dictatorship.
This means that the reactionaries must be deprived of the right to voice their opinions; only the people have that right.
Who are the "people"? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.
Under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, these classes unite to create their own state and elect their own government so as to enforce their dictatorship over the henchmen of imperialism -- the landlord class and bureaucratic capitalist class, as well as the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang, which represents these classes, and their accomplices. The people's government will suppress such persons. It will only permit them to behave themselves properly. It will not allow them to speak or act wildly. Should they do so, they will be instantly curbed and punished. The democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly and association. The right to vote is given only to the people, not to the reactionaries. These two things, democracy for the people and dictatorship for the reactionaries, when combined, constitute the people's democratic dictatorship. (Mao Zedong, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1950))
This is an essential underlying trope--but now undertaken not in the context of class struggle but in a new transformational anti-colonialism that is at the same time imperial in the sense of its approach to a hierarchical arrangement of political relations). Of course that conclusion necessarily ignores the repudiation of the 1997 agreement by Chinese authorities, as well as the incorporation of the doctrine into the CCP Basic Line. But the object is to connect legal dependency on a foreign ideology with instability in a territory that is formally a Chinese dependency but in fact is beholden to another sovereign (or at leats that sovereign's ghost).
To that end, Professor Zheng spends time in the essay suggest that the Chief Executive is structurally impeded from exercising authority. The impediment is a system that Professor Zheng suggests transforms the civil service into a political party and a source of opposition to the Chief Executive. As a consequence, he argues, it has been difficult for the Hong Kong government to "make a difference." But he does this in a curious way--by measuring the number of "effective laws and policies. . . passed by the SAR government." This is a curious measure indeed, and perhaps misleading for two reasons. One it is offered without attaching it the to satisfaction of a need. It might well be that large numbers of laws were unnecessary (but Professor Zheng has a different purpose in mind here--the need for lots of law to eliminate vestiges of the UK legal system for which numbers might matter more). The other is that quantity is usually not a satisfactory measure of quality. Professor Zheng does offer some examples of what he believes were good initiatives that were not adopted.
More interesting is Professor Zheng's notion that, if the Chief Executive is bereft of power then the power had to go somewhere (other than, it seems to the civil service (itself an odd leap). That power, however is unlikely to find its way to the collective. First, he is dismissive of the efforts at double universal suffrage. Second, he sees in the devolution of power downward as the very definition of instability and disorder.
First, "it is difficult to adjust", and no compromise can be reached. People have produced a "one step in place" political reform fantasy. In the process of winning, the protesters did not have the opportunity to fulfill their demands, but because there was no compromise, all opportunities were lost. Second, the protests turned into violence and developed into a devastating social movement “protest against protests” or a sporty society.
One moves back here to the cauldron upended. And it requires the machinery of government--and its core leaders, to set it right.
The Black Hand [黑手] as a Structural Element that is Sourced in the Colonial Experience.
This gets Professor Zheng to a major insight in his marvelous essay--that the cause of disharmony in Hong Kong can be traced to the continued infection of foreign elements that have neither been absorbed properly or eliminated. 黑手] discourse in a much more interesting context.
To get there, though, Professor Zheng notes that a straightforward national analysis grounded in the well worm theories of simple de-colonization won't work because of Hing Kong's unique position as a global commercial center. To overcome that challenge Professor Zheng first posits the character of Hong Kong as an "international city." It follows form thsi internationalism that the recognition and tolerance of foreign forces is necessary. But it must necessarily also be controlled. And that is the missing element here. "This is reality, whether people like it or not. What needs to be addressed is whether the SAR Government has the ability to curb the negative effects of these foreign forces." And thus the foreign element discursive trope is fully formed; here one finds a much more sophisticated encounter with the Black Hand [
Effectively the picture painted is this: the ghosts of 19th century colonialism (a colonialism whose ghosts haunt the People's Republic from the Opium Wars "big bang" effect) haunt Hong Kong, but these spectres do more than haunt, they have possessed the international city. While the ghosts cannot be chased away (they are good for business) they must be used (exploited) but tightly controlled. Here one finds a convergence with Chinese trade policies (and its echoes in the similar line of the U.S. Trump Administration). At the same time, one wonders whether the obsession with these now ancient tropes perversely d much to carry their effects forward to the present and to magnify their effects. In this sense this version of the Black Hand might both serve as a self-fulfilling prophesy or worse, serve as the catalyst for its construction in the first place. But that is a bridge now crossed.
The spectral character of this argument, it antiquarian turn, is nicely evidenced with its focus on the United Kingdom. But it is also crucial to the argument that the 1997 agreement locked Hong Kong into a state of perpetual colonial status dependent on the United Kingdom but maintained by the People's Republic.
