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中华人民共和国反间谍法, the Counter-Espionage Law of the People's Republic of China (CEL-PRC], as revised (April 2023) comes into Effect 1 July 2023 (article 71).
The Counter-Espionage Law (CEL-PRC) is divided into six chapters:
Chapter 1 General Principles; Chapter 2 Safety precautions; Chapter III
Investigation and Disposal; Chapter Four Guarantee and Supervision;
Chapter V Legal Responsibilities; and Chapter 6 Regulations. The provisions are sometimes complex, and often ambiguous. They are fleshed out through regulation and administrative practices, and framed by other relevant law, some of which is noted in CEL-PRC. The basic thrust of the provisions may be summarized as follows:
Chapter 1 General Principles; Articles 1-11
The first articles set out the object of CEL-PRC ("to strengthen counter-espionage efforts, to prevent, stop and punish acts of espionage, to preserve national security, and to protect the people's interests" article 1); to place the Communist Party at the core of such efforts (Article 2), and to align counter-espionage efforts with law, human rights, and the interests and rights of individuals and organization (article 3). Those provisions set up the usual legal framework--a set of objectives based legal rules around which systems fo regulation centered on the exercise of administrative discretion will be elaborated. To that end, Article 4 provides the most useful addition--the definition of "acts of espionage." Two are worth a more careful analysis::
(1) Activities endangering the national security of the People's Republic of China carried out by espionage organizations and their agents, or instigated or funded by others, or by domestic and foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals in collusion with them; * * *
(3) Stealing, espionage, buying, or illegal provision of state secrets and intelligence carried out by foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals other than espionage organizations and their agents, or instigated or funded by others, or by domestic institutions, organizations, and individuals colluding with them As well as other documents, data, materials, and items related to national security and interests, or activities to instigate, lure, coerce, or bribe state staff to mutiny;Broadly defined--and there is little to suggest any need to avoid a broad definition, these provisions can bring within the law virtually any activity or the engagement with any information where the context lends itself sufficiently to fall within the definition.
The rest of this chapter focuses on the structural framework for institutionalizing anti-espionage measures. These include mechanisms for coordinating measures, identifying organs vested with leadership on these efforts, defining the scope of citizen duty to preserve national security, and developing a law based principle limiting abuse of discretion.
Chapter 2 Safety precautions; Articles 12-22
The Chapter describes the structural elements of espionage and their placement within the state apparatus. Among its most significant provisions are Articles 14 and 15:
Article 14: No individual or organization may unlawfully obtain or possess any documents, data, materials or items that are state secrets. Article 15: No individual or organization may unlawfully produce, sell, possess, or use specialized espionage devices that are specially used for espionage activities. The departments for national security under the State Council are to designate specialized espionage devices in accordance with relevant state provisions.
Chapter III Investigation and Disposal; Articles 23-39.
Chapter IV Guarantee and Supervision; Articles 40-52These articles touch on the investigative authority of state organs assigned a role in counter-espionage. The scope of investigative authority is broad--but not uniquely so within Chinese legality. Interesting are the statutory rules for questioning sessions:
The period for questioning and verification must not exceed 8 hours; but where the situation is complex, and administrative detention might be used or there is a suspected crime, the period questioning for verification must not exceed 24 hours. The state security organs shall provide necessary food and rest time for persons being summoned. Continuous summons are strictly prohibited. (Article 27).People under investigation may be prohibited from leaving the country of Chinese nationals (Article 33); foreigners deemed a risk may be denied entry (Article 34) and likely exit pending investigation.
The CEL-PRC protects state agents in the lawful conduct of their duties (Article 40). Such investigators are given priority and other state organs are expected to facilitate investigation (Articles 40-45). Systems for claims of abuse of discretion and authority must be developed--presumably through regulation at every level at which CE activities are undertaken (Article 52).
Chapter V Legal Responsibilities; Articles 53-69
Provisions sketching out penalties are included (Articles 53-55; 60-65). In many cases, national security offices are empowered to make administrative punishment decisions but subject to the Administrative Punishments Law (Article 67). Foreigners deported or forbidden from entry may be barred for up to ten years as an administrative measure (Article 66). Parties may appeal administrative determinations (Article 68). And officials who abuse their discretion may be punished (Article 69).
Chapter VI Supplemental Provisions
CEL-PRC applies not only to espionage;
The relevant provisions of this law apply to state security organs performing their duties to prevent, stop and punish activities endangering national security other than acts of espionage in accordance with laws, administrative regulations and relevant national provisions. The relevant provisions of this law apply to public security organs' conduct in discovering or punishing conduct endangering national security during the performance of their duties in accordance with law.(Article 70).This emphasizes the broad scope of the measures. Though the mechanics of prohibition sound in espionage, the breadth of conduct subject to its strictures include anything investigative bodies determine endanger national security.
* * *
The revised law has caused a bit of a stir outside of China. For commentary from leading press organs here, here, here. Notably worried were journalists (here); it may affect regional bilateral relations (here). Calls by senior officials within China for greater enforcement added to interest by potentially affected people and entities (here).Official Chinese press reporting here. Many of these positions were staked out at the beginning of May after the text of the CEL-PRC was distributed to the public.
For business, the problem isn't so much that China is again focusing on the administration of national security measures; the problem is the collateral effects on what elsewhere might be understood as ordinary course transactions, including transactions in and the use of information generated in, through, and about operations. The gist of the concern was nicely summarized by US intelligence entities and widely reported through well known press organs:
US intelligence warned companies operating in China Friday over the impact of Beijing's new counter-espionage law coming into force on July 1. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) said the law, which aims to protect China's national security secrets, gives Beijing "expanded legal grounds for accessing and controlling data held by US firms in China." The NCSC said the new law is ambiguous on what fits into the definition of national security secrets, but believes Beijing is taking an expansive view that could include information companies use as a normal part of their business. (US Warns Firms Over New Chinese 'Counter-espionage' Law; see also here)
The problem has already been planted firmly for foreign enterprises operating in China--effectively the difficulty of operating in China on the basis of what had, until now, been assumed to be global consensus expectations of business operations, especially with respect to information, data, accountability and compliance (Information as Regulatory Assets, the National Security Stratagem, and Emerging Governance Consequences: Yintao Yu v. ByteDance, Inc. (CCGC-23-606246) (TikTok)). It has become especially acute for US and other foreign consultancies. (Work dries up for US consultancies in China after national security raids ("The consultancies’ struggles come against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical tensions between the US and China, as well as Beijing’s heightened vigilance over possible spying.")).
The problem becomes acute because even as Chinese authorities have broadened and made more flexible their approaches to the policing of information generation and data flows (including but not limited to economic enterprises--civil society and whatever falls within their definition of espionage organizations)--liberal democratic states have begun to substantially broaden the scope of information and data that they expect enterprises operating in and through anywhere on earth must be reported and publicly made available. In other worlds, liberal democratic state compliance and due diligence regimes, enacted in law may make it much more difficult for foreign entities operating in China to comply both with Chinese expectations relating to state secrets (generated by or through or in their operations) and with the requirements of their home states (or other states the laws of which might apply to some or all of their operations) to generate and make available substantial amounts of information which may run counter to Chinese law.
