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| Nkisi, 19th century Berlin Palace Museum |
One knows only what one ought to know. To make something known is to catalogue it within the structures of knowledge ready to receive it. Knowledge production mirrors every other form of production structured through social relations--It follows the same form--today moving from the model of the factory to that of the service industry, to that of the production of coded rationalities.
None of this makes sense--except as a means of centering the signification of objects in ways that enhance pre-coded s(in the sense that knowledge is possible only from knowledge of what is expected) structures of social relations, and of the construction of those social relations in the context of its environment.
None of this makes sense excepts a function of social ordering and the production of effects of value to that ordering.. Value, in turn, is purely subjective. And disciplinary. Practical knowledge, then, is prized; theoretical knowledge also but only as it contributes to the production of practical value. That is the way that societies have now organized their knowledge factories--overseen by those who manage the capital of systems of social relations--foundations, states, civil society organs, and the like. Outliers may sometimes be tolerated (one never knows what value they might inadvertently produce). But generally they are disciplined--ghosted in every sense of that word. They become invisible--not in the conversations among approved knowledge producers nor acknowledged in any practical way. Though sometimes there is comfort in exile. And the possibility of preserving the invisible for a future age when the calculus of value changes.
It is in these senses, then, that all knowledge is driven by culture, shaped by politics, and made neutral through the naturalization of bias that enhances the presumptions and prerogatives of social relations. It is not necessarily inevitable that knowledge cannot overcome the systems within which it is signified (or better identified as knowledge worth knowing, and knowing in a particular way). But perhaps it is that the way that the social economics of such fundamental occurrences and practices operate require the sort of sacrifice that tends to augment the price and value of such efforts. The alternative--as in many aspects of practical knowledge--is serendipity (whether serendipity is real or strategically imagined). The trope of accidental (in the old sense of unintentional and thus not threatening) discovery is both a shield against social discipline and a means of evading its rigidity from time to time.
These mechanics, of course, are transposed into the construction of the abstracted worlds within which so-called artificial intelligence is then animated. It is, indeed, animated as a set of social relations built around the strategic cultivation and protection of knowledge systems and the social relations it is meant to protect and the interests of which it is meant to advance. And it is in this sense, perhaps, tat one can understand more fully the pathos of the practical efforts to manage AI without expending any effort on its epistemology. That is, the construction of rule systems built within a set of complicated instructions for the constitution and operation of social relations that are a manifestation of empirical (surface) manifestation and normative (ideologically bias systems of positive and taboo bias) will inevitably produce--or reproduce--the modeled set of social relations within which its own episteme is obscured. It is that obscuring, rather than the symptomatic application of its consequences in the coding and utilization of AI systems, that serves as the core source of corruption, manipulation, and abuse which, rightly, has become an object of some interest among those who have taken on themselves the task of managing our varied structures of social relations. In other words, using law, norm, and application, as the means for managing AI effectively produces the opposite effect: the very nature of that project ensures that the limitations of the coded rationalities from which AI meta structures are derived and within which they must operate. One must, in other words, "fix" oneself before one can expect a coded abstraction of oneself overseeing a hypothetical version of oneself in relation to others can do it for one. That applies to collectives with more force, perhaps, than individuals.
It is with that "grain of salt" that one might more productively consider, and perhaps engage with the Ministerial Declaration The G7 Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting (30 April 2023), and the Governance Principles for a Society Based on Cyber-Physical Systems (developed by a voluntary group of individuals drawn from G7 member nations, and intended to contribute to discussion on governance innovation at the G7 Digital and Technology Ministers' Meeting). The text of both follow below. Both are quite practical. And both are excellent vehicles for better understanding the value and limitations of practicability detached from systemic episteme. Nonetheless, they each mark an important evolutionary step in the now inevitable digital transformation of the corporeal into an animated construct of itself. At its best, it suggests the potential and challenges of tool-tech principles; at its worst it suggests a blindness to the power of tools in the hands of people not bound by sensibilities of the toolmaker; or in the case of self-reflexive AI, precisely because the tool now seeks to realize the maker's ideal state.
1. We, the Digital and Tech Ministers of the G7, met on 29 and 30 April 2023 under the chair
of Mr. KONO Taro, Minister for Digital Transformation, Mr. MATSUMOTO Takeaki,
Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, Mr. NISHIMURA Yasutoshi, Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry, to address the current and future challenges in the digital
society. They also invited for discussion the representatives from the guest countries of
Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, and Ukraine, and the international organisations
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, International Telecommunication
Union, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations, and
World Bank Group.
2. We, the Digital and Tech Ministers of the G7, once again condemn in the strongest
possible terms Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes an
unacceptable violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Russia must
withdraw all forces and equipment from Ukraine immediately and unconditionally.
3. We reaffirm our commitment from the G7 Digital Ministers’ Meeting in Germany last year
to support Ukraine and continue to recognise the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine
on digital infrastructure. We strongly support the UN Human Rights Council Resolution
(A/HRC/49/L.31/Rev.1) led by Ukraine on the ‘Role of States in countering the negative
impact of disinformation on the enjoyment and realisation of human rights’ adopted at the
49th Human Rights Council Session on 1 April 2022.