As far as the impact of Britain on Hong Kong is concerned, to a large extent, after the return of 1997, Hong Kong has only changed from a British "direct colony" to a British "indirect colony." Except for some text changes and literal articles (even including the Basic Law), when the return of 1997, Hong Kong did not change anything. After the reunification, no major changes (especially institutional changes) have occurred to reflect Hong Kong people's autonomy or Chinese sovereignty. What the parties have endeavored is only the "rule of law" in Hong Kong.
Yet the conflation of legal forms to contradiction in political system is to some extent a fairly thin reed onto which to hand this argument. It is at its most powerful as a formalist argument at the level of macro-analysis. Yet one wonders how well it holds up at the micro level. But that is the problem; what makes Hong Kong so difficult for systems grounded in a fundamental ordering principle of leadership cores is the extent to which a space is available that may be managed but not controlled. It is here that the contradiction between systems becomes acute. But that is not a function of colonialism so much as an indigenous emerging political culture. And that is what poses the greatest challenge for Hong Kong's ultimate sovereign, one still in search of a resolution.
For this reason, Professor Zheng's discussion of the contribution of what he might term colonial rule of law sensibilities, focuses on what he perceives as its political effects. Here one moves from the abstract colonialism of legal systems, to the more concrete colonialism of entrenched power. It does so in twp respects. First rule of law is the manifestation of the law as the mechanism of direct colonialization. Second, it also serves as the mechanics of an indirect colonialism to the extent law protects the interests of foreigners in Hong Kong's international cityscape through ist discourse of rights to person and property.
But this "rule of law" system has become the most effective tool for maintaining vested interests, especially for the UK. Not only that, because it is an "indirect colony", the British or other foreign forces, they only take advantage . . . without any responsibility. . . .. It is the most effective "supervisor" of the SAR government and the most effective resistance to changes in Hong Kong.
What makes this more striking is the quite profound way in which Professor Zheng is able to translate the central authorities' Black Hand campaign by refocusing it from the crude efforts of the UNited States to influence the protestors to a much more powerful indictment of the 1997 Agreement and the underlying basis of One Country Two Systems doctrine. That, though, is not likely to entirely please the central authorities who remain committed to the principle--committed enough to threaten occupation of Hong Kong to preserve the system. Now does not appear to be the time to quesiton One Country Two Systems fundamental premises. But the indictment is still worth considering--it is simple to state: that the Black Hand that undermines Hong Kong is not the Americans encouraging protest, but rather the Black hand is embedded into the core legal framework of Hong Kong, into its political culture, and into the values it encourages. Ironically this argument appears to come straight from a Western playbook--most successful deployed today by Western feminists and critical legal scholars but now nicely deployed to post colonial decolonization.
Professor Zheng's notion of indirect colonialism is particularly interesting. There is something to the idea of shades of colonialism. But that also suffers a flaw--it conflates vertically ordered power relations which may be necessary and benign ( for example the relationship between China and Singapore, or those between China and its Belt and Road Initiative partners) and colonialism. That is colonialism and imperialism are conflated, But we have suggested that this is a vestige of a passing era, and that the two systems of power relationships are not necessarily identical.
Professor Zheng does have a sense of this in his nicely nuanced discussion of legal decolonization in the paragraphs that follow. None of these provide a satisfactory guide, with one possible exception--Singapore. That is the example Professor Zheng offers to Hong Kong. After independence, according to Professor Zheng, "the original colonial heritage was effectively decolonized, and while retaining a positive legacy, its negative aspects were removed leaving a rule of law that promotes social harmony." Professor Zheng assures us that this "is in stark contrast to the "rule of law" in Hong Kong. To a large extent, Hong Kong's "rule of law" can effectively protect the interests of the original colonists, but it is difficult to enhance Hong Kong's own interests." It is here, at last, that Professor Zheng can fuse his layering of contradictions to point to the core problem of Hing Kong--its imbalance.
That brings Professor Zheng to the consequences of disharmony and the inversion of the social order. That comes in two distinct but related forms. The first is tied to the paradox of a bottom up governance in which power is not actually held by the "bottom." Here one has a variation of the ruling class control through the facade of democratic governance that is at the heart of much of the Leninist critique of Western liberal democracy. Professor Zheng refines these and applies them to the situation in Hong Kong to some effect. First, bottom up power serves the vested interests of the "ruling elite" in Hong Kong. Second, the principle value of this relationships that the ruling elite is able to enjoy the benefits of protection without the bother of assuming any responsibility for the result. Instead they have constructed a paper tiger Executive to misdirect popular anger to a convenient target. It is here that Hong Kong's western indirect colonial leash serves it purpose: "The “rule of law” has the same logic for vested interests, that is, “the rule of law” is the most effective weapon to protect their interests from losses. Considering that Hong Kong's deep-rooted vested interests are now growing up during the British Hong Kong authorities, this logic is not difficult to understand.
