Reflections on Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour on "Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology: From “Means” to “Meanings” and from “Minds” to “Hearts”"

 

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In a recent post I considered briefly the quite powerful insights of Tugrul Keskin in “Algorithmic Ummah: Turkey’s AI Ambitions and the Neoliberal Pan-Islamist Reconfiguration of the Global South,” Presentaiton at the Conference "AI and International Relations: Perspectives from the Global South and Muslim World," (FIU, 4 December 2025). There the object was to begin to understand the hugely important magma flow of ambition, desire, and its operationalization around the construction and utilization of virtual spaces to the ends of reshaping (and controlling) the cognitive universe of physical things (and the people whoa re both its objects and its vessels). 

But all realms, including virtual realms, that are both a projection of the human and a means of externalizing the collective human for reinsertion into people, and form people, into the communities they would now feel "naturally" follow from this dialectic--all human realms--require a theology. Theology here is understood in its classical Greek sense of a rationalizing discourse on the gods. This is not God-speak, but rather humans speaking from within the cognitive cage in which, it is assumed, the divine (external) force/presence/thing/person has placed human--and humanity. It is Janus faced in the sense of rationalizing the necessary exteriorization of the rationalizing forces of cognition (the making and ordering of things including the world in which humans find themselves) and then the ordering of humans and human collectivity as a consequences of that ordering and placement (Cf., Paul Tillich, "Systematic Theology," 195). 

That theology is particularly ironic where it represents the expression of humanity outside of itself--like a divine force--which can then, from its exterior position--assume an autonomous and superior role in shaping the lebenswelt that passes for the entirety of human cognitive space. It is even more interesting, and ironic, when that divine space, that human divinity, is then shaped, in turn, or merged with, other exteriorizations, in this case religions that are grounded on an assumption of a presence that is both (1) not human; (2) a creator of the human and of humanity; and (3) a shepherd with a specific interest in managing the human flock through texts and periodic demonstration of power that can be manifested only by those who exist beyond the laws and the cognitive cages into which humanity has been placed. And for all of this, on the human plane at least, one requires a θεολόγος (theologis), one who speaks of--and for-God). That is one needs theos (θεο; the exogenous manifestation of an ordering force) and Logos (λόγος; reason, logic, the divine presence in human readable form ). And it is in the second part of the word that one re-encounters that semiosis of the divine: that the human is incapable of speaking OF the divine (in whatever form the human can grasp it) without speaking FOR the God. 

Nietzsche spoke to this, of course (Nietzsche, Götzendämmerung), but with a measure of fear and loathing; one assuming that it was possible to break free of our cognitive cages and with it of the exogenous manifestation from out of which (or into which) humanity not just humanity's cognitive cages, but the rule systems that permitted structures to arise  that could authoritatively deprive others of life, liberty or property for failure to conform to the received or produced ordering Logos.  But Nietzsche was philosophizing with a hammer (oder, Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert; see, e.g., how one goes that task here, here, here). Others have sought to rationalize this semiosis within the cognitive cages of the Holy writ from out of which, and only through which, authoritative cognition of reality is possible. 

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But why use a hammer? Why use a hammer, a tool with a stone head in its Old Saxon reference, when one can construct a virtual manifestation of the thing that one wants to change--or explode--and so made, to unmake or make the fundamental ordering around which the virtual "hammerish" thing has been created. Where, as in older times, the hammer--martulus (Latin)--was transformed from something exogenous to the human to something intimately human, that is to a maccabeus (מַכַּבִּי, makkabī) sometimes connected to the Hebrew word for "hammer" (maqqebet; מַקָּבוֹת), which produced a collective semiotics of human, human purpose, and divine direction for interpreting and applying that purpose: it might be understood as the future patronymic of the Jewsih family Maccabesus and particularly through the father of the man who secured the liberation of the Jews from the Greek Syrians, Judah Maccabee; it might signify the son as the hammer of the Jewish collective against their enemies, it might contain within it the divine guidance for battle--the acronym for מִי-כָמֹכָה בָּאֵלִם יְהוָה ; Mi kamocha Ba'elim Adonai? ("Who, oh Lord, is like You among the mighty?").  

Why use a hammer when the virtual makes unavoidable a realization that humans are now the hammer. We are the thing we use; we are that thing virtually and in aggregation now made manifest in and through or technological manifestations. To some extent, then, it may be worth considering whether one any longer needs either humans or an exogenous, autonomous and non-human manifestation of divine force--one needs only the construction of the spirit of the divine from out of the human and into its virtual incarnation; one only needs a virtual God, and a θεολόγος (theologis), human or virtual, one that can receive, organize, manifest, impose, and render human the virtual theology of this virtual incarnation of the divine presence. And that presence may now be constructed as much from out of humanity as it is been received from outside by humanity. Is there, in the end, a difference within  a dialectics in which both vectors operate continuously and simultaneously?

Those are some of the orienting thoughts that emerged from a reading of Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour, Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology: From “Means” to “Meanings” and from “Minds” to “Hearts” (2025) 16(6) Religions 796 (https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16060796).  The author summarizes his work this way:

Muslim responses to Artificial Intellgence (AI) have so far focused mainly on how it challenges the human “mind”. This paper moves from the “mind” to the “heart”, which, in Islam, is not only a vessel of emotion but a cognitive, moral and spiritual centre. Charting a path between cynicism and optimism, the article proposes a third track: critical, hopeful, and ethically grounded. Utilizing indigenous Islamic concepts (e.g., ijtihād “independent reasoning”, maṣlaḥah mursalah “unrestricted public interest”, and sadd al-dharā’iʿ “blocking the means to harm”), it advocates a bottom-up approach that focuses not just on managing AI, but on shaping “who” we are in the AI age, calling for a moral vision rooted in intentionality (niyyah), moral clarity, and individual-cum-collective responsibility. (Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology; Abstract).

