The the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) has just released its 2023 Report: From a China strategy to no strategy at all: Exploring the diversity of European approaches. The Report was edited by Bernhard Bartsch and Claudia Wessling. Coordinating institutions included Elcano Royal Institute, Spain; the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), France; and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Germany
It makes for fascinating reading, not as much for its quite valuable dissection of European policy fracture around a common core (roughly the EU's new discursive "re-risking" trope--a phrase that only a European bureaucrat could come to love, but because it serves as a quite accurate mirror of the state of European solidarity. That state of solidarity is itself an important marker for all sorts of European ventures--from its mandatory supply chain due diligence policies, to the way in which it confronts external threat, to the extent that they are capable of putting Europe at least on a par with their own interests. That, in turn, exposes the fundamental problem--the vacuum where a coherent European policy ought to be. That, of course, is the point taken up over the course of this quite valuable Report.
The Executive summary follows. The full report is available online HERE.
Executive Summary: From a China strategy to no strategy at all -
Exploring the diversity of European approaches
Executive Summary compiled by Bernhard Bartsch and Claudia Wessling
Survey: Johannes Kast
Editing: Alexander Davey and John Seaman
In this report, we take stock of national approaches to China across EU members states
and important countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland. Experts
from 24 countries have contributed their analysis, and the MERICS office in Brussels pro-
vided a chapter outlining current EU policies vis-à-vis China. Authors focused on the fol-
lowing guiding questions:
▪ National China strategies: Where do member states and other European countries
stand?
▪ Mechanisms: How do European countries coordinate and share information on Chi-
na?
▪ EU tools: Which national instruments exist for implementation?
▪ Risk analysis: Which approaches do countries take?
▪ Working with China: In which Chinese institutional frameworks do countries partici-
pate?
▪ Spotlight on Taiwan: What activities exist in this contested space?
European approaches to China vary considerably
The year 2023 has brought new momentum to the relationship between Europe and China.
After more than three years of pandemic-related stagnation, mutual visits have picked up
again. European heads of state and government and EU Commission President Ursula von
der Leyen traveled to Beijing; China’s new premier Li Qiang visited Germany and France in
his first overseas trip since taking office. Despite the revival of contacts, numerous factors
continue to burden relations between China and the EU, and other European countries.
Under Xi Jinping, China has changed and become more centralized, authoritarian and
assertive abroad, and its goals are often in contradiction with European interests and val-
ues. Back in 2019, the EU Commission acknowledged this shift by introducing the tripartite
definition of China as a partner for cooperation and negotiation, an economic competitor,
and a systemic rival.
Since then, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have continued their path: China
has become more confrontational in the Taiwan Strait, more repressive in Xinjiang, tight-
ened control over Hong Kong and promoted visions of an alternative international order.
Increasing geopolitical and economic tensions between China and the United States have
put pressure on the European Union to position itself in a complex triangle. The appar-
ent “no limits” friendship with Russia, irrespective of Moscow’s war against Ukraine, has
changed many European countries’ formerly favorable views of China, particularly in cen-
tral and eastern Europe.
On the EU level, a range of mechanisms have been created to counter the increasingly
geopolitical nature of Chinese influence and competitive distortions of markets, industries
and technologies. These include investment screening, an anti-coercion instrument, an
international procurement instrument (IPI), the Global Gateway Initiative and a planned law
package aimed at monitoring and combatting foreign interference (including from China),
as well as industrial policy initiatives such as the EU Chips Act.
Exhibit 1
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen introduced a “de-risking” proposal in March
2023 for navigating dependency risks in relations with China. The concept was also men-
tioned in the European Council conclusions on China after the June summit. Clearly, there
has yet to be full agreement in the EU on how to operationalize “de-risking”, a sign that a
unified European approach to China is still a long way off, even if there is more agreement
today that some sort of strategic thinking on the issue is needed.