(Pix credit here)
Here, again, Professor Zheng develops an indirect attack on the foundations of the One COuntry Two Systems policy. That policy now serves as the great obstacle to returning Hong Kong to a state of social harmony and its system to a natural stability. "But realistically, because it is the implementation of "one country, two systems", it is difficult for mainland China to change the colonial heritage of Hong Kong in the past. Only Hong Kong itself has this ability." Professor Zheng, however, argues that the current situation in Hong Kong makes clear Hong Kong's unwillingness or inability to change. That inability is also institutional and deeply embedded in Hong Kong's political, economic, legal, and social cultures. He takes aim at Hong Kong's educational system, in ways that echo what appears to be the criticism of the central government, about the critical role of Hing Kong's education elite sin perpetuating ideologies of disharmony--of deliberately cultivating the upending of the cauldron of state.
On the practical level, after the reunification, the colonial education has not only changed, but has intensified. The former democratic movement still had some "anti-British" flavors, but now it has turned to the mainland of the motherland. National identity has completely gone to the opposite side. It is necessary to clearly understand that the main body of the protesters over the years has been the younger generation who grew up after the reunification of 1997. They are also the mainstay of the "Hong Kong independence" power.
This is a powerful indictment. We will be curious to see what, if any, response, Hing Kong's educational elite has to this charge.
Professor Zheng offers a way out, though--a greater emphasis on building programs that aim to stress the one country part of the doctrine and to give the two systems elements a more marginal role. To solve the problem of One Country Two systems, then, one country must prevail over two systems. And to prevail, the foreign elements of two systems must first be identified and eliminated.
To that end, Professor Zheng proposes an approach that is likely to have some influence. He argues that the 1997 transfer was effectively both flawed and incomplete. It has produced the disharmony that has led directly to the current situation and has exposed what he terms the great contradictions of the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. In effect, he suggests, there was no return, just the forms of return. What is necessary he suggest, is the actual return of