GANHRI Statement (8 May 2024): "Business and Human Rights: The Role and Experiences of NHRI's"

 

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For those who may have missed this, οn 8 May 2024, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) from all regions gathered in Geneva for the Annual Conference of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), on the role and experiences of NHRIs in addressing Business and Human Rights (BHR), at which they adopted the GANHRI Statement (8 May 2024): Business and Human Rights: The Role and Experiences of NHRI's. The text of the 2024 GANHRI Statement follows below. 

National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) have been recognized at the international level as actors for the promotion and protection of human rights since 1946. Throughout the next three decades the United Nations and some of its affiliated organizations prepared a series of reports on the feasibility of national institutions as instruments for protection and promotion of human rights. These reports culminated in the UN International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, held in Paris in 1991. The workshop led to the drafting of guiding principles – popularly known as the “Paris Principles” [Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles)] – that were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993.

When NHRIs met in Tunis for their second international workshop, they decided to establish the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), previously known as the International Coordinating Committee of institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (ICC). Since then, the UN General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions calling for the strengthening of NHRIs. (GANHRI, 'Who We').

The 2024 GANHRI Statement continues the traditional policy trajectories of the organization: (1) urging States to adopt and transpose  key human rights instruments; 82) furthering the project of legalizing the corporate responsibility to respect human rights through public law and policy based compliance measures; (3) extending the breadth of human rights to include sustainability issues (¶¶18-22);  (4) adding their voices to an elite consensus that the UNGP's "smart mix of measures" means public law driven compliance administered through States (¶¶28-29; 31) and driven by international institutions and their secretariats (including NHRI, ¶¶ 12-14); (5) developing and firming the consensus that human rights due diligence now occupies the central core of the structures of corporate responsibility (see esp. ¶ 11); and (6) engaging more thoroughly in the debates about the human rights impacts of big data tech (¶¶ 23-27).  

The GANHRI Statement is particularly useful as a measure of the way in which human rights elites within international and national institutional structures have chosen to read and to apply the insights and principle of the UNGP. Within that collective, these appear to become the current consensus view of group meaning making around the central orthodoxies of public power and the subordination of markets and autonomous individual choices to institutionalized administrative techno-politics. This is an outcome that is plausibly connected to the idea of and in the UNGP. Its expression through liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist  lenses will bear watching. Even within the legalization camp, there is still a substantial space for variation in approaches, sensibilities, premises, and applications.

The English language text of the 2024 GANHRI Statement and the Paris Principles follows.

Marco Fasciglione, 'Impresa e diritti umani nel diritto internazionale Teoria e prassi' [Business and Human Rights in International Law: Theory and Practice] (Giappichelli, 2024)

 

 

For those who read Italian and are interested in issues of business and human rights as these notions are been developing in Europe recently,  Marco Fasciglione's marvelous Impresa e diritti umani nel diritto internazionale Teoria e prassi [Business and Human Rights in International Law: Theory and Practice] (Giappichelli, 2024) might be a great interest.  It is well worth a read for its rich analysis.

The Preface is reproduced below in the original and in a crude English translation. The work may be accessed HERE.

Useful Resources from the Future of Life Institute (FLI): "The AI Act Explorer"

 

 

For those of you interested in exploring the EU's new Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act, the  Future of Life Institute (FLI): "The AI Act Explorer" may prove helpful. It is based, for the moment on the full Final Draft of the Artificial Intelligence Act as of 19 April 2024 including the AI Act's 13 critical Annexes. The Act and Annexes run 458 pages in its English version--for the 19 April text in other languages see here. Also available are a collection of all of the official AI Act document.

One of the great ironies of the EU Act is that it is so long and technical that it may require big data tech, and perhaps generative intelligence, in order to effectively understand and apply its provisions. It has, in this way, effectively de-humanized the critical human element which was among the core objectives of the Act in the first place.  But then mimesis is a critical characteristic of this field, even as those busy working on coding, application, and attaching all of this to text (the only thing left of the project of humanization it may seem) sometimes forget. For a longer discussion of the theory around why this constrict and its irony may be inevitable at this stage see 'The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Person, and the “Human” Condition', International Journal for the Semiotics of Law. 

In any case the AI Act is here, and compliance, conformity and contestation are all necessary and potential next steps. --and contestation--for which this resource may be helpful. 

Bricolage: 习近平主席在十四届全国人大一次会议闭幕会上的重要讲话让海外华侨华人信心倍增 [President Xi Jinping’s important speech at the closing session of the 14th National People’s Congress has doubled the confidence of overseas Chinese] and 犹太利益集团势力庞大 美国无底线盲撑以色列 [The Jewish interest groups are powerful and the United States blindly supports Israel without any bottom line]

 

 Diaspora communities are sometimes an essential element of creating community and developing lines of communication, cultural connections, and solidarity between States and their diasporas. It has been an important matter of State policy in many places (e.g., Vanessa Bravo & Maria De Moya, 'Communicating the Homeland's Relationship with Its Diaspora Community: The Cases of El Salvador and Colombia,' (2015) 10 Hague J. Dipl. 70 (2015).  China has also been careful about cultivating relationships with its diaspora communities. This is viewed as a positive obligation measured by the support of diaspora communities for the aspirations of countries of origin (Carsten Schäfer, Research Report: China's diaspora policy under Xi Jinping: Content, limits and challenges, SWP Research Paper, No. 10/2022). "President Xi Jinping has on many occasions stressed the importance of overseas Chinese in the country's reform and opening-up and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." (Xi's remarks on importance of overseas Chinese, China Daily 2023).  Xi Jinping's 2023 speech reported widely perhaps best summarizes the current position:

On March 13 [2023], the first session of the 14th National People's Congress concluded at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, President of the State, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, delivered an important speech at the closing meeting. Adhering to the people's position, strengthening historical confidence, demonstrating mission responsibility, and guiding the way forward, President Xi Jinping's important speech has doubled the confidence of overseas Chinese overseas. They all said that the grand goal of building a strong country and rejuvenating the nation is inspiring. Chinese sons and daughters overseas must pool their wisdom and strength, give full play to their advantages overseas, serve as bridges between China and other countries in the world, and contribute to the comprehensive construction of society. We will build a modern socialist country and comprehensively promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. * * * "As Chinese sons and daughters overseas, we must practice our best to become friendly envoys of people-to-people diplomacy." Zhang Jian, president of the Overseas Chinese Association of Zambia, said that overseas Chinese are an important group that represents China's image overseas and should actively participate in local society and economy. Construction, strive to expand channels and platforms for exchanges and cooperation between China and foreign countries, use the inclusive wisdom and pattern of Chinese civilization to serve as a bridge between China and the world, deliver positive energy to world peace and development, and contribute to the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind. 


3月13日，第十四届全国人民代表大会第一次会议在北京人民大会堂闭幕。中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平在闭幕会上发表重要讲话。坚守人民立场、坚定历史自信、彰显使命担当、指引前进方向，习近平主席重要讲话让身在海外的华侨华人信心倍增。他们纷纷表示，强国建设、民族复兴的宏伟目标催人奋进，海外中华儿女要凝聚智慧和力量，充分发挥身在海外的优势，做好中国与世界各国之间的桥梁纽带，为书写全面建设社会主义现代化国家、全面推进中华民族伟大复兴的绚丽篇章添砖加瓦、增光添彩。* * * “作为身在海外的中华儿女，我们要身体力行成为民间外交的友好使者。”赞比亚华侨华人总会会长张键说，华侨华人是海外代表中国形象的一个重要群体，应积极参与当地社会和经济建设，努力拓展中外交流合作渠道和平台，以中华文明兼容并蓄的智慧和格局，做好中国与世界沟通的桥梁，为世界和平发展传递正能量，为推动构建人类命运共同体贡献力量。(习近平主席在十四届全国人大一次会议闭幕会上的重要讲话让海外华侨华人信心倍增 HERE (Xinhua))

Xi Zhongxun  provided the link between investment, patriotism and overseas Chinese in the early days of the Period of Reform and Opening up:

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In the early days of reform and opening up, overseas Chinese came to Guangdong for inspection. At a foreign economic and trade conference, Xi Zhongxun said bluntly: "Now, people say that when you come to invest in the motherland, the first thing is to be patriotic, and the second thing is to make money. This is wrong. In fact, you The first is to make money, and the second is to be patriotic. If you don’t make money, why do you love your country?” Those overseas Chinese laughed: “Secretary Xi is right, of course we are patriotic when we invest, but if we don’t make money, who will.” Comrade Xi Jinping also proposed the principle of "three benefits" for overseas Chinese affairs in 1995. This win-win concept is of the same origin. 改革开放初期，华侨来广东考察，在一次外经贸会议上，习仲勋直率地说：“现在，人们都说你们来祖国投资，第一是爱国，第二才是赚钱。此话不对，你们实际上第一是赚钱，第二才是爱国，不赚钱你们爱什么国。”那些华侨就笑了：“习书记讲得对，我们来投资，当然有爱国心，但是不赚钱，谁来呀。”习近平同志在1995年也提出了侨务工作“三有利”的原则，这种共赢的理念是一脉相承的。(习近平总书记关于侨务工作的重要论述之实践与理论渊源探析 [An analysis of the practical and theoretical origins of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important exposition on overseas Chinese affairs ](2021)).

These are insights later developed in interesting ways under the leadership of Xi Jinping: "The overseas Chinese all over the world are an important bridge between China and the world. An important innovation in Xi Jinping’s discussion on overseas Chinese affairs is to attach importance to the role of overseas Chinese in promoting the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind and promoting the construction of the “Belt and Road”." [遍布世界的华侨华人是中国与世界沟通联系的重要桥梁。习近平侨务工作论述的重要创新，就是重视华侨华人在推动构建人类命运共同体、推进“一带一路”建设中的作用。] (习近平总书记关于侨务工作的重要论述之实践与理论渊源探析 [An analysis of the practical and theoretical origins of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important exposition on overseas Chinese affairs ](2021)).

It was thus with great interest that one approaches a recent article that appeared in Ta Kun Pao (大公报 ):  犹太利益集团势力庞大 美国无底线盲撑以色列 [The Jewish interest groups are powerful and the United States blindly supports Israel without any bottom line], the text of which follows in the original and a crude English translation.  Its inconsistency with the broad insights of promoting the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind might be worth considering. Unless, of course, both the conditions of overseas Chinese and "Jews" differ in some way. Yet the reconciliation of the insights of Socialist Internationalism of the New Era and this application appear hard to reconcile in theory.  Unless ideologically the Jews are now to play a distinctly curious role in the further evolution of Chinese Marxist Leninism (see eg HERE), one that appears to align more with the USSR in the 1950s than China in its New Era (eg here).  But that cannot be right in the shadow of New Era Socialist Internationalism core principles. 

