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I am delighted to circulate a rough discussion draft I have prepared in anticipation of its first presentation at a conference organized by the remarkable Martin Belov, Professor in Constitutional and Comparative Constitutional Law at the University of Sofia ‘St. Kliment Ohridski’, Faculty of Law. The event, Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear: Constitutional and International Law Perspectives, will be held in Sofia, Bulgaria 8-10 November.
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Here is the abstract (it needs to be shortened certainly but provides a perhaps useful synopsis of what is attempted):
Abstract: Constitutions are studied as rational expressions of political calculus aligned in time, space, and place. But constitutional emergence from the womb of conflict are born in emotion—anger, vindication, joy, and faith in a shared future; and they never stray far There is a semiotics of constitutional emotion; and a connection between the semiotics of constitutive emotion and constitutional text—as norm and form. It is the state and profundity of that emotion, perhaps more than the calculus of rational governance, that propels a people to statehood, and statehood to take its particular form. The state of emotion must be maintained, honored, and performed, if it is to carry the state forward from the moment of its emergence, through the long period of time when the founding generation, and their emotional imaginaries are long dead, and the context in which that emotion was felt and understood become incomprehensible outside of its time. It is to the preservation of that emotional explosion, and its alignment with core constitutional text, that constitutions devote time and effort, usually in its preambular text, and sometimes in extraconstitutional documents with quasi-constitutional significance. If powerful enough, the emotive semiotic of constitutional explosion can affect not just its political community but those of other political communities looking for a way to rationalize and direct their own collective political emotion. The focus will be on the way that emotive context—a revolution to preserve traditional values; a communist revolution within a multi-state imperial power; and a revolution with a long fuse grounded in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. To those ends the essay first looks to a powerful instance of emotive semiotics, the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776), and its reflection in the subtextual mimetic dialectics of threat and crisis and resolution in the U.S. federal Constitution (1789). It then considers its value as a template for the constitutionalization of separation in the 21st century through the lens of the preambular texts of the Chinese (1982) and Cuban (2019) constitutions. It then considers its transnationalization in the context of the Kosovo Declaration of Independence (2008). Both express anger driven clusters of emotion with constitutive effect but from very different starting and ending points. For the United States, the traditional form of popular solidarity and independence—grounded in fear, crisis and its resolution—and originating in and through popular action (even if elite directed). For Kosovo, the emerging form (at least for subaltern states)—also grounded in fear, crisis and resolution, but enveloped in a network of expectation and approval from more power and transnational actors.
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Contents:
1. Introduction.
2. American Constitutional Convulsions in the Search for the Structures of a More Perfect Union.
3. The Marxist-Leninist Variations: A Glimpse at China and Cuba and Foreign Corruption.
4. From the State to the Techno-Bureaucratization of Dialectics of Fear and Crisis: A Glimpse at Kosovo.
5. From Template to the Mimetic Constitutionalization of Fear/Crisis.
6. Conclusion.
The draft may be accessed here (SSRN); the Introduction follows below.
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The Constitution of Fear and the Performance of Crisis: The Dialectical Mimetic Semiotics of the Constitutional State and the Signification of Preambular and Extraconstitutional Texts
Larry Catá Backer
W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar; Professor of Law and International Affairs
Pennsylvania State University
239 Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
For book: "Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear: Constitutional and International Law Perspectives"
(Martin Belov, ed.)