Hong Kong to China in form and effect. To that end he proposes a second return of Hong Kong to China. That will be a matter for China--and not for Hong Kong. But it will involve a radical transformation of both one country two systems and of the legal, political, social and economic order in Hong Kong.Whatever one thinks of this approach, one must agree with Professor Zheng that "Things have already happened and Hong Kong cannot return to its original point."
__________
郑永年：“抗议之都” 谁主香港？
时间:2019-08-20 07:47内容来源:联合早报 版阅读：新闻归类:观点评论
香港的局势发展到今天，其实也并不是那么令人震惊。（彭博社） 对香港观察者来说，香港的局势发展到今天，其实也并不是那么令人震惊。这么多年来，香港的抗议活动从来没有间断过，并不难计算这
对香港观察者来说，香港的局势发展到今天，其实也并不是那么令人震惊。这么多年来，香港的抗议活动从来没有间断过，并不难计算这座城市已经发生了多少大大小小的、出自不同背景、具有不同目标的抗议活动。一座城市发生如此频繁的社会抗议活动，在世界历史上非常罕见。实际上，抗议趋向于具有人们所说的“死磕”性质，抗议活动已经“日常生活化”了。有人说，香港是名副其实的“抗议之都”，这并不会过。
人们感到震惊的是抗议活动的暴力化。香港是一个富裕城市，中产阶级居多，较理性，较之其它地方，抗议相对平和。但现在完全不同了，暴力化已经成为一个不可扭转的大趋势。而这也不难理解，任何社会抗议，如果各方得不到妥协，必然以暴力终结。有太多的历史经验证明了这一必然的结果。
局势发展到这个地步，人们必须选择支持哪一边。但如果面向未来，人们必须花很大的精力来理解“何从何去”的问题。香港到底发生了什么？为什么发展到今天不可收场的地步？这座城市的未来在哪里？
说穿了，香港的根本问题只有一个，那就是：谁主香港？
1997年香港主权从英国回归中国，实行“一国两制”。那么，是中国在治理香港吗？答案是否定的。因为实行“一国两制”，中国只享受主权，没有治权，“港人治港”，治权在行政长官和香港政府。如此，中国所享有的实际主权少而又少，表现在有限的外交领域，而在大多数领域只享有“名誉主权”。即使是驻军也只具有象征意义。就治理而言，最具有实质性的法律体系并不在中国的主权之内。
在维持“一国两制”上，中国大陆并没有像西方所说的那样，积极介入香港事务。即使有介入的想法，也受“一国两制”这一“意识形态”的制约。实际的情形是，为了维持“一国两制”，大陆把大量的好处向香港输送，以期维持其繁荣，至少是经济上的。有关方面也的确想做一些能够促成实质性主权的事情，但想做的事情一件也没有做成过，例如早些时候的“23条”和这次的“送中条例”。社会、经济和民间层面的交流和来往大大增加，但这些可以对香港的经济发生影响，但对香港的治理制度和能力则没有实质性的影响。
特首与政党无有机联系
是香港政府在治理这个城市吗？也没有。这里涉及诸多制度设计因素。就权力结构来说，香港实行“三权分立”制度。在这一制度下，哪些权力在香港行政当局？立法方面只有不到一半的权力可以说属于行政当局，并且这一半权力还是通过“建制派”而达成。行政当局对司法则完全没有权力，整个司法系统几乎仍然掌握在“隐居”起来的“港英当局”手中。即使是行政系统，除了特首，也仍然是从港英当局“整体”接收而来。
就政治权力的来源来说，问题更大，因为香港基本上“无政党政治”，即特首的产生和政党之间没有必然的有机联系。在实践层面，特首不得不把“公务员”体系当作政党使用。在运作过程中，这使得行政中立成为不可能。一旦特首被“政治化”，公务员系统也不得不政治化（无论是主动的还是被动的），并且这种政治化更有可能和特首的政治意向背道而驰。这次公务员系统很多人公开向特区政府施加压力，表露无遗。
因为没有坚实的政治（政党）支持，这些年来，特区政府很难有所作为。试问特区政府通过了几项有效的法律和政策？历任特首都想有所作为，但就是没有好结果。即使是具有善意、实际上也能改善香港状况的政策，也很难有好的结果。首任特首董建华的住房政策的流产，就是很好的案例。
是香港人民在治理香港吗？也显然不是。香港人一直在争取他们理想中的“港人治港”，即“双普选”。但因为各方面的较量，迄今并没有什么结果。（不过，应当指出“双普选”也只是一个理想的“设想”，因为也有太多的经验表明，即使实现了“普选”，也并不见得会出现有效的治理。）
更为严重的是，通过“自下而上”的社会运动来争取既定目标的达成，这个过程本身具有很大的问题。其一，“众口难调”，不能达成妥协，人们产生了“一步到位”的政改幻想。在争取过程中，抗议者也并不是没有机会实现他们的诉求，但因为没有妥协，所有机会都付之东流。其二，抗议演变成暴力，发展成为破坏性极强的“为了抗议而抗议”的社会运动，或者运动型社会。如此，就形成了抗议者“你不顺我意，我也绝对不让你做事情”的心态，造成了政府和抗议者之间的严重对立局面。
外国势力一直都在
那么是外国势力在主宰香港吗？要清楚地意识到，香港是国际化的都市，外国势力的存在和介入并不奇怪。长期以来，这座城市一直是东方信息中心，很多西方国家（尤其是美国）都有强大势力的存在。但只要香港是开放的，外国势力一定会在，并且也会努力地去影响香港的发展。这是现实，不管人们喜欢与否。所须要关切的是特区政府是否有能力来遏制这些外国势力的负面影响。