Still notions of bricolage may suggest a curious interpenetration of ideas that may be based on a strategic misreading of Marx's "On the Jewish Question" (see eg here; others have also curiously grappled with its bits and pieces eg here, but which ought to be read in its own historical context, e.g here helpful framing), aligned with the domestic strategic imperatives of the anti-beliefs in ghosts and gods campaign (信鬼神 [Belief in Ghosts and Gods]: 官员信鬼神患的是“精神缺钙”病 [Officials who believe in ghosts and gods are suffering from "mental calcium deficiency" disease]), and the even more strategic tilt toward influence in the MENA region (Choosing Sides, Socialist Internationalism, and the Ideological Signification of China's Jewish Problem in the International Arena: "Wang Yi Holds Talks with the Delegation of Arab-Islamic Foreign Ministers" ("These two discursive tropes--the Jew as the post-modern objectification of the foreign-fascist-feudal oppressors, on the one hand, and the Jew as compulsory wanderer, the predicate exemplar of a semiotics of progressive dialectical overcoming toward perfection--now appear to be usefully conflated as a Chinese Marxist "solution" to the Jewish problem in MENA").  

One cannot say with certainty how any of this is connected in meaningful ways to Socialist Internationalism, at least in its ideal state; but the bricolage is there ("We find what works (resonates and seduces), and hang it on our walls or sit it on our floor; and then, when something new comes along, or when what we’re doing stalls, we rearrange it." (Here; Derrida on bricolage here)). And its current configurations ought to give thoughtful Chinese Leninist at least some pause especially where the insights lead not to a community with a shared future for mankind but rather to the sensibilities of the liberal elites in late 19th century Europe before its Marxist enlightenment (from a Chinese perspective).

2024年“最美职工” [2024's Best Workers] and other Interventions in the New Era Project of "继续把改革推向前进 " [Continuing to Push Forward Reform]

 

Pix Credit here: 2024's Best Workers here

The latest issue of Qiushi 《求是》(10th Issue 2024, 15 May 2024) is built around productivity and production in the New Era. That is, it is meant to underscore the changed characteristics of developing productive forces in the New Era. That movement is understood as one that deepens the prior Reform and Opening Up Era's focus on economic productive forces  to one that understands everything and every one as a productive force that must be harnessed to push forward the task of modernization. That modernization, of course, is not an object in itself, but as is sometimes overlooked, merely a step (and important one to be sure) in the inescapable obligation of the vanguard Chinese Communist Party to lead  the nation toward the establishment of a communist society. In the absence of that directed movement, the authority of the CPC vanishes along with the central ordering element of the Socialist Path.  

That, anyway, is the  theory.  And it is a theory that is underscored in its own way and for the present stage of historical development in the lead article around which the rest of the issue revolves: 习近平《全面深化改革开放，为中国式现代化持续注入强劲动力》[Xi Jinping, 'Comprehensively deepen reform and opening up, and continuously inject strong momentum into China's modernization]. Nonethless, the issue is particulatly interesting for the way it seeks to recall the central theme of the prior era of Chinese development--the Era of Reform and Opening Up--and to draw on its language and imagery even as the character and quality of Reform adapts in substantial ways to the realities of the New Era of historical development. Still the recycling of the old language to new ends is quite fascinating. 

As the introduction to the issue [本期导读] puts it:

本刊配发了学习习近平总书记重要文章的编辑部文章《继续把改革推向前进》。围绕学习宣传贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想和习近平总书记重要文章精神，本期刊发了穆虹的文章，对深入学习领会习近平总书记关于全面深化改革的重要论述作出阐释；中共国家发展改革委党组的文章，对进一步全面深化经济体制改革、以高质量发展推进中国式现代化作出阐释。铁凝的文章，学习贯彻习近平总书记在文艺工作座谈会上的重要讲话精神，阐释新时代文艺繁荣发展的必由之路。吴汉圣的文章，对努力推进基层治理体系和治理能力现代化作出阐释。田培炎的文章，对学习贯彻《中国共产党纪律处分条例》、做学纪知纪明纪守纪的模范作出阐释。巨力的文章，回顾60年前中法建交这一历史性决定，阐释中法建交和中法关系的深远历史启示。姜辉的文章，学习贯彻习近平文化思想、阐述重庆加快打造新时代文化强市的实践探索。中国航空工业集团有限公司党组的文章，阐述以航空报国之志建设航空强国。新华社记者的文章，讲述粤港澳大湾区勇立潮头、破浪先行的生动实践。国家统计局发布了经济社会发展统计图表：2024年一季度全国规模以上文化及相关产业企业相关指标情况。