More specifically, as measures such as the French, German and soon the EU Supply Chain Due Diligence Law, and laws related to modern slavery, or reporting measures related to sanctions (for example with respect to operations in Xinjiang) become more prominent, the scope and range of information may also be broadened from those that focus on the internal operations of an enterprise in China to those that relate to impacts of those operations. The issue becomes more pressing as enterprises embrace Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) risk reporting and operations decision making measures--which are effectively data rich calculations. The contradiction does not have an easy solution, nor will it be possible to interpret one's way out from under this broadening set of expectations about how activities are undertaken, recorded and shared.
More interesting, of course, might be the way that influential civil society and hybrid institutions, dedicated to the development of systems of information generation and disclosure--for example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the International Organization for Standardization--might be deemed to constitute espionage or espionage facilitating organs under the law. In the case of ISO the irony would be substantial because China has been a member of ISO through its Standardization Administration of the P. R. C (SAC). GRI operated in the HKSAR (here). More likely, of course, is that China will reserve put of application of any number of rules, procedures and the like generated by these and other standard setting, accountability, and related organizations with respect to data generation and reporting in China.
But all of this is speculation. And it is speculation without the benefit of the regulations that may be developed--and applied in varying form--at the national, provincial and local levels. Still, the need for speculation evidences an enhanced risk environment--and this is precisely the sort of risk that business tends to dislike. In the recent language of the G7--China has now made re-risking a bit more complicated for foreign enterprises, standard setting and accountability organs that rely n information generated in and about activity in China (Comparing What is on Offer as Empires De-Couple (work together to build a community of one heart and one mind (同心同德的共同体)): Studying the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué and President Xi Jinping Keynote Speech at the Inaugural China-Central Asia Summit).
The issues, as they generally tend to in this context when distilled from the political hysteria on both sides, essentially can be understood as boiling down to a choice between privileging administrative flexibility (favoring policy/political objectives) or privileging predictability and certainty (favoring, in the case of business at least, economic and efficiency principles/objectives). Over the last decade that balancing has shifted with increasing clarity, especially with respect to the habits and cultures of officials.
The text of 中华人民共和国反间谍法 [Counter-espionage Law of the People's Republic of China] as Revised appears below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation. An alternative English translation is available here. A useful analysis may be accessed here.
中华人民共和国反间谍法
(2014年11月1日第十二届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十一次会议通过 2023年4月26日第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二次会议修订)
目 录
第一章 总 则
第二章 安全防范
第三章 调查处置
第四章 保障与监督
第五章 法律责任
第六章 附 则
第一章 总 则
第一条 为了加强反间谍工作,防范、制止和惩治间谍行为,维护国家安全,保护人民利益,根据宪法,制定本法。
第二条 反间谍工作坚持党中央集中统一领导,坚持总体国家安全观,坚持公开工作与秘密工作相结合、专门工作与群众路线相结合,坚持积极防御、依法惩治、标本兼治,筑牢国家安全人民防线。
第三条 反间谍工作应当依法进行,尊重和保障人权,保障个人和组织的合法权益。
第四条 本法所称间谍行为,是指下列行为:
(一)间谍组织及其代理人实施或者指使、资助他人实施,或者境内外机构、组织、个人与其相勾结实施的危害中华人民共和国国家安全的活动;
(二)参加间谍组织或者接受间谍组织及其代理人的任务,或者投靠间谍组织及其代理人;
(三)间谍组织及其代理人以外的其他境外机构、组织、个人实施或者指使、资助他人实施,或者境内机构、组织、个人与其相勾结实施的窃取、刺探、收买、非法提供国家秘密、情报以及其他关系国家安全和利益的文件、数据、资料、物品,或者策动、引诱、胁迫、收买国家工作人员叛变的活动;
(四)间谍组织及其代理人实施或者指使、资助他人实施,或者境内外机构、组织、个人与其相勾结实施针对国家机关、涉密单位或者关键信息基础设施等的网络攻击、侵入、干扰、控制、破坏等活动;
(五)为敌人指示攻击目标;
(六)进行其他间谍活动。
间谍组织及其代理人在中华人民共和国领域内,或者利用中华人民共和国的公民、组织或者其他条件,从事针对第三国的间谍活动,危害中华人民共和国国家安全的,适用本法。
第五条 国家建立反间谍工作协调机制,统筹协调反间谍工作中的重大事项,研究、解决反间谍工作中的重大问题。
第六条 国家安全机关是反间谍工作的主管机关。
公安、保密等有关部门和军队有关部门按照职责分工,密切配合,加强协调,依法做好有关工作。
第七条 中华人民共和国公民有维护国家的安全、荣誉和利益的义务,不得有危害国家的安全、荣誉和利益的行为。