就外国势力来说，这里尤其要强调英国的角色，因为香港之前是英国的殖民地。就英国对香港的影响来说，在很大程度上，九七回归之后，香港只是从一个英国的“直接殖民地”转变成为英国的“间接殖民地”。除了一些文字变化和字面文章（甚至包括《基本法》），九七回归之时，香港什么都没有改变，照单全收。回归之后，没有发生任何重大的变化（尤其是制度上的变化）来体现港人自治、或者中国主权。各方所努力所秉持的只是香港的“法治”。
郑永年：“抗议之都” 谁主香港？(2)
时间:2019-08-20 07:47内容来源:联合早报 版阅读：新闻归类:观点评论
无疑，法治的确是香港的制度本质，是香港秩序的基� ５彩钦飧龇ㄖ蜗低常踩怀晌宋旨鹊美妫ㄓ绕涫怯⒐妫┑淖钣行Чぞ摺２唤鋈绱耍蛭羌浣又趁竦兀⒐蛘咂渌夤屏Γ侵蛔沼嫖讨挥
无疑，“法治”的确是香港的制度本质，是香港秩序的基础。但也是这个“法治”系统，俨然成为了维持既得利益（尤其是英国利益）的最有效工具。不仅如此，因为是“间接殖民地”，英国或者其他外国势力，它们只坐收渔翁之利，而不用负任何责任。今天，这套“法治”体系已经演变成外国势力固若金汤的“话语权”，它既是特区政府最有效的“监督者”，也是香港变化的最有效阻力。
不过，这绝对不意味着这套“法治”须要退出历史舞台。这里的问题也是“谁主”“法治”？比较一下二战之后从殖民地独立出来的国家的不同作为，人们就可以清楚地看到如何处理殖民地遗留下来的制度遗产了。
战后，在反殖民地统治胜利，取得独立之后，一些国家完全保留了原来殖民地的制度，并且跟着殖民地实行西方式民主，但没有很成功的案例，失败的案例则比比皆是。但也有很多国家实行了“去殖民地化”。不过，因为“去殖民地化”方式不同，结果有好有坏。一些国家简单粗暴，废除了所有制度遗产，而新的制度（尤其是能够有效运作的制度）又建立不起来，不仅影响了和西方的关系，也制约了本地各方面的发展。
新加坡的成功经验
但在另一些国家，也进行了“反殖民地化”，但不仅能够保留一些积极的殖民地遗产，促进本地的发展，也能够和西方搞好关系。新加坡最为典型。在独立之后，对原来殖民地遗产进行了有效去殖民地化，在保留了积极的遗产的同时，去除了其消极面。就“法治”而言，没有人会否认新加坡的“法治”体系，是在殖民地遗产的基础之上发展起来的。
新加坡成功经验只有几个字：牢牢把“法治”掌握在自己手里。新加坡自独立以来，在涉及主权和国家重大利益的问题上，从来毫不含糊，总是竭尽全力保护之，甚至不怕“得罪”任何一个国家。这和香港的“法治”形成了鲜明的对比。在很大程度上说，香港的“法治”能够有效保护原来殖民地者利益，但很难增进香港本身的利益。
治权不在香港人手里
自然，这套“法治”的维持也和香港本身的既得利益有关。这里的问题是，香港是这些既得利益在统治吗？可能也不是。很显然，他们理论上是香港的统治精英，并且香港的发展是他们的切身利益。但同样是因为制度设计缺陷所致，这个既得利益阶层只追求利益，但不用承担任何政治责任。这些年来，往往出现既得利益者“有利益一哄而上，面临问题全身而退”的局面。“法治”对既得利益而言具有同样的逻辑，即“法治”是保护他们利益免受损失的最有效武器。考虑到现在香港根深蒂固的既得利益，是在港英当局时期成长起来的，这个逻辑并不难理解。
对所有这些情况，中国大陆并非不了解，也因此急着加以改变。但现实主义地看，因为是实行“一国两制”，中国大陆很难改变往日香港的殖民地遗产，只有香港本身才有这个能力。不过，现实似乎刚好相反。如上所述，因为各种制度因素，治权并不在香港人手里，无论是特区政府还是香港社会。更为严重的是，一些香港人把这种局面归咎于中央政府，也因此把矛头对准了中央政府。在实际层面，回归之后，殖民地式的教育不仅没有改变，反而变本加厉。从前的民主运动还有些“反英”的味道，现在则转向了反祖国大陆。国家认同完全走向了反面。要清楚地意识到，这些年来抗议者的主体便是九七回归之后成长起来的年轻一代，他们也是现在“港独”力量的主体。
正因为如此，本来是一体的“一国”和“两制”便分离开来，大陆方面强调“一国”，香港方面则强调“两制”，而特区政府夹在中间，无能为力。
港府受到各种制约
为了化解这种僵局，这些年中国大陆也开始进行积极主动的政策调整。大湾区建设便是很好的例子。这无疑是正确的方向。在“一国两制”遇到困局的时候，对大陆来说，须要回答的问题是：“一国”能够做些什么？诸如大湾区那样的发展计划，本来就是要通过大陆的单边开放政策，通过社会经济的方式来逐步化解矛盾，以期待最终解决问题。
不过，在官僚层面（包括大陆和香港），人们并没有深刻理解这个问题。官僚层面趋向于想通过改变“两制”来解决问题。这次推出的“送中条例”就是典型的例子。因为之前有“23条”的经验，推出“送中条例”的社会回应应当是预期中的，但官僚层面没有足够的考量，还是匆匆忙忙推出来了。
无论如何，在不存在一个有效的治理主体的情况下，香港产生今天这样的“权力真空”局面并不奇怪。香港特区政府不仅受制于来自内部的各种制约，包括源自制度设计的权力制约和来自社会力量的制约，更受制于外部外国势力在“法治”旗号下的制约，软弱不堪，导致了实际上的“无政府状态”。尽管这并不是说，特区政府不想有所作为，但如此软弱，谁也没有能力把事情做好。同时，尽管追求“公益”成为不可能，但还是有人在大力追求“私利”，那就是隐形的老殖民地者和既得利益者。追求公益的“不作为”和追求私利的“有作为”，便造成了今天香港的现实。
今天，经过如此长期激烈的社会抗议运动，香港所面临的诸多矛盾都已经充分暴露出来了，即使那些没有浮上台面和隐藏在背后的，人们对它们也有了比较清晰的认识。但这并不等于问题可以得到解决。香港问题的有效解决，仍然取决于回答“谁主香港？”的问题。既然所有这些问题是香港缺失政治主体的结果，在没有一个政治主体出现之前，没有人会天真地认为，香港会出现稳定的局面，这些问题会得到解决。更为重要的是，今天的香港已经完全不是回归之初的香港了，事情已经发生，香港也不能再回到原点。对中国大陆的挑战便是：如何对香港进行第二次“回归”？
作者是新加坡国立大学东亚研究所教授
文章仅代表个人观点
Zheng Yongnian: "The Capital of Protests" Who is Hong Kong?