This issue is accompanied by an editorial article "Continue to Push Forward Reform" on studying General Secretary Xi Jinping's important articles. Focusing on studying, publicizing and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important articles, this issue publishes Mu Hong's article, which explains the in-depth study and understanding of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important expositions on comprehensively deepening reform; the article of the Party Group of the National Development and Reform Commission of the Communist Party of China explains the further comprehensive deepening of economic system reform and the promotion of Chinese-style modernization with high-quality development. Tie Ning's article studies and implements the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech at the symposium on literary and artistic work, and explains the only way for the prosperity and development of literature and art in the new era. Wu Hansheng's article explains the efforts to promote the modernization of grassroots governance systems and governance capabilities. Tian Peiyan's article explains the study and implementation of the "Regulations on Disciplinary Actions of the Communist Party of China" and being a model of learning, knowing, and abiding by discipline. Ju Li's article reviews the historic decision of establishing diplomatic relations between China and France 60 years ago, and explains the profound historical enlightenment of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France and China-France relations. Jiang Hui's article studies and implements Xi Jinping's cultural thoughts and expounds Chongqing's practical exploration of accelerating the creation of a cultural power in the new era. The article of the Party Leadership Group of China Aviation Industry Corporation Limited expounds on building an aviation power with the ambition of serving the country through aviation. The article of Xinhua News Agency reporters tells the vivid practice of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area standing at the forefront and breaking the waves. The National Bureau of Statistics released a statistical chart of economic and social development: the relevant indicators of cultural and related industries enterprises above a certain scale in the first quarter of 2024.

The articles are quite interesting for the light they shine on the continuous evolution of emphasis within the arc of Socialist New Era development of all productive forces. 

Every movement, though, must have its incarnation. That is every conceptual construct along the Socialist Path requires a visualization of individuals who embody the spirit of the ruling ideology and its contemporary expression. In this case, that embodiment must be manifested in the bodies of ideal workers whose physical bodies serve as a container for the essence of the spirit of all around  development of productive forces--they represent the ideal worker. They are heroic model figures--（英模人物）.And this issue ends with the recognition of the individuals chosen to represent the possibility of attaining that ideal within the key areas of production at the heart of New Era modernization.  These are stories to be emulated, and against which individual effort may be assessed.

The table of contents follow below, along with Opening Editorial, and the announcement of the 2024 Best Workers on the occasion of the "May 1" International Labor Day, as announced by the Central Propaganda Department and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

Cognitive Cloaks, Complicity, and the Art of Engaging with Warfare Without Engaging in War: Norwegian Pension Fund Global Excludes Weichai Power Co Ltd [China] , Adani Ports & Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ) [India], and L3Harris Technologies Inc [US]

 

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Our friends at the Norwegian Pension Fund Global's Ethics Council have been busy in their usual manner.  Norges Bank announced on 15 May that it would adopt the Ethics Council Recommendation of three companies. 

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The issue is war, and the focus is on the capacity to make war--at least the facilitation of that capacity--and the instances when that can be triggered. The specific focus is on feeding the military apparatus of Russia and Myanmar, and contributing to the capacity to build nuclear weapons. The effective focus is on the continued development of the facility and complicity concepts to manage warmaking capacity without, exactly, formally appearing to become involved in those conflicts.  The Pension Fund Global has been steadily building its variation of a "jurisprudence, or a cognitive framework, for complicity and facilitation (eg here and here; and at its edges here), which, given their influence and their position within European elite networks, will be expected to leak out through the pathways of European technocracies, governmental and academic, and elsewhere but perhaps not always in the service of the specific set of political objectives  (here). The issue of complicity and facilitation remains important and its development essential for the construction of emerging systems of duty, responsibility, and management. 

But it may not be the most interesting aspects of thiese actions by the Norway Pension Fund apparatus. 

It is a neat trick.  But that deployment and capacity of law is ancient--the development of law to construct legal fictions  made "real" by the authority of law to pronounce it so. The effect is to artifice reality in ways that, for the community of believers (in law and in power to make perception real), can produce a faith, backed by the power of the state, in the meaning of a "thing" or a "condition" or a "status" because the community wills it so--and can suppress or ignore dissenting views. In a sense the Norwegian Pension Fund Global's apparatus, provides a glimpse into the power and utility of law not to mask, but to recast, the way in which perception and action is understood, interpreted, and from out of which authoritative reactions may be supported. 

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This is, effectively cognitive law.  It is the power of a community to construct and then to order, the intangible. These can be intangible objects or things: corporations, states and other forms of human collectives or communities. They can also be manifested as status: marriage, gender, citizenship, rights, and the like. And in this case, it can objectify the cluster of actions that might manifest engaging or not engaging in conflict, at its more violent ends--in combat. Thus the cognitive elements of the premises, conceits, and protections of "law", "policy" and the like to constitute and manage the interpretation of acts around intangible characterizations of actions or inactions, constitute one of the most fascinating features of law--its cognitive effects. While its application in these cases are of a rather common sort--its implication for the newer terrains of the management of cognition may be quite consequential--for descriptive and predictive analytics, for the inductive reasoning of generative intelligence, and for the application of big data tech to, in this case, the determination of the forms and means of projecting "rights" power in conflict, that is of engaging with war--without "appearing" (as a matter of the power of strategic law supported cognitive cloaking) to be engaging in war. Historically, at least during the era of modernity, there has been a high tolerance for this when it has been convenient to the principal drivers of specific conflict. It appears to remain convenient, for the moment, in these sets of conflicts. Its expansion or application elsewhere may prove to be inconvenient.