European approaches to China – whether by the EU, its member states and other countries
in the region – have changed since the publication of the first ETNC report on “Mapping Eu-
rope-China Relations – A Bottom-up Approach” in 2015. The European Think-tank Network
on China (ETNC) has for many years now analyzed the variations among European coun-
tries’ relations with China on a range of issues, including economic interdependencies, soft
power, the Covid-19 pandemic, political values or the impact of China’s growing rivalry with
the United States (all publications available on the network’s website: https://etnc.info).
The EU institutions can only act with support of member states; at the same time, initiatives
launched by Brussels often set the tone and pace for actions taken in European capitals.
Ten years after Xi Jinping took the helm in China, European countries have become more
aligned on how to deal with this aspiring world power. However, approaches towards China
vary depending on the intensity of relations, the extent and nature of economic dependence
as well as attitudes towards the authoritarian government in China. Some have devised na-
tional China strategies, some prefer a less public, more decentralized approach, others do
not consider China an important issue for their national politics. National approaches and
their evolution in recent years are laid out in the country chapters of this report.
In addition to the chapters, each author completed a survey on the aforementioned guiding
questions. Some questions were non-exclusive with multiple responses possible. For ex-
ample, a country could have both an official, as well as a sectoral China strategy. Further-
more, respondents could choose to skip any question. As a result of this methodological
approach, the number of responses may not match the total number of participants for
each section of the survey.
Moreover, some of the questions were open-ended with some room for interpretation, such
as what counts as an “unofficial” China strategy. Respondents could also indicate if they did
not have enough knowledge or information to answer a specific question. Hence, the lack
of a response does not necessarily imply the lack of a national mechanism or approach.
The following is a summary of the key findings.
Almost all European countries have developed strategic approaches to China
Compared to the situation a decade ago, it can be clearly stated that the discussions on
China in all European countries have matured. Many governments and other stakehold-
ers have developed more sophisticated policies, coordination mechanisms and regulatory
tools with which to approach China. Out of the 24 countries in this report, 20 countries and
the European Union pursue more strategic approaches to China in the sense that they dis-
cuss, analyze and communicate their stances in structured and formalized settings.
Only a minority of European countries has published an official China strategy
Even though exchanges with China have intensified tremendously since the turn of the
century, only six European countries reviewed in this report have cast their approach into
a more formalized China strategy. Norway came in first in 2007, the Netherlands followed
in 2013 and 2019. Sweden also joined the group in 2019, the same year the EU presented
its tripartite “partner, competitor, rival” approach in its Strategic Outlook. Sweden, at the
time, did not speak of a strategy, but a “communication”, stressing that it was following the
EU’s example. Both governments published the strategies on request of their respective
parliaments.
In 2021, Finland’s “Action Plan on China” painted a rather dire picture of the future of
mutual relations. In July 2023, Germany published its first ever China strategy after fierce
discussions within the ruling coalition over its general direction and tone. Outside the EU,
Switzerland’s Federal Council, the country’s highest executive, published the “China Strat-
egy 2021 – 2024”, calling out challenges more explicitly, while insisting on continued en-
gagement.
Experiences with formulating national China strategies have been mixed. On the flipside
were diplomatic pushback from the Chinese side and constant pressure to update strate-
gies in a geopolitical environment that is continuously, and sometimes dramatically chang-
ing. There are good reasons for deciding against a full-fledged strategy, but it appears that
many governments now see the benefits and the necessity of formalizing their approach to
China on some level. On the positive side, authors in this report note gains on transparen-
cy, knowledge development and greater alignment from discussing the issue among wide
groups of stakeholders.
A larger proportion of European countries has China-specific approaches embedded in their
policy frameworks
Among the countries analyzed in this study, nine have relevant frameworks in place or
formulated approaches in differing contexts that are recognized by the respective govern-
ments. But these are not published as official China strategies. The United Kingdom and
Ireland, for instance, outlined their China policies in speeches given by their respective
Foreign Ministers in spring 2023. The Belgian Foreign Ministry has developed a China
strategy this year but has not yet publicly communicated on it. The Austrian government
has announced the development of a China strategy, but with no time frame given and it
remains unclear if it will ever come to fruition.