Time: 2019-08-20 07:47 Content Source: Lianhe Zaobao Read: News Classification: Viewpoint Comments
The situation in Hong Kong has developed to this day, but it is actually not so shocking. (Bloomberg) For Hong Kong observers, the situation in Hong Kong has developed to this day, but it is not so shocking. Over the years, the protests in Hong Kong have never been interrupted, and it is not difficult to calculate this.
For Hong Kong observers, the situation in Hong Kong has developed to this day, but it is not so shocking. Over the years, the protests in Hong Kong have never been interrupted. It is not difficult to calculate how many large and small protests have taken place in the city with different backgrounds and different objectives. Such frequent social protests in a city are rare in world history. In fact, the protest tends to have what people call the "dead shackles" and the protests have been "daily life". Some people say that Hong Kong is a veritable "protest capital" and this will not happen.
People are shocked by the violence of the protests. Hong Kong is a wealthy city with a middle class that is more rational and more peaceful than other places. But now it is completely different, and violence has become an irreversible trend. And it is not difficult to understand that any social protest, if the parties do not compromise, must end with violence. There are too many historical experiences to prove this inevitable result.
The situation has developed to this point, and people must choose which side to support. But if you are looking to the future, people must spend a lot of energy to understand the question of where to go. What happened in Hong Kong? Why did it develop to the point where it can't be closed today? Where is the future of the city?
To put it bluntly, there is only one fundamental problem in Hong Kong, that is: Who is Hong Kong?
In 1997, Hong Kong’s sovereignty returned to China from Britain and implemented “one country, two systems”. So, is China governing Hong Kong? the answer is negative. Because of the implementation of "one country, two systems", China only enjoys sovereignty and has no power to rule. "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong", the power of governance is in the Chief Executive and the Hong Kong Government. In this way, China enjoys less and less actual sovereignty, manifested in a limited area of diplomacy, and enjoys only "honorary sovereignty" in most areas. Even the garrison has only symbolic meaning. As far as governance is concerned, the most substantive legal system is not within China's sovereignty.
In maintaining "one country, two systems", mainland China has not actively involved in Hong Kong affairs as the West has said. Even if there is an intervention, it is subject to the "ideology" of "one country, two systems." The actual situation is that in order to maintain "one country, two systems", the mainland has delivered a large number of benefits to Hong Kong in order to maintain its prosperity, at least economically. The relevant parties did indeed want to do something that would lead to substantial sovereignty, but they did not do anything they wanted to do, such as the earlier "23 articles" and the "send regulations". Social, economic and non-governmental exchanges and exchanges have greatly increased, but these can have an impact on Hong Kong's economy, but have no substantive impact on Hong Kong's governance system and capabilities.
Chief executive has no organic connection with political parties
Is the Hong Kong government governing the city? nor. There are many institutional design factors involved here. As far as the power structure is concerned, Hong Kong implements the "separation of powers" system. Under this system, which powers are in the Hong Kong Administration? Less than half of the powers in the legislation can be said to belong to the administration, and this half of the power is still achieved through the "constructionist." The Administration has no power at all for the judiciary. The entire judicial system is still almost in the hands of the "Hong Kong British authorities" who are "reclusive". Even the administrative system, except for the Chief Executive, is still receiving the "whole" from the British Hong Kong authorities.