Abstract: Constitutions are studied as rational expressions of political calculus aligned in time, space, and place. But constitutional emergence from the womb of conflict are born in emotion—anger, vindication, joy, and faith in a shared future; and they never stray far There is a semiotics of constitutional emotion; and a connection between the semiotics of constitutive emotion and constitutional text—as norm and form. It is the state and profundity of that emotion, perhaps more than the calculus of rational governance, that propels a people to statehood, and statehood to take its particular form. The state of emotion must be maintained, honored, and performed, if it is to carry the state forward from the moment of its emergence, through the long period of time when the founding generation, and their emotional imaginaries are long dead, and the context in which that emotion was felt and understood become incomprehensible outside of its time. It is to the preservation of that emotional explosion, and its alignment with core constitutional text, that constitutions devote time and effort, usually in its preambular text, and sometimes in extraconstitutional documents with quasi-constitutional significance. If powerful enough, the emotive semiotic of constitutional explosion can affect not just its political community but those of other political communities looking for a way to rationalize and direct their own collective political emotion. The focus will be on the way that emotive context—a revolution to preserve traditional values; a communist revolution within a multi-state imperial power; and a revolution with a long fuse grounded in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. To those ends the essay first looks to a powerful instance of emotive semiotics, the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776), and its reflection in the subtextual mimetic dialectics of threat and crisis and resolution in the U.S. federal Constitution (1789). It then considers its value as a template for the constitutionalization of separation in the 21st century through the lens of the preambular texts of the Chinese (1982) and Cuban (2019) constitutions. It then considers its transnationalization in the context of the Kosovo Declaration of Independence (2008). Both express anger driven clusters of emotion with constitutive effect but from very different starting and ending points. For the United States, the traditional form of popular solidarity and independence—grounded in fear, crisis and its resolution—and originating in and through popular action (even if elite directed). For Kosovo, the emerging form (at least for subaltern states)—also grounded in fear, crisis and resolution, but enveloped in a network of expectation and approval from more power and transnational actors.
Contents:
1. Introduction.
2. American Constitutional Convulsions in the Search for the Structures of a More Perfect Union.
3. The Marxist-Leninist Variations: A Glimpse at China and Cuba and Foreign Corruption.
4. From the State to the Techno-Bureaucratization of Dialectics of Fear and Crisis: A Glimpse at Kosovo.
5. From Template to the Mimetic Constitutionalization of Fear/Crisis.
6. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
Fear has returned to the constitutional state.[1] Or rather, a state of dread for the constitutional state, one “forced to it,- forced by dread causes.”[2] Forced, or compelled in the Sophoclean sense, by the very nature of the constitutional state; the liberal constitution as the textual expression of a constant state of fear.[3] The etymology of fear speaks to its connection to risk—the fear that comes with a n event, process, choice or condition that may portend calamity, sudden danger or attack. It is the fear of things going wrong or of never having been gotten right. Its psychology is now well captured by the resurrection of the more ancient use of the term in the form of the fear spell of gaming: the projection of the image of an object’s worst fear that causes the object to flee,[4] constitutionally speaking. Though it doesn’t last long; its terror, the fear of the actualization of the manifestation of fear, lingers; always. What is cast once, can be cast again, and again. “’constitution of fear’ is not a one-off occurrence. Quite the contrary. It crowns the politics of resentment. It becomes its manifesto.”[5] And it serves as an object lesson; there is indeed something worth fearing; in contemporary times the Soviet Union serves as the constitutional scary story par excellence—both for liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninist systems; [6] for those with longer memories, the Kaiserreich.[7]
At the start of the 21st century fear, the dread if what might be, was manifested in its old monsters. At their core were questions that generated interest within the debates about the viability and essential character of liberal democracy at least with respect to its interactions with organized (and perhaps disorganized) religion.[8] Today that fear has taken a more foundational turn. It is a fear of constitutional entropy in its sense of a gradual (or perhaps precipitous) decline into disorder.[9] One encounters, in modern form, the insights of Abd al Rachman ibn Khaldun respecting the inevitability of the dissipation of group solidarity (‘assabiyah) across time.[10] In its modern forms it has touched on all constituted systems,[11] and states.[12]
