Tong Zhiwei [童之伟] is today one of the most distinguished scholars of Chinese constitutional law. Based for many years at East China University of Political Science and Law, he has taught in a number of universities and has been prominent, as well as courageous, in his scholarship and engagement with his political community, and with colleagues worldwide. Over the course of the years I have translated and shared many of his short essays posted online (see here).
Professor Tong has recently produced a quite interesting and important essay, 法学基本研究对象与核心范畴再思考——基于宪法视角的研究 [Tong Zhiwei: Rethinking the Basic Research Objects and Core Categories of Law——Research From a Constitutional perspective], which appeared online in Aisiaxiang on 26 September 2022. The abstract nicely frames its object--the application of principles of socialist modernization to the reinvigoration of the framework within which Chinese constitutional jurisprudence might be better aligned with the times and the realities of this "New Era" :
[内容摘要]现代汉语法学的核心话语形成于20世纪前期，一百多年来并无明显变化。基本研究对象、核心范畴设定与当代中国法律实践错位，是当今法学基础性研究要解决的首要课题。汉语法学应以权为基本研究对象，采用绝对方法形成以法权为核心的基本范畴体系。汉语法学基础理论应通过重置核心话语来获取现代性、本土性和对当代法律实践的适应性。[[Abstract] The core discourse of modern Chinese jurisprudence was formed in the early 20th century, and has not changed significantly for more than a hundred years. The dislocation between basic research objects, core category setting and contemporary Chinese legal practice is the primary topic to be solved in today's basic legal research. Chinese jurisprudence should take rights as the basic research object, and adopt absolute methods to form a basic category system with legal rights as the core. The basic theory of Chinese jurisprudence should acquire modernity, locality and adaptability to contemporary legal practice by resetting the core discourse.]
This rethinking about the way one rationalizes Chinese jurisprudence (in a sense a rationalization of the structures for rationalizing specific fields of knowledge) provides a refreshingly new way to approach the now sometimes ritualized discourse of rights, duties, power, and the like that has had academics and others running around in circles for a century or so. To be sure the performance of circle running has been quite useful for managing orthodoxy, and preserving, perhaps even moving the field in some direction or other. Yet, as Tong suggests in the case of China it is one that has grown increasingly detached from the reality about which it ostensibly claims a relation. At the same time, there is much here that suggests that the easy stance of current popular critical movements (of the so-called left or right camps) in their own discursive circle running around the critique of liberal rights, might neither be as useful or relevant as it might appear. The missing link, though, is ideology, and it comes at no surprise that ideology is itself an instrument of orthodoxy and the demonization of heresy. The discussion of legal transplantation is particularly useful in two respects, The first touches on the effects of transplantation of transplants (in this case the already digested receipt of European jurisprudence filtered through its development in Japan). The second, in the more abstract transplantation of grounding ideology--especially in the discourse that marks the porous borderlands between Marxist-Leninist and liberal democratic transplants onto Chinese jurisprudence. Lastly, the consideration of a three part basic jurisprudential typology--(1) traditional rights; (2) power and jurisdiction; and (3) residual rights (positive and negative)--provides a rich basis for considering the possibilities of jurisprudential development in China.
It is my great pleasure, with Professor Tong's assent, to post both the original and a crude English translation. In that context I note that a critical term used through out the text “权力” , and translated as power, might well be understood in a more subtle and complex sense as incorporating a cluster of related terms in English--including authority, jurisdiction, commission, as well as the extent or scope of each.
童之伟：
法学基本研究对象与核心范畴再思考——基于宪法视角的研究
原载于 《法学》第9期
[内容摘要]现代汉语法学的核心话语形成于20世纪前期，一百多年来并无明显变化。基本研究对象、核心范畴设定与当代中国法律实践错位，是当今法学基础性研究要解决的首要课题。汉语法学应以权为基本研究对象，采用绝对方法形成以法权为核心的基本范畴体系。汉语法学基础理论应通过重置核心话语来获取现代性、本土性和对当代法律实践的适应性。
[关键词]宪法 权利 权力 法权 权
科学哲学中以研究理论体系著称的A.N.怀德海教授有句名言:“所有以其陈述的真实性为基础的人类话语都必须以事实为根据。它的任何分支都不能主张对这一规则的豁免权。”[[1]]他所谓“人类话语”指的是科学，而“事实”则是指具体学科的基本研究对象。当代中国法学应以什么为基本研究对象和相应核心范畴？对上述问题，我国法学界可谓自20世纪初年以来就一直众说纷纭、莫衷一是。对这个话题以及相关问题，笔者一度做过些研究，近年来又有些新思考，现试在其他学者和本人已有论述的基础上再次撰文表达些看法。本文所说的中国当代法律实践，主要指以宪法为基础的当代中国法律制度及其实施过程。为表述方便，本文通常将法学基本研究对象和核心范畴统称为法学核心话语。
一、汉语法学核心话语设定历程的简要回顾
探寻汉语法学设定基本研究对象和核心范畴之简史的直接目的，在于促进与当代中国的法律实践更相适应的法的基础性理论的形成。这要求研究者置身当代中国的法律实践，既尊重传统，又努力超越百年前形成的基础性法学教科书等“本本”及其选择的基本研究对象、核心范畴乃至相关的基础性命题。如果要确定汉语法学基础理论的平均研究水准，大体上可选择当时出版的高等法学院校的法理学教科书为讨论样本。因为，正如科学哲学家托马斯.库恩所言，“不论是外行还是科学家，他们的科学知识都得自于教科书和源于教科书的少数其他几类文献”；“每次在革命的背景下重建历史的开端，这种重建通常由革命后的科学教科书加以完成。”教科书的作用，“在于使学生迅速熟悉那些当代科学共同体认为他们已知道的东西。”[[2]]基于这种认识，本文在讨论法的基础性理论问题时，往往会选择当时主流的教科书为剖析对象。为了实事求是地评估汉语法学基础性理论与当代中国法律实践的适应水平并改善前者对后者的适应状况，我们不能不考察已知的法学基本研究对象和核心范畴选择同与其相对应的中国法律实践的适应状况。
（一）外语法学对汉语法学核心话语选择的影响
法的基础性理论的基本状况首先反映在其选择的基本研究对象和核心范畴上。18世纪末至20世纪30年代前后这一百多年间，世界上的先进国家大体都处于被人们称为自由资本主义的发展阶段，其经济特征主要是强调财产私有、自由竞争、小政府，国家机构只做“夜警”，国家权力基本不在生产、流通、分配、消费等经济环节发挥作用。那个时代的西语法学家，虽然也关注国家、国家机构和它们的法律表现权力（power）以及相应的义务（duty，obligation）,但不是重点，他们的关注重点主要是个人（自然人、法人）的权利（right）义务。这与罗马法对欧洲的影响主要局限于私法领域也有一定的关系。在对英美法德荷五国18-19世纪法学家著作的较广泛比较阅读中，笔者没有发现任何一位法学家明显忽视权力，也没有发现哪一位法学家将包括国家机构职权、权限、公共职能在内的权力刻意全部解说为权利的著作。因此，当代汉语权利义务法学将权力纳入权利概念的做法的根源，不一定适合在西语法学中去寻找。易言之，不能因为日语近现代法学源于欧洲，汉语现代法学受日语法学影响最深，就想当然地将与日语法学相联系的汉语法学的缺憾，看成归根结底源于西语法学的东西。要厘清相关问题，需要我们根据日语法学的具体情况及其对汉语法学的影响过程做具体分析。
法学史资料表明，19世纪末20世纪初的日本法学著作的情况与欧洲很有些不同，显示出了足够多样性。有的学者的著作总体看能够从法学角度平行看待权利、权力，如加藤弘之。加藤氏后期不仅正视权力，而且将权力看得比权利更重要、更有决定性意义，进而提倡“權力競爭”、优胜劣败。[[3]]但是，从总体情况看，日语法学进入20世纪之后，更多的学者开始看好以权利义务为法学基本研究对象和核心范畴，从权利义务角度解释各种法现象的安排。这种安排在权利义务两者之间大体上是以权利为主角、义务为配角的。所以，20世纪初日语法学的主流部分内部虽不十分自洽，但实际上形成了一个可称为权利义务法学的流派，其中直接影响了汉语法学的有代表性学者是梅谦次郎、穂積陳重、冈田朝太郎、[[4]]奥田义人、岡村司、织田万、美浓部达吉等人。日语权利义务法学的基本特征可概括为五点：
1.受欧洲法学影响，以权利为法学基本研究对象。19世纪末20世纪初日本几位有代表性的法律学者写道：“德国人莱布尼茨说：法律之学是权利之学。在西洋诸国，法律和权利大抵使用同一词语。盖法律为权利之外表，权利为法律之内容，二者有内外之别，但其本质同一”；[[5]]“德国人莱布尼茨将法学定义为权利之学问，耶林著书《为权利而斗争》，指明了应当尊重权利的原因。至此，对法学的观念从“正义”转变为了“权利”，自此可见人们的权利思想不断发展”；[[6]]“自德国大家拉伊普尼克以法学为权利之学问，于是权利之观念，遂为法律上最紧要之事”。[[7]]其中，东京大学织田万教授这部被引用的教材在中国有不同年代的汉译版本。持这一学派倾向的学者谈论法的内容时，眼中往往只有权利，基本不提权力，或将权力视为权利的一部分。不过，他们讨论权利时，会相应地讨论义务，但他们不认为义务与权利同样重要。[[8]]
2.大体上平行看待权利和义务的学科地位，以权利义务两者为核心范畴。采用这种做法并直接影响汉语法学的有代表性日本学者当数先后任职东京帝国大学的梅谦次郎、织田万教授及他们编写的教科书，[[9]]其最明显特点是在篇章标题的层次将权利义务相提并论或用权利义务解说法律关系。相对而言，表现出这种学派倾向的日本法学家数量显得最多，奥田义人和更晚一些在汉语法学界很有影响的美浓部达吉的有代表性的基础性法学著作或教材，采用的都是以权利义务为核心范畴的体系。
3.认为法律有不同本位之分，且近现代法律以权利为本位，不以义务为本位。早在19世纪90年代初，穂積陳重就在研究法典的专著中集中讨论了“法典の本位”问题，他把法典的本位区分为“権利本位”、“義務本位”和“行为本位”三种，并认为近代之法律普遍以权利为本位，但少数公法应以义务为本位。[[10]]不少日语法学家认同穂積陳重权利本位的提法，同时也认为以权利为本位的提法与欧洲有些语言中法律和权利两个概念以同一个名词做载体（如德文Recht）有关。[[11]]他们倾向于认为“权利本位”源于德国法学家，而且源头其说不一。不过德文Recht一词，有法律和权利两个含义，具体哪个含义，根据上下文确定，但德文是严格区分权力（Gewalt）和权利（Recht)的，前者不能被视为后者的构成部分。也就是说，德文法学并无后来在日语和汉语权利义务法学中的外延包括权力的“权利”概念。不过，“权利本位”“义务本位”之类提法在日语法学中只是昙花一现，因其内容含混不切实际，到20世纪初就几乎无人再讨论这类话题。
4.认为权力只是权利的具体存在形式，表现为国家机关的职权、权限等，因而不重视乃至忽视权力概念。将权力及其具体表现形式“职权”“权限”等解释为权利的一部分，是日语权利义务法学的突出特点之一。如奥田义人将“警察权”“裁判权”“设官吏以保护人民”之权放入了“权利”范围，[[12]]织田万将“赋课征收租税，科当刑罚”之权放入了“权利”范围，[[13]] 美浓部达吉更是将各级各类国家机关之“权”几乎尽数纳入了“权利”范围。[[14]]像前引梅谦次郎等人一样，岡村司的教材或著作，也是将“統治權”“權力”、国家机关“職權”等明确放进了“權利”的范围。[[15]]
5.重视法律关系概念并从权利义务关系角度阐释法律关系。时任東京帝国大学教授的梅谦次郎称：“法文有时使用法律关系四字，学者尤多使用之。其定义曰：存于或人与或他之人又或物之间权利义务之状态也。在民事诉讼法等谓为权利关系，名异义同。然当云权利，则遗义务之一方，故不如译为法律关系，其义较正。”然后，他又以亲子之间、某人与其钟表之间的关系为例，解说了法律关系，特别说明人“对于物为直接之关系，而对于他人为间接之关系，而对于他人为因物间接之关系，不能谓人与物无法律之关系也。”[[16]]从法文法学引进法律关系概念并从权利义务角度定义和运用之，是日语法学的偏好之一。[[17]]日语法学不少讨论到法律关系的论著在中国汉译出版，直接影响汉语法学。
综合起来看，19世纪末20世纪初的日本，社会发展水平虽落后于欧美，但总体来说处在自由资本主义时期，政府属18-19世纪欧美“夜警”型，没有大规模介入经济过程，因而与公共预算体量及其在国家经济总量中所占比例相联系的权力的总量相对较小，权力在法权结构中所占比例较低。所以，日语权利义务法学相对忽视权力，结构上虽多少有些瑕疵，但还是能够适应那个时期包括其法律实践在内的日本总体社会状况的。
（二）1949年前汉语法学的核心话语选择
不论从派出留学学习法学的人数还是汉译外语法学教材、读物看，中国19纪末20世纪上半叶的法学，主要是以日本学者为师的。上述日语法学不同流派的基本研究对象观和核心范畴选择偏好，都直接影响了20世纪上半叶的汉语法学，以致后者与前者的学派结构高度近似。这种高度近似首先表现为以是否较严格区分权利、权力为界限，可将法学者或其著作都划分成两类。 第一类的共同特点，是严格区分权利与权力。这些学者或著作倾向于认为：权利、权力是两个不同概念，权利概念的外延不包括权力；权利以个人和由个人组成的私的性质的组织为主体，权力以公共机关(其典型表现是国家机关）及其官员为主体，等等。这一类型的学者和著作，把权利、权力放在平等、平行的学科地位展开自己的论述，有代表性的人物主要是杨廷栋和他的著作。[[18]]具第二类学派倾向的法学论著或教科书忽视或不重视权力，把关注重点完全放在权利义务上，并以此为基础形成了与日语权利义务法学对应五方面内容重合度甚高的汉语权利义务法学主张：