4. We reaffirm our commitments outlined in the Declaration of the Summit for Democracy,
including that the ways in which technologies, including new and emerging ones such as
artificial intelligence, biotechnologies, and quantum technologies, are designed,
developed, maintained, governed, acquired, funded, sold, and used should be shaped
by a commitment to democratic principles including equality, inclusion, sustainability,
transparency, accountability, diversity, and respect for human rights including
privacy. We underscore the need for technology companies to behave responsibly and
reinforce our commitment to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
and protect against human rights abuses.
5. Digitalisation and digital infrastructure underpin modern societies and help to deliver
inclusive economic growth that maximises the benefits of digital technologies, including
emerging technologies and artificial intelligence, such as through the Japanese
Presidency’s vision for a Society 5.0.
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6. In particular, recognising the critical role of data, as an enabler of economic growth,
development and social well-being, we advance international policy discussions to
harness the full potential of cross-border data flows under the banner of Data Free Flow
with Trust (DFFT). In this context, we share the view that trust should be built and realised
through various legal and voluntary frameworks, guidelines, standards, technologies and
other means that are transparent and protect data. We recognise the need to accelerate
and operationalise work on DFFT. We take note of the interests expressed by
stakeholders on operationalising DFFT across varied sectors including the areas such as
health including pandemic response, climate change, and varied IoT uses including
mobility.
7. We recognise that the rapid spread of digitalisation also reveals the necessity to address
digital divides both at domestic and international levels. The benefits of emerging
technologies can contribute to reducing digital divides including the gender digital divide.
We confirm our commitment to strengthen our cooperation with like-minded partners
including developing and emerging countries with a view to reducing digital divides
including the gender divide, such as by supporting efforts on digital skills and digital
connectivity. We recognise that people of all ages and backgrounds need basic digital
skills, to enable them to navigate an increasingly digitally connected world and to close
digital divides, in cooperation with the G20 Digital Economy Working Group. We also
recognise a renewed role for smart city initiatives in promoting connectivity to bridge
digital divides in cities and communities of all sizes, based on previous discussions in
relevant fora and we look forward to the outcomes of the G7 Sustainable Urban
Development Ministers’ meeting.
8. Building upon this backgrounds and the outcomes of past G7 Digital and Tech Ministers’
meetings, we discussed the facilitation of cross-border data flows and data free flow with
trust, secure and resilient digital infrastructure, Internet governance, emerging
technologies in innovating society and economy, responsible AI and global AI governance
and digital competition.
Facilitation of Cross-Border Data Flows and Data Free Flow with Trust
9. In line with the 2019 G20 Osaka Leader's Declaration, the UK 2021 G7 Roadmap for
Cooperation on Data Free Flow with Trust, and the German 2022 G7 Action Plan for
Promoting Data Free Flow with Trust, we affirm our commitment to operationalise Data
Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) and to build upon commonalities, complementarities, and
elements of convergence between existing regulatory approaches and instruments
enabling data to flow with trust in order to foster future interoperability.
10. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate on leveraging opportunities of cross-border
data flows and addressing challenges raised, in particular, regarding security, privacy
protection, data protection, and the protection of intellectual property rights while
recognising our varied approaches to data governance. We seek to increase trust across
our digital ecosystem and to counter the influence of authoritarian approaches. In this
regard, we welcome the OECD Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data
Held by Private Sector Entities as a critical tool to improve trust in cross-border data flows
by identifying safeguards applicable when clarifying how national security and law
enforcement agencies access personal data under existing legal frameworks.
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11. We stress the need for tangible progress on advancing DFFT and we recognise that there
are potential gaps in international governance to operationalise DFFT in particular due to
its cross-sectoral nature, and that there is a need for a new mechanism to bring
governments and stakeholders together to cooperate on facilitating cross-border flows of
personal and non-personal data under the banner of DFFT. To this end, we commit to
operationalising DFFT through a new institutional arrangement for partnership.
12. We resolve to intensify regulatory and technological cooperation and aim to further
cooperate on knowledge sharing including through the OECD, the roundtable of G7 data
protection and privacy authorities, expert groups relevant to DFFT as well as other
multistakeholder forums. We also recognise that the added value of varied perspectives
from a range of stakeholders is needed to inform policy efforts. In this regard, we welcome
the OECD Report "Moving forward on data free flow with trust: new evidence and analysis
of business experiences" as to the issues related to application of privacy and data
protection requirements for cross-border data flows, as perceived from a business
perspective.