一切国家机关和武装力量、各政党和各人民团体、企业事业组织和其他社会组织,都有防范、制止间谍行为,维护国家安全的义务。
国家安全机关在反间谍工作中必须依靠人民的支持,动员、组织人民防范、制止间谍行为。
第八条 任何公民和组织都应当依法支持、协助反间谍工作,保守所知悉的国家秘密和反间谍工作秘密。
第九条 国家对支持、协助反间谍工作的个人和组织给予保护。
对举报间谍行为或者在反间谍工作中做出重大贡献的个人和组织,按照国家有关规定给予表彰和奖励。
第十条 境外机构、组织、个人实施或者指使、资助他人实施的,或者境内机构、组织、个人与境外机构、组织、个人相勾结实施的危害中华人民共和国国家安全的间谍行为,都必须受到法律追究。
第十一条 国家安全机关及其工作人员在工作中,应当严格依法办事,不得超越职权、滥用职权,不得侵犯个人和组织的合法权益。
国家安全机关及其工作人员依法履行反间谍工作职责获取的个人和组织的信息,只能用于反间谍工作。对属于国家秘密、工作秘密、商业秘密和个人隐私、个人信息的,应当保密。
第二章 安全防范
第十二条 国家机关、人民团体、企业事业组织和其他社会组织承担本单位反间谍安全防范工作的主体责任,落实反间谍安全防范措施,对本单位的人员进行维护国家安全的教育,动员、组织本单位的人员防范、制止间谍行为。
地方各级人民政府、相关行业主管部门按照职责分工,管理本行政区域、本行业有关反间谍安全防范工作。
国家安全机关依法协调指导、监督检查反间谍安全防范工作。
第十三条 各级人民政府和有关部门应当组织开展反间谍安全防范宣传教育,将反间谍安全防范知识纳入教育、培训、普法宣传内容,增强全民反间谍安全防范意识和国家安全素养。
新闻、广播、电视、文化、互联网信息服务等单位,应当面向社会有针对性地开展反间谍宣传教育。
国家安全机关应当根据反间谍安全防范形势,指导有关单位开展反间谍宣传教育活动,提高防范意识和能力。
第十四条 任何个人和组织都不得非法获取、持有属于国家秘密的文件、数据、资料、物品。
第十五条 任何个人和组织都不得非法生产、销售、持有、使用间谍活动特殊需要的专用间谍器材。专用间谍器材由国务院国家安全主管部门依照国家有关规定确认。
第十六条 任何公民和组织发现间谍行为,应当及时向国家安全机关举报;向公安机关等其他国家机关、组织举报的,相关国家机关、组织应当立即移送国家安全机关处理。
国家安全机关应当将受理举报的电话、信箱、网络平台等向社会公开,依法及时处理举报信息,并为举报人保密。
第十七条 国家建立反间谍安全防范重点单位管理制度。
反间谍安全防范重点单位应当建立反间谍安全防范工作制度,履行反间谍安全防范工作要求,明确内设职能部门和人员承担反间谍安全防范职责。
第十八条 反间谍安全防范重点单位应当加强对工作人员反间谍安全防范的教育和管理,对离岗离职人员脱密期内履行反间谍安全防范义务的情况进行监督检查。
第十九条 反间谍安全防范重点单位应当加强对涉密事项、场所、载体等的日常安全防范管理,采取隔离加固、封闭管理、设置警戒等反间谍物理防范措施。
第二十条 反间谍安全防范重点单位应当按照反间谍技术防范的要求和标准,采取相应的技术措施和其他必要措施,加强对要害部门部位、网络设施、信息系统的反间谍技术防范。
第二十一条 在重要国家机关、国防军工单位和其他重要涉密单位以及重要军事设施的周边安全控制区域内新建、改建、扩建建设项目的,由国家安全机关实施涉及国家安全事项的建设项目许可。
县级以上地方各级人民政府编制国民经济和社会发展规划、国土空间规划等有关规划,应当充分考虑国家安全因素和划定的安全控制区域,征求国家安全机关的意见。
安全控制区域的划定应当统筹发展和安全,坚持科学合理、确有必要的原则,由国家安全机关会同发展改革、自然资源、住房城乡建设、保密、国防科技工业等部门以及军队有关部门共同划定,报省、自治区、直辖市人民政府批准并动态调整。
涉及国家安全事项的建设项目许可的具体实施办法,由国务院国家安全主管部门会同有关部门制定。
第二十二条 国家安全机关根据反间谍工作需要,可以会同有关部门制定反间谍技术防范标准,指导有关单位落实反间谍技术防范措施,对存在隐患的单位,经过严格的批准手续,可以进行反间谍技术防范检查和检测。
第三章 调查处置
第二十三条 国家安全机关在反间谍工作中依法行使本法和有关法律规定的职权。
第二十四条 国家安全机关工作人员依法执行反间谍工作任务时,依照规定出示工作证件,可以查验中国公民或者境外人员的身份证明,向有关个人和组织问询有关情况,对身份不明、有间谍行为嫌疑的人员,可以查看其随带物品。
第二十五条 国家安全机关工作人员依法执行反间谍工作任务时,经设区的市级以上国家安全机关负责人批准,出示工作证件,可以查验有关个人和组织的电子设备、设施及有关程序、工具。查验中发现存在危害国家安全情形的,国家安全机关应当责令其采取措施立即整改。拒绝整改或者整改后仍存在危害国家安全隐患的,可以予以查封、扣押。
对依照前款规定查封、扣押的电子设备、设施及有关程序、工具,在危害国家安全的情形消除后,国家安全机关应当及时解除查封、扣押。
第二十六条 国家安全机关工作人员依法执行反间谍工作任务时,根据国家有关规定,经设区的市级以上国家安全机关负责人批准,可以查阅、调取有关的文件、数据、资料、物品,有关个人和组织应当予以配合。查阅、调取不得超出执行反间谍工作任务所需的范围和限度。
第二十七条 需要传唤违反本法的人员接受调查的,经国家安全机关办案部门负责人批准,使用传唤证传唤。对现场发现的违反本法的人员,国家安全机关工作人员依照规定出示工作证件,可以口头传唤,但应当在询问笔录中注明。传唤的原因和依据应当告知被传唤人。对无正当理由拒不接受传唤或者逃避传唤的人,可以强制传唤。
国家安全机关应当在被传唤人所在市、县内的指定地点或者其住所进行询问。
国家安全机关对被传唤人应当及时询问查证。询问查证的时间不得超过八小时;情况复杂,可能适用行政拘留或者涉嫌犯罪的,询问查证的时间不得超过二十四小时。国家安全机关应当为被传唤人提供必要的饮食和休息时间。严禁连续传唤。
除无法通知或者可能妨碍调查的情形以外,国家安全机关应当及时将传唤的原因通知被传唤人家属。在上述情形消失后,应当立即通知被传唤人家属。
第二十八条 国家安全机关调查间谍行为,经设区的市级以上国家安全机关负责人批准,可以依法对涉嫌间谍行为的人身、物品、场所进行检查。
检查女性身体的,应当由女性工作人员进行。
第二十九条 国家安全机关调查间谍行为,经设区的市级以上国家安全机关负责人批准,可以查询涉嫌间谍行为人员的相关财产信息。
第三十条 国家安全机关调查间谍行为,经设区的市级以上国家安全机关负责人批准,可以对涉嫌用于间谍行为的场所、设施或者财物依法查封、扣押、冻结;不得查封、扣押、冻结与被调查的间谍行为无关的场所、设施或者财物。
第三十一条 国家安全机关工作人员在反间谍工作中采取查阅、调取、传唤、检查、查询、查封、扣押、冻结等措施,应当由二人以上进行,依照有关规定出示工作证件及相关法律文书,并由相关人员在有关笔录等书面材料上签名、盖章。
国家安全机关工作人员进行检查、查封、扣押等重要取证工作,应当对全过程进行录音录像,留存备查。
第三十二条 在国家安全机关调查了解有关间谍行为的情况、收集有关证据时,有关个人和组织应当如实提供,不得拒绝。
第三十三条 对出境后可能对国家安全造成危害,或者对国家利益造成重大损失的中国公民,国务院国家安全主管部门可以决定其在一定期限内不准出境,并通知移民管理机构。
对涉嫌间谍行为人员,省级以上国家安全机关可以通知移民管理机构不准其出境。
第三十四条 对入境后可能进行危害中华人民共和国国家安全活动的境外人员,国务院国家安全主管部门可以通知移民管理机构不准其入境。
第三十五条 对国家安全机关通知不准出境或者不准入境的人员,移民管理机构应当按照国家有关规定执行;不准出境、入境情形消失的,国家安全机关应当及时撤销不准出境、入境决定,并通知移民管理机构。
第三十六条 国家安全机关发现涉及间谍行为的网络信息内容或者网络攻击等风险,应当依照《中华人民共和国网络安全法》规定的职责分工,及时通报有关部门,由其依法处置或者责令电信业务经营者、互联网服务提供者及时采取修复漏洞、加固网络防护、停止传输、消除程序和内容、暂停相关服务、下架相关应用、关闭相关网站等措施,保存相关记录。情况紧急,不立即采取措施将对国家安全造成严重危害的,由国家安全机关责令有关单位修复漏洞、停止相关传输、暂停相关服务,并通报有关部门。
经采取相关措施,上述信息内容或者风险已经消除的,国家安全机关和有关部门应当及时作出恢复相关传输和服务的决定。
第三十七条 国家安全机关因反间谍工作需要,根据国家有关规定,经过严格的批准手续,可以采取技术侦察措施和身份保护措施。
第三十八条 对违反本法规定,涉嫌犯罪,需要对有关事项是否属于国家秘密或者情报进行鉴定以及需要对危害后果进行评估的,由国家保密部门或者省、自治区、直辖市保密部门按照程序在一定期限内进行鉴定和组织评估。
第三十九条 国家安全机关经调查,发现间谍行为涉嫌犯罪的,应当依照《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》的规定立案侦查。
第四章 保障与监督
第四十条 国家安全机关工作人员依法履行职责,受法律保护。
第四十一条 国家安全机关依法调查间谍行为,邮政、快递等物流运营单位和电信业务经营者、互联网服务提供者应当提供必要的支持和协助。
第四十二条 国家安全机关工作人员因执行紧急任务需要,经出示工作证件,享有优先乘坐公共交通工具、优先通行等通行便利。
第四十三条 国家安全机关工作人员依法执行任务时,依照规定出示工作证件,可以进入有关场所、单位;根据国家有关规定,经过批准,出示工作证件,可以进入限制进入的有关地区、场所、单位。
第四十四条 国家安全机关因反间谍工作需要,根据国家有关规定,可以优先使用或者依法征用国家机关、人民团体、企业事业组织和其他社会组织以及个人的交通工具、通信工具、场地和建筑物等,必要时可以设置相关工作场所和设施设备,任务完成后应当及时归还或者恢复原状,并依照规定支付相应费用;造成损失的,应当给予补偿。