1.受欧洲和日本双重影响，选定权利为法学基本研究对象。有学者援引德国学者，谓“法学者，权利之学也”；[[19]]当时主流的法学教材也说，“自德意志学者唱法律为权利之学以来,法学观念之以正义为中心者,一变而以权利为中心,各人之权利思想,因以发达”；[[20]] “Leibniz（今译莱布尼茨——引者）尝谓法学为权利之学，因权利与法律，实有不可分之关系。”[[21]]还有学者直接下结论说：“以法律为权利之规定，(点击此处阅读下一页) 法律学为权利之学，乃现代学者间之通说。”[[22]]此说后来被民国时期的汉语权利义务法学直接继承。
2.以权利义务为法学核心范畴。这是民国时期事实上普遍的做法，当时有代表的提法是：“权利义务之观念，在法学上甚为重要，盖法律之任务，即在规定权利与义务，故现代一般通说，皆以法学为权利义务之学也”。[[23]] 同一时期普遍以权利义务为核心范畴来安排基础性法学教材的内容体系。以中国人为作者的第一本法学通论教材是留日归国学者孟森编写的，该教材很简明，它在章标题层面把“权利及义务”并列，从权利义务角度解说全部法关系。[[24]]民国时期的著名法学家朱采真说：“大概研究法律的人们该很要晓得权利义务的法律观是怎么样吧。这原本是从来的一点常识”。在其所撰写的基础性法学著作的总共22章中，共有6章（7-12）专论权利义务，章标题分别是：权利义务的法律观，权利的类别，义务的类别，权利义务的主体，权利义务的客体，权利的得丧变更和行使。[[25]]其他章标题没有权利义务字样，但大多也是围绕权利、义务展开的，全书三级标题目录中无“权力”一词。20世纪30年代和20世纪40年代另一种流行的基础性法学教材对“权利义务”的安排，类同朱采真的教材，用了一整编8章的篇幅。[[26]]邱汉平是东吴大学法理学教授，他的法理学讲义和正式出版的教材，也是将权利义务平行地放在章的层次做标题和解说全部法律关系的。[[27]]
3.继受了日语法学的“法以权利为本位”的命题。在梁启超1904年接过穂積陳重关于近世各国法律均取权利本位的看法后，民国时期继续论述法的本位问题和权利本位说的论著或教材甚多，尽管日语法学后来完全放弃了他们前辈最初提出的这个论题。朝阳大学法学名师夏勤、郁嶷编写的几种入门型法学教材，从现存版本看都讲到了“权利本位”。稍早他们只是较简单提及，说“现世文明诸国之法律，咸以权利为本位”。他们后来又为此做了大段原理性论说，并认为是“德人Jhering著权利争斗论，首创权利本位之说。”[[28]]夏勤在1946年独自署名出版法学教材时，还以可见其“主张权利本位之激烈”来评说耶林（Jhering），[[29]]尽管这种理解极可能是误解。其他不少学者的著作也对法的本位、权利本位有所论述。[[30]]同其起源地日语法学的权利本位论一样，20世纪上半叶汉语权利义务法学的“权利”也是外延包括权力及其主要具体表现形式职权、权限在内的概念，实际上，它的“权利”从外延和内容看都是法权说证成的法权概念，因而“权利本位”的内容客观上等同于以法权为中心的主张。但由于没有区分权利、权力和法权，这种主张实际上没有意义。
4.视权力（以及它的具体存在形式职权、权限等）为权利的构成部分。这是20世纪汉语法学中占绝对优势的权利概念观和权利义务法学的基本特征之一，前引所有清末和民国时期的法学基础性教材中，除杨廷栋和李景喜禧等少数学者编写的之外，差不多都采用了这种权利概念。这方面最典型的具体做法是将“权利”分为“私权”，将“权力”及其具体存在形式如职权、权限及它们当时的主要表现形式立法权、行政权、司法权都纳入“公权”范围，让其称为“权利”的构成要素。这方面的情形除前引出版物外，还可参见民国著名法学家朱采真的著作和当时颇为流行的法学通俗读物。[[31]]
5.沿用日语法学的法律关系的概念，仍将其解说为权利义务关系。留日学法学回国的孟森率先将“权利义务之关系即为法律关系”作为他所编法学教材第10章第3节的标题。[[32]]东吴大学法学院的法理学讲义甚至将“法律关系”作为它全部16章中的第7章，并按性质、动态、静态分为三节。[[33]]由此我们还是不难想象“法律关系”部分在20世纪上半叶汉语法学中的地位。不过，在20世纪上半叶，有两位法学名家按照他们理解的德国法学传统，一直坚持将法律关系中的公法关系解说为“权力关系”，仅将私法关系解说为权利义务关系，[[34]]但他们的做法没能阻止多数学者像日语权利义务法学那样强说“权力”为“权利”的一部分，进而把法律关系都解说成权利义务关系。
19世纪末至20世纪上半叶，中国社会发展落后于日本，但经济、政治实践和以宪法（临时的和正式的）为基础的法律制度。从社会发展阶段上看，有较多相似性，由国家或政府直接控制的经济资源体量和所占比例不是很大，权力在法权结构中所占比例也不算特别高。而且，或许并非巧合的是，从1908年的《钦定宪法大纲》到1912年的《中华民国临时约法》，直到1947年宪法，其中都有“权利义务”的规定，差别只在于有的上了章标题，有的没上章标题。但是，所有这些宪法性文件，不论是制宪大纲，还是临时宪法和宪法，都没有使用“权力”一词，只有实际上指称权力的“全权”“职权”“政权”“立法权”等名词。从这个角度看，那时汉语法学的基础性出版物中没有“权力”概念是正常、合理的。反之，如果上述法学基础性出版物有“权力”概念并与“权利”并列，尽管在学理上是应该的，但从以宪法为基础的法律制度上看，却是不太合适的。由此我们完全可以理解何以20世纪上半叶的汉语法学一度形成视法学为权利权力之学的萌芽，但终于还是由权利义务法理学居优势地位的格局。
（三）汉语法学传统核心话语在当代的复兴
1978年以后，汉语法学在看待权利、权力、义务及其学科地位的问题上发生了较大的分化。1980年代后，汉语法学不少论著、教材开始改变以权利为基本研究对象、以权利义务为核心范畴的传统定位，出现了将权利、权力（即法定之“权”）或权利、权力、义务三者作为法学最重要研究对象看待，以权利、权力或反映权利权力共同体及其本质属性的“法权”为核心范畴的主张。[[35]]但是，如果确如前文所述，即法的基础理论的平均研究水准是由高等法学院校入门型教科书来体现的，那么可以说，当代汉语法学在基本研究对象、核心范畴乃至相关基础性命题等五个基本方面，与19世纪末20世纪初日语法学和20世纪上半叶汉语法学比较，并无明显变化。我们不妨将20世纪80年代以来四十余年与以上两个法学发展阶段占优势的基础性法学在相同的五个方面做些简单对比。
1.像20世纪中叶前一样，当代汉语法学仍然视权利为法学基本研究对象。近年有学者做了“为什么法学是‘权利之学’而不是‘义务之学’”的设问后，从人民已是权利主体的角度，重新肯定了法学是权利之学的认识。[[36]]对此，另有学者概括了学术会议的集体认识并评价道：在放弃了以 “阶级性”为唯一范畴的法与国家理论后，“‘法学是权利之学’像是被吹响的胜利号角，成为 1988 年响彻全国的科学宣言”；那时，“与会者达成了 ‘法学应该是权利之学’”等共识。[[37]]将法学权利看作法学基本研究对象，汉语法学的主流方面一百多年来没有任何变化。
2.当代汉语法学仍守持着20世纪中叶前以权利义务为法学最基本概念的传统，但有所发挥。有学者认为，1980年代末，“把‘权利义务’确立为中国法学的基本范畴，是中国法理学寻找学术研究逻辑起点最成功的范例，是中国法学历史上的重大突破。”[[38]]从此，在这个逻辑起点上，法理学“找到了自己应该研究的对象，法理学从此走向了科学。这个逻辑起点就是‘权利和义务’这对法学的基本范畴，从它们出发，法学家们建构起现代中国的法理学范畴体系”。还有学者提出，法理专家普遍认为“以权利和义务为基本范畴重构法学理论体系，是新时期法学界亮出的一张明牌”；认为权利义务在“法学经典范畴”中占特殊地位。[[39]]不过，这种确定现代汉语话语核心的时间实际上更早一些，开始发生转折的时间起点应该在19世纪末中国传统的律学向现代法学过渡的那些年，完成转变的时间是20世纪前30-40年。
3.重新提出了“法律以权利为本位”的命题，但结合当代中国实际做了新的、补充性论述。有学者评价道，从1988年起，中国法学经历了从“权利义务”到“权利本位”的转变过程；在当今中国，“一切权力属于人民，人民同时也就成为权利主体，法的本位也就从义务本位转变为权利本位”；“权利本位的理论既深化了对法的本质的认识”，“是法理学从阶级斗争法学中摆脱出来的学术标志”；“权利本位的理论还催生了中国权利学派，这是中国法理学40年发展中唯一可按立场、观点、方法划分而形成的理论学派。”[[40]]另外，在2018年一次全国性法学会议上，“立足历史的视角，多数与会学者对 30 年前 ‘权利本位论’的提出赞不绝口，他们认为，这不仅是法理学历史上的一个传奇，而且也是顺应改革开放大潮、推动中国法制现代化进程的历史性标识”。[[41]]应该说，权利本位的主张和包括法学发展循义务本位到权利本位的规律等理论，是在日语法学提出、后来又放弃了的。20世纪上半叶汉语法学自梁启超开始，继承和推进了日语法学关于法的本位和权利本位的论说，对此早已有学者做过评论。[[42]]不过，20世纪最后十多年复兴的权利义务法学确实丰富了权利本位理论，其中主要是提出并系统论述了“权力来源于权利, 权力服务于权利, 权力应以权利为界限, 权力必须由权利制约”，以及“主张权利本位，反对权力本位”的观点。[[43]]至于这些观点是否站得住脚，另当别论。
4.尽管“权力”在以宪法为基础的中国当代法律制度中近乎占半壁江山，但它在汉语法学中仍然受轻视乃至被忽视。像在20世纪上半叶的中日语权利义务法学中一样，权力在当今全国法学院校通用基础性教科书中被无根无据地放到了“权利”之一部分的位置。我们不妨以我国高等学校当前最常用的法理学教材为例看看这种情况：该教材35万字，分15章，章节目三级标题的目录共10页，但只在最后一章最后一节的倒数第二目才出现了“权力”（“完善权力监督与制约机制”）一词，且全书未见对“权力”做解说、解释，包括它与宪法、法律规定的“职权”、“权限”的关系。在这部教材中，权力及其主要具体法律表现职权、权限，仍然被放在完全脱离我国宪法法律文本的“权利”概念下予以论述。[[44]]同19世纪末和20世纪上半叶的中日语权利义务法学的安排近乎完全一样。
5.当代汉语法学在新的历史条件下接受和发展了20世纪上半叶中日语法学将法律关系解说为权利义务关系，而“权力”及其具体表现形式“职权”“权限”又都被放进了“权利”范围的传统论述。应该看到，这种传统做法在明治宪法和民国时期的宪制性文件下是能合理解释的，而在当今中国则与以宪法为基础的中国法律制度完全脱节。其中的道理，留待下文相关部分言说。据笔者初步统计，过去三十余年里采用这种法律关系论述模式的汉语法学基础性教材种数，占全部同类教材种数的比例，至少高于八成。这应该算是我国法学界众所周知的状况，此处就不做援引、论证了。
以上五点，应可视为复兴后的当代中国权利义务法学（有的学者称为权利法学）的基本特征。它们表明，在20世纪上半叶的汉语法学和近两个世纪一些外语法学（尤其是日语法学）有形或无形的影响下，当代汉语法学的基本研究对象观和核心范畴及相关基础性命题，基本上维持了20世纪上半叶日语权利义务法学和汉语权利义务法学的传统格局。对这个评估，有些学者可能多少会感到有些惊异，但这确实是很难否认的事实。这里，当代汉语权利义务法学与前人的继承与被继承关系很明显，(点击此处阅读下一页) 也很自然。因为，法学学术生产力与经济生产力及其遵循的规律原理上是一样的。对于后者，马克思说过：“人们不能自由选择自己的生产力——这是他们的全部历史的基础，因为任何生产力都是一种既得的力量，是以往的活动的产物。可见，生产力是人们应用能力的结果，但是这种能力本身决定于人们所处的条件，决定于先前已经获得的生产力，决定于在他们以前已经存在、不是由他们创立而是由前一代人创立的社会形式。”[[45]]像经济生产力一样，法学学术生产力也不是短期内能由几个人推动就突飞猛进发展的，得要靠积累。我国1980年代末复兴权利义务法学的主要意义在于衔接和延续了法学在1950年代乃至此前数十年在法学基本研究对象观、核心范畴及相应基础性命题方面已经获得的认知，并尝试着论证了它们在历史新时期的适用性和价值。
时代在进步，1980年代末基本沿用自同一世纪上半叶的汉语法学权利义务核心话语与中国当代法律实践的适应状况如何，很值得研究。下面我们不妨继续讨论。
二、汉语法学传统核心话语与当代法律实践
法学核心话语对于法学研究者来说是自选工具，用起来得心应手就好，完全是每个学者自己的事情。但高等法学院校通用法学基础性教材的确认的核心话语，却是所有法学人都应该关心的公共产品。笔者之所以三十年来特别关注权利义务法学设置的基本研究对象和核心范畴等，最初是因为它们与笔者研究宪法现象时的观察、体验很不一样，后来是自己指导的硕博士生和接触的年轻法律职业人士普遍反映权利义务法学认定的基本研究对象和核心范畴乃至基础性命题与后本科阶段学习、工作严重脱节。事实求是地说，这可能与笔者长期从事宪法学、公法学的教学、研究工作有关，如果换成做民商法学的人，应该不至于有同样的感觉。但无论如何，相信处在宪法学和各个公法学教学研究岗位上的人们能最充分地感受到了逾百岁的权利义务法学对宪法和公法现象缺乏解释力的真实程度。[[46]]这应该是一件好事，因为，感受到不完善才有推动其完善的动力。
传统的汉语权利义务法学教学体系为什么会对宪法和公法现象缺乏必要解释力？笔者以为，最根本原因在于百年来它确定的基本研究对象、核心范畴没能与时俱进及时修正，以致与当代中国法律实践发生了较大程度的错位。为了看清这个道理，我们得对中国学术界常用的权利一词的多重含义做较具体的定位，然后在此基础上查明权利义务法学通常所守持的“权利”到底是哪重意义的权利。概括地看，当代中国学术界是在以下三重意义上使用“权利”一词的。
第一重意义的权利是政治性论著或文献中不时用到的“权利”，如前引“人民同时也就成为权利主体”一语中的“权利”一词。即“人民权利”。这重意义的权利不是法律权利，只是一个推定的政治概念，而法律权利属法律制度的一部分，两者内容有根本差别，必须严格区分开。在古典自然法学派理论家那里，所有个人在自然状态下的全部自然权利，作为整体就是本源意义上典型的“人民权利”。在那个理论体系中，“人民权利”中一部分被委托给一些人或机构，一部分个人自己保留，因而进入政治社会后就转化为法权力和法权利，从而“人民权利”也因此而不复存在。不论中外，本源意义上“人民权利”从来不是一个宪法、法律用语，不是一个可用以讨论严谨法学问题的名词。把法律上、法学上的权利义务关系中的“权利”说成本源意义上“人民权利”，在任何意义上都说不通。不过，需要说明的是，“人民”与“公民”不分，以“人民”一词指称“公民”、国民的情况不适用笔者这个判断。
第二重意义的权利是法权利，在宪法法律（即国内法）范围内它的主体是自然人、法人，不是国家等公共机关，在我国宪法中表述为“权利和自由”。[[47]]所以，权利在任何国家的宪法、法律中都不包括公共权力。国家机关等公共组织披上法人外衣，转变身份进入市场后可以是权利主体，但此时它已不是国家机关而是民事组织。此处国家机关转换为法人充任“权利主体”状态只是过渡性的，不同于纯正的民事主体。其过渡性地变身为民事主体完成市场行为后，会立马回归权力主体的位置。在民主法治国家，有公民资格的自然人享有的各种权利中，只有选举权包含权力的原子，但那仅仅是权力的原子，经法定选举程序后才能提炼出权力。
第三重意义的权利正是传统权利义务法学使用的范围包括权力的外延复合型“权利”。20世纪中叶前的日语法学创造了这种“权利”，后为汉语权利义务法学接纳并视为核心范畴。在20世纪中叶前较典型的日语权利义务法学论著中，这重意义的“权利”概念的指称范围主要包括：（1）人身权、财产权、各种个人自由，即个人权利；（2）国家对个人、臣民之权力，包括各种统治权即国家机关等公共团体的权力及其具体表现形式，如职权、权限等；个人、臣民对国家的权利，如选举权和其他公共事务参与权；（3）有些日语法学入门型教材将“國際權”即作为国际法主体的权利也纳入了其范围。在20世纪上半叶的汉语权利义务法学出版物中，“权利”的含义近似于日语法学，如果说有所不同，那也只是把国家对个人之公权按孙中山五权宪法思想列举为立法权、行政权、司法权等。这重意义的权利概念，是与日本明治宪法和中国民国时期的宪制性法文件相适配的。因为，那个时代两国宪法、宪制性法文件中都没有“权力”一词。当今中国权利义务法学选用的“权利”概念的指称范围与民国时期相同，但不及民国时期清楚明白。在当代汉语的权利义务法学的一些有代表性出版物中，“权利”概念的外延虽然实际上仍包括立法权、行政权、职权、权限等国家机关的权力，但有关作者在论说这种“权利”时似乎由于理不直气不壮而不得不采用了半遮半掩的态度，故读者须细读才能看明白。这种做法在论述法律关系的时候表现较典型。[[48]]
要看清百年来的权利义务法学认定的基本研究对象、核心范畴等与当代中国法律实践发生了较大程度错位的现实，还应知晓一个道理：在任何现代立宪国家，权利与权力在宪法、法律面前都是平等的，没有高下之分。这是起码的现代法律和法学常识。我国保障权利与权力在法律面前平等的制度首先体现在宪法序言最后自然段、宪法的法治条款和宪法监督条款中，还有合法性审查制度和行政诉讼制度。这个问题之所以提出来，是因为许多年来有一些诸如以权利为本位的不切实际的华而不实说法，妨碍了人们获得正确的宪法法律意识。按后一种说法，似乎权力与权利冲突，权力就应该退让、服从和服务于权利保障的需要。这是背离法治原则和正常立宪国家法律制度的虚假说法。能确认和实现权利与权力平等和平衡，就是理想的法治愿景了。
在澄清了以上两方面的学理问题后，我们再看以权利为基本研究对象和以权利义务为法学核心范畴的安排与当代中国法律实践错位情况就清楚多了。这种类型的错位的首要表现，是权利义务法学自日语法学引进时起直到当代，百年来一直在上述三重意义上交替使用“权利”一词。所以，不论作为基本研究对象还是核心范畴，权利的含义在权利义务法学中从来都是飘忽不定，经常按论者临时需要悄然相互调换的。前述三重意义上的“权利”实际上是三个不同的分析单元，构成前引A.N.怀德海所说的三种“事实”，其性质属于三个概念共一个汉语载体（“权利”）。这是汉语法学遇到的特殊状况，严格地说是一种缺憾，法学者原本应在严格区分并详细阐明它们不同含义的前提下加以克服。可能的办法包括像当代日语法学那样放弃权利权力统一体意义上的“权利”概念，也可以像笔者一直主张的那样，将权利权力统一体称为“法权”，同时在与我国宪法、法律接轨的意义上使用权利概念。最不合适的选择是利用这种缺憾，在一个汉语名词（“权利”）的“屋顶”下让实际上不一样的三个概念悄然进进出出彼此替换。因为，这样做的性质，其实是刻意利用汉语“权利”一词的多义性偷换概念做无意义的文字游戏以维持某些百年未变的命题在形式上不倒。
其次，错位还表现在百年前形成的权利义务法学中那个范围包括权力的外延复合型“权利”概念，很大程度上脱离了以宪法为基础的当代中国法律制度及其实施过程。这种理论与实践错位的状况现在到了到了在法学核心话语层次做出新安排的时候了。在这方面，1947年后日语法学随日本宪法改革而自我调整的做法值得中国学者参考借鉴。前文说过，日本明治宪法没有“权力”一词，那时的法学把按学理标准属于权力组成部分的职权、权限作为权利的构成部分，有可以理解的一面。但是，这种情况在权力概念已于1947年载入日本宪法并取得重要地位后，情况就不同了。1947年生效的《日本国宪法》在序言和关于“国会是国家的最高权力机关”，众议院在过渡期行使国会权力的第41条、第101条，都对“权力”做了规定。其中序言第一自然段的“权力”一词，所处宪法地位极为显要：“国政源于国民的严肃信托，其权威来自国民，其权力由国民的代表行使，其福利由国民享受。这是人类普遍的原理，本宪法即以此原理为根据。凡与此相反的一切宪法、法令和诏敕，我们均将排除之。”[[49]]此条可谓日本宪法中的宪法，“权力”作为这一条的重要内容，其地位异常突出。大量日语法学资料显示，1947年《日本国宪法》施行后各个时期的日语法学入门型教材，一改往例，至少从1960年代起，已近乎完全放弃了权利义务法学和将权力视为权利内容之一的“权利”概念。甚至传统权利义务法学赖以立足的“法律关系”解说模式总体上也近乎消失了。[[50]]与此同时，“权力”（如“権力分立”“権力と権威”」）也开始进入入门型法学教材的章标题、节标题。[[51]]