13. To deliver on the goal of operationalising DFFT, we endorse the establishment of the
Institutional Arrangement for Partnership (IAP) to bring governments and stakeholders
together to operationalise DFFT through principles-based, solutions-oriented, evidence-
based, multistakeholder and cross-sectoral cooperation. We endeavour to launch it in the
coming months and will convene meetings to further discuss the means under the IAP
that could be put in place to achieve our common vision endorsed under Annex 1. We
are also committed to working together with international and regional organisations and
to support relevant initiatives in a complementary manner. We affirm our commitment to
deliver tangible progress in operationalising DFFT and will report to the subsequent
meetings of the G7 Leaders and relevant ministers on the outcomes and next steps.
Secure and Resilient Digital Infrastructure
14. Building on the UK 2021 G7 Digital and Technology Ministerial Declaration and the
Germany 2022 G7 Digital Ministerial Declaration, we continued and deepened our
discussion on secure and resilient digital infrastructure. We recognise the critical role
digital infrastructure plays in addressing global challenges such as climate change,
pandemics, and fragility.
15. We recognise the importance of continuing work and discussion to enhance security and
resilience of digital infrastructure. Rapid digitalisation of the whole society leads to
increased demand for higher levels of security and resilience in digital infrastructure in
addition to greater speeds, larger capacity, lower energy consumption, lower latency, as
well as ubiquitous connectivity. Secure and resilient digital infrastructure is a key
foundation for a vibrant economy with high potential for economic growth, job creation
and for an open and democratic society. We recognise that network architectures that
enhance security and redundancy and promote interoperability can strengthen resilience
of digital infrastructure.
16. In line with the 2021 Digital and Technology Ministerial Declaration, we continue to
promote secure, resilient, competitive, transparent, sustainable and diverse digital,
telecoms, and ICT infrastructure supply chains. We support an innovative and
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competitive digital ecosystem which is secure and resilient. We welcome supplier
diversification efforts in ICTS supply chains and continue to discuss market trends
towards open, interoperable approaches, alongside secure, resilient and established
architectures in a technology neutral way. Under the Japanese G7 Presidency and
against the background of early deployments of Open RAN, we have exchanged views
on open architectures and security-related aspects and opportunities. To further
strengthen G7 priorities on secure and resilient digital infrastructure, we are committed
to continue working collaboratively within the G7 and with industry and other stakeholders.
17. In order to increase digital infrastructure redundancy, it is important to develop, deploy
and maintain various multi-layered networks consisting of terrestrial networks, submarine
cable networks, and non-terrestrial networks. We are committed to deepen our
cooperation within the G7 and with like-minded partners to support and enhance network
resilience by measures such as extending secure routes of submarine cables. Network
interoperability is also critical. Ensuring interoperability between various networks to
enable roaming between operators in case of an emergency contributes to higher
network resilience.
18. It is also important to extend secure and resilient digital infrastructure to like-minded
partners, including developing and emerging economies. Developing secure and resilient
digital infrastructure globally requires awareness raising of network security, data
protection and cloud resilience and thus it is important to strengthen our collective effort
to support developing countries in promoting network security including through capacity
building.
19. We also recognise the importance of discussion on the role of submarine cable networks
and their global development and maintenance, particularly from the security and
resilience viewpoint. With the current geopolitical situation in mind, it is urgently important
for the G7 to cooperate with other like-minded partners, including those in developing
and emerging economies in strengthening global connectivity by ensuring secure and
resilient routes of international communication infrastructure.
20. In addition to these efforts to improve security and resilience of current digital
infrastructure, we note the importance of sharing a vision for the next generation network
in the Beyond 5G/6G era, and endorse the G7 Vision of the future network in the Beyond
5G/6G era. We are committed to enhancing cooperation on research, development, and
international standards setting, toward building digital infrastructure for the 2030s and
beyond. [Annex 2]
21. We endorse the G7 Action Plan for Building a Secure and Resilient Digital Infrastructure
that outlines the above efforts to build a secure and resilient digital infrastructure. In
supporting secure and resilient digital infrastructure in developing countries, we seek to
cooperate with international organisations and development agencies such as the World
Bank and the ITU. [Annex 3]
Internet Governance
22. We reconfirm our commitment to the promotion of an open, free, global, interoperable,
reliable, and secure Internet that supports innovation and strengthens respect for
democratic values and human rights. We also confirm our commitment to the protection
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and promotion of one global, unfragmented Internet and thus oppose any intention and
action toward Internet fragmentation.
23. We strongly support and promote the inclusive multistakeholder approach to Internet
governance. We reinforce our support for the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as
the leading multistakeholder forum for Internet policy discussions. We are committed to
making collective efforts toward the success of IGF 2023 in Kyoto, Japan, including
stronger collaboration with stakeholders from national, regional and global stakeholder
communities.
24. We reconfirm our commitment to the Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI) and
its principles, and to cooperating in implementing them. We also continue to strive to
expand this commitment within the global family of countries that also support democratic
values, aiming for a global protection of the DFI ́s crucial principles that underpin today ́s
open and free Internet. We welcome DFI’s geographic and economic diversity, including
developing countries and emerging economies and invite the global community to join
the effort. In this regard, we continue to strengthen our collaboration with stakeholders
around the world in implementing DFI and its principles.