The Press Release explained:

1. Weichai Power Co Ltd  [a Chinese company] has been excluded from investment by the GPFG due to an unacceptable risk that the company is contributing to the sale of weapons or military materiel to states that are subject to investment restrictions on government bonds. The Council considers that there is an unacceptable risk that the company is contributing to the sale of military materiel to the authorities in Russia and Belarus. [The company "produces engines and power trains for heavy vehicles" ; see Section 3.2 of the Ethics Council Recommendation]. The Council's recommendation may be accessed HERE (https://etikkradet.no/weichai-power-co-ltd-2/

2. Adani Ports & Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ) [an Indian company] be excluded from investment by the GPFG due to an unacceptable risk that the company is contributing to serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict. APSEZ is an Indian logistics company that engages, among other things, in the operation of ports and port services. APSEZ is part of the Adani group of companies. As per the Council’s recommendation, APSEZ has been under observation since March 2022 due to its business association with the armed forces in Myanmar. The Council's Recommendation may be accessed HERE (https://etikkradet.no/adani-ports-special-economic-zone-ltd-4/

3. L3Harris Technologies Inc [headquartered in the US] has been excluded from investment by the GPFG due to the company’s production of key components for nuclear weapons.  [The company manufactures missiles and motors for missiles that can carry nuclear weapons, in this case those of the United States and its allies]; see Section 4 of the Ethics Council Recommendation]. The Council’s Recommendation may be accessed HERE (https://etikkradet.no/l3harris-technologies-inc-2/

L3Harris and Weichai are linked nicely because of the way that each is used to continue to develop a mapping (and line drawing) for materials and activities that might be included in facilitation or complicity analysis. In the case of the US company, it was the manufacture of missiles and motors; in the case of the Chinese company it was engines and power trains. The standard, for the moment, appears to be an "especially for military purposes" standard ("These are vehicles built especially for military purposes and must therefore be considered to constitute military materiel." Weichai Recommendation, p. 4); and a "constitutes a critical part of" standard (ibid,, p. 5). The application in both cases appears unproblematic. On the other hand, development of a more precise single standard standard (eg an "exclusively for" or a "primarily for" or a "possible use by" standard) might be worth considering. The current standard is somewhat elastic, and elasticity may create too large a space for the serendipitous application of administrative judgment.

Of the three, the Adani Ports Recommendation may be the most interesting in terms of the work of the Ethics Council. Adani had captured the attention of the Pension Fund apparatus for some time. It has been placed under observation in 2022 respecting the operation of a port in Myanmar that conflicted with the political objectives of Norway to facilitate the instability and eventual collapse of the military government now in control of that State. I note that there is no judgment here and such a position aligns with that of many States; the interesting part is the way in which the concept of facilitation has been used to rationalize and operationalize the policy goal through the mechanics of State investment vehicles. This time, however the issue was not facilitation but cooperation. Adani claimed the offending operations had been sold in May 2023. however, that sale remains wrapped in mystery. 

No information on the buyer is available, and APSEZ has stated that it cannot share any such information on the grounds of confidentiality. The Council attaches importance to the fact that the company has failed to help shed light on the matter, that no other information is to be found about the company that is said to have acquired APSEZ’s operations in Myanmar, and that APSEZ’s auditor did not have sufficient information to assess whether the sale to Solar Energy was a transaction between related parties. (Adani Recommendation, Summary, detail ibid., p. 7).

The transparency issue here did not relate to issues of general transparency but to quite specific transparency that called into question the internal systems of the company: Adani's "auditor did not have
sufficient information to assess whether the sale to Solar Energy and certain other transactions were between related parties. " (Ibid., p 8). No surprises here. There is a bit of a warning here: where (especially non-OECD) States begin to take the position that certain information constitutes state secrets or are vital to national security and create a distinctive cognitive legality that treats information as a State asset, compliance may become harder. This can spill over into related legal frameworks, for example the EU's Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive).

The Council Recommendations follow below with links. It remains useful for Norway to cloak its engagement in warfare around the artifice of engaging with the operational mechanisms of its facilitation. For the moment.

 

Essays on Climate Change and Public Law--French Yearbook of Public Law (Issue 1, 2023)

The French Yearbook of Public Law describes itself this way:

The objective of the “French Yearbook of Public Law” is to narrow the gap which has tended to develop between the French and the international debate on public law. The former remains too often isolated from the latter, for various reasons, ranging from the conviction of the French model’s exemplary nature to an insufficient openness of French public lawyers to the international academic language, which English has undoubtedly become nowadays. This has two serious consequences. On the one hand French lawyers might often be unaware of developments in other legal systems, and on the other hand foreign lawyers face serious difficulties to follow French legal developments.

For its first issue the FRPL includes a very intriguing set of essays on Climate Change and Public Law, with a great introduction by Jean-Bernard Auby (Emeritus Public Law Professor, Sciences Po Paris) and Laurent Fonbaustier (Public Law Professor, Université Paris-Saclay).

The Issue may be accessed HERE. The Introductory essay on the Climate Change Sossier and the Table of Contents follow below

The Principal Contradiction (主要矛盾) of Internationalism and the Chinese Path: 为迷茫的世界注入希望，为人类的进步探索方向（和音）[Inject hope into the confused world and explore the direction for human progress (Harmony)]

 

Pic Credit here (Roy Lichtenstein 1964)

 

Most people, if pressed, might confess a definitive preference for hope in a confused world--even for hope in a world a little less confused than one might speculate in darker moments. Liberal democracy has been injecting hope into the global community since the middle of the last century; now from the Marxist-Leninist camp comes hope in a  reworked formula.