或许很少有学者注意，从1949年起，“权力”在中国宪法、法律中的地位的变化十分近似于日本。文献资料显示，在1949年9月前中国有过的各种临时宪法、宪法等宪制性法文献中，都没有出现过“权力”一词。就事实而言，中国共产党领导制定的法律中最先采用“权力”概念的是第一届全国政协1949年9月27日通过的《中央人民政府组织法》第3条，该条授权全国政协在召开全国人大前，选举中央人民政府成员“并付之以行使国家权力的职权”。[[52]]这个规定实际上从法律上阐明了“国家权力”与“职权”及与其相联系的权限之间的统属关系。随后采用“权力”的是起临时宪法作用的1949年9月29日通过的《中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领》。该纲领第13条第2款规定：在普选的全国人大召开前，由政协全体会议执行全国人大的职权，选举中央人民政府委员会，“并付之以行使国家权力的职权。”1954年《宪法》第2条第1款“中华人民共和国的一切权力属于人民。人民行使权力的机关是全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会”的规定进一步提升了“权力”的地位。这部宪法明确了国家“一切权力”“国家权力”法学上的“权力”在指称对象上的等同关系，以及它们与同一部宪法规定的职权、权限之间的统属关系。从那时起直到现在，尽管时代不同，宪法经历了多次全面修改和局部修改，但这些宪法中的权力概念与中国法律生活乃至社会生活中的“权力”一词之间的关系，一直是稳定和协调一致的，错位的仅仅是沿袭上世纪初旧说的权利义务法学。
在以宪法为基础的当代中国法律制度中，权力的地位集中体现在中国现行《宪法》序言第五自然段和第2条的下列规定中：“中国人民掌握了国家的权力，成为国家的主人。”“中华人民共和国的一切权力属于人民。/人民行使国家权力的机关是全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会。”其中，“国家的权力”“国家权力”、国家“一切权力”，(点击此处阅读下一页) 以及将这些规定具体化的《宪法》第三章规定的国家机构“职权”“权限”等的法学表现，就是“权力”概念。所以，当代中国法学绝对不应该继续像19世纪末、20世纪上半叶的日语和汉语权利义务法学对待没有宪法地位的“权力”那样，将其遮遮掩掩、半明半暗地放在以公民、自然人、法人为主体的“权利”概念的“屋顶”下。法学上必须有独立的“权力”概念反映和表述宪法法律中的权力及其具体存在形式，这是十分自然的逻辑和天经地义的道理，实在没必要反复申论。由此观之，忽视以宪法为基础的中国当代法律制度中的权力，片面地以“权利”为法学基本研究对象和以权利或权利义务为法学核心范畴的定位，与以宪法为基础的中国当代法律制度在很大程度上格格不入，与中国当代法律实践错位幅度甚大，应该予以修正。
再次，将法学基本研究对象定位于权利和将权利或权利义务认定为核心范畴，排斥权力，其做法也与当代世界范围的经济政治现状脱节。19世纪和20世纪前期的欧美、日本经济，在所有权结构上也是以私人财产所有权为基础的，但国家很少干预经济生活。20世纪初期及此前的中国经济发展虽大大落后于欧美、日本，但在国家很少干预经济生活方面情况是差不多的。与此相联系，以公共财产为物质支撑的权力的体量和在法权结构中所占的比重自然都比较少，因而在法学上被放置在“权利”的名称下，尽管不甚合理，但不合理程度较低，不太引人注目。20世纪中叶以来，欧美日政府以国家补助、福利国家甚至国家持股等形式大规模干预经济生活，权力的体量和在法权结构中的比例都大幅增高。这种情况在法律制度上的典型表现，就是权力大幅度扩展和53一词进入宪法的重要条款，在法学上的表现是权力成为与权利平行的基本概念。
其实，西语法学一直在适应着1930年代之后法律生活中权力体量和权力在法权结构中所占比例大幅度上升的变化，这点在分析实证主义法学的代表人物的著作中有典型的表现。在W.N.霍菲尔德（1879-1918）的著作中，权利与权力的关系是比较含糊的，甚至有将权力视为权利一部分的倾向。但这种情况到H.凯尔森（1881—1973）那里就很不相同了。凯尔森虽然也谈权利义务，但他把权力看做国家主权的国内法表现，看作创造、适用法律规范和决定其效力范围的力量，认为权力是法律秩序后面的支柱。[[53]]他显然是把权力放在与权利平行的学科地位加以讨论的。到J.拉兹（1939-2022），情况就完全不同了，他关注、讨论权力的力度已经总体上超过了关注、讨论权利的力度。过去西语法学只谈论基本权利，罕见基本权力的提法，但拉兹特别重视基本权力概念。他认为这个概念是凯尔森提出来的，专指第一次制定宪法的权力。[[54]]但拉兹常态化地将权力分为基本权力（basic powers ）与其他权力并基于这种分类讨论权力，显然是试图提升一部分权力对权利的相对学科地位，以实现权力与权利分类的对称和平衡。无论如何，在其主要以研究分析实证主义法学有代表性人物的学说的著作中，从奥斯丁、霍菲尔德到凯尔森，相对于权利而言，拉兹更多地讨论了他们对权力的论述。而且，他也努力区分权利和权力，把两者看成独立平行的的概念并且分别与义务相对应。[[55]]拉兹生前出版的最后一本著作表明，他谈论权力的频率明显超越了讨论权利，而且有讨论权力的专章却没有任何一章的标题中出现权利（right）一词。在标题为“规范性权力”（normative power）的专章中，拉兹分析了作为改变规范条件的能力的几种规范性权力，对并非因果关系导致的规范变化的行为所拥有的广义规范性权力与狭义规范性权力做了区分。不过，这一章主要论述的是狭义规范权力。 他将规范性权力分为基本规范性权力和被束缚规范性权力，前者是基本的、原始的权力，简称基本权力，后者是非基本的、被决定的权力，简称受束缚权力(chained powers)。[[56]]不过，在拉兹的话语体系中，“权力是指实现改变或防止改变发生的能力”，因此，他顺理成章地“将规范性权力定义为一种改变或防止规范条件发生改变的权力”。[[57]]他的权力和规范性权力的定义有点儿脱离他自己所崇尚的法律规范（或其他学者所说的法律规则、法律条文），范围略显宽泛，因而只能供汉语法学在形成或完善自己的话语体系时参考。
20世纪中叶后中国进入社会主义发展阶段，一度实行较单纯的生产资料公有制甚至“一大二公”，在宪法确认我国当前处在并将长期处在社会主义初级阶段后，也是公有制为主体的多种经济成分并存。这些都决定了我国法律制度中权力总量会比较大，权力在法权结构中所占的比例会比在资本主义法律制度下更高。这些应该都是我们在日常生活中每日到处都能感受得到的事实，也是在当代中国做法学不能不接的“地气”。面对上述情况，在百年前的学术框架内回避或忽视权力，在法律实践上不利于权力监督和制约，在理论上逻辑上问题更多，这点上文已有所论说，此处不再赘述。
无论如何，权力是当代中国以宪法为基础的法律制度和法律实践中理论、逻辑地位与权利平行，实际地位和经济政治功能甚至比权利显得更为突出的客观事实。法学基本研究对象和核心范畴定位应该既与本国以宪法为基础的法律制度相适应，亦应有助于实现权利与权力的相对平衡。
三、汉语法学核心话语应然的选择依据和选择范围
法的一般理论的核心话语的形成依据，从总体上应该是其所处国家和时代以宪法为基础的法律制度及其实施状况，即一国当代的法律实践，前者应该是对后者的理论反映。不过，这种理论的“反映”不是对一国法律实践的摄影、照相，而应是研究者参考历史的和外部的情况，按融洽（包括自洽）的要求经过理性修正后的图像。如果对这个前提能有大体上的共识，那么我们可以说，汉语法学选择核心话语应主要依据以宪法为基础的当代中国法律制度及其实施过程中三方面的基本内容和基本情况：
1.“权利”的确认和保障，构成中国全部法律制度的大约半壁江山。“权利”在当代中国的制度化集中表现是宪法关于公民基本权利的的文字和条款。我国《宪法》保障公民基本权利的规定和条款范围包括：（1）《宪法》序言和总纲对于公民的地位的规定，公民的合法的私有财产不受侵犯、保护公民的私有财产权和继承权的规定，顾及个人利益、在发展生产的基础上，逐步改善人民的物质生活和文化生活的规定，以及公民“有权”做什么的规定等。（2）《宪法》题为“公民的基本权利和义务”的整个第2章，从第33条至第56条总共24条规定的内容。其中第33条第1款对“公民”一词所下定义，实为确认权利的基本主体，第33条其余各款和从第34条到第56条的全部条款，都是确认公民基本权利和享有基本权利的同时应该履行的相关义务的规定。（3）《宪法》第3章直接涉及个人权利保障的个别条款，如《宪法》第130条关于案件公开审理和“被告人有权获得辩护”的规定。宪法的这些结构性要素是包括保障公民各种基本权利的宪法相关法和民法典在内的全部法律保障制度的根据和基础，具体涉及自然人、法人的权利、自由、正当个人特权和个人豁免等广泛的方面。
2.“权力”授予、运行和监督、制约，构成中国全部法律制度的另外大约半壁江山。“权力”在当代中国的制度化集中表现，是《宪法》关于国家权力、国家机构职权、权限的规定，包括：（1）《宪法》“序言”和“总纲”对于国家、国家指导思想、根本任务、国家权力归属、国家性质、国家机构组织和活动原则和国家应遵循的其他各种原则的规定，实际上都是针对权力的规定。因此，国家、国家性质、国家根本任务、国家机构组织和活动原则，相应地就是权力、权力性质、权力根本任务、行使权力的机构的组织和活动原则，可类推。（2）《宪法》总纲对于国家、国家机关可以做的事情的规定，《宪法》第3章“国家机构”从第57条到第140条的全部条款，其中“国家机构”是各个权力主体的统称，各国家机关的职权、权限是权力的具体存在形式，行使职权、权限的程序即运用权力的程序；（3）《宪法》第4章规定“国旗、国歌、国徽、首都”，其中国旗、国歌、国徽是关于权力象征的规定，首都是关于行使最高权力的机关的设置地点的规定。宪法的这些结构性要素，是包括各种国家机关组织法、港澳基本法在内的所有确认权力，规范、制约、监督权力及其具体表现形式——职权、权限、正当公职特权、公职豁免的全部法律制度的根据和基础，后者只是前者的具体化。
3.“剩余权”是法律之外的行为规则确认或承认的权利，如人们常说的道德权利、道德权力、一般民间社团章程确认的权利或其内部组织机构的“职权”等等。制宪、释宪、立法、释法、执法、司法等国家机关行为都考虑乃至决定法的权利、权力与它们的边界划分，还希望对它的存在形式和功能有所引导。不论对于法律还是法学，它们都是不能被忽视的社会存在。它们表现为“权”减去权利权力或法权之后的剩余部分，所以笔者称其为“剩余权”。它直接是法学的基本研究对象不可缺少的组成部分，但它与以宪法为基础的法律制度的关系是间接的、处在法律规范体系直接调整的范围之外。
基于以上三方面基本事实，遵循任何科学学科都有的将基本研究对象尽可能单纯化同时又全覆盖的要求，法学一般理论研究在确定基本研究对象时必须将“权”与对应义务区分开来并选取“权”为基本研究对象，“权”包括法定之“权”和剩余权。当代汉语法学如此确定的中国社会实践中的“权”，正相当于A.N.怀德海在科学哲学意义上论述的“事实”。各种各样的“权”在当代汉语法学中的地位恰如马克思政治经济学中“庞大的商品堆积”和作为“财富的元素形式”的“单个的商品”。因此，就像《资本论》开门见山在第一句话末尾宣告“我们的研究就从分析商品开始”一样，[[58]]从事汉语法学一般理论研究的学者也应理直气壮地向读者交底：法学的基本研究对象是“权”，我们的研究应从分析“权”开始。“权”作为一个整体，由“权利”“权力”“剩余权”三种现象构成，所以，从分析“权”开始，就是从分析“权利”“权力”“剩余权”构成的“权”的完整表象开始，其学科地位相当于马克思《资本论》中的“商品”。“权利”“权力”“剩余权”是“权”的三种存在形式，指称它们四者的四个法学基本概念实际上穷尽了一国全部利益内容、财产内容及其在法内法外规范体系中的全部表现形式。法权只是权的内部构成要素权利权力的组合体。
根据以上认识，笔者在 20 世纪末提出了一个“5+1+1”共七个概念组成的汉语法学基本范畴体系。其中“5”指权利、权力、法权、剩余权、权共五个概念，[[59]]它们的指称对象既在整体上，也可个别地或通过组合穷尽中外今古全部利益、财产和它们在全部法内法外规则中的表现；第一个“1”指义务，它的指称对象是去“权”及其各种存在形式对称的负利益、负值财产及其全部法内法外表现；第二个“1”指法（或法律），它指承载并在其中分配“5+1”全部正负利益内容、财产内容及其法内法外表现形式的“筐”。[[60]]当时，郭道晖先生对上述问题发表了两点看法：第一，把作为权利权力统一体的“法权”定义为“法定之权”有道理，但似嫌狭窄，应解释为“法的权利、权力”；第二，整个法学不能只限于权利，还应包括权力。他赞同并且认为应当强调权力范畴在法理学中应有的重要地位并专门加以研究。[[61]]我认同郭先生关于思考不应限于“法律所定的权利、权力”的意见，引入“权”的概念正好能解决他提出的应将法外权利、权力纳入法学基本范畴体系的问题。这样，法学就从正反两个方面形成了对中外今古的利益、财产及其在社会规则体系中的表现形式做全面法学分析奠定了可靠基础。(点击此处阅读下一页)
所以，基于唯物史观，当代汉语法学的核心话语应当从如此选取的基础性法现象的上述六个分析单元的范围内确定。权利、权力、法权、剩余权和义务之所以被称为基础性法现象，是因为其中前五个单元的法现象穷尽了一国或一社会的各种利益进而各种财产的全部法律表现，而“义务”则穷尽了相应范围内的全部各种负利益、进而各种负值财产的全部法律表现。[[62]]将全部基础性法现象划分为单元，是因为它们只是“权”和对应“义务”的构成要素的不同范围的组合，如权是法权和剩余权的组合，法权是权利和权力的组合等，义务也一样。这是实践法学对所有法现象及其相互关系做利益分析和财产分析的技术性安排。
四、结论
一国基础性法学的研究是不平衡的，但高等法学院校基础性法学教科书能反映其平均水平。按这个标准，今天我国法学的基础理论依旧如百年前一样奉权利或权利义务为法学基本研究对象，将权利义务作为法学核心范畴。这种状况到了该有所改善的时候了。马克思在谈到经济范畴时说过：它们只不过是生产的社会关系的理论表现，“这些观念、范畴也同它们所表现的关系一样，不是永恒的。它们是历史的、暂时的产物。”[[63]]所以，“每个原理都有其出现的世纪。例如，权威原理出现在11世纪，个人主义原理出现在18世纪。因而不是原理属于世纪，而是世纪属于原理。”[[64]]以上道理，应该同样适用于法学，因此，今天我们完全可以说：权利义务原理出现在18世纪；18、19世纪属于权利或权利义务原理；权利义务原理早在20世纪上半叶前就整体性告别了属于它的自由资本主义时代。所以，汉语法学要走向现代化，实现与当代中国法律实践接轨，必须以调整对基本研究对象的认识为前提，重置法学核心范畴和重新表述相关基础性命题。具体说来，当代汉语法学应完成以下几个转变。
1.将“权”选定为基本研究对象，视法学为“权”的学问，从而把“权力”和剩余权都纳入基本研究对象的范围。传统汉语法学停留在欧美18、19世纪、落后于时代的集中表现，就在于从基本范畴体系上结构性地忽视权力、排除权力。只要将权力纳入法学基本研究对象的范围，放在与权利平行的位置，法学现代化就大体解决了展开研究的前提和基础问题。因为，“权”的内部结构虽分为权利、权力、剩余权，但毕竟权利、权力是基本的、起决定性作用的部分。当代中国不同于20世纪中叶之前各国的最基本情况，是经济上以生产资料公有制为主体、多种经济成分并存和以国有经济为主导，与此相联系的政治实践是强大的公共机构起主导作用并在经济领域实行宏观调控。基于以上经济、政治背景，在中国当代法律实践中，权力及其主要表现形式职权、权限的体量和在全部“权”中所占的比重、发挥的功能，也都是20世纪中叶前的各国乃至当今的西语法学国家不能与之比肩的。相对而言，形成和适应欧美日自由资本主义时期经济政治背景，定型于20世纪上半叶的以权利或权利义务为基本研究对象的法学，即使仅看其与私法相匹配的形式和缺乏“权力”概念的外观，就已经与当代中国法律实践相去甚远。而且，这种法的一般理论也早已被现代西语和日语法学所放弃。不论从哪方面看，当代汉语法学都不应该继续在基本研究对象定位问题上抱守老旧的权利或权利义务法学之残缺。可以说，确认“权”的法学基本研究对象地位，当代中文法学现代化就有了与中国法律实践相契合的理论前提和基础。
将现代汉语法学定位于研究“权”的学问有多重意味，主要包括：法学既不是权利之学，也不是权利义务之学，而是权之学，具体地说是权利、权力、剩余权之学；如果将剩余权忽略不计，亦可谓法学是权利、权力之学；法学实质上应是研究如何通过制定和实施法规则以实现权及其体现的利益、财产的公平分配，并促进权的总量进而利益总量、财产总量最大限度的保存和增殖的学问。至于权内部的比例结构，则取决于权所处的历史发展阶段等诸多复杂的因素。其中，剩余权不在法的范围内，但法需要解决法权与剩余权的界限、比例和互动问题，因此，剩余权应该是法学的研究对象。“权之学”与“权利之学”“权力之学”都只有一字之差，但内容有根本的不同：“权之学”兼顾和包容了后两者，还兼顾了剩余权，所以，“权之学”在内容结构上等同于“权利权力剩余权之学”。如果想把剩余权撇开，把视界集中在法律范围内，也可以把法学看作“权利权力之学”或“法权之学”。提出法学是“权之学”，意在修正将法学看作权利之学或权利义务之学、把权力结构性排除在基本研究对象之外的传统法学基本研究对象观的偏颇。
2.汉语法学应以指称权利权力统一体的法权为核心范畴。形成自己特有的核心范畴，是一个学科的一般理论自立于一般理论之林的必要条件。从这个角度看，汉语法学还没有产生过自己的一般理论，汉语权利义务法学只是外语权利义务法学的分支或其在中国的延展。学术界现在已提出了建设法学话语体系的艰巨任务，这是推动法学进步的重要抓手。法学话语体系建设最关键的课题应该是形成新的核心范畴，以置换或部分置换一百多年来一直未变的权利或权利义务。在20、21世纪之交，笔者曾提出和论证了权利权力统一体的存在，后将这个统一体命名为法权，形成了以法权为核心的汉语法学基本范畴体系构想。[[65]]对于法权，笔者过去只将其视为一个基于对权利权力共同体的把握而形成的新的分析单元，并未将其视为法律规定的制度性实体，现在看来这里包含着认识缺憾。实际上，作为权利权力统一体的法权在中国宪法、法律文本中不仅有记载，而且比较常见。我们长期没“看到”法权的真正原因，是蒙蔽于对它缺乏研究而造成的无知之幕。
法权在中国宪法、法律文本中的直接表现，就是作为单汉字名词的“权”，更形象地说就是写进了各种法律条款的“权”。例如，我国《宪法》第8、130条分别规定，“参加农村集体经济组织的劳动者，有权在法律规定的范围内经营自留地、自留山、家庭副业和饲养自留畜”，“被告人有权获得辩护”，其中的“权”具体指称的虽是权利，却是在权利权力共同体意义使用的，是以可指称权利权力共同体的名词，具体指称作为其组成部分的权利；《宪法》第65、108条分别规定，全国人大“选举并有权罢免全国人民代表大会常务委员会的组成人员”，县级以上的地方各级人民政府“有权改变或者撤销所属各工作部门和下级人民政府的不适当的决定”，其中的“权”具体指称的是权力，却是以可指称权利权力共同体的名词的名义，具体指称作为其组成部分的权力。另外，《刑事诉讼法》第3条关于“任何机关、团体和个人都无权行使这些权力”中与“无”相联系的“权”，可谓单独使用单汉字名词权的较典型情况：此“权”既是在权利权力共同体意义使用的，也是权利权力共同体本身，是法权在法律文本上最直观的表现。因为，属于机关的是权力、属于个人的是权利，这里的“权”集权利权力二者于一身。不过，法权在中国宪法法律文本中更多的时候是与其他名词一起组成复合名词，如人身权、财产权、立法权、审判权中的“权”。它们其实是由“人身”“立法”等名词和单汉字名词“权”结合形成的复合名词。这里还要附带说明，百余年来“法权”一词反复出现，但到21世纪实际上只有实践法学用以指称权利权力统一体的“法权”概念得到了理论论述和逻辑证明，有明确的外延和充实的内容，故不存在与已实际消亡或源于误译形成的法权二字的混淆问题。再说，发现和证明实践法学的权利权力统一体这个“实体”本身才是最重要、最根本的，给它命什么“名”虽然不是无关紧要，但却肯定是相对次要得多的方面。这正如姓名完全相同的人成千上万，但真正造成实质性困扰的情况很少，原因是除名称外还有其他参照指标可辨识他们。
