Anniversary Gifts for the Russo-Ukraine War; But For Whom?: Decoding 关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场 ["China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis]"

 

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 Anniversaries are usually celebrated with rituals of gift giving; along with moments of performances of sentimental musings, and the performances of those family members and friends notorious for self-destructive behaviors are projected out. This 1st anniversary of the second offensive in the Russo-Ukrainian War (actually close to the 9th anniversary of the Russo-Ukrainian war which commenced with the 1st purported Partition of Ukraine in 2014) is no different.  

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The United States and its allies gifted Ukraine much by way of moral support, assurances, and lots of military and humanitarian goods and services.  That family of course included those eager to participate in the anniversary (the US and the EU's Eastern flank) and those who still have many many many issues to resolve but who can't help sharing them in sometimes clumsy and self destructive ways (the EU's Western flank and elements of the political left and right who either see Russia through backwards looking time tunnel or think themselves able to convert their own empire into some sort of self sustaining self-referencing bunker). But the bigger gift--the United States is returning Ukraine to Europe--whether the ancient European elites who still insert themselves in and through the vast spaces of a once mightier construct like it or not.

The Russians, in an act of self love, gifted themselves an even greater loosening of formal communal restraints (eg self-restraining nuclear treaties) and performed a commitment ceremony of sorts rededicating the nation (or at least its leaders) to the task of the total consumption of Ukraine. They have also gifted themselves greater solidarity with like minded states on the same level of global dominance--Iran, for example--and cultvated smaller states in key areas, or at least influential personalities there--Nicaragua and the ALBA region, Berlusconi and his crowd, and the gentleman who holds high office in Hungary. Self-gifting, then, can be as pleasurable for the core of Russian state leadership as pleasuring others. And yet there was a gift to Ukraine as well--the gift of nationality, now forged in blood. More than anything else the events since 2014 has done more than anything to forge a modern Ukrainian nation-state.

Criminality is a gift that is paid back many fold. That was the gift that Ukraine gave to Russia to mark this anniversary--the gift of knowing that Russians who perpetrated criminal acts will be punished in this world or in the next.

Almost everyone has at least one contact in their phone who will never pick up the phone again. . . We will not erase their names from the phone or from our own memory. We will never forget them. We will never forgive that. We will never rest until the Russian murderers face deserved punishment. The punishment of the International Tribunal. The judgment of God. Of our warriors. Or all of them together. (Zelenskyy Speech 24 February 2023); and here)

And in the process Ukraine has gifted the world a clearer structure not just for identfying but for preparing cases for trials--joining together state elements, civilians, and a broad spectrum of civil society. 

Now the Chinese have delivered their gift as well.  In the form of the 关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场 ["China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" uploaded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs foreign language website  and available in the original Chinese. This ast is especially interesting. It serves as a concrete application of Chinese efforts to reboot a new operating system as the means for running international law and relations "software." (discussed here:Attacking From the Flanks--One Can Attain Victory By Rebooting the Operating Systems of the International Order!: China's "The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper" [全球安全倡议概念文件]). More than anything else, this new OS would hard wire the structures of post-global empire onto the operational style of international institutions, re-framing their objectives and their relations to states--formally equal, but functionally differentiated in accordance with their power-rank. It represents a critical application of the theoretical foundations of Chinese internationalism applied to a difficult problem of managing national dependencies within a post-global order but in ways that do not threaten an oppositional equal with a set of their own first and second tier dependencies to manage and protect. Gone is the operational language of the 19th-20th centuries and the ugliness of territorial partition and criminality; in its place a security driven international order in which  security binaries are embedded in more complicated systems of vertically tiered dependencies. Within this framework sovereignty is re-invented, and fractured, and inter-governmentality is centered within the structures of the international order--the place where equals and their dependents may meet to facilitate workable relations. None of this is inherently bad, but it does work to enhance  the Chinese position in the world, at least as to its form and the timing of its release. 

Mr. Zelenskyy remains sensitive to Chinese overtures. There are a number of possible reasons.  Two he has made clear.  The first is to attempt to align any Chinese peace plan structure with those of his own 10 Point Peace Plan announced November 2022. There are a number of places where the two plans overlap. 