The object is shared with other theological, political, and normative systems: how to bend technology in the service of, but more deeply, how to transform a technology itself, into the very manifestation, the authentic expression of, the the "spiritual and ethical values" of the meta-normative cage of normative (in this case religious) lifeworld, that is the world that is made by that exogenous presence who by its very nature is the essence of the thing created. It is a small step from this starting point to θεολόγος theo-logos, the theologian: "

Addressing this subject from a practical Muslim theology perspective, this paper explores the intersection of AI and Islamic theology, using four methodical questions, as articulated by Richard R. Osmer—a key theorist in practical theology: What is going on? (the descriptive-empirical task); Why is this going on? (the interpretative task); What ought to be going on? (the normative task); How might we respond? (the pragmatic task). * * * The latter two questions. . . direct us toward a constructive theological engagement with AI. The normative task calls on Muslim scholars and communities to assess AI through the lens of Quranic values, the Prophetic model (Sunnah), and maqāṣid (higher objectives of Islam).  . .  the pragmatic task challenges Muslim theologians, technologists, and policymakers to implement faithful and effective responses. (Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology)

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Gamal Abdelnour starts with the possibilities of the virtual theologian. One argument, mirroring those of Chinese Marxists, views the entire enterprise as a Trojan Horse--the technologies of the virtual must be as corrupt and corrupting as the degenerate and haram  (حرام) premises within which it was created in liberal democratic non-Muslim Lifeworlds. The other suggests that the hammer can be distinguished from its wielder and that, purged of the corruption of its developers, can be deployed both for the Ummah  (أُمَّة; the community of Muslim believers) and against the dar al harb (دار الحرب) . Considered within this discussion is the further pone--can the virtual displace the human theologian, and from there, can it authoritatively speak for or serve as the vessel through which God speaks to  the believers. To that Gamal Abdelnour suggests the possibility of optimism--transposing the ancient Greek idea of the ikon (εἰκών ) into an Islamic context--one does not worship the object but rather uses the object as a portal to the authentic abstraction. That is, in the case of the virtual, one approaches a human abstraction of the divine as a means of reaching the "pure" abstraction that is the divine. Gamel Abdelnour then suggests that the virtual cannot displace the human theo-logos, interposing itself between its creator and THE creator: "To suggest that AI could produce theology in any meaningful sense is to conflate linguistic mimicry with spiritual apprehension and, in doing so, risks a reductive understanding of religion itself. Consequently, the claim that AI could generate its own theology represents a category error rather than a legitimate theological challenge." It is not clear that this is indeed possible, though Gamel Abdelnour is right to raise it--if the virtual represents the collective manifestation of the Ummah, and not just a particular cleric or other, then it might well be possible to suggest that the ummah speaks more clearly in its aggregated form than it does through the inspiration of an individual--unless of course, the individual is directly touched by the divine in a way that is denied the aggregated creation of humanity in itself. 

That brings him to his third and fourth questions. He suggests, in part, with respect t the third, that Islam is not burdened with the dissipation of religion that is the marker of advanced "Western" civilization--one that refuses to invest its tools with the moral and theological imprint that is taken for granted in both religious (and Marxist-Leninist) systems. "The result [Ganel Abdelnour suggests] of these historical and structural shifts is a culture awash in information but starving for wisdom. We have built machines that can simulate intelligence, process language, and make predictions—but we have not cultivated the ethical frameworks to decide how these capabilities should be used. In the absence of a shared metaphysical horizon, "(Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology) Of course, Zigmut Bauman and Martha Nussbaum may not be the sole  ikon (εἰκών ) the reflection through which opens the authentic portal to the "heart" of the "West"; but there it is, certainly in the form of the shock troops of Western elite progress to self-actualization from a certain perspective. 

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This is worth noting only for its consequent--if indeed one misreads "the West" then one might also misread both the depth and amplitude of difference and the possibilities of avoiding the sort of corruption that is the start of the analysis. All of that I leave to others who might find in that consideration something to take up their time.  But the consequences is worthy of consideration--a means over meaning approach  only covers the fundamental values that are always to be encased in virtual representations of the physical world reduced to an endless iterative consumption of the data that in the aggregate constitutes that world (to the extent it is identified as such--another issue). "AI systems, therefore, not only reflect human values but also shape them, reinforcing existing inequities under the guise of neutrality. The overarching concern is existential: without reintegrating moral, philosophical, and spiritual insights, AI risks deepening a crisis where we have immense power but little wisdom about its purpose or consequences." What is missing then, is wisdom (sophia (σοφία)) --holy wisdom (hagia sophia Ἁγία Σοφία)-- which religion must supply. It follows, then, tn contrast to elite "modernity," to means over meaning approaches (the essential corruption of "the West"), Gamel Abdelnour offers one the other part of the binary that is the usual antipodes of classical dialectics: "Islamic intellectual history offers a contrasting model. Classical Muslim education was grounded in the harmonious integration of the ʿulūm al-naqliyya (transmitted sciences such as Quranic exegesis, hadith, and jurisprudence) and ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya (rational sciences such as logic, philosophy, and medicine)." (Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology). 

And the suggestion from out of the meta-cognitive cage of religion? That is straightforward as well--the virtual must not be constructed from out of the iterative mimetic actions and products of the human, but rather it must be first constructed within the cage of theological values, understanding and signification/organizaiton of the world of the human. Only then, and within it, might the human be embedded in a system now more closely connected to the divine. For Islam, the framework is fairly straightforward in theory. For other religions it may also be so--including the self-referencing systems of humanism, Marxist-Leninism and the religious pathways of pagans, those to which religious establishments might seek to dismiss, and certainly in some places to suppress. 

 The historical contributions of Muslim scholars to fields such as mathematics, astronomy, and medicine underscore Islam’s positive orientation toward scientific advancement. The works of scholars like Ibn Sina, Al-Khwarizmi, and Ibn al-Haytham (d. 1040) were not only compatible with Islamic values but were also driven by them. Today’s AI revolution can be seen as a continuation of this intellectual tradition—seeking knowledge that is beneficial and applying it in service of humanity. What is required is not rejection but the ethical calibration of AI to align with Islamic values. (Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology).

To those ends, Gamel Abdelnour "challenges dominant AI discourses that prioritize cognitive intelligence by re-centring the Islamic theological concept of the qalb (heart) as the true locus of understanding, moral discernment, and spiritual receptivity in the Islamic tradition." (Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology). To those ends, and as is common among some intellectuals in the "West," he suggests a binary in which the power of "Western" thought becomes its primary weakness in the face of the revolutionary (or divine reaching) potential of virtual technologies: 

Modern epistemologies, shaped by Cartesian dualism and Enlightenment rationalism, have marginalized the heart’s role, reducing intelligence to computational output and sidelining moral and spiritual wisdom. In contrast, Islam’s holistic anthropology integrates intellect and spirit, proposing that the heart’s reform is not only a theological imperative but a sociotechnical necessity in an AI-driven world. (Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology).

That is true enough. Yet it also constitutes and is constituted by a way of perceiving the world, and of rationalizing those "things" that one sees (and distinguishes these from that which is not seen) that mimics rather than distinguishes the religious path from that which is deemed corrupt and corruption. And, indeed, in the concluding section, the "What is to be Done?" consequences of the excellent analysis, one returns to the foundational problem of the self as the object/source of dialogue with the divine.  

By beginning with the self, we also become co-creators of broader reform. If individual users engage AI with moral vigilance, ethical restraint, and spiritual intention, then their cumulative influence will ripple upward. Institutions are not impersonal monoliths; they are shaped by the aggregated values and expectations of individuals. Thus, a spiritually grounded grassroots reform may, in time, influence curricula, fatwas, platform design, and policy.(Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology).