3.法学确立“权”和“法权”应有的学科地位，会水到渠成地形成本土的或本民族的法的一般理论。对法学来说，汉语总体上只是载体，用汉语写成和讲述的法学未必就是本土的、民族的法学。本土的、民族的法学的特有基因只能从基于本国当代法律实践合理选定的基本研究对象中抽象出的核心范畴才能产生和传递。反观当代法学教学体系中的权利和义务，两者原本都是法学界公认的外语法学概念，在成为汉语基础性法学教科书的经典范畴之前，它们并没有经历过本土化、民族化改造，其外延、内容和学科地位等所有根本的方面，都实际上保留着19、20世纪之交它被汉译引进时的状态。以汉语权利义务法学守持的“权利”为例，它原本是从哪些“原料”中抽象出来的，有什么样的“身世”，具体包括哪些构成要素或外延的范围，至今都属尚待查明和没有给予清楚交代的事项。仅仅其外延一直飘忽不定（如不确定是否包含权力），就给汉语法学的正常发展造成了无法逾越的障碍。以这样来路不明的“权利”而不是基于中国传统形成的权利一词为核心范畴的法学，[[66]]不可能真正是中国本土的和本民族的法学。
反观权和法权，它们的词源、产生的逻辑道路和本土性、民族性都清楚明白，而且在表意上具有任何西语名词都不具有的独特优势。这个优势的具体表现是，“权”使得从根本上看是一个整体的权利、权利、剩余权共同体有了汉语名称，而且该名词既可用以指称这个共同体，又可在不同的上下文中分别指称三者之一；“法权”使得从根本上看是一个统一体的权利权力有了汉语名称，而且该名词既可用以指统一体，又可单独分别指构成它的权利、权力或它们的组成分子。名词只是概念的载体，“权利权力剩余权共同体”和“权利权力统一体”，只是在经历了马克思运用于其政治经济学的从抽象上升到具体的方法（或绝对方法）中的“第一条道路”，并走到了逻辑终点后才成为合格的权和法权概念。作为一个过程，“第一条道路”清楚展示了权和法权概念的外延和内容。所以，权和法权概念是汉语法学认识法现象取得的独特学术成就，只能以汉语为基准和中心译为西语。[[67]]日语需要做解说，但不存在翻译问题。当然，汉语法学任何时候都应以开放的态度对待外语法学及其基本范畴。汉语法学缺乏而又能从国外引进的好东西，当然要实行“拿来主义”，但一旦条件成熟，汉语法学就应创造出有自身原创知识产权的成果取而代之。同时，对于本土的和民族的东西，要防止不自觉地基于西语中心的下意识地排斥、否定。
相应地，一些基础性命题应随法学基本研究对象和核心范畴的重新设定而作相应调整。例如，如果一定要给法确定一个中心、重心或本位的话，那么，它理应是体现权利权力平衡或以权利权力共同体（即法权）为根本的某种提法。无论如何，任何两极化的说法都是站不住的，必须从根本上把两极视为一个整体的两端，承认两端之间的部分是根本，理论上和实践上才有出路。再如，一些脱离法治原则，片面贬权力褒权利的提法应修正。又如一百多年来将法律关系片面解说为权利义务关系的提法，也应该被法权关系的提法所取代。总之，汉语法学的基本研究对象、核心范畴和整个范畴体系，都应随它们反映的事物、实体的变化而变化。
（责任编辑：郭海清）
[1] Alfred N.Whitehead,Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology,The Free Press, 1978,p.39.
[2] Thomas S. Kuhn，The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition，University of Chicago Press， 2012，pp.137,139.
[3] 加藤弘之『人権新説』，东京：谷山楼1882版，第32-81页。
[4]［日］冈田朝太郎：《法学通论》，熊元翰编，安徽法学社1911年版；见上海人民出版社2013年版，第73-90页；第97-102页。
[5] 岡村司：『法學通論』，和佛法律學校明法堂1900年版，第190页。
[6] 飯島喬平：『法学通论』，东京：早稻田大學出版部1905年版，第194页。
[7] 織田萬：『法学通論』，东京：有斐閣1902年版；见《法学通论》刘崇佑译本，商务印书馆1913年版，第129页。
[8] 在以上方面，山田三良的论述很有代表性。参见山田三良：『法学通論』，明治大学出版部1919年版，第203-213页。
[9]［日］梅谦次郎：《法學通論》（第1册），刘敬第编，上海丙午社等1912年版，第105-186页；織田萬：『法学通論』，东京：有斐閣1902年版，见《法学通论》刘崇佑译本，商务印书馆1913年版，第129-193页。
[10] 穂積陳重：『法典論』，东京：東京哲學書院1890年版，第174-180页。
[11] 参见山田三良：『法学通論』，明治大学出版部1919年版，第200-203页。
[12] [日]奥田义人等：《法学通论》，张知本编辑，湖北法政编辑社1905年版，第92-94页。
[13] [日]织田万：《法学概论》，刘崇佑译，商务印书馆1913年版，第133-135页。
[14]［日］美浓部达吉：《公法与私法》，黄冯明译，商务印书馆1941年版，第109-124页。
[15] 参见岡村司：『法學通論』，和佛法律學校明法堂1900年版，第190-266、363-531页。
[16]［日］梅谦次郎：《法學通論》，陈进第编辑，上海丙午社等1912年版，第124-125页。
[17] 可参见岡村司：『法學通論』，和佛法律學校明法堂 1900年復刻版，第200-201页。
[18] 杨廷栋：《法律学》，中国图书公司1908年版，分别见第 3-9页，51—55 页。
[[19] 胡育庆：《法学通论》：上海太平洋书店1933年版，第124页。
[20] 夏勤：《法学通论》，正中书局1946年版，见冯玉军等主编之《夏勤法学文集》，法律出版社2015年版，第156页。
[21] 白鹏飞：《法学通论》，上海民智书局1928年版，第163页。
[22] 欧阳谿著，郭卫修编：《法学通论》，上海法学编译社1935年版,第241页。
[23] 何任清：《法学通论》1946年啇务印书馆年版，第119页。
[24] 孟森：《新编法学通论》（商务印书馆1910年版），见《孟森政法著译辑刊（中）》，中华书局2008年版，第434-444页。
[25] 朱采真：《现代法学通论》，世界书局1931年版，直接引语第117页，间接引语参见第116-161页。
[26] 参见欧阳谿：《法学通论》，上海汇文堂新记书局1947年版,第241-294页。
[27] 邱汉平：《法学通论》，商务印书馆1937年版第87—116页。
[28] 夏勤、郁嶷：《法学通论》，朝阳大学出版部1919年版，第110页；《法学通论》，朝阳大学出版部1927年版，第101页。
[29] 夏勤、郁嶷：《法学通论》，朝阳大学出版部1927年版，第101页。
[30] 例如朱采真：《法学通论》，世界书局1929年版，第171、181页；白鹏飞：《法学通论》，上海民智书局1928年版，第164页。
[31] 朱采真：《法学通论》，世界书局1929年版，第181-188页；钱香稻：《法学通论问答》，上海三民公司1930年版，第48-50页。
[32] 孟森：《新编法学通论》（商务印书馆1910年版），见《孟森政法著译辑刊（中）》，中华书局2008年版，第443页。
[33] 邱汉平：《东吴大学法学院法理学讲义》目录第5页；另可参见邱汉平：《法学通论》，商务印书馆1937年版，第95——116页。
[34] 夏勤、郁嶷：《法学通论》，朝阳大学出版部1919年版，第39-40页；夏勤：《法学通论》，正中书局1946年版，见冯玉军等主编之《夏勤法学文集》，法律出版社2015年版，第120-121页。
[35] 参见童之伟：《论变迁中的当代中国法学核心范畴》，《法学评论》2020 年第 2期，第7-10页。
[36] 徐显明：《中国法理学进步的阶梯》，《中国社会科学》2018年第11期，第48页。
[37] 郭晔：《追寻和感悟中国法学的历史逻》，《法制与社会发展》，2018 年第 5 期，第207页。
[38] 徐显明：《中国法理学进步的阶梯》，《中国社会科学》2018年第11期，第48页。
[39] 郭晔：《追寻和感悟中国法学的历史逻辑》，《法制与社会发展》，2018 年第 5 期，第210、214页。
[40] 徐显明：《中国法理学进步的阶梯》，《中国社会科学》2018年第11期，第48页。
[41] 郭晔：《追寻和感悟中国法学的历史逻辑》，《法制与社会发展》，2018 年第 5 期，第211页。
[42] 童之伟：《20世纪上半叶法本位研究之得失》，《法商研究》2000年第6期，第3-8页。
[43] 张文显、于宁:《当代中国法哲学研究范式的转换》，《中国法学》2001年第1期，第74-75页。
[44] 参见本书编写组：《法理学》，人民出版社、高等教育出版社2010年版，第111-132页。
[45] 《马克思致帕·瓦·安年科夫》，《马克思恩格斯选集》第4卷，人民出版社2012年版，第408-409页。
[46] 本文对一国的全部法律采用三元分类，即将全部法律分为私法、公法和根本法（宪法）。
[47] 《宪法》第51条规定：“中华人民共和国公民在行使自由和权利的时候，不得损害国家的、社会的、集体的利益和其他公民的合法的自由和权利。”
[48] 参见本书编写组：《法理学》，人民出版社、高等教育出版社2010年版，第111-132页。
[49]日本國會眾議院國會関系資料，https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_annai.nsf/html/statics/shiryo/dl-constitution.htm，2022年6月12日访问。
[50] 做此判断主要依据的参考资料：森泉章（関东学院大学）：『法學』，有斐閣1993年版；伊藤正己 (东京大学)和加藤一郎 (东京大学)等：『現代法學入門』，有斐閣雙書2005年版；末川博（京都大学）：『法學入門 』，有斐閣雙書2014補訂版；田中成明(京都大学)：『法學入門』，有斐閣2016年版；永井和之、森光（中央大学）：『法學入門』，中央経済社2020年版；長穀部恭男(早稲田大学)：『法律學の始発駅』，有斐閣2021年版。
[51] 末川博（京都大学）：『法學入門』，有斐閣1967年版，第7讲的标题；伊藤真(律师)：『法學入門』，日本評論社，2009年版，第2章第1节。
[52] 姜士林等主编：《世界宪法全书》，青岛出版社1997年版，第70-74页。
[53] Hans Kelsen，General Theory of Law and State，trans.Anders Wedberg, Harvard University Press, 1945,pp.75,255-257,269-272.
[54] 我尽自己可能在凯尔森著作中查找basic power，但没找到直接提法，或许他指的是制定凯尔森所说的“基本规范”的权力或“主权性权力”。
[55] Joseph Raz，The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of the Legal System，Oxford University Press，1980，pp.107-110,175-182.
[56] Joseph Raz，The Roots of Normativity,edited by Ulrike Heuer,Oxford University Press,2022,pp.162-178.
[57] Joseph Raz, Normative Powers (revised), Columbia PublicLaw Reserch Paper No. 14-629 (2019). Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2460.
[58] 卡.马克思:《资本论》，《马克思恩格斯文选》第5卷，人民出版社2009年版，第47页。
[59] 权利、权力、法权、剩余权、权的对应概念是个人义务、公职义务、法义务、法外义务、义务。由于“权”是正面的、是形，义务是负面的、是影，故法学宜保留“权”的全部五个分析单元，但对“义务”全体，只作为一个分析单元看待。
[60] 《“法理学向何处去”专题研讨会纪要》，载《法学研究》 2000 年第 1 期，第 156-157 页。这份“纪要”原本是笔者整理的，只是没有署名。此次援引在保持原文不变的基础上做了必要编辑，其中有一处文字变动：以作者后来稳定使用的“权”取代了早年使用的、指同一个事物的“总体权”。
[61] 同上注，第 157 页。
[62] 参见权利分析模型和义务分析模型，参见童之伟：《法权说对各种"权"的基础性定位》，《学术界》 2021年第2期，第106-125页；《再论法理学的更新》，载《法学研究》1999年第2期，第3-21页。
[63] 马克思：《哲学的贫困》，载《马克思恩格斯选集》（第 1 卷），人民出版社 2012 年版，第 222 页。
[64] 同上注，第227页。
[65] 有代表性演讲或论文：《“法理学向何处去”专题研讨会纪要》，载《法学研究》 2000 年第 1 期，第 156-157 页；童之伟：《法权中心的猜想与证明》，载《中国法学》2001 年第 6 期，第 15-38 页。
[66] 前者是范围包括权力的外延复合型“权利”概念，“身世”尚待查明，后者是范围不包括权力的外延单纯型“权利”概念。两种“权利”的差别详见童之伟：《中文法学的权利概念》，载《中外法学》2021 年第 5 期，第 1246-1265 页。
[67] 对“权”和“法权”，欧美主流出版机构之一的博睿学术出版社分别译为“quan”和“faquan”，参见 Tong Zhiwei, Right, Power, and Faquanism,trans.Xu Ping, Brill 2018, pp.1-35.
Tong Zhiwei: Rethinking the Basic Research Objects and Core Categories of Law——Research From a Constitutional Perspective
Update time: 2022-09-26 19:00:01
Author: Tong Zhiwei
Originally published in the 9th issue of "Law Science"
[Abstract] The core discourse of modern Chinese jurisprudence was formed in the early 20th century, and has not changed significantly for more than a hundred years. The disjunction between basic research objects, core category frameworks and contemporary Chinese legal practice is the primary subject of contemporary basic legal research. Chinese jurisprudence should take rights as the basic research objective, and adopt comprehensive methods to develop a basic categorical system with legal rights at its core. By resetting the core discourse this way, the basic theory of Chinese jurisprudence should embrace modernity, locality, and adaptability to contemporary legal practice.
[Keywords] Constitution, right, power, legal right, right
Professor A.N. Whitehead, who is famous for studying theoretical systems in the philosophy of science, has a well-known saying: "All human discourse based on the truth of its statements must be based on facts. No branch of it can claim immunity against this rule." [[1]] By "human discourse" he refers to science, while "facts" refer to the basic research objects of specific disciplines. What should contemporary Chinese jurisprudence take as its basic research object and corresponding core category? Regarding the above-mentioned issues, it can be said that the legal circles of our country have had different opinions and disagreements about this since the early 20th century. The author once did some research on this topic and related issues, and has developed some new thoughts in recent years. Here I seek to express some opinions on the basis of my own work and that of other scholars. The contemporary Chinese legal practice mentioned in this article mainly refers to the contemporary Chinese legal system based on the State Constitution and its implementation process. For the convenience of expression, this paper generally refers to the basic research objects and core categories of law as the core discourse of law.