"The plan calls for: (1) Radiation and nuclear safety, focusing on restoring safety around Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine, which is now-Russian occupied; (2) Food security, including protecting and ensuring Ukraine’s grain exports to the world’s poorest nations; (3) 3. Energy security, with focus on price restrictions on Russian energy resources, as well as aiding Ukraine with restoring its power infrastructure, half of which has been damaged by Russian attacks; (4) Release of all prisoners and deportees, including war prisoners and children deported to Russia; (5) 5. Restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Russia reaffirming it according to the UN Charter, which Zelenskyy said is “not up to negotiations”; (6) Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, restoration of Ukraine’s state borders with Russia; (7) Justice, including the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes; (8) Prevention of ecocide, need for protection of environment, with focus on de-mining and restoring water treatment facilities; (9) Prevention of escalation of conflict, and building security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including guarantees for Ukraine.; and (10) Confirmation of the war’s end, including a document signed by the involved parties." (Explainer: What is Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan?)

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The second reason is that such an effort at inserting itself in the peace process provides Ukraine an opportunity to speak directly to the Chinese (and  thus indirectly to the Russians). This desire was expressed on the eve of the unveiling of the Chinese Plan ("Answering journalists' questions, Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that he would like to have a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.  "At the level of diplomats, we have conveyed this signal to China. We would like to meet. It is in the interests of Ukraine today," the Head of State summarized." here: The more countries are involved in the implementation of the Peace Formula, the sooner the war in Ukraine will end - Volodymyr Zelenskyy). By 25 February it was reported that Mr Zelenskyy was speaking more directly about the possibility of a meeting with Mr. Xi ("Mr Zelensky did not say when such a meeting might take place but said he believed the talks would be crucial for global security. 'I plan to meet Xi Jinping and believe this will be beneficial for our countries and for security in the world,' he told a news conference in Kyiv on the first anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine." here).

Both the official English translation and the original Chinese versions of the 12 point plan follow below, along with a brief effort to decode it embedded (in red) after each of the twelve points of the peace plan. The issue is not whether the plan is good or bad, but rather the extent to which it may advance Chinese interests and their vision for the recasting of the international order and their place within it.

 

China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis

2023-02-24 09:00

1. Respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community. All parties should jointly uphold the basic norms governing international relations and defend international fairness and justice. Equal and uniform application of international law should be promoted, while double standards must be rejected. 

First, initial sentence, the emphasis is on key terms--(1) UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED international law; and STRICTLY observed. The all caps terms are subject to a variety of meanings including rejecting the applicability of none universally recognized IL and equating strictly with narrowly or precisely.

Second, the focus on sovereignty protection is on the term EFFECTIVELY UPHELD (not fully, equally upheld). It is true that all states are equal members of the international community--but the equality of membership  need not be aligned with the condition of sovereign capacity. This is not a matter of double standards but of the alignment of international relations with the realities of security. None of this, of course, applies to territories that are viewed as integral parts of a state--even if contested. The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper"principle 2.

2. Abandoning the Cold War mentality. The security of a country should not be pursued at the expense of others. The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs. The legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly. There is no simple solution to a complex issue. All parties should, following the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and bearing in mind the long-term peace and stability of the world, help forge a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture. All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent.

This is one of my favorites.  It has become something of a mantra for the Chinese side to equate any effort to disagree or to take measures to protect interests under the disparaging term "cold war mentality." It is thus most useful as a discursive trope and thus finds its way here (as a gateway to the substantial writing under that heading already produced.  It cannot then be read outside of its rich discursive context.  Aftre this it gets more interesting, while regional military bloc should be treated as illegitimate (eg NATO) security cooperation organizations (eg the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) is perfectly unproblematic. The borderlands between security cooperation and military bloc remains myserious--except perhaps as a discursive trope founded on name calling (always effective at some level).Anf that gets to the heart of this proposal--the replacement of current principles of collective security with the Chinese develoepd principle of "common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security". On the one hand it may mean what it implies--an amorphous term. On the other it appears to mean that the sovereignty at the heart of Peace Plan ¶1 must be understood as a function of security in ¶2, and that this security must be understood in context with greater states requiring a greater breathing space (perhaps as a revised form of the  way it put forward by Germany after 1933). And reading ¶1 to exclude claimed territory, security takes on a different hue. Nonetheless this is all sub-text; a well  veiled sub-text to e sure but one that can be better understood in coordinated related documents (eg here: Attacking From the Flanks--One Can Attain Victory By Rebooting the Operating Systems of the International Order!: China's "The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper" [全球安全倡议概念文件]  principle 1, 4).