Yet that is the very essence of the journey of Western philosophy beyond that which was considered, and especially that which produces a more nuanced and complicated relationship between reality, cognition, the self, and the communal self in its relationship with itself and with those exogenous presences within which traditional religion is most comfortable (my discussion here: Larry Backer, The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Self and the "Human" Condition). Gamel Abdelnour ends by challenging readers: "Looking forward, the Islamic theology of technology must move beyond binary oppositions—rejection or uncritical acceptance—and offer a third path: one of purposeful engagement. By acknowledging that technology is not neutral, and that our responses to it shape who we become, Muslims are called to reassert their moral agency in a rapidly transforming world." (Artificial Intelligence and the Islamic Theology of Technology). One wonders, however, about the constitution of "moral agency" in a world of iterative mimetics cultivated through structures and pathways with respect to which religion may not work from or as a clean slate. 

Gamal Abdelnour's excellent article may be accessed HERE. 

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Tugrul Keskin on “Algorithmic Ummah: Turkey’s AI Ambitions and the Neoliberal Pan-Islamist Reconfiguration of the Global South,” Presentaiton at the Conference "AI and International Relations: Perspectives from the Global South and Muslim World," (FIU, 4 December 2025)

 

 

My friend and colleague, the remarkable Tugrul Keskin  will be presenting his paper,  “Algorithmic Ummah: Turkey’s AI Ambitions and the Neoliberal Pan-Islamist Reconfiguration of the Global South,” at the conference AI and International Relations: Perspectives from the Global South and Muslim World, on December 4, 2025, hosted by Florida International University. I will be joining the event online from Almaty. Please find the conference program attached.

The Conference theme is fascinating:

The AI and International Relations: Perspectives from the Global South and Muslim World conference convenes leading scholars and researchers to examine the political, strategic, and ethical dimensions of artificial intelligence in contemporary world affairs. The conference explores how AI reshapes notions of sovereignty, governance, and agency — particularly within the Global South and the Muslim world — while considering the broader geopolitical, cultural, and technological contexts in which these transformations unfold. Through interdisciplinary dialogue across international relations, political economy, and technology studies, participants analyze AI as both an instrument of global power and a catalyst for new forms of innovation and governance. The discussions engage critical questions of digital sovereignty, security, and ethical responsibility, emphasizing how technological change redefines power and legitimacy in the international system. By situating non-Western perspectives within the study of artificial intelligence and global order, the conference underscores the need for rigorous, comparative, and theoretically informed inquiry into the governance of emerging technologies. It advances a deeper understanding of how AI influences the evolving structures of authority, strategy, and decision-making in the twenty-first-century world. (AI and International Relations: Perspectives from the Global South and Muslim World).

Keskin suggests that: "Turkey’s AI ambitions have accelerated dramatically over the past decade, enabling  the country to recast itself not merely as a regional security actor but as a  civilizational-technological leader. While global narratives portray the AI  competition as primarily between the United States and China (Lee, 2018; Segal,  2018), Turkey positions itself as a third pole an Islamic technological vanguard  capable of guiding the Global South through “moral,” “ethical,” and “justice-oriented” AI. 

 Of particular interest is Keskin's focus on Islamic Foundations and their role in reshaping Tirkish efforts to leverage its power.

 Keskin concludes:

 Turkey’s pursuit of an algorithmic Ummah represents a significant transformation in the
relationship between technology, civilizational politics, and geopolitical strategy. By integrating Islamic solidarity discourse with AI-driven modernization and defense-industrial expansion,  Turkey seeks to assert itself as a moral and technological leader within the Muslim world and  the Global South. Yet the project is riddled with contradictions that reflect the structural limits  of middle-power technological nationalism. Turkey’s digital sovereignty remains constrained by  global supply chains; its Pan-Islamic rhetoric is often overshadowed by pragmatic national  interests; and its South–South partnerships frequently reproduce dependencies characteristic of neoliberal capitalism.
•Nevertheless, the algorithmic Ummah remains a powerful framework for understanding how
states in the Global South use technology to reshape moral geographies, challenge Western-centric digital orders, and articulate new civilizational futures. As AI continues to transform
global politics, Turkey’s experiment offers a critical window into the possibilities and tensions of building alternative technological worlds in a multipolar age.

The Conference Program and speaker list follows below. 

Click here to register

The conference will be free and open to the public.

Xi Jinping (Full text: Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development) and 推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合（学习贯彻党的二十届四中全会精神）[Promoting the Deep Integration of Technological Innovation and Industrial Innovation (Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)]

 

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The 4th plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Committee has come and gone, producing a 15th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. The focus, as always, remains socialist modernization as it evolved through stages of Chinese historical development. 

The most important outcome of the Communist Party of China’s fourth plenum, held last month in Beijing, was the review and adoption of the “Recommendations of the CPC Central Committee on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development”. * * * The recommendations define major economic and social development objectives under the 15th five-year plan, encompassing seven areas: significant achievements in high-quality development; improvements in scientific and technological self-reliance; further deepening comprehensive reform; cultural and ethical progress across society; improvements in quality of life; new strides in environmental protection; and strengthening national security. (Cui Jianchun, "Opinion | 15th five-year plan charts a course for China’s modernisation" SCMP 17 November 2025)

The text of the English language version of the Full text: Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development may be accessed HERE. 

 The central elements of the 15th Five Year Plan and its intimate connection with advanced Socialist Modernization in the New Era and its objective to overcome the general contradiction of the times, was elaborated in a detailed commentary under the authorship of Xi Jinping (Full text: Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development). These are especially useful in summarizing the approach to the seven key areas specified in the 15th Five Year Plan.

First, the important position of the 15th Five-Year Plan period. Socialist modernization can only be realized through a historical process of gradual and ongoing development. It requires the unremitting hard work of one generation after another. * * *

Second, economic and social development objectives for the 15th Five-Year Plan period. Setting development objectives in a well-conceived way is crucial to the formulation and implementation of five-year plans. In the draft document, we have defined the main objectives for economic and social development according to the basic positioning of the 15th Five-Year Plan period and the specific requirements for this stage.  An important benchmark for basically achieving socialist modernization by 2035 is that China’s per capita GDP will
be on a par with that of a mid-level developed country by that time. * * *

Third, promoting high-quality development. Following the approach of the 14th Five-Year Plan, this draft document also defines the promotion of high-quality development as the main focus in economic and social development in the 15th Five-Year Plan period. It sets the requirements of continuing to pursue economic development as our central task, fully and faithfully applying the new development philosophy on all fronts, promoting higher-quality economic growth while achieving an appropriate increase in economic output, and driving sustained, sound economic development and all-around social progress. * * *