Does a crisis of the constitutional state follow? We appear to be in the age of constitutional crisis. The intelligentsia has been curating the notion in interesting ways,[13] and in its more elaborate forms, from its academic leading forces.[14] And not just the state is reconceived in the imaginaries of crisis.[15] The lifeworld of that crisis requires the cultivation of fear, and especially the fear that the inhabitants of the structures built through constitutional text are ready to leave the building.[16]. Fear is the soil in which constitutional crisis can be cultured, nourished, and eventually harvested. That cultivation is also an essential element of the dialectic of constitutional systems, especially that between the theory of the constitutional object and the fulfillment of its intent (assuming a consensus around the meaning of that notion) in fact. “It is a longstanding theme of critical literature on American politics that the system of government of the United States is an eighteenth century edifice which has serious difficulties in coming to grips with the challenges of the twentieth century.”[17]
The word crisis is itself richly semiotic. Beyond its fairly straightforward contemporary usage crisis points to its richer etymological sub-text.[18] Its origins are embedded in judgment of a specific kind—of the determination in the decisive point of the course of disease at which change must come, for better or worse. More literally crisis signifies a point of judgment (from its Proto-Indo-European root *krei), a point that separates or distinguishes between was possible before and what was likely after. Fear may be found at that point of separation. Crisis, then, objectifies a course of events at specific temporal points, which it then signifies (going back/going forward/going sideways/going up or down), and which then imbues that signification with meaning (success/failure/good/bad). The essence of crisis is also entropic in the sense that the indeterminacy of systemic rules as a function of its application inevitably opens systems (this generates the constancy of fear) to points of signification that may change the character of a system from what was (conceived or experienced) to what will be.[19]
Constitutional crisis, and its imaginaries of fear, add a particular quality to this semiosis. Crisis is the interpretation (judgement) of the signification (the principles and assumptions embedded in the constitution) of an object (the constitution itself). When one speaks to the imaginaries of constitutional crisis, then, one speaks to the semiotics of instability, of a deviation, from the expectations and trajectories that are supposed to affirm that the system is working “correctly.” One also speaks to the temporalities of that crisis—one that changes character from the moment of constitutional inception through the moment of constitutional disintegration. In this sense, then, what is permanent is a state of constitutional crisis;[20] what Mao Zedong described as continuous revolution,[21] in contradistinction to Leon Trotsky’s more objective based concept of permanent revolution,[22] reformulated for consumption beyond the narrow lens of Marxist-Leninist theory. What is mutable is the constitution itself as a function of the dread around which crisis is manifested and response produced.
Constitutions, however, are more likely studied as rational expressions of political calculus aligned in time, space, and place. One understands reason here in its more ancient sense—as an explanation or justification adapting action (constitution) to ends (government), but also in its contemporary sense as an understanding with universal validity.[23] That rationality has been parsed in a variety of different ways, each perhaps a better reflection of their starting point than of the constitutional end point. One might speak to constitutions as contracts for the organization of a political collective as property in the hands of their members.[24] Conversely, one might invert this ordering premise to speak to constitutions as contracts for the organization of social relations against the apparatus of government.[25] One can speak to the constitution of sovereignty, or of the sovereign constitution, as if these objects were either inevitable or immutable. And hovering over all of this is what has become the constitutional incantation par excellence in this century—the dialectical relationship and mutual constitution of incantation of the middle of rule of law and constitution.[26]
To speak of constitutional rationality, then, is to engage in the process of constitutional rationalization in the sense of justification. The former implies an innate quality of constitutions; the later an effort to invest that quality in constitutions. Both express the impulse toward perfection—in the sense of the Christian doctrine of justification,[27] but to different ends. That rationalization—our constitutions—express, perform, signify and fulfill the premises of the political-economic model to which it gives expression, a phenomenological expression in acts of faith in the perfection rationalized within that political-economic model. In this sense, constitutional rationality has its own psychology—as a phenomena of the mind. One does not speak of psychology as a science but rather as an application of the philosophy of solidarity—of the construction of orthodoxy and deviance, and of the development of structures for the privileging of the one and the suppression (or cure) of the other. Psychology in this sense is the rationalization of a phenomenology of orthodoxy built on the mimetics of behaviors that are themselves not just dialectical (and thus intersubjective) but also managed within strictly its bell curves.[28] What is natural about constitutions, then, from this perspective are its bell curves which are themselves the manifestation of its ordering premises in the actions and structures that reaffirm their value.