25. We condemn government-imposed Internet shutdowns and network restrictions. We
resolve to cooperate in making visible and tackling the tactics of digital authoritarianism,
and seek to strengthen cooperation in addressing practices such as Internet shutdowns,
network restrictions and digital mass-surveillance that violate international human rights
law, including by collaborating with other initiatives such as the Freedom Online Coalition
and its Task Force on Internet Shutdowns. We are committed to protect the technical
infrastructure essential to the general availability or integrity of the Internet.
26. We endorse the G7 Action Plan for an Open, Free, Global, Interoperable, Reliable and
Secure Internet. [Annex 4]
27. We remain committed to protecting our democratic institutions and values from foreign
threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference, disinformation and
other forms of foreign malign activity that seek to undermine democracy and the ideals
that open societies are founded on, consistent with existing initiatives, including the G7
Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), the G7 Interior and Security Ministers' Meeting, and
the OECD MIS/DIS Information Resource Hub.
28. Information integrity is a challenge in strengthening trust in the digital economy with
broader societal implications. We recognise the importance of actions taken by a wide
range of stakeholders, including social media platforms, civil society, the Internet
technical community, and academia to address online information manipulation and
interference and disinformation while respecting human rights, in particular to the right to
freedom of expression. We plan to collaborate in gathering and compiling existing
practices by various stakeholders to address online disinformation as Existing Practices
against Disinformation (EPaD), and intend to publicise and present this report at the UN
IGF 2023 in Kyoto. Some of these practices include stopping monetisation of
disinformation content, strengthening the accountability of digital platforms, or providing
users with the means to understand and report disinformation. We also encourage
businesses to allocate adequate resources which reflect the diversity of languages and
cultures where they operate when it comes to countering intentional online information
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manipulation and interference, including disinformation.
29. We are committed to work together with all stakeholders to contribute to the UN Global
Digital Compact (GDC), with a view to promoting a human rights based, and gender
responsive approach, and with reference to existing outcome documents such as the
Agreed Conclusions of the 67th session of the Commission on the Status of Women on
gender equality in innovation and technology, and international human rights law
commitments, including in relation to gender equality. We will encourage the GDC to
reinforce build on, and contribute to the success of the IGF and WSIS process. Based on
our commitment to the multistakeholder approach, we also resolve to work together to
prepare for the coming discussions during the WSIS+20 review process in 2025,
including empowering multistakeholder participation and engagement.
Emerging and Disruptive Technologies in Innovating Society and Economy
30. We recognise that digital innovation accelerated by emerging technologies and innovative
governance models has the power to unlock inclusive economic growth and a sustainable
society that serves the well-being of people. We also recognise the importance of
developing cyber and digital skills across the economy. To ensure that we are able to
capitalise on the benefits of emerging technologies, including integration of cyber-
physical systems and its major components including Internet of Things (IoT) technology,
we work toward social implementation of emerging technologies, embedding security
within technology and ensuring domestic and international interoperability of
technologies composing digital infrastructures.
31. We share the importance of developing policy discussions on digital identity systems and
other means to build trust and security in data sharing. We will share and accelerate best
practices on digital identity and credentials and support discussions on the ongoing
development of the OECD draft recommendation on the governance of digital identity.
We take note of the discussions at the G7 Stakeholder Conference on Digital
Technologies for Trust on 29 March 2023 on compatible policy approaches and
technologies for data exchange in a trusted way, including enhanced traceability and
controllability of data as well as verification of data sharing partners.
32. We recognise that hardware and software across sectors and borders are intricately inter-
connected as a system, and hence we need to cooperate throughout the global value
chain of digitally-enabled products and services to enable trust and security in the digital
economy. In this regard, we recognise interoperability based on trust of software and IoT
products contributes to managing existing and potential vulnerabilities. We recognise the
importance of designing, developing, and deploying well-secured apps and software and
responding to vulnerabilities appropriately, including by enhancing transparency of
software components.
33. We also affirm the importance of foundational digital technologies, such as
semiconductors, and exploring the value technical standards could provide to minimise
the impacts of a supply chain disruption. We recognise the need to continue working with
stakeholders across the G7 and like-minded countries in relevant forums on emerging
technology topics, such as interoperability of IoT products in cooperation with relevant
Ministerial tracks.
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34. We share the view that rapid innovation of emerging and disruptive technologies that
allows us to boost the economy and address varied social challenges such as climate
change, pandemics, and the effects of aging populations, in turn requires consideration
regarding governance of digital technologies and examination of societal impacts
including to address misuse. In this regard, we acknowledge the need for agile, more
distributed and multi-stakeholder governance and legal frameworks, designed for
operationalising the principles of the rule of law, due process, democracy, and respect
for human rights while harnessing the opportunities of innovation. We acknowledge the
need for a possible common approach on this agenda based on the input by the
Taskforce on Governance for a Digitalized Society with a view to enabling human-centred,
sustainable, and resilient societies by benefit of technologies.
