Just Published: Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt, "Party-Building Through Ideological Campaigns Under Xi Jinping," Asian Survey 63(3) (2023) 1-27

 

Pix Credit here ("Scatter the Old World; Build the New"; 1960s)

 Ideological campaigns have been a part f human history for quite a long time--it is just that those with the authority to "name" these movements tends to avoid the term in favor of  something related to "movements." And yet both the nature of these "movements" as "ideological" and as "campaigns" are, from a contemporary perspective, hard to avoid. The have become emblematic of the way in which social relations are mediated and managed  in this current historical stage of the political development of liberal democracy, Marxist-Leninism, and post-colonial based socio-political ideologies. 

In the liberal democratic West the great ideological campaigns of "defund the police; "me-too;" "social justice;" "equality;" "diversity, equity, and inclusion;" "environmental, social, and governance" movements, for example, have been having an important influence on the evolution of social relations. Each reflects the fundamental nature of liberal democracy--individual centered, markets driven, and bottom up in the sense that popular agitation leads to public action in concert with private agitation and movements for normative change. "These are the fruits of a successful ideological campaign slowly t transformed over the course of centuries into a basis for authoritative constitutional interpretation" (LC Backer, "The Rule Of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule Of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism," Transnational Law & Contemp. Problems 16 (2006) 29-102;  at n. 29  (referencing the power of the Federalist Papers as a foundational ideological campaign in American constitutionalism)).

In Marxist-Leninist systems, and especially in contemporary Chinese Marxist-Leninist systems, ideological campaigns also reflect the fundamental principles of the political-economic model.  In this case collective, driven by a political vanguard, and elaborated from and through state organs.  Ideological campaigns signal the development of the political economic model in its most fundamental sense (the object of my 2006 article "The Rule Of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao , supra).  But it also is "an important vehicle for communicating regime values to Party cadres and the masses." (Jia Heping, "The Three Represents Campaign: Reform the Party or Indoctrinate the Capitalists?," Cato Journal 24 (2004) 261, 262).  

Ideological campaigns continue to be an important element both of the development of the political model in China and as a means of communication between the central elements of the CPC, its cadres, and more generally mass society. The central role of political campaigns from the time of the leadership of Hu Jintao to that of Xi Jinping has just recently been examined in a marvelous article authored by Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt, "Party-Building Through Ideological Campaigns Under Xi Jinping," Asian Survey  63(3) (2023) 1-27. The Abstract nicely summarizes the thrust of the article:

This article investigates the increasing reliance on ideological campaigns by the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping as part of an unfolding party-building project. Analyzing five campaigns conducted from 2013 to 2021, the study shows that they aimed to re-establish the linkage between the party center and party members, reinforce society’s connection to the party center, and crowd out competing narratives both inside the party and outside it. The article highlights the evolution of ideological campaigns in three phases, emphasizing how they developed from focusing on party members’ social environment toward positioning the party center and Xi Jinping at its core as the source of values and norms for party members and societal actors. The development of the party’s ideological campaigns under Xi Jinping thus has significant implications for the party’s model of governance, both internally and externally.

Mittelstaedt first develops a theoretical framework of the analysis and then considers what is posited as the three phases of the way in which ideological campaigns are targeted ("Through these campaigns and the changes in messaging they entail, the CCP aims to crowd out competing narratives, both within the party and in broader society, to maintain its authority and influence. This did not happen overnight but can be divided into three phases" Ibid., p. 5). The phases include: (1) Phase 1: Hu Jintao’s Last Campaign; (2)  Phase 2: Positioning the Party as Party Members’ Normative Source; and (3) Phase 3: Positioning the Party as Society’s Normative Source. "The increasing frequency of ideological campaigns under Xi Jinping therefore is about establishing the party as the center of norms and values, reinforcing rank-and- file members’ links to it, and crowding out competing narratives both within the party and in broader society." (Mittelstaedt, supra, p. 5).  Most interesting is the analysis of the way in which ideological campaigns, under Xi's leadership, were first shifted from a tool of mass education to the Party center--in an effort to build a more unified CPC "with common ideas, ideologies and goals." (Mittelstaedt, supra, p. 8-9). Thereafter, the focus shifted again and became much broader, to "reinforce society's connection to the center, and crowd out competing narratives" (Ibid., p. 15). Those competing narratives were both external--but also internal among China's intellectual elites. The discussions of the alignment of such campaigns with the making of official Party history is instructive (Ibid., 19-21). 

Since [2015], campaigns have focused on the party’s internal construction, while encouraging its members to propagate party values in their everyday lives. The earlier campaigns, in 2014–15 and 2016, were aimed at ideological and organizational construction and focused more on loyalty to the party and its ideals. At the same time, education had become holistic, incorporating not only the learning of texts, speeches, and intra-party rules but also being part of the everyday organizational life within party branches. In this framework, campaigns since the 19th Party Congress could steer the individual cadre and party member toward different aims, focusing on loyalty to the party as an organization and entity and constructing a broader political culture within and outside of the party. (Ibid., 21).