1. A brief review of the setting process of the core discourse of Chinese legal science
The direct purpose of exploring the brief history of the basic research objects and core categories of Chinese jurisprudence is to promote the formation of a basic theory of law that is better suited to contemporary Chinese legal practice. This requires researchers to place themselves within the forms of legal practice of contemporary China, respectful of tradition, but also to striving to go beyond the “law on the books" such as basic law textbooks formed a hundred years ago, as well as their selected basic research objects, core categories and related basic propositions. If we want to determine the average research level of the basic theories of Chinese law, we can generally draw from jurisprudence textbooks of elite law schools published at that time as samples for discussion. For, as the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn said, "Both the layman and the scientist derive their scientific knowledge from textbooks and a few other types of documents derived from textbooks." The reconstruction of the beginning of the contemporary history of textbooks was completed by post-revolutionary science textbooks." The role of textbooks "is to quickly familiarize students with what the contemporary scientific community thinks they already know." [[2]] Based on this understanding, when discussing the basic theoretical issues of law, this article often chooses the mainstream textbooks at that time as the object of analysis. In order to realistically evaluate the level of adaptation between the basic theories of Chinese jurisprudence and contemporary Chinese legal practice and improve the adaptation of the former to the latter, we have to examine the known basic research objects of jurisprudence and the selection of core categories and corresponding Chinese legal practice adaptation status.
(1) The influence of foreign law study on the choice of core discourse in Chinese legal science
The fundamental situation of the basic theory of law is firstly reflected in the basic research objects and core categories selected by it. During the more than one hundred years from the end of the 18th century to the 1930s, the advanced countries in the world were generally in the stage of development known as free capitalism. Their economic characteristics mainly emphasized private property, free competition, small government, and state institutions. Only as a "night watchman", the state power basically does not play a role in economic links such as production, circulation, distribution, and consumption. Although the Western jurists of that era also paid attention to the state, state institutions and their legal representation power (control) and corresponding obligations (duty, obligation), they were not the focus, and their attention was mainly on individuals (natural persons, legal persons) rights (entitlements) and obligations. This has something to do with the fact that the influence of Roman law on Europe was mainly limited to the field of private law. In my extensive comparative reading of the works of jurists from the 18th and 19th centuries in the five countries of Britain, America, France, Germany and the Netherlands, the author did not find any jurist who obviously neglected power, nor did I find any jurist who included the powers, authority, and control of state institutions. Power, including public functions, is deliberately interpreted in its entirety as a work of right. Therefore, the root of the practice of incorporating power into the concept of rights in contemporary Chinese right-duty jurisprudence is not necessarily suitable to be found in Western jurisprudence. In other words, because modern Japanese jurisprudence originated in Europe and modern Chinese jurisprudence is most influenced by Japanese jurisprudence, we should not take for granted that the shortcomings of Chinese jurisprudence related to Japanese jurisprudence are ultimately derived from Western jurisprudence. To clarify the relevant issues, we need to make a specific analysis based on the specific situation of Japanese law study and its influence on Chinese jurisprudence.
Legal history data show that the situation of Japanese legal works in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is quite different from that in Europe, showing sufficient diversity. On the whole, some scholars' works treat rights and power in parallel from the perspective of law, such as Hiroyuki Kato. In his later period, Kato not only considered power, but also regarded power as more important and decisive than rights, and then advocated "power competition", where the superior wins and the inferior loses. [[3]] However, in general, after Japanese law study entered the 20th century, more scholars began to take rights and obligations as the basic research object and core category of jurisprudence, and explain various legal phenomena from the perspective of rights and obligations. This arrangement generally takes rights as the leading role and obligations as supporting roles between rights and obligations. Therefore, although the mainstream part of Japanese law study in the early 20th century was not very self-consistent internally, it actually formed a school that can be called the law of rights and obligations which included Okada Asataro, [[4]] Okuda Yoshito, Okamura Division, Oda Man, Minobe Tatsukichi and others. The basic features of Japanese rights and obligations law can be summarized as five points:
1. Influenced by European jurisprudence, rights are the basic research object of jurisprudence. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, several representative legal scholars in Japan wrote: "Leibniz, a German, said: the study of law is the study of rights. In Western countries, law and rights generally use the same word. The appearance of right, right is the content of law, there are differences between the two, but their essence is the same”; [[5]] “Leibniz, a German, defined jurisprudence as the science of right, and Jhering wrote “For Right And the Struggle" pointed out the reasons why rights should be respected. So far, the concept of jurisprudence has changed from "justice" to "rights". Punic regards jurisprudence as the study of rights, and the concept of rights is therefore the most important matter in law. [[7]] Among them, the cited textbook by Professor Wan Oda of Tokyo University has Chinese translations in different years in China. When scholars who hold this school tend to talk about the content of law, they often only have rights in their eyes, and basically do not mention power, or regard power as a part of rights. However, when they discuss rights, they discuss obligations accordingly, but they don't think obligations are as important as rights. [[8]]
2. Generally speaking, the disciplinary status of rights and obligations is viewed in parallel, with rights and obligations as the core category. The representative Japanese scholars who adopt this approach and directly influence the study of Chinese law are Ume Kenjiro, Professor Oda Man of Tokyo Imperial University, and the textbooks written by them. The most obvious feature are the chapter titles. At the same level, rights and obligations are compared or rights and obligations are used to explain the legal relationship. Relatively speaking, this school of jurisprudence appears to include the largest number of Japanese jurists. The representative basic legal works or textbooks of Yoshito Okuda and later Minobe Tatsukichi, who was very influential in Chinese legal circles, All adopt a system with rights and obligations as the core category.
3. It is believed that laws have different standards, and modern laws are based on rights, not obligations. As early as the early 1890s, Hozumi Chen Zhong focused on the issue of "the standard of the code" in his monograph on the study of legal codes. He divided the standard of the code into three types: "rights standard", "obligation standard" and "behavior standard", and advanced the idea that modern laws are generally based on rights, but a few public laws should be based on obligations. [[10]] Many Japanese legal scholars agreed with Hozumi Chenzhong’s right-based formulation, and also believe that the right-based formulation is the same as the two concepts of law and rights in some European languages (such as German Recht). [[11]] They tend to think that "rights standard" originated from German jurists, and the origins are different. However, the word Recht in German has two meanings of law and right. The specific meaning depends on the context. However, German strictly distinguishes power (Gewalt) and right (Recht), and the former cannot be regarded as a component of the latter. That is to say, German jurisprudence does not have the concept of "right", which was extended later in Japanese and Chinese right and duty jurisprudence, including power. However, terms such as "right-based" and "obligation-based" were short-lived in Japanese law study. Because of their vague and impractical content, almost no one discussed such topics by the beginning of the 20th century.
4. They thought of power as only the specific form of existence of rights, manifested as the functions and powers of state organs, etc., so they do not pay attention to or even ignore the concept of power. It is one of the outstanding features of Japanese rights and obligations to interpret power and its specific manifestations such as "authority" and "competence" as part of rights. For example, Yoshito Okuda included the power of "police power", "judgment power" and "appointing officials to protect the people" into the scope of "rights". [[13]] Tatsuyoshi Minobe included almost all the "rights" of various state agencies at all levels into the scope of "rights". [[14]] Like Umekenjiro and others cited above, Tsukasa Okamura’s textbooks or works also clearly include “ruling power”, “power”, and “power” of state agencies into the scope of “rights”. [[15]]
5. They paid attention to the concept of legal relationship and explained legal relationship from the perspective of rights and obligations. Ume Kenjiro, who was a professor at Tokyo Imperial University at the time, said: "French sometimes uses the word legal relationship, especially among scholars. Its definition is: the state of rights and obligations between someone and another person or thing. .In the civil procedure law, it is called a rights relationship, and the name has different meanings. However, when it says rights, it means one of the obligations, so it is better to translate it as a legal relationship, and its meaning is more correct. Taking the relationship between a person and a clock as an example, he explained the legal relationship, especially explaining that people "have a direct relationship with things, and an indirect relationship with others, as for the indirect relationship between other people and things, it cannot be said that there is no legal relationship between people and things.” [[16]] It is one of the preferences of Japanese jurisprudence to introduce the concept of legal relationship from French jurisprudence and define and apply it from the perspective of rights and obligations. [[17]] Many treatises on Japanese law study discussing legal relations were translated into and published in Chinese, which directly affected Chinese jurisprudence.
Taken together, Japan at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century lagged behind Europe and the United States in terms of social development, but generally speaking it was in the period of liberal capitalism. Therefore, the total amount of power related to the size of the public budget and its proportion in the national economic aggregate is relatively small, and the proportion of power in the legal power structure is relatively low. Therefore, the Japanese law of rights and obligations relatively neglects power. Although its structure is somewhat flawed, it can still adapt to the overall social conditions in Japan, including its legal practice, at that time.
(2) The core discourse selection of Chinese legal science before 1949
Regardless of the number of people sent abroad to study law or Chinese translation of foreign legal textbooks and reading materials, Chinese law in the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century was mainly taught by Japanese scholars. The above-mentioned basic research object views and core category selection preferences of the different schools of Japanese jurisprudence directly affected the Chinese jurisprudence in the first half of the 20th century, so that the school structure of the latter was highly similar to that of the former. This high degree of approximation first manifests itself in the fact that legal scholars or their works can be divided into two categories based on the stricter distinction between rights and powers. The common feature of the first category is the strict distinction between rights and powers. These scholars or works tend to believe that: rights and power are two different concepts, and the extension of the concept of rights does not include power; rights are dominated by individuals and private organizations composed of individuals, and power is represented by public agencies (typically represented by State organs) and their officials as the main body, and so on. This type of scholars and works put rights and power in an equal and parallel discipline to develop their own discussions. The representative figures are mainly Yang Tingdong and his works. [[18]] The legal treatises or textbooks with the tendency of the second type of school ignore or do not pay attention to power, and focus entirely on rights and obligations, and based on this, they form a Chinese right that highly coincides with the five aspects of Japanese rights and obligations law. The Jurisprudence of Obligation claims:
1. Influenced by both Europe and Japan, rights are selected as the basic research object of law. Some scholars quoted German scholars as saying that "legal scholars are also the study of rights"; [[19]] mainstream legal textbooks at that time also said, "Since German scholars chanted law as the study of rights, the concept of law has been centered on justice. , changed and centered on rights, and everyone’s thought on rights was developed because of it”; [[20]] “Leibniz (the current translation of Leibniz—the quoter) tried to say that jurisprudence is the study of rights, because rights and laws , there is an inseparable relationship.” [21]] Some scholars directly concluded: “Take the law as the regulation of rights, jurisprudence as the study of rights, is the consensus among modern scholars. General theory.” [[22]] This theory was later directly inherited by Chinese rights and obligations law in the period of the Republic of China.
2. Taking rights and obligations as the core category of jurisprudence. This was actually a common practice during the period of the Republic of China. At that time, some representatives said: "The concept of rights and obligations is very important in jurisprudence, because the task of law is to stipulate rights and obligations. Taking jurisprudence as the study of rights and obligations". [[23]] During the same period, rights and obligations were generally used as the core category to arrange the content system of basic law textbooks. The first textbook on general theory of law with a Chinese author was compiled by Meng Sen, a scholar who had returned from studying in Japan. [[24]] Zhu Caizhen, a famous jurist in the period of the Republic of China, said: "Perhaps people who study law should know what the legal concept of rights and obligations is. This is a bit of common sense." Among the 22 chapters in his basic legal works, there are 6 chapters (7-12) dedicated to rights and obligations, The titles of the chapters are: legal view of rights and obligations, categories of rights, categories of obligations, subjects of rights and obligations, objects of rights and obligations, gain, loss, change and exercise of rights. [[25]] The titles of other chapters do not have the words "rights and obligations", but most of them revolve around rights and obligations. There is no word "power" in the catalog of three-level titles in the whole book. Another popular basic law textbook in the 1930s and 1940s arranged "rights and obligations" similar to Zhu Caizhen's textbook, and used a whole series of 8 chapters. [[26]] Qiu Hanping is a professor of jurisprudence at Soochow University. His jurisprudence lecture notes and officially published textbooks also put rights and obligations in parallel at the chapter level to make titles and explain all legal relationships. [[27]]
3. Inherited the proposition of "law is based on rights" in Japanese jurisprudence. In 1904, after Liang Qichao took over Hozumi Chen Zhong’s view that the laws of all countries in modern times were rights-based, there were many treatises or teaching materials that continued to discuss the issue of the standard of law and the theory of rights-based theory during the Republic of China, although Japanese legal study later completely abandoned their predecessors’ initial proposal. of this topic. Several introductory law textbooks written by Xia Qin and Yu Yi, famous law teachers at Chaoyang University, all talk about "rights standard" from the existing editions. Earlier they just mentioned it briefly, saying that "the laws of all civilized countries in this world are based on rights." They later made a large section of theoretical discourse on this, and believed that "Jhering, a German, wrote the theory of the struggle for rights and first created the theory of the standard of rights." [28] When Xia Qin signed and published the law textbook in 1946, he also Commenting on Jhering can be seen as "the fierceness of advocating the right standard", [[29]] although this understanding is likely to be a misunderstanding. The works of many other scholars also discussed the standard of law and the standard of rights. [[30]] Like the right-based theory of Japanese legal study in its place of origin, the “right” in Chinese right-duty jurisprudence in the first half of the 20th century is also a concept of extension including power and its main concrete forms of authority and authority. In fact, , its "right" is the concept of legal right justified by the theory of legal right in both extension and content, so the content of "right-based" is objectively equivalent to the claim centered on legal right. But since there is no distinction between rights, powers, and jurisprudence, this claim is practically meaningless.
4. Regard power (and its specific forms of existence, authority, jurisdiction, etc.) as an integral part of rights. This is one of the basic characteristics of the concept of rights and the law of rights and obligations, which are absolutely dominant in Chinese jurisprudence in the 20th century. Among all the basic legal textbooks in the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China period cited above, except those written by a few scholars such as Yang Tingdong and Li Jingxixi , almost all adopted this concept of rights. The most typical specific approach in this regard is to divide "rights" into "private rights" and to include "powers" and their specific forms of existence such as functions, powers, and their main manifestations at the time, legislative power, executive power, and judicial power. The scope of "public rights" is called the constituent elements of "rights". In addition to the publications cited above, you can also refer to the works of Zhu Caizhen, a famous jurist in the Republic of China, and popular legal books at that time. [[31]]
5. Following the concept of legal relationship in Japanese legal study, it is still interpreted as a relationship of rights and obligations. Meng Sen, who studied law in Japan and returned to China, took the lead in using "the relationship between rights and obligations is the legal relationship" as the title of Chapter 10, Section 3 of his law textbook. [[32]] The lecture notes on jurisprudence of Soochow University Law School even include "Legal Relations" as the seventh chapter among its 16 chapters, and divide it into three sections according to nature, dynamics and statics. [[33]] From this, it is not difficult for us to imagine the status of the "legal relationship" part in Chinese legal science in the first half of the 20th century. However, in the first half of the 20th century, according to their understanding of the German jurisprudence tradition, two famous legal scholars insisted on explaining the public law relationship in the legal relationship as a "power relationship" and only interpreting the private law relationship as a right-obligation relationship.[[ 34]] But their approach failed to prevent most scholars from insisting that "power" is a part of "right" like the Japanese law of rights and obligations, and then interpreting legal relations as rights and obligations.
the
From the end of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, China's social development lagged behind that of Japan, but its economy, political practice, and legal system based on the Constitution (temporary and formal). From the perspective of social development stages, there are many similarities. The volume and proportion of economic resources directly controlled by the state or government are not very large, and the proportion of power in the legal structure is not particularly high. Moreover, it may not be a coincidence that from the 1908 "Imperial Constitutional Outline" to the 1912 "Interim Constitution of the Republic of China" until the 1947 Constitution, there are "rights and obligations" provisions, the only difference is that some Chapter titles, some without chapter titles. However, all these constitutional documents, whether it is the constitutional outline, or the interim constitution and the constitution, do not use the word "power", only such terms as "full power", "official power", "political power" and "legislative power" actually refer to power . From this point of view, it was normal and reasonable that the concept of "power" was not included in the basic publications of Chinese legal science at that time. Conversely, if the above-mentioned basic legal publications have the concept of "power" and are juxtaposed with "rights", although it should be theoretically appropriate, it is not appropriate from the perspective of a legal system based on the Constitution. From this, we can fully understand why Chinese jurisprudence in the first half of the 20th century once formed the germination of jurisprudence as the study of rights and powers, but in the end it was still dominated by the jurisprudence of rights and duties.
(3) The revival of the traditional core discourse of Chinese legal science in the contemporary era
After 1978, Chinese jurisprudence diverged greatly in terms of rights, powers, obligations and their disciplinary status. After the 1980s, many treatises and textbooks on Chinese legal studies began to change the traditional positioning of rights as the basic research object and rights and obligations as the core category. The three are regarded as the most important research objects of law, and the core category is rights, power, or "legal rights" reflecting the community of rights and powers and their essential attributes. [[35]] However, if it is true as mentioned above, that is, the average research level of the basic theories of law is reflected by the introductory textbooks of elite law schools, then it can be said that contemporary Chinese legal science has the basic research objects and core categories. Compared with Japanese legal studies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and Chinese legal science in the first half of the 20th century, there is no significant change in five basic aspects, including related basic propositions. We might as well make a simple comparison in the same five aspects between the 40-odd years since the 1980s and the basic law that prevailed in the above two stages of legal development.
1. Mirroring development before the middle of the 20th century, contemporary Chinese jurisprudence still regards rights as the basic research object of jurisprudence. In recent years, some scholars have asked "why the science of law is the 'science of rights' rather than the 'science of obligations'", and reaffirmed the understanding that law is the science of rights from the perspective that the people are the subjects of rights. [[36]] Another scholar summed up the collective understanding of the academic conference and commented: After abandoning the theory of law and state with "class nature" as the only category, "'Law is the study of rights' is like the trumpet of victory being sounded, becoming the 1988 In 2009, the scientific declaration resounded throughout the country”; at that time, “the participants reached a consensus that ‘law should be the study of rights’” and so on. [[37]] regard legal rights as the basic research object of law, and the mainstream aspects of Chinese legal science have not changed for more than one hundred years.