35. We also acknowledge the call of the multistakeholder community at the G7 Digital
Transformation Summit held on 28 April 2023 where they discussed with G7 Ministers
the key issues of digital transformation including artificial intelligence, digital
infrastructures, and agile governance based on the delivery of Governance Principles for
a Society based on Cyber Physical Systems by the Taskforce. We recognise the need to
consider the suggestions by stakeholders in the related works of the G7 Digital and Tech.
We also welcome the establishment of the OECD Global Forum on Technology as an
important new forum to bring together multiple stakeholders around emerging technology
impacts and opportunities.
36. We reiterate our long-term commitment to better harness digital technologies to achieve
a sustainable society and continue working on green transition, energy and resource
efficiency, circular economy and climate change in digitalising society while working to
mitigate the environmental impacts of the digital sector itself.
These efforts include:
> Improving circularity of hardware and energy efficiency on data centres and next
generation computing including software technologies by improving computational
velocity and efficiency.
> Collaboratively exploring opportunities to leverage a life cycle approach in developing,
implementation and use of digital technologies including the recyclability and “right
to repair” these technologies.
> Exchange best practices and advance a sustainable by design approach of digital
equipment and products in order to reduce the consumption of resources and
increase the use of recycled elements in these products of sustainable by design.
37. We also call for development of sustainable supply chains and seek to explore the
potential impact thereof. In this regard, we work on:
> Sharing information on the use, reuse, and disposal of hazardous substances and
compounds used in production of IoT, semiconductors and other digital equipment
and possible means of alternation.
> Improvements of the circularity of these supply chains and any potential
environmental impacts.
38. We continue discussions on the ways to develop our collective approaches on immersive
technologies such as the metaverse. We recognise the potential of immersive
technologies to provide a myriad of innovative opportunities for different areas and use
cases and the need for policy discussions on interoperability, portability, and ecological
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sustainability and standards to support these aims as well as to foster a trustworthy, safe
and secure use of the technologies based democratic values while maintaining a free
open and fair global economic architecture. We recognise the role that international
organisations could play in this regard and seek to continue contributing to on-going
discussion in relevant multilateral fora including the OECD.
Responsible AI and Global AI Governance
39. In 2016, we initiated an international discussion on AI principles. This discussion helped
pave the way for the 2019 OECD AI Recommendation (OECD AI Principles) and the
associated work launching the OECD.AI Policy Observatory and Network of Experts. In
2020, we supported the launch of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI).
40. The OECD AI Principles provide guidance for trustworthy AI and for ensuring an open
and enabling environment for AI development and deployment that is grounded in human
rights and democratic values. Since adoption of these principles, the OECD continues to
engage and work with the global AI community to support their implementation.
41. Rapid AI developments call for attention to, and cooperation on, emerging and medium-term policy issues including development of technical standards, developed by
international standards development organisations (SDOs), as well as other tools to
ensure the development and deployment of trustworthy AI in line with the OECD AI
Principles. In this context, we welcome the contributions of existing initiatives on these
topics.
42. We reaffirm our commitment to promote human-centric and trustworthy AI based on the
OECD AI Principles and to foster collaboration to maximise the benefits for all brought by
AI technologies. We oppose the misuse and abuse of AI to undermine democratic values,
suppress freedom of expression, and threaten the enjoyment of human rights.
43. We stress the importance of international discussions on AI governance and
interoperability between AI governance frameworks, while we recognise that like-minded
approaches and policy instruments to achieve the common vision and goal of trustworthy
AI may vary across G7 members. Tools for trustworthy AI, such as regulatory and non-
regulatory frameworks, technical standards and assurance techniques, can promote
trustworthiness and can allow for the comparable assessment and evaluation of AI
systems. We support the development of tools for trustworthy AI through multistakeholder
international organisations, and encourage the development and adoption of international
technical standards in SDOs through private sector-led multistakeholder processes. We
commend work to date in the OECD on mapping the commonalities and differences
between trustworthy AI frame works, and we intend to work together to support such work
that fosters interoperability.
44. We are committed to supporting all stakeholders from across sectors, with their
participation in SDOs, and to facilitating inclusive engagement with a special emphasis
on participation of SMEs, start-ups, academia and wider society. We resolve to promote
international technical standards to support interoperable tools for trustworthy AI.
45. We reaffirm that AI policies and regulations should be human centric and based on
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democratic values, including protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and
the protection of privacy and personal data. We also reassert that AI policies and
regulations should be risk-based and forward-looking to preserve an open and enabling
environment for AI development and deployment that maximises the benefits of the
technology for people and the planet while mitigating its risks.
46. We recognise that AI development is progressing rapidly, and has the potential for
significant impacts on society. Being mindful of such potential impact of AI on our
societies, we also recognise that AI policies and regulations should be adapted to the
context of application in a way that is sensitive to technical and institutional characteristics
as well as societal and cultural implications, including geographic, sectoral and ethical
aspects.