Fourth, strengthening the domestic economy and promoting unimpeded domestic and international economic flows. As the international landscape becomes increasingly challenging and complex, we must move faster to create a new development pattern and keep a firm hold on the initiative in development. At present and for some time to come, we must work to strengthen the domestic economy and boost domestic economic flows, so as to leverage the stability of the domestic economy as a hedge against uncertainties in the international economy. * * *

Fifth, making solid progress toward realizing common prosperity for all. Chinese modernization is the modernization of common prosperity for all. Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, we have remained true to our original aspiration and approached problems from the perspective of the people’s interests. This has seen us advancing coordinated regional development, adopting strong measures to ensure and improve the people’s wellbeing, securing victory in the fight against poverty, and building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.  * * *

Sixth, ensuring both development and security. Security is a prerequisite for development while development provides a guarantee for security. Over the next five years, China will see a notable rise in uncertainties and unforeseen factors, which will make the task of ensuring both development and security much harder. With a view to modernizing China’s national security system and capacity, the document recommends steps for improving the national security system, building up national security capacity in key sectors, enhancing public safety governance, and improving the social governance system. * * *

Seventh, upholding the overall leadership of the Party. We must uphold and strengthen the Party’s overall leadership, as it is the fundamental guarantee for advancing Chinese modernization. With a view to improving the Party’s ability to lead China’s economic and social development endeavors, the document emphasizes the need to uphold and strengthen the Party Central Committee’s centralized, unified leadership, refine the mechanisms through which the Party Central Committee’s major decisions and plans are carried out. (Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan).

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There are no surprises, just elaboration of the 3rd Plenum development and refinement of the focus of economic and social development from the 14th Five Year Plan. First, the emphasis on bending economic and social development to the current general contradiction  might be expected, but it may be worth considering the extent to which the details of the 15th Five Year Plan actually moves the nation forward along that path. This is especially interesting as a function of what appears to be a fairly routine elaboration of welfare state objectives as common to Portugal as it is now to China. One might wonder if that is, indeed, the better expression of movement beyond the general contradiction and forward along the Socialist Path. Second, the emphasis on development and security continues to firm up the alignment in policy development between the United States and China. Even the details, such as they are, resonate, especially the last bit (the details of which are well beyond any form of public disclosure): "speed up the development of advanced combat capabilities, modernize military governance, and consolidate and improve integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities. Third, the reminder of the Party's leadership is at once both a standard element of these documents and a reminder of the driving source and political center of Chinese governance. The administrative apparatus operationalizes, the Party leads, subject to its duties to the People and solidarity with the core ideology of the political-economic model. That might resonate well with the continuing evolution of the managerial models of American corporate law and practice.  Fourth, and likely the most foundational important--the fundamental duty of the State and of the leadership of the Party is to advance socialist modernization through the sages of Chinese development, directing an accelerated movement of people and productive forces through the stages of development necessary to move forward along a Socialist Path. 

Still, all of this, especially its evolutionary character and its relationship to current challenges (different from those at the time of the 14 Five Year Plan) require popular explanation. And thus 推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合（学习贯彻党的二十届四中全会精神）[Promoting the Deep Integration of Technological Innovation and Industrial Innovation (Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)], the work of Yin Hejun (阴和俊), Minister of Science and Technology and its Communist Party secretary (see also his interview on this topic here: 锚定科技强国目标 以科技现代化有力支撑中国式现代化——访科技部党组书记、部长阴和俊 [Anchoring the goal of building a strong nation in science and technology and providing powerful support for China's modernization through scientific and technological modernization—An interview with Yin Hejun, Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Minister of Science and Technology]). 

The explanation is well worth reading. Yin's has a quite specific focus: "promoting the deep integration of technological innovation and industrial innovation" [“推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合”]. In that respect there is an alignment between the 4th Plenum's focus in this respect and President Trump's Genesis Mission (The American Leninist-Brain Trust Republic: Text of President Trump's Executive Order, "Launching the Genesis Mission," and the Press Release "President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery"). 

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科技创新主要包括基础研究、应用研究、技术开发和成果转化等活动，取得新的科学发现，提出新的科学原理，发明新的技术方法工艺，得到新的验证示范。产业创新通过技术应用、管理改革、模式创新，开发新产品，开拓新市场，创造新需求，推动产业变革和经济发展。[Technological innovation mainly includes basic research, applied research, technology development, and achievement transformation activities, resulting in new scientific discoveries, proposing new scientific principles, inventing new technologies, methods, and processes, and obtaining new verification and demonstrations. Industrial innovation, through technological application, management reform, and model innovation, develops new products, explores new markets, creates new demands, and drives industrial transformation and economic development. ] (推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合)

Both are essential for promoting high quality development at the heart of the 3rd Plenum's refocusing of socialist modernization. "”新质生产力具有高科技、高效能、高质量特征，是创新起主导作用，摆脱传统经济增长方式、生产力发展路径的先进生产力质态。" ["New-type productivity is characterized by high technology, high efficiency, and high quality. It is an advanced form of productivity in which innovation plays a leading role and breaks away from the traditional economic growth mode and productivity development path."] (Ibid.). Like the Americans, Yon notes:

  Artificial intelligence, as a strategic technology leading a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, is rapidly and widely permeating all sectors and aspects of the economy and society, comprehensively empowering all industries, driving the iterative upgrading of technological systems, and reshaping scientific research paradigms, industrial forms, and economic patterns. [人工智能作为引领新一轮科技革命和产业变革的战略性技术，正在迅速广泛渗透经济社会各领域各方面，全面赋能千行百业，牵引技术体系迭代升级，重塑科研范式、产业形态和经济格局] (Ibid.)

To these ends, connectivity is the key: " 强调要搭建平台、健全体制机制，让创新链和产业链无缝对接。[It was emphasized that platforms should be built and systems and mechanisms improved to ensure seamless integration between the innovation chain and the industrial chain.] (Ibid.). Also critical is the deep integration of governmental leadership within systems of innovation of productive forces. "Adhere to the combination of an effective market and a proactive government. Innovation requires both market mechanisms and proactive government planning and policy guidance. The combined efforts of both are essential to effectively stimulate innovation and creativity across society." [坚持有效市场和有为政府相结合。创新既需要市场机制推动，也需要政府超前谋划和政策引导，二者共同发力，有效激发全社会创新创造活力。] (Ibid.). 

