Thursday, January 22, 2026

Davos 2026 Part 2: Reflections on the American 整风 [Rectification Campaign] : The "Herodotus" Quality of the Text of Remarks Delivered by President Donald Trump

 

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Intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin always stubbornly try in all sorts of ways, including literary and artistic ways, to project themselves and spread their views, and they want the Party and the world to be remoulded in their own image. In the circumstances it is our duty to jolt these "comrades" and tell them sharply, "That won't work! The proletariat cannot accommodate itself to you. . . The past epoch is gone, never to return. . . China is moving forward, not back, and it is the revolutionary base areas, not any of the backward, retrogressive areas, that are leading China forward. This is a fundamental issue that, above all, comrades must come to understand in the rectification movement. . . . I believe that in the course of the rectification movement and in the long period of study and work to come, you will surely be able to bring about a transformation in yourselves and in your works, to create many fine works which will be warmly welcomed by the masses of the people, and to advance the literature and art movement in the revolutionary base areas and throughout China to a glorious new stage. (Mao Zedong, "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" (2 and 23 May 1942); see also nice discussion in Bonnie McDougall, Mao Zedong's  "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art": A Translation of the 1943 Translation With Commentary (Universoty of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1980)).

Rectification [整风 (Zhěngfēng)] or better put from its original longer form--to correct a working style--has always been around the intersticies of societal relations. In a world in which religion no longer fashions the bars within which it is possible to judge the need and character of rectification, other ideological frameworks have come into their own. Especially in the context of the ordering of political/social relations 整风 (Zhěngfēng; rectification) has moved from its classical Marxist-Leninist roots to insinuate itself as a critical element of the work style of all of the great ideological cages within which express the current tastes of humanity for their self-organization and the objectification of their hopes, manners, customs, dreams, and behaviors. 

In whatever form one finds it, in whatever era of historical development of a collective, in whatever form the cognitive cages of societal rationalizations appear, 整风 (Zhěngfēng; rectification) is also there. I insist on using the term as it has come to be known in the aftermath of the template setting Yan'an rectification of the late 1940s which shaped both the disciplinary working style of vanguards (where Leninist, intellectual, techno-expert, aristocratic or what not).  

Once again President Trump has come to Davos to deliver a speech to the assembled high level cadres of the global order(ing) and make deals (for what else would the self-aware incarnation of a transactional cognitive archetype do other than make deals?). Last year, when he returned at the start of his 2nd Presidency I noted:

Mr. Trump has been no stranger to Davos--and Davos will have him even as they might fear and loathe him and what he may be thought to bring to the table. He may be a "bad" boy but in the end he is more one of them than not--just in need of socialization and disciplining. At least that was the idea in 2018 when Mr. Trump last addressed this collection of vanguard elements ("America First" Explained at the Davos World Economic Forum: Text of President Trump's Address And White House Background Briefing). Still, the fundamental wariness and the sentiments fashionable in 2018 do linger (In quotes: How leaders at Davos 2025 view Trump's comeback). It is just that this time it is clearer that Mr. Trump could care less, perhaps because he no longer needs to care, and Davos movers and shakers are far more cautious, especially when they are being quoted. . .  This is a Mr. Trump who might still be mocked, and resisted, but now also a Mr. Trump who might have to be taken more seriously --a disruptive force that either benefits or threatens the vanguard ordering represented in this body. (Davos Discourse 1--Mr. Trump's Address to the World Economic Forum 2025 and the Evolving Characteristics of America First as an Alternative to European and Chinese Models)

 Last year President Trump loomed over the assembly briefly and on screen--a virtual presence that signified both a projection into the meeting and a distance from it, and a reminder that in modernity, virtual projections and the simulacra of the material might convey as much power as the physical--perhaps more.  

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This year the President attended in person and delivered an address (Transcript: President Donald Trump Remarks @WEF Davos 2026). But this time, President Trump had 整风 (Zhěngfēng; rectification) on his mind. That was what appeared to be on his mind in the words of his own propaganda team: 

President Donald J. Trump commanded the stage this morning at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, delivering a bold address that reaffirmed America’s leadership on the global stage and charted a decisive path forward for Western nations. Highlighting the imperatives of national sovereignty, cultural preservation, and proactive security, President Trump articulated a robust strategy to promote mutual prosperity and fortify alliances against global challenges. (In Davos, President Trump Outlines Bold Vision for American Prosperity, Transatlantic Strength )

While one might argue that the discursive style of President Trump's remarks might be distinguishable from that of Mao Zedong when, in addressing  the intelligentsia in Yan'an in 1942 ("Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art"), it is hard (at least for me) to note much a a difference beyond discursive style and the primary (or at least initial) targets of a discourse in the form of a warning and ultimately sketching the boundaries of a new disciplinary framework. 

It is from the perspective of rectification, then, that one might usefully approach the President's remarks.

1.  Defeat the forces of reaction both at home and abroad! The President understood, and indeed, appeared to relish, his role as a measuring stick of rectification at the gathering if intellectuals and cadres at the global Yan'an. "It’s great to be back in beautiful Davos, Switzerland, and to address so many respected business leaders, so many friends, a few enemies." (Trump Remarks).  That stick was fashioned from out of the discursive construction of the dialectic between the old regime and his. "Under the Biden administration, America was plagued by the nightmare of stagflation, meaning low growth and high inflation, a recipe for misery, failure, and decline. But now, after just one year of my policies, we are witnessing the exact opposite " (Ibid.). At the root of the decline  were "radical-left Democrats" now taking up the role that in Yan'an had been occupied by right wing reactionaries, landlords and bourgeoisie elements. Within the liberated area that is the United States a new reality emerges and a need to appropriately lead the masses arises. The foundation of the authority for this political work is grounded in the victory of the current leadership against the reactionaries. "The USA is the economic engine on the planet. And when America booms, the entire world booms. It’s been the history. When it goes bad, it goes bad. And I hope we all — you all follow us down and you follow us up."

2. Adopting a correct working style is essential for unity around the core of leadership.  President Trump here gets to the operational heart of the matter, the proper working style of ought to be American liberal democratic praxis! "This afternoon, I want to discuss how we have achieved this economic miracle, how we intend to raise living standards for our citizens to levels never seen before, and perhaps how you too and the places where you come from could do much better by following what we’re doing because certain places in Europe are not even recognizable, frankly, anymore." (Trump Remarks). The President, echoing the thrust of the National Security Strategy 2025 and the State Department elaboration of America First, starts with the failed praxis of the ancien regime:

In recent decades, it became conventional wisdom in Washington and European capitals that the only way to grow a modern Western economy was through ever-increasing government spending, unchecked mass migration, and endless foreign imports. The consensus was that so-called dirty jobs and heavy industries should be sent elsewhere, that affordable energy should be replaced by the “Green New Scam,” and that countries could be propped up by importing new and entirely different populations from faraway lands.

This was the path that sleepy Joe Biden administration and many other Western governments very foolishly followed, turning their backs on everything that makes nations rich and powerful and strong. And there’s so much potential in so many nations. The result was record budget and trade deficits and a growing sovereign deficit, driven by the largest wave of mass migration in human history. We’ve never seen anything like it.

