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From the time that the Communist Party of China decisively turned against the Soviet error of cults of personality, the issue of the nature and character of left and right error has been a troublesome one. But it is important in the sense that both left and right error represent substantial threats to the interpretative integrity and trustworthiness of CPC interpretation and application of its own line. At its most fundamental--left and right error can adversely affect the trustworthiness of the CPC line itself. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping's insight about Mao Zedong--that he was 30% wrong and 70% right may carry over to the operations othe the CPC itself and all of its members. It for that reason that some CPC intellectuals put forward the idea of collective leadership in the hope of minimizing the risk of left and right error (driven by individual mistakes) and to reduce the impact of such error at the institutional level. But that itself was subject to left error (in the form f the metaphor of the Gang of Four at the end of the Cultural Revolution) and right error (in the form of the tendency to detach socialist modernization from political allegiance to the 4 Cardinal Principles and the role of the CPC as a vanguard rather than as a political organ).
The issue of left and right error--and its relationship to the fundamental error of personality cults--itself carries with it a more fundamental issue; that of definition. The problem was recognized at an early stage by Mao Zedong, and then applied against his own error in the end of the period of Cultural Revolution. "As Mao summed up in an earlier period, “Broadly speaking, in the last
seventeen years our Party has learned to use the Marxist-Leninist weapon
of ideological struggle against incorrect ideas within the Party on two
fronts – against right opportunism and against “left” opportunism.” (MSW, V.2, p.205) (The Communist, Vol. V, No. 7, February 19, 1979).
For Deng Xiaoping, left and right error were defined by reference to the errors of Mao Zedong (and that if the CPC collective during the first half century of its role as a vanguard in power) (On Opposing Wrong Ideological Tendencies (1981)).
We should criticize wrong ideologies whether they are “Left” or Right. Emancipation of the mind, too, means opposing both “Left” and Right ideologies. The call by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee for emancipating our minds was directed at the “two whatevers”, and the emphasis was on correcting “Left” errors. Later a Right deviation emerged that must, of course, also be corrected. . . . During the 17 years preceding the “cultural revolution” our work, in the main, proceeded along a correct path, though there were twists and turns and mistakes. Comrade Mao Zedong should not be held solely responsible for everything; we ourselves should share the responsibility. We should sum up historical experience and draw the necessary lessons in accordance with the principle of seeking truth from facts. (Ibid.)
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The problem of error is a continuous one; "Which of the two is the main target or main danger is determined by the concrete conditions facing a revolutionary movement. But overall, it is the Marxist-Leninist method to guard against both right and “left” tendencies for both steer us off the revolutionary road." (The Communist, Vol. V, No. 7, February 19, 1979)).
For the New Era that focus of the definition of left and right error has evolved along with Chinese Leninist theory. It might be tempting to posit new definitions suitable for the New Era as follows:
Left Error: The fundamental presumption that the CPC is the ends in itself and the the principle of Communist collectivity ends at the apex of CPC institutionalized authority. The error is left because it posits that Leninism is itself detach from and superior to the fundamental legitimating ideology from which it derives its authority--the obligation of the Leninist Party to merely serve as the instrument of achieving the establishment of a communist society in China. Where the CPC becomes the ends then the Leninist Party loses its legitimacy and the effective role of leading social forces must be undertaken elsewhere. It is in this sense that one might understand the quite important concept of putting the CPC at the center is merely a shorthand for expressing the central role of the CPC to work solely towards the accomplishment of its mission--again the establishment of a communist society in China. A corollary of left error, is the notion that the balance between core and collective--the basic building block of vanguard operation and reflected in the fundamental balancing inherent in the mass line--will come unbalanced. This is a left error within the core at every level of cadre organization. Every level. Collective leadership may not be its rectification; perhaps data driven accountability measures will be more effective.
Right Error: The fundamental presumption that socialist modernization is the ends in itself and that its promotion as a technocratic effort detached from the guidance of vanguard forces, will produce the desired ends--the establishment of a communist society in China. This was essentially the charge that the current general secretary laid at the doorstep of socialist modernization, and its corruption by the technocrats that has acquired an unbalanced authority over the last several decades. The Work Report of the 20th National CPC Congress was centered--in its focus on the correct path towards moving forward--on the need to both recognize the right error of a socialist modernization that became detached from its central objective: to move the nation closer to the realization of the establishment of a Communist society in China (eg here). There was a corollary--that the error of detachment becomes fatal when it seeks to transform the nature and role of the vanguard leading forces organized as a Communist Party into a political rather than as a vanguard representing all of the people (a key premise that is incompatible with the core of liberal democratic theory). Where economic development becomes the core, then the project of national transformation becomes effective. And where that project ceases to have any legitimacy, the conseqe3unce is a bourgeois revolution and a political crisis of equal consequence to that of the Cultural Revolution from the left. What the general secretary then offers as a corrective--a left corrective--is New Era theory in two critical areas: (1) centering the CPC (and the core of the core-collective binary at the heart of democratic centralism); and (2) transforming socialist modernization into a project of national rejuvenation to realize the Chinese Dream. That Dream is itself only a temporary guidepost on the core project (communism) (see here, here, here, here, and here).
The question then remains: to what extent and in what manner must the CPC (even against its highest ranking officials) continue to be vigilant against left and right error, and implement a means of rectifying error. Here again Deng Xiaoping, faced with a similar challenge from the left suggested the balancing:
Fifth, in rectifying “Left” and Right tendencies, we should not arbitrarily raise the matter to the level of a principle or launch a movement and have everyone make a self-criticism. If everyone had to do so, we would soon have another movement on our hands. Of course, the fact that we aren’t going to launch a movement doesn’t mean that our political work can be without orientation or that we don’t need to build momentum behind our effort. We will still need a rectification campaign at the proper time. Without it some problems may be difficult to solve. (On Opposing Wrong Ideological Tendencies (1981)).
The current general secretary has suggested that as a result of the success of Reform and Opening Up the current challenge is stronger from right rather than from left error. And thus the focus on the great institutional sources of right error (as the current core of leadership sees it)--the Youth League and the rudderless construction of socialist modernization. It offers political theory and the great project of Chinese national rejuvenation as a rectification. And it offers up an intensification of democratic centralism around a rigidly hierarchical CPC model as an institutional and systemic rectification of the right tendencies of collective leadership. And, indeed, to some extent, core CPC leaders have suggested that now is the time for such an intensified rectification campaign.
The trip to Yen'an could not have signaled that intention any more loudly (see here). But in the process, Deng's warnings should remain as fresh in the New Era and it was in the era of Reform and Opening Up. But it might be worth remembering, especially in the most ratified heights of responsibility, that there has not been an age where the likelihood that interpretation will be 30% wrong and 70% right will not exist. The CPC cultivates, at its best, a humility in the face of that reality. Whether that cultivation will bear greater fruit in the New Era remains to be seen.
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