Underlying all of this is innovative autonomy and self-sufficiency. This represents a key element in the rupture between the Era of Reform and Opening Up and the New Era of historical development.  The object is to both to avoid tech dependency and to promote dependency on Chinese tech by others--the American model. Yin noted five areas of priority in that respect:

(I) Strengthen Original Innovation and Key Core Technology Breakthroughs to Enhance Technological Support and Leadership. We must adhere to the principles of facing the forefront of global science and technology, the main battlefield of the economy, major national needs, and the health of the people, highlighting national strategic needs, and deploying and implementing a number of major national science and technology tasks. We must adopt extraordinary measures to achieve decisive breakthroughs in key core technologies in key areas such as integrated circuits, industrial machine tools, high-end instruments, basic software, advanced materials, and biomanufacturing across the entire value chain.  [（一）加强原始创新和关键核心技术攻关，提升科技支撑引领能力。坚持面向世界科技前沿、面向经济主战场、面向国家重大需求、面向人民生命健康，突出国家战略需求，部署实施一批国家重大科技任务。采取超常规举措，全链条推动集成电路、工业母机、高端仪器、基础软件、先进材料、生物制造等重点领域关键核心技术攻关取得决定性突破。]  * * *

(II) Promote the aggregation of innovation resources to enterprises and strengthen the leading role of enterprises in scientific and technological innovation. Strengthen the integration of industry, academia, and research led by enterprises, support enterprises in leading the formation of innovation consortia, undertake more national key scientific and technological tasks, and promote integrated innovation across the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain. [（二）推动创新资源向企业集聚，强化企业科技创新主体地位。加强企业主导的产学研融合，支持企业牵头组建创新联合体，更多承担国家科技攻关任务，促进产业链上下游融通创新。] * * *

(III) Improve the transformation mechanism and accelerate the efficient transformation and application of major scientific and technological achievements. We will allow scientific and technological personnel greater autonomy in the distribution of benefits from the transformation of scientific and technological achievements, establish a separate management system for job-related scientific and technological achievements assets, and deepen the reform of empowering job-related scientific and technological achievements. [（三）完善转化机制，加快重大科技成果高效转化应用。允许科技人员在科技成果转化收益分配上有更大自主权，建立职务科技成果资产单列管理制度，深化职务科技成果赋权改革。] * * *

(IV) Strengthen policy guarantees and create a favorable ecosystem for deep integration. Strengthen intellectual property protection, enhance the rule of law, ethics, integrity, and security in science and technology, and improve policies on market access, regulation, and fair competition.. . Deepen international scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation, establish a high-tech talent immigration system, and attract and cultivate outstanding global talent. [四）强化政策保障，营造深度融合的良好生态。加强知识产权保护，强化科技法治、科技伦理、科研诚信、科技安全建设，完善市场准入、监管、公平竞争等政策。. . 深化国际科技交流合作，建立高技术人才移民制度，引育世界优秀人才。] * * *

(V) Improve the regional innovation system and explore new models of deep integration tailored to local conditions. Strengthen central-local coordination in strategic planning, policies, major tasks, research capabilities, and resource platforms for science and technology innovation. [（五）健全区域创新体系，因地制宜探索深度融合新模式。加强科技创新战略规划、政策措施、重大任务、科研力量、资源平台等央地协同。]

Again, the suggestion of greater alignment between the U.S. and Chinese approaches, and the greater distance between both and European approaches becomes clearer. 

Pix credit here (Hold high the Great Red Banner of the "Angang Constitution" to set off the High Tide of grasping Revolution and Promoting Production).

The text of (1) Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ; (2) Xi Jinping (Full text: Explanation of the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development) (Official translation); (3)  推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合（学习贯彻党的二十届四中全会精神）[Promoting the Deep Integration of Technological Innovation and Industrial Innovation (Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)]  (Chinese with English translation) follow below.

CfP: Special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation - titled Omnibus Legislation and EU Regulatory Reform: Between Efficiency and Constitutional Integrity

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I am delighted to pass along this call for papers for a Special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation, the theme of which is "Omnibus Legislation and EU Regulatory Reform: Between Efficiency and Constitutional Integrity." Its guest editor is Alberto Alemanno, Jean Monnet Professor in European Union Law at HEC Paris.

Here is the description:

The European Union is undergoing a fundamental transformation in how it makes law. Responding to calls for simplification and competitiveness – echoed and amplified by demands from the US Administration –, the EU Commission has embraced omnibus legislation as the principal mechanism for systematic regulatory reform. Omnibus acts, which amend multiple legal instruments across disparate regulatory domains in a single legislative package, have evolved from rarely-used technical consolidation tools into vehicles for substantive deregulatory policy change. Since January 2025, the Commission has embarked on an unprecedented wave of omnibus legislation, with multiple packages spanning across sustainability (Omnibus I), investment (Omnibus II), agriculture (Omnibus III), single market rules (Omnibus IV), defense (Omnibus V), and chemicals (Omnibus VI). The EU Parliament quiescently accepted the use of this legislative technique by putting the Omnibus I package to a vote. Looking ahead to 2026, more than half of planned proposals are packaged as omnibuses, covering areas as diverse as digital regulation - which was presented today -, environmental policy, food and feed safety, automotive standards, energy products, taxation, and citizenship.


This proliferation of omnibus legislation fundamentally changes the procedural and substantive framework through which regulatory change occurs in the EU. While the omnibus might not be incompatible with the EU legal order, its current practice raises significant questions about constitutional integrity, procedural safeguards, fundamental rights protection, and the balance between efficiency and legality in EU lawmaking. The academic literature on omnibus legislation under EU law remains notably limited. While comparative scholarship has extensively examined omnibus practices in national systems (e.g. United States, Canada, Israel, and EU Member States), the supranational dimension has been largely overlooked.


This Special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation - titled Omnibus Legislation and EU Regulatory Reform: Between Efficiency and Constitutional Integrity - seeks to address this gap by providing the first systematic scholarly analysis of EU omnibus legislation at a time when it is becoming a central instrument of regulatory reform. We welcome contributions that are critical, supportive, or ambivalent regarding omnibus techniques, including work that identifies circumstances in which omnibus legislation can be designed compatibly with constitutional safeguards and robust protection levels. Ultimately, the Union's legitimacy depends on the reviewability and accountability of its acts, including those that purport to simplify and “cut red tape”. Even the most ambitious simplification agendas must unfold within, never outside, the discipline of law.

The full CfP follows below.

The American Leninist-Brain Trust Republic: Text of President Trump's Executive Order, "Launching the Genesis Mission," and the Press Release "President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery"

 

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All are Leninists now. 

Pix credit here (movie "Fight Club")

Leninism is now so deeply embedded in the premises of societal organization that it has simply disappeared from consciousness to become the basis for what now passes for collective consciousness itself. Everywhere.

This is neither bad nor good. It is, however, unavoidable in this stage of the historical development of liberal democracy it appears. 