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It is with that in mind that one might most usefully approach a quite interesting essay published prominently in the People's Daily  in the wake of Xi Jinping's recent visit to various European states. That essay, 为迷茫的世界注入希望，为人类的进步探索方向（和音）[Inject hope into the confused world and explore the direction for human progress (Harmony)]. To some extent it represents a refinement of and an effort to popularize (that is to develop a narrative for the masses, domestic and international) of the New Era Socialist Internationalism. The timing was meant to capitalize on popular interest in the latest travel of Xi Jinping: "透过习近平主席此次欧洲之行，世界再次看到中国维护世界和平、促进共同发展的大国担当    [Through President Xi Jinping’s trip to Europe, the world has once again seen China’s responsibility as a major country in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development] (为迷茫的世界注入希望，为人类的进步探索方向（和音）).

The narrative turn is anchored on several key premises wrapped in a rhetoric that underscores key terms with signification in international, Marxist-Leninist, and liberal democratic ways of organizing and making meaningful the world(s) around them. They are meant to be trans-cognitive--shared words/different signification. The object is to inject Chinese wisdom into a global situation which, under the leadership of the liberal democratic vanguard, has produced chaos (乱象), creating major challenges (重大挑战) that have brought the world to a critical turning point (关键转折点). The resulting hot issues (热点问题) have become too complex and difficult (复杂难) under the current vanguard leadership bringing European peace and security issues to a crossroad (欧洲和平安全走到十字路口). "Confusion and anxiety have generally increased and China is expected to provide Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to resolve the crisis and achieve peace." [迷茫和焦虑情绪普遍上升, 期待中国为解决危机、实现和平提供中国智慧、中国方案。] (为迷茫的世界注入希望，为人类的进步探索方向（和音）). 

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The torch of hope, following this discursive river, must be handed off from one old vanguard, to another better suited for leadership in the current stage of global historical development. "Becoming a beacon of development and progress in the world and increasingly playing an important leadership role in international affairs" "China is an important and positive force in the world's multi-polar structure"成为世界发展与进步的灯塔，在国际事务中日益发挥重要领导作用”“中国是世界多极化格局中的重要和积极力量” (Ibid.). These were views were especially embraced by China's European friends with whom the visit produced stronger bonds, among them the current leadership in Serbia and Hungary. The basis of hope under the vision of a new global vanguard consists of three critical points.

Pix credit here Roy Lichtenstein 1962 (Masterpiece)

1. "China advocates an equal and orderly world multipolarity, emphasizing the equality of all countries, large and small, and earnestly promotes the democratization of international relations to ensure that the multipolarization process is generally stable and constructive "[中方倡导平等有序的世界多极化，强调大小国家一律平等，切实推进国际关系的民主化，确保多极化进程总体稳定和具有建设性。]. (Ibid).

2.  "Today's world is shaped by economic globalization, and protectionism cannot change the general trend of economic globalization. China and Europe jointly insist on tearing down walls instead of building them, opening up without isolating, and integrating without decoupling, which will help create a better tomorrow for the world economy" [当今世界是经济全球化塑造的世界，保护主义改变不了经济全球化大势。中欧共同坚持拆墙而不筑墙、开放而不隔绝、融合而不脱钩，有助于开创世界经济更加美好的明天。] (Ibid.).

3.  On the issues of Ukraine and the Hams-Israel war, and more generally "On issues related to peace and stability, China has always stood on the right side of history, on the side of peace and justice, and on the commanding heights of international morality. China has been widely recognized and highly praised by the international community, and has become a mainstay in promoting international peace and stability" [在攸关和平与稳定的问题上，中国始终站在历史正确一边，站在和平正义一边，站在国际道义制高点，得到国际社会的广泛认同和高度评价，成为促进国际和平与稳定的中流砥柱。] (Ibid).

These suggest not merely the core of China's vision, but also the central premises on which this vision is to be advanced. They are best read on two simultaneously operating cognitive tracks: the first is as a positive statement of the Chinese vision; the second is as a deep criticism of the current vision; every word includes both a positive (what one is) and a negative (what one is not) statement. In the process one acquires a better sense of both the Chinese vision and the Chinese understanding of the world into which China seeks to project that vision as something different.  Principal among the anchoring points are a strong aversion to chaos and instability (except perhaps as part of a revolutionary process going in the correct direction), the privileging of development as the core human rights, the primacy of collective rights, duties and obligations, and the value of an ordering structure in which  every state occupies the center of its own universe, arranged in categories of ascending clusters of prominence, strength, and power. The conceptual universe in which the vision of Socialist internationalism emerges is structured around these critical terms that serve as the skeleton of this vision in this New Era, at least least at this stage of its historical development: chaos (乱象); major challenges (重大挑战); hot issues (热点问题); critical turning point (关键转折点); crossroads (十字路口). This, in effect, is the projection of the fundamental structures of the dialectics of contradiction into the international sphere (foundation, Mao Zedong, 'On Contradiction').  And in the New Era, the principal contradiction is "between the ever-growing needs of the people for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development." 