3. Ceasing hostilities. Conflict and war benefit no one. All parties must stay rational and exercise restraint, avoid fanning the flames and aggravating tensions, and prevent the crisis from deteriorating further or even spiraling out of control. All parties should support Russia and Ukraine in working in the same direction and resuming direct dialogue as quickly as possible, so as to gradually deescalate the situation and ultimately reach a comprehensive ceasefire. 

Everyone loves a good cease fire; people who find themselves in an advantageous position (with respect to the occupation of territory) love cease fires more.  The timing of calls for cease fires--especially when not accompanied by demands that troops pull back to where they were before hostilities commenced suggests a strategic deployment of the device in aid of one party over another. In this case, and because it is well known that Russia is increasingly dependent on China, the call for a cease fire at this point in time, when Russia continues to hold a significant amount of territory, suggests that the line of cease fire will be used as the start and perhaps end point of "negotiations" aimed at territorial concessions (bowing to realities on the ground and rationalized by application of Peace Plan ¶ 2). Armistice lines tend to become permanent even in the absence of final treaty--eg Korea, etc.). The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper"principle 5.

4. Resuming peace talks. Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. All efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be encouraged and supported. The international community should stay committed to the right approach of promoting talks for peace, help parties to the conflict open the door to a political settlement as soon as possible, and create conditions and platforms for the resumption of negotiation. China will continue to play a constructive role in this regard. 

Talk is said to be cheap; in this context it can be quite expensive.  Negotiation has become a complex performative device.  It is a ritualized ceremony of public perception and more veiled discussion away from the public eye around ritual meetings with their own traditions and scripts. But they are also a space within which the fruits of other forms of negotiation performances (also understood in some manifestations as the techniques of later generation warfare) may be inserted as leverage. Thus cease fires and ritual conversations tend to shift the field of battle to less bloody though perhaps not less effective forms. In effect, then, the Chinese concede that war rages on but that its new rationalization is meant to minimize destruction of productive forces (that are the object of all this fighting--preserved in any case for the winner) and permit involvement at the peripheries by others.

5. Resolving the humanitarian crisis. All measures conducive to easing the humanitarian crisis must be encouraged and supported. Humanitarian operations should follow the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and humanitarian issues should not be politicized. The safety of civilians must be effectively protected, and humanitarian corridors should be set up for the evacuation of civilians from conflict zones. Efforts are needed to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant areas, improve humanitarian conditions, and provide rapid, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, with a view to preventing a humanitarian crisis on a larger scale. The UN should be supported in playing a coordinating role in channeling humanitarian aid to conflict zones.

It might be assumed that this provision has its greatest effectiveness before cessation of hostilities. On the other hand its encouragement of population movements suggest again that population displacements in the guise of humanitarian aid can also e effectively used as a means of consolidating territorial adjustment--by getting rd of subversive forces and clearing a path for re-population, especially if this is to occur after the end of fighting. Een more interesting appears to be the reduction in the responsibilities of the occupying power to protect subject populations and their property.  That appears to apply only to some conflicts but not this one. The focus on UN coordination is meant to strip the liberal democratic pro-Ukrainian campt of the ability to drive such efforts by shifting the locus of authority from states and regions to the UN apparatus where all parties may participate-interfere.   The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper"principle 3.

6. Protecting civilians and prisoners of war (POWs). Parties to the conflict should strictly abide by international humanitarian law, avoid attacking civilians or civilian facilities, protect women, children and other victims of the conflict, and respect the basic rights of POWs. China supports the exchange of POWs between Russia and Ukraine, and calls on all parties to create more favorable conditions for this purpose.

Again strictly abide is an ambiguous term  but perhaps well applied in this context--though it is not clear how this aspirational commend (like the others) is to be enforced or monitored.  On the other hand the application of the principle of avoiding attacks on civilians and their property appears to be a means of externalizing Chinese efforts to better manage their Russian dependency towards better behavior.  As one Chinese commentator was reported as saying--the Russian difficulty is to prevent them from acting like nomadic bandits ("游牧啊，天生就喜欢抢劫” nomads are born to like robbery). Beyond that conformity to the rules of war and the Geneva Conventions among oter instruments is always a worthy goal--however those might be interpreted and applied in practice.