Leninism, both as a word and as a theory of governance, as well as the modalities of the governance it theorizes, cannot be named. The first rule of Leninism, in whatever form it takes, is never talk about Leninism. And the more it is acknowledged the harder one works at erasing that acknowledgement. It has become a function of some of its expression--as Marxism, as authoritarianism, as Fascism (a unity of opposites?), and as brain trust supervisory liberal democracy. All them then share the fundamental feature of Leninism as a tech-based cognitive cage from out which social relations may be rationalized: a vanguard (however defined) is a necessary predicate for a stable social order the guidance and leadership of which is effectuated through the establishment of a dictatorship of leading forces.   

Perhaps it was inevitable. The inevitability was clear enough in 1918 with the collapse of the Russian Imperial then then sort of democratic machinery. But what was inevitable was not Marxist revolution. No. What was inevitable and initially feared was the overthrow of ancient forms of caste/hierarchies  masquerading as everything from theocracy to monarchies, oligarchies, aristocratic regimes and liberal democracy (all of which as Aristotle never tied of trying to explain to those who would not listen, or if they were listening were doing so strategically for their own advantage). That overthrow was not meant to produce something better. Well, maybe not exactly nothing better--it produced a more suitable discursive environment in which what came next, what was feared, could be insinuated into the bones of virtually every system of power then strong enough to thrive. It produced new forms of caste power, of modalities of leadership and guidance--better suited to the age of large first stage industrialization, and the foundations of systems that would, ultimately, be ideal for the merger of technology and control.

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What was feared in 1918 and thereafter was not Marxism, or the movement toward (eventually) the establishment of communist societies, the shock troops of which would be a motley collection of the poor and eventually collective identity collectives. Bismarck had shown the possibilities of suborning the poor and using them to buttress older systems; but then so did the Americans from a cleaner and more tech advanced perspective in the 19th century, especially after the destruction of the gentry plantation structures  and their replacement by the technologies of factory style human robotization of the later initial period of industrialization). Still, the Bolsheviks had demonstrated, again, both the frailty of old power orders, and the power of ideas to manage and use the poor (workers)--and the ambitious (intellectuals, for example). These, as always, could (and do) serve as the canon fodder to be deployed for this effort; these are the willing offerings of the necessary blood sacrifice , the horrors of which plays so well (discursively, of course) within societies whose members had already be primed to absorb the sacrifice with the appropriate cultural and value ordering premises, and so primed, and so motivated, would become the vehicles for the triumph of the new caste reordering for societies now primed toward the acceptance of that instrumental inevitability for the birth of new power orders that now appeared to be the antithesis of themselves.

What was feared enough to produce a quite brilliant reaction and fundamental change of course, was what eventually (and with a head nod to Rousseau) elaborated as a variety of forms of caste vanguardsm, one built around the pioneering work of Soviet professional revolutionaries. Vanguardism was quite correctly perceived as both threat and opportunity at least outside of the Bolshevik realms by those holding onto the cognitive premises around which power was arranged and could be deployed in whatever horrible way suited those whose hands never really got dirty, societal herdmasters; what was feared with the rise of the professional revolutionary, and with them, the arrangement of power within the forms and technologies of Leninism. Vanguardisms, and especially vanguards enhanced by and through technology, appears to offer the same threat--and the same possibilities--as did bourgeois  revolutionaries of the 17th and 18th centuries to those who had profited from centuries of technologies of power the decrepitude of which, enhanced by the blindness of arrogance and the "Forbidden City effect" of increasingly retreating into their fantasy pleasure spaces (discussed here; Forbidden Cities).

That the Soviet Leninist vanguard was able to topple the older regimes with what appeared to be the effort of a 10 year old blowing out birthday candles, suggested that while the Soviet form of Leninist vanguardism was a threat--the use of Leninist vanguardism was also an opportunity. It was an opportunity that could be refashioned to suit the political-economic models that were emerging in recognizable form by 1919. The Soviets, heading a more developmentally backward state (their word, similar with early Chinese Marxist-Leninist before the Japanese War), focused on class struggle. The rest, in a far ore advanced state of development (in the Chinese Leninist sense of modernization), focused on the utilization of the "brain trust" as the principle means of advancing a new (now Leninist) vanguard ruling group. 

Pix Credit Here (Movie, "Oh Brother Where Art Thou")

On that basis liberal democracy was able to lay the foundations of its approach to Leninist vanguardism to suit its stage of historical development, around which it consigned old power caste categories ( race, sex, birth, etc,) to the dust bin of history, while retaining its forms and structures of authority (of course) and raised up new technologies of governing, one based on the deployment of knowledge production as an instrument suited to the needs of those who "make the rules"--and the technological of the rule system itself, producing, in some respects a factory floor model of "law" and its "rule" that also became a function of the new power-laboring classes--the expert, the intellectual, and the well training official, all now the new shock troops of caste power manged through the mechanics of liberal democracy and guided by those with the power to manage knowledge production through the control of the resources necessary for its elaboration and the realization of tech and knowledge fueled "goals." That, in turn required a governance apparatus different from that necessary to control peasants and workers along a Socialist Path; it required an apparatus of the oxen of knowledge producers (well rewarded at their higher levels) pulling the cart of development toward values infused wealth (welfare) maximization, the forms and objectives of which have also been an object of brain trust development, for which purposes the State retained a critical importance as the holder of the authority to "make things happen." In that respect as well the difference between Soviet/Chinese Leninist pathways and those of liberal democracy converged as to form, at least. But it also required new means of in-taking human capital (merit, loyalty, patriotism, solidarity, etc., whatever works in context), and a new means of expressing the democratic character of the enterprise of aligned knowledge-power systems. A nice post-Bolshevik variant might be understood within the structures of the International Labor Organization--consisting of representation of workers, enterprises, and the state. Knowledge based consultative democracy is another, as is supervisory regulation, and other knowledge based mechanisms for deploying knowledge, including the knowledge of managing behaviors, sentiments, and the politics of those not sufficiently embedded in the mechanisms of knowledge-power-management. 

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And, of course, brain trusts plus technology--whether it is of intellectuals, of the leading forces of social development, or of anything else--answer only to themselves and their own logic. In the context of tech driven brain trust vanguardism of the liberal democratic sort one does not  encounter some sort of sad re-enactment of the cruder forms of totalitarianism of the last century. Though that false analogy appears to drive much of what passes for discussion and analysis among the fearful, the lazy, and those effectively out of the loop and not ready for tech based disciplinary "re-education." There is something new; it is new because the technologies are new, and with it, the approaches to understanding the "meaning" of core social collective premises become new as well. One moves from total control to total management; and one moves from a totalizing absence of personal liberty to its mediation by reference to public policy goals, aspirations, ideals and objectives.  Many global societies have been engaging in dress rehearsals for this new form of managed freedom and liberty for some time; and the politics of identity in the liberal democratic sphere, and that of patriotism and the avoidance of "chaos" have fueled the same control trajectories in Marxist Leninist States, to different effect in the ground. Brian trust vanguardism, like its post-Soviet Marxist cousin, manages and with technology, it may well manage so seamlessly that the difference between management and control will be a function of the determination of how much discretion left to humans  marks the diffe4rence between social solidarity principles and totalitarian disciplinary structures. In both cases, though, deviation from the vision and desires of the vanguard become harder as the politics of social collectives shifts from the masses to its leaders who manifest "the best of us." 