As far as the source of political power is concerned, the problem is even greater, because Hong Kong is basically "no party politics", that is, there is no necessary organic connection between the emergence of the chief executive and the political parties. On the practical level, the Chief Executive had to use the "civil servant" system as a political party. In the course of operation, this makes administrative neutrality impossible. Once the chief executive is “politicized”, the civil service system has to be politicized (whether active or passive), and this politicization is more likely to run counter to the political intent of the chief executive. Many people in the civil service system have publicly exerted pressure on the SAR government.
Because there is no solid political (party) support, it has been difficult for the SAR government to make a difference over the years. How many effective laws and policies have been passed by the SAR Government? Successive capitals want to make a difference, but there is no good result. Even policies that are in good faith and can actually improve the situation in Hong Kong are hard to have good results. The abortion of the first special director Tung Chee-hwa’s housing policy is a good case.
Is the Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong? Obviously not. Hong Kong people have been fighting for their ideal "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong", that is, "double suffrage." However, because of the contests in various aspects, there has been no result so far. (However, it should be pointed out that "double universal suffrage" is also an ideal "conceived" because there is too much experience to show that even if "universal elections" are achieved, effective governance will not necessarily occur.)
What is more serious is that the process of achieving a set goal through the “bottom-up” social movement has a big problem in itself. First, "it is difficult to adjust", and no compromise can be reached. People have produced a "one step in place" political reform fantasy. In the process of winning, the protesters did not have the opportunity to fulfill their demands, but because there was no compromise, all opportunities were lost. Second, the protests turned into violence and developed into a devastating social movement “protest against protests” or a sporty society. In this way, the mentality of the protesters "You are not obedient, I will never let you do things" has formed a serious confrontation between the government and the protesters.
Foreign forces have always been
So is it that foreign forces are dominated in Hong Kong? It is necessary to clearly understand that Hong Kong is an international city, and the existence and involvement of foreign forces is not surprising. For a long time, the city has been the center of information in the East, and many Western countries (especially the United States) have powerful forces. But as long as Hong Kong is open, foreign forces will certainly be there and will work hard to influence the development of Hong Kong. This is reality, whether people like it or not. What needs to be addressed is whether the SAR Government has the ability to curb the negative effects of these foreign forces.
As far as foreign powers are concerned, the role of the United Kingdom is especially emphasized here because Hong Kong used to be a British colony. As far as the impact of Britain on Hong Kong is concerned, to a large extent, after the return of 1997, Hong Kong has only changed from a British "direct colony" to a British "indirect colony." Except for some text changes and literal articles (even including the Basic Law), when the return of 1997, Hong Kong did not change anything. After the reunification, no major changes (especially institutional changes) have occurred to reflect Hong Kong people's autonomy or Chinese sovereignty. What the parties have endeavored is only the "rule of law" in Hong Kong.
Zheng Yongnian: "The Capital of Protests" Who is Hong Kong? (2)
Time: 2019-08-20 07:47 Content Source: Lianhe Zaobao Read: News Classification: Viewpoint Comments
Undoubtedly, the "rule of law" is indeed the institutional essence of Hong Kong and the basis of Hong Kong's order. But this "rule of law" system has become the most effective tool for maintaining vested interests, especially for the UK. Not only that, because it is an "indirect colony", the British or other foreign forces, they only take advantage of the fishermen's interests, without any responsibility. Today, this "rule of law" system has evolved into the "discourse power" of foreign powers. It is the most effective "supervisor" of the SAR government and the most effective resistance to changes in Hong Kong.
However, this does not mean that this "rule of law" needs to withdraw from the historical arena. The question here is also "who is the master" and "the rule of law"? Comparing the different actions of countries that were independent from the colonies after World War II, one can clearly see how to deal with the legacy of the colonies.
After the war, after the victory of anti-colonial rule and independence, some countries completely retained the original colonial system and followed the colony with Western-style democracy, but there were no successful cases, and cases of failure abound. However, many countries have implemented “decolonization”. However, because of the different ways of “decolonization”, the results are mixed. Some countries are simple and rude, abolishing all institutional heritage, and new institutions (especially those that can function effectively) cannot be established, which not only affects the relationship with the West, but also restricts the development of all aspects of the local.
Singapore's successful experience
However, in other countries, "anti-colonization" has also been carried out, but not only can some positive colonial heritage be preserved, local development can be promoted, and relations with the West can be made. Singapore is the most typical. After independence, the original colonial heritage was effectively decolonized, and while retaining a positive legacy, its negative aspects were removed. As far as the "rule of law" is concerned, no one would deny that Singapore's "rule of law" system was developed on the basis of colonial heritage.