7. Keeping nuclear power plants safe. China opposes armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities, and calls on all parties to comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and resolutely avoid man-made nuclear accidents. China supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in playing a constructive role in promoting the safety and security of peaceful nuclear facilities.

It is hard to argue with this proposal; one that also aligns with Mr. Zelenskyy's Peace Plan. But it does leave open the occupation of such plants as long as they are not the object of armed conflict. The issue here is safety not tactical. 

8. Reducing strategic risks. Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed. Nuclear proliferation must be prevented and nuclear crisis avoided. China opposes the research, development and use of chemical and biological weapons by any country under any circumstances.

The interdiction of nuclear, chemical and blogical weapons does require re-statement form time to time, though there has been consensus around its framework for about a century.  The Russians, especially appear to need reminding.  And this may be an indication that they would receive no help from China should some of their leaders wind up being indicted for violation of the basic rules respect nuclear, chemical and biological warfare.  It is a pity that non of this was very much emphasized when the object of Russian tactics were Chechnya, Georgia, or Syria. Yet here the deficiency is shared in greater measure with the Americans in the Bush II, Obama, and Trump administrations whose phlegmatic reaction may become an object of increasing shame in the years to come.

9. Facilitating grain exports. All parties need to implement the Black Sea Grain Initiative signed by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN fully and effectively in a balanced manner, and support the UN in playing an important role in this regard. The cooperation initiative on global food security proposed by China provides a feasible solution to the global food crisis.

Two points here. The first is again the effort to use something positive and innocuous to further advance the Chinese objective of containing  detaching American leadership and its placement in the ecologies of UN organizations where it might be easier to isolate or at least slowly work to erode American leadership (to the extent that the Americans don't do this themselves).   The second is again tied to notions of preserving productive forces. The grain exports create production and distribution chans that may be as easily claimed for the Belt & Road institutions as it might fall back to the modalities of liberal democratic camp management of its production chains.

10. Stopping unilateral sanctions. Unilateral sanctions and maximum pressure cannot solve the issue; they only create new problems. China opposes unilateral sanctions unauthorized by the UN Security Council. Relevant countries should stop abusing unilateral sanctions and “long-arm jurisdiction” against other countries, so as to do their share in deescalating the Ukraine crisis and create conditions for developing countries to grow their economies and better the lives of their people.

This one is simple and to some extent exposes a bit of discursive legerdemain that means to hide a hypocritical contradiction (but all is fair in discursve politics perhaps). For years China has campaigned against the project of American sanctions, even as sanctions stratgeies have become more refined, better targeted, and much more effective. The complaining then is no surprise. What is surprising is the way in which sanctions programs from Chinese adversaries is somehow characterized as different in form and operation from the sort of punitive counter measures that China has become famous for when less powerful states annoy them--Australia, South Korea and the like. It is hard to name one set of reactive positions in furtherance of national interests "sanctions" that are illegitimate because they are unilateral, and find another set of sanctions unobjectionable because they are named something else. Still The rhetorica position is powerful and ancient--ming-ming (明名 intelligent naming)One understands 名(naming) in its semiotic sense--to draw distinctions between objects (resist) and to align them (reconcile), or bian ( 辨) (arguments grounded in the drawing of distinctions) but in a way that rationalizes (明) the distinctions drawn (Guiguzi (鬼谷子), Guiguzi: China’s First Treatise on Rhetoric; A Critical Translation and Commentary (Hui Wu (trans.); Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2016 (before 220 A.D.); Book II.6.1).

11. Keeping industrial and supply chains stable. All parties should earnestly maintain the existing world economic system and oppose using the world economy as a tool or weapon for political purposes. Joint efforts are needed to mitigate the spillovers of the crisis and prevent it from disrupting international cooperation in energy, finance, food trade and transportation and undermining the global economic recovery.

This principle runs parallel to the organizing principles of international law as it relates to conflict.  The object s to preserve productive forces for the victor--either from a solicitude for the individual (rights based liberal democratic ideology) or because of the essential value of productive forces (including people) fr the development of collective stability and prosperity (Marxist-Leninist lens). See here. The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper"principle 6.