第四十五条 国家安全机关因反间谍工作需要,根据国家有关规定,可以提请海关、移民管理等检查机关对有关人员提供通关便利,对有关资料、器材等予以免检。有关检查机关应当依法予以协助。
第四十六条 国家安全机关工作人员因执行任务,或者个人因协助执行反间谍工作任务,本人或者其近亲属的人身安全受到威胁时,国家安全机关应当会同有关部门依法采取必要措施,予以保护、营救。
个人因支持、协助反间谍工作,本人或者其近亲属的人身安全面临危险的,可以向国家安全机关请求予以保护。国家安全机关应当会同有关部门依法采取保护措施。
个人和组织因支持、协助反间谍工作导致财产损失的,根据国家有关规定给予补偿。
第四十七条 对为反间谍工作做出贡献并需要安置的人员,国家给予妥善安置。
公安、民政、财政、卫生健康、教育、人力资源和社会保障、退役军人事务、医疗保障、移民管理等有关部门以及国有企业事业单位应当协助国家安全机关做好安置工作。
第四十八条 对因开展反间谍工作或者支持、协助反间谍工作导致伤残或者牺牲、死亡的人员,根据国家有关规定给予相应的抚恤优待。
第四十九条 国家鼓励反间谍领域科技创新,发挥科技在反间谍工作中的作用。
第五十条 国家安全机关应当加强反间谍专业力量人才队伍建设和专业训练,提升反间谍工作能力。
对国家安全机关工作人员应当有计划地进行政治、理论和业务培训。培训应当坚持理论联系实际、按需施教、讲求实效,提高专业能力。
第五十一条 国家安全机关应当严格执行内部监督和安全审查制度,对其工作人员遵守法律和纪律等情况进行监督,并依法采取必要措施,定期或者不定期进行安全审查。
第五十二条 任何个人和组织对国家安全机关及其工作人员超越职权、滥用职权和其他违法行为,都有权向上级国家安全机关或者监察机关、人民检察院等有关部门检举、控告。受理检举、控告的国家安全机关或者监察机关、人民检察院等有关部门应当及时查清事实,依法处理,并将处理结果及时告知检举人、控告人。
对支持、协助国家安全机关工作或者依法检举、控告的个人和组织,任何个人和组织不得压制和打击报复。
第五章 法律责任
第五十三条 实施间谍行为,构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。
第五十四条 个人实施间谍行为,尚不构成犯罪的,由国家安全机关予以警告或者处十五日以下行政拘留,单处或者并处五万元以下罚款,违法所得在五万元以上的,单处或者并处违法所得一倍以上五倍以下罚款,并可以由有关部门依法予以处分。
明知他人实施间谍行为,为其提供信息、资金、物资、劳务、技术、场所等支持、协助,或者窝藏、包庇,尚不构成犯罪的,依照前款的规定处罚。
单位有前两款行为的,由国家安全机关予以警告,单处或者并处五十万元以下罚款,违法所得在五十万元以上的,单处或者并处违法所得一倍以上五倍以下罚款,并对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员,依照第一款的规定处罚。
国家安全机关根据相关单位、人员违法情节和后果,可以建议有关主管部门依法责令停止从事相关业务、提供相关服务或者责令停产停业、吊销有关证照、撤销登记。有关主管部门应当将作出行政处理的情况及时反馈国家安全机关。
第五十五条 实施间谍行为,有自首或者立功表现的,可以从轻、减轻或者免除处罚;有重大立功表现的,给予奖励。
在境外受胁迫或者受诱骗参加间谍组织、敌对组织,从事危害中华人民共和国国家安全的活动,及时向中华人民共和国驻外机构如实说明情况,或者入境后直接或者通过所在单位及时向国家安全机关如实说明情况,并有悔改表现的,可以不予追究。
第五十六条 国家机关、人民团体、企业事业组织和其他社会组织未按照本法规定履行反间谍安全防范义务的,国家安全机关可以责令改正;未按照要求改正的,国家安全机关可以约谈相关负责人,必要时可以将约谈情况通报该单位上级主管部门;产生危害后果或者不良影响的,国家安全机关可以予以警告、通报批评;情节严重的,对负有责任的领导人员和直接责任人员,由有关部门依法予以处分。
第五十七条 违反本法第二十一条规定新建、改建、扩建建设项目的,由国家安全机关责令改正,予以警告;拒不改正或者情节严重的,责令停止建设或者使用、暂扣或者吊销许可证件,或者建议有关主管部门依法予以处理。
第五十八条 违反本法第四十一条规定的,由国家安全机关责令改正,予以警告或者通报批评;拒不改正或者情节严重的,由有关主管部门依照相关法律法规予以处罚。
第五十九条 违反本法规定,拒不配合数据调取的,由国家安全机关依照《中华人民共和国数据安全法》的有关规定予以处罚。
第六十条 违反本法规定,有下列行为之一,构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任;尚不构成犯罪的,由国家安全机关予以警告或者处十日以下行政拘留,可以并处三万元以下罚款:
(一)泄露有关反间谍工作的国家秘密;
(二)明知他人有间谍犯罪行为,在国家安全机关向其调查有关情况、收集有关证据时,拒绝提供;
(三)故意阻碍国家安全机关依法执行任务;
(四)隐藏、转移、变卖、损毁国家安全机关依法查封、扣押、冻结的财物;
(五)明知是间谍行为的涉案财物而窝藏、转移、收购、代为销售或者以其他方法掩饰、隐瞒;
(六)对依法支持、协助国家安全机关工作的个人和组织进行打击报复。
第六十一条 非法获取、持有属于国家秘密的文件、数据、资料、物品,以及非法生产、销售、持有、使用专用间谍器材,尚不构成犯罪的,由国家安全机关予以警告或者处十日以下行政拘留。
第六十二条 国家安全机关对依照本法查封、扣押、冻结的财物,应当妥善保管,并按照下列情形分别处理:
(一)涉嫌犯罪的,依照《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》等有关法律的规定处理;
(二)尚不构成犯罪,有违法事实的,对依法应当没收的予以没收,依法应当销毁的予以销毁;
(三)没有违法事实的,或者与案件无关的,应当解除查封、扣押、冻结,并及时返还相关财物;造成损失的,应当依法予以赔偿。
第六十三条 涉案财物符合下列情形之一的,应当依法予以追缴、没收,或者采取措施消除隐患:
(一)违法所得的财物及其孳息、收益,供实施间谍行为所用的本人财物;
(二)非法获取、持有的属于国家秘密的文件、数据、资料、物品;
(三)非法生产、销售、持有、使用的专用间谍器材。
第六十四条 行为人及其近亲属或者其他相关人员,因行为人实施间谍行为从间谍组织及其代理人获取的所有利益,由国家安全机关依法采取追缴、没收等措施。
第六十五条 国家安全机关依法收缴的罚款以及没收的财物,一律上缴国库。
第六十六条 境外人员违反本法的,国务院国家安全主管部门可以决定限期出境,并决定其不准入境的期限。未在规定期限内离境的,可以遣送出境。
对违反本法的境外人员,国务院国家安全主管部门决定驱逐出境的,自被驱逐出境之日起十年内不准入境,国务院国家安全主管部门的处罚决定为最终决定。
第六十七条 国家安全机关作出行政处罚决定之前,应当告知当事人拟作出的行政处罚内容及事实、理由、依据,以及当事人依法享有的陈述、申辩、要求听证等权利,并依照《中华人民共和国行政处罚法》的有关规定实施。
第六十八条 当事人对行政处罚决定、行政强制措施决定、行政许可决定不服的,可以自收到决定书之日起六十日内,依法申请复议;对复议决定不服的,可以自收到复议决定书之日起十五日内,依法向人民法院提起诉讼。
第六十九条 国家安全机关工作人员滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊,或者有非法拘禁、刑讯逼供、暴力取证、违反规定泄露国家秘密、工作秘密、商业秘密和个人隐私、个人信息等行为,依法予以处分,构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。
第六章 附 则
第七十条 国家安全机关依照法律、行政法规和国家有关规定,履行防范、制止和惩治间谍行为以外的危害国家安全行为的职责,适用本法的有关规定。
公安机关在依法履行职责过程中发现、惩治危害国家安全的行为,适用本法的有关规定。
第七十一条 本法自2023年7月1日起施行。
(Adopted at the Eleventh Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People's Congress on November 1, 2014, and revised at the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fourteenth National People's Congress on April 26, 2023)
Source: National People's Congress Website 2023-04-26 19:10:43
Table of contents
Chapter 1 General Principles
Chapter 2 Safety precautions
Chapter III Investigation and Disposal
Chapter Four Guarantee and Supervision
Chapter V Legal Responsibilities
Chapter 6 Regulations
Chapter 1 General Principles
Article 1 This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution in order to strengthen anti-espionage work, prevent, stop and punish espionage, maintain national security, and protect the interests of the people.