Pix credit here (Éminence Grise, Jean-Léon Gérôme (1873))

 The brain trust concept has become ubiquitous in liberal democracy, and so deeply embedded that it is now virtually impossible  to avoid the concept and its value as an inevitable solution to everything without rejecting the contemporary premises on which liberal democracy has been reordered since 1918. Consider this opening snippet from the Magazine of Columbia University: "Columbia’s Mind, Brain, and Behavior Initiative is assembling the best thinkers in the world to study the most complex object in the known universe." (The Brian Trust). One cannot imagine a world in which the brain trust is not a central element of power--aligning knowledge production with power, and the desires of power with knowledge production in a closed loop self-referencing structure within which one provides both tests who "for knows better" and then assumes that knowledge in the service of power  effectively trumps traditional politics either from the top, or more interesting, from the bottom. At the same time it aligns knowledge production with the production of law. Rule of law, in this sense, begins to assume the closed loop characteristics of productivity measures on the factory of floor of politics, directed now to the maximization of the realization of what expert knowledge--the brain trust, always eager to please those who make their new found status-power possible--makes possible. And the productivity of expert knowledge makes possible what power can conceive and desire. 

Pix Credit here (Cenerentola, Jean Pierre Ponnelle production, finale Act 1)

Tutti [All]
(meno Dandini) [except Dandini]
Andiamo, andiamo a tavola. [Come on; let's go to the table]
Si voli a giubilar. [Let's fly to rejoice in the feast]

Dandini
Oggi che fo da Principe [Today while I can still act the part of the Prince]
Per quattro io vuo' mangiar. [I will eat for four] (Cenerentola Finale Act 1)

The marriage is particular effective and visible in the context of tech and law making--as development and deployment according to rule grounded in the efforts of éminence grise yoked to that task. See, e.g., (1) U.N. Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Offers Platform to Build Safe Systems and Open Call for Candidates: (2) Reflections on Brainstorming Roundtable Hosted by Surya Deva, UN Special Rapporteur for Development (29 Nov 2023): "business models for inclusive sustainable development". The United States has been no stranger to these trends, and in a sense has led them since before Lenin managed to articulate his version of revolutionary vanguardim in "What is to be Done?" (1901-02). This has emerged from out of the shadow win the new era of historical development of the Republic especially in the relationship between tech based innovation of productive forces and the role of the state in directing, managing, and guiding that development (Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress: Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat and "The Golden Age of American Innovation"). 

In that consideration of the emerging US AI and tech policy there was an element of Chinese style modernization, and with it, the techniques and sensibilities of a revolutionary vanguard: 

6. The Structures of American Modernization. If, as Mr. Kratsios suggests, the American ideological operating system requires direction (its coders and quality control functionaries) , and that this direction is both collective and political, then analysis can narrow down to the precise expression of that guidance in any stage of national historical development. Here Mr. Kratsios gets down to some directional detail: 

"Our first assignment is to secure America’s preeminence in critical and emerging technologies. This administration will ensure that our nation remains the leader in the industries of the future with a strategy of both promotion and protection—protecting our greatest assets and promoting our greatest innovators. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

Market driven innovation has political consequences, those consequences are the responsibility of the political hierarchy, the apex hierarchs have a responsibility for developing policy (mandatory and nudging) as a current expression and application of core principles bent toward the realization of ultimate goals. Here the political goal is to shape the market, and the direction of individual or private, activities within it, toward a metrics accessible (assuming agreement on the principles on which the metrics are based and the forms of measurement) goal--(1) preeminence, in (2) critical and emerging, (3) tech, (4) built around, (5)industries of the future, (6) through a national political strategy , (7) of promotion and protection, of (8) the critical factors of its production. It is in this objective that the failures of "left error" become most apparent to Mr. Kratsios:

To the degree it even tried to accomplish this, the Biden administration failed on its own terms, led by a spirit of fear rather than promise. The old regime sought to protect its managerial power from the disruptions of technology, while promoting social division and redistribution in the name of equity. They secured American technology poorly, and failed to strengthen our leadership at all. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

To overcome this left error, Mr. Kratsios suggests, the state apparatus must be burdened with three responsibilities:  

First, we have to make the smart choices of creatively allocating our public research and development dollars. Second, we have to make the right choices in constructing a common-sense, pro-innovation regulatory regime. And third, we have to make the easy choice to adopt the incredible products and tools made by American builders and to enable their export abroad. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

Strategic use of research funds by the state, high quality innovation in regulatory regimes bent toward the fulfillment of policy goals, and then the aggressive export f the products of this model elsewhere (both the model of innovation and its products). These then suggest a large range of recent actions undertaken by the Trump administration against officials, institutions, and intergovernmental relations that are viewed as either remnants of left error or that are in the way of the state  undertaking these strategies as they understand them. Mr. Kratsios summarizes with respect to these three State objectives what has already been widely reported in the press: taking back and re-arranging State research funding to align with State objectives; regulatory reform also tied to State objectives and the rectification of the techno-bureaucratic establishment so that its working style will align with State objectives; and the re-invigoration of a re-imaged 19th century form of American merchant diplomacy and integrated economic order. (Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress)

Pix Credit here (Columbia "Brain Trust")

 

The project now continues. On 24 November, President Trump issued a Press Release: President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery. The Genesis Mission Press Relase described an earlier issued Executive Order: Launching the Genesis Mission.

The announcement builds on President Trump’s Executive Order Removing Barriers to American Leadership In Artificial Intelligence and advances his America’s AI Action Plan released earlier this year—a directive to remove barriers to innovation, reduce dependence on foreign adversaries, and unleash the full strength of America’s scientific enterprise. Secretary Wright has designated Under Secretary for Science Darío Gil to lead the initiative. The Genesis Mission will mobilize the Department of Energy’s 17 National Laboratories, industry, and academia to build an integrated discovery platform.  The platform will connect the world’s best supercomputers, AI systems, and next-generation quantum systems with the most advanced scientific instruments in the nation. Once complete, the platform will be the world’s most complex and powerful scientific instrument ever built. It will draw on the expertise of roughly 40,000 DOE scientists, engineers, and technical staff, alongside private sector innovators, to ensure that the United States leads and builds the technologies that will define the future. (Energy Department Launches ‘Genesis Mission’ to Transform American Science and Innovation Through the AI Computing Revolution)

 The Executive Order describes the project as "a national effort to accelerate the application of AI for transformative scientific discovery focused on pressing national challenges." (Launching the Genesis Mission, §2(a)). 