Quite frankly, many parts of our world are being destroyed before our very eyes, and the leaders don’t even understand what’s happening. And the ones that do understand aren’t doing anything about it. Virtually all of the so-called experts predicted my plans to end this failed model would trigger a global recession and runaway inflation. But we have proven them wrong. It’s actually just the opposite. (Trump Remarks).

 It doesn't really matter whether one believes this or not, or whether, in the blue collar style of oppositional trope one fact checks these assertions (against one's pne value measure). That is not the point here. The point is the trope, and the oppositional categories that are used to define the "defects among our comrades, such as idealism, dogmatism, empty illusions, empty talk, contempt for practice and aloofness from the masses, all of which call for an effective and serious campaign of rectification" (Mao Zedong "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" Section 5). The failures are magnified when set up against the dialectical successes of the current ruling ideology. These are described  in a long passage of the Remarks that use as its markers (1) the rejection of "nation-wrecking energy policies", (2) the operationalization of an anti-bureaucratism campaign to reduce the size of the American nomenklatura and its regulatory footprint, (3) tax reduction, (4) tariffs and trade deficits; (5) "historic trade deals with partners covering 40 percent of all U.S. trade;" and (6) gasoline prices and nuclear energy. As the President would summarize it, "In one year, our agenda has produced a transformation like America has not seen in over 100 years." (Trump Remarks).

3. Social Revolution (社会革命) as Self-Revolution (自我革命) Must Guide the Appropriately Direct the Spirit of Rectification.  If the United States has, through an intense if short period of self-revolution, attained a more advanced stage of social revolution, it can serve as template, guide and leading force for global social revolution.  To those ends, President Trump considers a number of objectives and expressions of leadership that are meant to highlight the American basic or fundamental political line (a cognitively transactional America First Project) in action. 

The President starts with Venezuela. His description, likely irritating to those still embedded in the cognitive premises of the ancien regime (likely including a large segment of his audience, Yan'an style) is discursively significant for its approach.  In its choices of what "facts" are important and what facts disappear into the ether of irrelevance to the fundamental political line.

Venezuela has been an amazing place for so many years, but then they went bad with their policies. Ten years ago, it was a great country, and now it’s got problems. But we’re helping them. And those 50 million barrels, we’re going to be splitting up with them, and they’ll be making more money than they’ve made in a long time. Venezuela is going to do fantastically well. We appreciate all of the cooperation we’ve been giving. We’ve been giving great cooperation. Once the attack ended, the attack ended, and they said, “let’s make a deal.” More people should do that. (Trump Remarks)

 The President moves on to artificial intelligence (AI). There AI exists in two contexts--the first is transactional--the competition with China for markets grounded in technological leadership. The second is AI as an impetus for energy consumption (one of the unintended ungreen consequences of the anti-fossil fuel green revolution). "And we’re leading the world in AI by a lot. We’re leading China by a lot. I think President Xi respects what we’ve done, in part because I’ve allowed these big companies building these massive buildings to build their own electric capacity." (Trump Remarks). And all originates within and from the core of leadership (领导核心).  "And I came up with the idea, you know, you people are brilliant, you have a lot of money. Let’s see what you can do. You can build your own electric generating plant. And they looked at me. They didn’t believe me." (Ibid.). 

The President then turns to (on) Europe. For the President Europe, perhaps more than the US "radical left" represents the core of reactionary elements ripe for rectification. 

Because of my landslide election victory, the United States avoided the catastrophic energy collapse which befell every European nation that pursued the Green New Scam, perhaps the greatest hoax in history. The Green New Scam, windmills all over the place, destroy your land, destroy your land. Every time that goes around, you lose a thousand dollars. You’re supposed to make money with energy, not lose money. Here in Europe, we’ve seen the fate that the radical left tried to impose on America. They tried very hard. Germany now generates 22 percent less electricity than it did in 2017. And it’s not the current chancellor’s fault. He’s solving the problem. He’s going to do a great job. But what they did before he got there, I guess that’s why he got there. And electricity prices are 64 percent higher. (Trump Remarks).

The UK does not fare better, at least through the lens of energy policy. 

The United Kingdom produces just one third of the total energy from all sources that it did in 1999. Think of that, one third. And they’re sitting on top of the North Sea, one of the greatest reserves anywhere in the world. But they don’t use it. And that’s one reason why their energy has reached catastrophically low levels with equally high prices. High prices, very low levels. Think of that, one third, and you’re sitting on top of the North Sea.  And they like to say, “Well, you know, that’s depleted.” It’s not depleted. It’s got 500 years. They haven’t even found the oil. The North Sea is incredible. They don’t let anybody drill. Environmentally, they don’t let them drill. They make it impossible for the oil companies to go. They take 92 percent of the revenues. So the oil companies say, we can’t do it. (Ibid.).

The President foregrounds windmills for special evocative treatment.  From a semiotic perspective windmills represent or embody, they manifest, the left error of the current techno-bureaucratic institutionalist system that is, for the President, the primary object of rectification. 

Pix Credit China Daily (China Takes the Lead in Wind Energy Revolution
 Instead of closing down energy plants, we’re opening them up. Instead of building ineffective, money-losing windmills, we’re taking them down and not approving any.* * * The Green New Scam, windmills all over the place, destroy your land, destroy your land. Every time that goes around, you lose a thousand dollars. You’re supposed to make money with energy, not lose money. * * * There are windmills all over the place. And they are losers. One thing I’ve noticed is that the more windmills a country has, the more money that country loses and the worse that country is doing. China makes almost all of the windmills, and yet I haven’t been able to find any wind farms in China. * * * They put up a couple of big wind farms, but they don’t use them. They just put them up to show people what they could look like. They don’t spin. They don’t do anything. They use the thing called coal mostly. China goes with the coal. . . They killed the birds. They ruin your landscapes. Other than that, I think they’re fabulous, by the way. Stupid people buy them.(Trump Remarks)

 And then the shaping of the European rectification under the guidance of the American vanguard:

The consequences of such destructive policies have been stark, including lower economic growth, lower standards of living, lower birth rates, more socially disruptive migration, more vulnerability to hostile foreign adversaries, and much, much smaller militaries. * * * They have to get out of the culture that they’ve created over the last 10 years. It’s horrible what they’re doing to themselves. They’re destroying themselves. These are beautiful, beautiful places. We want strong allies, not seriously weakened ones. We want Europe to be strong. Ultimately, these are matters of national security, and perhaps no current issue makes the situation more clear than what’s currently going on with Greenland. (Trump Remarks)

To those ends, of course, the blueprint is set out in the U.S. State Department "Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2026-2030.

And that gets the President to the transaction of the moment--Greenland.  And of course, nothing here is ever particularly clean cut. First, there is nothing historically odd about the idea of territorial cession as a transaction, especially, it seems, involving Greenland. 