47. Given that generative AI technologies are increasingly prominent across countries and
sectors, we recognise the need to take stock in the near term of the opportunities and
challenges of these technologies and to continue promoting safety and trust as these
technologies develop. We plan to convene future G7 discussions on generative AI which
could include topics such as governance, how to safeguard intellectual property rights
including copyright, promote transparency, address disinformation, including foreign
information manipulation, and how to responsibly utilise these technologies. These
discussions should harness expertise and leverage international organisations such as
the OECD to consider analysis on the impact of policy developments and GPAI to conduct
relevant practical projects.
48. We endorse the Action Plan for promoting global interoperability between tools for
trustworthy AI and for cooperating to anticipate and prepare for upcoming AI opportunities
and challenges. [Annex 5]
Digital Competition
49. Digital markets are global, dynamic, can involve novel business models and large
amounts of data, and have a vital and important impact on the competition and innovation
in our economies. It is increasingly important to both use existing competition
enforcement tools and to develop and implement new or updated competition policy
initiatives or regulatory and competition frameworks, which may be required to
complement or adjust the existing competition policy instruments, swiftly and effectively
to address the issues caused by entrenched market power, promote competition and
stimulate innovation. This may be particularly important in connection with fostering
fairness and contestability. In recognition of this importance, we acknowledge that digital
competition is a global issue requiring cooperation by enforcers and policymakers.
50. We resolve to further strengthen cooperation based on the knowledge accumulated and
shared by the G7 chaired by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. We intend to
share issues and challenges that G7 members are facing in promoting digital competition,
such as those common to G7 members in using, implementing, and planning existing,
new and upcoming laws and regulatory tools.
51. We plan to also update the “G7 inventory of new rules for digital markets”, the mapping
of legal approaches to digital competition in each of the G7 jurisdictions to facilitate
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mutual understanding in sharing the above with a view to fostering greater coordination
to support competitive digital markets.
52. We intend to share the experiences that G7 members have in their respective jurisdictions
with respect to competition in digital markets, including enforcement, and discuss how
G7 enforcers and policymakers can cooperate for a better understanding of the
approaches to digital competition oversight. We plan to also update the “Compendium of
approaches to improving competition in digital markets” in the G7 and other jurisdictions.
53. We plan to convene a summit related to digital competition for competition authorities and
policymakers in the fall of 2023 to facilitate international efforts to promote competitive
markets and effective competition law enforcement.
54. In addition to convening an enforcers’ and policymakers’ summit in the fall of 2023, we
also plan to create a point of contact group to facilitate the close exchange of information
and experience among the G7 competition authorities and policymakers throughout the
year.
Way Forward
55. We express our appreciation to our knowledge partners ERIA, ITU, OECD, UN, and the
World Bank for contributing their expertise and experience, and welcome continuous
cooperation to realise a prosperous, digitally connected world based on our shared
democratic values.
56. We encourage the G7 Leaders to take note of our discussions during the G7 Summit in
Hiroshima from 19 to 21 May 2023.
57. We express our continuous support and solidarity with Ukraine in light of Russia’s illegal
invasion and infringement of international law.
58. We discussed the potential of digital technologies to address sustainability challenges,
including mitigation of the environment impacts of the digital sector itself. Looking ahead,
we encourage continued G7 discussions on these issues.
59. We look forward to Italy’s G7 presidency in 2024 and encourage the G7 to continue
building on the outcomes of Japan’s 2023 G7 presidency and its positive and ambitious
legacy.
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Governance Principles for a Society Based on Cyber-Physical Systems
Principles
Section 1: Basic Principles for Governing Cyber-Physical Systems 1. Exploration of Possibilities of CPS
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To realize a human-centered, sustainable, and resilient society by solving social problems such as climate change, pandemics, and the effects of aging populations, and to boost the economy through improving productivity, it is necessary for G7 countries to fully explore the potential of Cyber-Physical Systems (hereinafter, “CPS”), which are emerging as a society-wide “system of systems.”
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In governing a society that includes widespread adoption of various CPS, we should carefully consider the ancillary risks of CPS, such as the creation of enormous architectural power and increasing uncontrollability, as well as the fact that people will find it practically impossible to avoid the influence of CPS.
1.2 Application of the Principles of Rule of Law to CPS
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Powers derived from CPS, either public or private, should be subject to the principles of the rule of law.
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The possibility of a more agile and distributed governance system, which aims to address the risks generated by the complex and dynamic nature of CPS, should be explored in a way that is consistent with the principles of the rule of law.
1.3 Agile and Multi-Stakeholder Process as Due Process for Governing CPS
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Actors that play an active role in CPS, either public or private, including organizations and individuals that develop, deploy or operate CPS (hereinafter, “CPS actors”), should act according to fair procedures based on the notion of due process. Accordingly, they should proactively self-evaluate the consequences of the behavior of CPS and, in accordance with feedback from their stakeholders and generated data, keep the architecture and operation of CPS updated.
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The principles of the rule of law for CPS should be materialized through fair procedures based on the notion of due process, under which laws, standards, codes, algorithms, and physical features which control the behavior of CPS should be designed, operated, and updated based upon reasonable, meaningful,and inclusive involvement of appropriate stakeholders.