12. Promoting post-conflict reconstruction. The international community needs to take measures to support post-conflict reconstruction in conflict zones. China stands ready to provide assistance and play a constructive role in this endeavor.

 This provision is consonant  with current developments and advances them to some extent. But it ought to be read through the lens of the current substantial contest for the control fo the narratives of trade and development waged now in the form of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and the Rules Based International Order framework. Reconstruction is control n the sense of remaking the areas reconstructed in one's own image.  Contests over which institutions lead or influence that reconstruction will have a significant effect on the shapie of the post reconstruction order.

 

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关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场

2023-02-24 09:00

【中大小】

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一、尊重各国主权。公认的国际法，包括联合国宪章宗旨和原则应该得到严格遵守，各国主权、独立和领土完整都应该得到切实保障。国家不分大小、强弱、贫富一律平等，各方要共同维护国际关系基本准则，捍卫国际公平正义。国际法应当得到平等统一适用，不应采取双重标准。

二、摒弃冷战思维。一国的安全不能以损害他国安全为代价，地区安全不能以强化甚至扩张军事集团来保障。各国的合理安全利益和关切都应得到重视和妥善解决。复杂问题没有简单解决办法。应坚持共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观，着眼世界长治久安，推动构建均衡、有效、可持续的欧洲安全架构，反对把本国安全建立在他国不安全的基础之上，防止形成阵营对抗，共同维护亚欧大陆和平稳定。

三、停火止战。冲突战争没有赢家。各方应保持理性和克制，不拱火浇油，不激化矛盾，避免乌克兰危机进一步恶化甚至失控，支持俄乌相向而行，尽快恢复直接对话，逐步推动局势降级缓和，最终达成全面停火。

四、启动和谈。对话谈判是解决乌克兰危机的唯一可行出路。一切有利于和平解决危机的努力都应得到鼓励和支持。国际社会应坚持劝和促谈正确方向，帮助冲突各方尽快打开政治解决危机的大门，为重启谈判创造条件和提供平台。中方愿继续为此发挥建设性作用。

五、解决人道危机。一切有利于缓解人道危机的举措都应得到鼓励和支持。人道主义行动必须遵守中立、公正原则，防止将人道问题政治化。切实保护平民安全，为平民撤离交战区建立人道主义走廊。加大对相关地区的人道主义援助，改善人道主义状况，提供快速、安全、无障碍的人道主义准入，防止出现更大规模人道主义危机。支持联合国在对冲突地区人道援助方面发挥协调作用。

六、保护平民和战俘。冲突当事方应严格遵守国际人道法，避免袭击平民和民用设施，应保护妇女、儿童等冲突受害者，尊重战俘的基本权利。中方支持俄乌交换战俘，各方应为此创造更多有利条件。

七、维护核电站安全。反对武装攻击核电站等和平核设施。呼吁各方遵守核安全公约等国际法，坚决避免出现人为核事故。支持国际原子能机构为促进和平核设施的安全安保发挥建设性作用。

八、减少战略风险。核武器用不得，核战争打不得。应反对使用或威胁使用核武器。防止核扩散，避免出现核危机。反对任何国家在任何情况下研发、使用生化武器。

九、保障粮食外运。各方应均衡全面有效执行俄罗斯、土耳其、乌克兰和联合国签署的黑海粮食运输协议，支持联合国为此发挥重要作用。中方提出的国际粮食安全合作倡议为解决全球粮食危机提供了可行方案。

十、停止单边制裁。单边制裁、极限施压不仅解决不了问题，而且会制造出新的问题。反对任何未经安理会授权的单边制裁。有关国家应停止对他国滥用单边制裁和“长臂管辖”，为乌克兰危机降温发挥作用，也为发展中国家发展经济和改善民生创造条件。

十一、确保产业链供应链稳定。各方应切实维护现有世界经济体系，反对把世界经济政治化、工具化、武器化。共同减缓危机外溢影响，防止国际能源、金融、粮贸、运输等合作受到干扰，损害全球经济复苏。

十二、推动战后重建。国际社会应采取措施支持冲突地区战后重建。中方愿为此提供协助并发挥建设性作用。