The United States has tried to acquire Greenland several times. In 1867, Secretary of State William Seward commissioned a survey of Greenland. Impressed with the abundance of natural resources on the island, he pushed to acquire Greenland and Iceland for US$5.5 million – roughly $125 million today. But Congress was still concerned about the purchase of Alaska that year, which Seward had engineered. It had seen Alaska as too cold and too distant from the rest of the U.S. to justify spending $7.2 million – roughly $164 million today – although Congress ultimately agreed to do it. There was not enough national support for another frozen land. In 1910, the U.S. ambassador to Denmark proposed a complex trade involving Germany, Denmark and the United States. Denmark would give the U.S. Greenland, and the U.S. would give Denmark islands in the Philippines. Denmark would then give those islands to Germany, and Germany would return Schleswig-Holstein – Germany’s northernmost state – to Denmark. (Fortune; a history that President Trump alluded to in his Remarks)

That is quite different from the willingness to engage in a transaction for territory. And, indeed, Denmark rejected an offer from the Truman Administration to purchase Greenland in 1946 ("Ultimately, the U.S. and Danish governments agreed on other ways to incorporate Greenland into America's defenses." Here including the 1951 Defense Treaty). Second, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric of acquisition and the objectives. The Americans have no real taste for additional burdens of governance spaces; they do have a taste for freedom to use and exploit territories as they please (even if "as they please" is defined and constrained by contract). And currently they appear to have a particular taste for national security borderlands  with respect to which some have thought Greenland spaces ought to play a role. These transactional, exploitation, and use objectives then get translated and ground up within the more ancient rituals of acquisitions--"you use it [territory] you own it" rules. These confusions appear all over the place and might be considered in the context of the President's remarks.

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Would you like me to say a few words of Greenland? I was going to leave it out of the speech, but I thought – I think I would have been reviewed very negatively. I have tremendous respect for both the people of Greenland and the people of Denmark. Tremendous respect. But every NATO ally has an obligation to be able to defend their own territory. And the fact is, no nation or group of nations is in any position to be able to secure Greenland other than the United States. We’re a great power, much greater than people even understand. I think they found that out two weeks ago in Venezuela. * ** We literally set up bases on Greenland for Denmark. . . .We were fighting to save it. For Denmark, big, beautiful piece of ice – it’s hard to call it land, it’s a big piece of ice – but we saved Greenland and successfully prevented our enemies from gaining a foothold in our hemisphere. So we did it for ourselves also. . . . After the war, we gave Greenland back to Denmark. How stupid were we to do that? But we did it. But we gave it back. But how ungrateful are they now? . .. So now our country and the world face much greater risks than it did ever before because of missiles, because of nuclear, because of weapons of warfare that I can’t even talk about. * * *

Greenland is a vast, almost entirely uninhabited and undeveloped territory. The sitting undefended in a key strategic location between the United States, Russia and China, that’s exactly where it is right smack in the middle, wasn’t important nearly when we gave it back. You know, when we gave it back, it wasn’t the same as it is now. It’s not important for any other reason. You know, that one talks about the minerals. There’s so many. There’s no rare earth. No such thing as rare earth. There’s rare processing. But there’s so much rare earth. And this to get to this rare earth, you had to go through hundreds of feet of ice. That’s not the reason we need it. We need it for strategic national security and international security. This enormous, unsecured island is actually part of North America on the northern frontier of the Western Hemisphere. That’s our territory. 

It is all here. Jumbled up of course, but for a transactional mind perfectly logically bricolaged. And that is precisely how a merchant type would want it. The Remarks are a concoction of imprecise language (I don't dare say sloppy because the imprecision is clearly deliberate cloaked in what a transactional opponent might be lulled into thinking is sloppy). It is not exactly clear what the Americans want--Greenland is worthless and it is essential for security; it is an object in commerce and held by a State incapable of exploiting it to comply with its obligations; and so on. That is a transactional not an institutional stance--and thus the rectification--the working style of transaction rather than of institutional solidarity. In the end one does not quite know what the "acquisition of Greenland" actually means other than that the Americans want to be able to do whatever it is they want to do for the protection of their interests and consequentially those of their allies within the inner core of the American territorial peripheries. That does not make it any less galling for the Danish. But it does reveal the praxis of rectification in the new era of the historical development of the United States. And indeed, almost immediately after the speech negotiations appeared to have kicked into high gear (see, e.g. here). And here it is the American version of social revolution through self-revolution .

Nonetheless, social and self-revolution, and its modalities of rectification start at home.  The President is as clear on that point as the Democratic Party and its supporters were in seeking then Mr. Trump's rectification between 2020 and 2024. The President declared: "the 2020 U.S. presidential election . . . was a rigged election. Everybody now knows that. They found out. People will soon be prosecuted for what they did. It’s probably breaking news, but it should be. It was a rigged election. You can’t have rigged elections." (Trump Remarks). And, like Mao Zedong in the 1940s (and Fidel Castro in the 1960s) rectification starts with the appropriate disciplining of the intelligentsia and their organs. 

You need strong borders, strong elections, and, ideally, a good press. I always say it. Strong borders, strong elections, free, fair elections, and a fair media. The media is terrible. It’s very crooked. It’s very biased, terrible. But someday it’ll straighten out because it’s losing all credibility. Think of it. When I went in a landslide, a giant landslide, won all seven swing states, won the popular vote, won everything. And they only get negative press. That means that it has no credibility. And if they’re going to get credibility, they’re going to have to be fair. So you need a fair press. But you also need those other elements. (Trump Remarks).

The issue isn't about "truth" but ideological stance, and from ideological stance the rationalization of approaches to vesting actions and objects with appropriate signification.  That as visible now as it was in 1942 in Yan'an as it has been in the Europe of the Brussels effect and in the America of the rules based multilateral order. 

 4. For transactions there must be peace! Like that other hegemon, but from a quite different starting (and perhaps ending) point. The new fundamental political line is focused on peace. It is not focused on the normative values around which conflict is considered and ends negotiated. It is focused on peace as an object, a state of being, a space within which it is possible to undertake the sort of translations that might enhance states of substantial non-conflict.

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We now understand that “President Trump is the President of Peace." (President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal). It ought to follow that the Republic is now, collectively, a Republic of Peace--self-revolution ushers in a state of social revolution. That, one might be excused for thinking, is the thrust of President Trump's message to the Republic. This is a message that has been underscored and elaborated by Secretary of State Rubio, whose discussion of the notion of peace, and states of peace brokered by a strong Republic reflects the more fundamental self-revolution of "transactional-merchant phenomenology and its understanding of peace as an essential element of something larger: "As they say in some movies--peace, like death, is not an end but a doorway. That acquires a quite interesting aspect in transactional spaces." What, then, is peace?  Perhaps Secretary Marco Rubio describes it best under conditions of transaction framing merchant realities--peace is the absence of war. War is understood as violent conflict, one that either destroys valuable objects (infrastructure, productive capacity and the like), or human the consumption of whom is the essential element of the process of production (workers, family units, consumers,  and operators of economic, social, religious, and cultural productivity) and the object (collectively) of productivity (at its extreme here) and curated. Societal self-pleasuring is the ultimate aim--however that is defined and made suitable for the times; and self-pleasuring consists of the proper interaction of objects and people agreeably arranged  and ordered in ways that permit a movement toward the maximization of their own self-and social value and that of the collective. This comes in many flavors of course (and ideology provides one of several languages for constituting these "flavors" in form suitable for both consumption and framing the human condition).  But at its heart is the fundamental postulate--that without the end of destruction there can be no movement toward. Nonetheless, peace is not its own object.  It is a state of (dis)engagement that permits the fundamental logic of the operation of self and social systems toward the realization of its apex goal and purpose--the regularization of spaces in which transactions may be undertaken for the further fulfillment of self and social revolution. It might be understood as movement toward development (or modernization, however these terms are understood) that improves (or in some systems perfects) things and conditions of life for individuals and collectives.  In other words, the object is not peace; the object is the achievement of a state of stable transactions--iterative, perhaps even purposeful beyond the value of the transaction--that then manifest desired states of being. (The Phenomenology of Peace and the Price of the Deal--Text of and Reflections on the Interview: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Brian Kilmeade of Fox Radio). ("President Trump is the President of Peace" Reflections on the Power of Presidential Self-Revolution (自我革命), the Republic's Social Revolution (社会革命) and the Presidential Message: "President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal").

