Functional Differentiation in the Projection of Multi-Generational War Techniques--A New Front in the Russo-Ukrainian War; Russia in Nicaragua

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The Russo-Ukrainian war has evolved on several fronts. At its core is the physical conflict through which Russia seeks to realize its territorial ambitions. Its territorial peripheries extend first to front line states who seek to aid the principal territorial combatants.  On the one side China, and perhaps to a lesser extent Iran and beyond that the states that seek advantage or to honor old alliances or habits of connection. These provide Russia with a means of softening the hostile actions of those who, on the other side, seek to support Ukraine.  Principal among these are the United States ad the European Union, Japan, and Euro-Asia. Like China and its associated states, the states on the Ukrainian side seek to provide Ukraine with the means necessary for them--as the front line state--to resist Russian territorial ambitions.  At the same time. like the Chinese side, they seek to remain just shy of appearing to be an active combatant.  Thus the Russian allied states would undermine sanctions and provide material support, while the Ukrainian allied states shore up the NATO alliance, provide substantial financial and military assistance, and project defensive power against Russia by denying it access to trade, finance, and other interconnections beyond its borders.  At the outer fringes of these bands of alliances are the great trading and friendship circles--the OECD, the BRICS alliance,and the Belt & Road states. 

To that end, the United States and NATO has sought to move its defensive positions right up to the  borders with Russia. With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the ability of the liberal democratic alliance to project power right to the edges of the Russian heartland, even if defensive, becomes greater. But Russia is not without means of projecting closer to the American heartland. Cuba remains an eager, convenient and powerful instrument.   Certainly Russian operatives have a long history of operation in Cuba; and lately Chinese operatives have found a home there as well. Cuban security and other administrative organs to serve the interest of and as agents for Russian interests that may at the same time serve Cuban interest as well. Cuba can also serve as a convenient base for running advanced warfare operations detached enough so that it might not be directly connected with the principles in the conflict (especially Russia and China). 

Now Russia has augmented its ability to project power in the Western Hemisphere. It was reported that

The Daniel Ortega-Rosario Murillo regime has authorized Russian personnel, ships, and aircraft to enter Nicaragua from July 1 to December 31, 2022. The Russian troops will participate in humanitarian aid, military exercises, and operations against illicit activities on the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the June 7 decree in the official Gazette indicated.

“The region has reason to feel threatened. Nicaragua bought offensive as opposed to defensive armament from the Russians. The 80 tanks that it acquired are perfectly suited for armed entry into any of the capitals of Central America,” former opposition lawmaker, lawyer, and political analyst Eliseo Núñez told Diálogo. “The Russians in Nicaragua, with conventional and technological military capabilities, are a danger to the region. We already see what is happening in Costa Rica with hackers blocking the internet […], who coincidentally are from Russia.”

The decree includes the entry of 80 Russian military personnel, on a rotating basis, to participate in “experience exchanges and conduct training in humanitarian aid operations” with the Nicaraguan Army’s Special Operations Command. Moreover, 50 additional troops will take part in security training, and another 50 Russian service members will exchange experiences “in tasks to confront and combat narcotrafficking and transnational organized crime,” the decree states. (Nicaragua Authorizes Entry of Russian Troops on Its Territory )

The overture and the propaganda effect (especially its signalling objectives) of Decree 10-2022, approved by the Ortega-controlled legislature authorizing Russian military activity in and around the nation, was unmistakable.