Singapore’s successful experience has only a few words: firmly hold the “rule of law” in its own hands. Since independence, Singapore has never been unequivocal in matters involving sovereignty and the country’s major interests. It has always tried its best to protect it, even not afraid of “offending” any country. This is in stark contrast to the "rule of law" in Hong Kong. To a large extent, Hong Kong's "rule of law" can effectively protect the interests of the original colonists, but it is difficult to enhance Hong Kong's own interests.
The power of governance is not in the hands of Hong Kong people
Naturally, the maintenance of this "rule of law" is also related to Hong Kong's own vested interests. The question here is, is Hong Kong ruling these vested interests? May not be. Obviously, they are theoretically the ruling elite of Hong Kong, and the development of Hong Kong is their vital interest. But the same is due to the flaws in the system design. This vested interest class only pursues interests, but does not have to bear any political responsibility. Over the years, there have often been situations in which vested interests “have the benefits to go all the way and face problems and fall back”. The “rule of law” has the same logic for vested interests, that is, “the rule of law” is the most effective weapon to protect their interests from losses. Considering that Hong Kong's deep-rooted vested interests are now growing up during the British Hong Kong authorities, this logic is not difficult to understand.
For all these situations, mainland China is not ignorant and is therefore eager to change. But realistically, because it is the implementation of "one country, two systems", it is difficult for mainland China to change the colonial heritage of Hong Kong in the past. Only Hong Kong itself has this ability. However, reality seems to be the opposite. As mentioned above, due to various institutional factors, power is not in the hands of Hong Kong people, whether it is the SAR Government or the Hong Kong society. What is more serious is that some Hong Kong people blame this situation on the central government, and therefore aim at the central government. On the practical level, after the reunification, the colonial education has not only changed, but has intensified. The former democratic movement still had some "anti-British" flavors, but now it has turned to the mainland of the motherland. National identity has completely gone to the opposite side. It is necessary to clearly understand that the main body of the protesters over the years has been the younger generation who grew up after the reunification of 1997. They are also the mainstay of the "Hong Kong independence" power.
Because of this, the "one country" and "two systems" that were originally integrated were separated. The mainland side emphasized "one country" and the Hong Kong side emphasized "two systems". The SAR government was in the middle and could do nothing.
The Hong Kong Government is subject to various restrictions
In order to resolve this stalemate, China has also begun to make proactive policy adjustments in these years. The construction of the Dawan District is a good example. This is undoubtedly the right direction. When the "one country, two systems" encounter difficulties, for the mainland, the question that needs to be answered is: What can "one country" do? Development plans such as the Dawan District are supposed to gradually resolve conflicts through the unilateral open policy of the mainland and through social and economic methods, in the hope of finally solving the problem.
However, at the bureaucratic level (including the mainland and Hong Kong), people do not have a deep understanding of this issue. The bureaucratic level tends to solve the problem by changing the "two systems." The "Send Regulations" introduced this time is a typical example. Because of the previous "23" experience, the social response to the "Send the Regulations" should be expected, but there is not enough consideration at the bureaucratic level, or it has been rushed out.
In any case, it is not surprising that Hong Kong has created a "power vacuum" situation today without an effective governance body. The Hong Kong SAR government is not only subject to internal constraints, including power constraints from institutional design and constraints from social forces, but also subject to external foreign forces under the banner of “rule of law”, which is weak and leads to "Anarchy." Although this is not to say that the SAR government does not want to make a difference, it is so weak that no one can do anything well. At the same time, although the pursuit of "public interest" has become impossible, there are still people who are pursuing "private benefits", that is, invisible old colonists and vested interests. The pursuit of public welfare "inaction" and the pursuit of self-interest "doing something" have created the reality of Hong Kong today.
Today, after such a long and fierce social protest movement, many of the contradictions faced by Hong Kong have been fully exposed. Even those who are not on the table and hidden behind, people have a clearer understanding of them. But this does not mean that the problem can be solved. The effective resolution of the Hong Kong issue still depends on the question of "Who is Hong Kong?" Since all these problems are the result of the lack of political actors in Hong Kong, no one will naively believe that there will be a stable situation in Hong Kong before the emergence of a political subject, and these problems will be resolved. More importantly, Hong Kong today is not the beginning of Hong Kong at the beginning of the reunification. Things have already happened and Hong Kong cannot return to its original point. The challenge to mainland China is: How to make a second "return" to Hong Kong?
The author is a professor at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore. The article only represents a personal point of view
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