In short, the Communist Party of China’s understanding of the principal contradictions in our society has constantly kept pace with the times and the specific changes in our country’s national conditions. The process of the Party’s continuous deepening of its understanding of the principal contradictions in our society marks our Party’s understanding of the development of human society. The understanding of the laws and laws of socialist construction has reached a new level, which is a new development of the Marxist theory of contradiction and the sinicization of Marxism. [总之，中国共产党对我国社会主要矛盾的认识是随着时代发展和我国国情的具体变化而不断与时俱进的，党对我国社会主要矛盾认识不断深化的过程，标志着我们党对人类社会发展规律、对社会主义建设规律的认识达到了一个新境界，是马克思主义矛盾学说的新发展，也是马克思主义中国化的新发展。] (韩振峰中国共产党对我国社会主要矛盾的认识过程 [Han Zhenfeng,The process of the Communist Party of China’s understanding of the principal contradictions in our society])

It is only a small step to the internationalization of contradiction and to Socialist internationalism, which is also the dialectics of the movements of cognitive foundations from one set of ordering premises (liberal democracy) to another (Marxist-Leninist). That, at any rate, is the theory; and from that theory to the cognitive power of ideological frameworks (if constructed well enough).

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also the fundamental law of thought. It stands opposed to the metaphysical world outlook. It represents a great revolution in the history of human knowledge. According to dialectical materialism, contradiction is present in all processes of objectively existing things and of subjective thought and permeates all these processes from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction." (Mao Zedong, 'On Contradiction')

Pix credit here; Roy Lichtenstein "Drowning Girl" 1963

 The full essay on the original Chinese and in an English translation follows below.

 

Cold War Style Cognitive Warfare: "Deepening the Response to Authoritarian Information Operations in Latin America"/"Contrarrestar las operaciones de información de actores autoritarios en Latinoamérica"

 

It is possible to identify three areas of current interest in relation to the control of cognition to advance the interests and aspiration of ideologically driven human collectives. The first is cognitive control of enemy populations connected to "hot wars" (eg here). The second touches on the curation of cognition at its edges by focusing on interpretation and behavior rather than on the foundations of cognitive pathways (eg here, and here). The third focuses cognitive control of target populations of competitor or target states (and other collectives) connected to "cold war." This last is the subject of a set of interesting essays just published as "Deepening  the Response to Authoritarian Information Operations in Latin America" and in Spanish "Contrarrestar las operaciones de información de actores autoritarios en Latinoamérica."

These control objectives exist on several levels and have been understood in a variety of ways. For example at a fairly benign level they have been referred to as narrative wars, seeking power to manage a "master narrative" within or between human collectives of every sort. In its more ancient (now tech enhanced) and generalized form it pointed to efforts at shaping the imaginaries or lifeworlds of target populations so that, having gained control of the way a target population sees and understands the world around them--makes sense of the world through a process of interpretation grounded in foundational premises about things, processes and "truths." In the context of orderly management within collectives it is sometimes understood, in a more micro-behavior environment, as the control and discovery of mis- mal- and dis-information (especially strong in the context of pandemic since 2019). What these areas of interest struggle with is ways to theorize a critical distinction, one between (1) collective cognitive development as it evolves along with its way of understanding the world--a natural though sometimes violently controlled process within social collectives however organized, and (2) technologies or actions that undermine that process of self development by projecting in the foreign in ways that contain a substantial element of deception. That deception, in turn can focus on the source of inward projection, the strategic leveraging of data (whether true or false as those things are understood), and the simulation of collective engagement. This is to be distinguished from, for example, transparent projections of views into one collective from another. At a very basic level the modalities of that deception focus on the much discussed strategies of mal-, mis- and dis-information.  But at the level of cognitive warfare (or battles for cognitive control) its focus is on the way in which a collective identifies, receives and processes this information in ways that are more likely to lead to conclusions and actions that align with the interest of the projecting power. 

Pix Credit here, p. 18

What "Deepening  the Response to Authoritarian Information Operations in Latin America"/ "Contrarrestar las operaciones de información de actores autoritarios en Latinoamérica" attempts is to understand those strategic maneuverings in the context of cold war--where oppositional or competitive forces act strategically to undermine their opponents and to take territory or relationships form one to another in ways that may be more permanent.  It represents a way of end running the governing apparatus and its administrative-intellectual complex by rewiring mass cognition out from under them. And thus, for the essays, the worry about the stability of liberal democracy in Latin America.  

 Authoritarian governments are escalating their efforts to manipulate the information ecosystem globally in order to undermine democratic institutions, advance their own interests, and buttress their autocratic allies In Latin America, where there has been significant democratic backsliding in recent years, malign information operations backed by the Russian government and sometimes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) draw on well-worn narratives of Western imperialism to attack democracy These narratives are carried by a Russian-built communications infrastructure which floods news wires, television  programming, social media platforms, and other channels with made-for-export material that aims to make authoritarian systems and their repressive leaders appear desirable. Amid the deluge, work by civil society-led initiatives to secure the integrity of the information space in Latin America is intensifying. Current efforts mostly focus on innovations in fact-checking efforts and reinvigorating broken models of independent journalism however, the essays in this report, by two leading experts on Latin America’s information environment, suggest that these efforts may not be enough to counter intensifying uthoritarian efforts to manipulate information spaces to their benefit. In confronting increased collaboration by global authoritarian actors and their regional allies, the development of diverse civil society-led coalitions and new skill sets focused on highlighting and countering authoritarian influence is critical.