Others make China policies part of more overarching strategies. In France, China fea-
tures as a topic in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. In Lithuania, it is part of the National Security
Strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy published in 2021 and 2023 respectively. Latvia
includes China policies in the yearly report of the Foreign Minister to parliament. In Spain
it is mentioned in its more recent foreign policy and national security strategies. Denmark’s
most recent foreign policy and security strategy (from 2023) contains some overall strategic
guidance for relations with China, and it specifically refers to the EU as a key coordinator
in handling the challenges from Beijing.
Eight countries in our analysis included approaches to China in their sectoral strategies.
In Norway, the topic features in various policy fields. In the Czech Republic, the export
strategy serves as a backdrop for describing approaches to China, while Greece uses the
Greece-China Tourism Action Plan for this purpose. According to a survey the editors of
this study conducted among the contributing authors, to date, only Bulgaria, Hungary and
Poland are still lacking more coordinated strategic approaches to China.
Developing strategies below the threshold of an all-of-government process is, for some
countries, a reasonable way to formulate goals in their China policies without having to deal
with the sometimes painful and diplomatically controversial process of devising a stand-
alone document.
On the domestic level, political parties in the analyzed countries are only beginning to
include China as a topic in their programs. Several parties in the Czech Republic, Germa-
ny, the Netherlands and Switzerland have published position papers on policies towards
China; in Lithuania, the topic is mentioned in electoral programs. On the EU level, the
center-right European People’s Party and the pro-European Renew group also have for-
mulated their own China strategies.
Better mechanisms for coordination and information sharing on China
Within governments, the level of attention for China-related issues, coordination, steering,
knowledge and mechanisms of information sharing differs considerably between the coun-
tries analyzed in this study. The European Union itself and 11 countries have inter-minis-
terial coordination mechanisms in place. Among them are the Dutch “Interdepartementaal
China Beraad” (ICB) and the “Interdepartementaal Directeurenoverleg China”, the Swedish
“China Network of the Government Offices”, the Finnish “Valtionhallinnon Kiina-verkosto”,
Poland’s “Inter-Ministerial Team for the Coordination of Activities for the Development of the
Strategic Partnership with China”, or Germany’s regular ministerial state secretary rounds.
Eight countries have established official consultation mechanisms between government
and business. For instance, in Germany, the Asia-Pacific Committee on German Business
(APA) regularly convenes meetings on China, bringing together the Economics Ministry
and representatives from five major business associations. In the United Kingdom, there
are various bodies which engage business and government, such as the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI) or the China Britain Business Council. The Czech Republic, Finland,
Spain and Sweden also have business-government formats on China in place.
Coordination on China becomes more challenging if one wants to connect China knowl-
edge on the national and subnational level, as our analysis shows. Only the Netherlands,
Norway and Finland have coordination mechanisms for municipalities. Three countries –
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden – have established national China competence
centers. Their organizational structures are different, but they all have similar purposes:
improving understanding of China, bringing together existing knowledge and responding to
demands from governments on different levels.
EU member states apply defensive tools conceived by Brussels differently
The EU has, in recent years, launched and established several instruments and regulations
that are (not only, but also) aimed at improving capabilities to deal with China’s increasing
economic and geopolitical clout. Among these:
▪ International Procurement Instrument
▪ Anti-foreign Subsidy legislation
▪ Foreign Direct Investment Screening
▪ Anti-coercion Instrument (pending approval)
▪ Anti-forced Labor Instrument (under negotiation)
▪ Chips Act (pending approval)
▪ Critical Raw Materials Act (under negotiation)
▪ Economic Security Strategy
Taking the screening mechanism for foreign direct investment (FDI screening) as an exam-
ple, among the countries analyzed in this report, 16 EU member states have made national
provisions, and four countries are preparing for implementation. Outside of the EU, the
United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland are engaged in parallel processes. For the time
being, Greece and Bulgaria are not yet planning the introduction of similar tools.