The Article's Introduction follows below.

 

JEAN CHRISTOPHER MITTELSTAEDT

Party-Building through Ideological Campaigns under Xi Jinping

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the increasing reliance on ideological campaigns by the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping as part of an unfolding party- building project. Analyzing five campaigns conducted from 2013 to 2021, the study shows that they aimed to re-establish the linkage between the party center and party members, reinforce society’s connection to the party center, and crowd out competing narratives both inside the party and outside it. The article highlights the evolution of ideological campaigns in three phases, emphasizing how they developed from focusing on party members’ social environment toward positioning the party center and Xi Jinping at its core as the source of values and norms for party members and societal actors. The development of the party’s ideological campaigns under Xi Jinping thus has significant implications for the party’s model of governance, both internally and externally.

KEYWORDS: Chinese Communist Party; party-building, ideology; cam- paigns, governance

RESPONDING TO THE PARTY’S PERCEIVED SEPARATION from the people, the 18th Party Congress of November 2012 announced the launch of the Mass Line Education and Practice campaign for 2013. Ending in 2014, it was imme- diately followed in 2015 by the Three Stricts, Three Steadies campaign aimed at high-level cadres. In 2016, the Two Lines of Study, One Way of Becoming movement to study Xi Jinping’s speeches and central directives to become an “adequate party member” broadened this program to the entire party. The 19th Party Congress of autumn 2017 again announced the launch of the Do Not Forget the Original Aspiration, Keep the Founding Mission Firmly in Mind campaign to understand the party’s history and mission. Kicked off in May 2019, it concluded in early January 2020. Finally, yet another campaign to study party history was launched in summer 2021, in the lead-up to the 100th anniversary of the party’s founding. Under Xi Jinping, ideological campaigns proliferated, reversing the decline of ideology in the 1990s and 2000s (Dickson 2014; Holbig 2013; Lieberthal 1995, 190). Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin only conducted one campaign each. During his ten years in office, Hu Jintao accelerated the pace, but even he only started two campaigns, to study Jiang’s Three Represents and his own “scientific development outlook.” By contrast, under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conducted five top- down intra-party campaigns, each aimed at rectification and marked by a clear start and finish. Why does the party rely so much on ideological campaigns?

The literature provides some answers. In his study of Jiang Zemin’s Three Stresses campaign, Andrew Mertha (2017) argued that it sought to “temper” individuals and “make them more submissive to the larger political goals of the Party centre.” Suisheng Zhao (2016) agrees, showing that ideological campaigns also play an important role in producing legitimacy. This chimes well with Zhengxu Wang’s (2018, 330) claim that education campaigns ensure that the leader’s “brand of ideological formulation is transmitted to every single party member, and the whole party is unified under his flag.” Scholars have provided some answers as to how campaigns work in this fashion. Analyzing official newspapers from 2000 to 2004, Victor Shih (2008) in his pioneering study finds that Jiang Zemin’s protégés are more likely to parrot his signature ideology of Three Represents. Leaders can therefore use ideo- logical campaigns to monitor loyalty. Jinghan Zeng (2016) provides another explanation: analyzing patron–client relationships among different factions in campaigns under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, he finds that ideological campaigns recruit new protégés rather than monitoring loyalty. Though there are differences in approach, the literature focuses rather heavily on the indi- vidual leader and centralization of power.

The CCP’s reliance on ideological campaigns has been a significant feature of its governance. This was especially so during the Mao era, when they were understood as “aimed at changing thinking, and cultural and educational standards, correcting erroneous thoughts...raising each person’s general polit- ical consciousness, and opposing anti-socialist forces” (Cell 1977, 8). However, a greater role for ideology under Xi Jinping alone cannot explain the intensi- fication of such campaigns since 2012. Ling Li (2019) notes that there has been a shift from a mass line policy to political discipline, which has been part of Xi’s overarching campaign to consolidate power. According to Li, the party’s ability to conduct campaigns and make people comply signals its strength and trans- fers this authority to its top leader. This contrasts with the view of Macabe Keliher and Hsinchao Wu (2016), who argue that Xi’s ongoing campaigns are part of a broader party-building project. In other words, campaigns serve institutional purposes that go beyond immediate aims of power consolidation. By strengthening the party’s institutions, Xi is creating a sustainable system of governance that can withstand internal and external pressures. The prevailing literature suggests that messaging and shifting objectives of campaigns matter beyond narratives and signaling and centralization.