2. Contemporary Chinese jurisprudence still adheres to the tradition of taking rights and obligations as the most basic concept of jurisprudence that emerged before the middle of the 20th century. Nonetheless that basic concept has been developed to some extent. Some scholars believe that in the late 1980s, "the establishment of 'rights and obligations' as a basic category of Chinese jurisprudence was the most successful example of Chinese jurisprudence seeking a logical starting point for academic research, and it was a major breakthrough in the history of Chinese jurisprudence."[38] ] Since then, on this logical starting point, jurisprudence "found the object it should study, and jurisprudence has since moved towards science. This logical starting point is the basic category of 'rights and obligations' in jurisprudence. Starting from them, jurists Construct the jurisprudence category system of modern China". Some scholars also pointed out that jurisprudence experts generally believe that "reconstructing the theoretical system of law with rights and obligations as the basic category is a bright card shown by the legal circle in the new era"; they believe that rights and obligations occupy a special position in the "classic category of law" . [[39]] However, the starting point from which it is possible to uncover the core of modern Chinese discourse actually occurs earlier. The starting point of the turning point in jurisprudence then, should be the transition from traditional Chinese jurisprudence to modern jurisprudence at the end of the 19th century. The first 30-40 years of the 20th century marked the period during which the transition to this jurisprudential basic line was completed.
3. The proposition that "law is based on rights" is put forward again, but a new and supplementary discussion is made in light of the reality of contemporary China. Some scholars commented that since 1988, Chinese jurisprudence has undergone a transformation process from "rights and obligations" to "rights-based"; from obligation-based to right-based.” “Right-based theory has not only deepened the understanding of the essence of law”, it “is the academic symbol of jurisprudence breaking away from class struggle jurisprudence”; “right-based theory has also given birth to the Chinese School of Rights which was is the only theoretical school formed in the 40 years of Chinese jurisprudence that can be divided into positions, viewpoints, and methods.” [[40]] In addition, at a national law conference in 2018, it was said that “from a historical perspective, most of the participating scholars fully praised the "right-based theory" proposed 30 years before. They believed that this was not only a legendary event in the history of jurisprudence, but also a historic symbol of conforming to the tide of reform and opening up and promoting the modernization of China's legal system. ". [[41]] It should be said that the right-based proposition and theories including the proposition that the development of legal science follows the obligation-based to the right-based law that were put forward in Japanese legal studies were then abandoned. In the first half of the 20th century, Chinese jurisprudence began with Liang Qichao, and inherited and advanced Japanese jurisprudence on the standard of law and the standard of rights, which has already been commented on by scholars. [[42]] However, the right-duty jurisprudence revived in the last ten years of the 20th century has indeed enriched the right-based theory, mainly proposing and systematically discussing that "power comes from right, power serves right, and power should be bounded by right." , Power must be restricted by rights", and the viewpoint of "advocating the standard of rights and opposing the standard of power". [[43]] Whether these views are tenable is another matter.
4. Although "power" accounts for nearly half of the constitution-based contemporary Chinese legal system, it is still underestimated or even ignored in Chinese jurisprudence. Just like in the Chinese and Japanese law of rights and obligations in the first half of the 20th century, power has been placed as part of "rights" in today's general basic textbooks of law schools across the country. Let us take the most commonly used jurisprudence textbook in China’s colleges and universities as an example: the textbook is 350,000 words and divided into 15 chapters. The term "power" ("improving the power supervision and restriction mechanism") appeared in the penultimate chapter of the book, and there was no explanation or elucidation of "power" in the whole book, including its relationship with the "powers" and "permissions" stipulated in the Constitution and laws. In this textbook, power and its main specific legal manifestations of authority and authority are still discussed under the concept of "right" that is completely divorced from the legal text of our country's constitution. [[44]] It is almost exactly the same as the arrangement of Chinese and Japanese rights and obligations jurisprudence at the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.
5. Contemporary Chinese jurisprudence now accepts and develops under new historical conditions. In the first half of the 20th century, Sino-Japanese jurisprudence interpreted the legal relationship as the relationship of rights and obligations, while "power" and its specific manifestations "authority" and "control" were both embedded into the traditional discourse of the scope of "rights". It should be noted that this traditional practice can be reasonably explained under the constitutional documents of the Meiji Constitution and that of the Republic of China, but in today's China it is completely out of touch with the Chinese legal system based on the [State] Constitution. The rationale for this is left to the relevant sections below. According to the author's preliminary statistics, the number of basic textbooks on Chinese legal studies that adopted this mode of legal relationship discussion in the past thirty years accounted for at least 80% of the total number of similar textbooks. This should be regarded as a well-known situation in the legal circles of our country, so we will not cite or demonstrate it here.
The above five points should be regarded as the basic characteristics of the revived contemporary Chinese right and duty jurisprudence (some scholars call it the right jurisprudence). They show that under the tangible or intangible influence of Chinese jurisprudence in the first half of the 20th century and some foreign legal science (especially Japanese legal studies) in the past two centuries, the basic research object view, core categories and related basic propositions of contemporary Chinese jurisprudence, Basically maintained the traditional structure of Japanese right and duty law and Chinese right and duty law in the first half of the 20th century. Some scholars may feel somewhat surprised by this assessment, but it is indeed a hard fact to deny. Here, the inheritance and inheritance relationship between contemporary Chinese rights and obligations law and predecessors is obvious, and is also very natural. Because, in principle, the academic productivity of law is the same as that of economic productivity and the laws they follow. Regarding the latter, Marx said: "People cannot freely choose their own productive forces—this is the basis of their entire history, because any productive force is a vested force and a product of past activities. It can be seen that productive forces are people's but this capacity itself is determined by the conditions in which men find themselves, by the productive forces previously acquired, by the forms of society which existed before them and which were created not by them but by the previous generation." [[45]] Like economic productivity, legal academic productivity cannot be developed by leaps and bounds in a short period of time driven by a few people, it has to rely on accumulation. The main significance of the revival of the law of rights and obligations in the late 1980s in China lies in the convergence and continuation of the understandings developed through law in the 1950s and even the previous decades in terms of the basic research objects, core categories and corresponding basic propositions of law, and attempts to demonstrate their applicability and value in the new period of history.
The times are advancing. It is worth studying how the core discourse of rights and obligations in Chinese jurisprudence, which was basically used in the late 1980s since the first half of the same century, adapts to contemporary Chinese legal practice. Let's continue the discussion below.
2. Traditional core discourse of Chinese legal science and contemporary legal practice
The core discourse of law is a tool for legal researchers, as long as it is handy to use, it is entirely a matter for each scholar to choose how it is to be used. However, the core discourse confirmed by the general legal basic textbooks of higher law schools is a public product that all legal scholars should care about. The reason why the author has paid special attention to the basic research objects and core categories set up by the jurisprudence of rights and obligations in the past 30 years is that they are very different from the author’s observation and experience when studying constitutional phenomena. Young legal professionals generally reflect that the basic research objects and core categories and even basic propositions identified by the law of rights and obligations are related to post-bachelor There is a serious disconnect between stage study and work. To be honest, this may be related to the fact that the author has been engaged in the teaching and research of constitutional law and public law for a long time. If I were replaced by a person who studies civil and commercial law, I should not feel the same way. But in any case, I believe that people who are in the teaching and research positions of constitutional law and various public law can fully feel the true extent of the lack of explanatory power of the over-100-year-old law of rights and obligations to the phenomenon of constitutional law and public law. [[46]] This should be a good thing, because the feeling of imperfection is what motivates the search for its perfection.
Why does the traditional Chinese teaching system of rights and obligations lack the necessary explanatory power for constitutional and public law phenomena? The author believes that the most fundamental reason is that the basic research objects and core categories determined by it over the past century have not been revised in a manner that aligns with the times, resulting in a large degree of dislocation with contemporary Chinese legal practice. In order to see this truth clearly, we have to make a more specific positioning of the multiple meanings of the word "right" commonly used in Chinese academic circles, and then on this basis, find out what meaning is the "right" usually held by the law of rights and obligations right. In a nutshell, contemporary Chinese academic circles use the word "right" in the following three senses.
In its first sense, the term "right" is sometimes used in political treatises or literature, such as the word "right" in the phrase "the people also become the subjects of rights" quoted earlier. That is, "people's rights". This meaningful right is not a legal right, but a presumed political concept, while legal rights are part of the legal system. The two contents are fundamentally different and must be strictly distinguished. According to the theorists of the classical natural law school, all the natural rights of all individuals in the natural state, as a whole, are typical "people's rights" in the original sense. In that theoretical system, part of the "people's rights" is entrusted to some people or institutions, and some individuals retain it for themselves. Therefore, after entering the political society, it is transformed into legal power and legal rights, and "people's rights" therefore cease to exist. Regardless of China or foreign countries, "people's rights" in its original sense has never been a constitutional or legal term, nor a term that can be used to discuss rigorous legal issues. It does not make sense in any sense to refer to the "rights" in the relationship between rights and obligations in law and jurisprudence as "people's rights" in the original sense. However, it needs to be explained that there is no distinction between "people" and "citizens", and the author's judgment does not apply to the situation where the word "people" refers to "citizens" or nationals.
The second meaning of rights is legal rights. Within the scope of constitutional laws (that is, domestic laws), its subjects are natural persons and legal persons, not public agencies such as the state. It is expressed as "rights and freedoms" in our country's constitution. [[47]] Therefore, rights do not include public power in any country's constitution or law. A public organization such as a state agency can be a subject of rights after it changes its identity and enters the market under the cloak of a legal person, but at this time it is no longer a state agency but a civil organization. Here, the transformation of state organs into legal persons acting as "subjects of rights" is only a transitional state, which is different from pure civil subjects. After it transitionally transforms into a civil subject to complete market behavior, it will immediately return to the position of the subject of power. In a democratic country ruled by law, among the various rights enjoyed by natural persons with citizenship, only the right to vote contains the atoms of power, but that is only the atoms of power, and power can only be extracted after legal election procedures.
The term right in its third meaning corresponds exactly to the scope used by the traditional right and duty jurisprudence, including the extended compound "right" of power. Japanese legal studies before the middle of the 20th century created this kind of "right", which was later accepted and regarded as the core category by Chinese law of rights and obligations. In the typical Japanese legal treatises on rights and obligations before the middle of the 20th century, the scope of the concept of "rights" in this important sense mainly includes: (1) personal rights, property rights, and various personal freedoms, that is, individual rights; The power of individuals and subjects, including various ruling powers, that is, the power of public organizations such as state organs and its specific manifestations, such as powers, authority, etc.; (2) the rights of individuals and subjects to the state, such as the right to vote and participate in other public affairs; (3 ) Some introductory textbooks on Japanese legal studies include "international rights", that is, rights as subjects of international law. In Chinese publications on rights and obligations in the first half of the 20th century, the meaning of "rights" is similar to Japanese legal studies. If there is a difference, it is just that the state's public rights to individuals are enumerated as legislation in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's five-power constitutional thought. power, executive power, judicial power, etc. This meaningful concept of rights is compatible with the Japanese Meiji Constitution and the constitutional legal documents of the Republic of China. Because, at that time, the word "power" did not exist in the constitutions or constitutional legal documents of the two countries. The scope of the concept of "right" chosen by the jurisprudence of rights and obligations in China today is the same as that in the period of the Republic of China, but it is not as clear as that in the period of the Republic of China. In some representative publications on rights and obligations law in contemporary Chinese, although the extension of the concept of "rights" actually still includes the powers of state organs such as legislative power, executive power, functions and limits, the relevant authors are discussing this "right" "Rights" seems to have to adopt a half-covered attitude because of lack of righteousness, so readers have to read carefully to understand. This approach is more typical when discussing legal relations. [[48]]
In order to see clearly the fact that the basic research objects and core categories identified by the jurisprudence of rights and obligations over the past century have been largely misaligned with contemporary Chinese legal practice, one more reason should be known: in any modern constitutional country, rights and power are in the constitution. All are equal before the law and there is no distinction between superior and inferior. This is the minimum common sense of modern law and jurisprudence. Our country’s system of guaranteeing rights and powers equal before the law is firstly reflected in the last natural paragraph of the Constitution’s preamble, the rule of law clauses and constitutional supervision clauses of the Constitution, as well as the legality review system and administrative litigation system. The reason why this question is raised is that for many years, there have been some unrealistic rhetoric such as rights-based, which have prevented people from obtaining a correct awareness of the constitution and law. According to the latter argument, it seems that power conflicts with rights, and power should give way, obey and serve the needs of rights protection. This is a false statement that deviates from the principle of the rule of law and the legal system of a normal constitutional country. The ideal vision of the rule of law is to recognize and realize the equality and balance of rights and powers.
After clarifying the theoretical issues in the above two aspects, it becomes much clearer when we look at the dislocation between the arrangement of taking rights as the basic research object and rights and obligations as the core category of jurisprudence and contemporary Chinese legal practice. The first manifestation of this type of dislocation is that right and duty jurisprudence has been using the word "right" interchangeably in the above three senses for a hundred years from the introduction of Japanese legal studies to the present day. Therefore, whether it is a basic research object or a core category, the meaning of rights has always been erratic in the law of rights and obligations, and is often quietly exchanged according to the temporary needs of the commentators. The above-mentioned “rights” in the triple sense are actually three different analysis units, which constitute the three “facts” mentioned by A.N. Whitehead quoted above, and their nature belongs to the three concepts sharing one Chinese carrier (“rights”). This is a special situation encountered by Chinese jurisprudence. Strictly speaking, it is a shortcoming that legal scholars should overcome on the premise of strictly distinguishing and clarifying their different meanings in detail. Possible solutions include abandoning the concept of "right" in the sense of the unity of rights and powers as in contemporary Japanese jurisprudence, or calling the unity of rights and powers "legal rights" as the author has always advocated, using the concept of rights in the sense of alignment. The most inappropriate choice is to take advantage of this shortcoming and let three concepts that are actually different slip in and out and replace each other under the "roof" of a Chinese noun ("right"). Because, the nature of doing so is to deliberately use the ambiguity of the Chinese word "right" to secretly replace the concept as a meaningless word game in order to maintain certain propositions that have not changed for a century.
Secondly, the dislocation is also manifested in the concept of "rights", which includes the extension and compound concept of power in the law of rights and obligations formed a hundred years ago, which is largely divorced from the contemporary Chinese legal system based on the Constitution and its implementation process. This dislocation of theory and practice is now the time to make new arrangements at the core discourse level of law. In this regard, the self-adjustment of Japanese jurisprudence with the reform of the Japanese constitution after 1947 is worthy of reference by Chinese scholars. As mentioned above, the Meiji Constitution of Japan does not have the word "power". At that time, jurisprudence regarded the powers and limits of power as components of power according to academic standards, which is understandable. However, this situation was different after the concept of power was enshrined in the Japanese Constitution in 1947 and gained important status. The "Constitution of Japan", which came into effect in 1947, stipulates "power" in the preamble and Articles 41 and 101 of the House of Representatives exercising the power of the National Assembly during the transition period. Among them, the word "power" in the first natural paragraph of the preamble has an extremely prominent constitutional status: "The government of the state originates from the serious trust of the people, its authority comes from the people, its power is exercised by the representatives of the people, and its benefits are enjoyed by the people. This is This constitution is based on the universal principle of human beings. We will exclude all constitutions, decrees and imperial edicts that are contrary to this.” [[49]] This article can be called the constitution of the Japanese Constitution. “Power "As an important content of this article, its status is extremely prominent. A large amount of Japanese legal studies data shows that the introductory textbooks of Japanese law in various periods after the implementation of the "Constitution of Japan" in 1947 have almost completely abandoned the law of rights and obligations and regarded power as the content of rights. One of the "rights" concept. Even the "legal relationship" interpretation mode on which the traditional rights and obligations jurisprudence relies has almost disappeared in general. [[50]] At the same time, "power" (such as "separation of power" and "power and authority") also began to enter the chapter titles and section titles of introductory law textbooks. [[51]]
Perhaps few scholars have noticed that since 1949, the status of "power" in China's constitution and laws has changed in ways that are very similar to changes in Japan. According to the literature, the term “power” did not appear in the various interim constitutions, constitutions and other constitutional law documents that existed in China before September 1949. As a matter of fact, the first law to adopt the concept of "power" in the laws enacted by the leadership of the Communist Party of China was Article 3 of the "Organization Law of the Central People's Government" adopted by the first CPPCC National Committee on September 27, 1949. Before the National People's Congress is convened, members of the Central People's Government are elected " this article vested the “authority to exercise state power" in the CPPCC National Committee. [[52]] This regulation actually clarifies the affiliation relationship between "state power" and "power" and the related powers legally. The subsequent use of "power" was the "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" adopted on September 29, 1949, which served as an interim constitution. Paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the program stipulates that before the convening of the National People's Congress with universal suffrage, the plenary session of the CPPCC shall exercise the functions and powers of the National People's Congress and elect the Central People's Government Committee, "and give it the functions and powers of exercising state power." The 1954 Constitution "Article 2, paragraph 1, "All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs for the people to exercise power are the National People's Congress and local people's congresses at all levels." The regulation further enhances the status of "power". This constitution clarifies the equivalent relationship between "all powers" of the country and "state power" in jurisprudence in terms of referents, as well as the subordinate relationship between them and the functions and powers stipulated in the same constitution. From then until now, although the times have changed and the constitution has undergone many comprehensive and partial revisions, the relationship between the concept of power in these constitutions and the word "power" in Chinese legal life and even social life has always been What is stable and coordinated, what is misplaced is only the jurisprudence of rights and obligations that followed the old theory at the beginning of the last century.
In the contemporary Chinese legal system based on the Constitution, the status of power is embodied in the following provisions of the fifth natural paragraph and Article 2 of the preamble of the current Chinese Constitution: "The Chinese people have mastered the power of the country and become the masters of the country ""All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people./The organs through which the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and local people's congresses at all levels." , and the legal manifestations of the "powers" and "permissions" of state agencies stipulated in Chapter III of the "Constitution" that embody these provisions are the concept of "power". Therefore, contemporary Chinese jurisprudence should absolutely not continue to covertly and semi-obscurely treat the concept of power, in the eyes of citizens, in the same way that Japanese and Chinese rights and obligations jurisprudence was understood at the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century treated "power" as something with no constitutional status. , Natural persons, and legal persons are under the "roof" of the concept of "rights" as the subject. In jurisprudence, there must be an independent concept of "power" to reflect and express the power in the constitution and laws and its specific form of existence. This is a very natural logic and a matter of course, and there is really no need to repeat it. From this point of view, ignoring the power in the contemporary Chinese legal system based on the Constitution, one-sidedly taking "right" as the basic research object of jurisprudence, and positioning rights, or rights and obligations, as the core category of jurisprudence are not consistent with the Chinese legal system based on the Constitution. The contemporary legal system is largely incompatible with the contemporary legal practice in China, and should be corrected.