• The fair procedures for governing CPS should be interwoven into the whole structure of the democratic governance system, which, if necessary, may require appropriate modifications or improvements.
1.4 National policies and international co-operation
• Given the borderless nature of cyberspace, it is necessary to consider national policies and international cooperation that can engender an interoperable framework of CPS, in a way that is consistent with shared core values among G7 countries, such as respect for the rule of law, democracy, and human rights principles.
Section 2: Integrated Governance Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems 2.1 Integrated Approach for Governance Framework
• In order to put the basic principles described in the former section into practice, an integrated governance framework should be pursued, which includes proactive governance by CPS actors, expert involvement and utilization of digital tools, agile regulatory governance, reliable certification mechanisms, effective sanction systems appropriately tailored liability systems, and legal remedial measures to ensure an agile, meaningful, reasonable, and inclusive multi- stakeholder process.
2.2 Proactive and Voluntary Governance by CPS Actors
• CPS actors should be encouraged to, in good faith, to implement proactively implement and comply with the agile and multi-stakeholder governance process designed for grounding the codes, algorithms, and physical features that control behaviors of CPS on legitimate reason consistent with human rights principles and the fair procedures based on the rule of law.
2.3 Expert Involvement and Utilization of Digital Tools
• Given the difficulties faced by citizens in understanding the nature of CPS or in accessing relevant multi-stakeholder procedures, an adequate expert involvement and effective utilization of digital tools should be considered as a measure to make the multi-stakeholder approach reasonable, meaningful, and inclusive.
2.4 Agile Regulatory Governance
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Governance and regulatory approaches should be adaptive, iterative, flexible, responsive, and anticipatory, in accordance with the OECD Recommendation for Agile Regulatory Governance to Harness Innovation.
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Governments should appropriately seize the opportunities offered by CPS toimprove the design and means of regulation.
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2.5 A reliable Assurance Framework for Enhancing Trust in CPS
A framework for assurance mechanisms for the constituents of CPS, including for each constituent system, in relation to the processes underlying the system or the management of the organization that controls the system, should be employed to ensure trust among CPS actors.
Assurance mechanisms in relation to the interactions between constituents of CPS should also be discussed to improve trust in the CPS.
2.6 Effective Sanction System and Appropriately Tailored Liability System for Elaborated Incentive Structure
• Governments should explore effective sanction system and appropriately tailored liability systems to ensure compliance with responsible development and deployment of CPS, which consider the incentives for CPS actors as well as the degree of unpredictability and uncontrollability of CPS so that they promote innovation while ensuring the implementation of agile and multi-stakeholder procedures and respect for fundamental principles including the rule of law, democracy, and human rights principles.
2.7 Remedial Measures for Reasonable and Meaningful Multi-Stakeholder Process
• When relevant persons and entities are excluded from the multi-stakeholder process regarding the design of the codes, algorithms, and physical features that control the behavior of CPS which have a significant impact on them, the right and access to legal remedies should be granted to them.
1. The Potential of Cyber-Physical Systems
Digital technologies are changing the world by accelerating the integration of cyberspace and physical space. Their remarkable development means that, in the not-too-distant future, society will consist of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)—networks of independent yet integrated systems that collect process and analyze data in real time using algorithms, and applying the output to physical space. This emerging “system of systems” will underpin smart cities, homes and medical care, autonomous driving and automated government services among other applications.
Cyber-Physical Systems also have the potential to help humans address social problems such as climate change, pandemics, and the effects of aging populations, and to boost the economy through improvements in productivity. Furthermore, Cyber-Physical Systems can also contribute to making government more efficient, effective, fair and inclusive.
We recognize that the potential of Cyber-Physical Systems needs to be explored and maximized in order to create a more human-centered, sustainable, and resilient society.
2. Risks Ancillary to CPS
With the aim of achieving the above-mentioned objectives, several risks shall be considered in developing CPS.
First, CPS may create enormous “architectural power”, i.e. power exercised through various forms of architecture in physical space, cyberspace, or both. While CPS may have a significant impact on people's daily lives and well-being, there is a risk that architectural power may not be executed in a way that is consistent with the fundamental values shared by G7 countries, such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Mitigating this risk requires a global dialogue about the human-centered principles that should underlie digital systems, such as well-being, fairness, transparency, robustness, and accountability. It is especially important to note that avoiding CPS will not be an option for most people – before the emergence of CPS, people could choose not to be connected to cyberspace, but such a choice will no longer exist after the entire social system is connected to cyberspace.
Second, the dynamic and complex nature of CPS makes it hard to analyze system-wide risks in advance. Therefore, a more agile and distributed governance system is required. The risks of agile and distributed governance are that some of the constituent systems of CPS may work in ways that are at odds with the fundamental values shared by G7 countries, or that they may work inconsistently, which will lead to system-wide dysfunction.