Article 2: Anti-espionage work adheres to the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, adheres to the overall national security concept, adheres to the combination of open work and secret work, and combines specialized work with the mass line, adheres to active defense, punishes according to law, and treats both symptoms and root causes to strengthen national security. People's Defense Line.
Article 3 Counter-espionage work shall be carried out in accordance with the law, respect and safeguard human rights, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of individuals and organizations.
Article 4: The act of espionage referred to in this Law refers to the following acts:
(1) Activities endangering the national security of the People's Republic of China carried out by espionage organizations and their agents, or instigated or funded by others, or by domestic and foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals in collusion with them;
(2) Participating in espionage organizations or accepting missions from espionage organizations and their agents, or taking refuge in espionage organizations and their agents;
(3) Stealing, espionage, buying, or illegal provision of state secrets and intelligence carried out by foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals other than espionage organizations and their agents, or instigated or funded by others, or by domestic institutions, organizations, and individuals colluding with them As well as other documents, data, materials, and items related to national security and interests, or activities to instigate, lure, coerce, or bribe state staff to mutiny;
(4) Espionage organizations and their agents carry out or instigate or fund others to carry out, or domestic and foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals collude with them to carry out network attacks, intrusions, interference, etc. against state organs, secret-related units, or key information infrastructure Activities such as control and sabotage;
(5) Instructing the enemy to attack targets;
(6) Carrying out other espionage activities.
This Law applies to espionage organizations and their agents that engage in espionage activities against third countries within the territory of the People's Republic of China, or use citizens, organizations, or other conditions of the People's Republic of China, and endanger the national security of the People's Republic of China.
Article 5 The state establishes a counter-espionage coordination mechanism to coordinate and coordinate major issues in counter-espionage work, and to study and resolve major issues in counter-espionage work.
Article 6 The national security organ is the competent authority for counter-espionage work.
Relevant departments of public security, secrecy, and the military, in accordance with the division of responsibilities, closely cooperate, strengthen coordination, and do a good job in relevant work according to law.
Article 7 Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the obligation to safeguard the security, honor and interests of the country, and must not conduct acts that endanger the security, honor and interests of the country.
All state organs and armed forces, all political parties and people's organizations, enterprises, institutions, and other social organizations have the obligation to prevent and stop espionage and maintain national security.
National security organs must rely on the support of the people in their counter-espionage work, mobilize and organize the people to prevent and stop espionage.
Article 8: Any citizen or organization shall support and assist counter-espionage work in accordance with the law, and keep state secrets and counter-espionage work secrets known.
Article 9: The state protects individuals and organizations that support and assist in counter-espionage work.
Individuals and organizations that report espionage or make significant contributions to counter-espionage work shall be commended and rewarded in accordance with relevant state regulations.
Article 10: Espionage acts endangering the national security of the People's Republic of China that are carried out by overseas institutions, organizations, or individuals, or instigated or funded by others, or that are carried out by domestic institutions, organizations, or individuals in collusion with overseas institutions, organizations, or individuals, must be punished by law.