[It] recognizes the need to invest in AI-enabled science to accelerate scientific advancement. In this pivotal moment, the challenges we face require a historic national effort, comparable in urgency and ambition to the Manhattan Project that was instrumental to our victory in World War II and was a critical basis for the foundation of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its national laboratories. (Ibid., §1)

Pix credit here (the adversary)

It is meant to harness the best minds toward objectives that strengthen the Republic as that is understood by those in power in a State directed project that harnesses national productive forces toward those ends: "The Genesis Mission will dramatically accelerate scientific discovery, strengthen national security, secure energy dominance, enhance workforce productivity, and multiply the return on taxpayer investment into research and development, thereby furthering America’s technological dominance and global strategic leadership." (Ibid., § 1). All of this is to be overseen by the core of leadership in (or of) the Republic, Michael Kratsios the "Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST) [who] shall provide general leadership of the Mission." (Ibid., § 2(c)) and operationalized under the leadership of the Secretary of Energy (Ibid., §2(b). And it object--not merely to ensure the accelerated movement of the Republic's tech innovation forward, but to do so in a way that protects the Republic against these forces of internal chaos and external threat. This ties back to the Trump Administration objectives of moving toward a new golden age--the Republic's analogue to the Chinese Marxist-Leninist objectives of socialist modernization as an instrument essential to the project of national rejuvenation. 

No fault here. But also a very nice sign both of the deep penetration of Leninist vanguardism as an essential element of techno-liberal democracy and with it the way in which the State, even in markets driven cultures, may deploy national productive forces, including human productive elements to suit its purposes, purposes that are manifested and realized through an interaction between knowledge producers and power holders. Perhaps left in its wake, and perhaps necessarily so, are the discursive ropes that once served to animate the Republic's sense of itself, even as it was changing from 1919. 

And what is the measure of success? Victory!

But there is no substitute for victory. ** * In a world so shaped by politics as well as technology, we must take action in both of these domains. We need all Americans to continue to rise to the occasion, to make full use of their talents, and to build. (Ibid.)

To those ends the masses must unite under the leadership and guidance of the center to ensure that individual effort can be aggregated, in the fundamental working style of American markets driven organization, to "preserve the inheritance of the American Century to share with posterity, and to ensure that the technologies that give shape to our world help the American people secure the blessings of liberty we received from our forebearers * * * and drive us further into the endless frontier." (Remarks by Director Kratsios). (Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress)

 To those ends, the American Science and Security Platform (Platform) will be developed. It will serve as "the infrastructure for the Mission with the purpose of providing, in an integrated manner and to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with law" (Ibid., § 3(a)) with the following capabilities:

(i) high-performance computing resources, including DOE national laboratory supercomputers and secure cloud-based AI computing environments, capable of supporting large-scale model training, simulation, and inference;

(ii) AI modeling and analysis frameworks, including AI agents to explore design spaces, evaluate experimental outcomes, and automate workflows;

(iii) computational tools, including AI-enabled predictive models, simulation models, and design optimization tools;

(iv) domain-specific foundation models across the range of scientific domains covered;

(v) secure access to appropriate datasets, including proprietary, federally curated, and open scientific datasets, in addition to synthetic data generated through DOE computing resources, consistent with applicable law; applicable classification, privacy, and intellectual property protections; and Federal data-access and data-management standards; and

(vi) experimental and production tools to enable autonomous and AI-augmented experimentation and manufacturing in high-impact domains.

To what ends? Within 60 days of the date of the order, the Energy Secretary and their staff is to "identify and submit to" Mr. Kratsios, the APST, "a detailed list of at least 20 science and technology challenges of national importance" what might be fodder for the Platform created under § 3. These are to "span priority domains consistent with National Science and Technology Memorandum 2 of September 23, 2025." (Launching the Genesis Mission, §4(a)). These are to include: "(i) advanced manufacturing; (ii) biotechnology; (iii) critical materials; (iv) nuclear fission and fusion energy; (v) quantum information science; and (vi) semiconductors and microelectronics.

In this project, the State is also to serve a coordinating and amplification role.  

The Secretary, in coordination with the APST and the Special Advisor for AI and Crypto, shall establish mechanisms for agency collaboration with external partners possessing advanced AI, data, or computing capabilities or scientific domain expertise, including through cooperative research and development agreements, user facility partnerships, or other appropriate arrangements with external entities to support and enhance the activities of the Mission, and shall ensure that such partnerships are structured to preserve the security of Federal research assets and maximize public benefit.(Launching the Genesis Mission, §5(c)).

This, then, is how liberal democratic techno-brain trust-vanguardism works at the start of the second quarter of this century, and in the process re-shapes the Republic. Make no mistake, this is not a partisan project but rather one that the Republic's leadership has been working towards for more than a century. It aligns with the times and with the Republic's political economic model n a form relevant to the contradictions that threaten its forward movement along the American progressive pathway. In this form, the Republic's Leninism, long in gestation and dedicated to countering and overcoming the threat of Soviet Marxist class struggle Leninist vanguardism, now appears to assume a more prominent and coordinating role, a role of leadership and guidance over non-state productive forces, and in the name of national security and the safeguarding of the State from instability and chaos to assume a larger role in the management of non-state assets and the autonomous decision making of individuals that are its subjects. In the process both the nature and practice of brain trust liberal democracy and the relationship between individuals, the state and its law changes to suit the times. 

And one of its great markers--the abandonment of the risk avoidance foundational premises underlying both the United Nations and European approaches to Artificial Intelligence. In that one sees that second dialectic, between law and technology, in which knowledge production and the needs of one drives and tends to shape the approach of the other. In the case of the United Nations and European éminences grise, knowledge production is grounded in risk avoidance which is then tied to and informed against a reading of constitutional traditions that serve to shape the nature and limits of that production (and use) of knowledge. In the case of the United States, the Leninist brain trust shapes law to facilitate a production of knowledge in the service of other identified fundamental challenges, one which reshapes and devalues risk as a constitutional (and therefore legal) value in shaping the law of high quality production in the service of the State, and from the State to the private sector.  

Both President Trump's Executive Order, Launching the Genesis Mission, and his Press Release on the Genesis Mission, President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery, follows below. Make of it what you will from and through whatever cognitive lens suits. 

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 All of this, as interesting as it might be, leaves unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, the critical question: how does the vanguard govern itself? The Chinese as children of the Soviet experiment offer us democratic centralism, normative objectivity, dictatorship of proletariat, and the mass line. It is not clear how liberal democratic vanguard forces mean to govern themselves and remain true to the foundational premises of the Republic (whether undertaken by either of the two currently principal political establishments).