It is in this context that one can approach the language of peace in the President's remarks on Ukraine. 
"The war with Ukraine is an example. We are thousands of miles away, separated by a giant ocean. It’s a war that should have never started, and it wouldn’t have started if the 2020 U.S. presidential election weren’t rigged." (Trump Remarks). These remarks evidence the same sort of strategic ambiguity as the Greenland remarks.  The President starts with an assessment of his power of persuasion over Mr. Putin, so that the 2022 invasion would not have occurred. "It was terrible what happened. I could see it happening, too. After I left, I could see it happening." (Ibid.).  This was a transaction the financial ramifications of which drove approaches, one conflated with border control and inflation.

Biden had given Ukraine and NATO $350 billion of staggering sums, $350 billion. I came in, and just like the southern border, just like inflation, just like our economy, I said, wow, this place is in trouble, meaning our country. All of these things were out of control. But the border was out of control. We fixed it with the strongest border anywhere in the world. (Ibid.).
And thus the obectification f peace as a core element of the new  fundamental political line. Peace, not at any price, but for peace's sake in which price is negotiable  and norms are price points. 

And I’ve now been working on this war for one year, during which time I settled eight other wars, India, Pakistan. I settled other wars that were Vladimir Putin called me. Armenian, Azerbaijan, he said, “I can’t believe you settled that one.” They were going on for 35 years. I settled it in one day. And President Putin called me. He said, “You know, I can’t believe I worked on that war for 10 years trying to settle it. I couldn’t do it.” I said, “Do me a favor. Focus on settling your war. Don’t worry about that.” What does the United States get out of all of this work? All of this money other than death, destruction and massive amounts of cash going to people who don’t appreciate what we do? They don’t appreciate what we do.(Ibid.).

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Of course, sometimes the instruments of peace are too expensive, or the institutional elements of peace mechanisms are not worth the price as a function of the value in transactions (or transnational security) they offer. From here one meanders through a number of transactional spaces. These include (1) NATO spending; (2) Greenland (no force); (3) naval capacity augmentation; (4) NATO spending again (bad deal tropes again); (5) Greenland and its incorporation into seamless North American defenses (Golden Dome); (6) the availability of the American Golden Dome to friends; (7) ending the loss of life in the Russo-Ukraine war ("Because too many people are dying, needlessly dying. Too many souls are being lost. It’s the only reason I’m interested in doing it. But in doing it, I’m helping Europe. I’m helping NATO"); (8) back to Greenland, its lack of exploitative valueless except for national security and NATO's failure; (9) financial markets and defense spending (with another swipe at the Europeans and NATO--the essence of rectification); (10) back to Greenland (partners will come to regret intransigence on the issue); (11) from the rectification to the utilization of a "strong NATO" presumably reconstituted in ways that align with the US fundamental political-transactional line; (12) global markets in pharma and welfare state stability and the value of the transactional lens (using in part President Macron's  sunglasses as metaphor); and (13) the value and essence of tariffs in transactional spaces.  What makes them interesting is not the meander but the connections, one that might best be savored after the fact, as oral discourse they might  only produce a momentary effervescence of key words dropped in oceans of sound.  But it also reveals discursive pathways, pathways that are quite different from those of techno-institutionalists, pathways that produce values in transactional dialectics in which categories are merely transactional objects that can be shifted, aligned or abandoned to suit the transactional objective. This is a force of logic that appears completely illogical to bureaucrats and traditionally trained officials precisely because it upends the niceties of discursive categories and their integrity, that collapses the un-collapsable and that evidences a shifting aggregation and re-aggregation of value that is dynamic and malleable. 

5. The Post-Global Mass Line; people are the rulers of rectification. Like the Socialist Path, the Liberal Democratic transactional Path requires discipline, dedication. . . .and results.  To those ends resident Trump brings his global vision home in several key respects: (1) home ownership by individuals; (2) caps on credit card interest rates; (3) American crypto-currency hegemony; and (4) mortgage bonds, mortgage rates and a public criticism of the apex American central banker.

But an appropriate working style s also necessary for the American core of leadership; and there is no better example than the way in which he deals with the Davos host country. The language is critically important. And that produces probably the most important part of the speech, the part of the speech that ought to be reviewed, considered, analyzed, and internalized more than anything else that passed from or thorough the lips of the President:

I mean, I had a case with Switzerland. We happened to be in Switzerland. Maybe I’ll give you a quick story. But they were paying nothing. They make beautiful watches, great watches, Rolex, all of them. They were paying nothing to the United States when they sent their product in. And we had a forty one billion dollar deficit, 41 billion with this beautiful place flew over it, isn’t it nice?

So I said, let’s put a 30 percent tariff on them so that we get back some of it, not all of it at all. We still have a deficit, big deficit, 40, 41 million. That’s a big deficit. And I said, let’s put a tariff on. Different tariffs, different places, you’re all party to some cases, victims to them. But in the end, it’s a fair thing. And most of you realize that.

But we put a 30 percent tariff on Switzerland and all hell broke loose. They were calling. I mean, like you wouldn’t believe. And I know so many people from Switzerland. Incredible place. Incredible, brilliant place. * * *

The prime minister, I don’t think president, I think prime minister called, a woman, and she was very repetitive. She said, “No, no, no, you cannot do that. 30 percent. You cannot do that. We are a small, small country.” I said, “Yeah, but you have a big, big deficit. You may be small, but you have a bigger deficit than big countries.” She said, “No, no, no, please. You cannot do it.” Kept saying the same thing over and over. “We are a small country.” I said, “But you’re a big country in terms of…” And she just rubbed me the wrong way, I’ll be honest with you. And I said, “All right, thank you, ma’am. Appreciate it. Do not do this. Thank you very much, ma’am.” And I made it 39 percent.

And then all hell really broke out. And I was paid visits by everybody. Rolex came to see me. They all came to see me. But I realized, and I reduced it. Because I don’t want to hurt people. I don’t want to hurt them. And we brought it down to a lower level. Doesn’t mean it’s not going up, but we brought it down to a lower level. But they pay now, the tariff. (Trump Remarks).