Thirdly, positioning the basic research object of law as rights and identifying rights or rights and obligations as the core category, excluding power, is also out of touch with the contemporary world-wide economic and political status quo. The European, American and Japanese economies in the 19th and early 20th centuries were also based on private property ownership in terms of ownership structure, but the state rarely intervened in economic life. Although China's economic development in the early 20th century and before that lagged far behind that of Europe, the United States, and Japan, the situation was similar in that the state seldom intervened in economic life. In connection with this, the amount of power supported by public property and its proportion in the legal structure are naturally relatively small, so it is placed under the name of "right" in jurisprudence, although it is unreasonable, though less irrational and less noticeable. Since the middle of the 20th century, the European, American and Japanese governments have intervened in economic life on a large scale in the form of state subsidies, the development of welfare state structures, and even state shareholding. The volume of power and the proportion of power in the legal structure have increased significantly. The typical manifestation of this situation in the legal system is the substantial expansion of power and the entry of the word "power" into an important clause in the Constitution. The manifestation in jurisprudence is that power has become a basic concept parallel to right.
In fact, Western jurisprudence has been adapting to changes in the size of power and the proportion of power in the legal power structure in legal life after the 1930s. Performance. In the works of W.N. Hohfeld (1879-1918), the relationship between rights and power is relatively vague, and there is even a tendency to regard power as a part of rights. But this situation is very different when it comes to H. Kelsen (1881-1973). But this situation is very different when it comes to H. Kelsen (1881-1973). Although Kelsen also talked about rights and obligations, he regarded power as the expression of national sovereignty in domestic law, as the power to create and apply legal norms and determine the scope of their effects, and believed that power was the pillar behind the legal order. [[53]] He obviously discusses power as a subject parallel to rights. When it comes to J. Raz (1939-2022), the situation is completely different. His focus on and discussion of power has generally exceeded the intensity of his attention and discussion of rights. In the past, Western legal studies only talked about basic rights, and the reference to basic power was rare, but Raz paid special attention to the concept of basic power. He believes that this concept was proposed by Kelsen, specifically referring to the power to make the constitution for the first time. [[54]] However, Raz's normalization of power into basic powers and other powers and discussing power based on this classification is obviously an attempt to elevate the relative disciplinary status of some powers to rights in order to realize the relationship between power and rights. Assortment of symmetry and balance. In any case, in his works, which mainly focus on the study and analysis of the doctrines of the representative figures of positivist jurisprudence, from Austin, Hohfeld to Kelsen, Raz discusses more about their views on power than on rights. discussion. Moreover, he also strives to distinguish rights and powers as separate and parallel concepts that correspond to duties respectively. [[55]] The last book published by Raz during his lifetime shows that the frequency of his discussion of power obviously exceeds the discussion of rights, and there are chapters dedicated to discussing power, but the word right (right) does not appear in the title of any chapter. In a special chapter titled "normative power," Raz analyzes several types of normative power as the capacity to change normative conditions, the broad normative nature of normatively changing behavior that is not causally induced. Power is distinguished from normative power in a narrow sense. However, this chapter mainly discusses the narrow normative power. He divides normative power into basic normative power and bound normative power. The former is basic and primitive power, referred to as basic power, and the latter is non-basic and determined power, referred to as chained power. . [[56]] However, in Raz's discourse system, "power refers to the ability to effect change or prevent change", so he logically "defines normative power as the ability to change or prevent normative conditions from changing. power". [[57]] His definition of power and normative power is a bit divorced from the legal norms he himself advocated (or the legal rules and legal provisions that other scholars say), and the scope is slightly broad, so it can only be used by Chinese jurisprudence. Refer to it when forming or perfecting your own discourse system.
After the middle of the 20th century, China entered the stage of socialist development, and once implemented relatively simple public ownership of means of production or even "one big and two public" [trans: Mao Zedong's generalization of one of the characteristics of rural people's communes, which refers to the large scale of the people's communes and the high degree of socialist public ownership see here]. Multiple economic components coexist. These all determine that the total amount of power in my country's legal system will be relatively large, and the proportion of power in the legal power structure will be higher than under the capitalist legal system. These should be facts that we can feel everywhere in our daily life, and they are also the "earth atmosphere" that cannot be ignored in contemporary Chinese jurisprudence. In the face of the above situation, avoiding or ignoring power within the academic framework of a century ago is not conducive to the supervision and restriction of power in legal practice, and there are more problems in theory and logic. This point has been discussed above and will not be repeated here.
In any case, power is an objective fact that in contemporary China's constitution-based legal system and legal practice, its theoretical and logical status is parallel to that of rights, and its actual status and economic and political functions are even more prominent than rights. The orientation of the basic research objects and core categories of law should not only adapt to the country's constitution-based legal system, but also help to achieve the relative balance of rights and power.
3. The basis and scope of selection of the core discourse of Chinese legal science
The basis for the formation of the core discourse of the general theory of law should be the constitution-based legal system and its implementation in the country and era in general, that is, the contemporary legal practice of a country. The former should be based on the theory of the latter. reflect. However, the "reflection" of this theory is not a photograph of a country's legal practice, but an image that has been rationally corrected according to the requirements of harmony (including self-consistency) by researchers referring to historical and external conditions. If there is a general consensus on this premise, then we can say that the choice of core discourse in Chinese jurisprudence should mainly be based on the constitution-based contemporary Chinese legal system and the basic content and basic situation in three aspects during its implementation:
1. The recognition and protection of "rights" constitute about half of China's entire legal system. The institutionalization of "rights" in contemporary China is concentrated in the words and clauses of the Constitution on the basic rights of citizens. The provisions and clauses of my country's "Constitution" that protect the basic rights of citizens include: (1) The preamble and general outline of the "Constitution" stipulates the status of citizens, the legal private property of citizens is inviolable, and the protection of private property rights and inheritance rights of citizens , taking into account personal interests, on the basis of developing production, gradually improving the people's material life and cultural life, as well as the regulations on what citizens "have the right" to do, etc. (2) The entire Chapter 2 of the Constitution entitled "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens", from Article 33 to Article 56, contains a total of 24 provisions. Among them, the definition of the word "citizen" in the first paragraph of Article 33 is actually the basic subject of the confirmation of rights. and related obligations that should be fulfilled while enjoying fundamental rights. (3) Chapter 3 of the "Constitution" directly involves individual provisions on the protection of individual rights, such as Article 130 of the "Constitution" on the public trial of cases and the "defendant's right to defense". These structural elements of the constitution are the basis and foundation of the entire legal protection system, including constitution-related laws and civil codes that guarantee various basic rights of citizens, specifically involving the rights, freedoms, legitimate personal privileges and personal immunities of natural persons and legal persons, etc. wide range of aspects.
2. The granting, operation, supervision, and restriction of "power" constitute the other half of China's entire legal system. The institutionalization of "power" in contemporary China is the concentrated expression of the "Constitution" on state power, state agency powers, and limits of authority, including: (1) the "Preamble" and "General Outline" of the "Constitution" for the state, state guiding ideology, The fundamental tasks, the ownership of state power, the nature of the state, the principles of the organization and activities of state institutions, and various other principles that the state should follow are actually stipulations aimed at power. Therefore, the state, the nature of the state, the fundamental tasks of the state, and the principles of the organization and activities of state institutions are correspondingly the principles of power, the nature of power, the fundamental tasks of power, and the principles of organization and activities of institutions exercising power. (2) The general outline of the "Constitution" stipulates what the state and state organs can do, and all the articles from Article 57 to Article 140 of Chapter 3 "National Institutions" of the "Constitution", among which "National Institutions" are the subjects of power The powers and powers of various state organs are the specific forms of power, and the procedures for exercising powers and powers are the procedures for exercising power; (3) Chapter 4 of the "Constitution" stipulates "the national flag, national anthem, national emblem, and the capital", among which The national flag, national anthem, and national emblem are regulations on symbols of power, and the capital is regulations on the location of organs exercising the highest power. These structural elements of the constitution include all the powers affirming, regulating, restricting, supervising powers and their specific manifestations, including the organizational laws of various state organs and the Basic Law of Hong Kong and Macao. The basis and foundation of the legal system, the latter is only the concretization of the former.
3. "Residual rights" are the rights recognized or recognized by the rules of conduct outside the law, such as the often-called moral rights, moral powers, rights recognized by the constitutions of general civil society organizations or the "powers" of their internal organizations, etc. Constitution-making, constitution-interpretation, legislation, law-interpretation, law-enforcing, judiciary and other state organs' behaviors all consider and even determine the rights and powers of laws and their boundaries, and hope to guide its existence and functions. Regardless of law or jurisprudence, they are social existences that cannot be ignored. They appear as the remainder after subtracting the rights or legal rights from "rights", so I call them "residual rights". It is directly an indispensable part of the basic research object of law, but its relationship with the legal system based on the Constitution is indirect, and it is outside the scope of direct adjustment of the legal norm system.
Based on the above three basic facts, following the requirement of any scientific discipline to simplify the basic research object as much as possible while covering all, the general theoretical research of law must distinguish "right" from the corresponding obligation when determining the basic research object And choose "right" as the basic research object, "right" includes statutory "right" and residual right. The "quan" in Chinese social practice so determined by contemporary Chinese jurisprudence is exactly equivalent to the "fact" discussed by A.N. Whitehead in the sense of philosophy of science. The status of various "rights" in contemporary Chinese jurisprudence is just like "huge commodity accumulation" and "single commodity" as "the elemental form of wealth" in Marx's political economy. Therefore, just as "Das Kapital" declares at the end of the first sentence that "our research begins with the analysis of commodities", [[58]] scholars who are engaged in the general theoretical research of Chinese jurisprudence should also confidently explain to readers: Jurisprudence The basic research object is "right", and our research should start from the analysis of "right". "Quantity" as a whole is composed of three phenomena: "right", "power" and "residual right". Its subject status is equivalent to the "commodity" in Marx's "Das Kapital". "Right", "power" and "residual right" are the three forms of existence of "right", and the four basic concepts of jurisprudence referring to them actually exhaust all the contents of a country's interests, contents of property and its internal and external norms All manifestations in the system. Legal power is only a combination of rights and powers, which are the internal elements of power.
Based on the above understanding, the author proposed a basic category system of Chinese legal science consisting of seven concepts of "5+1+1" at the end of the 20th century. Among them, "5" refers to the five concepts of right, power, legal right, residual right, and obligations. [[59]] Their referents can be used as a whole, individually or in combination to exhaust all the interests and properties of China and foreign countries, both modern and ancient. and their performance in all legal and extralegal rules; the first "1" refers to obligations, and its reference objects are negative interests, negative value property and all internal and external symmetry of "right" and its various forms of existence Extra-legal expression; the second "1" refers to law (or law), which refers to the "basket" that carries and distributes all positive and negative interests, property content, and legal and extra-legal expressions of "5+1". [[60]] At that time, Mr. Guo Daohui expressed two views on the above-mentioned issues: first, it is reasonable to define "legal power" as a unity of rights and powers as "statutory power", but it seems too narrow and should be interpreted as "The rights and powers of law"; second, the whole jurisprudence should not be limited to rights, but should also include powers. He agrees and believes that the important position of power category in jurisprudence should be emphasized and specially studied. [[61]] I agree with Mr. Guo's opinion that thinking should not be limited to "rights and powers stipulated by law". question. In this way, jurisprudence has formed a reliable foundation for comprehensive legal analysis of Chinese and foreign interests, property, and their manifestations in the social rule system from both positive and negative aspects.
Therefore, based on historical materialism, the core discourse of contemporary Chinese jurisprudence should be determined within the scope of the above-mentioned six analytical units of fundamental legal phenomena so selected. The reason why rights, powers, legal rights, residual rights and obligations are called basic legal phenomena is that the legal phenomena of the first five units have exhausted the various interests of a country or a society, and then all the legal expressions of various properties, while "obligation" exhausts all the legal manifestations of all kinds of negative interests within the corresponding range, and then all kinds of negative property. [[62]] Divide all basic legal phenomena into units because they are just combinations of different scopes of "rights" and corresponding "obligations". For example, rights are a combination of legal rights and residual rights, and legal rights are Combinations of rights and powers, etc., as well as obligations. This is a technical arrangement for practical jurisprudence to analyze interests and property of all legal phenomena and their interrelationships.
4. Conclusion
The research on basic law in a country is uneven, but the basic law textbooks of higher law schools can reflect its average level. According to this standard, the basic theories of legal science in China today still regard rights or rights and obligations as the basic research object of law, and regard rights and obligations as the core category of law, just like a hundred years ago. It's time for this situation to improve. When talking about economic categories, Marx said: They are only the theoretical expression of the social relations of production, "These concepts and categories, like the relations they express, are not eternal. They are historical and temporary products." [[63]] Therefore, "every principle has its own century. For example, the principle of authority appeared in the 11th century, and the principle of individualism in the 18th century. Therefore, it is not the principle that belongs to the century, but the century to the principle." [[ 64]] The above principles should also be applicable to jurisprudence. Therefore, today we can say that the principle of rights and duties appeared in the 18th century; the 18th and 19th centuries belonged to the principle of rights or rights and duties. In terms of integrity, it is time to bid farewell to and its era of free capitalism. Therefore, in order to modernize Chinese-language jurisprudence and achieve integration with contemporary Chinese legal practice, it is necessary to adjust the understanding of basic research objects, reset the core categories of jurisprudence, and re-express relevant basic propositions. Specifically, contemporary Chinese jurisprudence should complete the following changes.
1. Select "right" as the basic research object, and regard jurisprudence as the study of "rights", so that "power" and residual rights are included in the scope of basic research objects. The concentrated expression of traditional Chinese jurisprudence staying behind in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe and the United States and lagging behind the times lies in structurally ignoring and excluding power from the basic category system. As long as power is included in the scope of the basic research objects of law and placed in a parallel position with rights, the modernization of law will generally solve the premise and basic problems of conducting research. Because, although the internal structure of "quan" is divided into rights, powers, and residual rights, after all, rights and powers are the basic and decisive parts. Contemporary China is different from the most basic situation of other countries before the middle of the 20th century. Its economy is dominated by public ownership of means of production, a variety of economic components coexist, and the state-owned economy is dominant. The political practice associated with this is that powerful public institutions play the leading role. function and implement macro-control in the economic field. Based on the above-mentioned economic and political background, in contemporary Chinese legal practice, power and its main forms of authority, authority, volume of authority, proportion in the total "power", and functions are all before the middle of the 20th century. Countries and even today's Western legal countries cannot compare with it. Relatively speaking, forming and adapting The economic and political background of the period of free capitalism in Europe, America and Japan, and the legal science that was established in the first half of the 20th century with rights or rights and obligations as the basic research object, even if we only look at its form that matches private law and the appearance that lacks the concept of "power", It is far from contemporary Chinese legal practice. Moreover, this general theory of law has long since been abandoned by modern Western and Japanese jurisprudence. No matter how you look at it, contemporary Chinese jurisprudence should not continue to cling to the incompleteness of the old rights or rights and obligations jurisprudence on the positioning of basic research objects. It can be said that by confirming the status of "quan" as a basic legal research object, the modernization of contemporary Chinese jurisprudence will have a theoretical premise and foundation that is compatible with Chinese legal practice.
Positioning modern Chinese jurisprudence as the study of "rights" has multiple meanings, mainly including: that jurisprudence is neither the study of rights nor the study of rights and obligations, but the study of rights, specifically the relationship between rights, power, and residual rights. If the remaining rights are ignored, it can be said that law is the study of rights and power; in essence, law should study how to realize rights and the benefits they embody, the fair distribution of property, and promote the development of rights through the formulation and implementation of legal rules. The knowledge of the maximum preservation and multiplication of the total amount and then the total amount of interests and property. As for the internal proportional structure of the right, it depends on many complex factors such as the historical development stage of the right. Among them, the residual right is not within the scope of the law, but the law needs to solve the boundary, proportion and interaction between the legal right and the residual right. Therefore, the residual right should be the research object of law. There is only one word difference between "the study of power" and "the study of rights" and "the study of power", but the content is fundamentally different: "the study of rights" takes into account and accommodates the latter two, and also takes into account the residual rights, so , "The study of rights" is equivalent to "the study of rights and residual rights" in terms of content and structure. If you want to put aside the residual rights and focus your field of vision within the scope of the law, you can also regard jurisprudence as "the study of rights and powers" or "the study of legal rights". Proposing that jurisprudence is "the study of power" is intended to correct the prejudice of the traditional view of the basic research object of law, which regards jurisprudence as the study of right or the study of rights and obligations, and excludes power structure from the basic research object.
2. Chinese jurisprudence should take legal power, which refers to the unity of rights and powers, as the core category. The formation of its own unique core category is a necessary condition for the general theory of a subject to stand on its own among the general theories. From this point of view, Chinese jurisprudence has not yet produced its own general theory, and Chinese jurisprudence of rights and obligations is only a branch of foreign language jurisprudence of rights and obligations or its extension in China. The academic circles have now put forward the arduous task of building a discourse system of law, which is an important starting point for promoting the progress of law. The most critical issue in the construction of legal discourse system should be to form new core categories to replace or partially replace rights or rights and obligations that have not changed for more than a hundred years. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the author once proposed and demonstrated the existence of the unity of rights and powers, and later named this unity legal rights, forming the conception of the basic category system of Chinese legal science with legal rights as the core. [[65]] As for legal power, the author used to only regard it as a new analytical unit formed based on the grasp of the community of rights and powers, and did not regard it as an institutional entity stipulated by law. Now it seems that there is a lack of understanding here. In fact, legal power as a unity of rights and powers is not only recorded in the Chinese Constitution and legal texts, but also relatively common. The real reason we haven't "seen" the right for so long is that we've been blinded by a veil of ignorance resulting from a lack of study of it.