Constitutions, observed from their rear-ends, are well positioned to be presumed rational expressions of the unstoppable urge of humans toward the rational—especially when it comes to their highest order social relations;[29]a rational phenomenology in the style of Husserl.[30] But constitutions are not ordinarily “made” in an antiseptic political laboratory; constitutions are not conceived and drafted in themselves; constitutions are not fabricated dispassionately as a product of rational thought detached from the context in which they appear—much as one might want to theorize that possibility. Since the seventeenth century, certainly, many constitutional orders have emerged from out of the womb of conflict.[31] They are born from fear and crisis in the passion of circumstances that made it possible to constitute a nation, a state, and its apparatus, and also to tear it apart[32]—anger, vindication, joy, and faith in a shared future must be cultivated, and so cultivated, they must be transposed into the normative and institutional text around which the state is organized.
The term “emotion” is understood in its classical sense—as a moving, or stirring or agitation, “from Old French emouvoir "stir up" (12c.), from Latin emovere "move out, remove, agitate."[33] The agitator, of course, is fear and crisis. The agitation implies emotional rather than physical movement—a state of agitation, and it adds a psychological layer to the psychology of constitutional rationality. It also implies a movement that is not necessarily tied to a direction or form—emotion stirs up feeling; and emotion may in turn be stirred up in the process of constitutional conception, gestation, and birth. And it continues to stir during the course of the “life” of a constitutional order until it is overturned and the process begins again. Between inception and abandonment lies preservation. In Freudian terms emotion may be understood as the manifestation of the id to the superego of the rationalization that produces the ego of the constitutional text. In Jungian terms, perhaps, one dives into the subconscious of collective solidarity which is as solid as the life of the generations called on (trained to) its orthodoxies and invested in its fears. And its drivers—fear of an in crisis.
Fear and crisis define the heart of the constitutional compulsion that both defines the constitution as object and that signifies its structures and processes: compulsion; challenge; agitation; reform/protection; orthodoxy; heresy; abandonment—rinse and repeat. It would follow that constitutional emotion, its agitation, is distilled so that it might survive the moment of its realization. as the foundational premises, the way of looking at the world and the course of events that led to constitutional emergence, that are then elaborated in constitutional text, or in text that inform constitutional frameworks. Those fundamental premises are not lost in the process of constitutional crafting, neither are the emotional states in which they are forged. Transposition and preservation provide the ground on which constitutions are developed and their normative structures cultivated.
It is the state and profundity of the emotional state of constitution (fear and crisis), and its response (preservation through iterative mimetic repetition of action within its structures), perhaps more than the calculus of rational governance, that propels a people to statehood, and statehood to take its particular form, and compels mutation (even in the face of unchanging text) of that state as one generation gives way to another. . The state of emotion must be maintained, honored, and performed, if it is to carry the state forward from the moment of its emergence, through the long period of time when the founding generation, and their emotional imaginaries are long dead, and the context in which that emotion was felt and understood become incomprehensible outside of its time.
It is to the preservation of that emotional explosion, and its alignment with core constitutional text, that constitutions devote time and effort, usually in its preambular text, and sometimes in extraconstitutional documents with quasi-constitutional significance. If powerful enough, the emotive semiotic of constitutional explosion can affect not just its political community but those of other political communities looking for a way to rationalize and direct their own collective political emotion. This relational framing suggests a semiotics of constitutional emotion; and a connection between the semiotics of constitutive emotion and constitutional text—as norm and form.[34] This semiotics is built on constitutional emotion as an object (the preambular materials), as the signification of the quality of “objectivity” (the text of these objects as an ordering system), and as a signified object that elaborates a way of understanding and applying the signified object (the constitutional text itself).