This article argues that ideological campaigns under Xi Jinping’s leadership serve as critical party-building tools, aiming to re-establish the linkage between the party center and its members and reinforce society’s connection to the party and its center. Through these campaigns and the changes in messaging they entail, the CCP aims to crowd out competing narratives, both within the party and in broader society, to maintain its authority and influence. This did not happen overnight but can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, from 2013 on, the focus was on the party’s relationship with the people, reflecting Hu Jintao’s continued influence. Xi Jinping broke with this during the second phase, which started in 2015 and sought to tighten party members’ connections to the center and define appropriate behavior. The third phase aimed to shape the broader social environment by promoting party values, displacing alternative narratives, and fostering stronger ties between society and the party. It culminated in the 2021 party history cam- paign, which marked the first time an internal ideological campaign extended its reach beyond the party and into society. As the party continues to employ ideological campaigns, the implications for the future of the CCP and its relationship with society are significant. The CCP is likely to further strengthen its institutional structures, tighten control over its members, and position itself as the source of social values and norms. In doing so, the party seeks to create a sustainable system of governance that can withstand internal and external pressures, shaping China’s future in line with its vision and goals. In the following sections, I outline the theoretical framework that explains this shift and analyze the campaigns in detail.

Charismatic authority, according to Max Weber (2012), is a type of authority that relies on the personal charisma of the leader. In contrast to traditional or legal-rational authority, which are based on custom and law, respectively, charismatic authority is based on the personal qualities of the leader, such as their personality, skills, or talents. According to Weber, charisma is especially important for “expansive political movements in their early stages” (370), mobilizing people to enact change. Despite its potential for inspiring loyalty, charismatic authority is not sustainable in the long run. As Weber notes, in later stages when movements become institutionalized, charisma gives way “to the forces of everyday routine” (370). Because charismatic authority is very much opposed to administration and routine, the movement loses its ability to tap into the sources of charisma. Weber notes that “charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules” (361). The challenge is to maintain this sense of purpose and energy over the long term, without succumbing to the forces of routine and bureaucracy. He calls this “charisma of office,” wherein an organizational apparatus embodies charismatic authority. This process is what Eisenstadt (Weber’s editor) calls the transferring of charisma “from the unique personality or the unstructured group to orderly institutional reality” (Weber 1968, xxviii). Political scientist Xueguang Zhou (2022) agrees. As he notes, in traditional China, “Confucian values and the piety-based social order played such a role” (94). After the People’s Republic of China was founded, the CCP inherited this role, both updating it and locating it “in the organizational apparatus of the CCP.”

While Weber does not say how institutions can be imbued with charisma, Eisenstadt provides some elaborations. He notes that social situations “in which the appeal to the charismatic becomes especially articulated” include rites of passage and rituals, but also the communication of symbols and messages (Weber 1968, xxvii). Participating in these events therefore disrupts existing social and cultural orders. This is the case with ideological campaigns that disrupt prevailing routines. Messages and symbols then “give meaning to their [people’s] experiences in terms of some fundamental cosmic, social, or political order” and “prescribe the proper norms of behavior” while relating the “individual to collective identification” (xxviii). Likewise, during ideolog- ical campaigns, the type of content is important for understanding how the individual is to position themselves with respect to the party, its leadership, and society. This also means that there are multiple centers of charismatic authority, including societal, political, economic, cultural, and religious cen- ters, with which campaign messages are in continuous conflict. As Zhou (2022, 95) argues, the “routinization of charisma not only requires a stable organizational basis but also needs to be built at the societal center of values and norms.”

Thus, ideological campaigns intended as party-building mechanisms attempt to imbue the party (and Xi Jinping at its core) with charismatic authority while also establishing it as the center, which provides an alternative to challenges of “pluralism and liberalism in the public arena” (Zhou 2022, 95) and within the party. Competing narratives include Western democratic ideals, including the perceived threats of “constitutional democracy,” “uni- versal values,” and “historical nihilism” (Central Committee 2013). By posi- tioning the party as the source of norms and values, ideological campaigns aim to counteract these alternative narratives and assert the party’s domi- nance over the political, social, and cultural landscape in China. The increas- ing frequency of ideological campaigns under Xi Jinping therefore is about establishing the party as the center of norms and values, reinforcing rank-and- file members’ links to it, and crowding out competing narratives both within the party and in broader society.

The following sections of this article explore the methods of ideological campaigns, focusing on creating links between the party center and its lead- ing cadres and rank-and-file members, reinforcing party members’ connec- tions to the center by altering the messaging, and emphasizing the center’s role as the primary source of values and norms to overcome opposing narra- tives within the party and in society as a whole. The Mass Line Education and Practice campaign emphasized the importance of serving the people and addressing corruption, while the Three Stricts, Three Steadies campaign focused on strict self-discipline, adherence to party principles, and imple- mentation of policies. The Two Lines of Study, One Way of Becoming campaign encouraged the study of Xi Jinping’s speeches and central direc- tives, aiming to instill loyalty and devotion to the party’s goals and position- ing the party center as party members’ sole source of norms and values. The last two campaigns focused on building a social environment conducive to the party’s norms, policies, and rules and situating the party center and Xi Jinping at its core as the dominant source of societal norms and values.