Article 11 National security organs and their staff shall act strictly in accordance with the law in their work, and must not exceed or abuse their powers, and must not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of individuals and organizations.
Information on individuals and organizations acquired by national security organs and their staff in accordance with the law to perform counter-espionage duties can only be used for counter-espionage work. Those belonging to state secrets, work secrets, commercial secrets, personal privacy and personal information shall be kept confidential.
Chapter 2 Safety precautions
Article 12 State organs, people's organizations, enterprises, institutions, and other social organizations assume the main responsibility for their own unit's anti-espionage security and prevention work, implement anti-espionage security and prevention measures, educate their units' personnel on maintaining national security, mobilize, organize The personnel of the unit prevent and stop espionage.
Local people's governments at all levels and relevant industry authorities are to manage the relevant anti-espionage security and prevention work in their administrative regions and industries in accordance with the division of responsibilities.
State security organs coordinate, guide, supervise and inspect anti-espionage security work in accordance with the law.
Article 13 People's governments at all levels and relevant departments shall organize anti-espionage security prevention publicity and education, incorporate anti-espionage security prevention knowledge into the content of education, training, and law popularization, and enhance the entire people's anti-espionage security awareness and national security literacy.
News, broadcasting, television, cultural, Internet information service units, etc., should carry out targeted anti-espionage publicity and education for the society.
National security organs shall, based on the situation of counter-espionage security prevention, guide relevant units to carry out counter-espionage publicity and education activities, and improve awareness and capabilities of prevention.
Article 14 No individual or organization shall illegally acquire or hold documents, data, materials, or items that are state secrets.
Article 15: No individual or organization shall illegally produce, sell, possess, or use special espionage equipment specially needed for espionage activities. Special espionage equipment shall be confirmed by the competent national security department of the State Council in accordance with relevant state regulations.
Article 16 Any citizen or organization discovering espionage shall promptly report to the national security organ; if the report is made to the public security organ or other state organ or organization, the relevant state organ or organization shall immediately transfer it to the state security organ for handling.
National security organs shall disclose to the public the telephone numbers, mailboxes, and online platforms for accepting reports, handle the reported information in a timely manner in accordance with the law, and keep confidential for the whistleblower.
Article 17: The state establishes a management system for key anti-espionage security units.
Key units for counter-espionage security and prevention shall establish a counter-espionage security and prevention work system, fulfill the requirements for counter-espionage security and prevention work, and specify internal functional departments and personnel to undertake counter-espionage security and prevention responsibilities.
Article 18 Key anti-espionage security prevention units shall strengthen the education and management of staff anti-espionage security precautions, and conduct supervision and inspection of the performance of anti-espionage security precautions by resigned personnel during the declassification period.
Article 19: Key anti-espionage security and prevention units shall strengthen the daily security and prevention management of secret-related matters, places, carriers, etc., and adopt anti-espionage physical prevention measures such as isolation and reinforcement, closed management, and setting up alerts.
Article 20: Anti-espionage security prevention key units shall, in accordance with the requirements and standards for anti-espionage technical prevention, take corresponding technical measures and other necessary measures to strengthen anti-espionage technical protection for key departmental parts, network facilities, and information systems.
Article 21: For new construction, reconstruction and expansion of construction projects in important state organs, national defense and military industrial units and other important secret-related units, as well as in the surrounding security control areas of important military facilities, the national security organs shall implement the construction projects involving national security matters license.
When local people's governments at or above the county level formulate national economic and social development plans, land and space plans, and other relevant plans, they shall fully consider national security factors and designated security control areas, and solicit opinions from state security organs.
The delineation of security control areas shall coordinate development and security, adhere to the principles of scientific rationality and necessity, and shall be jointly planned by national security organs in conjunction with departments of development and reform, natural resources, housing and urban-rural construction, secrecy, national defense technology and industry, and relevant military departments. It shall be reported to the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government for approval and dynamic adjustment.
The specific implementation measures for construction project permits involving national security matters shall be formulated by the competent national security department of the State Council in conjunction with relevant departments.
Article 22: According to the needs of counter-espionage work, national security organs may, in conjunction with relevant departments, formulate counter-espionage technical prevention standards, guide relevant units to implement counter-espionage technical prevention measures, and units with hidden dangers may carry out counter-espionage after strict approval procedures. Spy technology prevents inspection and detection.
Chapter III Investigation and Disposal
Article 23: National security organs exercise the functions and powers stipulated in this Law and related laws in accordance with the law in countering espionage work.
Article 24: When staff members of national security organs perform counter-espionage tasks in accordance with the law, they may present their work certificates in accordance with regulations, check the identity certificates of Chinese citizens or foreign personnel, and ask relevant individuals and organizations about relevant information. Those suspected of espionage can check their belongings.
Article 25: When staff members of national security organs perform counter-espionage tasks in accordance with the law, upon approval by the person in charge of the national security organs at or above the districted city level, they may inspect the electronic equipment, facilities, and related procedures of relevant individuals and organizations upon presentation of their work certificates. ,tool. If a situation endangering national security is discovered during the inspection, the national security organ shall order it to take measures to rectify immediately. Where rectification is refused or there are still hidden dangers endangering national security after rectification, they may be sealed up and detained.
For electronic equipment, facilities, and related procedures and tools that have been sealed up and impounded in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, after the situation that endangers national security is eliminated, the national security organs shall promptly release the seal and impoundment.
Article 26: When staff members of national security organs are performing counter-espionage tasks in accordance with the law, they may consult and obtain relevant documents, data, materials, Articles, relevant individuals and organizations should cooperate. Consultation and retrieval shall not exceed the scope and limits required for the execution of counterintelligence tasks.
Article 27: Where it is necessary to summon persons who violate this law to accept investigation, the person in charge of the case-handling department of the national security organ shall approve the summons with a summons warrant. For persons who violate this law found on the spot, the staff of the national security organs may orally subpoena them by presenting their work certificates in accordance with regulations, but this shall be noted in the interrogation records. The reason and basis for the summons shall be informed to the person summoned. A person who refuses to accept a summons without justified reasons or who evades a summons may be summoned compulsorily.
The national security organ shall conduct inquiries at the designated place in the city or county where the summoned person resides, or at his residence.
The national security organ shall promptly inquire and verify the summoned person. The time for questioning and verification shall not exceed eight hours; if the situation is complicated, administrative detention may be applicable or a crime is suspected, the time for questioning and verification shall not exceed 24 hours. The national security organ shall provide the summoned person with necessary meals and rest time. Continuous summons are strictly prohibited.
Except for circumstances where it is impossible to notify or may hinder the investigation, the national security organ shall promptly notify the family members of the summoned person of the reasons for the summons. After the above-mentioned circumstances disappear, the family members of the person summoned shall be notified immediately.
Article 28: National security organs investigating espionage may conduct inspections of persons, objects, and places suspected of espionage in accordance with the law upon the approval of the person in charge of the national security organ at or above the district city level.
Examination of a woman's body shall be conducted by a female staff member.