Where does that lead one? This contribution examines a powerful instances of emotive semiotics shaping collective constitutional meaning making through a semiotic lens. The focus will be on the way that emotive context—a revolution to preserve traditional values; a communist revolution within a multi-state imperial power; and a revolution with a long fuse grounded in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. To those ends the essay first looks to a powerful instance of emotive semiotics, the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776), and its reflection in the subtextual mimetic dialectics of threat and crisis and resolution in the U.S. federal Constitution (1789). It then considers its value as a template for the constitutionalization of separation in the 21st century through the lens of the preambular texts of the Chinese (1982) and Cuban (2019) constitutions. It then considers its transnationalization in the context of the Kosovo Declaration of Independence (2008). Both express anger driven clusters of emotion with constitutive effect but from very different starting and ending points. For the United States, the traditional form of popular solidarity and independence—grounded in fear, crisis and its resolution—and originating in and through popular action (even if elite directed). For Kosovo, the emerging form (at least for subaltern states)—also grounded in fear, crisis and resolution, but enveloped in a network of expectation and approval from more power and transnational actors. Each expresses anger driven clusters of emotion with constitutive effect but from very different starting and ending points. For the United States, the traditional form of popular solidarity and independence—grounded in fear, crisis and its resolution—and originating in and through popular action (even if elite directed). For Cuba and China, variations on liberation from foreign domination and toward an embrace of a radically different framing of the perception of politics and its social relations. For Kosovo, the emerging form (at least for subaltern states) embedded in a hierarchically constituted set of principles of transnational constitutionalism[35]—also grounded in fear, crisis and resolution, but enveloped in a network of expectation and approval from more power and transnational actors.[36]
The contribution is organized as follows. First a brief theoretical introduction to the manifestation of a semiotics of constitutional emotion. Second, a deeper analysis of the signification of preambular and extraconstitutional text as memory and as an intensification of direction with respect to constitutional framing and interpretation through the lens of the American revolutionary experience. Third, a consideration of that experience in the context of the Marxist-Leninist and liberation movements in China and Cuba producing related but distinct ordering frameworks. Fourth, a consideration of these three distinct expressions of constitutional fear-threat structures within memories of the triumph of a revolutionary moment of separation, in the context of a revolutionary experience which is effectively detached in part from those undergoing revolutionary crisis. The contribution ends with an examination of the effects of what unites and separates these experiences as a phenomenology of dynamic mimetic dialectics. The focus will be on the way that the emotive context fuels fear and directs crisis in very different constitutional contexts —a revolution to preserve traditional values; a communist revolution within a multi-state imperial power; a revolution with a long fuse grounded in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism; and an ethno-religious defensive rebellion within a larger imperial post-modern project.
[1] Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, A Constitution of fear, Verfassongsblog (16 November 2017); available [], last accessed 15 September 2024 (“The new brand of constitutionalism on the rise in Poland is defined by a „constitution of fear”. Fear is the leitmotif of the constitution-making process defined by suspicion, exclusion, drive for retribution and settling the scores.” Ibid.).
[2] Sophocles, Electra (R.C. Jebb (trans) (410 BC)) available [http://classics.mit.edu/Sophocles/electra.html] last accessed 30 September 2024.
[3] Frederick Schauer, ‘The Constitution of Fear’ (1995) 353 Constitutional Commentary 203-206.
[4] Fear, DND 5th Edition Community Wiki, available [https://dnd5e.wikidot.com/spell:fear] last accessed 29 September 2024.
[5] Koncewicz, A Constitution of fear, supra.
[6] Robert Sharlet, Soviet Constitutional Crisis (NY: Routledge 2016); Kunal Sharma, ‘What China Learned from the Collapse of the USSR,’ The Diplomat (& Dec. 2021); available [https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/what-china-learned-from-the-collapse-of-the-ussr/], last accessed 21 September 2024.
[7] Mark Hewitson, ‘The Kaiserreich in Question: Constitutional Crisis in Germany Before the First World War,’ (2001) 73 The Journal of Modern History
[8] Larry Catá Backer, ‘The Crisis of Secular Liberalism and the Constitutional State in Comparative Perspective: Religion, Rule of Law, and Democratic Organization of Religion Privileging States,’ (2015) 48 Cornell International Law Journal 51-104
[9] Cf., Alexander V. Mantzaris & George‑Rafael Domenikos, ’ Exploring the entropic nature of political polarization through its formulation as an isolated thermodynamic system,’ (2013) 13 Nature Portfolio 4419; available [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-31585-w] last accessed 21 September 2024; .