Nicaraguan political analyst Roberto Cajina said the torrent of propaganda emanating from the Kremlin after Decree 10-2020 was passed constitutes a veiled threat to the United States. Russian state television anchor Olga Skabeeva gave extensive coverage to Ortega’s initiative and said, “It’s time for Russia to flex its muscles near some US cities.” TASS, a Russian state-owned news agency also widely disseminated news of the military agreement with Nicaragua, while Sputnik, another Russian state-owned news agency headlined a recent report: “Nicaragua: military cooperation with Russia will strengthen national security.” The Kremlin later tried to tone down the rhetoric and Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova dismissed the collaboration with Nicaragua as a “routine operation.” (Nicaragua’s Ortega strains US relations by expanding military ties with Russia)

The significs of the exercise of this power projection are potentially important.  Its discursive  importance is clear and unmistakable. This builds on the narrative of resistance to the new empire as a way of masking the imperial machinations of a more backwards looking 20th century Russian imperial project, but one that suits the 21st imperial aspirations of its much more potent partner in Asia. It also continues to feed the now ancient anti-colonial discourse that have proven to be so useful in the internal politics of  states more comfortable with the encomienda than with the realities and potentials of this century ("In the Shadow of Empires—Latin American Perceptions of Development and International Law"-- Summary of Presentation for ASIL 2019 Proceedings).  

It is unclear the extent to which the changes in Nicaragua may be used to destabilize (or appear to destabilize) the region.  The extent to which ti is designed to produce some sort of in terrorem effect on shipping in and through the Panama Canal is even less clear. A base for targeted projections of instability, though, is always useful, as is a refuge for operations.  Its potential use as a base for regional targeted special operations, then, is then likely more significant--drugs (for high demand Northern Hemisphere and European markets, money laundering, sanctions avoidance, smuggling, gun running, agitation, and assassination. These are useful and destabilizing modalities of projecting power even into the heart of an opponent within interlocking systems of global interaction.  Its potential to fuel sensitive battles within US politics on the eve of the mid term elections, then, ought not be overlooked--especially the potential to ramp up the politics of migration and its instrumentalization as a weapon of indirect war. What makes this potentially even more interesting is the changing political landscape in Central and Northern South America, with governments potentially more sympathetic to Nicaragua and Russia/China and with a long list of grievances against the United States. Nicaragua, like Cuba, can also serve as a strategic base for avoiding sanctions regimes--an extension of the "silk roads" Russia is now creating around the heartland of the liberal democratic empire (A new corridor for India-Russia trade via Iran is almost ready).  And a distracted US, like a distracted Europe, can serve the interests of those who wish to absorb Ukraine within another empire, one partition at a time.

The United States has not been oblivious--it has extended sanctions regimes against Nicaragua (US slaps more sanctions on Nicaragua, accuses it of deepening Russia ties).  But these have been anemic. Anemia may be symptomatic of a greater challenge--the need to master the newer arts of integrated spectrum conflicts with a dynamic but not uniform global dimension. The great symptom of this challenge might appear as the a manifestation on the ground of anything like a coordinated approach to the geopolitical  pieces radiating out from the conflict on the ground in Ukraine is as well understood as it ought to be, or that the way in which functionally differentiated roles for each of these radiating bands now appears to finely tune the disaggregated use of multi-generational warfare techniques assigned to different segments of interlinked friendly states and other actors. Nor is it clear that the Americans are now merely playing a defensive strategy rather than actively deploying these differentiated  operational and tactical centers toward a positive and coordinated objective, even one with many subparts. It would be a great pity if the United States and its allies deal with this piecemeal--as it has done with the BRICS states--is to underestimate the systems of alliances deploying different elements of multi-generational warfare.  A greater pity is the United States continues its usual approach to the region, studied indifference unless the US needs something or the regional actors irritate  some faction of US ruling elites. A failure to coordinate on the part of the United States and its allies may be regrettable. In the meantime, those supporting Russia may be able to take greater advantage of the opportunities provided by operations in the soft underbelly of American strategic vision. Look for ways in which American competitor states--both apex and regional powers now see to take advantage of the American inability to properly situate that underbelly within the geopolitical body of functionally differentiated and disaggregated conflict-front strategies of multi-generational warfare. One saw a hint of this in the evolving National Security Strategy of the US (see, e.g.,  Ruminations 76: From Global to Fortress America; Thoughts on "National Security Strategy of the United States" (4 Dec 2017)). Time will tell if the US is keeping up with the times.