Article 29: National security organs investigating espionage may, with the approval of the person in charge of the national security organ at or above the districted city level, inquire about the property information of persons suspected of espionage.
Article 30: National security organs investigating espionage may, with the approval of the person in charge of the national security organ at or above the districted city level, seal up, detain, or freeze places, facilities, or property suspected of being used for espionage; Freeze places, facilities or property unrelated to the espionage under investigation.
Article 31: Staff members of national security agencies shall take measures such as consultation, transfer, subpoena, inspection, inquiry, seizure, seizure, and freezing in anti-espionage work, which shall be carried out by two or more people, and work certificates and relevant documents shall be produced in accordance with relevant regulations. Legal documents, and the relevant personnel shall sign and seal relevant transcripts and other written materials.
When national security organ staff conduct inspections, seal-ups, seizures, and other important evidence-gathering tasks, they shall record and record the entire process and keep them for future reference.
Article 32: When national security organs investigate and learn about espionage activities and collect relevant evidence, relevant individuals and organizations shall provide truthful information and shall not refuse.
Article 33: For Chinese citizens who may cause harm to national security or cause major losses to national interests after leaving the country, the competent national security department of the State Council may decide that they are not allowed to leave the country within a certain period of time and notify the immigration management agency.
For those suspected of espionage, the national security organs at or above the provincial level may notify the immigration management agencies to not allow them to leave the country.
Article 34: For overseas personnel who may conduct activities that endanger the national security of the People's Republic of China after entering the country, the competent national security department of the State Council may notify the immigration management agency to deny them entry.
Article 35: For persons who are not allowed to leave or enter the country notified by the national security organ, the immigration management agency shall implement it in accordance with relevant state regulations; decision and notify the immigration management agency.
Article 36: When national security organs discover network information content involving espionage or risks such as network attacks, they shall, in accordance with the division of responsibilities stipulated in the "Network Security Law of the People's Republic of China", notify relevant departments in a timely manner, and they shall deal with it in accordance with the law or order the telecommunications business Operators and Internet service providers promptly take measures such as repairing vulnerabilities, strengthening network protection, stopping transmission, eliminating programs and content, suspending related services, removing related applications, closing related websites, and keeping relevant records. If the situation is urgent and failure to take immediate measures will cause serious harm to national security, the national security agency will order the relevant unit to repair the loophole, stop the relevant transmission, suspend the relevant service, and notify the relevant department.
After taking relevant measures, if the above-mentioned information content or risks have been eliminated, the national security organs and relevant departments should make timely decisions to resume relevant transmissions and services.
Article 37: National security organs may adopt technical reconnaissance measures and identity protection measures due to the needs of counter-espionage work, in accordance with relevant state regulations, and after strict approval procedures.
Article 38: Where a violation of the provisions of this law is suspected of committing a crime, and it is necessary to identify whether the relevant matter is a state secret or intelligence and to evaluate the harmful consequences, the state secrecy department or the secrecy department of the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government shall, in accordance with procedures, Identification and organizational evaluation within a certain period of time.
Article 39: After investigation, national security organs discover that espionage is suspected of committing a crime, and shall file a case for investigation in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China.
Chapter Four Guarantee and Supervision
Article 40: Staff members of state security organs perform their duties in accordance with the law and are protected by law.
Article 41: National security organs investigate espionage in accordance with the law, postal, express delivery and other logistics operation units, telecommunications business operators, and Internet service providers shall provide necessary support and assistance.
Article 42: Staff members of state security organs are required to perform emergency tasks, and upon presentation of their work certificates, enjoy priority in public transportation, priority in passage, and other conveniences.
Article 43: When performing tasks in accordance with the law, staff members of national security organs may enter relevant places and units by presenting their work certificates in accordance with regulations; unit.
Article 44: Due to the needs of counter-espionage work, national security organs may, in accordance with relevant state regulations, give priority to use or requisition according to law the means of transportation, means of communication, venues, and buildings of state organs, people's organizations, enterprises, institutions, and other social organizations, as well as individuals. If necessary, relevant workplaces and facilities and equipment can be set up. After the task is completed, it should be returned or restored to its original state in a timely manner, and corresponding fees should be paid in accordance with regulations; if losses are caused, compensation should be given.
Article 45: Due to the needs of counter-espionage work, national security agencies may, in accordance with relevant national regulations, request customs, immigration management and other inspection agencies to facilitate customs clearance for relevant personnel, and to exempt relevant materials and equipment from inspection. Relevant inspection agencies shall provide assistance in accordance with the law.
Article 46: When the personal safety of a staff member of a national security organ or his/her close relatives is threatened due to the performance of a task, or an individual is assisted in the execution of a counter-espionage task, the national security organ shall, in conjunction with relevant departments, take necessary measures in accordance with the law to protect the ,rescue.
Individuals who support or assist counter-espionage work and whose personal safety or that of their close relatives are in danger may request protection from state security organs. State security organs shall, in conjunction with relevant departments, take protective measures in accordance with the law.
Individuals and organizations that cause property losses due to support and assistance in counter-espionage work shall be compensated in accordance with relevant state regulations.
Article 47: The state shall provide proper resettlement for those who have contributed to the counter-espionage work and need to be resettled.
Relevant departments such as public security, civil affairs, finance, health, education, human resources and social security, veterans affairs, medical security, and immigration management, as well as state-owned enterprises and institutions, should assist state security agencies in their resettlement work.
Article 48: Personnel who are disabled, sacrificed, or died due to counter-espionage work or support or assistance in counter-espionage work shall be given corresponding pensions and preferential treatment in accordance with relevant state regulations.
Article 49: The state encourages scientific and technological innovation in the field of counter-espionage, giving full play to the role of science and technology in counter-espionage work.
Article 50: National security organs shall strengthen the construction and professional training of professional counter-espionage forces to enhance counter-espionage capabilities.
Political, theoretical and professional training should be conducted in a planned way for the staff of state security organs. Training should adhere to integrating theory with practice, teaching according to needs, emphasizing practical results, and improving professional ability.
Article 51: National security organs shall strictly implement the internal supervision and security review system, supervise their staff's compliance with laws and disciplines, and take necessary measures in accordance with the law to conduct regular or irregular security reviews.
Article 52: Any individual or organization has the right to report and accuse state security organs and their staff of exceeding their powers, abusing their powers, and other illegal activities to higher-level state security organs or supervisory organs, people's procuratorates, and other relevant departments. The national security organs or supervisory organs, people's procuratorates, and other relevant departments that accept reports and accusations shall promptly ascertain the facts, deal with them according to law, and promptly inform the informant or accuser of the results of the handling.
No individual or organization may suppress or retaliate against individuals or organizations that support or assist national security organs in their work, or report or accuse them in accordance with the law.
Chapter V Legal Responsibilities
Article 53: Whoever commits an act of espionage constitutes a crime shall be investigated for criminal responsibility according to law.