[10] Abd al Rachman ibn Khaldun, The Muquaddimah: An Introduction to History (Franz Rosenthal (trans) NJ Dawood (ed); Princeton University Press, 2015 (1377)).
[11] Parag Khanna, ‘The Coming Entropy of Our World Order: How Do We Reconcile an Increasingly Fractured Order With an Increasingly Planetary Reality?,’ Noema (7 May 2024), available [https://www.noemamag.com/the-coming-entropy-of-our-world-order/], last accessed 20 September 2024; Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,’ The Atlantic (February 1994), pp. 44-76; available [https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/], last accessed 20 September 2024.
[12] Armin von Bogdandy and Pál Sonnevend, Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area (Oxford: Hart, 215);
[13] Jack M. Balkin, ‘Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot,’ (2017) 77 Maryland Law Review 147 (constitutional crisis defined as the point where “the Constitution is about to fail in its central task” ibid); Keith E. Whittington, ‘Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?,’ (2001) 43 William & Mary Law Review 2093 (distinguishing between crises of operation and of fidelity);
[15] W. Michael Reisman, ‘The Constitutional Crisis of the United Nations,’ (1993) 87(1) American Journal of International Law 83-100.
[16] Louis M. Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief (OUP, 1996).
[17] Philip Cerny, ‘Political Entropy and American decline (1989) 18(1) Millenium: Journal of International Studies 47-63, 47.
[18] Etymology Online, crisis, available [https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=crisis] last accessed 30 September 2024.
[19] Cf., Ted Sichelman, ‘Quantifying Legal Entropy,’ (2021) 9 Frontiers in Physics [https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2021.665054 ] last accessed 23 September 2024.
[20] Arthur S. Miller, ‘Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm,’ (1978) 39 Ohio State Law Journal
[21] Stuart R. Schram, ‘Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution, 1958–69,’ (1971) 46 The China Quarterly 221-244.
[22] Nikolai Bukharin, ‘The Thery of Permanent Revolution,’ (1925) 5(10) Communist Review reprinted in Marxists.org website; available [https://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1924/permanent-revolution/index.htm] last accessed 23 September 2024.
[23] Etymology Online reason, available [https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=reason] last accessed 29 September 2024.
[24] John O. McGinnis, ‘The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective’ (1997) 21 Harvard Journal Law & Public Policy 195-209; Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England’ (1989) 49 Journal of Economic History 803-837..
[25] Mark F. Grady and Michael T. McGuire, ‘The Nature of Constitutions’ (1999) 1 Journal of Bioeconomics 227-240.
[27] Romans 3:23-25.
[28] For a revealing but controversial exposure, see Richard J. Herrenstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (NY: Free Press, 1994).
[29] Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William Rehg (trans), Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
[30] Konstantinos Kavoulakos, ‘On Jürgen Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms,’ (1999) 096 Radical Philosophy 33-41; available [https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/constitutional-state-and-democracy] last accessed 19 September 2024) (“Thus, beside the ʻinstrumental rationalizationʼ of the systems, we have a ʻcommunicative rationalizationʼ of the so-called ʻlifeworldʼ (Lebenswelt) – that is, the world-images, moral beliefs, and fundamental institutions that govern social life.” Ibid., p. 33)
[31] Chris Thornhill, ‘Constitutional Law and Cultures of Violence,’ (2024) 49(2) Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 34-64.
[32] Michael F. Conklin, The Constitutional Origens of the American Civil War (CUP, 2019).
[33] Etymology Online, ‘emotion’ available [https://www.etymonline.com/word/emotion], last accessed 30 September 2024.
[34] Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Two Letters to Lady Welby,’ in Jan M. Broekman and Larry Catá Backer (Eds.) Signs in Law—A Source Book (The Semiotics of Law in Legal Education III) (Dordrecht Springer, 2015), pp. 95-116.
[35] Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Londen: Bloomsbury, 2004); Nicholas Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (CUP, 2009).
[36] Larry Catá Backer, ‘God(s) Over Constitution:
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