In the context of China’s growing strength and ambitions in science, technology and inno-
vation, the EU put forward in 2021 a strategy on cooperation in research and innovation
(“Strategic, open, and reciprocal”). It suggests measures to protect research security and
integrity in member states. The EU and some member states have started developing tools
to better protect their interests, but the process proves to be cumbersome. According to this
analysis, only six countries covered in this report have established regulations or guide-
lines for research institutions – Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. In 2022, the EU published a Staff Working Document on tackling
foreign interference in research and innovation (R&I).
Risk analysis: an approach in the making
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the resulting economic fallout for
European countries dependent on energy supplies from Russia, the issue of dependence
on China has been fiercely discussed in Europe (also covered in the 2022 ETNC report:
https://etnc.info/reports). The Commission’s “de-risking” agenda and the June 2023 frame-
work on a European Economic Security Strategy are aimed at minimizing risks arising
from economic exchanges in geopolitically challenging times. However, only the EU itself,
Finland and the Netherlands have presented systematic and public analyses of dependen-
cies, e.g., in critical raw materials or supplies.
Two countries – Lithuania and Latvia – have compiled internal reports on the issue, four
countries – the Czech Republic, Germany, Norway, and Poland – are working on assess-
ments. Sweden and France have also conducted an analysis. Austria, Greece, and Slova-
kia, on the other hand, do not appear to plan any risk assessments. In Bulgaria, the war in
Ukraine and the overarching risk stemming from chronic dependence on Russian energy
imports and technology are hotly debated. However, this has not resulted in any substan-
tial reviews or policy shifts. For ten countries, no information was available to the experts
compiling this report.
European countries are increasingly wary of participating in Chinese frameworks
In the past decade, China has systematically established its own institutional frameworks
to increase geopolitical and economic influence. One of these frameworks is the 16+1
initiative established in 2012 to engage with Central and Eastern European countries – a
format that was sometimes criticized in the EU as undermining its unity.
After a period of expansion (Greece entered the format in 2019), the group is now down to
“14+1”. Seven countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia) analyzed in this report are part of it, among them, two (Romania, Bulgaria) have
downgraded their participation in the most recent summit meeting in 2021. Two others cov-
ered in this report (Latvia, Lithuania) have withdrawn from the group, while a third (Estonia)
has also withdrawn. While some country representatives mentioned disappointment over
China’s economic engagement in the region as their main motive for dropping out, others
have grown wary of China’s support for Russia and coercive measures for deepening rela-
tions with Taiwan. The future of 14+1 is uncertain.
The Belt and Road Initiative, launched by Xi Jinping in 2013, is the best-known among Chi-
na’s initiatives to go global and create markets, investment opportunities for its companies
but also increase political influence in the participating countries. Ten countries analyzed in
this report have a high-level BRI agreement (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia). Switzerland and Austria entertain so-
called “sectoral” agreements in the BRI context. In the case of Romania, an agreement was
signed during the visit to China of a state secretary in the Ministry of Economy and Com-
merce back in 2015. Since the text is not public, it remains unclear whether it is a general
or a sectoral one.
In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced during her election campaign an inten-
tion of leaving the agreement that Rome signed in 2019 and which will be automatically
renewed next year. Now, her right-wing government seems caught between a rock and a
hard place: on the one hand, there is fierce opposition to withdrawing in the local business
community, which is worried about losing preferential treatment they perceive to enjoy as
BRI members. On the other hand, a competing narrative in Italy attests that other countries
get the same treatment without any MoU. On the international stage, the US and European
partners expect Meloni to deliver on her campaign promise.
A majority of 19 countries participates in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
a multilateral development bank and financial institution to support social and economic
development projects globally. The EU and five other countries covered in this report are
not members (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia).
Approaches to Taiwan: Nonissue for some, increasing contacts for others
While some of the countries analyzed follow China’s expectations and steer clear of en-
tertaining even informal contacts with Taiwan, there is a trend among others for increased
exchanges at the political level. In light of rising military tensions in the Taiwan Strait and
calls from the Xi government for unification, the number of high-level exchanges between
European and Taiwanese politicians has increased recently, with more than a dozen visits
in 2022/23 so far.
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