Article 54: Where an individual commits an act of espionage that does not constitute a crime, the national security organ shall give a warning or impose an administrative detention of up to 15 days, a single or combined fine of up to 50,000 yuan, and a fine of up to 50,000 yuan if the illegal income is more than 50,000 yuan , a fine of not less than one time but not more than five times the illegal income shall be imposed solely or concurrently, and may be punished by the relevant departments according to law.
Whoever knowingly knows that others are committing espionage acts, provides them with support or assistance in information, funds, materials, labor services, technology, places, etc., or harbors or shelters them, if it does not constitute a crime, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
Units that commit acts in the preceding two paragraphs shall be given a warning by the national security organ, and a fine of not more than 500,000 yuan shall be imposed either alone or in combination; if the illegal income is more than 500,000 yuan, a fine of not less than one time but not more than five times the illegal income shall be imposed either alone or in combination Fines, and the directly responsible executives and other directly responsible personnel shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph.
National security organs may, based on the circumstances and consequences of violations by relevant units and personnel, suggest that relevant competent authorities be ordered to stop engaging in relevant businesses, provide relevant services, or order to suspend production and business operations, revoke relevant licenses, and revoke registrations. Relevant competent departments shall promptly report back to the state security organs the information on the administrative handling.
Article 55: Those who commit acts of espionage who surrender themselves or perform meritorious service may be given a lighter, mitigated or exempted punishment; those who perform major meritorious service shall be rewarded.
If you are coerced or deceived abroad to join espionage organizations or hostile organizations, and engage in activities that endanger the national security of the People's Republic of China, you must truthfully explain the situation to the agencies of the People's Republic of China stationed abroad in a timely manner, or report the truth to the national security organs in a timely manner after entering the country directly or through your unit. Those who explain the situation and show repentance may not be investigated.
Article 56: Where state organs, people's organizations, enterprises, institutions, and other social organizations fail to perform their anti-espionage security protection obligations in accordance with the provisions of this law, the state security organs may order corrections; The relevant person in charge may, if necessary, report the interview to the higher-level competent department of the unit; if harmful consequences or adverse effects occur, the national security organ may issue a warning and circulate a criticism; if the circumstances are serious, the responsible leaders and the directly responsible Personnel shall be punished by relevant departments according to law.
Article 57: Those who violate the provisions of Article 21 of this law to build, rebuild, or expand construction projects shall be ordered to make corrections and given warnings by the national security organs; Revoke the license, or suggest that the relevant competent department deal with it according to law.
Article 58: Whoever violates the provisions of Article 41 of this law shall be ordered to make corrections by the national security organs, be warned or circulated for criticism; where corrections are refused or the circumstances are serious, the relevant competent departments shall impose punishments in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.
Article 59: Those who violate the provisions of this law and refuse to cooperate with data retrieval shall be punished by the national security organs in accordance with the relevant provisions of the "Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China".
Article 60: Whoever violates the provisions of this law by committing any of the following acts constitutes a crime shall be investigated for criminal responsibility according to law; if it does not constitute a crime, the national security organ shall give a warning or impose an administrative detention of not more than ten days, and may concurrently impose a fine of 30,000 yuan The following fines:
(1) divulging state secrets related to counter-espionage work;
(2) Knowing that others have committed criminal acts of espionage, and refusing to provide relevant evidence when the national security organ investigates the relevant situation and collects relevant evidence;
(3) Deliberately obstructing state security organs from carrying out their tasks in accordance with the law;
(4) Concealing, transferring, selling off, or destroying property seized, seized, or frozen by state security organs according to law;
(5) Concealing, transferring, acquiring, selling on behalf of, or covering up or concealing in other ways the property involved in the case, knowing that it is an act of espionage;
(6) Retaliate against individuals and organizations that support and assist the work of state security organs in accordance with the law.
Article 61: Illegal acquisition and possession of documents, data, materials, and items belonging to state secrets, as well as illegal production, sale, possession, and use of special espionage equipment, which do not constitute a crime, shall be warned or punished by the national security organs. Administrative detention for less than ten days.
Article 62: National security organs shall properly keep property sealed up, impounded, or frozen in accordance with this Law, and handle them in accordance with the following circumstances:
(1) Those suspected of committing a crime shall be dealt with in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China and other relevant laws;
(2) If it does not constitute a crime and there are illegal facts, confiscate what should be confiscated according to law, and destroy what should be destroyed according to law;
(3) If there is no illegal fact, or if it is irrelevant to the case, the seal, seizure, and freezing shall be lifted, and the relevant property shall be returned in a timely manner; if losses are caused, compensation shall be made in accordance with the law.
Article 63: Where property involved in a case falls under any of the following circumstances, it shall be confiscated or confiscated according to law, or measures shall be taken to eliminate hidden dangers:
(1) Illegally obtained property and its fruits and proceeds, and personal property used for espionage;
(2) Documents, data, materials, and items that are illegally obtained or held as state secrets;
(3) Special espionage equipment illegally produced, sold, possessed, or used.
Article 64: The perpetrators and their close relatives or other relevant personnel shall take measures such as recovering and confiscating all the benefits obtained by the perpetrators from espionage organizations and their agents due to the perpetrators' espionage activities.
Article 65: All fines and property confiscated by state security organs according to law shall be turned over to the state treasury.
Article 66: Where foreign personnel violate this Law, the competent national security department of the State Council may decide to leave the country within a specified time limit, and determine the period for which they are not allowed to enter the country. Those who fail to leave the country within the prescribed time limit may be deported.
For overseas personnel who violate this law, if the national security department of the State Council decides to deport them, they will not be allowed to enter the country within ten years from the date of deportation, and the punishment decision of the national security department of the State Council shall be final.
Article 67: Before making a decision on administrative punishment, the national security organ shall inform the party concerned of the content of the proposed administrative punishment and the facts, reasons, and basis, as well as the rights enjoyed by the party in accordance with the law such as statement, defense, and request for a hearing, and in accordance with the "People's Republic of China The relevant provisions of the Administrative Penalty Law shall be implemented.
Article 68: If a party is dissatisfied with the decision on administrative punishment, administrative compulsory measures, or administrative licensing, it may apply for reconsideration according to law within 60 days from the date of receipt of the decision; Within 15 days from the date of the written decision, file a lawsuit in the people's court according to law.
Article 69: Staff members of state security organs abuse their powers, neglect their duties, engage in favoritism, or engage in illegal detention, extorting confessions by torture, obtaining evidence by violence, or disclosing state secrets, work secrets, commercial secrets, personal privacy, and personal information in violation of regulations, etc. Sanctions shall be given according to law, and if a crime is constituted, criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law.
Chapter 6 Regulations
Article 70: National security organs shall, in accordance with laws, administrative regulations, and relevant state regulations, perform their duties of preventing, stopping, and punishing acts that endanger national security other than espionage, and the relevant provisions of this law shall apply.
The relevant provisions of this law apply to public security organs discovering and punishing acts that endanger national security in the process of performing their duties in accordance with the law.
Article 71 This Law shall come into force on July 1, 2023.
Editor: Xia Hongzhen
Editor in charge: Liu Jingbo
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