 Los gobiernos autoritarios intensifican sus esfuerzos para manipular el ecosistema informativo en todo el mundo con el fin de promover sus propios intereses, apoyar a sus aliados autocráticos y socavar las instituciones democráticas En América Latina, en donde se han registrado importantes retrocesos democráticos en los últimos años, las operaciones de información perniciosas respaldadas por el gobierno ruso y, en ocasiones, por el Partido Comunista de China (PCC), recurren a trillados mensajes sobre el imperialismo occidental para atacar la democracia Estas narrativas se transmiten mediante una infraestructura de comunicaciones de Rusia que inunda los cables de noticias, los programas de televisión, las plataformas de redes sociales y otros canales con material producido para la exportación a efectos de hacer que los sistemas autoritarios y sus líderes represivos parezcan deseable. En medio de este diluvio se intensifican las iniciativas lideradas por la sociedad civil para garantizar la integridad del espacio informativo de América Latina Las acciones actuales se centran sobre todo en la comprobación de datos innovadora y en la revitalización de modelos quebrados de periodismo independiente No obstante, los ensayos de este informe, realizados por dos destacadas especialistas para combatir los esfuerzos cada vez más ingentes que realizan los agentes autoritarios para manipular los espacios de información en
su beneficio. A fin de hacer frente a la creciente colaboración entre los actores autoritarios globales y sus aliados regionales es fundamental desarrollar coaliciones diversas, lideradas por la sociedad civil, así como nuevos conjuntos de habilidades dirigidas a resaltar y contrarrestar la influencia autoritaria

One wonders, though, whether the worry should go deeper. Collective cognitive lifeworlds and imaginaries, at least in the current stage of historical development, do not appear to maintain themselves.  Just as they may be altered by strategically successful interventions from outside, they might also require a substantial amount of work to protect from the inside. The current approach appears to be defensive and targeted against modalities of inward projection. It might be as useful to also consider the active cultivation of solidarity and stability protective internal measures to ensure the autonomy and coherence of a cognitive system. That requires, of course, an understanding of that system's core imaginaries--premises, ways of looking at the world and the like--and a focus on those rather than particular applications of that cognitive baseline from time to time. Old systems were better able to protect their cognitive cores when they were up to it through systemic reinforcement of core principles (rather than micro applications). But these systems did not operate nor where they created under conditions of digitalization, and open borders in which a measure of interpenetration is now cognitively good (from the bottom up, for example), as well as bad (from one control apparatus to another for strategic ends). Where the focus is on protection against episodic mis-, dis- and mal-informaiton, the larger threat is missed. These considerations are embedded in the marvelous essays that are included, but from the starting point of symptoms. This is a critically important contribution to a wider and more long term challenge for all collective cognitive systems in an age that rewards difference  but rewards the management and utilization of difference toward strategic ends more.

The Introduction to the essays follows below. 

The Fall of Sugar and the Management of Misery In Cuba

 

In 1969 Fidel Castro called on Cubans to join in bringing in the sugar harvest. The harvest was measured in the millions of tons--much of it slated for export to the Soviet Union at premium prices. Americans, some now prominent, engaged in solidarity with the Cuban Revolution by going to Cuba to help with the harvests. It was a heady time for youngsters and ideologues committed to a vision of an idealized communist state , something that many sought to export, along with sugar, back to the heart of what Mr Castro referred to as the Empire. 

But for decades, the industry has been in decline. While the island regularly produced more than 7 million tonnes in the 1980s, last season — squeezed by new “maximum pressure” United States sanctions — it yielded only 480,000 tonnes. This year, the target is even lower as Cuba heads for its worst sugar harvest in more than a century.  Once we were the country that exported the most sugar,” Dionis Perez, director of communications at Azcuba, the state agency that regulates sugar production, told Al Jazeera.  But “this is the first year that Cuba doesn’t plan to export more sugar than it consumes”. (here)

That was 2023.  It turns out that 2024 is going to be worse. Marc Frank now reports a sugar harvest so small that there may not be enough sugar to produce Cuban Rum, among the few reliable money making exports for a state whose economic system has entombed Cuba's productive forces. 

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The Cuban sugar harvest is winding down at the lowest tonnage since 1900, forcing the government to import and putting more pressure on its domestic rum, soft drink and pharmaceutical industries, according to official reports, two economists and a rum industry source. President Miguel Diaz-Canel said at the end of April that the state-run industry had produced 71% of the 412,000 metric tons planned, or just shy of 300,000 metric tons, and would mill into May. Cuba produced 350,000 metric tons in the last harvest and while some sugar mills remain open, yields drop sharply in May as hot, humid weather sets in, accompanied by summer rains. “This means we will have to import and, of course, less sugar means there is less syrup and alcohol for various industries and, of course, rum,” said Cuban economist Omar Everleny. The communist-run Caribbean island nation was once the world’s top sugar exporter, and produced 8 million metric tons of raw sugar in 1989, before the collapse of its former benefactor, the Soviet Union, sparked a steady decline. (Cuba may import sugar, rum industry pressed amid disastrous harvest)

It may well be time to call on the current generation of American youth to volunteer their labor. But there is no sugarcane to harvest. And soon, there may be no rum to drink. The only thing that is left are the ideals of a political economic model, reaffirmed less than a decade ago, that is increasingly detached from the realities of Cuban life. What is left is a political economic model that continues to exist at the sufferance of those states with an interest in its preservation , and is fueled by the extraordinary success of a pragmatic policy of controlled misery (here, here, and here).