3. Rule of Law and Due Process for CPS
In order to maximize the positive impact brought by CPS in a way that harmonizes with the fundamental values shared by G7 countries, we believe due attention must be paid to the emerging CPS-driven society and its governance system.
In particular, from the perspective of controlling architectural power, an important question is how to apply the principle of the rule of law which plays an important role in the control of power in our current society and its governance system.
In a society where architectural power is increasing, not only laws or standards, but also codes, algorithms, and physical features that control the behavior of CPS must be grounded in legitimate reason consistent with human rights principles, as they play a central role in governing CPS.
To examine whether a law is grounded in legitimate reason, stakeholders must be guaranteed the opportunity to make arguments in both law-making and remedial processes. The guarantee of due process in law-making and remediation is closely related to the principle of the rule of law. Due process seeks to make the law just by making the process of creating law fair.
Therefore, it is necessary for public and private actors that play an active role in CPS, including organizations and individuals that deploy or operate aspects of CPS (hereinafter, “CPS actors”), to implement fair procedures based on the notion of due process that ensures that codes, algorithms, and physical features are grounded in legitimate reason. Accordingly, they should proactively self-evaluate the consequences of the behavior of CPS and, in accordance with feedback from stakeholders and generated data, keep the architecture and operation of CPS updated.
Given that the fair procedures for governing CPS interact with legal rules at multiple levels, such as constitutional provisions, legislative acts, regulations, and standards, it is crucial to pursue their harmonization with the existing governance system in an integrated manner. The fair procedures for governing CPS should be interwoven into the whole structure of the democratic governance system, and, if necessary, may require appropriate modifications or improvement of the current governance system.
Given the borderless nature of cyberspace, it is also necessary to consider national policies and international cooperation for building an interoperable framework for CPS in a way that is consistent with core values shared by G7 countries, such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights.
4. Need for an Integrated Governance Framework
One promising option for governing CPS consistently with shared core values such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights principles, is the implementation of an agile yet multi-stakeholder approach for designing the codes, algorithms, and physical features used by CPS actors. Incorporating an appropriate multi-stakeholder approach into an agile design process will create the potential for codes, algorithms, and physical features to be democratically controlled and legitimate. It is also desirable for CPS actors to make the CPS more democratically legitimate and socially acceptable. Therefore, the potential of an agile and multi-stakeholder approach for designing or redesigning the codes, algorithms, and physical features should be explored.
To effectively implement the above-mentioned due process, we should establish an integrated governance framework. Such framework should include proactive governance by CPS actors, expert involvement and utilization of digital tools, agile regulatory governance, reliable certification mechanisms, effective enforcement systems and appropriately tailored liability systems, and legal remedial measures to ensure a meaningful, reasonable, and inclusive multi-stakeholder process.
First of all, CPS actors should be encouraged to, in good faith, proactively implement and comply with the agile and multi-stakeholder governance process designed for grounding the codes, algorithms, and physical features that control behaviors of CPS in legitimate reason consistent with human rights principles and the fair procedures based on the ruleof law.
Adequate procedures for expert involvement and effective utilization of digital tools should be considered as measures to make the multi-stakeholder approach reasonable, meaningful, and inclusive. It is often difficult for citizens to understand the meaning of codes, algorithms, and physical features that control the behaviors of CPS. Adequate expert involvement helps people to deepen their understanding of the technical aspects of CPS, which in turn makes the multi-stakeholder approach more meaningful in the sense of grounding the codes, algorithms, and physical features on legitimate reason.
Agile regulatory governance refers to a regulatory approach which is adaptive, iterative, flexible, responsive, and anticipatory, as stated in the OECD Recommendation for Agile Regulatory Governance to Harness Innovation.
A reliable assurance framework, not only for constituents of CPS, but for the interaction between constituents of CPS, should be designed to enhance trust among relevant stakeholders, which is a foundation of the reasonable and meaningful agile and multi- stakeholder approach.
An effective sanction and appropriately tailored liability system should be elaborated in addition to an incentive structure for stimulating innovation as well as meaningful implementation of and compliance with fair procedures based on the notion of due process. Possible and not exclusive options may include, well-designed strict civil liability or fault-based civil liability with shifting the burden of proof, which encourage elaborated cost-benefit analysis for CPS actors to internalize the external harm caused by the CPS; or a deferred prosecution agreement scheme, originally used in the context of corporate misconduct, to extract proactive implementation of the fair procedure for governing CPS and voluntary cooperation with the relevant authorities and entities from CPS actors, and so on.
Legal remedial measures are also important to keep agile and multi-stakeholder approach reasonable, meaningful, and inclusive. Especially when it is revealed that relevant stakeholders have been excluded from the multi-stakeholder process regarding the design of the codes, algorithms, and physical features that control the behavior of CPS which have a significant impact on them, the right and access to legal remedies should be granted to these stakeholders. Implementing a variety of online dispute resolution mechanisms depending on different types of disputes and stakeholder needs, such as complaint handling by CPS actors, or alternative dispute resolution (ADR) by neutral organizations, would help materialize the right and access to legal remedies.
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