The direct expression of legal rights in the Chinese Constitution and legal texts is the "Quan" [trans: 权 as an aggregating terms for right, power, authority etc. ] as a single Chinese character noun, and more figuratively speaking, it is the "Quan" written into various legal clauses. For example, Articles 8 and 130 of China's "Constitution" respectively stipulate that "laborers who participate in rural collective economic organizations have the right to operate private plots, private hills, family sidelines, and raise private livestock within the scope prescribed by law", "defendants are entitled to a defense", in which "quan" specifically refers to rights, but it is used in the sense of a community of rights and powers, and is a term that can refer to a community of rights and powers, and specifically refers to the rights that are part of it; the Constitution Articles 65 and 108 respectively stipulate that the National People's Congress "elects and has the power to recall members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress", and local people's governments at and above the county level "has the right to change or abolish their subordinate departments and lower-level people's governments. "Inappropriate decisions", in which "quan" specifically refers to power, but in the name of a noun that can refer to a community of rights and powers, it specifically refers to the power that is part of it. In addition, in Article 3 of the "Criminal Procedure Law", "no organ, group or individual has the right to exercise these powers", the "right" associated with "no" can be described as a typical situation where a single Chinese character noun right is used alone: "Quan" is not only used in the sense of the community of rights and powers, but also the community of rights and powers itself. It is the most intuitive expression of legal rights in legal texts. Because what belongs to the agency is power, and what belongs to the individual is right. The "quan" here is a combination of right and power. However, in the legal texts of the Chinese Constitution, legal rights are often combined with other nouns to form compound nouns, such as the "quan" in personal rights, property rights, legislative powers, and judicial powers. They are actually compound nouns formed by combining nouns such as "personal" and "legislation" with the single Chinese noun "quan". It should also be explained here that the term "legal rights" has appeared repeatedly for more than a hundred years, but in the 21st century, only the concept of "legal rights" used by practical jurisprudence to refer to the unity of rights and powers has been theoretically discussed and logically proved. Clear denotation and substantial content, so there is no confusion with the word legal power that has actually disappeared or originated from mistranslation. Besides, it is the most important and fundamental thing to discover and prove the "entity" of the unity of rights and powers in practical jurisprudence. Although it is not unimportant to give it a "name", it is definitely a relatively secondary aspect. This is just as there are thousands of people with the exact same name, but it is rare to actually cause substantial distress because there are other references besides names to identify them.
3. Jurisprudence establishes the proper subject status of "quan" and "legal power", and will naturally form a general theory of local or national law. For jurisprudence, the Chinese language is generally just a carrier, and jurisprudence written and narrated in Chinese may not necessarily be local and ethnic jurisprudence. The unique genes of local and national jurisprudence can only be generated and transmitted from the core categories abstracted from the basic research objects reasonably selected based on the country's contemporary legal practice. On the other hand, rights and obligations in the contemporary law teaching system, both of which were originally foreign jurisprudential concepts recognized by the legal circle, did not undergo localization and nationalization before they became classic categories in Chinese basic law textbooks. In all fundamental aspects, such as content, subject status, etc., it actually retains the state when it was introduced into Chinese translation at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Take the "rights" upheld by the Chinese law of rights and obligations as an example, what "raw materials" it was originally abstracted from, what kind of "life experience" it has, and what constituent elements or extensions it specifically includes are still to be determined. Matters identified and not given a clear account. Just its denotation has been erratic (for example, it is not sure whether it includes power), which has caused insurmountable obstacles to the normal development of Chinese jurisprudence. A jurisprudence with such an unknown "right" as its core category instead of the word "right" based on Chinese tradition,[[66]] cannot really be the jurisprudence of China's own country and nation.
On the other hand, right and legal right, their etymology, logical path of production, locality, and nationality are all clear, and they have unique advantages that no Western language nouns have in terms of meaning. The concrete manifestation of this advantage is that "quan" makes the community of rights, rights, and residual rights, which is fundamentally a whole, have a Chinese name, and the term can be used to refer to this community and refer to it separately in different contexts. One of the three; "legal power" gives a Chinese name to the rights and powers that are fundamentally a unity, and this term can be used to refer to the unity, and it can also refer to the rights, powers, or their components that constitute it. constituent molecules. Nouns are only the carriers of concepts. "Community of residual rights of rights and powers" and "unity of rights and powers" are only "first" in the method (or absolute method) that Marx used in his political economy to ascend from abstraction to concreteness. road", and reached the logical end before becoming a qualified concept of right and legal right. As a process, "The First Way" clearly demonstrates the connotation and content of the concepts of power and legal power. Therefore, the concepts of right and legal right are unique academic achievements in the understanding of legal phenomena in Chinese jurisprudence, and they can only be translated into Spanish with Chinese as the benchmark and center. [[67]] Japanese needs commentary, but there is no translation problem. Of course, Chinese jurisprudence should treat foreign legal studies and its basic categories with an open attitude at all times. The good things that Chinese jurisprudence lacks but can be imported from abroad must of course be "imported", but once the conditions are ripe, Chinese jurisprudence should create achievements with its own original intellectual property rights to replace them. At the same time, for local and national things, it is necessary to prevent subconscious rejection and negation based on the center of Spanish.
Correspondingly, some basic propositions should be adjusted accordingly with the resetting of the basic research objects and core categories of law. For example, if it is necessary to determine a center, center of gravity, or standard for law, then it should be a formulation that reflects the balance of rights and powers or is based on the community of rights and powers (that is, legal power). In any case, any theory of polarization is untenable. We must fundamentally regard the two poles as the two ends of a whole, and admit that the part between the two ends is fundamental. There is a way out in theory and practice. As another example, some references that deviate from the principle of the rule of law and one-sidedly derogate power and praise rights should be revised. Another example is the one-sided interpretation of legal relationship as the relationship of rights and obligations for more than a hundred years, which should also be replaced by the formulation of the relationship of legal rights. In short, the basic research objects, core categories and the entire category system of Chinese jurisprudence should change with the changes of the things and entities they reflect.
(Editor in charge: Guo Haiqing)
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, The Free Press, 1978, p.39.
[2] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition, University of Chicago Press, 2012, pp.137,139.
[3] Kato Hiroyuki's "New Theory of Human Rights", Tokyo: Taniyama Tower 1882 Edition, pp. 32-81.
[4] [Japanese] Okada Totaro: "General Theory of Law", edited by Xiong Yuanhan, Anhui Law Society, 1911 edition; see Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2013 edition, pp. 73-90; pp. 97-102.
[5] Okamura Division: "General Theory of Law", Hefo Law School Mingfatang 1900 edition, p. 190.
[6] Iijima Qiaohei: "General Theory of Law", Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1905 edition, p. 194.
[7] Oda Wan: "General Theory of Law", Tokyo: Yufei Pavilion, 1902 edition; see Liu Chongyou's translation of "General Theory of Law", Commercial Press, 1913 edition, p. 129. the
[8] In the above aspects, Yamada Miyoshi's discussion is very representative. See Yamada Miyoshi: "General Theory of Law", Meiji University Press, 1919 edition, pp. 203-213.
[9] [Japan] Ume Kenjiro: "General Theory of Law" (Volume 1), edited by Liu Jing, Shanghai Bingwu Society, etc., 1912 edition, pp. 105-186; Oda Wan: "General Theory of Law", Tokyo: Yufeikaku 1902 For the 1913 edition, see "General Theory of Law" translated by Liu Chongyou, The Commercial Press, 1913 edition, pp. 129-193.
[10] Hozumi Chen Zhong: "On the Code", Tokyo: Tokyo Philosophy Academy, 1890 edition, pp. 174-180.
[11] See Sanliang Yamada: "General Theory of Law", Meiji University Press, 1919 edition, pp. 200-203.
[12] [Japan] Okuda Yoshito et al.: "General Theory of Law", edited by Zhang Zhiben, Hubei Legal and Political Editorial House, 1905 edition, pp. 92-94.
[13] [Japanese] Oda Wan: "Introduction to Law", translated by Liu Chongyou, Commercial Press, 1913 edition, pp. 133-135. the
[14] [Japan] Tatsuyoshi Minobe: "Public Law and Private Law", translated by Huang Fengming, Commercial Press, 1941 edition, pp. 109-124.
[15] See Okamura Division: "General Theory of Law", Hefo Law School Mingfatang 1900 edition, pp. 190-266, 363-531.
[16] [Japanese] Ume Kenjiro: "General Theory of Law", edited by Chen Jindi, Shanghai Bingwu Society, etc., 1912 edition, pp. 124-125.
[17] See Okamura Division: "General Theory of Law", Hefo Law School Mingfatang 1900 reprinted edition, pp. 200-201.
[18] Yang Tingdong: "Law", China Book Company, 1908 edition, see pages 3-9, 51-55 respectively.
[[19] Hu Yuqing: "General Theory of Law": Shanghai Pacific Bookstore, 1933 edition, p. 124.
[20] Xia Qin: "General Theory of Law", Zhengzhong Book Company, 1946 edition, see "Xia Qin Legal Works" edited by Feng Yujun and others, Law Press, 2015 edition, p. 156.
[21] Bai Pengfei: "General Theory of Law", Shanghai Minzhi Bookstore, 1928 edition, p. 163.
[22] Ouyang Xi, edited by Guo Weixiu: "General Theory of Law", Shanghai Law Compilation and Compilation House, 1935 edition, p. 241.
[23] He Renqing: "General Theory of Law", 1946 Annual Edition of the Military Press, p. 119.
[24] Meng Sen: "New General Theory of Law" (Commercial Press, 1910 edition), see "Meng Sen's Political and Legal Works and Translation Series (Middle)", Zhonghua Book Company, 2008 edition, pp. 434-444.
[25] Zhu Caizhen: "A General Theory of Modern Law", World Book Company, 1931 edition, page 117 for direct quotations, and pages 116-161 for indirect quotations.
[26] See Ouyang Xi: "General Theory of Law", Shanghai Huiwentang Xinji Bookstore, 1947 edition, pp. 241-294.
[27] Qiu Hanping: "General Theory of Law", Commercial Press, 1937 Edition, pp. 87-116.
[28] Xia Qin, Yu Yi: "General Theory of Law", Chaoyang University Press, 1919 edition, page 110; "General Theory of Law", Chaoyang University Press, 1927 edition, page 101.
[29] Xia Qin, Yu Yi: "General Theory of Law", Chaoyang University Press, 1927 edition, p. 101.
[30] For example, Zhu Caizhen: "General Theory of Law", World Book Company, 1929 edition, pages 171 and 181; Bai Pengfei: "General Theory of Law", Shanghai Minzhi Book Company, 1928 edition, page 164.
[31] Zhu Caizhen: "General Theory of Law", World Book Company, 1929 edition, pages 181-188; Qian Xiangdao: "Questions and Answers on General Theory of Law", Shanghai Sanmin Company, 1930 edition, pages 48-50.
[32] Meng Sen: "New General Theory of Law" (Commercial Press, 1910 edition), see "Meng Sen's Political and Legal Works and Translation Series (Middle)", Zhonghua Book Company, 2008 edition, p. 443.
[33] Qiu Hanping: "Lecture Notes on Jurisprudence of Soochow University Law School", page 5 of the catalog; see also Qiu Hanping: "General Theory of Law", Commercial Press, 1937 edition, pp. 95-116.
[34] Xia Qin, Yu Yi: "General Theory of Law", Chaoyang University Publishing Department, 1919 edition, pp. 39-40; Xia Qin: "General Theory of Law", Zhengzhong Bookstore, 1946 edition, see "Xia Qin's Legal Anthology" edited by Feng Yujun and others ", Law Press, 2015 edition, pp. 120-121.
[35] See Tong Zhiwei: "On the Core Category of Contemporary Chinese Jurisprudence in Change", "Law Review" No. 2, 2020, pp. 7-10.
[36] Xu Xianming: "Stairway to the Progress of Chinese Jurisprudence", "Social Sciences in China", No. 11, 2018, p. 48.
[37] Guo Ye: "Pursuing and Comprehending the Historical Logic of Chinese Jurisprudence", "Legal System and Social Development", Issue 5, 2018, p. 207.
[38] Xu Xianming: "Stairway to the Progress of Chinese Jurisprudence", "Social Sciences in China", No. 11, 2018, p. 48.
[39] Guo Ye: "Pursuing and Comprehending the Historical Logic of Chinese Jurisprudence", "Legal System and Social Development", Issue 5, 2018, pp. 210, 214.
[40] Xu Xianming: "Stairway to the Progress of Chinese Jurisprudence", "Social Sciences in China", No. 11, 2018, p. 48.
[41] Guo Ye: "Pursuing and Comprehending the Historical Logic of Chinese Jurisprudence", "Legal System and Social Development", Issue 5, 2018, p. 211.
[42] Tong Zhiwei: "The Gains and Losses of Legal Standard Research in the First Half of the 20th Century", "Law and Business Studies", Issue 6, 2000, pp. 3-8.
[43] Zhang Wenxian, Yu Ning: "Contemporary Chinese Legal Philosophy Research Paradigm Transformation", "China Legal Science", No. 1, 2001, pp. 74-75.
[44] See the writing group of this book: "Juristry", People's Publishing House, Higher Education Press, 2010 edition, pp. 111-132.
[45] "Marx to P. V. Annenkov", "Selected Works of Marx and Engels", Volume 4, People's Publishing House, 2012 edition, pp. 408-409.
[46] This article uses a ternary classification for all the laws of a country, that is, all laws are divided into private law, public law and fundamental law (constitution).
[47] Article 51 of the "Constitution" stipulates: "When exercising their freedom and rights, citizens of the People's Republic of China must not harm the interests of the state, society, or the collective, or the lawful freedom and rights of other citizens."
[48] See the writing group of this book: "Juristry", People's Publishing House, Higher Education Press, 2010 edition, pp. 111-132.
[49] Diet Relations of the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet, https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_annai.nsf/html/statics/shiryo/dl-constitution.htm, accessed June 12, 2022.
[50] References for this judgment: Akira Morizumi (Kanto Gakuin University): "Law", Yuhikaku 1993 edition; Masaki Ito (Tokyo University) and Kato Ichiro (Tokyo University), etc.: "Introduction to Modern Law", Uhikaku Double Books, 2005 Edition; Suekawa Hiroshi (Kyoto University): "Introduction to Law", Uhikaku Double Books 2014 Supplementary Edition; Tanaka Naruaki (Kyoto University): "Law Introduction", Uhikaku 2016 Edition; Nagai Kazuyuki, Morimitsu ( Chuo University): "Introduction to Law", Chuo Jijisha 2020 edition; Kyoo Hasebe (Waseda University): "Law Science の先発駅", Yuhikaku 2021 edition.
[51] Hiroshi Suekawa (Kyoto University): "Introduction to Law", Uhikaku 1967 edition, the title of Lecture 7; Makoto Ito (lawyer): "Introduction to Law", Japan Review, 2009 edition, Chapter 2, Section 1.
[52] Jiang Shilin and other chief editors: "The Complete Book of World Constitutions", Qingdao Publishing House, 1997 edition, pp. 70-74.
[53] Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg, Harvard University Press, 1945, pp.75, 255-257, 269-272.
[54] I tried my best to search for basic power in Kelsen's writings, but I couldn't find a direct mention. Perhaps he refers to the power or "sovereign power" that formulates what Kelsen called "basic norms".
[55] Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of the Legal System, Oxford University Press, 1980, pp.107-110, 175-182.
[56] Joseph Raz, The Roots of Normativity, edited by Ulrike Heuer, Oxford University Press, 2022, pp.162-178.
[57] Joseph Raz, Normative Powers (revised), Columbia PublicLaw Research Paper No. 14-629 (2019). Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2460.
[58] Karl Marx: "Das Kapital", "Selected Works of Marx and Engels", Volume 5, People's Publishing House, 2009 edition, p. 47.
[59] The corresponding concepts of rights, powers, legal rights, residual rights, and rights are personal obligations, public duties, legal obligations, extrajudicial obligations, and obligations. Since "rights" are positive and form, and obligations are negative and shadows, jurisprudence should retain all five analysis units of "rights", but treat "obligations" as a whole only as one analysis unit.
[60] "Summary of the Symposium on "Where is Jurisprudence Going"", contained in "Legal Research" No. 1, 2000, pp. 156-157. This "summary" was originally compiled by the author, but it was not signed. This citation made necessary edits on the basis of keeping the original text unchanged, and there was a text change: the author used the "quan" that was used stably later to replace the "total power" used in the early years to refer to the same thing.
[61] Note above, p. 157.
[62] See the rights analysis model and obligation analysis model, see Tong Zhiwei: "The Basic Positioning of Various "Rights" in the Theory of Legal Rights", "Academics", No. 2, 2021, pp. 106-125; Updates in Jurisprudence", contained in "Legal Studies", No. 2, 1999, pp. 3-21.
[63] Marx: "The Poverty of Philosophy", contained in "Selected Works of Marx and Engels" (Volume 1), People's Publishing House, 2012 edition, p. 222.
[64] Ibid Note, page 227.
[65] Representative speeches or papers: "Summary of the Symposium on "Where is Jurisprudence Going"", published in "Legal Research", No. 1, 2000, pp. 156-157; Tong Zhiwei: "The Conjecture of the Legal Center" and Proof", contained in "China Legal Science", No. 6, 2001, pp. 15-38.
[66] The former is an extended and complex concept of "rights" that includes power, and "life experience" has yet to be ascertained, while the latter is an extended and simple concept of "rights" that does not include power. For details on the difference between the two "rights", see Tong Zhiwei: "The Concept of Rights in Chinese Jurisprudence", Chinese and Foreign Law, No. 5, 2021, pp. 1246-1265.
[67] Regarding "quan" and "legal power", one of the mainstream publishing organizations in Europe and the United States Brill Academic Publishing House translated it as "quan" and "faquan", see Tong Zhiwei, Right, Power, and Faquanism, trans. Xu Ping, Brill 2018, pp.1-35.
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