That is the essence of the speech, of the discursive framework of the second Trump Administration and of its democratic centralism and mass line practice in the service of its fundamental political line. It is a story that plays over and over again in the remarks. It is not about the remarks bit its cadence its organization, its Herodotus style logoi structures (on Herodotus and his literary and cognitive style here)

The main theme of the work is the struggles between Greeks and Barbarians, as is explicitly stressed in the prooemium. After a short introduction to legendary times, the Histories start with the conflict between Lydians and Greeks. When the Lydian king Croesus is defeated by Cyrus the Great, the expansion of the Persian Empire becomes the backbone of the work. Herodotus develops a high literary technique of references back and forward, presenting many digressions—the so-called logoi. (Herodotus: i Introduction to the Histpories)

One is back, in a way, to a different sort of golden age of discourse; it is one that belies the structures of Pathos, Logos, and Ethos (Πάθος, Λόγος και Ήθος) in favor of sequential and non-sequential looping that represents not just discourse but policy. It is one that is transactionally conversational, one that is inductive and built on aggregations of iterative discursive performances ("Logos is the word Herodotus uses for his own long narrative. It is also his word for the discrete pieces of narrative told to him by informants; thirdly, it signifies a variety of ideas or communications that take place within the narrative, among the people whose words and deeds are described. Logoi wield a dangerous power of their own; people’s distinctive speech acts, as they often talk past and attempt to manipulate one another in the Histories, help drive forward the causal connections creating the logôn hodos that is Herodotus’ own massive nine-book work." here). For moderns this is excruciating, yet its semiotics points to a way of layering meaning in ways that manage perception that unconsciously point to the mimetic discourse of coding generative intelligence. 

6. The Democratic Centralism of the Post-Global.  The America First project promises democracy and engagement for American First Adherents (the patriots) and dictatorship for the forces of opposition and reaction. This is democratic dictatorship with liberal democratic characteristics in the new era of its historical development. (For the original Chinese Leninist conception, see Mao Zedong, On the Peoples Democratic Dictatorship (1949). But more importantly, in the global context, the essence of  America First is a public facing and inter-governmental form of democratic centralism with the United States as its core (on its Chinese early essence, Mao Zedong, Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference Convened By The Central Committee Of The Communist Party Of China (30 January 1962), a concept closely tied to rectification ("Without democracy there cannot be any correct centralism because people’s ideas differ, and if their understanding of things lacks unity then centralism cannot be established. What is centralism? First of all it is a centralization of correct ideas, on the basis of which unity of understanding, policy, planning, command and action are achieved. This is called centralized unification.").  

 President Trump says:

Many places, I could give you six, seven places just in the people in this little area. I know every one of them. They’re sort of, they’re looking down. They don’t want to see me and they don’t want to stare me in the eyes. But they’re taking advantage of, everybody took advantage of the United States. But I’ve been very fair and I gave them a tariff and it was fine. But I realized that without us, it’s not Switzerland anymore. Without us, it’s not any of the countries that are represented here.  And we want to work with the countries. We want to work with them. We’re not looking to destroy them. I could have said 39%, 40%. I could have said I want a 70% tariff, then we make money with Switzerland. But Switzerland would have been probably destroyed, financially destroyed. I don’t want to do that. (Trump Remarks)

Mao Zedong reminds us: " We must conscientiously bring questions out into the open, and let the masses speak out. Even at the risk of being cursed we should still let them speak out." (Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference).  President Trump says:  

But we should be paying the lowest interest rate of everybody. I hope Scott’s listening to this because we should be paying the lowest interest rate of everybody. Without us, without us, most of the countries don’t even work. And then you have the protection factor. Without our military, which is the greatest in the world by far, without our military, you have threats that you would never, you wouldn’t believe. You wouldn’t believe. You don’t have threats because of us. And that’s because of NATO. (Trump Remarks).

Mao Zedong reminds us: 

We should always uphold the principle of the unity of proletarian internationalism. We always advocate that the socialist countries and the world communist movement must unite firmly on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. The international revisionists are ceaselessly cursing us. Our attitude is, let them go on cursing us. When it becomes necessary we can give them some appropriate answers. Our Party has become accustomed to being cursed. Leaving aside those who attacked us in the past, what about the present? Abroad, the imperialists curse us, the reactionary nationalists curse us, the revisionists curse us; in our country Chiang Kai-shek curses us, the landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements and rightists curse us. They had always done so in the past . . . Are we isolated? "   (Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference). 

And so on. And how does one move along the liberal democratic transactional path? President Trump sends time describing its components: (1) reindustriaization; (2) migration and crime enforcement (against bandits and reactionary elements);  (3) safety in the national capital city; (4) rectification of left and right error within institutions of lower level cadres (elected and appointed officials in sanctuary cities for example); (5) destroying transnational criminal gangs (the Somalis are mentioned); (6) eradicating piracy; and (7) dealing with undigested migrant groups and their anti-social 'assabiyah ("Situation in Minnesota reminds us that the West cannot mass import foreign cultures which have failed to ever build a successful society of their own").

What is left? 

So together, with confidence, boldness, and persistence, let us lift up our people, grow our economies, defend our shared destiny, and build a future for our citizens that is more ambitious, more exciting, more inspiring, and greater than the world has ever seen.(Trump Remarks)

 

The full text of President Trump's remarks follows and may also be accessed here in transcript form with thanks to the Singju Post.  



Wednesday, January 21, 2026

Davos 2026 Part 1--A Bandung Conference for a "First Wives" Club of "Middle Powers"; Reflections on the Remarks of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney

 

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 Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada delivered a stark speech in Davos, Switzerland, on Tuesday, prompting global political and corporate leaders in the audience to rise from their seats for a rare standing ovation. He described the end of the era underpinned by United States hegemony, calling the current phase “a rupture.” He never mentioned President Trump by name, but his reference was clear. (New York Times)

Prime Minister Mark Carney, the former central banker, lifeline vanguard insider, good team player, and prominent child of the ancien regime's vision for a world order within which Canada could find itself a safe space of sorts; Prime Minister Carney, the "good son" who "existed at the nexus of global thinkers and multilateral institutions. The “rockstar banker” was a fixture at summits, where he spoke beside business leaders and the political elite, espousing the values of international cooperation and the need for open economies and shared rules" (Guardian); Prime Minister Carney gave a speech at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum traditionally held at Davos, Switzerland.  In their own words: 

Since 1971, the World Economic Forum has stood at the intersection of geopolitics and cooperation, believing that the only viable path forward is to connect leaders across sectors, regions, ideologies and generations to make sense of global challenges and move the world forward together. . . .Our Annual Meeting in Davos brings together leaders from across sectors and regions to address the world’s most pressing challenges, while our year-round communities — spanning industries, regions, and generations — collaborate continuously through initiatives and dialogues that turn ideas into action. The Forum is an independent, not-for-profit organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, with offices in New York and San Francisco, United States, Beijing, China, and Tokyo, Japan. (here)

The performances by these elements of the core of leadership of intersecting global vanguards (or at least the face of these vanguards) are not to be missed; nor their discourse ignored. Each n their own way reveals the public face of the cognitive cages, the rationalizing lenses, through which these political officials and their claques (quite important claques to be sure, important enough certainly to blank out alternative visions within their own world orderings). They speak in one language to the public and beneath it the more coded language for public signalling of private engagements.  

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For 2026  it is somewhat appropriate to start with the remarks delivered by the Canadian Prime Minister. It is not clear how one ought to react to these remarks--quite elegant, beautiful, poignant, elegiac, nostalgic--of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, delivered, as will so many others, at the Davos conclave for the performative expression of the global vanguard, gathered together in their inaccessible winter retreat in order to (safely) emote for each other for the benefit of the masses onto which their performances are projected to whatever ends these projections are made. The Prime Minister speaks to heresy, again in the fullness of that term in its older senses (both positive and negative from the perch of the 2nd quarter of the 21st century and its heterodoxies)--"c. 1200, from Old French heresie, eresie "heresy," and by extension "sodomy, immorality" (12c.), from Latin hæresis, "school of thought, philosophical sect." The Latin word is from Greek hairesis "a taking or choosing for oneself, a choice, a means of taking; a deliberate plan, purpose; philosophical sect, school," from haireisthai "take, seize," middle voice of hairein "to choose." The Prime Minister indeed, speaks to immorality, and choice, especially by those states with the power to make or break the context of the choosing.   

It was a speech directed to the heresies of the United States (for some reason the heretical theology of Marxist Leninist States, particularly China, which resonate with those of the United States, have never been seen as worthy enough to engage with, other than  for their consequential threat, but hardly ever as theoretical or normative ones; but that is a discussion for another day. . . .).   

It was a speech about betrayal (in the old sense of giving up something of value to an enemy, normative or physical); betrayal of a lifetime's work; betrayal of the core  catechism of the world order that perhaps became inseparable from who he was, is or constituted himself within the nexus of his self-constitution be reference to his community of believers.  But worse, it is the confessional text of a self-betrayal, of an insider's arrogance brought face to face with the price of both; of a person who had spent so long not just disbelieving in the possibility that the lebenswelt through which everything he was in the world had been built was now sinking into something that he views with horror, but one who, like the other members of his faith community had done their level best to extirpate the heresies of those who had for years, for decades, warned of its coming; of the betrayal that is the price to be paid by the global magisterium of the orders of the ancien regime for their arrogant complacency that assumed the power of their own ordering premises one evident by its success so much so that they did not it it worth the effort to defend it when defending might have been possible (though there are those who had argued, me included) that the inherent contradictions of the system made such saving unlikely). It was a success that rotted the mind (the normative sphere) even as the critical support structs of its power were weakened or swept away in 2001, in 2006-08, in 2011, and in 2014 (at least as these events were reconstructed as indictments of the old order, the patching up of which consisted on piling more of the modalities of failures on the failures themselves. It was all genteel of course; this was a world order of the intellect, of the normative superstructure within which action could be tamed (except of course in its peripheries where more primitive and ruthlessly guarded ant-orthodoxies loomed, like bands in the forests, or those who inhabited lands beyond the horizons of the heartlands of belief). 

The speech is worth a careful read--for its richness and its emotion--part funeral oration, part pep talk, part counsel from an older relative who has "been around the block", part bitter dialog of the spurned partner, and part memory of a time when everyone in the family thought that nothing was impossible. I will briefly focus on three aspects.

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1. Rupture.  The Prime Minister starts with rupture. "I’ll talk about the rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story, and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints." (Carney Remarks). It was a long time coming. An admission that the old credo, the old orthodoxies, remain rhetorically powerful (something the Chinese side exploits quite successfully) but that its insides have been cleaned out and to some extent either repurposed or abandoned. But it was also a judgment. Rupture suggests the breaking up of a thing--it looks no farther than the ruptura, that one painfully ecstatic moment of breaking, breaching, bursting apart (or into parts). It looks no farther than the present because it is meant to draw the eye to the past--to what had been before the rupture--it suggests that moving forward requires a looking back, a stepping backward into the future to mourn, preserve or remake in the image of the thing that cannot ever be brought back to its state pre-rupture. That is a choice--normative political, cognitive. And it is a powerful discursive trope--like an anesthetic is eases the pain and provides the comfort and security of what is known or what some form of the contemporary knowledge of what has been lost to time except as recreated memory. There is nothing wrong with that. 

Nonetheless it veils other pathways. Those pathways may, instead, in ways that do not suit the Peime Minister (intellectually and perhaps politically) that turn the gaze from the past in other directions (forward suggests value, and there may be no value other than the value of the reality of what comes after). The Prime Minister looks forward from out of the past and he sees nothing that does not remind him of loss: "Every day we are reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry. That the rules-based order is fading. That the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." (Carney Remarks). And then he looks further back as the people of his generation were trained to do (Thucydides) and then closer to the current era of historical development through the lens that represents a collective learned rationalizing experiencing (the Prague Spring of 1968). That is not to suggest that either is bad or foolish--quite the reverse, both are powerful sources of cognitive rationalization and analytics. It is to suggest however, that how one approaches these tells us more about learning in action in contemporary content than the sum of the learning of the thing itself. Thucydides he understand (in the manner in which elites in the West were taught for generations) as a trap to be avoided. The Prague Spring and the end of the Sovoet Empire he sees through a post-1989 lens (one that ironically marked the beginning of the end and the starting point for the apogee of arrogance and complacency that marked the period of the "End of History and the Last [Wo]Man") as offering a collectively synthesized means of avoiding the trap. 

Not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false. Havel called this “living within a lie.” The system’s power comes not from its truth but from everyone’s willingness to perform as if it were true. And its fragility comes from the same source: when even one person stops performing — when the greengrocer removes his sign — the illusion begins to crack. It is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.

Of course that is the other trap--the dependency trap that the Prime Minister acknowledges and then brushes away. It is as much the trap of the old Marxist-Leninist Soviet imperial project as it was that of the post 1945 multilateral rules based order. Cuba learned first hand both the glories of dependency before 1989 and the tragedy when the structures of dependency (and the flows of subsidy) vanish after 1991. And now that dependency--that transactional dialectic of "accommodation" in exchange for protection is both re-imagined (by the Americans) and becomes an object of recrimination among those the Americans would either abandon or choose to change the terms of exchange. That was succinctly stated in what is likely to serve as the most interesting and provocative (in its own re-imagining of the past--especially the value of the bargain of that past with respect that the Prime Minister both mourns and mocks):

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, praised its principles, and benefited from its predictability. We could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection. We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false. That the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient. That trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim. This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods: open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security, and support for frameworks for resolving disputes. So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals. And largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality. (Carney, Remarks)

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In the end, what, then, separates the Soviet from the American Empire of the past (or for that matter the Chinese and the American Empires that are (re)emerging)? Comfort, perhaps. One could get fat but still despise the conditions that make cultural, economic, and political obesity possible. One can--to recall yet another object from the past--bite the hand that feeds one. Perfectly fair--especially in the most emotive stage of a rupture.

Nevertheless, the Prime Minister is not incorrect. There was a betrayal--at least a betrayal  in the form of the refusal of the United States to continue relentlessly along the path of globalization to arrive at  the establishment of a global society in which the State, like other institutions, would wither away. The original sin of the United States was to have failed to disappear and merge with, into, and as the global, that is to dissolve into and as the system it oversaw.  It was a betrayal of their destiny to dissolve within the warm embrace of techno-bureaucratic international institutions that would provide the architecture of a new, and more permanent, global ordering within which its functionally differentiated components--states, large economic and civil society institutions, and other mass organizations (representing identity based mass organs, indigenous, religious and other communities)--would each do their part in the elaboration and perfection of a global society  in which personal self-actualization was possible under the collective normative structures of social relations produced and protected within global expert techno-administrative organs and materialized through a deep interpenetration of (again) functionally differentiated officials, managers, etc. in a perfectible self-referencing dialectic between the top and its manifestations at the bottom. 

In other (and fewer) words--the United States was to have disappeared (like other hegemons) within a system that would make national hegemony incomprehensible. (For my own description of the process along with the warning of the forces that would corrupt, transform or overturn what then appeared to the elites to be an unavoidable "forward" movement, see, “Economic Globalization Ascendant: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order,” Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 17(1):141-168 (2006). Published as “Globalização Econômica e Crise do Estado: um estudo em quatro perspectives”, Sequencia No. 51: 255-276 (December 2005). DOWNLOAD ARTICLE HERE: 17BerkLaRazaLJ141(2006)EconGlobal). The Americans broke what in retrospect was viewed by the emerged global apparatus and its supporters as its fundamental obligation and duty to become immanent in the global. In that respect, and certainly with respect to generations of elite techno-managers and their apparatus, what the United States has done with increasing ferocity since 2001 amounts to the grand betrayal of the commitment to follow the "Globalization Path" toward the functional extinction of the State as a privileged entity before the sovereignty of the while within its techno-bureaucratic institutions. That also, perhaps was as much a fantasy as the one that the Prime Minister describes. 

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2.  The New World Order.  Beyond Thucydides and the moral of the Soviet Empire, the semiotics of Leviathan (Job 41 (God's creation of power beyond the human); Psalm 74:14; (Leviathan crushed and offered for food in the desert); Psalm 104:26 (Leviathan frolicking in the sea with human ships;  Isaiah 27:1 (God returns to restore and kill Leviathan in the process) and Behemoth (Job 40:15–24) continues to resonate--as the incarnation of chaos and destruction that are both a gift of God (and part of the creation) and also of manifestations that must be served up at the time of the perfection of the world and the human in it. And it resonates quite evocatively in the Prime Minister's remarks, certainly as perceived through the cognitive lens of Thomas Hobbes in which, it might vbe suggested, that humanity is itself the or a great serpent. 

The multilateral institutions on which middle powers relied— the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture of collective problem solving – are greatly diminished.  As a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions. They must develop greater strategic autonomy: in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance, and supply chains.  This impulse is understandable. A country that cannot feed itself, fuel itself, or defend itself has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself. But let us be clear-eyed about where this leads. A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile, and less sustainable.  And there is another truth: if great powers abandon even the pretence of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from “transactionalism” become harder to replicate. Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships. Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty. Buy insurance. Increase options. This rebuilds sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will be increasingly anchored in the ability to withstand pressure. (Carney, Remarks)

Leviathan, however, is a problematic semiotic trope in its Hobbsian imageries--"'Leviathan' (London: Andrew Cooke, 1651): an allegory of governance and the nature of civil and ecclesiastical authority. A crowned man whose body is made of numerous human bodies, emerges from a mountain at the foot of which is a city, holding a sword in his right hand and a crozier in in left hand; below is the title inscribed on a tapestry and surrounded by ten framed allegories: castle, crown, cannon, military trophies, battle on the left, church, bishop mitre, thunder, inscribed trident and forks, and assembly of magistrates;. 1651 (here). The problem is that the condition of Leviathan appears inescapable.

Great powers can afford to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity, the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not. But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what is offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating. This is not sovereignty. It is the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.  In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice: to compete with each other for favour or to combine to create a third path with impact. (Carney Remarks)

And there it is. Rupture cannot be undone.  What is left is the world ordering of hegemons. And it is within that that the rest must find a way to serve or be served. And the foundation of that choice is to mimic empire--one way or another sovereignty and impact. That, perhaps is the new credo of the post-global. "We should not allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity, and rules will remain strong — if we choose to wield it together." What cannot be undone, what cannot be challenged might still be resisted and resistance required imitation. But imitation in which the old rubble of a failed global vision might now be used  as instruments for forging a livable place within the new world ordering. Rome has fallen; one must use the materials of its own magnificent structures toward new ends. "This is not naive multilateralism. Nor is it relying on diminished institutions. It is building the coalitions that work, issue by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together. In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations. And it is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities." (Carney, Remarks). One uses the tools of the old master to build new structures to co-exist alongside the building of the new masters of global spaces. 

The result is the announcement of a new Canada First foreign policy:

 Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on incomes, capital gains and business investment, we have removed all federal barriers to interprovincial trade, and we are fast-tracking a trillion dollars of investment in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors, and beyond. We are doubling our defence spending by 2030 and are doing so in ways that builds our domestic industries.We are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the European Union, including joining SAFE, Europe’s defence procurement arrangements. We have signed twelve other trade and security deals on four continents in the last six months. In the past few days, we have concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar. We are negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines, Mercosur. To help solve global problems, we are pursuing variable geometry— different coalitions for different issues, based on values and interests. On Ukraine, we are a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the largest per-capita contributors to its defence and security.  On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland’s future. Our commitment to Article 5 is unwavering. We are working with our NATO allies (including the Nordic Baltic  to further secure the alliance’s northern and western flanks, including through Canada’s unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, submarines, aircraft, and boots on the ground. Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and calls for focused talks to achieve shared objectives of security and prosperity for the Arctic. On plurilateral trade, we are championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European Union, creating a new trading block of 1.5 billion people.  On critical minerals, we are forming buyer’s clubs anchored in the G7 so that the world can diversify away from concentrated supply. On AI, we are cooperating with like-minded democracies to ensure we will not ultimately be forced to choose between hegemons and hyperscalers.(Carney, Remarks)

It is hard to see in this something different than Secretary of State Rubio's America First policy--except of course its normative values and operational goals. The transactional lens, of course, is jettisoned in favor of an institutional one (as befits this progeny of the school of institutionalist cognitive framing).  The structures, however,  . . . well. . .  (Reflections on the Normative-Institutional Architecture of America First: U.S. State Department "Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2026-2030). 

3. A Bandung Conference for the Post Global. It follows that even as the Prime Minister constructs his narrative of rupture, and of the horrors of the new transactional ordering of the world (transactional dialectics with which he had no problem as long as the vectors of value were favorable), the he offers "a new hope" in an ancient form. And it is one the irony of which is inescapable. He offers this:  "But I also submit to you that other countries, particularly middle powers like Canada, are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that embodies our values, like respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states." That is also extraordinary in a singular sense. If, indeed, the great betrayal of the multilateral order was the unwillingness to give up the hyper-privilege of the State, of political ordering, within the architecture of globalization, then one wonders at the solution which is itself grounded in the repositioning of the State at the center of  multilateral regionalisms. The Prime Minister, in a sense, not merely declares the old vision dead, but then  in mourning its corpse again, seeks to mimic precisely the great betrayers that killed the old vision.   

Yet again, one cannot walk into the future looking back without looking back. And in this case the power of the Prime Minister's discourse, and its tropes, hearken back to another time--a time during the formative period of the old global empire as it sought to generate itself in definitive form; a time when those on the periphery of the global spaces within which Canada found a warm hearth and home--when those on the outside, post-colonial and post imperial spaces now (re) emerging  into sovereign spaces from which their past could only be recalled but not recaptured, sought uncomfortably to accommodate the empires of the global in ways that would not extinguish themselves back into the abyss of sovereign subalternity.  One speaks here of the Bandung Conference and the rise of the first great challenge to the global order (now mourned by Canada) and one notes the parallel discourse of  those who were once on the inside, now on the outside again resorting to ancient discourse to challenge yet another generation's sovereign ordering (the Bandung Conference through US conceptualizing eyes here; through Chinese conceptualizing eyes here). Bandung had a nice run but did not end well for its participants, swallowed up as most were within the discursive universe of totalizing globalization as economics, politics, culture and values. Still the notion of leveraging capacity is as much with us in the post global as it was at Bandung and with the European Union before it stopped evolving. The "third path with impact" then becomes the Bandung path: "We should not allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity, and rules will remain strong — if we choose to wield it together." This time it is not post colonial but rather post-global states now looking in and trying to find and leverage their place within an emerging order they had little hand in crafting and perhaps less in moving forward.  

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And then the sovereign transactional bit begins, one that is also inescapable in the new world ordering but which sounds discursively far more heroic than the ordinariness of the bargaining will eventually reveal, one that sounds in some measure precisely like the elements of the system whose copmponents are the cause of the mourning with which the remarks started: 

It means building what we claim to believe in. Rather than waiting for the old order to be restored, create institutions and agreements that function as described. And it means reducing the leverage that enables coercion. Building a strong domestic economy should always be every government’s priority. Diversification internationally is not just economic prudence; it is the material foundation for honest foreign policy. Countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world’s largest and most sophisticated investors. We have capital, talent, and a government with the immense fiscal capacity to act decisively. And we have the values to which many others aspire. (Carney, Remarks).

The Prime Minister remarks: "The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy." That is true as far as it goes. And yet; and yet; it is the power of nostalgia (discursive) when combined with the power of the transactional, now driven through and perhaps for institutional structures, that the new order will be deepened as "middle powers" speak to the values of the past while refashioning themselves in the image of a future over which they have precious little control. A tragedy wrapped up in an idea, wrapped up in ideals, wrapped up in the cognitive framework within which ideals can be fashioned, wrapped up in the way we observe, recognize, name and give meaning to the things around us.  There will be lots more of that at Davos. 

Nostalgia may not be a strategy but it is certainly a powerful discursive trope, one well used in these remarks. One can choose to walk backwards into the future or one need not.

The full text of the Prime Minister's remarks follow. 

 

 

 

Tuesday, January 20, 2026

Putting People at the Center--The Meta Oversight Board Consults the Masses!

 

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The Meta Oversight Board was created in 2020 to respond to criticisms from across the political and social cognitive spectrum of the way in which social media platforms were or were not appropriately curated. In in its own words

The Oversight Board’s mission is to improve how Meta treats people and communities around the world. We apply Facebook, Instagram and Threads’ content standards in a way that protects freedom of expression and other global human rights standards. We do this by providing an independent check on Meta’s content moderation, making binding decisions on the most challenging content issues. We deliver policy recommendations that push Meta to improve its rules, act more transparently and treat all users fairly.

How well they are doing is a matter of perspective; as is the value and consequences of the form of oversight chosen that produced the Board as its disciplinary mechanism. See here, here.  For a Meta Board self assessment after five years, its essence deeply embedded in its title, From Bold Experiment to Essential Institution (December 2025) see here.

To some extent, perhaps, they are meant to be a useful simulacra of the community that they represent
To ensure a global perspective, our Board Members come from a variety of cultural and professional backgrounds, speak more than 30 languages and are chosen to be reflective of the diverse users of Facebook, Instagram and Threads. From academics to policymakers and journalists, each Member brings a unique perspective that can help to improve how Meta moderates content on its platforms.

But if course they are not; they are meant to "ensure a global perspective"--an elite vanguardist perspective to be sure. Their website makes a virtue of this ("As experts on social media, governance, digital rights and free expression, our Board Members hold valuable insights into the big questions and key issues arising from global developments in moderating online content. Read their published articles and watch them giving their insights on international issues."). They are hardly meant to either be in touch with or even the slightest bit sympathetic to mass opinion, mass desire, or mass behaviors (good or bad). Instead they are chosen precisely because their status as representative of global vanguardist views suggest the human aggregation thought suitable for exercising guidance and leadership over the masses to help bring them closer to the  ideal behaviors which these members themselves are meant to represent in all if its quite narrow but still variegated glory. 

That is, of course, as it should be in a world thew democratic impulse of which is meant to instill an elitist pedagogy--not a pedagogy of the oppressed--but one of the leading forces of  whatever societal collective is viewed as worthy of representation (and therefore of incarnation within the chatter that is Facebook, Instagram and its cousins). 

Still, in a world in which the "people are the masters" of the apparatus constituted for their protection, guidance, happiness, stability, wellbeing, etc., it is important from time to time to reach out to get a sense of mass sentiment. Or perhaps better put, in the style of "town halls", to engage in the performance of consultation to better align the  reciprocal roles of vanguard and masses (eg here, here, and here). .  

 So-called "town hall meetings" have their origins in efforts to practice direct democracy (but not its binding forms) reflecting the style that echos the informal New England town meetings, generally open to all townspeople (now stakeholders) and held at the town hall (now virtually any venue) and in which the attendees were given an opportunity to present ideas, voice opinions, and ask questions of local public officials. This form of engagement has become an increasingly important feature of governance in both public and private sectors, including universities. 

But town hall meetings are now deployed as much to manage stakeholders to to serve as a means of listening to stakeholder ideas, opinions, criticisms and the like. 
For most large-enterprise organizations, the company all-hands or town hall meeting is one of the most important events in a corporate communications strategy. The company town hall is typically an annual or quarterly meeting, attended by every employee, that allows the CEO and/or management to present company goals, awards and recognition; engage in planning sessions; and provide inspiration for the work ahead. (ON24, Town Hall Meetings)
No longer a means of engagement, they appear to have become a technique of control and socialization of productive sectors of institutional communities, as a means of harvesting data to better achieve those ends, and as a form, of socializing productive forces through interaction with high officials who use the opportunity of a town meeting more to speak than to listen. (On the Practice of Town Hall Meetings in Shared Governance--Populist Technocracy and Engagement at Penn State)  

Here is the Meta Press Release

For the first time in the organization’s five-year history, the Oversight Board is reviewing Meta's approach to permanently disabling accounts – an urgent concern for Meta’s users. The Board has taken a new case to assess whether Meta was right to permanently disable an Instagram user’s account, following a referral in which the company requested guidance from the Board. This represents a significant opportunity to provide users with greater transparency on Meta’s account enforcement policies and practices, make recommendations for improvement, and expand the types of cases the Board can review.

 Submit a Public Comment

The Board would appreciate public comments that speak to Meta’s approach to account strikes and removals and how best to ensure fairness and transparency for users. If you or your organization would like to share your perspectives, please submit them here. Your feedback is a vital part of the Board’s decision-making and can help shape our recommendations to Meta. Thank you,
The Oversight Board

 The full description of the object of consultation follows below. Anyone with an interest ought to consider participating. The masses might be heard, even if their voices will be aggregated, digested, essentialized, and on that basis turned into data that can be used both to inform Meta and to serve as the basis against which the masses may be guided. As a function of the current public facing political line of economic enterprises, this is as it should/must be.